Potusphere, Afghanistan

POTUS Watch Survey of the Advisors to the President Of The United States Issue nº5 – AFGHANISTAN

Paris, 11 March 2009 The inauguration of Barack Obama on January 20, 2009 began a new, historic chapter in American politics. Yet international challenges have not relented, nor will inevitable internal struggles that accompany high-level political decision-making. Modeling his administration after Lincoln’s “team of rivals,” President Obama has brought on the most experienced players, with big personalities and vehement convictions. As policy is crafted, some advisors will have close proximity to the president while others will not have the necessary relationship to move an agenda on critical policy matters. Twice monthly, POTUS Watch will systematically assemble key positions in the Obama administration on central foreign and economic policy issues in order to highlight tendencies among his Cabinet and closest advisors. POTUS Watch will define majority and minority opinions, examine who holds those views, and identify the relative power of these actors in the decision-making process. By outlining major political currents, POTUS Watch aims to spotlight the emergence of power blocs and trends in order to better understand the foreign policy-making mechanisms in the Obama administration. Amy Greene

Amy K. Greene [email protected]

POTUS Watch, nº5 - Afghanistan

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Introduction

Despite increased attention being paid recently to other hot-button international events and developments, the burning question of American foreign policy remains: What do to in Afghanistan? Clearly, the administration’s consensus for a new plan comes from Obama himself. It is he, after all, who fixed the focus on Afghanistan’s centrality. Obama declared that Afghanistan is the crucial front and merits the use of all available tools to turn around a losing situation. President Obama announced the launch of a sixty-day review of the strategy in Afghanistan. The principal actors conducting this review are the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it is based largely on their recommendations that the President will fill in the contours of his approach. More recently, Obama announced, to both praise and criticism, the deployment of 17,000 additional American troops during spring and summer 2009 – all of this before the strategic review has even been completed. A classified report authored by the Joint Chiefs leaked to the press in February 2009 and was purportedly seen by Gates himself. Among the recommendations are the following:  Warn against sending a “surge” of troops, without eliminating possibility for further soldier increases in future  End efforts to create Western-style democracy and also lessen fight against narcotics trafficking in order to focus on establishing – and achieving – pragmatic, modest goals on the ground to restore basic order and security  Bolster training of Pakistani security forces to conduct counter-insurgency missions in tribal areas  Secure Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal Among the relevant national security actors in the Obama camp that deal directly with the situation in Afghanistan, the biggest differences are not so much on the overarching matters – such as the need to diversify tactics and strategic orientations – but rather on the central prisms through which they axe the problem. 

Administration Actors

Vice President Joe Biden Biden has been laying the groundwork for Obama, both by cultivating support among allies in the lead-up to the 2009 NATO summit and by giving strong indications of Obama’s broad orientations to test the political waters. At the Munich Conference in February 2009, Biden told Allies, “We'll need your help. […] Our security is shared. And so, too, I respectfully suggest, is our responsibility to defend it.” During his January 2009 trip to Afghanistan as outgoing Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Joe Biden informed President Hamid Karzai that he could no longer rely on the preferential presidential treatment granted by Bush and also

Amy K. Greene [email protected]

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foretold the end of regular video conferences, also a Bush custom. In 2008, Biden abruptly walked out of a dinner with Karzai after the Afghan president insisted that no Afghan government corruption existed and, should it, fault would not lie with him. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton While assuring that she would still oversee Holbrooke as Special Envoy (though he also reports directly to Obama), Clinton understood what Condoleezza Rice did not – by attempting to oversee every major dossier, real action on the important ones becomes more difficult. Clinton’s role in this conflict, while not minor, is not as strongly implicated in policy minutia as that of Holbrooke. During her confirmation hearing, Clinton, for her part, called Afghanistan a “narcostate” with a government “plagued by limited capacity and widespread corruption.” Recently, as Secretary of State, Clinton announced regular three-way meetings with top officials from both Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are presumed to be more substantive on policy than the Bush meetings. On March 5, 2009, Clinton called for a high-level international conference (a “big-tent meeting”) to discuss Afghanistan with representatives from the United Nations, NATO, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and other strategic regional allies (Russia and India?). Secretary of Defense Robert Gates In January 2009, Gates summarized his core view on Afghanistan victory in these terms: “My own personal view is that our primary goal is to prevent Afghanistan from being used as a base for terrorists and extremists to attack the United States and our allies, and whatever else we need to do flows from that objective.” Gates is “very skeptical” that sending more than General David McKiernan’s requested troop reinforcements will prove useful in a country with a tradition of resisting foreign occupation. He wants to strip the ideology from the war redefine success through modest, concrete, and winnable goals. Otherwise, Gates has been acutely critical of NATO allies for being unwilling to contribute an equal share, calling them “unwilling to step up to the plate” and “disappointing” in their performance. In 2008, Gates publicly admonished Germany for exercising the “luxury” to keep troops out of Afghanistan “thereby forcing other partners to carry an unproportionately high share of the fighting and dying.” Since Obama’s inauguration, Gates has warned that the new American administration was “prepared” to make greater commitments, “but there clearly will be expectations that the allies must do more as well." National Security Advisor James Jones Jones’ influence over American security policy is central and his views on Afghanistan well defined. “Symbolically, [Afghanistan is] more the epicenter of terrorism than Iraq. If we don’t succeed in Afghanistan, you’re sending a very clear message to the terrorist

Amy K. Greene [email protected]

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organizations that the U.S., the U.N. and the 37 countries with troops on the ground can be defeated.” Jones warns that a loss in Afghanistan would be disastrous for the irreversible damage it would cause the NATO alliance. In a 2007 letter to the Washington Post, Jones argued, “cohesion will be at grave risk. A moribund or unraveled NATO will have profoundly negative geostrategic impact.” That said, he recognizes that a core weakness of NATO is its lack of an effective strategy: the U.S. and NATO have not developed an effective plan to deliver aid and to reconstruct newly-liberated localities enough to prevent the return of the Taliban. Jones suggests that effective training of local security forces is as critical to success as removing the focus from military solutions only. Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke Holbrooke assumes his position armed with a reputation for frankness, blunt honesty, and credibility. He acknowledges that the challenge in Afghanistan is entirely more difficult than the challenge in Iraq, notably due to the role of Pakistan. He reports to Clinton, but insisted on having direct contact with the White House because the deployment of up to 30,000 additional troops will impact policymaking such that his role will require interdepartmental coordination. He has also said that part of his job will be to coordinate “what is clearly a chaotic foreign assistance program” in Afghanistan. Holbrooke summed up the central challenges by insisting, “massive, officially sanctioned corruption and the drug trade are the most serious problems the country faces, and they offer the Taliban its only exploitable opportunity to gain support.” (Washington Post, 2008) General David McKiernan The head U.S. Commander in Afghanistan argues need to send 30,000 additional U.S. troops in Afghanistan to “change the dynamics of the security situation, predominantly in southern Afghanistan” where the situation is at a stalemate (February 2009). In addition, he advocates an additional 4,000-soldier Army brigade to train the Afghan Army. McKiernan warns against sending too many troops, however, without the appropriate emphasis placed on reinforcing civil agencies within both the U.S. and foreign governments. “There’s a point where you have too many foreign forces,” he said (February 2009). Head of U.S. Central Command General David Petraeus Petraeus currently leads a 100-day strategic review of the situation in Afghanistan that includes more than 100 members from State, the Pentagon, and the private sector split among six sub-regional teams to investigate root causes of insecurity in the region as well as solutions that integrate military, diplomacy, and development. Two of Petraeus’ focal points are government-led reconciliation of Taliban insurgents in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the use of diplomatic and economic tools to stimulate regional development initiatives. He also seems to favor approaches that advocate cooperating

Amy K. Greene [email protected]

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with China and Saudi Arabia - Pakistan’s biggest investors – as well as creating a contract group formed by the U.N. Security Council. The result of the strategic review will be a new military plan for the region. 

External Actors

Afghan President Hamid Karzai Karzai’s situation is delicate. The preferential relationship he enjoyed with George W. Bush has made way for public admonitions by the Obama administration, including Obama calling Karzai “unreliable” and “ineffective.” This looks to amount to the early signs of a tough dialogue resembling the U.S.’s approach to South Vietnam. Karzai’s depends largely on the Americans and is disappointing them, but Obama needs Karzai. In spite of his waning popularity at home, and questions of his governing competency, Karzai remains the most popular of possible candidates to lead Afghanistan. In a test of wills, Karzai has proposed moving the elections up from August 2009 to May, hoping to legitimize his power amidst the uncertainty of America’s next step. Rush elections are expected to favor him, as opponents will not have had time to mount challenges. Karzai tows a precarious line, positioning himself against the Americans to appeal to a disgruntled Afghan people while also trying to keep America pleased. All the while he evades responsibility for the failure of Afghan reconstruction. Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari Zardari has legitimacy in Pakistan but lacks the authority he needs to transform its society. His country being inextricably linked to Afghanistan’s security, Zardari has the difficult task of managing American presence in his country, while also being sufficiently critical to please growing anti-American sentiment. Following an ineffective Musharraf, Zardari has increasing pressure coming from the Obama administration to produce results, notably in the border zones. In February 2009, Zardari called for increased funding from allies, insisting that the Pakistani military has the might, technology, and manpower to fight Taliban more inexpensively and efficiently than Allies. 

Points for Reflection

The roles and organization of the major actors is not yet clear, but certain questions nonetheless emerge. What will be Joe Biden’s role vis-à-vis allies and policymaking? How strictly will Hillary Clinton follow Obama’s directives? What will the relationship between Jones and Clinton look like? How much authority will Hillary Clinton have over Richard Holbrooke? What sort of power politics will Holbrooke play to reinforce his position? Will Obama, Biden, and Clinton delegate relations with Karzai and Zardari to Holbrooke? Given the Clinton’s recent proposal for an international conference, how important of a role will the United States give to others in the development and direction of a new policy in Afghanistan?

Amy K. Greene [email protected]