Political Law Doctrines.docx

Jurisprudence Political Law GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE POLICE POWER In the exercise of police power, the State can regulate the rates imposed by a public utility such as SURNECO. Hence, the ERC simply performed its mandate to protect the public interest imbued in those rates. SURIGAO DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SURNECO) v. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, G.R. No. 183626, October 04, 2010 A mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the exercise of the same is a delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature. ABRAHAM RIMANDO v. NAGUILAN EMISSION TESTING CENTER, INC., et al., G.R. No. 198860, July 23, 2012 Traditional distinctions exist between police power and eminent domain. In the exercise of police power, a property right is impaired by regulation, or the use of property is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted to promote public welfare. In such cases, there is no compensable taking, hence, payment of just compensation is not required. On the other hand, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, property interests are appropriated and applied to some public purpose which necessitates the payment of just compensation therefor. MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. AND LA FUNERARIA PAZ-SUCAT, INC. v. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, G.R. No. 175356, December 3, 2013 STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT An immunity statute does not, and cannot, rule out a review by this Court of the Ombudsman‘s exercise of discretion, however, the Court‘s intervention only occurs when a clear and grave abuse of the exercise of discretion is shown. ERDITO QUARTO v. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN SIMEON MARCELO, et al., G.R. No. 169042, October 5, 2011 The state may not be sued without its consent. Likewise, public officials may not be sued for acts done in the performance of their official functions or within the scope of their authority. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al. v. PHIL PHARMAWEALTH, INC., G.R. No. 182358, February 20, 2013 The general rule is that a state may not be sued, but it may be the subject of a suit if it consents to be sued, either expressly or impliedly. There is express consent when a law so provides, while there is implied consent when the State enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation. This Court explained that in order to determine implied waiver when the State or its agency entered into a contract, there is a need to distinguish whether the contract was entered into in its governmental or proprietary capacity. HEIRS OF DIOSDADO MENDOZA ET AL. v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, G.R. No. 203834, July 9, 2014 The DPWH is an unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own and it enjoys immunity from suit. HEIRS OF DIOSDADO MENDOZA ET AL. v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, G.R. No. 203834, July 9, 2014 Page 1 of 100

SEPARATION OF POWERS The President, Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water district and the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) to create franchises that are exclusive in character. TAWANG MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE v. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011 Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has exercised his discretion ―in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Hence, in matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion. DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR. v. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as Chief State Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE, G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013 Where the Executive Department implements a relocation of government center, the same is valid unless the implementation is contrary to law, morals, public law and public policy and the Court cannot intervene in the legitimate exercise of power of the executive. The rationale is hinged on the principle of separation of powers which ordains that each of the three great government branches has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in concerns falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by ABUSAMA M. ALID, Officerin-Charge, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE - REGIONAL FIELD UNIT XII (DA-RFU XII) v. ABDULWAHAB A. BAYAO, OSMEÑA I. MONTAÑER, RAKMA B. BUISAN, HELEN M. ALVAREZ, NEILA P. LIMBA, ELIZABETH B. PUSTA, ANNA MAE A. SIDENO, UDTOG B. TABONG, JOHN S. KAMENZA, DELIA R. SUBALDO, DAYANG W. MACMOD, FLORENCE S. TAYUAN, in their own behalf and in behalf of the other officials and employees of DA-RFU XII, G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013 CHECKS AND BALANCES Any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciary‘s fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED CHIEF/ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012

VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE

The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., v. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, et.al., G.R. No. 178552, October 05, 2010 CONSTITUTIONALITY Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9335, otherwise known as the Attrition Act of 2005 and its IRR are constitutional. BUREAU OF (CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA) v. HON. MARGARITO B. TEVES, G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011 The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 is valid and constitutional. HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, et al. v. REY SALAC, et al., G.R. No. 152642, November 13, 2012 A statute having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. HENRY R. GIRON v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013 The government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons, in possession of sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in such institutions, thus, the requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not unreasonable. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST v. ANALIZA F. PEPANIO AND MARITI D. BUENO, G.R. No. 193897, January 23, 2013 The tests to determine if an ordinance is valid and constitutional are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy). As to substantive due process, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy. Considering that traffic congestions were already retarding the growth and progress in the population and economic centers of the country, the plain objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the public interest and advance the general welfare in the City of Cebu. Its adoption was, therefore, in order to fulfill the compelling government purpose. With regard to procedural process the clamping of the petitioners’ vehicles was within the exceptions dispensing with notice and hearing. As already said, the immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires was necessary because the transgressors were not around at the time of apprehension. Under such circumstance, notice and hearing would be superfluous. VALENTINO L. LEGASPI v. CITY OF CEBU, et al./BIENVENIDO P. JABAN, SR., et al. v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 159110/G.R. No. 159692. December 10, 2013

There is no deprivation of property as no restriction on their use and enjoyment of property is caused by the implementation of R.A. 9646. If petitioners as property owners feel burdened by the new requirement of engaging the services of only licensed real estate professionals in the sale and marketing of their properties, such is an unavoidable consequence of a reasonable regulatory measure. No right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power of the State. The legislature recognized the importance of professionalizing the ranks of real estate practitioners by increasing their competence and raising ethical standards as real property transactions are susceptible to manipulation and corruption. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. v. PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE, G.R. No. 197676; February 4, 2014 The petitioner who claims the unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of showing first that the case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional question that he raised is unavoidable. If there is some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the question of constitutionality should be avoided. Thus, to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP, INC., v. JESSIE ROBREDO, G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014 LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT The clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5 (1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties. Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector. Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens. While the major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major political parties, however, cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law." The experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party- list system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941, must now come to an end. The High Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging in socio-economic or

political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, in this case the Supreme Court remanded the present petitions to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by the Supreme Court. ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013 POWERS OF CONGRESS The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office; they are, for all intents and purposes, "elected members" of the House of Representatives. WALDEN F. BELLO AND LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 191998, December 07, 2010 The power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which is not permissible. RENALD F. VILANDO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, et al., G.R. Nos. 192147, August 23, 2011 The conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, et al. v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., G.R. No. 180308, June 19, 2012 A person cannot file an action with the Supreme Court questioning the findings of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) except when it committed a grave abuse of discretion. The abuse must, as contemplated by the law, be so gross that it amounts to evasion of duty. MARIA LOURDES B. LOCSIN v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND MONIQUE YAZMIN MARIA Q. LAGDAMEO, G.R. No. 204123, March 19, 2013 The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal was in no way estopped from subsequently declaring that the integrity of the ballot boxes was not preserved opposed to its initial findings, after it had the opportunity to exhaustively observe and examine in the course of the entire revision proceedings the conditions of all the ballot boxes and their contents, including the ballots themselves, the Minutes of Voting, Statements of Votes and Election Returns. LIWAYWAY VINZONSCHATO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ELMER E. PANOTES, G.R. No. 204637, April 16, 2013 Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of the Members of the House of Representatives. To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of all of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption of office. Absent any of the foregoing, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over the said contests. REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013

Congress has the power and prerogative to introduce substantial changes in the statutory public office or position and to reclassify it as a primarily confidential, non-career service position. Flowing from the legislative power to create public offices is the power to abolish and modify them to meet the demands of society; Congress can change the qualifications for and shorten the term of existing statutory offices. When done in good faith, these acts would not violate a public officer‘s security of tenure, even if they result in his removal from office or the shortening of his term. Modifications in public office, such as changes in qualifications or shortening of its tenure, are made in good faith so long as they are aimed at the office and not at the incumbent. THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE, represented by GOVERNOR JESUS O. TYPOCO, JR. v. BEATRIZ O. GONZALES, G.R. No. 185740, July 23, 2013 The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives. REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013 Reapportionment is “the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.” The aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts. The basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province and not the number of registered voters therein. The Court notes that after the reapportionment of the districts in Camarines Sur, the current Third District, which brought Naval to office in 2010 and 2013, has a population of 35,856 less than that of the old Second District, which elected him in 2004 and 2007. However, the wordings of R.A. 9716 indicate the intent of the lawmakers to create a single new Second District from the merger of the towns from the old First District with Gainza and Milaor. As to the current Third District, Section 3 (c) of R.A. 9716 used the word “rename.” Although the qualifier “without a change in its composition” was not found in Section 3(c), unlike in Sections 3(d) and (e), still, what is pervasive is the clear intent to create a sole new district in that of the Second, while merely renaming the rest. ANGEL G. NAVAL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND NELSON B. JULIA, G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014 LIMITATIONS ON LEGISLATIVE POWER The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, August 24, 2010 R.A. 9646 does not violate the “one title-one subject” rule under Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Constitution. In Farinas v. Executive Secretary, the Court held it is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient to accomplish that object. Aside from provisions establishing a regulatory system for the professionalization of the real estate service sector, the new law extended its coverage to real estate developers with respect to their own properties. The inclusion of real estate developers is germane to the law’s primary goal of developing "a corps of technically competent, responsible and respected professional real estate service practitioners whose standards of practice and service shall be globally competitive and will promote the growth of the real estate industry." REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. v. PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE, G.R. No. 197676; February 4, 2014

PDAF No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in ―the various operational aspects of budgeting, including ―the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities and the — regulation and release of funds , in violation of the separation of powers principle [The Court cites its Decision on Guingona, Jr. v. Carague (Guingona, Jr., 1991)]. From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional [The Court cites its Decision on Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima (Abakada, 2008)]. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to; and (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects. Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.

To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: “[A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.” Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase ―as may be defined by law. In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of — making equal the unequal (Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively — underdeveloped compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. Considering that Local Development Councils are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no lawmaking authority except only when acting as a body. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase ― “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of P.D. 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. As for the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of P.D. 1869, as amended by P.D. 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used ― to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure development projects and [second,] to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines. The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a priority. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of priority infrastructure development projects and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of infrastructure is too

broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” must be stricken down as unconstitutional since — similar to Section 8 of P.D. 910 — it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. BELGICA et al. v. OCHOA JR.; SJS v. DRILON et al.; NEPOMUCENO v. PRESIDENT AQUINO III, G.R. No. 208566, G.R. No. 208493, G.R. No. 209251, November 19, 2013 DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION PROGRAM The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAP’s adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP. Congress could appropriate but would have nothing more to do during the Budget Execution Stage. The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the country’s economic situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already set apart from the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution. The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25 (5) must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely: 1. There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices; 2. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and 3. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices. Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets, programs and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost. The DBM declares that part of the savings brought under the DAP came from "pooling of unreleased appropriations such as unreleased Personnel Services appropriations which will lapse at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow moving projects and discontinued projects per ZeroBased Budgeting findings." The declaration of the DBM by itself does not state the clear legal basis for the treatment of unreleased or unalloted appropriations as savings. The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased or unalloted is a mere description of the status of the items as

unalloted or unreleased. They have not yet ripened into categories of items from which savings can be generated. Appropriations have been considered "released" if there has already been an allotment or authorization to incur obligations and disbursement authority. Congress acts as the guardian of the public treasury in faithful discharge of its power of the purse whenever it deliberates and acts on the budget proposal submitted by the Executive. Its power of the purse is touted as the very foundation of its institutional strength, and underpins "all other legislative decisions and regulating the balance of influence between the legislative and executive branches of government." Such enormous power encompasses the capacity to generate money for the Government, to appropriate public funds, and to spend the money. Pertinently, when it exercises its power of the purse, Congress wields control by specifying the PAPs for which public money should be spent. It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has the final say on matters of appropriations. For this purpose, appropriation involves two governing principles, namely: (1) "a Principle of the Public Fisc, asserting that all monies received from whatever source by any part of the government are public funds;" and (2) "a Principle of Appropriations Control, prohibiting expenditure of any public money without legislative authorization." To conform with the governing principles, the Executive cannot circumvent the prohibition by Congress of an expenditure for a PAP by resorting to either public or private funds. Nor could the Executive transfer appropriated funds resulting in an increase in the budget for one PAP, for by so doing the appropriation for another PAP is necessarily decreased. The terms of both appropriations will thereby be violated. MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO v. BENIGNO SEMION C. AQUINO III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014 CYBERCRIME LAW Section 4 (c) (3) — Penalizing posts of unsolicited commercial communications or SPAM. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression. Commercial speech though not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression; it is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob one of these rights without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Section 12 — Authorizing the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time. If such would be granted to law enforcement agencies it would curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for official abuse. Section 12 is too broad and do not provide ample safeguards against crossing legal boundaries and invading the right to privacy. Informational Privacy which is the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters has two aspects, specifically: (1) The right not to have private information disclosed; and (2) The right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion. Section 12 applies to all information and communications technology users and transmitting communications is akin to putting a letter in an envelope properly addressed, sealing it closed and sending it through the postal service. Another reason to strike down said provision is by reason that it allows collection and recording traffic data ― with due cause. Section 12 does not bother to relate the collection of data to the probable commission of a particular crime. It is akin to the use of a general search warrant that the Constitution prohibits. Likewise it is bit descriptive of the purpose for which data collection will be Page 10 of 100

used. The authority given is too sweeping and lacks restraint which may only be used for Fishing Expeditions and unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked information or worse to extortion from certain bad elements in these agencies. Section 19 — Authorizing the DOJ to restrict or block access to suspected computer data. Computer data produced by its author constitutes personal property regardless of where it is stored. The provision grants the Government the power to seize and place the computer data under its control and disposition without a warrant. The DOJ order cannot substitute judicial search warrants. Content of the computer data also constitutes speech which is entitled to protection. If an executive officer could be granted such power to acquire data without warrants and declare that its content violates the law that would make him the judge, jury and executioner all rolled in one. Section 19 also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech: (1) dangerous tendency doctrine; (2) balancing of interest test; and (3) clear and present danger rule. It merely requires that the data be blocked if on its face it violate any provision of the cybercrime law. Section 4 (c) (4) penalizes libel in connection with Section 5 which penalizes aiding or abetting to said felony. Section 4 (c) (4) is valid and constitutional with respect to the original author of the post but void and unconstitutional with respect to other who simply receive the post and react to it. With regard to the author of the post, Section 4 (c) (4) merely affirms that online defamation constitutes similar means for committing libel as defined under the RPC. The internet encourages a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style. Facebook and Twitter were given as examples and stated that the acts of liking, commenting, sharing or re-tweets, are not outrightly considered to be aiding or abetting. Compared to the physical world such would be mere expressions or reactions made regarding a specific post. The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute a broad sweep that generates a chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicament awaits internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues and democracy will be threatened together with all liberties. Charging offenders of violation of R.A. 10175 and the RPC both with regard to libel and likewise with R.A. 9775 on Child pornography constitutes double jeopardy. The acts defined in the Cybercrime Law involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same with the RPC and R.A. 9775. JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, Jr., ET AL v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., G.R. No. 203335. February 18, 2014 EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

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The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, et al., G.R. No. 189155, September 07, 2010 The doctrine of state immunity should not be extended to the petitioner as the same is an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. SPOUSES DAVID and ELISEA RAMOS, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011 The president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZV. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, et al., G.R. No. 191805, 193160, November 15, 2011 POWERS The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 58 is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency. JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES v. HON. MANUEL E. GAITE et al., G.R. No. 176596, March 23, 2011 The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President, without need of congressional authority to exercise the same. DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, et al. v. HON. RONALDO PUNO, et al., G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011 The abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing delegated legislative authority to reorganize his own office pursuant to Executive Order No (E.O.) 292. PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR. v. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS-INVESTIGATIVE AND ADJUDICATORY DIVISION, et al., G.R. NO. 196425, JULY 24, 2012 Directives and orders issued by the President in the valid exercise of his power of control over the executive department must be obeyed and implemented in good faith by all executive officials. Acts performed in contravention of such directives merit invalidation. DR. EMMANUEL T. VELASCO, et al. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AUDIT OFFICE, G.R. No. 189774, September 18, 2012 The President‘s discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. The faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the President, not a separate grant of power. It simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them. This is precisely why the law provides that "administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not

contrary to the laws or the Constitution." NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO, et al. v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al., G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013 It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President. ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL v. ALFREDO LIM, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015 The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters on which the Constitution or the circumstances require the President to act personally, executive and administrative functions are exercised through executive departments headed by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are presumptively the acts of the President unless disapproved by the latter. There can be no question that the act of the secretary is the act of the President, unless repudiated by the latter. In this case, approval of the Amendments to the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (ASTOA) by the DOTC Secretary had the same effect as approval by the President. The same would be true even without the issuance of E.O. 497, in which the President specifically delegated to the DOTC Secretary the authority to approve contracts entered into by the Toll Regulatory Board. ANA THERESIA “RISA” HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015 POWER OF APPOINTMENT The power to appoint rests essentially on free choice. The appointing authority has the right to decide who best fits the job from among those who meet the minimum requirements for it. As an outsider, quite remote from the day-to-day problems of a government agency, no court of law can presume to have the wisdom needed to make a better judgment respecting staff appointments. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE) AND NATIONAL MARITIME POLYTECHNIC (NMP) v. RUBEN Y. MACEDA, G.R. No. 185112, January 18, 2010 Prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President‘s or Acting President‘s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. ARTURO DE CASTRO v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND PRES. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, G. R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010 The prohibition against the President or Acting President to make appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President‘s or Acting President‘s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, G. R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010 POWER OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION The Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power including the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally- created Office of the Ombudsman. EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES et al., G.R. Nos. 196231, 196232 September 04, 2012 POWERS RELATIVE TO APPROPRIATION MEASURES

The power of the President to reorganize the Executive Branch includes such powers and functions that may be provided for under other laws. To be sure, an inclusive and broad interpretation of the President‘s power to reorganize executive offices has been consistently supported by specific provisions in general appropriations laws. ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA et al. v. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT JUDICIAL POWER The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under Article VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court. METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011 Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, G.R. No. 191618, June 7, 2011 The fact that the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD) conducts public consultations or hearings does not mean that it is performing quasi-judicial functions. SALVACION VILLANUEVA, et al. v. PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, et al., G.R. No. 178347, February 25, 2013 The Constitutional mandate of the courts in our triangular system of government is clear, so that as a necessary requisite of the exercise of judicial power there must be, with a few exceptions, an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution, not merely a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. As Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution provides, "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION v. THUNDERBIRD PILIPINAS HOTELS AND RESORTS, INC., et al., G.R. No. 197942-43/G.R. No. 199528. March 26, 2014 The interpretation and application of laws have been assigned to the Judiciary under our system of constitutional government. Indeed, defining and interpreting the laws are truly a judicial function. Hence, the Court of Appeals (CA) could not be denied the authority to interpret the provisions of the articles of incorporation and bylaws of Forest Hills, because such provisions, albeit in the nature of

private laws, have an impact on the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties. FOREST HILLS GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC., v. GARDPRO, INC., G.R. No. 164686, October 22, 2014 JUDICIAL REVIEW Judicial review is permitted if the courts believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct. When the evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, et al. v. MICHAEL ALFIO PENNISI, G.R. No. 169958, March 5, 2010 The discretion to determine whether a case should be filed or not lies with the Ombudsman. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is shown, judicial review is uncalled for as a policy of non-interference by the courts in the exercise of the Ombudsman‘s constitutionally mandated powers. ANGELITA DE GUZMAN v. EMILIO A. GONZALEZ III, et al., G.R. No. 158104, March 26, 2010 Unless it is shown that the questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, this Court will not interfere in the findings of probable cause determined by the Ombudsman. ROBERTO B. KALALO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ERNESTO M. DE CHAVEZ AND MARCELO L. AGUSTIN, G.R. No. 158189, April 23, 2010 The Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies - not unlawfully defies - the constitutional directive. As intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010 When the issues presented do not require the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of a body but are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should not be applied. AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., et al. v. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE, G.R. No. 187714, March 08, 2011 The determination of where, as between two possible routes, to construct a road extension is obviously not within the province of this Court. Such determination belongs to the Executive branch. BARANGAY CAPTAIN BEDA TORRECAMPO v. METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM, et al., G.R. No. 188296, May 30, 2011 Certiorari does not lie against the Sangguniang Panglungsod, which was not a part of the Judiciary settling an actual controversy involving legally demandable and enforceable rights when it adopted Resolution No. 552, but a legislative and policy-making body declaring its sentiment or opinion. SPOUSES ANTONIO AND FE YUSAY v. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY, G.R. No. 156684, April 06, 2011 This Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a division of the COMELEC. However, the Court held that an exception to this rule applies where the

commission of grave abuse of discretion is apparent on its face. MARIA LAARNI L. CAYETANO v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND DANTE O. TINGA, G.R. No. 193846, April 12, 2011 While as a rule, it is beyond the province of the Court to analyze and weigh the parties’ evidence all over again in reviewing administrative decisions, an exception thereto lies as when there is serious ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. ANTONIO T. REYES G.R. No. 170512, October 5, 2011 The power of judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES SITTING AS AN IMPEACHMENT COURT, et al., G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012 Courts cannot certainly give primacy to matters of procedure over substance in a party-list group‘s Constitution and By-Laws, especially after the general membership has spoken. SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ROMEO R. ROBJSO, PEDRO T. DABU, JR., LOPE E. FEBLE, NOEL T. TIAMPONG and JOSE FLORO CRISOLOGO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JONATHAN DE LA CRUZ, ED VINCENT ALBANO and BENEDICT KATO, G.R. No. 203646, April 16, 2013 Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the Ombudsman‘s decision shall be final, executory, and unappealable. But of course, the said principle is subject to the rule that decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law are still "subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law, or when such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings." FREDERICK JAMES C. ORAlS v. DR. AMELIA C. ALMIRANTE, G.R. No. 181195, June 10, 2013 An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible to judicial resolution. Petitioners who are real estate developers are entities directly affected by the prohibition on performing acts constituting practice of real estate service without first complying with the registration and licensing requirements for brokers and agents under R.A. 9646. The possibility of criminal sanctions for disobeying the mandate of the new law is likewise real. Asserting that the prohibition violates their rights as property owners, petitioners challenged on constitutional grounds the law’s implementation which respondents defended as a valid legislation pursuant to police power. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. v. PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE, G.R. No. 197676; February 4, 2014 Constitution requires our courts to conscientiously observe the time periods in deciding cases and resolving matters brought to their adjudication, which, for lower courts, is three (3) months from the date they are deemed submitted for decision or resolution. SPOUSES RICARDO and EVELYN MARCELO v. JUDGE RAMSEY DOMINGO G. PICHAY, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 78, PARANAQUE CITY, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1838, March 12, 2014 What further constrains this Court from touching on the issue of constitutionality is the fact that this issue is not the lis mota of this case. Lis mota literally means “the cause of the suit or action”; it is rooted in the principle of separation of powers and is thus merely an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the executive and legislative acts of our coequal branches of the government. KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP, INC., v. JESSIE ROBREDO, G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014

The petition did not comply with the requisites of judicial review as there was no actual case or controversy. Petitioner's allegations show that he wants the Supreme Court to strike down the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund. This court must act only within its powers granted under the Constitution. This court is not empowered to review proposed bills because a bill is not a law. The court has explained that the filing of bills is within the legislative power of Congress and is not subject to judicial restraint. Under the Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret laws. It cannot speculate on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not pass. It cannot rule on mere speculations or issues that are not ripe for judicial determination. The petition, therefore, does not present any actual case or controversy that is ripe for this court's determination. IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AGAINST THE ABOLITION OF THE JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF AUTONOMY, UDK-15143; January 21, 2015 The following are the determinants of an issue having transcendental importance: (a) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (b) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (c) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. None of the determinants is present in this case. The events feared by petitioner are merely speculative. IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AGAINST THE ABOLITION OF THE JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF AUTONOMY, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015 OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE The operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature. HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED et.al v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011 As a general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act carries with it the illegality of its effects. However, in cases where nullification of the effects will result in inequity and injustice, the operative fact doctrine may apply. The Court has upheld the efficacy of such DAP-funded projects by applying the operative fact doctrine. MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO v. BENIGNO SEMION C. AQUINO III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014 MOOT & ACADEMIC As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. ATTY. EVILLO C. PORMENTO v. JOSEPH "ERAP" EJERCITO ESTRADA AND COMELEC, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010 E.O. 883 and Career Executive Service Board Resolution No. 870 having ceased to have any force and effect, the Court can no longer pass upon the issue of their constitutionality. ATTY. ELIAS OMAR A. SANA v. CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD, G.R. No. 192926, November 15, 2011

A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. JOEL P. QUIÑO, et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND RITCHIE R. WAGAS, G.R. No. 197466, November 13, 2012 Retirement from the service during the pendency of an administrative case does not render the case moot and academic. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. MARCELINO A. DECHAVEZ, G.R. No. 176702, November 13, 2013 The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. The Court, as a rule, will decline to exercise jurisdiction over a case and proceed to dismiss it when the issues posed have been mooted by supervening events. Mootness intervenes when a ruling from the Court no longer has any practical value and, from this perspective, effectively ceases to be a justiciable controversy. While the Court has recognized exceptions in applying the "moot and academic" principle, these exceptions relate only to situations where: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and PERRY L. PE v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206794, November 26, 2013 For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy. Thus, in Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco we have ruled that "where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest however intellectually challenging." HADJI HASHIM ABDUL v. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 184496, December 2, 2013 POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE The constitutional validity of the President‘s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN AND ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012 As stated in Francisco v. HRET, a political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally-imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally-imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court. In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings. THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015 APPOINTMENT TO THE JUDICIARY For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, the date the commission has been signed by the President (which is the date appearing on the face of such document) is the date of the

appointment. Such date will determine the seniority of the members of the CA in connection with Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by R.A. 8246. RE: SENIORITY AMONG THE FOUR (4) MOST RECENT APPOINTMENTS TO THE POSITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, A.M. No. 10-4-22-SC, September 28, 2010 The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, et al., G.R. NO. 202242, July 17, 2012 A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. It is also very clear that the Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its primary function – to legislate. In the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major branches of government. In so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of government. Hence, the argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013 Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an applicant’s moral fitness is challenged. It follows then that the “unanimity rule” only comes into operation when the moral character of a person is put in issue. It finds no application where the question is essentially unrelated to an applicant’s moral uprightness. FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA v. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014 The JBC, as a body, is not required by law to hold hearings on the qualifications of the nominees. The process by which an objection is made based on Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 is not judicial, quasi-judicial, or fact-finding, for it does not aim to determine guilt or innocence akin to a criminal or administrative offense but to ascertain the fitness of an applicant vis-aà -vis the requirements for the position. Being sui generis, the proceedings of the JBC do not confer the rights insisted upon by Jardeleza. He may not exact the application of rules of procedure which are, at the most, discretionary or optional. Finally, Jardeleza refused to shed light on the objections against him. During the June 30, 2014 meeting, he did not address the issues, but instead chose to tread on his view that the Chief Justice had unjustifiably become his accuser, prosecutor and judge. FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA v. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS THE COMMISSION OF AUDIT POWERS The Commission on Audit (COA) has been granted by the Constitution the authority to establish a special audit group when a transaction warrants the formulation of the same and the authority to

determine the scope of its audit and examination as well as the methods and techniques to be used therefor. THE SPECIAL AUDIT TEAM, COMMISSION ON AUDIT v. COURT OF APPEALS and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, G.R. No. 174788, April 11, 2013 No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. The Constitution vests COA, as guardian of public funds, with enough latitude to determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. The COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty and the Court generally sustains its decisions in recognition of its expertise in the laws it is entrusted to enforce. On the issue whether the TESDA officials should refund the excess EME granted to them, the Court applied the ruling in the case Casal v. COA where the Court held that the approving officials are liable for the refund of the incentive award due to their patent disregard of the law of and the directives of COA. Accordingly, the Director-General's blatant violation of the clear provisions of the Constitution, the 2004- 2007 GAAs and the COA circulars is equivalent to gross negligence amounting to bad faith. He is required to refund the EME he received from the TESDP Fund for himself. TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT CHAIRPERSON MA. GRACIA PULIDO TAN, COMMISSIONER JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR. AND COMMISSIONER HEIDI L. MENDOZA, G.R. No. 204869. March 11, 2014 JURISDICTION It is well settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Commission of Audit, are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their jurisdiction. RUBEN REYNA AND LLOYD SORIA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 167219, February 8, 2011 Since the BSP, under its amended charter, continues to be a public corporation or a government instrumentality, we come to the inevitable conclusion that it is subject to the exercise by the COA of its audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the provisions of the BSP Charter. BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMMSSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011 Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, it is the Commission on Audit which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities. The scope of the COA‘s authority to take cognizance of claims is however circumscribed to mean only liquidated claims, or those determined or readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers within reach of accounting officers. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN v. JODY KING CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP, G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013 Under Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution, the COA was vested with the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle the accounts of non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government. Complementing this power is Section 29 (1) of the Audit Code, which grants the COA visitorial authority over non- governmental entities required to pay levy or government share. The Manila Export and Cultural Office (MECO) is not a government-owned and controlled corporation or a government instrumentality. It is a sui generis private entity especially entrusted Page 20 of 100

by the government with the facilitation of unofficial relations with the people in Taiwan. However, despite its non-governmental character, the MECO handles government funds in the form of the “verification fees” it collects on behalf of the DOLE and the “consular fees” it collects under Section 2 (6) of E.O. 15, s. 2001. Hence, under existing laws, the accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of such “verification fees” and “consular fees” should be audited by the Commission of Audit. Section 14 (1), Book V of the Administrative Code authorizes the COA to audit accounts of non–governmental entities “required to pay ... or have government share” but only with respect to “funds ... coming from or through the government.” This provision of law perfectly fits the MECO. DENNIS A.B. FUNA v. MANILA ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OFFICE AND COA, G.R. No. 193462, February 4, 2014 The COA disallowed the payment of healthcare allowance of TESDA employees. COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty and responsibility to examine and audit expenditures of public funds, particularly those which are perceptibly beyond what is sanctioned by law. Only in instances when COA acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction shall the Court interfere. TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (TESDA) v. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015 THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION JURISDICTION Civil Service Commission (CSC) has jurisdiction over cases filed directly with it, regardless of who initiated the complaint. CSC likewise exercises concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board of Regents over administrative cases. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. Nos. 176162, 178845, October 09, 2012 Where the law allows its Board of Directors to create its own staffing pattern, it may hire a person even if the position being filled does not exist in the compensation and classification system of the Civil Service Commission. The rules that the Civil Service Commission (CSC) formulates should implement and be in harmony with the law it seeks to enforce. This is so since the CSC cannot enforce civil service rules and regulations contrary to, and cannot override, the laws enacted by Congress. TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 182249, March 5, 2013 When a public school teacher is subject of an administrative action, concurrent jurisdiction exists in the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Department of Education (DepEd) and the Board of Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC). Hence, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. ALBERTO PATOG, SR. v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 198755, June 5, 2013 ADDITIONAL, DOUBLE, OR INDIRECT COMPENSATION There has been no change of any long-standing rule, thus, no redefinition of the term “capital.” The terms “capital stock subscribed or paid,” “capital stock,” and “capital” were defined solely to determine the basis for computing the supervision and regulation fees under Section 40 (e) and (f) of the Public Service Act. HEIRS OF WILSON P. GAMBOA v. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES, G.R. No. 176579, October 09, 2012 Page 21 of 100

BILL OF RIGHTS DUE PROCESS (RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY) Due process, simply requires: (1) the right to notice of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person‘s legal right; (2) the right to a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor; (3) the right to a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and (4) the right to a finding or decision of that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties. MAYOR ABRAHAM N. TOLENTINO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) et al., G.R. Nos. 187958, 187961, and 187962, April 7, 2010 In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent‘s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one‘s favor, and to defend one‘s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. SPO1 LEONITO ACUZAR v. APRONIANO JOROLAN and HON. EDUARDO A. APRESA, PEOPLE’S LAW ENFORCEMENT BOARD (PLEB), G.R. No. 177878, April 7, 2010 Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. A.Z. ARNAIZ REALTY, INC. v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 170623, July 7, 2010 A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked at anytime directly or collaterally by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked. WINSTON F. GARCIA v. MARIO MOLINA AND ALBERT VELASCO, G.R. No. 157383, August 10, 2010 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one‘s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. RIMANDO GANNAPAO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 180141, May 31, 2011 As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he would have no reason to complain; the essence of due process is in the opportunity to be heard. MONICO K. IMPERIAL, JR. v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, G.R. No. 191224, October 4, 2011 The forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zenñ arosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violates or threatens the right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding private army groups (PAGs) with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups. MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA v. P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, et al., G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012

Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy. Thus, when the party seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard and air his side, but it is by his own fault or choice he squanders these chances, then his cry for due process must fail. THE HEIRS OF JOLLY R. BUGARIN v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174431, August 6, 2012 Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. DR. FERNANDO A. MELENDRES M.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES [LCP] v. PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 163859, August 15, 2012 Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in the strict judicial sense. What matters for due process purpose are notice of what is to be explained, not the form in which the notice is given, and simply the opportunity to be heard. SPS. EUGENE C. GO AND ANGELITA GO, AND MINOR EMERSON CHESTER KIM B. GO v. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, et al., G.R. No. 169391, October 10, 2012 The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard. JOHN C. ARROYO, et al. v. ROSAL HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC, G.R. No. 175155, October 22, 2012 Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. PACIFICO C. VELASCO v. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 169253, February 20, 2013 A government officer subject of an administrative action cannot claim that his right to due process was violated when he was made known of the charges against him and when he was able to file a counter- affidavit to refute the allegations against him. In an administrative case, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. ARLIC ALMOJUELA, G.R. No. 194368, April 2, 2013 The failure to designate the offense specifically and with precision is of no moment in this administrative case. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense. The law simply requires that the civil servant is informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him in a clear and concise manner to give the person a chance to answer the allegations intelligently. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) v. ARIEL R. MARQUEZ, G.R. No. 191877, June 18, 2013 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due

process. ENGINEER MANOLITO P. MENDOZA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 195395, September 10, 2013 Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one‘s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. RAY PETER O. VIVO v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAME CORPORATION (PAGCOR), G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013 There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required under R.A. 9262 (or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004) not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses’ affidavits to the petition. The grant of a Temporary Protection Order ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. Further, the essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. RALPH P. TUA v. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014 In due process, the parameter required is the presence of an opportunity to be heard, as well as the time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. This was not properly afforded to Saint Louis University. Plenary contempt power must be exercised judiciously and sparingly with highest self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retribution or vindication. It should not be availed of unless necessary in the interest of justice. SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC., ET AL. v. BABY NELLIE M. OLAIREZ, ET AL., G.R. No. 162299; March 25, 2014 The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be heard. Sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process exists when a party is given a chance to be heard through his motion for reconsideration. In the present case, we do not find it disputed that the respondents filed with the Secretary of Justice a motion for reconsideration of her resolution. Therefore, any initial defect in due process, if any, was cured by the remedy the respondents availed of. On the respondents’ allegation that they were denied due process during the NBI investigation, we stress that the functions of this agency are merely investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to any party. It cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI is an investigative agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative or as public welfare may require in accordance with its mandate. It also renders assistance when

requested in the investigation or detection of crimes in order to prosecute the persons responsible. Since the NBI’s findings were merely recommendatory, we find that no denial of the respondents’ due process right could have taken place; the NBI’s findings were still subject to the prosecutor’s and the Secretary of Justice’s actions for purposes of finding the existence of probable cause. We find it significant that the specimen signatures in the possession of Metrobank were submitted by the respondents for the consideration of the city prosecutor and eventually of the Secretary of Justice during the preliminary investigation proceedings. Thus, these officers had the opportunity to examine these signatures. RAY SHU v. JAIME DEE, ET AL., G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014 On the procedural grounds, the Court did not subscribe to the contention that petitioner’s right to due process was violated after the RTC had already conducted a full-blown trial on the Motion to Revoke, in compliance with the directive of the CA. Based on record, the petitioner had ample opportunity to refute the allegations contained in the Violation Report. The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard in support of his case; what the law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard. When the party seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard and to air his side, but it was by his own fault or choice that he squandered these chances, then his cry for due process must fail. NEIL E. SUYAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 189644, July 2, 2014 It is arbitrary as it deprives overseas workers of their monetary claims without any discernable valid purpose. Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract, in accordance with Section 10 of R.A. 8042. The award of the three-month equivalence of respondent’s salary must be modified accordingly. SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., v. JOY C. CABILES, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014 Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There may be no expression when there is no place where the expression may be made. COMELEC’s infringement upon petitioners’ property rights as in the present case also reaches out to infringement on their fundamental right to speech. Respondents have not demonstrated that the present state interest they seek to promote justifies the intrusion into petitioners’ property rights. Election laws and regulations must be reasonable. It must also acknowledge a private individual’s right to exercise property rights. Otherwise, the due process clause will be violated. THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015 K & G Mining Corporation was not deprived of due process. So long as a party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process. “The question is not whether petitioner succeeded in defending its rights and interests, but simply, whether it had the opportunity to present its side of the controversy.” Records show that the case took its regular course in lower tribunals. KGMC had the opportunity to be heard, was so heard and actively participated, in the proceedings before the Panel of Arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication Board. K & G MINING CORPORATION v. ACOJE MINING CORPORATION, INC., G.R. No. 188364, February 11, 2015 A cadet facing dismissal from the military academy for misconduct has constitutionally protected private interests (life, liberty, or property); hence, disciplinary proceeding conducted within the bounds of procedural due process is a must. For that reason, the Philippine Military Academy is not immune from the strictures of due process.

The statement that “a cadet can be compelled to surrender some civil rights and liberties in order for the Code and System to be implemented” simply pertains to what cadets have to sacrifice in order to prove that they are men or women of integrity and honor, such as the right to entertain vices and the right to freely choose what they want to say or do. In the context of disciplinary investigation, it does not contemplate a surrender of the right to due process but, at most, refers to the cadets’ rights to privacy and to remain silent. The minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process for students in disciplinary cases are: (1) The students must be informed in writing of the nature and the cause of any accusation against them; (2) They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) They shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Proceedings may be summary. Cross-examination is not an essential part of the investigation. Only substantial evidence is required, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative proceeding conducted to investigate a cadet’s honor violation need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. There is aversion to undue judicialization of an administrative hearing in the military academy. FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY v. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015 EQUAL PROTECTION The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. PINATUBO COMMERCIAL, G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010 Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010 Non-application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not violate the right to equal protection of the law. ATTY. VICENTE E. SALUMBIDES, JR., and GLENDA ARAÑA v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al., G.R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010 E.O. 1, creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, is declared unconstitutional insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, G.R. No. 193036, December 07, 2010 The consolidation of cases to a DOJ Special Panel under DO No. 182 does not violate equal protection of law and the right to speedy disposition of cases guaranteed by the Constitution. SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R. DACUDAO v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, G.R. No. 188056, January 08, 2013

The purpose of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution is to safeguard the integrity of contracts against unwarranted interference by the State. Section 47 of R.A. 8791 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. There is likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135. Further, the equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. Equal protection permits of reasonable classification. The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural persons was based on the nature of the properties foreclosed – whether these are used as residence, for which the more liberal one-year redemption period is retained, or used for industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership of property and enable mortgagee-banks to dispose sooner of these acquired assets. GOLDENWAY MERCHANDISING CORPORATION v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, G.R. NO. 195540, MARCH 13, 2013 We note that the Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not prohibit discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. AMELIA AQUINO, RODOLFO TAGGUEG, JR., ADELAIDA HERNANDEZ and LEOPOLDO BISCOCHO, JR. v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 181973, April 17, 2013 R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws, for the following reasons: (1) R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions. The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law; (2) The classification is germane to the purpose of the law. The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children; (3) the classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and apply equally to all members. The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse. R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. JESUS C. GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court- Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013 Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. In approving R.A. 9646, the legislature rightfully recognized the necessity of imposing the new licensure requirements to all real estate service practitioners, including and more importantly, those real estate service practitioners working for real estate developers. Unlike individuals or entities having isolated

transactions over their own property, real estate developers sell lots, houses, and condominium units in the ordinary course of business, a business which is highly regulated by the State to ensure the health and safety of home and lot buyers. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. v. PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE, G.R. No. 197676; February 4, 2014 This right does not require universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the same class. The Reproductive Health Law (RH Law) does not discriminate the poor. Rather, the RH Law provides priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women and children by providing free medical care. JAMES M. IMBONG, et al. v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., et al., G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014 Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of “privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.” It is a guarantee against “undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality.” There can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., v. JOY C. CABILES, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014 SEARCHES AND SEIZURES A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BELEN MACARIOS, G.R. No. 188611, June 16, 2010 Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the “plain view” of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. ELENITA C. FAJARDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011 A settled exception of the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures is that of an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not require a warrant. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NGYIK BUN, KWOK WAI CHENG et al., G.R. No. 180452, January 10, 2011 A search by a government employer of an employee‘s office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of workrelated misconduct. BRICCIO “Ricky” A. POLLO v. CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINODAVID, et al., G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011 In a buy-bust operation, the police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized, but duty-bound, to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GREGG C. BUENAVENTURA, G.R. No. 184807, November 23, 2011 The consequence of a violation of the guarantees against a violation of personal security and privacy and against unreasonable searches and seizures is the exclusion of the evidence thereby

obtained. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYNALDO BELOCURA, G.R. No. 173474, August 29, 2012 Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. HPS SOFTWARE AND COMMUNICATION CORPORATION AND HYMAN YAP v. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLOT), et al., G.R. Nos. 170217, 170694 December 10, 2012 Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. DON DJOWEL SALES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 191023, February 6, 2013 A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. The elements must be complied strictly since if the arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted therefrom was likewise illegal. GEORGE ANTIQUERA Y CODES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 180661, December 11, 2013 A general warrant is defined as "[a] search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to be arrested or the property to be seized." It is one that allows the "seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another" and gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take. Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued, vulnerable to abuses. Our Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and safeguards have been put in place to ensure that people and their properties are searched only for the most compelling and lawful reasons. WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 161106, January 13, 2014 The accused was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. The warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid since it is incidental to a lawful arrest. A search incidental to a lawful arrest includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto; (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit; and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. Any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DONALD VASQUEZ, G.R. No. 200304, January 15, 2014 The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is “to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach.” It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the State’s police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being

destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MEDARIO CALANTIAO, G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014 The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspect’s person and premises under his immediate control. This is so because “[o]bjects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.” “The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x x x. [It] serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused — and permits the warrantless seizure.” PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MEDARIO CALANTIAO, G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014 Considering that the appellant’s warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white crystalline substances seized from him is inadmissible in evidence, having come from an invalid search and seizure. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. OLIVER RENATO EDANO, G.R. No. 188133, July 7, 2014 For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of the aforequoted Rule, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYMAN ENDAYA, G.R. No. 205741, July 23, 2014 Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTOR COGAED, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014 For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the police officer introduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer. The police officer must also inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his or her part will amount to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. The police officer must communicate this clearly and in a language known to the person who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights. There must be an assurance given to the police officer that the accused fully understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a person’s constitutional right to privacy requires no less. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTOR COGAED, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014 RIGHT TO PRIVACY An individual’s right to privacy under Article 26 (1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase “prying into the privacy of another‘s residence,” therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private, including a business office. In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection Page 30 of 100

and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Simply put, a person has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in his property, whether he uses it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing his property or covering a significant portion thereof, without his consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013 The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Network activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. That the photos are viewable by “friends only” does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following: (1) Facebook “allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way”; (2) A good number of Facebook users “befriend” other users who are total strangers; (3) The sheer number of “Friends” one user has, usually by the hundreds; and (4) A user’s Facebook friend can “share” the former’s post, or “tag” others who are not Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only to his or her own Facebook friends. It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question. RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES v. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014 The Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression Page 31 of 100

of this video — which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption — he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case. DR. JOY MARGATE LEE v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN, G.R. No. 203254, October 8, 2014 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court. However, mere criticism should be distinguished from insult. MARC DOUGLAS IV C. CAGAS v. COMELEC, ET AL., G.R. No. 209185, February 25, 2014 The assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure. The Constitution itself provides as part of the means to ensure free, orderly, honest, fair and credible elections, a task addressed to the COMELEC to provide for a right to reply. 66 Given that express constitutional mandate, it could be seen that the Fundamental Law itself has weighed in on the balance to be struck between the freedom of the press and the right to reply. Accordingly, one is not merely to see the equation as purely between the press and the right to reply. Instead, the constitutionally-mandated desiderata of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections would necessarily have to be factored in trying to see where the balance lies between press and the demands of a right-to-reply. GMA NETWORK, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014 Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law; (b) reasonable; (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression; and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made with or on private property. This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons. First, as discussed, the principal message in the twin tarpaulins of petitioners consists of a social advocacy. Second, the present law — Section 3.3 of R.A. 9006 and Section 6 (c) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 — if applied to this case, will not pass the test of reasonability. A fixed size for election posters or tarpaulins without any relation to the distance from the intended average audience will be arbitrary. At certain distances, posters measuring 2 by 3 feet could no longer be read by the general public and, hence,

would render speech meaningless. It will amount to the abridgement of speech with political consequences. THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015 RIGHT TO TRAVEL The exercise of the right to travel guaranteed by the Constitution is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one‘s right to travel provided that such restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law. OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. JUDGE IGNACIO B. MACARINE, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770, July 18, 2012 RIGHT TO INFORMATION Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." HAZEL MA. C. ANTOLIN v. ABELARDO R. DOMONDON, et al., G.R. No. 165036, July 5, 2010 The right to information allows the public to hold public officials accountable to the people and aids them in engaging in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. By itself, it does not extend to causing the award of the sale of government assets in failed public biddings. Thus, assuming that a bidder, in a public bidding for the sale of government assets, may access the records for the purpose of validating the indicative price under the right to information, it does not follow that the said bidder is entitled to the award. PRIVATIZATION and MANAGEMENT OFFICE v. STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT and/or PHILIPPINE ESTATE CORPORATION, G.R. No. 200402, June 13, 2013 RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION The rationale for upholding the validity of union shop clauses in a CBA, even if they impinge upon the individual employee‘s right or freedom of association, is not to protect the union for the union‘s sake. Laws and jurisprudence promote unionism and afford certain protections to the certified bargaining agent in a unionized company because a strong and effective union presumably benefits all employees in the bargaining unit since such a union would be in a better position to demand improved benefits and conditions of work from the employer. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION-DAVAO CHAPTER-FEDERATION OF UNIONS IN BPI UNIBANK, G.R. No. 164301, August 10, 2010 RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM The Reproductive Health Law (RH Law) does not violate the right to religious freedom when it comes to mandatorily using taxpayer’s money to fund contraceptives and when it comes to requiring would-be spouses, as a condition for the issuance of marriage license, attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding, and infant nutrition. The State may pursue its objectives without being dictated by the policies of a particular religion; otherwise, it would violate the separation of State and Church.

But the RH Law violates the right to religious freedom when it comes to compelling medical health practitioners, health care providers, and hospitals to refer patients to other institutions even though it is against their religious beliefs. It has been held that religious freedom yields to compelling state interest. However, using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit the free exercise of the conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to life or health of an individual in the perceived scenarios. JAMES M. IMBONG, et al. v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., et al., G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014 The subject tarpaulins, on its face, do “not convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic church." That the position of the Catholic church appears to coincide with the message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the expression within the ambit of religious speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates classified under "Team Patay" and "Team Buhay" according to their respective votes on the RH Law. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech. THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015 EMINENT DOMAIN Notice is part of the constitutional right to due process of law. It informs the landowner of the State‘s intention to acquire a private land upon payment of just compensation and gives him the opportunity to present evidence that his landholding is not covered or is otherwise excused from the agrarian law. HEIRS OF DR. JOSE DELESTE, NAMELY: JOSEFA DELESTE, et al. v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., G.R. No. 169913. June 8, 2011 The defendant in an expropriation case who has objections to the taking of his property is now required to file an answer and in it raise all his available defenses against the allegations in the complaint for eminent domain. CITY OF MANILA v. MELBA TAN TE, G.R. No. 169263, September 21, 2011 In expropriation cases, the trial court has the discretion to act based the commissioners’ report. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) v. SPS. TAN SONG BOK AND JOSEFINA S. TAN, et al., G.R. No. 191448, November 16, 2011 Taking also occurs when agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner and approved by Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) for Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage through the stock distribution scheme, as in the instant case. Thus, Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI)’s submitting its stock distribution program for approval is an acknowledgment on its part that the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita are covered by CARP. However, it was the PARC approval which should be considered as the effective date of “taking” as it was only during this time that the government officially confirmed the CARP coverage of these lands. HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, et al., G.R. No. 171101, April 24, 2012

There is nothing infirm in an agreement which impliedly waives the right of City of Manila to present evidence that it was acquiring the subject lots by expropriation for a proper public purpose since it may be assumed that the parties knew what they were doing and since such agreement would facilitate early disposal of the case. CITY OF MANILA v. ALEGAR CORPORATION, et al., G.R. No. 187604, June 25, 2012 The consequence of a finding of unjust and improper titling of the entire property by the Republic is that the title over the excluded portion shall be returned or transferred back to the owners of the lot, with damages. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. v. PAZ O. MONTALVAN, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND, JESUS J. MONTALVAN, G.R. No. 190336, June 27, 2012 Sequestration is not meant to deprive the owner or possessor of his title or any right to his property and vest the same in the sequestering agency, the Government or any other person, as these can be done only for the causes and by the processes laid down by law. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ESTATE OF HANS MENZI (THROUGH ITS EXECUTOR, MANUEL G. MONTECILLO), SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) et al., G.R. No. 183446, November 13, 2012 No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential damages. Consequential damages are awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers from impairment or decrease in value. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS v. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (BPI), G.R. No. 203039, September 11, 2013 Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Taking of private property without just compensation is a violation of a person‘s property right. In situations where the government does not take the trouble of initiating an expropriation proceeding, the private owner has the option to compel payment of the property taken, when justified. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) v. ORTIGAS AND COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, G.R. No. 171496, March 3, 2014 JUST COMPENSATION To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., G.R. No. 183279, January 25, 2010 Although the formula found in Section 17 of the CARL may be justly adopted in certain cases, it is by no means the only formula that the court may adopt in determining just compensation. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FORTUNE SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, G.R. No. 177511, June 29, 2010 The just compensation due to the landowners for their expropriated property amounted to an effective forbearance on the part of the State. Thus, the applicable interest rate at 12% per annum, computed from the time the property was taken until the full amount of just compensation was paid. APO FRUITS CORPORATION AND HIJO PLANTATION, INC., v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010

It is settled that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The Department of Agrarian Reforms's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GLENN Y. ESCANDOR, et.al., G.R. No. 171685, October 11, 2010 It is a settled rule that the nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner. MOISESTINIO, JR. AND FRANCIS TINIO v. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, G.R. No. 160923, January 24, 2011 Just compensation determined in accordance with R.A. 6657, and not P.D. 27 or E.O. 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full, and ample. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MAGIN FERRER, ATTY. RAFAEL VILLAROSA, G.R. No. 172230, February 2, 2011 The Land Bank of the Philippines is not merely a nominal party in the determination of just compensation but an indispensable participant in such proceedings. As such, LBP possessed the legal personality to institute a petition for determination of just compensation. DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 181566, March 09, 2011 The proper determination of the same is a matter of transcendental importance. The determination of just compensation goes beyond the private interests involved; it involves a matter of public interest — the proper application of a basic constitutionally-guaranteed right, namely, the right of a landowner to receive just compensation when the government exercises the power of eminent domain in its agrarian reform program. APO FRUITS CORPORATION AND HIJO PLANTATION, INC. v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G. R. No. 164195, April 05, 2011 The fair market value of the lot should be determined at the time when the parties signed the compromise agreement and the same was approved because this is tantamount to EPZA impliedly agreeing to paying the market value in 1993. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY v. ESTATE OF SALUD JIMENEZ, et al., G.R. No. 188995, August 24, 2011 The Court has already categorically declared in that if the issue of just compensation is not settled prior to the passage of the CARL, it should be computed in accordance with the said law, although the property was acquired under P.D. 27. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF JESUS S. YUJUICO, et al., G.R. No. 18471, March 21, 2012 In the payment of just compensation, the payment of interest shall be made until full payment of the amount adjudged as just compensation for the land. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PERFECTO OBIAS, et al, G.R. No. 184406, March 14, 2012 Just compensation for private agricultural lands acquired by the government under the auspices of P.D. 27 in relation to E.O. 228 should be computed in accordance with the method set forth under R.A. 6657. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, REPRESENTED BY OIC-SECRETARY JOSE MARI B. PONCE, NOW BY SECRETARY NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN v. HEIRS OF ANGEL T. DOMINGO, G.R. No. 188670, March 7, 2012 While the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function vested in the RTC acting as a special agrarian court, the judge cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into full

consideration the factors specifically identified by law and implementing rules. Special agrarian courts are not at liberty to disregard the formula laid down by the Department of Agrarian Reform. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF SALVADOR ENCINAS and JACOBA DELGADO, G.R. No. 167735, April 18, 2012 The Department of Agrarian Reform, as the administrative agency tasked with the implementation of the agrarian reform program and pursuant to its rule-making power under R.A. 6657, translated the factors in Section 17 into a basic formula in DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, and those found in succeeding DAR administrative regulations. The application of these formulas is mandatory and imposes upon the RTC-SACs the duty to apply, and not to disregard, them in determining just compensation. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF JUAN LOPEZ, et al, G.R. No. 171038, June 20, 2012 Evidently in a case where the conflict is exactly on just compensation, the agrarian reform process has yet to be completed. Thus, the land shall be considered taken only upon payment of just compensation because it would complete the agrarian reform process. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. MANOLOGODUCO, G.R. Nos. 174007, 181327, June 27, 2012 In appraising just compensation the courts must consider, in addition, all the facts regarding the condition of the landholding and its surroundings, as well as the improvements and the capabilities of the landholding. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VERONICA ATEGANABLE, G.R. No. 176692, June 27, 2012 When the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled, such just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under R.A. 6657. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EMILIANO R. SANTIAGO, JR., G.R. No. 182209, October 03, 2012 Acquisition of the property under OLT or P.D. 27 does not necessarily mean that the determination of just compensation thereof must be under the same decree. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPS. ROKAYA AND SULAIMAN BONA, G.R. No. 180804, November 12, 2012 It is well-settled that, in expropriation of properties, the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking. HENRY L. SY v. LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY, G.R. No. 202690, June 5, 2013 When a private property is taken for public use and there is a dispute as to the amount of just compensation, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling. Compensation must be just not only to the property owner, but also to the public which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT ENGINEER CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS v. SPOUSES HERACLEO and RAMONA TECSON, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013 When the government takes property pursuant to P.D. 27, but does not pay the landowner his just compensation until after R.A. 6657 has taken effect in 1998, it becomes more equitable to determine just compensation using R.A. 6657 and not E.O. 228. Hence, the valuation of the GSP of palay should be based on its value at the time it was ordered paid by the SAC. It is more equitable to determine just compensation due the petitioners using values pursuant to the standard laid down in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, considering that the tenant-beneficiaries have already benefited from the land, while the landowners wait in vain to be paid. THE HEIRS OF SPOUSES DOMINGO TRIA AND

CONSORCIA CAMANO TRIA v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, G.R. No. 170245, July 1, 2013 Where there is a dispute as to the amount of just compensation, the method to be used in the determination of the value of the land must result to a fair and reasonable amount and must not drastically reduce the said value. Just compensation refers to full and fair equivalent of the property taken from the owner and to be "just," the compensation must be real, substantial, full and ample. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL O. GALLEGO, JR., JOSEPH L. GALLEGO and CHRISTOPHER L. GALLEGO, G.R. No. 173226, July 29, 2013 The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition. The amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. Further, the Court has consistently ruled that just compensation cannot be arrived at arbitrarily; several factors must be considered such as, but not limited to, acquisition cost, current market value of like properties, tax value of the condemned property, its size, shape, and location. But before these factors can be considered and given weight, the same must be supported by documentary evidence. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. YCLA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 193936. December 11, 2013 The determination of just compensation is fundamentally a judicial function. To guide the RTC-SAC in the exercise of its function, Section 17 of R.A. 6657 enumerates the factors required to be taken into account to correctly determine just compensation. The law (under Section 49 of R.A. 6657) likewise empowers the DAR to issue rules for its implementation. The DAR thus issued DAR AO 598 incorporating the law‘s listed factors in determining just compensation into a basic formula that contains the details that take these factors into account. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. YATCO AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, G.R. No. 172551. January 15, 2014 Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker‘s gain, but the owner‘s loss. It must not be arrived at arbitrarily, but determined after an evaluation of different factors. Section 5 of R.A. 8974 enumerates the standards for assessing the value of expropriated land taken for national government infrastructure projects: (a) the classification and use for which the property is suited; (b) the developmental costs for improving the land; (c) the value declared by the owners; (d) the current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity; (e) the reasonable disturbance compensation for the removal and/or demolition of certain improvements on the land and for the value of the improvements thereon; (f) the size, shape or location, tax declaration and zonal valuation of the land; (g) the price of the land as manifested in the ocular findings, oral as well as documentary evidence presented; and (h) such facts and events as to enable the affected property owners to have sufficient funds to acquire similarly-situated lands of approximate areas as those required from them by the government, and thereby rehabilitate themselves as early as possible. In this case, the trial court failed to consider other relevant factors such as the zonal valuation, tax declarations, and current selling price supported by documentary evidence.

Zonal valuation is just one of the indices of the fair market value of real estate and cannot be the sole basis of “just compensation” in expropriation cases. Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation. Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value the property are the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax declarations thereon. The measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. To be just, the compensation must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS v. ASIA PACIFIC INTEGRATED STEEL CORPORATION, G.R. No. 192100. March 12, 2014 The date of taking of the subject land for purposes of computing just compensation should be reckoned from the issuance dates of the emancipation patents. An emancipation patent constitutes the conclusive authority for the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the grantee. It is from the issuance of an emancipation patent that the grantee can acquire the vested right of ownership in the landholding, subject to the payment of just compensation to the landowner. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTORINO T. PERALTA, G.R. No. 182704, April 23, 2014 The clear intent of the Constitutional guarantee of just compensation, whether understood within the terms of Article III, Section 9 or of Article XIII, Section 4, is to secure to any owner the "full and fair equivalent" of the property taken. Regardless of whether the taking was pursued in the "traditional" exercise of eminent domain or in its "revolutionary" exercise in the context of the State’s agrarian reform program, just compensation has but one meaning and the State is obligated to pay the "fair and full price of the property" even if the property is taken for social justice purposes. Jurisprudence settles that the determination of just compensation is fundamentally a function of the courts. Section 57 of R.A. 6657 explicitly vests in the RTC-SAC the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation for lands taken pursuant to the State’s agrarian reform program. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BENECIO EUSEBIO, JR., G.R. No. 160143, July 2, 2014 For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking. In addition, the factors enumerated under Section 17 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program are: (a) the acquisition cost of the land; (b) the current value of like properties; (c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom; (d) the owner's sworn valuation; (e) the tax declarations; (f) the assessment made by government assessors; (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property; and (h) the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, if any, must be equally considered. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. SPOUSES DIOSDADO STA. ROMANA AND RESURRECCION O. RAMOS, ET AL., G.R. No. 183290, July 9, 2014 The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested in the regional trial court acting as a SAC, and not in administrative agencies. The SAC, therefore, must still be able to reasonably exercise its judicial discretion in the evaluation of the factors for just compensation, which cannot be arbitrarily restricted by a formula dictated by the DAR, an administrative agency. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. SPOUSES DIOSDADO STA. ROMANA AND RESURRECCION O. RAMOS, ET AL., G.R. No. 183290, July 9, 2014 The Regional Trial Court may impose interest on the just compensation award as may be warranted by the circumstances of the case. In previous cases, the Court has allowed the grant of legal interest

in expropriation cases where there is delay in the payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12% interest per annum (p.a.). from the time of taking until June 30, 2013 only. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just compensation due the landowners shall earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% interest p.a. in line with the amendment introduced by BSP-MB Circular No. 799, series of 2013. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. SPOUSES DIOSDADO STA. ROMANA AND RESURRECCION O. RAMOS, ET AL., G.R. No. 183290, July 9, 2014 RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. CAPT. WILFREDOROQUERO v. THE CHANCELLOR OF UP MANILA, et al., G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010 The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations. CLARITA J. CARBONEL v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 187689, September 07, 2010 An information elicited in violation of the rights of the accused or without a valid waiver thereof is inadmissible, and the evidence garnered as the result of that interrogation is also inadmissible. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FEDERICO LUCERO, G.R. No. 188705, March 02, 2011 When custodial investigation is conducted in violation of Section 12 of Article III, only evidence on confessions and admission of the accused as against himself is prohibited. HO WAI PANG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 176229, October 19, 2011 The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution is applicable only in custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. A written statement given by an employee during an administrative inquiry conducted by his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his employment, is not a statement given by a person under custodial investigation, hence, not falling under the proscription provided in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. CARLOS L. TANENGGEE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013 Where the Office of the Ombudsman fails to investigate a case in an expedient manner through its own fault, the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases is deemed violated. Such constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasijudicial. RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA v. SANBIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 191411; EDWIN N. NACIONALES, ERNESTO P. MALVAS, and JOSE MA. G. AMUGOD v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 191871, July 15, 2013 Speedy disposition of cases under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN FIRST DIVISION and THIRD DIVISION, HERNANDO BENITO PEREZ, Page 40 of 100

ROSARIO PEREZ, RAMON ARCEO and ERNEST ESCALER, G.R. No. 188165/G.R. No. 189063. December 11, 2013 The right to a speedy disposition of cases is guaranteed by the Constitution. The concept of speedy disposition is flexible. The fact that it took the CSC six years to resolve the appeal of petitioner does not, by itself, automatically prove that he was denied his right to the speedy disposition of his case. After all, a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient, as the facts and circumstances peculiar to the case must also be considered. EDILBERTO L. BARCELONA v. DAN JOEL LIM, G.R. No. 189171, June 3, 2014 The situation in Gutang was categorized as falling among the exemptions under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought to be examined came from the body of the accused. The Court said: This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. JAIME D. DELA CRUZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014 The right to a speedy trial, as well as other rights conferred by the Constitution or statute, may be waived except when otherwise expressly provided by law. One’s right to the speedy disposition of his case must therefore be asserted. Due to the failure of petitioner to assert this right, he is considered to have waived it. EDILBERTO L. BARCELONA v. DAN JOEL LIM, G.R. No. 189171, June 3, 2014 This Court has emphasized that “‘speedy trial” is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept. In determining whether the accused’s right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings. The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. “While the Court recognizes the accused’s right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial.” WILLIAM CO v. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, G.R. No. 183994, June 30, 2014 As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the term is statutorily defined in Section 3 (g) of R.A. 9851, to wit: (a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and, (d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. JULIAN YUSAY CARAM v. ATTY. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, G.R. No. 193652, August 5, 2014 The right to counsel upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of the Miranda rights, which require that: (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires. Page 41 of 100

The Miranda rights were incorporated in our Constitution but were modified to include the statement that any waiver of the right to counsel must be made “in writing and in the presence of counsel.” The invocation of these rights applies during custodial investigation, which begins “when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements.” PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARK JASON CHAVEZ, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014 R.A. 7438 expanded the definition of custodial investigation to “include the practice of issuing an ‘invitation’ to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the ‘inviting’ officer for any violation of law.” This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of their Miranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario. Chavez is also being questioned by an investigating officer in a police station. As an additional pressure, he may have been compelled to surrender by his mother who accompanied him to the police station. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARK JASON CHAVEZ, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014 His right against self-incrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined as in this case. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHARLIE FIELDAD, G.R. No. 196005, October 1, 2014 [T]he fact that [the accused] was not assisted by counsel during the investigation and inquest proceedings does not in any way affect his culpability. It has already been held that “the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation.” Here, [the accused’s] conviction was based not on his alleged uncounseled confession or admission but on the testimony of the prosecution witness. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ABOLA BIO, G.R. No. 195850, February 16, 2015 There is nothing in the 1987 Constitution stating that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel. The assistance of a lawyer, while desirable, is not indispensable. A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. Hence, the administrative body is under no duty to provide the person with counsel because assistance of counsel is not an absolute requirement. FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY V. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015 SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE The rights against self-incrimination and to counsel guaranteed under the Constitution are applied only during the custodial interrogation of a suspect. A person undergoing a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation and, hence, the audit examiner may not be considered the law enforcement officer contemplated by the rule. MARIERA DE CASTRO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 171672, February 2, 2015 DOUBLE JEOPARDY

The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANTE TAN, G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010 As a rule, judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double jeopardy. In order to come under the exceptional cases where a judgment of acquittal may be reconsidered by the court, it is not enough that the party invoke the exceptions he must be able to bring his pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions. ANTONIO LEJANO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 176389 and 176864, January 18, 2011 Only the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG), and not the private offended party, has the authority to question the order granting the demurrer to evidence in a criminal case. And an acquittal by virtue of a demurrer to evidence is not appealable because it will place the accused in double jeopardy. BENJAMIN B. BANGAYAN, JR v. SALLY GO BANGAYAN, GR No. 172777, October 19, 2011 Mistrial is the only exception to the well-settled principle that acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. This Court was categorical in stating that a re-examination of the evidence without a finding of mistrial will violate the right to repose of an accused, which is what is protected by the rule against double jeopardy. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HONORABLE CA, et al., G.R. No. 198589, July 25, 2012 There is simply no double jeopardy when the subsequent information charges another with a different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts. Prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is the prosecution for the same offense. ISABELO A. BRAZA v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 1950, February 20, 2013 The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the OSG. Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It must be noted that the private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The rule is that a judgment acquitting the accused is final and immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Such acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial court or on appeal at the CA. Thus, the State is proscribed from appealing the judgment of acquittal of the accused to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court but such may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. DENNIS T. VILLAREAL v. CONSUELO C. ALIGA, G.R. No. 166995, January 13, 2014 CITIZENSHIP Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent membership in a political community. It denotes possession within that particular political community of full civil and political rights

subject to special disqualifications. Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of allegiance to the political community.14 The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office and the right to petition the government for redress of grievance. DENNIS L. GO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 202809, July 2, 2014 NATURALIZATION AND DENATURALIZATION It is not the registration of the act of election of Philippine citizenship, although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, which will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed. BALGAMELO CABILING MA, et al. v. COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., et al., G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010 Bare general assertions cannot discharge the burden of proof that is required of an applicant for naturalization. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. KERRY LAO ONG, G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012 Where a foreigner seeking to be granted of Philippine citizenship does not follow the rule on the period to file his petition, the action must be dismissed. The opportunity given to a foreigner to become a citizen is a mere privilege and the absence of one requirement is fatal to the petition of the foreigner. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LI CHING CHUNG, a.k.a. BERNABE LUNA LI, a.k.a. STEPHEN LEE KENG, G.R. No. 197450, March 20, 2013 A Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is different from judicial naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire the privilege of becoming a Philippine citizen based on requirements required under CA 473. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS, G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013 Under the present laws, the process of naturalization can be judicial or administrative. Judicially, C.A. No. 473 provides that after hearing the petition for citizenship and receipt of evidence showing that the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by law, the competent court may order the issuance of the proper naturalization certificate and the registration thereof in the proper civil registry. On the other hand, R.A. 9139 provides that aliens born and residing in the Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by administrative proceeding by filing a petition for citizenship with the Special Committee, which, in view of the facts before it, may approve the petition and issue a certificate of naturalization. In both cases, the petitioner shall take an oath of allegiance to the Philippines as a sovereign nation. DENNIS L. GO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 202809, July 2, 2014 Petitioner’s failure to state his former residence in the petition was fatal to his application for naturalization. Indeed, this omission had deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Differently stated, the inclusion of present and former places of residence in the petition is a jurisdictional requirement, without which the petition suffers from a fatal and congenital defect which cannot be cured by evidence on the omitted matter at the trial. DENNIS L. GO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 202809, July 2, 2014 LOSS AND REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

A Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice. IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO MUNESES, A.M. No. 2112, July 24, 2012 Foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath. TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012 The act of using a foreign passport does not divest one of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as a foreign citizen, he voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant he represented himself as a foreign citizen by using his foreign passport. Dual citizens by naturalization are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office. If by the time an aspiring candidate filed his certificate of candidacy he was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and foreign citizenship, he was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a local elective position. By being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. Being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS MODES AND KINDS OF APPOINTMENT A permanent appointment implies the holding of a civil service eligibility on the part of the appointee, unless the position involved requires no such eligibility. Where the appointee does not possess a civil service eligibility, the appointment is considered temporary. The subsequent acquisition of the required eligibility will not make the temporary appointment regular or permanent; a new appointment is needed. JUSTINA MANIEBO v. CA, G.R. No. 158708, August 10, 2010 When the position is not among those enumerated in Section 7, Chapter 2, Book V, Title 1 (Subtitle A) of E.O. 292, otherwise known as The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the appointment in order to be valid does not require presidential appointment. MODESTO AGYAO, JR. v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 182591, January 18, 2011 R.A. 6975 is intended only to prevent the new appointee from serving beyond the term of office of the original appointee. It does not prohibit the new appointee from serving less than the unexpired portion of the term as in the case of a temporary appointment. HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL v.

HON. ALEJANDRO S. URRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE NEW APPOINTEE VICE HEREIN PETITIONER, et al., G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011 Section 1 (2), Article IX (D) of the 1987 Constitution and similar provisions do not peremptorily prohibit the promotional appointment of a commissioner to chairman, provided the new appointee‘s tenure in both capacities does not exceed seven years in all. DENNIS A. B. FUNA, v. THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REYNALDO A. VILLAR, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012 The language of Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation, as such, the prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary. DENNIS FUNA v. ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALBERTO C. AGRA, et al., G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013 A person who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 may still be appointed in a government position provided that it is a coterminous or primarily confidential position. The tenure of a confidential employee is coterminous with that of the appointing authority, or is at the latter‘s pleasure. The position of a General Manager (GM) in a water district is considered as a confidential position due to the intimate relationship between the GM and the Board of Directors (BOD) of the water district and the power of the BOD to terminate the services of the GM on the ground of loss of confidence. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. PILILLA WATER DISTRICT, G.R. No. 190147, March 5, 2013 DISABILITIES AND INHIBITIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS A reading of the conflict of interest rule reveals that the prohibition against NEA personnel from participating in any question pertaining to a public service entity where he is directly or indirectly interested has the purpose of preventing such personnel from exercising the power of his office for personal pecuniary gain, which may cause grave damage and prejudice to public interest. NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND PEDRO RAMOS, G.R. No. 149497, January 25, 2010 DUTIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS There is a tremendous difference between the degree of responsibility, care, and trustworthiness expected of a clerk or ordinary employee in the bureaucracy and that required of bank managers, cashiers, finance officers, and other officials directly handling large sums of money and properties. SALVADOR O. ECHANO, JR. v. LIBERTY TOLEDO, G.R. No. 173930, September 15, 2010 Every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, he must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of her official duties but also in her personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the court‘s good name and standing. LOURDES CELAVITE-VIDAL v. NORAIDA A. AGUAM, A.M. No.SCC-10- 13-P, June 26, 2012 Acts may constitute Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service as long as they tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public office. Where a professor in a state university directly sells books to her students, the acts shall constitute Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service taking into account that the said act is prohibited by the institution, her moral ascendancy over her students, the book/compilation was overpriced, and that the students’ refusal to buy the

book/compilation could result in their failure in the subject. DR. ZENAIDA P. PIA v. HON. MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR., OVERALL DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, FORMERLY ACTING OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, DR. OFELIA M. CARAGUE, FORMERLY PUP PRESIDENT, DR. ROMAN R. UANNUG, FORMERLY DEAN, COLLEGE OF ECONOMICS, FINANCE AND POLITICS (CEFP), NOW ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, CEFP POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES (PUP), STA. MESA, MANILA, G.R. No. 172334, June 5, 2013 Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public servants must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, they must faithfully adhere to, hold sacred and render inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust; that all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. ATTY. VIRGILLO P. ALCONERA v. ALFREDO T. PALLANAN, A.M. No. P-12-3069, January 20, 2014 Section 8 of R.A. 6713, requires all public officials and employees to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of their SALN. In this relation, the same provision mandates full disclosure of the concerned public official's (a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current fair market value, (b) personal property and acquisition cost, (c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like,(d) liabilities, and(e) all business interests and financial connections. ANGELITO R. MARQUEZ, ET AL. v. JUDGE VENANCIO OVEJERA AND SHERIFF IV LOURDES COLLADO, A.M. No. P-11-2903, February 5, 2014 While the law and justice abhor all forms of abuse committed by public officers and employees whose sworn duty is to discharge their functions with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence, accountability, and loyalty, the court must protect them against unsubstantiated charges that tend to adversely affect, rather than encourage, the effective performance of their duties and functions. MICHAELINA RAMOS BALASBAS v. PATRICIA B. MONAYAO, G.R. No. 190524, February 17, 2014 RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. GSIS AND WINSTON F. GARCIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRES. & GEN. MANAGER OF GSIS v. DINNAH VILLAVIZA, et al., G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010 Though respondent is a casual employee as contemplated under Rule III, Section 2(f) of the Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, she is entitled to due process especially if they are to be removed for more serious causes or for causes other than that provided under Civil Service Commission Form No. 001, to wit: (1) when their services are no longer needed; (2) funds are no longer available; (3) the project has already been completed/finished; or (4) their performance are below par. PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND REYNALDO P. MARTIN v. MARIE JEAN C. LAPID, G.R. No. 191940, April 12, 2011 Rice subsidy is one of the benefits that will be granted to employees of GOCCs or GFIs only if they are "incumbents" as of July 1, 1989. MANOLITO AGRA, et al. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 167807, December 6, 2011

The only exception for an employee to receive additional, double and indirect compensation is where the law allows him to receive extra compensation for services rendered in another position which is an extension or is connected with his basic work. HILARION F. DIMAGIBA, et al. v. JULITA ESPARTERO, et al., G.R. No. 154952, July 16, 2012 R.A. 6758 withdrew the authority of the NHA to grant additional incentive benefits to its project personnel. Only those additional compensation benefits being received by incumbents before the effectivity of R.A. 6758, which were not integrated into the standardized salary rates, shall continue to be authorized. GENEROSO ABELLANOSA, et al. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 185806, July 24, 2012 It is a standing rule that every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the discharge of official duties, such that, in the absence of any proof that a public officer has acted with malice or bad faith, he should not be charged with personal liability for damages that may result from the performance of an official duty. Good faith is always presumed and he who alleges the contrary bears the burden to convincingly show that malice or bad faith attended the public officer‘s performance of his duties. Case law also exhorts that although a public officer is the final approving authority and the employees who processed the transaction were directly under his supervision, personal liability does not automatically attach to him but only upon those directly responsible for the unlawful expenditures. ROSALINDA DIMAPILIS-BALDOZ, in her capacity as then administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, represented by CHAIRMAN REYNALDO A. VILLAR AND COMMISSIONER JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., G.R. No. 199114, July 16, 2013 LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS In administrative cases, misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause; dishonesty, on the other hand, dishonesty has been defined as intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion. It is a well-settled rule that a public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees are dutybound to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and shall remain accountable to the people. GERARDO Q. FERRERAS v. RUDY P. ECLIPSE, A.M. No. P-052085, January 20, 2010 To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest. TERESITA NARVASA v. BENJAMIN A. SANCHEZ, JR., G.R. No. 169449, March 26, 2010 Acts which affect the performance of duties as an officer of the court and taints the judiciary‘s integrity should be punished accordingly. ROLAND ERNEST MARIE JOSE SPELMANS v. JUDGE GAYDIFREDO T. OCAMPO, A.M. No.MTJ-07-1663, March 26, 2010 Misconduct generally means wrongful, unlawful conduct, motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. Thus, any transgression or deviation from the established norm, whether it be

work- related or not, amounts to misconduct. PRISCILLA HERNANDO v. JULIANA BENGSON, A.M. No. P- 09-2686, March 10, 2010 Compensation and benefits of public officers are not intended purely for the personal benefit of officers neither is payment of salaries and benefits to a public officer satisfies the public purpose requirement. That theory would lead to the anomalous conclusion that government officers and employees may be paid enormous sums without limit or without any justification necessary other than that such sums are being paid to someone employed by the government. RAMON R. YAP v. COMMISION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010 Dishonesty is defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. ALAN A. OLANDESCA, G.R. No. 171434, April 23, 2010 The failure to remit the funds in due time amounts to dishonesty and grave misconduct which are both punishable with dismissal from service. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. MARCELA V. SANTOS, A.M. No. P-06-2287, October 12, 2010 In order that the public officer may be held guilty of giving unwarranted advantage to another to the prejudice of the government, it must be shown that the accused public officials did not rely on the competence and good faith of his subordinates. ANTONIO Y. DE JESUS, SR., ANATOLIO A. ANG and MARTINA S. APIGO v. SANDIGANBAYAN-FOURTH DIVISION and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 182539-40, February 21, 2011 Misrepresentation of qualifications, i.e., educational attainment and eligibility for government service amounts to plain and simple dishonesty as it refers to the act of intentionally making a false statement on any material fact in securing one's appointment. ANTONIO EXEQUIEL A. MOMONGAN v PRIMITIVO A. SUMAYO, A.M. No. P-10-2767, April 12, 2011 The public official‘s personal liability arises only if the expenditure of government funds was made in violation of law. TOMAS R. OSMEÑA, IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY MAYOR OF CEBU CITY v. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 188818 May 31, 2011 The Court will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the people‘s faith in the judiciary. ESPINA & MADARANG CO. & MAKAR AGRICULTURAL COMMERCIAL & DEVELOPMENT CORP. (MAKAR) v. HON. CADER P. INDAR AL HAJ, A.M. No. RTJ07-2069, December 14, 2011 Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property. In cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. VICTORY M. FERNANDEZ v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al., G.R. No. 193983, March 14, 2012 An administrative offense constitutes “misconduct” when it has direct relation to, and is connected with, the performance of the official duties of the one charged. Thus, misconduct refers to a transgression of an established and definite rule of action, more specifically, some unlawful

behavior or gross negligence by the public officer charged. PRISCILLA L. HERNANDO v. JULIANA Y. BENGSON, LEGAL RESEARCHER, RTC, BRANCH 104, QUEZON CITY, A.M. No. P-09-2686 (Formerly OCA I.P.I No. 06- 2441-P), March 21, 2012 An officer or employee in the government shall be considered habitually absent only if he incurs unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable 2/5 days monthly leave credit under the Civil Service Rules for at least three months in a semester or at least three consecutive months during the year. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. MANUEL Z. ARAYA, JR., UTILITY WORKER, MTCC, BRANCH 2, OZAMIS CITY, A.M. No.P-12-3053, (formerly A.M. No. 06-3-88- MTCC) Dismissal from the service, as a prescribed penalty imposed by Section 52 (A) (1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules for the commission of dishonesty even as a first offense, underscores the constitutional principle that public office is a public trust and only those who can live up to such exacting standard deserve the honor of continuing in public service. FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. FLORENTINO VELOSO, G.R. No. 196201, June 19, 2012 The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA) v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 189767, July 3, 2012 Taking monetary evidence without proper authority constitutes theft warranting the penalty of dismissal and cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from re- employment in the government service. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. MA. IRISSA G. MUSNI, A.M. No. P-11-3024, July 17, 2012 When an individual is found guilty of dishonesty, the corresponding penalty is dismissal from employment or service. BAGONG KAPISANAN SA PUNTA TENEMENT, INC v. AZER E. DOLOT, et al., G.R. NO. 179054, September 05, 2012 In case of dishonesty, the individual intentionally makes a false statement of any material fact, practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in order to secure his examination, registration, appointment, or promotion. Given the fact that respondent government officer was able to successfully overcome the onus of demonstrating that he does not possess any unexplained wealth and that the omissions (he did not disclose any business interest and/or financial connection, but showed a steady increase of his net worth) in his Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALNs) did not betray any sense of bad faith or the intent to mislead or deceive on his part considering that his SALNs actually disclose the extent of his and his wife‘s assets and business interests, respondent is merely culpable of Simple Negligence instead of the more serious charge of Dishonesty. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. ARNEL A. BERNARDO, ATTORNEY V, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR) G.R. No. 181598, March 6, 2013 Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference. On the other hand, gross neglect of duty is characterized by want of even the slightest care, or by conscious indifference to the consequences, and in cases involving public officials, by flagrant and palpable breach of duty. It is the omission of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own Page 50 of 100

property. Where a bank officer wilfully disregards the bank procedures, the act constitutes gross, not a simple, neglect of duty. This is so since the banking business is one impressed with public trust and a higher degree of diligence is imposed on banks compared to an ordinary business enterprise in the handling of deposited funds; the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their officials and employees is far greater than those imposed on ordinary officers and employees in other enterprises. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARTEMIO S. SAN JUAN, JR., G.R. No. 186279, April 2, 2013 When an elected official refuses to recognize a legitimate operation of a government agency and wilfully intervenes to lead the said operation to failure, grave misconduct is committed. It is characterized by a clear intent to violate the law, or a flagrant disregard of established rules, which must all be supported by substantial evidence. FRANKLlN ALEJANDRO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, represented by Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013 Where an officer or employee in the civil service incurs unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable 2.5 days monthly leave credit for at least three months in a semester or at least three consecutive months during the year, his act constitutes habitual absenteeism. If it is the second offense of the employee, the proper penalty is dismissal from service. Nonetheless, in several administrative cases, the Court refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating facts. The Court has considered the employee‘s length of service, acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feelings of remorse, advanced age, family circumstances and other humanitarian and equitable considerations in determining the appropriate penalty. The Court also ruled that where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by the employee ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. JUDGE MA. MONINA S. MISAJON, Municipal Trial Court (MTC), San Jose, Antique v. JERENCE P. HIPONIA, Clerk II, ELIZABETH B. ESCANILLAS, Stenographer I, WILLIAM M. YGLESIAS, Process Server, and CONRADO A. RAFOLS, JR., Utility Aide, all of the same court, A.M. No. P-08- 2439, June 25, 2013 Misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. A government employee who is found guilty of grave misconduct may be dismissed from the service even upon the first offense. ROLANDO GANZON v. FERNANDO ARLOS, G.R. No. 174321, October 22, 2013 Doctrine of conclusiveness of administrative findings of fact is not absolute. It is well settled that findings of fact by the administrative or quasi-judicial agencies are conclusive only when supported by substantial evidence. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is considered as grave if it involves additional elements such as corruption or willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proven by substantial evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. PRIMO C. MIRO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas v. MARILYN MENDOZA VDA. DE EREDEROS, CATALINA ALINGASA and PORFERIO I. MENDOZA, G.R. Nos. 172532 172544-45, November 20, 2013 Page 51 of 100

There is no defense in receiving money from party-litigants. The act itself makes court employees guilty of grave misconduct. Grave misconduct is a serious transgression of some established and definite rule of action that tends to threaten the very existence of the system of administration of justice an official or employee serves. It may manifest itself in corruption, or in other similar acts, done with the clear intent to violate the law or in flagrant disregard of established rules. Dishonesty has been defined as "the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." VILLAHERMOSA SR. v. SARCIA, A.M. No. CA-14-28-P, February 11, 2014 Dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary, as no other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness from an employee than a position in the judiciary. An administrative case for dishonesty against a court employee is cognizable by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) pursuant to Section 6 Article VIII of the Constitution. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. NENITA C. LONGOS, CLERK II, MUNICPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, DEL CARMEN-NUMANCIA-SAN ISIDRO-SAN BENITO, SURIGAO DEL NORTE, A.M. No. P-12-3070, March 11, 2014 In Blaquera v. Alcala, the Court no longer required the officials and employees of different government departments and agencies to refund the productivity incentive bonus they received because there was no indicia of bad faith and the disbursement was made in the honest belief that the recipients deserved the amounts. But this was qualified in Casal v. COA, where SC held the approving officials liable for the refund of the incentive award due to their patent disregard of the issuances of the President and the directives of COA. There, the officials’ failure to observe the issuances amounted to gross negligence, which is inconsistent with the presumption of good faith. TESDA v. COA, G.R. No. 204869, March 11, 2014 The act of fraudulently securing one’s appointment constitutes dishonesty. “Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement on any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, appointment or registration.” CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. LONGOS, A.M. No. P-12-3070, March 11, 2014 Clerks of Courts perform a delicate function as designated custodians of the court’s funds, revenues, records, properties and premises. By failing to remit on time, she violated the trust reposed to her as a disbursement officer. Delay in the remittance is a serious breach of duty, which carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from service. However, jurisprudence on administrative cases refrains from imposing actual penalties if mitigating circumstances are present. Conditions such as length of service, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations may alter the court’s decision. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. PEREZ, A.M. No. P-12-3074, March 17, 2014 Loafing is defined under the Civil Service rules as “frequent unauthorized absences from duty during office hours.” The word “frequent” connotes that the employees absent themselves from duty more than once. Respondent’s two absences from his post, being without authority, can already be characterized as frequent. It constitutes inefficiency and dereliction of duty, which adversely affect the prompt delivery of justice. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. JOHNI GLENN D. RUNES, A.M. No. P-12-3055, March 26, 2014 Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order, which a superior officer is entitled to

give and have obeyed. It imports a willful or intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable instructions of the employer. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY v. ARANDIA, G.R. No. 199549, April 7, 2014 Misconduct has a legal and uniform definition. It is defined as an intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official. A misconduct is grave where the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are present. JESSE PHILIP B. EIJANSANTOS v. SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE 156, G.R. No. 203696, June 2, 2014 Misconduct is defined as “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.” Misconduct becomes grave if it “involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.” Section 52 (A) (3), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that the penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal from the service. RUBY P. LAGOC v. MARIA ELENA MALAGA, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ET AL., G.R. No. 184890, July 9, 2014 Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray; unworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness. It is a malevolent act that makes people unfit to serve the judiciary. Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failureto discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE LAGADO v. CLERK II BRYAN LEONIDO, A.M. No. P-14-3222, August 12, 2014 Under Administrative Circular No. 14-2002, an officer or employee in the civil service shall be considered habitually absent if he incurs unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable 2.5 days monthly leave credit under the leave law for at least three (3) months in a semester or at least three (3) consecutive months during the year. RE: REPORT OF JUDGE RODOLFO D. VAPOR ON THE HABITUAL ABSENTEEISM OF FILIGRIN E. VELEZ, JR., PROCESS SERVER, A.M. No. P-14-3232, August 12, 2014 Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or registration. Dishonesty was understood to imply a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity. Respondent’s act of recommending approval despite lack of certification from end-users does not constitute dishonesty. It is actually a form of gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct. Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences, insofar as other persons

may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless persons never fail to take on their own property. In cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. Misconduct is an intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official. As differentiated from simple misconduct, in grave misconduct the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FLORENDO B. ARIAS, G.R. No. 188909, September 17, 2014 Sheriffs, being ranking officers of the court and agents of the law, must discharge their duties with great care and diligence. In serving and implementing writs, as well as processes and orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without affecting adversely the proper dispensation of justice. Simple Neglect of Duty is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference. On the other hand, Grave Abuse of Authority has been defined as a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or other injury; it is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority. SPS. SABIJON v. DE JUAN, A.M. No. P-14-3281, January 28, 2015 The Administrative Code of 1987 provides that a public employee’s failure to pay just debts is a ground for disciplinary action. Just debts are defined as (a) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (b) claims, the existence and justness of which, are admitted by the debtor. Willful failure to pay just debts is a light offense with the corresponding penalty of reprimand for the first offense. Failure to pay debts can indeed be considered, broadly speaking, as misconduct. However, when the gravamen of the offense is unwillingness to pay a just obligation, the employee should be held guilty for willful failure to pay just debt. MARY-ANN S. TORDILLA v. AMILANO, A.M. P-14-3241, February 4, 2015 Allowing another person to take the examination in one’s behalf is an act of dishonesty. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. JOVILYN DAWANG, A.M. No. P-15-3289, February 17, 2015 PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION An employee who was preventively suspended will still be entitled to step increment after serving the time of his preventive suspension even if the pending administrative case against him has not yet been resolved or dismissed. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM AND WINSTON F. GARCIA v. ALBERT M. VELASCO AND MARIO I. MOLINA, G.R. No. 170463, February 2, 2011 The issuance by the proper disciplining authority of an order of preventive suspension for 90 days of a civil officer or employee pending investigation of her administrative case is authorized provided that a formal charge is served to her and her charge involves dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that she is guilty of the charge as to warrant her removal from the service. TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MA. ROSARIO S. MANALANGDEMIGILLO, G.R. No. 176343, September 18, 2012

ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, REINSTATEMENT AND BACK SALARIES An illegally terminated civil service employee is entitled to back salaries limited only to a maximum period of five years, and not full back salaries from his illegal termination up to his reinstatement. ISABEL GALANG v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 175276, May 31, 2011 Section 63 of the EPIRA as well as Section 5, Rule 33 of the IRR clearly state that the displaced or separated personnel as a result of the privatization, if qualified, shall be given preference in the hiring of the manpower requirements of the privatized companies. Clearly, the law only speaks of preference and by no stretch of the imagination can the same amount to a legal right to the position. Undoubtedly, not all the terminated employees will be re-hired by the selection committee. ENRIQUE U. BETOY v. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, G.R. Nos. 156556-57, October 4, 2011 A government officer or employee‘s removal from office as a result of a bona fide reorganization is a valid cause for that employee‘s removal. CARLOS COTIANGCO, et al. v. THE PROVINCE OF BILIRAN AND THE CA G.R. No. 157139, October 19, 2011 A government employee enjoys constitution protection that ―No officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. VICTOR R. REYES, substituted by his heirs, CLARIBEL G. REYES, CLARISSA G. REYES, and CZARINA G. REYES v. CA, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 167002, December 12, 2011 For a valid dismissal from the government service, the requirements of due process must be complied with. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORP. v. COURT OF APPEALS and MIA MANAHAN, G.R. No. 185668, December 13, 2011 Failure to adduce substantial evidence that the act was part of the fraudulent scheme amounting to grave misconduct, dishonesty and reasonable violation of office rules and regulations presupposes that the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from the service is not warranted. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, REPRESENTED BY ROBERT G. VERGARA v. HEIDI R. CHUA, G.R. No. 202914, September 26, 2012 When there is reorganization conducted pursuant to an authority granted to the BOD of a government-owned and controlled corporation, an officer reassigned to a new position cannot claim that she was illegally removed from the previous one on the claim that the BOD has no authority to conduct reorganization. The BOD of a government-owned and controlled corporation may be granted by law the authority to effect reorganization therein. Thus, a reorganization undertaken pursuant to a specific statutory authority by the Board of Directors of a governmentowned and government-controlled corporation is valid. ATTY. MA. ROSARIO MANALANGDEMIGILLO v. TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (TIDCORP) et al., G.R. No. 168613, G.R. No. 185571, & G.R. No. 185571, March 5, 2013 When a government officer is subject to an administrative action, there must be a formal charge against him/her and an investigation to give him/her ample opportunity to be heard. A formal charge issued prior to the imposition of administrative sanctions must conform to the requirements set forth in Section 16, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. If the purported — formal charge does not contain the requirements set forth in Section 16, it cannot be said that the employee concerned has been formally charged, rendering the dismissal from

service invalid. A memorandum directing the person to explain within a given period of time does not constitute as a formal charge. Such wanton disregard of the proper procedure in administrative investigations under the civil service rules cannot be countenanced. For a valid dismissal from the government service, the requirements of due process must be complied with. TERESITA L. SALVA v. FLAVIANA M. VALLE, G.R. No. 193773, April 2, 2013 Civil servants enjoy security of tenure, and “[n]o officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process.” Under Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative Code, it is the Civil Service Commission that has the power to “[h]ear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal.” LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY v. AURORA A. SALVANA, G.R. No. 192074, June 10, 2014 OTHER MATTERS Section 13 (3) of R.A. 7077 evidently has to do with the composition of the Retired Reserve Unit. The provision in question does not prescribe the retirement age for reservists who are called into active service in the regular armed forces. COL. JESUS G. CABARRUS, JR., PAF (RES.) v. HON. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, et al., G.R. No. 180966, June 13, 2012 Resignation implies an intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority. To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority. In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be operative and effective. Without acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer remains in office. Resignation to be effective must be accepted by competent authority, either in terms or by something tantamount to an acceptance, such as the appointment of the successor. A public officer cannot abandon his office before his resignation is accepted, otherwise the officer is subject to the penal provisions of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. The final or conclusive act of a resignation’s acceptance is the notice of acceptance. The incumbent official would not be in a position to determine the acceptance of his resignation unless he had been duly notified therefor. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY v. AURORA A. SALVANA, G.R. No. 192074, June 10, 2014 During the pendency of the present administrative matter, respondent Sahi suffered a stroke and resigned from office in January 2011. Her claim for separation benefits and accrued leave credits though cannot be processed and released for lack of requirements. Nonetheless, respondent Sahi’s resignation does not render this case moot. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when a court employee is facing administrative sanction. PRESIDING JUDGE JUAN GABRIEL HIZON ALANO v. PADMA LATIP SAHI, ET AL., A.M. No. P-11-3020, June 25, 2014 P.D. 626, as amended, defines compensable sickness as “any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions.” Based on this definition, we ruled that for sickness and the resulting death of an employee to be compensable, the claimant must show either: (1) that it is a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex “A” of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation with the conditions set therein satisfied; or (2) if not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the working conditions.

The new employee compensation program now directs that all covered employers throughout the country be required by law to contribute fixed and regular premiums or contributions to a trust fund for their employees. Benefits are paid from this trust fund. If diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the trust fund would be endangered. In this sense, compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families look up to for compensation whenever covered accidents, salary and deaths occur. GSIS v. JOSE CAPACITE, G.R. No. 199780, September 24, 2014 NPC employees who were separated from the service because of the reorganization of the electric power industry and who received their separation pay under the EPIRA Law are still entitled to receive loyalty awards under the CSC Memorandum Circular. We declared that the receipt of retirement benefits does not bar the retiree from receiving separation pay. Separation pay is a statutory right designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal during the period that he/she is looking for another employment. On the other hand, retirement benefits are intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening the burden of worrying about his financial support, and are a form of reward for his loyalty and service to the employer. A separation pay is given during one's employable years, while retirement benefits are given during one's unemployable years. Hence, they are not mutually exclusive. Thus, it is clear that a separation pay at the time of the reorganization of the NPC and retirement benefits at the appropriate future time are two separate and distinct entitlements. Thus, not unless the loyalty award was considered in the computation of the separation pay, the same should not be withdrawn from the employees enumerated in the ND. NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 204800, October 14, 2014 A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, insofar as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. This clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity of the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State. Assuming that Gaite was a de facto officer of the Office of the President after his appointment to the Securities and Exchange Commission, any decision he renders during this time is presumed to be valid, binding, and effective. REMIGIO D. ESPIRITU v. LUTGARDA TORRES DEL ROSARIO, G.R. No. 204964, October 15, 2014 THE CIVIL SERVICE For an examinee or an incumbent to be a member of the CES and be entitled to security of tenure, she/he must pass the CES examinations, be conferred CES eligibility, comply with the other requirements prescribed by the CES Board, and be appointed to a CES rank by the President. PEZA BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND LILIA DE LIMA v. GLORIA MERCADO, G.R. No. 172144, March 9, 2010

Our Constitution, in using the expressions ―all workers and ―no officer or employee, puts no distinction between a probationary and a permanent or regular employee which means that both probationary and permanent employees enjoy security of tenure. Probationary employees enjoy security of tenure in the sense that during their probationary employment, they cannot be dismissed except for cause or for failure to qualify as regular employees. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC) v. GREGORIO MAGNAYE, JR., G.R. No. 183337, April 23, 2010 Reorganization is valid provided that it is done in good faith. As a general rule, the test of good faith lies in whether the purpose of the reorganization is for economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient. Removal from office as a result of reorganization must, thus, pass the test of good faith. VIRGINIA BAUTISTA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 185215, July 22, 2010 The CES covers presidential appointees only. Corollarily, as the position of Assistant Department Manager II does not require appointment by the President of the Philippines, it does not fall under the CES. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. COURT OF APPEALS AND PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE, G.R. No. 185766, November 23, 2010 Good faith is actually a question of intention and can be ascertained not from a person‘s own protestation of good faith, which is self-serving, but from evidence of his conduct and outward acts. CESAR S. DUMDUMA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 182606, December 4, 2011 Section 53 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service is clear that length of service may be considered either as mitigating or aggravating depending on the circumstances of the case. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. AURORA M. CLAVE, G.R. Nos. 194665, 194645, March 6, 2012 The mandatory order in the program of devolution under R.A. 7160 connotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. The only instance that the LGU concerned may choose not to absorb the NGA personnel is when absorption is not administratively viable, meaning, it would result to duplication of functions, in which case, the NGA personnel shall be retained by the national government. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. DR. AGNES QUIDA P. YU, G.R. No. 189041, July 31, 2012 Where another person takes the civil service examination on behalf of another, the said act constitutes dishonesty which is punishable by dismissal from service. The said public officer or government employee‘s length of service in the judiciary is inconsequential. The CSC‘s discovery of the perfidy in her acquisition of her civil service eligibility and her insistence in stating that she is civil service eligible in her Personal Data Sheet when she had been already found guilty of an administrative charge even after the finality of the CSC Resolution and even after her seeking clemency tell that she has not and does not live up to the high standards demanded of a court employee. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. MERLE RAMONEDA-PITA, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Danao City, A.M. No. P-08-2531, April 11, 2013 When a government employee undisputedly lacked CES eligibility, he did not hold his managerial position, within the coverage of the CES, in a permanent capacity or acquire security of tenure in that position. Otherwise stated, his appointment was temporary and "co-terminus with the appointing authority. One who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power, there being no need to

show that the termination is for cause. EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO v. EMERSON S. CARLOS, G.R. No. 194994, April 16, 2013 The Civil Service Law and rules do not give a concrete description of what specific acts constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but the Court defined such an offense in Ito v. De Vera as acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary, thereby prejudicing the best interest of the administration of justice. In Government Service Insurance System v. Mayordomo, the Court further declared that the administrative offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service need not be related to or connected with the public officer‘s official functions. As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his public office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer or employee. HEIRS OF CELESTINO TEVES v. AUGUSTO J. FELICIDARIO, A.M. No. P-12-3089, November 13, 2013 Section 26, Chapter 5, Title I-A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 lists the personnel actions that may be taken in the government service, namely: (1) appointment through certification; (2) promotion; (3) transfer; (4) reinstatement; (5) reemployment; (6) detail; and (7) reassignment. Reassignment should not be confused with a transfer. Reassignment has been defined as movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary. Under Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998 (Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions) it includes reassignment in the enumeration of personnel movements that do not require the issuance of a new appointment (but shall nevertheless require an office order from a duly authorized officer). It is presumed to be regular and made in the interest of public service unless proven otherwise or if it constitutes constructive dismissal. Moreover, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC has the power and function to prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws. The reassignment of a government employee which is undoubtedly a personnel and Civil Service matter to be properly addressed in accordance with the rules and guidelines prescribed by the CSC. MARICHU G. EJERA v. BEAU HENRY L. MERTO AND ERWIN VERGARA, G.R. No. 163109, January 27, 2014 The CSC has the power and the authority to amend the Civil Service Rules whenever it deems the amendment necessary. The insinuation of petitioner that this change was made for the sole purpose of hurting his appeal is a mere product of his imagination. The CSC is under no obligation to review all the cases before it and, on the basis thereof, decide whether or not to amend its internal rules. We note, though, that the authority of the CSC to amend the rules does not give it the authority to apply the new provision retroactively. EDILBERTO L. BARCELONA v. DAN JOEL LIM, G.R. No. 189171, June 3, 2014 Article IX (B), Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that the Civil Service Commission shall be “the central personnel agency of the Government.” In line with the constitutionally enshrined policy that a public office is a public trust, the Commission was tasked with the duty “to set standards and to enforce the laws and rules governing the selection, utilization, training, and discipline of civil servants.” LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY v. AURORA A. SALVANA, G.R. No. 192074, June 10, 2014

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS Mere misdeclaration of the SALN does not automatically amount to dishonesty. Only when the accumulated wealth becomes manifestly disproportionate to the employee‘s income or other sources of income and the public officer/employee fails to properly account or explain his other sources of income, does he become susceptible to dishonesty. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. NIETO A. RACHO, G.R. No. 185685, January 31, 2011 While Section 10 of R.A. 6713 provides that when the head of office finds the SALN of a subordinate incomplete or not in the proper form such head of office must call the subordinate‘s attention to such omission and give him the chance to rectify the same, and such procedure is an internal office matter. Whether or not the head of office has taken such step with respect to a particular subordinate cannot bar the Office of the Ombudsman from investigating the latter. LIBERATO M. CARABEO v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 190580-81, February 21, 2011 Failure to disclose a spouse’s business interests and financial connections in the SALN constitutes simple negligence. PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION (PAGC) and THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT v. SALVADOR A. PLEYTO, G.R. No. 176058, March 23, 2011 Cessation from office of a public official by resignation or retirement neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Court‘s at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. A public official‘s resignation does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. DESIDERIO W. MACUSI, A.M. No. P-13-3105, September 11, 2013 Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority; (2) recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. By way of exception, the following shall not be covered by the prohibition: (1) persons employed in a confidential capacity; (2) teachers; (3) physicians; and (4) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The purpose of Section 59 on the rule against nepotism is to take out the discretion of the appointing and recommending authority on the matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a relative. The rule insures the objectivity of the appointing or recommending official by preventing that objectivity from being in fact tested. Clearly, the prohibition against nepotism is intended to apply to natural persons. It is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. Moreover, basic rule in statutory construction is the legal maxim that “we must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.” To rule that the prohibition applies only to the Commission, and not to the individual members who compose it, will render the prohibition meaningless. Apparently, the Commission En Banc, which is a body created by fiction of law, can never have relatives to speak of. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. MARICELLE M. CORTES, G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014 Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public servants must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, public officers and employees must faithfully adhere to hold sacred and render Page 60 of 100

inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust and must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. JESSE PHILIP B. EIJANSANTOS v. SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE 156, G.R. No. 203696, June 2, 2014 The Court said that the rules do not provide a definition of, or enumeration of the acts constituting, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. It refers to acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish — or tend to diminish — the people’s faith in the Judiciary. If an employee’s questioned conduct tarnished the image and integrity of his public office, he is liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. EFREN T. UY, ET AL. v. JUDGE ALAN L. FLORES, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2332, June 25, 2014 Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice because they are tasked to execute final judgments of the courts, which would otherwise become empty victories for the prevailing party, if left unenforced. As agents of the law, sheriffs are mandated to uphold the majesty of the law, as embodied in the decision, without unnecessary delay to prevent injury or damage to the winning party. There is no need for the litigants to "follow-up" the sheriff’s implementation of the writ. Once the writ is placed in their hands, sheriffs are duty-bound to proceed and see to it that the execution of judgments is not unduly delayed. We have consistently held that the conduct required of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. All court personnel should be reminded that they have no business getting personally involved in matters directly emanating from court proceedings, unless expressly so provided by law. The reason is that, the image of the courts of justice is reflected in the conduct, official or otherwise, of even its minor employees. It is the imperative duty of everyone involved in the dispensation ofjustice, to maintain the courts’ integrity and standing as true temples of justice and to avoid any impression or impropriety, misdeed or negligence. HOLASCA v. PAGUNSAN, A.M. No, P-14-3198, July 23, 2014. The Republic cannot simply rely on the presumption that the PCGG has acted pursuant to law and based on prima facie evidence, for the same will undermine the basic constitutional principle that public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people. Indeed, sequestration is an extraordinary and harsh remedy. As such, it should be confined to its lawful parameters and exercised with due regard to the requirements of fairness, due process, and justice. While the Court acknowledges the Government's admirable efforts to recover ill-gotten wealth allegedly taken by the corporations, it cannot, however, choose to turn a blind eye to the demands of the law, justice, and fairness. PALM AVENUE HOLDING v. PCGG, G.R. no. 173082, August 6, 2014 Time and again, this Court has pronounced that any act which falls short of the exacting standards for public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced. Public office is a public trust. Public officers must at all imes be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. RE: REPORT OF JUDGE RODOLFO, ON THE HABITUAL ABSENTEEISM OF FILIGRIN VELEZ, A.M. No. P-14-3232, August 12, 2014 It must be emphasized that those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people's confidence in it. The Institution demands the best possible individuals in the service and it had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public Page 61 of 100

accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system. As such, the Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts towards an effective and efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE LAGADO v. CLERK II BRYAN LEONIDO, A.M. No. P-14-3222, August 12, 2014 Complete reliance on signatures is a ministerial function but respondent, as Assistant Director of BOE under DPWH, does not exercise purely ministerial duties. His duties entail review and evaluation of documents presented before him for recommending approval. He cannot simply recommend approval of documents without determining compliance with existing law, rules and regulations of the Department. According to the Court, all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies or enter negotiations. However, the Court went on to state that "there should be other grounds than mere signature or approval appearing on the voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction" or dismissal in this case. There exists a ground other than the signatures appearing on the emergency purchase/repair documents that should have prodded respondent to conduct a more than cursory examination of the documents. The absence of a certification and signature of the end-user which would justify the emergency repair and/or purchase is glaring. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FLORENDO B. ARIAS, G.R. No. 188909, September 17, 2014 All official travels abroad of heads of financial institutions, such as the DBP officials herein, are subject to prior approval of the President, regardless of the duration of the subject travel. When government officials are found to have clearly committed an outright violation and disregard of the law, We will not hesitate in ordering the refund of incentive awards and allowances for while the acts of public officials in the performance of their duties are presumed to be done in good faith, the presumption may be contradicted and overcome by evidence showing bad faith or gross negligence. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COA, G.R. No. 202733, September 30, 2014 Well-entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is created either by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence. The Court cannot agree to petitioner’s supposition that there should be automatic absorption of all ATO employees to the CAAP. Indeed, there is no such thing as a vested interest in a public office, let alone an absolute right to hold it. Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. Public office is not property but a “public trust or agency.” While their right to due process may be relied upon by public officials to protect their security of tenure which, in a limited sense, is analogous to property, such fundamental right to security of tenure cannot be invoked against a valid abolition of office effected by the legislature itself. A careful perusal of Section 86 of R.A. 9497 reveals that the transfer of ATO personnel, unless they opted to retire from the service, to the CAAP implies the application of the hold-over principle.

There being no express, much less implied prohibition of the application of the hold-over principle in R.A. 9497 per se, such proviso in the latter’s IRR does not amount to grave abuse of discretion. CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES’ UNION (CAAP-EU) v. CAAP, G.R. No. 190120, November 11, 2014 OMBUDSMAN The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the Sangguniang Bayan over administrative cases against elective barangay officials occupying positions below salary grade 27. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. ROLSON RODRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010 The administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper committee of the DepEd. Corollary, the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. PEDRO DELIJERO, JR, G.R. No. 172635, October 20, 2010 An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. Consequently, a decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. JOEL S. SAMANIEGO, G.R. No. 175573, October 05, 2010 The Ombudsman, in dismissing a complaint carries the duty of explaining the basis for his action; he must determine that the complainant had failed to establish probable cause. PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT- FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS THRU THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT v. HON. ANIANO DESIERTO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, et al., G.R. No. 148269, November 22, 2010 When a public official has been found guilty of an administrative charge by the Office of the Ombudsman and the penalty imposed is suspension for more than a month, an appeal may be made to the CA. However, such appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory and the implementation of the decision follows as a matter of course. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. CA and DINAH C. BARRIGA, G.R. No. 172224, January 26, 2011 The decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ. Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003. ROQUE C. FACURA and EDUARDO F. TUASON v. CA, et al. G.R. No. 166495, February 16, 2011 In administrative proceedings, the law does not require evidence beyond reasonable doubt or preponderance of evidence. Substantial evidence is enough. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. MANUEL P. VALENCIA, G.R. No. 183890, April 13, 2011 The decision of the Ombudsman of in finding probable cause is reviewable by the Court when there is allegation of grave abuse of discretion. PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT- FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, REPRESENTED BY MAGDANGAL B. ELMA v. HONORABLE ANIANO A. DESIERTO AS OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 135715, April 13, 2011 The power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officials is not exclusive, but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government in relation to the offense

charged. THERON LACSON v. THE HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al., G.R. Nos. 165399, 165475, 165404 and 165489, May 30, 2011 The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The challenge to the Ombudsman‘s power to impose these penalties, on the allegation that the Constitution only grants it recommendatory powers, had already been rejected by this Court. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. NELLIE R. APOLONIO, G.R. No. 165132, March 07, 2012 The Ombudsman need not conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a complaint. That should investigating officers find a complaint utterly devoid of merit, they may recommend its outright dismissal. Moreover, it is also within their discretion to determine whether or not preliminary investigation should be conducted. JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES v. HON. MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, et al., G.R. No. 189161, March 21, 2012 The power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory. ERNESTO A. FAJARDO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al., G.R. No. 173268, August 23, 2012 In an administrative proceeding, the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and not proof beyond reasonable doubt which requires moral certainty to justify affirmative findings. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. RODRIGO MAPOY, et al., G.R. No. 197299, February 13, 2013 The decision of the Office of the Ombudsman is immediately executory, and an appeal therefrom does not stop the decision from being executory. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. SAMSON G. DE LEON, G.R. No. 154083, February 27, 2013 The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the Constitution. It is tasked to exercise disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials, save only for impeachable officers. The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan‘s jurisdiction extends only to public officials occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher. Consequently, any act or omission of a public officer or employee occupying a salary grade lower than 27 is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the regular courts or other investigative agencies. The Ombudsman also has the power to impose administrative sanctions. Section 15 of R.A. 6770 reveals the manifest intent of the lawmakers to give the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. This provision covers the entire range of administrative activities attendant to administrative adjudication, including, among others, the authority to receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive suspension public officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the corresponding penalty. These powers unmistakably grant the Office of the Ombudsman the power to directly impose administrative sanctions; its power is not merely recommendatory.

The maintenance of peace and order in the community is a general function undertaken by the punong barangay. It is a task expressly conferred to the punong barangay under Section 389 (b) (3) of R.A. 7160. The peace and order function of the punong barangay must also be related to his function of assisting local executive officials (i.e., the city mayor), under Section 389 (b), Chapter III of the Local Government Code. Local executive officials have the power to employ and deploy police for the maintenance of peace and order, the prevention of crimes and the arrest of criminal offenders. However, police authority is superior to the punong barangay‘s authority in a situation where the maintenance of peace and order has metamorphosed into crime prevention and the arrest of criminal offenders. FRANKLlN ALEJANDRO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACTFINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, represented by Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013 The Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the ―protector of the people against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau. Its independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770 vesting disciplinary authority in the President over the Deputy Ombudsman violates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and is thus unconstitutional. By constitutional design, the Special Prosecutor is by no means an ordinary subordinate but one who effectively and directly aids the Ombudsman in the exercise of his/her duties, which include investigation and prosecution of officials in the Executive Department. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for her Deputies but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as agents of the Ombudsman herself in the performance of her duties. EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ET AL./ WENDELL BARERAS-SULIT v. ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ET AL., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014 The administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman does not end with a recommendation to punish. Further, clearly then, as early as August 17, 2000, when AO 14-A was issued, the OMBimposed penalties in administrative disciplinary cases were already immediately executory notwithstanding an appeal timely filed. FLOR GUPILAN-AGUILAR and HONORE R. HERNANDEZ v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN REPRESENTED BY HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, ET AL., G.R. No. 197307, February 26, 2014 The long standing policy of the Court is noninterference in the powers given by no less than the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman. Except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with the exercise by the Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers on complaints filed against erring public officials and employees. Its findings of fact are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially when they are affirmed by the CA. Generally, in reviewing administrative decisions, it is beyond the province of this Court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. It is not the function of this Court to analyze and weigh the parties’ evidence all over again except when there is serious ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result. JESSE PHILIP B. EIJANSANTOS v. SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE 156, G.R. No. 203696, June 2, 2014 The Ombudsman is constitutionally authorized to promulgate its own rules of procedure. This is fleshed out in Sections 18 and 27 of R.A. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," which empower the Ombudsman to "promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions, and duties" and to accordingly amend or modify its rules as

the interest of justice may require. As such, the CA cannot stay the execution of decisions rendered by the said office when the rules the latter so promulgates categorically and specifically warrant their enforcement, else the OMB’s rule-making authority be unduly encroached and the constitutional and statutory provisions providing the same be disregarded. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. ALEX M. VALENCERINA, G.R. No. 178343, July 14, 2014 The Court reiterates its policy of noninterference with the rulings of the Office of the Ombudsman, except in a clear case of grave abuse of discretion... The Constitution and R.A. 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public officials and employees. Specifically, the determination of whether probable cause exists is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. Whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not is basically its call. As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Office of the Ombudsman which, “beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service.” While the Ombudsman’s findings as to whether probable cause exists are generally not reviewable by this Court, where there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion, the Ombudsman’s act cannot escape judicial scrutiny under the Court’s own constitutional power and duty “to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” ROMEO R. ARAULLO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 194157, July 30, 2014 The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute illegal and unjust acts of those who are in the public service emanates from no less than the 1987 Constitution. Section 12 of Article XI states: Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or -controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof. As mandated by the 1987 Constitution, The Ombudsman Act was enacted in line with the state’s policy of maintaining honesty and integrity in the public service and take effective measures against graft and corruption. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: ... “Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases.” EDITA S. BUENO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 191712, September 17, 2014. Although the tenor of the text in Section 13 (3), Article XI of the Constitution merely indicates a “recommendatory” function, this does not divest Congress of its plenary legislative power to vest the Ombudsman power beyond those stated in the Constitutional provision. Pursuant to R.A. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act, the Ombudsman is legally authorized to directly impose administrative penalties against errant public servants. The current Ombudsman is intended to play a more active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses committed by public officers and employees. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. PRUDENCIO QUIMBO, G.R. No. 173277, February 25, 2015

IMPEACHMENT The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ v. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, et al., G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011 ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH Sequestration is simply a provisional remedy. It is an extraordinary measure intended to prevent the destruction, concealment or dissipation of sequestered properties, and thereby to conserve and preserve them, pending the judicial determination in the appropriate proceeding of whether the property was in truth ill-gotten. YKR CORPORATION AND HEIRS OF LUISA YULO v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 162079, March 18, 2010 The PCGG has discretion to grant appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending on the situation of the witness and his relative importance to the prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. It can even agree, to conditions expressed by the witness as sufficient to induce cooperation, which cannot be later withdrawn without mutual consent. JESUS DISINI v. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 180564, June 22, 2010 PCGG may not delegate to its representatives and subordinates its authority to sequester and any such delegation is invalid and ineffective. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) AND IMELDA R. MARCOS, G.R. No. 155832, December 07, 2010 A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case. The order and the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith be registered with the proper court. For orders issued before the ratification of this Constitution, the corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed within six months from its ratification. For those issued after such ratification, the judicial action or proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the issuance thereof. PALM AVENUE HOLDING v. PCGG, G.R. no. 173082, August 6, 2014 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW GENERAL PRINCIPLES In administrative cases, the requisite proof is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. JOEPHIL C. BIEN v. PEDRO B. BO, G.R. No. 179333. August 3, 2010 The Administrative Code of 1987 expressly prohibits the entering into contracts involving the expenditure of public funds unless an appropriation law authorizing the expenditure required in the contract and certification by the proper accounting official and auditor that funds have been appropriated by law and such funds are available are attached to the contract. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS v KANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC., G.R. No. 182967, April 06, 2011 Notice and hearing are the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. The right is guaranteed

by the Constitution itself and does not need legislative enactment. The statutory affirmation of the requirement serves merely to enhance the fundamental precept. The right to notice and hearing is essential to due process and its non-observance will, as a rule, invalidate the administrative proceedings. Equally significant is the principle that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. Hence, whatever irregularity had attended the issuance of the temporary permits in this case does not render correct what appears to be erroneous procedure. GMA NETWORK, Inc. v. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 196112, February 26, 2014 The implementing rules and regulations embodied in this circular, whose validity is undisputed by the parties, “partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.” GMA NETWORK, INC. v. CENTRAL CATV, INC., G.R. No. 176694, July 18, 2014. Well-established is the rule that administrative issuances — such as the NEDA JV Guidelines, duly promulgated pursuant to the rule-making power granted by statute — have the force and effect of law. Being an issuance in compliance with an executive edict, the NEDA JV Guidelines, therefore, has the same binding effect as if it were issued by the President himself. As such, no agency or instrumentality covered by the JV Guidelines can validly stray from the mandatory procedures set forth therein, even if the other party acquiesced therewith or not. SM LAND, INC., v. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 203655, August 13, 2014 We are very much aware of the time-honored rule that “the government cannot be estopped by the mistakes or errors of its agents.” Suffice it to state, however, that this precept is not absolute. As jurisprudence teaches, this rule on estoppel cannot be used to perpetrate an injustice. SM LAND, INC., v. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 203655, August 13, 2014 There is nothing in the 1987 Constitution stating that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel. The assistance of a lawyer, while desirable, is not indispensable. A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. Hence, the administrative body is under no duty to provide the person with counsel because assistance of counsel is not an absolute requirement. With respect to military academy disciplinary proceedings, the right to representation by counsel is generally not recorded by US courts as a fundamental requirement of due process. This is in view of the policy of treading lightly on the military domain, with regard for their own power and authority to conduct their own affairs within the broad confines of the law. FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA v. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015 ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES The National Power Corporation is not exempt from the payment of filing/ docket fees. It can no longer invoke R.A. 6395 (NPC Charter), as amended by P.D. 938, as its basis for exemption from the

payment of legal fees. IN RE: EXEMPTION OF THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION FROM PAYMENT OF FILING/ DOCKET FEES, A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, March 10, 2010 The structure of the Philippine National Red Cross is sui generis being neither strictly private nor public in nature. DANTE V. LIBAN, et al. v. RICHARD J. GORDON, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS, G. R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011 Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making powers only if there exists a law which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so promulgated must be within the confines of the granting statute and must involve no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself, so as to conform with the doctrine of separation of powers and, as an adjunct, the doctrine of non-delegability of legislative power. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE BUREAU OF FOOD AND DRUGS (NOW FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION) v. DRUGMAKER'S LABORATORIES, INC. AND TERRAMEDIC, INC., G.R. No. 190837, March 5, 2014 GMA must be reminded that the National Telecommunications Commission, insofar as the regulation of the telecommunications industry is concerned, has exclusive jurisdiction to "establish and prescribe rules, regulations, standards and specifications in all cases related to the issued Certificate of Public Convenience and administer and enforce the same." As such, and considering further its expertise on the matter, its interpretation of the rules and regulations it itself promulgates are traditionally accorded by the Court with great weight and respect. The NTC, being the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under its special and technical forte, and possessing the necessary rule-making power to implement its objectives, is in the best position to interpret its own rules, regulations and guidelines. The Court has consistently yielded and accorded great respect to the interpretation by administrative agencies of their own rules unless there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law. GMA NETWORK, INC. v. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 196112, February 26, 2014 The FDA has been deputized by R.A. 3720 to accept applications for registration of pharmaceuticals and grant or reject such applications. The said law expressly authorized the Secretary of Health, upon the recommendation of the FDA Director, to issue rules and regulations that pertain to the registration of pharmaceutical products. It is A.O. 67, an administrative regulation issued by the Secretary of Health in accordance with his rule-making power under R.A. 3720, which required that certain pharmaceutical products undergo BA/BE testing prior to the issuance of CPR, contrary to respondents’ assertion that it was Circular Nos. 1 and 8 that required such tests. Circular Nos. 1 and 8 cannot be considered as administrative regulations because they do not: (a) implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof; (b) interpret, clarify, or explain existing statutory regulations under which the FDA operates; and/or (c) ascertain the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of R.A. 3720 depends. The only purpose of these circulars is for the FDA to administer and supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO 67, including those covering the BA/BE testing requirement, pursuant to R.A. 3720. Therefore, the FDA has sufficient authority to issue the said circulars and since they would not affect the substantive rights of the parties that they seek to govern as they are not administrative regulations in the first place, no prior hearing, consultation, and publication are needed for their validity. BUREAU AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION v. DRUGMAKER'S LABORATORIES, INC., G.R. No. 190837,

March 5, 2014 There is no quarrel about the Secretary of Justice’s power of review over the actions of his subordinates, specifically public prosecutors. This power of review is encompassed in the Secretary of Justice’s authority of supervision and control over the bureaus, offices, and agencies under him, subject only to specified guidelines. Chapter 7, Section 38, paragraph 1 of E.O. 292, defines the administrative relationship that is supervision and control: “Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in other laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies, administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as follows: ... Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs.” Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing the relationship of particular agencies, the word “control” shall encompass supervision and control as defined in this paragraph. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE v. TEOFULO NANO ALAON, G.R. No. 189596, April 23, 2014 For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a tenancy relation between the parties. “[I]n order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.” CHARLES BUMAGAT, ET AL. v. REGALADO ARRIBAY, G.R. No. 194818, June 9, 2014 The power of taxation is inherently legislative and may be imposed or revoked only by the legislature. Moreover, this plenary power of taxation cannot be delegated by Congress to any other branch of government or private persons, unless its delegation is authorized by the Constitution itself. Hence, the discretion to ascertain the following — (a) basis, amount, or rate of tax; (b) person or property that is subject to tax; (c) exemptions and exclusions from tax; and (d) manner of collecting the tax — may not be delegated away by Congress. However, it is well-settled that the power to fill in the details and manner as to the enforcement and administration of a law may be delegated to various specialized administrative agencies like the Secretary of Finance in this case. The latest in our jurisprudence indicates that delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception. The reason is the increasing complexity of modern life and many technical fields of governmental functions as in matters pertaining to tax exemptions. This is coupled by the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions. Thus, rules and regulations implementing the law are designed to fill in the details or to make explicit what is general, which otherwise cannot all be incorporated in the provision of the Page 70 of 100

law. Such rules and regulations, when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, "deserve to be given weight and respect by the courts in view of the rule-making authority given to those who formulate them and their specific expertise in their respective fields." To be valid, a revenue regulation must be within the scope of statutory authority or standard granted by the legislature. Specifically, the regulation must (1) be germane to the object and purpose of the law; (2) not contradict, but conform to, the standards the law prescribes; and (3) be issued for the sole purpose of carrying into effect the general provisions of our tax laws. LA SUERTE CIGAR & CIGARETTE FACTORY v. CA, G.R. No. 125346, November 11, 2014 POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCB‘s authority and functions expressly set forth in P.D. 1986. ELISEO SORIANO v. MA. CONSOLIZA LAGUARDIA, et al., G.R. No. 164785, March 15, 2010 Administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying the law‘s general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. LUIS LOKIN v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al., G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010 By specific provision of law, it is PEZA, through its building officials, which has authority to issue building permits for the construction of structures within the areas owned or administered by it, whether on public or private lands. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA) v. JOSEPH CARANTES, ROSE CARANTES, AND ALL OTHER HEIRS OF MAXIMINOCARANTES, G.R. No. 18127, June 23, 2010 The rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises quasijudicial or adjudicatory functions. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, GLENDA A. VARGAS, et al. v. DANES B. SANCHEZ, G.R. No. 165569, July 29, 2010 By explicit provision of law, the Toll Regulatory Board was given the power to grant administrative franchise for toll facility projects. ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. AND JOSE MA. O. HIZON v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, et al., G.R. No. 166910, October 19, 2010 When the question involves the validity of a resolution issued by petitioner, it is the National Electric Authority, pursuant to its power of supervision, which has the authority to conduct investigations and other similar actions as well as to issue orders, rules and regulations with respect to all matters affecting electric cooperatives. SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., et al. v. ANANIAS D. SELUDO, JR., G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012 As a separate juridical personality from the government, UP cannot evade execution, and its funds may be subject to garnishment or levy. This notwithstanding, before execution may be had, a claim for payment of the judgment award must first be filed with the COA. LOCKHEED DETECTIVE AND WATCHMAN AGENCY, INC. v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 185918, April 18, 2012

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It is abundantly clear that Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112 in relation to Section 4 of P.D. 1894 have invested the TRB with sufficient power to grant a qualified person or entity with authority to construct, maintain, and operate a toll facility and to issue the corresponding toll operating permit or TOC. By explicit provision of law, the TRB was given the power to grant administrative franchise for toll facility projects. RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL v. TRB, G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015 JUDICIAL RECOURSE AND REVIEW Administrative liability attaches so long as there is some evidence adequate to support the conclusion that acts constitutive of the administrative offense have been performed (or have not been performed). HON. PRIMO C. MIRO v. REYNALDO M. DOSONO, G.R. No. 170697, April 30, 2010 Even in administrative cases, a degree of moral certainty is necessary to support a finding of liability. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. RODOLFO ZALDARRIAGA, G.R. No. 175349, June 22, 2010 With regard to pollution-related matters, an administrative recourse to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) must first be made before filing the complaint with the regular courts. SHELL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION B.V. v. EFREN JALOS, et al., G.R. No. 179918, September 08, 2010 Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292 provides that administrative offenses are classified into grave, less grave and light, depending on the gravity of the nature of the act complained of. The less grave offenses of simple neglect of duty and of simple misconduct carry the penalty of suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense. AN ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTY. PORTIA DIESTA, BRANCH CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 236, PASIG CITY AND LUZ SANTOS- TACLA, CLERK III, SAME COURT, A.M. No. P-05-1970 (Formerly A.M.OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1962-P), May 30, 2011 The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. v. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 191427, May 30, 2011 Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases, it is provided that administrative investigations shall be conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings. The weight of evidence required in administrative investigations is substantial evidence. SHERYLL C. DELA CRUZ, COMPLAINANT v. PAMELA P. MALUNAO, CLERK III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, BAYOMBONG, NUEVA VIZCAYA, A.M. No. P-11-3019, March 20, 2012 The subsequent reconciliation of the parties to an administrative proceeding does not strip the court of its jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until its resolution. Atonement, in administrative cases, merely obliterates the personal injury of the parties and does not extend to erase the offense that may have been committed against the public service. The subsequent desistance by the complainant does not free the public officer from liability, as the purpose of an administrative proceeding is to protect the public service based on the time-honored principle that

a public office is a public trust. CARLITO C. ENCINAS v. PO1 ALFREDO P. AGUSTIN, JR. and PO1 JOEL S. CAUBANG, G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013 Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one‘s cause of action. However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits exceptions. One exception which is relevant to the case is where no administrative review is provided by law. The case falls squarely under the aforementioned exception since the law per se provides no administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days. MARK JAMES S. MAGLALANG v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), as represented by its incumbent chairman, EFRAIM GENUINO, G.R. No. 190566, December 11, 2013 In an administrative proceeding, the evidentiary bar against which the evidence at hand is measured is not the highest quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, requiring moral certainty to support affirmative findings. Instead, the lowest standard of substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion, applies. Because administrative liability attaches so long as there is some evidence adequate to support the conclusion that acts constitutive of the administrative offense have been performed (or have not been performed), reasonable doubt does not ipso facto result in exoneration unlike in criminal proceedings where guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. JESSE PHILIP B. EIJANSANTOS v. SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE 156, G.R. No. 203696, June 2, 2014 As established by the facts, petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard and to adduce his evidence. This opportunity was enough for one to comply with the requirements of due process in an administrative case. The formalities usually attendant in court hearings need not be present in an administrative investigation, as long as the parties are heard and given the opportunity to adduce their respective sets of evidence. As defined in the landmark case Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations (1940), all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact is substantial evidence, which is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” The evidence presented in the present case is more than enough to support the conclusion reached. Where the findings of fact of a quasi-judicial body are supported by substantial evidence, these findings are conclusive and binding on the appellate court. EDILBERTO L. BARCELONA v. DAN JOEL LIM, G.R. No. 189171, June 3, 2014 The procedure for appeals to the Office of the President is governed by A.O. No. 18, Series of 1987. Section 1 thereof provides: Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office of the President shall be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of the decision/resolution/order complained of or appealed from … we interpreted the above provision and declared that “a decision or order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to the Office of the President when there is a special law that provides for a different mode of

appeal.” EMMANUEL B. MORAN, JR. v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 192957, September 29, 2014 ELECTION LAW CANDIDACY The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. VICTORINO B. ALDABA, et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R No. 188078, January 25, 2010 Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. LUIS A. ASISTIO v. HON. THELMA CANLAS TRINIDAD-PE AGUIRRE, G.R. No. 191124, April 27, 2010 The word “or” is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the Section 6(8) of R.A. 7941 provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No.190529, April 29, 2010 R.A. 7941, the Party-List System Act, covers all youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats. A nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. MILAGROS AMORES v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND EMMANUEL VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010 Where a dwelling qualifies as a residence — i.e., the dwelling where a person permanently intends to return to and to remain – his or her capacity or inclination to decorate the place, or the lack of it, is immaterial. ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010 Nowhere in the Section 40 of the Local Government Code will one find defective certificate of candidacy as a ground for disqualifying a candidate. Nor does it specify that a defective notarization is a ground for the disqualification of a candidate. SERGIO G. AMORA, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ARNIELO S. OLANDRIA, G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011 Filing a certificate of candidacy as a party-list representative while holding a judicial post constitutes grave misconduct with a penalty of dismissal from service. ASHARY M. ALAUYA v. JUDGE CASAN ALI L. LIMBONA, A.M. No. SCC-98-4, March 22, 2011 The three-term limitation made under R.A. 9164 has no retroactive application. CONSTANCIO F. MENDOZA v. SENEN C. FAMILARA AND COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 191017, November 15, 2011 There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate’s compliance with residency requirement since the question of residence is a question of intention. Notwithstanding, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where

once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time. ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND DAN ERASMO, SR., G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012 A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Hence, the second placer candidate is deemed to have garnered the highest number of votes and is entitled to hold the corresponding elective position. EFREN RACEL ARATEA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ESTELA D. ANTIPOLO, G.R. No. 195229, October 09, 2012 Existence of a valid certificate of candidacy is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution, hence a declaration of a candidate’s disqualification which rendered his COC invalid cannot be properly substituted MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND RODERICK A. ALCALA , G.R. No. 196804, October 09, 2012 A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Hence, if a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, all votes for that candidate are stray votes. DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND AGAPITO J. CARDINO, G.R. No. 193237, October 09, 2012 A change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time, otherwise the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No. 193314, February 26, 2013 The existence of a valid COC is a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted. If the COC is thereby cancelled or denied due course, the candidate cannot be validly substituted. SILVERIO R.TAGOLINO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013 A candidate whose COC is cancelled or denied cannot be substituted by another on the ground that the former was merely disqualified. In case of disqualification, there can be substitution because a candidate‘s disqualification does not automatically result to the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. However, when the certificate of candidacy of a person is denied or is cancelled, substitution cannot be had because the effect of cancellation is as if there is no candidate at all. SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013 The law (Section 8 of R.A. 7941) expressly requires the submission of a list containing at least five qualified nominees. Failure to submit the list of five nominees before the election warrants the cancellation of its registration. The requirement of submission of a list of five nominees is primarily a statutory requirement for the registration of party-list groups and the submission of this list is part of a registered party‘s continuing compliance with the law to maintain its registration. A partylist group‘s previous registration with the COMELEC confers no vested right to the maintenance of its registration. In order to maintain a party in a continuing compliance status, the party must prove not only its continued possession of the requisite qualifications but, equally, must show its compliance with the basic requirements of the law. COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013

Track record is a record of past performance often taken as an indicator of likely future performance. There is no basis in law and established jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking registration under the party-list system still need to comply with the track record requirement. Nowhere in R.A. 7941 is it mandated that groups seeking registration thereunder must submit evidence to show their track record as a group. ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST ABANG LINGKOD v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013 Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code reveals that false representation in the contents of the COC must refer to material matters in order to justify the cancellation of the COC. Material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refers to eligibility or qualification for elective office, whereas, false representation must consist of deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would render a candidate ineligible. Here, the respondent’s nickname is not a qualification for a public office which affects his eligibility. VILLAFUERTE v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014 Under the rules, a statement in a certificate of candidacy claiming that a candidate is eligible to run for public office when in truth he is not, is a false material representation, a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. A candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. These facts pertain to a candidate's qualification for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. Similarly, the candidate's status as a registered voter falls under this classification as it is a legal requirement which must be reflected in the COC. Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his COC "that he is eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is not a registered voter in the municipality where he intends to be elected, but still he states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation, a ground to support a petition under Section 78. A cancelled COC is void cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Whether a certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial, because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void. We then found that since the winning mayoralty candidate's certificate of candidacy was void, he was never a candidate at all and all his votes were considered stray votes, and thus, proclaimed the second placer, the only qualified candidate, who actually garnered the highest number of votes, for the position of Mayor. MAYOR HAYUDINI v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014 The minimum requirement under our Constitution and election laws for the candidates' residency in the political unit they seek to represent has never been intended to be an empty formalistic condition; it carries with it a very specific purpose: to prevent "stranger[s] or newcomer[s] unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community" from seeking elective offices in that community. The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement.

The fact that Osmenñ a has no registered property under his name does not belie his actual residence in Toledo City because property ownership is not among the qualifications required of candidates for local election. It is enough that he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. To successfully challenge a winning candidate’s qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. The reason for such liberality stems from the recognition that laws governing election contests must be construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. We wish to remind that COC defects beyond matters of form and that involve material misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling that COC mandatory requirements before elections are considered merely directory after the people shall have spoken. Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath is made, thereby violating both our election and criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the people of the Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we cannot choose the electorate’s will. LINA JALOVER v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014 NUISANCE CANDIDATE It is a well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative. The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed. CELESTINO A. MARTINEZ III v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) AND BENHUR L. SALIMBANGON, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010 The votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, are not stray but must be counted in favor of the latter. CASIMIRA S. DELA CRUZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOHN LLOYD M. PACETE, G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012 To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by respondent. This denial or cancellation may be "motu propio or upon a verified petition of an interested party," "subject to an opportunity to be heard." COMELEC's power to motu proprio deny due course to a certificate of candidacy is subject to the

candidate's opportunity to be heard. In election cases, due process requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. The clarificatory hearing was an ineffective opportunity to be heard, since COMELEC declared Timbol a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to explain his bona fide intention to run for office. COMELEC had already issued the resolutions when Timbol appeared before Election Officer Valencia in the clarificatory hearing. JOSEPH TIMBOL v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015 CAMPAIGN When the printed election propaganda was published, there arises a presumption that there was written acceptance by petitioner of the advertisement paid for or donated by his friends in the absence of evidence to the contrary. ALVIN B. GARCIA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND TOMAS R. OSMEÑA, G.R. No. 170256, January 25, 2010 REMEDIES AND JURISDICTION IN ELECTION LAW The ruling in Divinagracia v. COMELEC stressed that if the appellants had already paid the amount of P1,000 to the lower courts within the five-day reglementary period, they are further required to pay the COMELEC, through its Cash Division, the appeal fee of PhP 3,200 within fifteen (15) days from the time of the filing of the notice of appeal with the lower court. If the appellants failed to pay the P3,200 within the prescribed period, then the appeal should be dismissed. Divinagracia, however, contained the following final caveat: that for notice of appeal filed after the promulgation (July 27, 2009) of this decision, errors in the matter of non-payment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in election cases are no longer excusable. MATEO R. NOLLEN, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSAND SUSANA M. CABALLES, G.R. No. 187635, January 11, 2010 The general rule is, if what is being questioned is the correctness of the number of votes for each candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves. However, this rule applies only if the ballots are available and their integrity has been preserved from the day of elections until revision. BAI SANDRA S.A. SEMA v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN G.R. No. 190734, March 26, 2010 It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general rule recognized by all the courts, that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed, to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by merely technical objections. PEDRO MANZA et al. v. EDUARDO GUTIERREZ DAVID, et al., G. R. No. 42181, March 15, 2010 If the Court were to tabulate the results reflected in the ERs, it would, in effect, convert itself into a board of canvassers. This would entail a function which, obviously, this Court, in a petition for certiorari, cannot perform. JESUS TYPOCO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No. 186359, March 5, 2010 The period for filing a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy based on false representation is covered by Rule 23 and not Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Section 3 of Rule 25 allowing the filing of a petition at any time after the last day for filing of COC‘s but not later than the date of proclamation is merely a procedural rule that cannot supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). FERNANDO V. GONZALEZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March 08, 2011

A petition for disqualification and a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy, are two distinct remedies to prevent a candidate from entering an electoral race. Both remedies prescribe distinct periods to file the corresponding petition, on which the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections over the case is dependent. ALFAIS T. MUNDER v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ATTY. TAGO R. SARIP, G.R. No. 194076, October 19, 2011 The rules on the timely perfection of an appeal in an election case requires two different appeal fees, one to be paid in the trial court together with the filing of the notice of appeal, and the other to be paid in the COMELEC Cash Division within the 15-day period from the filing of the notice of appeal. BIENVENIDO WILLIAM D. LLOREN v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ROGELIO PUA, JR., G.R. No. 196355, September 18, 2012 When there has been no valid substitution, the candidate with the highest number of votes should be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor. RENATO M. FEDERICO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 199612, January 22, 2013 An opposition to a petition for registration of a party-list is not a condition precedent to the filing of a complaint for cancellation of the same. ANTONIO D. DAYAO, et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 193643 and 193704, January 29, 2013 Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that the false representation in the contents of the COC must refer to material matters in order to justify the cancellation of the COC. Material misrepresentation under the Omnibus Election Code refers to qualifications for elective office (residency, age, citizenship, or any other legal qualifications necessary to run for local elective office as provided in the Local Government Code) coupled with a showing that there was an intent to deceive the electorate. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTA v. COMELEC and MIGUEL VILLAFUERTE, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014 ELECTION PROTEST Decisions of the courts in election protest cases, resulting as they do from a judicial evaluation of the ballots and after full-blown adversarial proceedings, should at least be given similar worth and recognition as decisions of the board of canvassers. This is especially true when attended by other equally weighty circumstances of the case, such as the shortness of the term of the contested elective office, of the case. In election protest cases, disruption of public service is an element that has been weighed and factored in and cannot per se be a basis to deny execution pending appeal. JESUS M. CALO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 185222, January 19, 2010 A one-day delay in filing a Preliminary Conference Brief, does not justify the outright dismissal of an electoral protest based on technical grounds where there is no indication of intent to violate the rules on the part of petitioner and the reason for the violation is justifiable. SALVADOR D. VIOLAGO, SR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOAN V. ALARILLA, G.R. No. 194143, October 4, 2011 An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities. Its purpose is to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. CONGRESSWOMAN LUCY MARIE TORRES-

GOMEZ v. EUFROCINO C. CODILLA, JR. AND HON. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, G. R. No. 195191, March 20, 2012 The winning elected official in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR. v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 201716, January 08, 2013 Picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise ―official ballots that faithfully captures in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest. The ballot images in the compact flash (CF) cards, as well as the printouts of such images, are the functional equivalent of the official physical ballots filled up by the voters, and may be used in an election protest. Both are original documents and carry the same evidentiary weight as official physical ballot. LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, G.R. No. 199149, January 22, 2013 Where the party received, through his counsel, notices from the COMELEC of an examination requested by the opposing party and filed a motion for reconsideration against the same examination; he cannot claim that his right to due process was violated. In administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one‘s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN, G.R. No. 203302, March 12, 2013 COMELEC The discretion to allow execution pending reconsideration belongs to the division that rendered the assailed decision, order or resolution, or the COMELEC en banc, as the case may be – not to the Presiding Commissioner. MAYOR QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ARTEMIO BALAG, G.R. Nos. 189431 & 191120, April 7, 2010 The COMELEC is mandated to make the source codes for the AES technologies it selected for implementation pursuant to R.A. 9369 immediately available to CenPEG and all other interested political parties or groups for independent review. CENTER FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT IN GOVERNANCE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 189546, September 21, 2010 Although the COMELEC is admittedly the final arbiter of all factual issues as the Constitution and the Rules of Court provide, in the presence of grave abuse of discretion, however, the Court‘s constitutional duty is to intervene and not to shy away from intervention simply because a specialized agency has been given the authority to resolve the factual issues. ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010 Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. FESTO R. GALANG, JR. v. HON. RAMIRO R. GERONIMO and NICASIO M. RAMOS, G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011

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The COMELEC en banc had jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation of the registration and accreditation of a party-list and not the HRET as although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives, but it is the party-list nominee/representative who sits as a member of the House of Representatives over which the HRET has jurisdiction over. ABC (ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS) PARTY LIST, REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS CHAIRMAN, JAMES MARTY LIM v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., G.R. No. 193256, March 22, 2011 The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2 (5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of B.P. 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. This process does not entail any determination of administrative liability, as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration. MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012 The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET. ROMEO M. JOLOSJOS, JR. v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND DAN ERASMO, SR., G.R. Nos. 192474, 192704, 193566, June 26, 2012 The COMELEC‘s jurisdiction to settle the struggle for leadership within the party is well established. This singular power to rule upon questions of party identity and leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as an incident to its enforcement powers. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. AND TERESITA F. PLANAS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), et al., G.R. No. 193808, June 26, 2012 In correcting the erroneous entry, the COMELEC need not order the opening of the ballot box for the purpose of recounting the votes of the candidates affected if the correction sought is such that it can be made without the need of opening the ballot box. ANTONIO P. CERON v. COMMISSION ON ELECTION GRACE P. VALDEZ, et al., G.R. No. 199084, September 11, 2012 There is no impediment for the COMELEC and the DOJ to create the Joint Committee and FactFinding Team for the purpose of conducting a thorough investigation of the alleged massive electoral fraud and the manipulation of election results in the 2004 and 2007 national elections relating in particular to the presidential and senatorial elections. Neither does the creation of the said Committee violate the constitutional rights of an individual. JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE et al., G.R. No. 199085, September 18, 2012 Cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC which the COMELEC in division should first decide. The COMELEC en banc cannot short cut the proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a division because it denies due process to the candidate. KAMARUDIN K. IBRAHIM v. COMELEC and ROLAN G. BUAGAS, G.R. No. 192289, January 08, 2013 The express grant of power to the COMELEC to resolve election protests carries with it the grant of all other powers necessary, proper, or incidental to the effective and efficient exercise of the power expressly granted. Verily, the exclusive original jurisdiction conferred by the constitution to the COMELEC to settle said election protests includes the authority to order a technical examination of relevant election paraphernalia, election returns and ballots in order to determine whether fraud and irregularities attended the canvass of the votes. GOVERNOR SADIKUL A. SAHALI AND VICEPage 81 of 100

GOVERNOR RUBY M. SAHALI, SR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 201796, January 15, 2013 A protesting candidate cannot file a petition with the Supreme Court when the COMELEC decision is equally divided and a rehearing is not conducted; otherwise the petition shall be considered premature and shall be dismissed. When the COMELEC En Banc is equally divided in an opinion and the necessary majority cannot be had, there shall be a rehearing. To break the legal stalemate in case the opinion is equally divided among the members of the COMELEC en banc, Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure mandates a rehearing where parties are given the opportunity anew to strengthen their respective positions or arguments and convince the members of the COMELEC en banc of the merit of their case. It is provided also that when the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. MAMERTO T. SEVILLA, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND RENATO R. SO, G.R. No. 203833, March 19, 2013 The COMELEC has authority to effect the re-clustering of precincts when the act shall prevent failure of elections and promote free, orderly, and honest elections. Unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, the Court cannot interfere with the actions of the COMELEC. SALIC DUMARPA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 192249, April 2, 2013 Where another person takes the civil service examination on behalf of another, the act constitutes dishonesty which is punishable by dismissal from service. The public officer’s or government employee’s length of service in the judiciary is inconsequential. The CSC‘s discovery of the perfidy in her acquisition of her civil service eligibility and her insistence in stating that she is civil service eligible in her Personal Data Sheet when she had been already found guilty of an administrative charge even after the finality of the CSC Resolution and even after her seeking clemency tell that she has not and does not live up to the high standards demanded of a court employee. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. MERLE RAMONEDA-PITA, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Danao City, A.M. No. P-08-2531, April 11, 2013 The COMELEC is mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. It is the COMELEC‘s duty to cancel motu proprio the Certificate of Candidacy of a candidate who is clearly disqualified under the law to run for public office, notwithstanding the absence of any petition initiating a quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution of the same. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIA ISABELLE G. CLIMACO-SALAZAR, ROEL B. NATIVIDAD, ARTURO N. ONRUBIA, AHMAD NARZAD K. SAMPANG, JOSE L. LOBREGAT, ADELANTE ZAMBOANGA PARTY, AND ELBERT C. ATILANO, G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013 Unquestionably, the twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable before the COMELEC may properly order the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of a party-list organization. Hence, the due process violation was committed when a party-list group was not apprised of the fact that the term-sharing agreement entered into by the nominees of the said partylist group in 2010 would be a material consideration in the evaluation of the organization‘s qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013 elections. As it were, said party-list group was not able to answer this issue squarely. In other words, they were deprived of the opportunity to adequately explain their side regarding the term- sharing agreement and/or to adduce evidence,

accordingly, in support of their position. COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST), represented herein by its Chairperson and First Nominee, FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. Nos. 206844-45; COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), represented by its President and Incumbent Representative in the House of Representatives, ATTY. GODOFREDO V. ARQUIZA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206982, July 23, 2013 Under the present law (Section 43 of R.A. 9369), the COMELEC and other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses. With this, where there is Joint Panel created to investigate over an alleged commission of election fraud and is granted a concurrent jurisdiction with the COMELEC over the offense, the accused cannot claim that the constitution of the Joint Committee is invalid for violating the mandate of the COMELEC. Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the COMELEC and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the COMELEC in accordance with the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. With more reason, therefore, that we cannot consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the COMELEC‘s independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., G.R. No. 199082; BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR. v. HON. LEILA DE LIMA, et al., G.R. No. 199085; GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No. 199118, July 23, 2013 Factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by the courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC — created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself — on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence. The COMELEC may motu proprio cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any party-list organization if it violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections. ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013 The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed representative in favor of the HRET. The phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" refers to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. WIGBERTO R. TAÑADA, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ANGELINA D. TAN, AND ALVIN JOHN S. TAÑADA, G.R. Nos. 207199-200, October 22, 2013 The Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall. The COMELEC has exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections. It is thus not novel for the Supreme Court to uphold the COMELEC‘s broad power or authority to fix other dates for a plebiscite to enable the people to exercise their right of suffrage. MARC DOUGLAS IV C. CAGAS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS et al., G.R. No. 209185, October 25, 2013 Section 2 (1), Article IX (C) of the Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to “enforce and

administer all laws and regulations relative to conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.” The COMELEC has “exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuing free, orderly and honest elections.” Furthermore, Section 5 of Omnibus Election Code provided for the power of the COMELEC to set the elections to another date for any serious cause. In the case herein, the tight time frame of the enactment, signing into law and effectivity of R.A. 10360, coupled with the subsequent conduct of May 2013 National and Local elections, rendered impossible the holding of a plebiscite for the creation of province of Davao Occidental. In the exercise of its powers to protect the integrity of elections, COMELEC should not and must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in the exercise of its discretion to resolve election disputes. The right of suffrage should prevail over mere scheduling mishaps in holding elections or plebiscites. CAGAS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209185, October 25, 2013 COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 introduced a radical departure from the previous COMELEC resolutions relative to the airtime limitations on political advertisements. This essentially consists in computing the airtime on an aggregate basis involving all the media of broadcast communications compared to the past where it was done on a per station basis. Thus, it becomes immediately obvious that there was effected a drastic reduction of the allowable minutes within which candidates and political parties would be able to campaign through the air. The question is accordingly whether this is within the power of the COMELEC to do or not. The Court holds that it is not within the power of the COMELEC to do so. There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily authorized to enforce election laws but it cannot exercise its powers without limitations or reasonable basis. It could not simply adopt measures or regulations just because it feels that it is the right thing to do, in so far as it might be concerned. It does have discretion, but such discretion is something that must be exercised within the bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is not free to simply change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever it has to change the rules, the same must be properly explained with sufficient basis. While stability in the law, particularly in the business field, is desirable, there is no demand that the NTC slavishly follow precedent. However, we think it essential, for the sake of clarity and intellectual honesty, that if an administrative agency decides inconsistently with previous action, that it explain thoroughly why a different result is warranted, or if need be, why the previous standards should no longer apply or should be overturned. Such explanation is warranted in order to sufficiently establish a decision as having rational basis. Any inconsistent decision lacking thorough, ratiocination in support may be struck down as being arbitrary. And any decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. What the COMELEC came up with does not measure up to that level of requirement and accountability which elevates administrative rules to the level of respectability and acceptability. Those governed by administrative regulations are entitled to a reasonable and rational basis for any changes in those rules by which they are supposed to live by, especially if there is a radical departure from the previous ones. The law, on its face, does not justify a conclusion that the maximum allowable airtime should be based on the totality (aggregate) of possible broadcast in all television or radio stations. Senator

Cayetano has called our attention to the legislative intent relative to the airtime allowed – that it should be on a “per station” basis. It is therefore ineluctable to conclude that Congress intended to provide a more expansive and liberal means by which the candidates, political parties, citizens and other stake holders in the periodic electoral exercise may be given a chance to fully explain and expound on their candidacies and platforms of governance, and for the electorate to be given a chance to know better the personalities behind the candidates. In this regard, the media is also given a very important part in that undertaking of providing the means by which the political exercise becomes an interactive process. All of these would be undermined and frustrated with the kind of regulation that the respondent came up with. GMA NETWORK v. COMELEC, G.R. 205357, September 2, 2014 The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 were transfer and detail. Transfer is defined in the Resolution as “any personnel movement from one government agency to another or from one department, division, geographical unit or subdivision of a government agency to another with or without the issuance of an appointment”; while detail as defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment. Having acquired technical and legal meanings, transfer and detail must be construed as such. ELSIE S. CAUSING v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 199139, September 9, 2014 LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the immediately following election. In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative. VICTORINO ALDABA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R No. 188078, March 15, 2010 The constitutional provision draws plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010 The determination of the existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities does not simply lie on the mere pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress but measured on the very purpose of the LGC, as provided in its Section 2 (a). Indeed, substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) et al. v. COMISSION ON ELECTIONS et al., G.R. Nos. 176951, February 15, 2011 A province may be created without complying with Section 461 of the LGC requiring contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, AND RENE O. MEDINA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011

In computing the quorum in of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, its entire membership must be taken into account including that of the City Vice Mayor as presiding officer. LA CARLOTA CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL AND THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF LA CARLOTA CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL v. ATTY. REX G. ROJO, G.R. No. 181367, April 24, 2012 Section 444 (b) (1) (vi) of the LGC requires that, while the authorization of the municipal mayor need not be in the form of an ordinance, the obligation which the said local executive is authorized to enter into must be made pursuant to a law or ordinance. When the said obligation was approved through a mere resolution, it shall not confer any right to a person. The distinction between ordinances and resolutions is well-perceived. While ordinances are laws and possess a general and permanent character, resolutions are merely declarations of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter and are temporary in nature. As opposed to ordinances, "no rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a resolution." LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN, G.R. No. 191667, April 17, 2013 Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution states: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Section 453 of the LGC, meanwhile, states: It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within 30 days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries. As the phrase implies, "substantial alteration of boundaries" involves and necessarily entails a change in the geographical configuration of a local government unit or units. However, the phrase "boundaries" should not be limited to the mere physical one, referring to the metes and bounds of the LGU, but also to its political boundaries. It also connotes a modification of the demarcation lines between political subdivisions, where the LGU’s exercise of corporate power ends and that of the other begins. And as a qualifier, the alteration must be "substantial" for it to be within the ambit of the constitutional provision. The changes that will result from the conversion are too substantial that there is a necessity for the plurality of those that will be affected to approve it. Similar to the enumerated acts in the constitutional provision, conversions result in material changes in the economic and political rights of the people and LGUs affected. Given the far-reaching ramifications of converting the status of a city, we held that the plebiscite requirement under the constitutional provision should equally apply to conversions as well. AURELIO M. UMALI V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014 Section 16 and 76 of the Local Government Code do not confer authority upon any local government unit to create a separate or supplementary retirement benefit plan. Such a type of retirement benefit plan must first be granted to the local government by law before a local government can use it. CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014 PRINCIPLES OF LOCAL AUTONOMY

A liberal interpretation of the zoning power of city and municipal boards and councils, as to include the power to accordingly reclassify the lands within the zones, would be in accord with the avowed legislative intent behind the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, which was to increase the autonomy of local governments. BUKLOD NANG MAGBUBUKID SA LUPAING RAMOS, INC. v. E. M. RAMOS AND SONS, INC., G.R. No. 131481, March 16, 2011 The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority. It does not make local governments sovereign within the State. Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but subject to limitations like following national policies or standards, and those provided by the Local Government Code, as the structuring of local governments and the allocation of powers, responsibilities, and resources among the different local government units and local officials have been placed by the Constitution in the hands of Congress under Section 3, Article X of the Constitution. The Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the country's natural resources. Further, the DENR Secretary has the power to review and, therefore, decide, in this case, the issue on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended by the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights. LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES and HON. ANGELO T. REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 175368, April 11, 2013 The constitutional mandate for local autonomy supports petitioner city’s issuance of E.O. 40, series of 2008, creating change management teams as an initial step for its organization development masterplan. Local autonomy also grants local governments the power to streamline and reorganize. The text of the ordinance indicates its purpose of encouraging employees, especially those who are unproductive due to health reasons, to avail of the program even before they reach the compulsory retirement age. Section 6 provides for a form of severance pay to those who availed of GenSan SERVES, which was executed in good faith. The use of the term "retirement" in Section 6 is misleading in determining the nature of the benefits it provides. Labels are not determinative of substantive content. It is the purpose behind these incentives, as read from the text of the ordinance and as inferred from the effect of the ordinance as applied, which must govern. The benefits provided in Section 6 serve its purpose of inducing petitioner city’s employees, who are unproductive due to health reasons, to retire early. Furthermore, the benefits under GenSan SERVES were only given to a select few — the sickly and unproductive due to health reasons. Certainly, this negates the position that the benefits provide for supplementary retirement benefits that augment existing retirement laws. CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS v. COA, G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014

The prior approval of the concerned Sanggunian requirement is an attribute of the autonomy granted to and enjoyed by the LGUs under the Constitution. However, R.A. 7227 provided the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) the broad powers to accept any local or foreign investment, business, or enterprise. The Court finds that the implementation of the subject project (power plant in Subic, Zambales) does not need prior approval of the concerned sanggunians as required by Section 27 of the Local Government Code, because the SBMA’s decision to approve the project prevails over the objections of the sangguanians of the LGUs, by virtue of the provisions and powers granted by R.A. 7227. HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE v. HON. TEODORO A. CASIÑO, G.R. No. 207257, February 3, 2015 LOCAL GOVERNMENT A fifth-class municipality like Midsalip is not absolutely prohibited from adopting a salary schedule equivalent to that of a special city or a first-class province, provided, that it complies with the provision of R.A. 7160. PAULINO M. ALECHA AND PRECIOSO M. TAPITAN v. ELMER BEN V. PASION et al., G.R. No. 164506, January 19, 2010 Although Section 152 (c) of the Local Government Code requires a barangay clearance for any activity within its jurisdiction, such clearance cannot be denied when the activity is in a permissible zone, otherwise such denial is illegal. The same provision allows the city or municipality to which the barangay unit belongs to issue the required license or building permit despite the withholding of the barangay clearance. GREENHILLS EAST ASSOCIATION, INC. v. E. GANZON, INC., G.R. No. 169741, January 20, 2010 R.A. 7160 requires that where the head of the office or department requesting the requisition sits in a dual capacity, the participation of a Sanggunian member (elected from among the members of the Sanggunian) is necessary. ROLANDO SISON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 170339, March 9, 2010 Being merely a rectifying issuance and not a rezoning enactment, the questioned Resolution did not have to comply with the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing. THE LEARNING CHILD, INC., et al. v. AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, et al., G.R. Nos. 134269, 134440, 144518, July 7, 2010 Under the Local Government Code, the municipal mayor is required to secure the prior authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan before entering into a contract in behalf of the municipality. MUNICIPALITY OF TIWI AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF TIWI v. ANTONIO B. BETITO, G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010 Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President, the grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits does not need the approval of the President to be valid. THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL v. THE COMMISSIONERS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, et.al, G.R. No. 182574, September 28, 2010 The Revised Charter of Quezon City expressly provided that the city government had the power to regulate the kinds of buildings and structures that may be erected within fire limits and the manner of constructing and repairing them. The MMDA does not have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance. EMILIO

GANCAYCO v. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY AND METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011 The Local Government Code establishes the duties of national government agencies in the maintenance of ecological balance, and requires them to secure prior public consultation and approval of local government units for the projects described therein. BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. v. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN, REPRESENTED BY GOV. CARLITO S. MARQUEZ, et al., G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012 Under Section 456 of R.A. 7160, or the Local Government Code, there is no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor. Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the city was strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting it. ARNOLD D. VICENCIO v. HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR, et al., G.R. No. 182069, July 3, 2012 A provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President, and an exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code. Neither is the provincial governor authorized to convene a local civilian group or an organization of private citizens as it is proscribed pursuant to the national policy to establish one police force and under Section 24 of Article XVIII of the Constitution. JAMAR M. KULAYAN, et al. v. GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012 While the Local Government Code charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, the Local Government Code provides an exception in cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services. AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., et al. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, et al., G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012 In order for an entity to legally undertake a quarrying business, he must first comply with all the requirements imposed not only by the national government, but also by the local government unit where his business is situated. The permit to extract sand, gravel and other quarry resources shall be issued exclusively by the provincial governor, pursuant to the ordinance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. PROVINCE OF CAGAYAN, represented by HON. ALVARO T. ANTONIO, et al. v. JOSEPH LASAM LARA, G.R. No. 188500. July 24, 2013 An ordinance is deemed approved upon failure of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to declare the same invalid within 30 days after its submission in accordance with Section 56 of the LGC. RAMONITO O. ACAAC, et al. v. MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, et al., G.R. No. 187378, September 30, 2013 The issuance of a Barangay Protection Order under R.A. 9262 by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay.” TUA v. HON. MANGROBANG, G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014

The Constitution and the Local Government Code grants Local Government Units the power to create its own sources of revenue even if not provided in the NIRC or the LGC, so long as such are not oppressive and confiscatory. If the generation of revenue was the primary purpose and regulation was merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a tax. If the main purpose of the ordinance is to regulate certain construction activities of the identified special projects, which included cell sites or telecommunications towers, the fees (charges fixed by law or Ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a business or activity) imposed in the said ordinance are primarily regulatory in nature, and not primarily revenue-raising. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. MUNICIPALITY OF MALVAR, BATANGAS, G.R. No.204429, February 18, 2014 The power of the cities and municipalities, such as the Municipality of Calamba, to adopt zoning ordinances or regulations converting lands into non-agricultural cannot be denied. In Buklod ng Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E. M. Ramos and Sons, Inc. (2011), this Court recognized said power in the following manner: Section 3 of R.A. 2264, otherwise known at the Local Autonomy Act, empowers a Municipal Council “to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations” for the municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word “regulation” under the provision. As a matter of fact the same section declares that the power exists “any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding.” KASAMAKA-CANLUBANG v. LAGUNA ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 200491, June 9, 2014 Under R.A. 7160, local government units, such as the Municipality of Malolos, Bulacan, are vested with the power to reclassify lands. However, an ordinance is required in order to reclassify agricultural lands, and such may only be passed after the conduct of public hearings. The petitioner claims the reclassification on the basis of Municipal Resolution No. 16-98. Given the foregoing clarifications, however, the resolution was ineffectual for that purpose. A resolution was a mere declaration of the sentiment or opinion of the lawmaking body on a specific matter that was temporary in nature, and differed from an ordinance in that the latter was a law by itself and possessed a general and permanent character. HOLY TRINITY REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. VICTORIO DELA CRUZ, G.R. No. 200454, October 22, 2014 LOCAL OFFICIALS The law does not intend to place local government officials in the difficult position of having to choose between disobeying a reassignment order or keeping an allowance. Thus, absent a legal basis for its discontinuance, a government official who has been reassigned is still entitled to receive RATA. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT v. OLIVIA LEONES, G.R. No. 169726, March 18, 2010 Where personal liability on the part of local government officials is sought, they may properly secure the services of private counsel. ROMEO A. GONTANG v. ENGR. CECILIA ALAYAN, G.R. No. 191691, January16, 2013 On the matter of counsels’ representation for the government, the Administrative Code is not the only law that delves on the issue. Specifically for local government units, the LGC limits the lawyers Page 90 of 100

who are authorized to represent them in court actions, as the law defines the mandate of a local government unit’s legal officer. Evidently, this provision of the LGC not only identifies the powers and functions of a local government unit’s legal officer. It also restricts, as it names, the lawyer who may represent the local government unit as its counsel in court proceedings. Being a special law on the issue of representation in court that is exclusively made applicable to local government units, the LGC must prevail over the provisions of the Administrative Code, which classifies only as a general law on the subject matter. THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL v. THE HONORABLE CA, G.R. No. 199027, June 9, 2014 NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY The Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000 R.A. 8762 is valid and constitutional. While Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. Neither does the lessening of restraint on the foreigners' right to property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, amounts to a denial of the Filipinos' right to property and to due process of law. REPRESENTATIVES GERARDO S. ESPINA, et al. v. HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, JR. (EXECUTIVE SECRETARY), et al., G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010 Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, PAGCOR's franchise is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress such as the amendment under Section 1 of R.A. 9377. Hence, the provision in Section 1 of R.A. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of R.A. 8424 by withdrawing the exemption of PAGCOR from corporate income tax, which may affect any benefits to PAGCOR's transactions with private parties, is not violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) v. THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR) et al., G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011 The sale of government-owned Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to a foreign corporation is not prohibited but only Filipino citizens and corporations 60% of whose capital is owned by Filipinos may be granted water rights. INITIATIVES FOR DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICES, INC., et al. v. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM), et al., G.R. No. 192088, October 09, 2012 GMA cannot rely on the temporary permits to justify its continued operation on an expired Provisional Authority (P.A.). As the NTC itself discloses, a temporary permit is not intended to be a substitute for a PA which must be constantly renewed despite the issuance of a temporary permit. A P.A. refers to an authority given to an entity qualified to operate a public utility for a limited period during the pendency of its application for, or before the issuance of its Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC). It has a general scope because it is akin to a provisional CPC in that it gives a public utility provider power to operate as such and be bound by the laws and rules governing public utilities, pending the issuance of its actual CPC. On the other hand, a temporary permit is a document containing the call sign, authorized power, frequency/channel, class station, hours of operation, points of communication and equipment particulars granted to an authorized public utility. Its scope is more specific than a P.A. because it contains details and specifications under which a public utility should operate pursuant to a previously updated P.A. Page 91 of 100

As may be gleaned from the NTC’s statement, the operational validity of a temporary permit flows only from "a previously updated P.A." This means that there should be an effective P.A. before a temporary permit is issued. The latter is a specific issuance which proceeds from a pre-requisite PA. GMA NETWORK, INC. v. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 196112, February 26, 2014 The Regalian doctrine, embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain for land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It must be proved. And the applicant bears the burden to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CRISANTO S. RANESES, G.R. No. 189970, June 9, 2014 This Court has had a few occasions to rule that a franchise from Congress is not required before each and every public utility may operate. Unless there is a law that specifically requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility, particular agencies in the executive branch may issue authorizations and licenses for the operation of certain classes of public utilities. In the instant case, there is no law that states that a legislative franchise is necessary for the operation of toll facilities. "Congress has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for, or to authorize the operation of certain public utilities. With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency towards the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and towards the approval of the practice by the courts. It is generally recognized that a franchise may be derived indirectly from the state through a duly designated agency, and to this extent, the power to grant franchises has frequently been delegated, even to agencies other than those of a legislative nature. In pursuance of this, it has been held that privileges conferred by grant by local authorities as agents for the state constitute as much a legislative franchise as though the grant had been made by an act of the Legislature.” RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL v. TRB, G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015 BALANCE AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of

transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations. Thus: Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. PEDRO ARIGO v. SCOTT SWIFT, G.R. 206510, September 16, 2014 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT A government contract is essentially similar to a private contract contemplated under the Civil Code. The legal requisites of consent of the contracting parties, an object certain which is the subject matter, and cause or consideration of the obligation must likewise concur. Otherwise, there is no government contract to speak of. SARGASSO CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, et al. v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 170530. July 5, 2010 Competitive bidding is an essential element of a public bidding. It has been held in a long line of cases that a contract granted without the competitive bidding required by law is void and the party to whom it is awarded cannot benefit from it. PHILIPPINE SPORTS COMMISSION, et al. v. DEAR JOHN SERVICES, INC., G.R. No. 183260. July 4, 2012 A mere operator, under an operating agreement, cannot file a Mineral Product Sharing Agreement (MPSA) application in its name without a sufficient and valid authorization from its principal or from the holders of the mining claims and interests included therein. DIZON COPPER SILVER MINES, INC. v. DR. LUIS D. DIZON, G.R. No. 183573, July 18, 2012 Price escalation is expressly allowed under Presidential Decree 1594, which law allows price escalation in all contracts involving government projects including contracts entered into by government entities and instrumentalities and Government Owned or Controlled Corporations (GOCCs). PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY v. GREEN ASIA CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 188866, October 19, 2011 Competitive selection involves a selection process based on transparent criteria, which should not constrain or limit competition, and is open to participation by any interested and qualified private entity. Selection by negotiated agreements or negotiated projects, on the other hand, comes about as an end result of an unsolicited proposal from a private sector proponent, or if the government has failed to identify an eligible private sector partner for a desired activity after subjecting the same to a competitive selection.

Relevant to the case at bar is the selection modality by negotiated agreement arising from the submission and acceptance of an unsolicited proposal, known as the Swiss Challenge method, in esse a hybrid mechanism between the direct negotiation approach and the competitive bidding route. With the availability of the Swiss Challenge method for utilization by those in the private sector, PSEs have studied, formulated, and submitted numerous suo moto or unsolicited proposals with the ultimate goal of assisting the public sector in elevating the country’s place in the global economy, as in the case herein. SM LAND, INC. v. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 203655, August 13, 2014 Needless to say, allowing government agencies to retract their commitments to the project proponents will essentially render inutile the incentives offered to and have accrued in favor of the private sector entity. Without securing these rights, the business community will be wary when it comes to forging contracts with the government. Simply put, the failure of the government to abide by the rules it itself set would have detrimental effects on the private sector’s confidence that the government will comply with its statutory and contractual obligations to the letter. SM LAND, INC. v. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 203655, August 13, 2014 PUBLIC FUNDS Coco-levy funds are public funds as these funds are affected by public interest: to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened industry, the coconut industry. PETITIONERORGANIZATIONS, NAMELY: PAMBANSANG KOALISYON NG MGA SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA AT MANGGAGAWA SA NIYUGAN (PKSMMN), COCONUT INDUSTRY REFORM MOVEMENT (COIR) et al. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY et al., G.R. Nos. 147036-37, April 10, 2012 Section 2 which mandated that the coconut levy funds shall not be considered special and/or fiduciary funds nor part of the general funds of the national government of P.D. 755 contravenes the provisions of the Constitution. PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED), et al. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, September 04, 2012 No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. A violation of this constitutional edict warrants the disallowance of the payment. However, the refund of the disallowed payment of a benefit granted by law to a covered person, agency or office of the Government may be barred by the good faith of the approving official and of the recipient. BRENDA L. NAZARETH v. COMMISSIONERS of the COMMISSION on AUDIT, G.R. No. 188635, January29, 2013 TESDA is an instrumentality of the government established under the TESDA Act of 1994. Under the Act, the TESDA budget is included in the annual GAA; hence, the TESDP Fund, being sourced from the Treasury, are funds belonging to the government, or any of its departments, in the hands of public officials. The Constitution provides, “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” In this case, TESDA failed to point out the law specifically authorizing it to grant additional reimbursement for Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses from the TESDP Fund, contrary to the explicit requirement in the Constitution. TESDA v. COA, G.R. No. 204869, March 11, 2014

The Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. It is a sui generis private entity especially entrusted by the government with the facilitation of unofficial relations with the people in Taiwan. However, despite its non–governmental character, the MECO handles government funds in the form of the “verification fees” it collects on behalf of the DOLE and the “consular fees” it collects under Section 2 (6) of E.O. 15, s. 2001. Hence, under existing laws, the accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of such “verification fees” and “consular fees” should be audited by the COA. Section 14 (1), Book V of the Administrative Code authorizes the COA to audit accounts of non–governmental entities “required to pay … or have government share” but only with respect to “funds ... coming from or through the government.” This provision of law perfectly fits the MECO. DENNIS FUNA v. MANILA ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OFFICE AND THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 193462, February 04, 2014 EDUCATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS The constitutional mandate to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels is directed to the State and not to the school. THE PARENTS-TEACHERS ASSOCIATION (PTA) OF ST. MATHEW CHRISTIAN ACADEMY, et al. v. THE METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., G.R. No. 176518. March 2, 2010 It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of age and development-appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom. Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity. At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State. It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation building. Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4 (t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision

supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children. Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit. While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it. JAMES M. IMBONG, et al. v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., et al., G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014 Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning, has been enshrined in our Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987… [T]he four essential freedoms” of a university [are]: To determine for itself on academic grounds (1) who may teach; (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study. An educational institution has the power to adopt and enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient for its government, this being incident to the very object of incorporation, and indispensable to the successful management of the college. It can decide for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them, free from outside coercion or interference except when there is an overriding public welfare which would call for some restraint. Indeed, “academic freedom has never been meant to be an unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. An equally telling precept is a long recognized mandate, so well expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code, that every ‘person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.’” The schools’ power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic freedom and that “the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.” In this regard, the Court has always recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel, on students who violate disciplinary rules. The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after graduation for any act done by the student prior thereto. As the primary training and educational institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations, which are the Honor Code and the Honor System in particular. The minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process for students in disciplinary cases are: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative proceeding conducted to investigate a cadet’s honor violation need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. There is aversion to undue judicialization of an administrative hearing in the military academy. FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA v. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), G.R. NO. 211362, February 24, 2015 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW The State is the sole judge to decide whether to prosecute claims on behalf of an individual. It retains, in this respect, a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case. ISABELITA C. VINUYA, et al. v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010 Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH between the IBRD and the Land Bank is an integral component of the Guarantee Agreement executed by the Government of the Philippines as a subject of international law possessed of a treaty-making capacity, and the IBRD, which, as an international lending institution organized by world governments to provide loans conditioned upon the guarantee of repayment by the borrowing sovereign state, is likewise regarded a subject of international law and possessed of the capacity to enter into executive agreements with sovereign states. Being similar to a treaty but without requiring legislative concurrence, Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH — following the definition given in the Bayan Muna case — is an executive agreement and is, thus, governed by international law. Owing to this classification, the Government of the Philippines is therefore obligated to observe its terms and conditions under the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a fundamental maxim of international law that requires the parties to keep their agreement in good faith. It bears pointing out that the pacta sunt servanda rule has become part of the law of the land through the incorporation clause found under Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which states that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations." LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R. No. 193796, July 2, 2014 The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners’ claim against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner. ISABELITA C. VINUYA v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, G.R. No. 162230, August 12, 2014 The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its

foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim - par in parem, non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. We also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction. This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without the former’s consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) from private, commercial, and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the Tubataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling. During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Article 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea. Under Article 31, [t]he flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law. We fully concur with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear “international responsibility” under Article 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its

obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197. In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31. In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with another State in the context of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled that “[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative—the political — departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” PEDRO ARIGO v. SCOTT SWIFT, G.R. 206510, September 16, 2014 TREATIES National criminal jurisdiction being primary, it is always the responsibility and within the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide to try persons of the US, under our national criminal justice system or it may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US persons committing high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them. BAYAN MUNA v. ALBERTO ROMULO AND BLAS F. OPLE, G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011 The international law of the sea is generally defined as “a body of treaty rules and customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international law, regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans.” The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came into force on November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification. The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty ( mare clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum). The freedom to use the world’s marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles of international law. The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones of the sea which are: (1) internal waters; (2) territorial sea; (3) contiguous zone; (4) exclusive economic zone; and (5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is located. Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends

to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. PEDRO ARIGO v. SCOTT SWIFT, G.R. 206510, September 16, 2014 The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines to promote “common security interests” between the US and the Philippines in the region. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering that it is the VFA which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement. As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately: “The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions.” PEDRO ARIGO v. SCOTT SWIFT, G.R. 206510, September 16, 2014 TREATMENT OF ALIENS In deportation proceedings, there is no due process violation when the summary deportation proceedings were held and when the Summary Deportation Order was issued. In addition, the actual designation of the offense is not material so long as the act constituting the offense was clearly alleged in the Charge Sheet and sufficient enough to inform the alien of the specific ground for his deportation. Summary deportation shall be observed in cases where the charge against the alien is overstaying or expiration of his passport, including those aliens with cancelled passport. In such cases, a fullblown deportation hearing is not necessary. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION v. JUNG KEUN PARK, G.R. No. 159835, January 21, 2010

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