Power Of Eminent Domain Digested Cases (even).docx

City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, G.R. No. 14355, [October 31, 1919], 40 PHIL 349-385 Issue: Whether or not the Courts can inquire into the necessity of expropriation of delegate, such as the City of Manila? Held: The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by courts, but the general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into. When the courts come to determine the question, they must only find In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. The authority of the city of Manila to expropriate private lands for public purposes, is not denied as provided in its Charter. However, if the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law. In the instant case, the record does not show conclusively that the plaintiff has definitely decided that there exists a necessity for expropriation. The decision of the lower court is affirmed. [G.R. No. L-12172. August 29, 1958.] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants. Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Higinio V. Catalan for appellee. Prila, Pardalis & Pejo for appellants. Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. Held: NO. Where an ordinance of a Municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action; expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit; enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal; and entirely lacks standards thus confering upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se lawful. (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Primicias vs.

Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71; Schloss Poster Adv. Co., Inc. vs. City of Rock Hill, et al., 2 SE [2d], pp. 394-395) A Municipal Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive if it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; it then oversteps the bounds of police power without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare and, in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to sight (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil., 580), the State may not, under guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. To legally achieve that result, the landowner should be given just compensation and an opportunity to be heard. VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees. [G.R. No. L-26400. February 29, 1972.] Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can file a suit against the government by reason of the unjust taking of her property without just compensation Held: In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu , the SC held: ". . . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for public use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment.' If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked." Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole

lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking. As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. 3 In addition, the government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for the determination of compensation, including attorney's fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above indicated. No pronouncement as to costs. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur. LORENZO SUMULONG and EMILIA VIDANES-BALAOING, petitioners, vs. HON. BUENAVENTURA GUERRERO and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondents. [G.R. No. L-48685. September 30, 1987.] Issue: Whether the taking of private property for ―socialized housing which would benefit a few and not all citizens, constitutes taking for ―public use. Whether or not there was a proper assessment of the payment for just compensation. Held: Yes. The exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to certain limitations imposed by the constitution (1973), i.e. that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation (Art. IV, sec. 9); and that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. IV, sec. 1). The term "public use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect public bene t or advantage. As discussed in the above cited case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona: “The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. We have never been a laissez faire State. And the necessities which

impel the exertion of sovereign power are an too often found in areas of scarce public land or limited government resources. (p. 231) “ Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. The 1973 Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services including housing [Art. II, sec. 7]. In the case at bar, the use to which it is proposed to put the subject parcels of land meets the requisites of "public use". The lands in question are being expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project to provide housing facilities to lowsalaried government employees. Petitioners further contend that Pres. Decree 1224, as amended, would allow the taking of "any private land" regardless of the size and no matter how small the area of the land to be expropriated. Petitioners claim that "there are vast areas of lands in Mayamot, Cupang, and San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal hundred of hectares of which are owned by a few landowners only. It is surprising [therefore] why respondent National Housing Authority [would] include [their] two small lots . . . In J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, [G.R. No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413 (1970, at 428] this Court earlier ruled that expropriation is not confined to landed estates. The said case of J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. departed from the ruling in Guido v. Rural Progress Administration [84 Phil. 847 (1949)] which held that the test to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the area of the land and not the number of people who stood to be benefited. Since then "there has evolved a clear pattern of adherence to the `number of people to be benefited test'" [Mataas na Lupa Tenants Association, Inc. v. Dimayuga, G.R. No. 32049, June 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 30 (1984) at 39]. Thus, in Pulido v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 57625, May 3, 1983, 122 SCRA 63 (1983) at 73], this Court stated that, "[i]t is unfortunate that the petitioner would be deprived of his landholdings, but his interest and that of his family should not stand in the way of progress and the benefit of the greater majority of the inhabitants of the country." Petitioners maintain that Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended, would allow the taking of private property upon payment of unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors. In addition, they assert that the Decree would deprive the courts of their judicial discretion to determine what would be "just compensation". In Export Processing Zone Authority, this Court pointed out that: The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation. In the same case of EPZA also it was held that: Petitioners assert that Pres. Decree 1224, as amended, violates procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of

possession, control and disposition of property without giving the owner his day in court. Respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of possession without notice and without hearing, viz: “It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated. (p. 13) “ Lastly, On the matter of the issuance of a writ of possession, the ruling in the Ignacio case is reiterated, thus: [I]t is imperative that before a writ of possession is issued by the Court in expropriation proceedings, the following requisites must be met: (1) There must be a Complaint for expropriation sufficient inform and in substance; (2) A provisional determination of just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated must be made by the trial court on the basis of judicial (not legislative or executive) discretion; and (3) The deposit requirement under Section 2, Rule 67 must be complied with. (p. 14) WHEREFORE, the Orders of the lower court dated January 17, 1978 and June 28, 1978 issuing the writ of possession on the basis of the market value appearing therein are annulled for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction. Let this case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings to determine the compensation the petitioners are entitled to be paid. No costs. SO ORDERED. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. [G.R. No. L-59603. April 29, 1987.] Issue: Whether or not Presidential Decrees Numbered 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed and superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court, such that in determining the just compensation of property in an expropriation case, the only basis should be its market value as declared by the owner or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Held: The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court initial in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination. Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property,

following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned. The valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The doctrine we enunciated in National Housing Authority v. Reyes, supra, therefore, must necessarily be abandoned if we are to uphold this Court's role as the guardian of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the due process and equal protection clauses and as the final arbiter over transgressions committed against constitutional rights. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by the petitioner as basis for just compensation were made by the Lapu-Lapu municipal, later city assessor long before martial law, when land was not only much cheaper but when assessed values of properties were stated in figures constituting only a fraction of their true market value. The private respondent was not even the owner of the properties at the time. It purchased the lots for development purposes. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of documents which are out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost of present owners would be arbitrary and confiscatory. Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation. To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors since they had the opportunity to protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of land

owners accept unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not even look at, much less analyze, the statements. The idea of expropriation simply never occurs until a demand is made or a case filed by an agency authorized to do so. It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated. The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation. The SC held that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise would be to undermine the very purpose why this Court exists in the first place. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on February 16, 1982 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.