Presidential Change In France

May 15, 2007

No. 16

Presidential Change in France: Implications for Franco-Israeli Relations Uzi Eilam In the wake of his impressive electoral victory, President-elect Nicholas Sarkozy of France will now face the challenge of keeping his campaign promises to carry out reform at home and to elaborate a new foreign policy. In his victory speech, Sarkozy stressed the importance he attaches to the European Union but also reached out, once again, to the United States. Israel was not specifically mentioned in that speech, but the Middle East, in general, and Israel, in particular, are known to be on Sarkozy’s agenda. Franco-Israeli relations have undergone many upheavals in the past. The high point was the “Golden Age” of the 1950s, when France was Israel’s main ally and weapons supplier. The low point came after the Six-Day War of 1967, during the presidency of Charles de Gaulle, when France imposed an almost complete arms embargo and pushed Israel into the arms of the United States. Sarkozy’s election has now raised expectations of a dramatic improvement in relations between the two countries; many in Israel have taken note of Sarkozy’s Jewish roots (his Jewish grandfather immigrated to France from Greece). However, while some improvement is indeed likely to happen, that hardly means that the new President will adopt a blatantly pro-Israel posture. There is no doubt that President Sarkozy is markedly different from his predecessors: he belongs to the generation born after the Second World War, he was not born “with a silver spoon in his mouth,” and he did not study at the elite Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA), whose graduates have for generations filled leading positions in almost all French governments. Moreover, Sarkozy is noted for his pro-American inclinations and his admiration for the American economic model, and his desire to ease the tensions that have characterized Franco-American relations under President Jacques Chirac may well constitute an important component in the upgrading of Franco-Israeli relations as well. With respect to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, Sarkozy has expressed full support for Israel’s security while attaching great importance to the creation of the Palestinian state with the 1967 lines. Concerning Lebanon and Syria, the new President shows little no signs of being bound to traditional French constraints. So if there is there is further

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convergence of French and American approaches to the Iranian nuclear question (about which there is already considerable agreement), their understanding of the American dilemma in Iraq and their overall reading of the Middle Eastern strategic map, France’s desire to be an active partner in the Middle Eastern peace process could well elicit greater responsiveness by both the United States and Israel. The struggle against terrorism could also be an issue on which France and Israel might cooperate more closely although here, too, a really significant upgrading of ties would require inclusion of the United States as the third leg in a triangular relationship. Finally, Sarkozy’s effort to breathe new life into the French economy could provide an important stimulus to enhanced technological and industrial cooperation between France and Israel. All these elements underpin the assumption of greater understanding and strategic convergence between the two countries. On the other hand, some factors are liable to delay and perhaps even prevent Sarkozy from carrying out far-reaching changes. In the realm of foreign policy, it is important to bear in mind the influence of the senior officials in the Quai d’Orsay. They constitute a bureaucratic power whose reach extends to other government offices and to international organizations and diplomatic legations around the world, and they could present an obstacle to rapid changes Sarkozy might like to introduce. The new President may have trouble overcoming the resistance of traditional “Gaullist” tendencies in the Foreign Ministry (not to speak of public opinion, especially its Muslim component) to any transformation of France into a close but junior partner of the United States and/or a “pro-Israeli” factor in the international arena (even if that is what he wants to do, which is not at all self-evident). Even in the European arena, France could well position itself as a stronger actor in the European Union but it cannot change overnight into an enthusiastic supporter of Israeli integration into new fields of EU activity. At the bilateral level, as well, efforts to energize the French economy and make it more competitive, both within Europe and globally, can open up new opportunities for Israeli business. Nevertheless, there is little likelihood that a “presidential decree” to cooperate with Israel will produce results; more can be expected from focused initiatives by industries in both countries. The last question relates to Israel’s role in enhancing bilateral ties. General elections for parliament will soon be held in France and the political complexion – right or left – of the government Sarkozy will have to work with it is still uncertain. In any event, any contribution Israeli technology can make to the French economy would be marginal, at best. Cooperation in the war on terror will also not make a decisive different in improving French capabilities. Any upgrading in these areas will depend on the focused manner in which French and Israeli ministers and officials interact. At the same time, the President does have a dominant voice in foreign and defense policy and if there any chance of intensifying ties, even if slowly and incrementally, it depends on the President’s capabilities. Within the framework of existing agreements on defense, economy, industry and technology, there have been ups and down in the historic

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relationship between the two countries. In the past, ties have flourished when there was a positive signal from “on high,” and future such signals from the Elysee Palace will create a similar stimulus if strategic understandings between France and Israel, including understandings on France’s role in promoting a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, are integrated into a new three-way partnership with the United States. Israel might best facilitate that kind of partnership by adopting a low profile and taking care to appreciate the nuances of measures Sarkozy takes to promote his program. ________________________________ INSS Insight is published through the generosity of Sari and Israel Roizman, Philadelphia

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