Constitutional Law 1 Reviewer.docx

1 INTRODUCTION I.

Constitutional Law Study of the maintenance of the proper balance between authority as represented by the three inherent powers of state and liberty as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

II.

The Constitution

down a general principle is usually not selfexecuting. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. i) Thus, a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the Constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action [Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 03, 1997].

A. Definition – that body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised (Cooley). - The written instrument enacted by direct action of the people by which the fundamental powers of the government are established, limited and defined, by which those powers are distributed among several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politics (Justice Malcolm). B. Doctrine of constitutional supremacy Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. C. Parts 

ii) Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of this provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts [Pamatong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004]. CASE: Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

Constitution of Liberty The series of prescription setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the citizens and imposing limitations on the powers of government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights (e.g. Art III). Constitution of Government The series of provisions outlining the organization of the government, enumerating its powers, laying down certain rules relative to its administration and defining the electorate (e.g. Art. VI, VII, VIII and IX). Constitution of Sovereignity The provisions pointing out the mode or procedure in accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought (e.g. Art. XVII).

Facts: The GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the outstanding shares. The winning bidder "is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.” In a close bidding only 2 bidders participated, the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm. Petitioner Manila Prince, a Filipino Corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian Firm, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder, petitioner matches the bid price of P44.00 per share by Renong Berhad. Subsequently, petitioner sent a manager's check as bid security to match the bid of Renong Berhad which respondent GSIS refuse to accept. Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated which Renong Berhad, petitioner came to the Supreme Court on prohibition and mandamus. The court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.

D. Characteristics of a good written Constitution  Broad Not just because it provides for the organization of the entire government and covers all persons and things within the territory of the state but because it must be comprehensive enough to provide for contingency.  Brief It must confine itself to basic principles to be implemented with legislative details more adjustable to change and easier to amend.  Definite To prevent ambiguity in its provisions which could result in confusion and divisiveness among the people (Cruz, ibidd, p.5-6).

Petitioner’s claim: (Manila Prince Hotel) Invoked Art 12, Sec 10, Par. 2: The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 constitution “In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the state shall give preference to qualified Filipinos” and argues that the Manila Hotel was covered by the phrase "national patrimony" and hence cannot be sold to foreigners; selling 51% would be tantamount to owning the business of a hotel which is owned by the GSIS, a GOCC, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry which undoubtedly is part of the national economy. Respondents’ claim: (Govt Service Insurance System, Manila Hotel Corp, COP, OGCC)

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E. Self-executing vs. non-self-executing provisions Self-executing provisions - A provision which lays

1. Art 12, Sec 10, Par. 2: is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be existing laws to lay down conditions under which business may be done and Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony Issue: W/N the constitutional provision is self-executory Held: Yes, under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

2 A provision which lays down a general principle is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means if which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected is selfexecuting. Sec 10, second par. Article XII of the 1987 constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to "the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony" and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. When our constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the state shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. It means that- qualified Filipino shall be preferred. And when our constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject, consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforce itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy.

III. The Constitutions of the Philippines A. Pre-1987 Constitution 1. The Malolos Constitution. a) The Philippine Revolution of 1896. b) Proclamation of Philippine independence, at Kawit, Cavite, on June 12, 1898. c) Revolutionary Congress convened at Barasoain Church, Malolos, Bulacan, on September 15, 1898. Three drafts were submitted, namely, the drafts of Pedro Paterno, Apolinario Mabini and Felipe Calderon.

authority to exercise that part of the military power of the US President which is legislative in character was transferred from the military government to the Philippine Commission [first, the Schurman Commission, then, the Taft Commission]. c) The Spooner Amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill of March 2, 1901 provided that all military, civil and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands shall be exercised in such manner x x x for the establishment of a civil government and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property and religion. On July 1, 1901, the Office of the Civil Governor was created, and the executive authority previously exercised by the military governor was transferred to the Civil Governor. d) The Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 continued the existing civil government, with the commitment from the US Congress to convene and organize in the Philippines a legislative body of their own representatives. On October 16,1907, the Philippine Assembly was convened to sit as the Lower House in a bicameral legislature, with the Philippine Commission as the Upper House. e) The Jones Law [Philippine Autonomy Act] of August 29, 1916. It superseded the Spooner Amendment and the Philippine Bill of 1902. It was the principal organic act of the Philippines until November 15,1935, when the Philippine Commonwealth was inaugurated (under the 1935 Constitution). It contained a preamble, a bill of rights, provisions defining the organization and powers of the departments of government, provisions defining the electorate, and miscellaneous provisions on finance, franchises and salaries of important officials. Executive power was vested in the Governor General, legislative power in a bicameral legislature composed of the Senate and House of Representatives, and judicial power in the Supreme Court, the Courts of First Instance and inferior courts. f) The Tydings-McDuffie Act [Philippine Independence Act] of March 24, 1934 authorized the drafting of a Constitution for the Philippines, the establishment of a Commonwelath Government and, after ten years, independence.

d) The Calderon proposal was reported to the Congress on October 8, 1898, and the Congress approved the proposed Constitution on November 29, 1898.

3. The 1935 Constitution

e) President Emilio Aguinaldo approved the same on December 23, 1898; Congress ratified it on January 20, 1899.

a) Pursuant to the authority granted under the TydingsMcDuffie Law, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 4125 (May 26,1934) calling for the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention.

f) Aguinaldo promulgated the Constitution the following day, along with the establishment of the Philippine Republic on January 21, 1899.

b) Election of delegates: July 10, 1934; Constitutional Convention inaugural: July 30, 1934.

g) This was the first republican constitution in Asia, framed by a revolutionary convention which included 40 lawyers, 16 physicians, 5 pharmacists, 2 engineers and 1 priest. The Constitution recognized that sovereign power was vested in the people, provided for a parliamentary government, acknowledged separation of powers, and contained a bill of rights. 2. The American Regime and the Organic Acts

c) Draft Constitution approved by the Constitutional Convention on February 8, 1935; brought to Washington on March 18, 1935, and on March 23, 1935, US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt certified that the draft constitution conformed substantially with the TydingsMcDuffie Law. d) The Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite held on May 14, 1935.

a) The Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. The treaty of peace entered into between the US and Spain upon the cessation of the Spanish- American War. It provided, among others, for the cession of the Philippine Islands by Spain to the US.

e) The Philippine Commonwealth established under the Constitution was inaugurated on November 15, 1935; full independence was attained with the inauguration of the (Third) Philippine Republic on July 4, 1946.

b) US President McKinley’s Instructions of April 7, 1900, to transform the military into a civil government as rapidly as conditions would permit. On September 1, 1900, the

f) The Constitution was amended in 1939: Ordinance appended to the Constitution, in accordance with the Tydings-Kocialkowski Act of August 7, 1939 [Resolution of Congress: September 15, 1939; Plebiscite: October 24,

3 1939] g) It was amended again in 1940: Changed President’s and Vice President’s term from six to four years, but no person shall serve as President for more than 8 years; changed the unicameral to a bicameral legislature; established an independent Commission on Elections [Resolution: April 11, 1940; Plebiscite: June 18, 1940] i)

Another amendment was adopted in 1947: Parity Amendment, effective July 4, 1949, granting to Americans, for a period of twentyfive years, the same privileges as Filipinos in the utilization and exploitation of natural resources in the Philippines [Resolution: September 18, 1946; Plebiscite: March 11, 1947], See: Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1.

4. The Japanese (Belligerent) Occupation a) With the occupation of Manila, the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces proclaimed, on January 2, 1942, the military administration over the territory occupied by the army, and ordered that “all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions shall continue to be effective for the time being as in the past”, and “all public officials shall remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before”. b) Order No. 1 of the Japanese Commander in Chief, on January 23, 1942, organized the Philippine Executive Commission. c) Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4, dated January 30 and February 6, 1942, respectively, continued the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance and Justices of the Peace Courts, with the same jurisdiction, in conformity with later instructions given by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Imperial Army in Order No. 3, dated February 20, 1942. d) October 14, 1943, the (Second) Philippine Republic was inaugurated, with Jose P. Laurel as President. 5. The 1973 Constitution a) Resolution of Both Houses (RBH) No. 1, March 16, 1967, increasing the membership of the House of Representatives from 120 to 180 b) RBH No. 2, March 16,1967, calling for a Constitutional Convention to revise the 1935 Constitution c) RBH No. 3, March 16, 1967, allowing members of Congress to sit as delegates in the Constitutional Convention without forfeiting their seats in Congress d) RBH 1 and RBH 3 were submitted to the people in a plebiscite simultaneously with local elections in November 1967, but both were rejected by the people. e) RBH No. 4, June 17, 1969, amending RBH No. 2, and authorizing that specific apportionment of delegates to the Constitutional Convention and other details relating to the election of delegates be embodied in an implementing legislation f) Republic Act No. 6132: Constitutional Convention Act of 1970. i) See Imbong v. Comelec, 35 SCRA 28, where the constitutionality of the RA 6132 was challenged because it had to do with the calling of a Constitutional Convention but was not passed by % of all the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, voting separately. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the law, declaring that

after Congress had exercised its constituent power by adopting RBH 2 and RBH 4, with the requisite % vote as required by the 1935 Constitution, it may, by simply exercising legislative power, pass a law providing for the details for the implementation of the resolutions passed in the exercise of its constituent power. g) Election of delegates: November 10, 1970; Constitutional Convention was inaugurated on June 1, 1971. i)

Attempt of the Constitutional Convention to submit for ratification one resolution (reducing the voting age from 21 to 18) in a plebiscite to coincide with the 1971 local elections was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Tolentino v. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702. The Court held that when a Constitutional Convention is called for the purpose of revising the Constitution, it may not submit for ratification “piecemeal amendments” because the 1935 Constitution speaks of submission of the proposed amendments in “an election” (in the singular), and also because to allow the submission would deprive the people of a “proper frame of reference”.

h) Presidential Proclamation No. 1081, on September 21, 1972: Declaration of martial law by President Ferdinand E. Marcos. i) Constitutional Convention approved the draft Constitution on November 29, 1972. j) On November 30, 1972, President Marcos issued a decree setting the plebiscite for the ratification of the new Constitution on January 15, 1973; on December 17, 1972, issued an order suspending the effects of Presidential Proclamation 1081 in order to allow free and open debate on the proposed Constitution. .i) Planas v. Comelec, 49 SCRA 105, and companion cases (collectively known as the Plebiscite Cases) sought to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite. The cases were eventually dismissed for being moot and academic when President Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation 1102, declaring that the Constitution had been ratified and has come into force and effect. k) On December 23, 1972, President Marcos announced the postponement of the plebiscite, but it was only on January 7, 1973, that General Order No. 20 was issued, directing that the plebiscite scheduled on January 15, 1973, be postponed until further notice, and withdrawing the order of December 17, 1972, suspending the effects of Pres. Proclamation 1081 which allowed free and open debate on the proposed Constitution. l) On December 31, 1972, Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 86, organizing the Citizens Assemblies to be consulted on certain public issues; and on January 5, 1973, issued Presidential Decree No. 86-A, calling the Citizens Assemblies to meet on January 10-15, 1973, to vote on certain questions, among them: “Do you approve of the new Constitution?” and “Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?” m) On January 17, 1973, President Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, declaring that the new Constitution had been ratified by the Citizens Assemblies, and “has thereby come into force and effect”. i) The validity of the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was challenged in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30, and companion cases (collectively known as the Ratification Cases). The basic issues and the votes of the

4 SC justices were: (1) Whether the validity of Proclamation 1102 is a political or a justiciable question - Six justices said it is justiciable, three said it is political, and one justice qualified his vote. (2) Whether the new Constitution was validly ratified (with substantial if not strict compliance) conformably with the 1935 Constitution - Six justices said no, three said there was substantial compliance, and one qualified his vote. (3) Whether the people had acquiesced in the new Constitution (with or without valid ratification) Four justices said the people had already accepted the new Constitution, two said that there can be no free expression by the people qualified to vote of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under martial law, one said he is not prepared to state that a new Constitution once accepted by the people must be accorded recognition independently of valid ratification, and three expressed their lack of knowledge or competence to rule on the question because under a regime of martial law with the free expression of opinions restricted, they have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution. (4) Whether the petitioners are entitled to relief - Six justices voted to dismiss the petitions, while four were for giving due course to the petitions. (5) Whether the new Constitution is already in force - Four said yes by virtue of the people’s acceptance of the same, four said they could not with judicial certainty whether or not the people had accepted the Constitution, and two declared that the new Constitution is not in force, “with the result that there are not enough votes to declare tha the new Constitution is not in force”. The SC decision concluded: “Accordingly, by virtue of the majority of six votes x x x. with four dissenting votes x x x all of the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. ” n) The 1973 Constitution was amended in 1976: Package often (10) amendments, proposed by Marcos on September 2, 1976, without specifying the particular provisions being changed. This package contained the infamous Amendment No. 6. The amendments were ratified in a plebiscite held on October 16, 1976. i) In Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333, where the authority of President Marcos to propose amendments to the Constitution was challenged, the high tribunal said: “If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative powers of the interim (National) Assembly (which was never convened), there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the functions of the Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, though peculiar, to its gross legislative power x x x (W)ith the interim National Assembly not convened and only the President' and the Supreme Court in operation, the urge of absolute necessity renders it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution.” o) The Constitution was amended again on January 30, 1980: Restored original retirement age of judges to 70 years of age p) Another amendment was adopted on April 7, 1981: Restored the presidential system, while retaining certain features of the parliamentary system; granted natural-born Filipinos who had been naturalized in a foreign country the right to own a limited area of residential land in the Philippines q) Still another amendment was made on January 27, 1984: Provided for new rules on presidential succession, replaced the Executive Committee with a revived Office of the Vice President, and changed the composition of the Batasan Pambansa r) Snap presidential election of 1986.

i)

A petition to prohibit the holding of the snap election was filed with the SC in Philippine Bar Association v. Comelec, 140 SCRA 455. But the petition was dismissed because considerations other than legal had already set in, the candidates were in the thick of the campaign, and the people were already looking forward to the election.

s) February 22-25, 1986: EDSA I People’s Revolution. See: Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Corazon Aquino, G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986, where the Supreme Court held that the Cory Aquino government was not only a de facto but a de jure government. CASES: Planas v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-35925, January 22, 1973 (aka the Plebiscite cases) Facts: On 1 June 1971, a Constitutional Convention was held to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. While the Convention is in session on 21 September 1972, the entire Philippines were placed under martial law by virtue of Proclamation No. 1081. On 29 November 1972, the Convention approved its proposed Constitution. The next day the President issued PD No. 73 “submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor”, as well as setting the Plebiscite for said ratification. On 7 December 1972, Charito Planas petitioned the Court to enjoin respondents from implementing PD No. 73 on the grounds that the calling of plebiscite and appropriation of public funds are lodged exclusively in the Congress and that there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly and no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof, there is no proper submission to the people of said proposed Constitution. On 17 December 1972, the President temporarily suspended the effects of PD 1080 for purpose of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution. On 23 December 1972, the Plebiscite was postponed until further notice by the President. Thereby the Court refrained from ruling on the cases. On 12 January 1973, petitioners filed an “urgent motion” praying for the resolution of the cases “as soon as possible.” Issues: 1. WON the validity of PD 73 is justiciable on the ground that the question at hand is political in nature. 2. WON PD 73 is valid. 3. WON the Constitutional Convention have the authority to pass the proposed Constitution. 4. WON martial law affected the proper submission of the proposed Constitution to a plebiscite. Held: 1. Yes. The Court finds that the issue aforementioned is a justiciable one since the assailed decree purports to have the force and effect of legislation, not only because of the long list decided by the Court on the acts of the Executive, but also of Subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution. 2. The validity of PD 73 was declared moot and academic by the Court because the plebiscite ordained in said Decree has been postponed. 3. Yes. The Court held that the Constitutional Convention was legally free to postulate any amendment it may deem fit to propose for as long as they adhere to Section 1 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution. 4. The issue involves question of fact which cannot be predetermined, and that martial law per se does not necessarily bar the factual possibility of adequate freedom. Javellana vs. Exec. Sec., 50 SCRA 33 (aka the Ratification cases) FACTS: On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including. Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed constitution upon ground the that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed

5 constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and void. Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import and objective. ISSUES: Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or political question, and therefore non-justiciable. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force. HELD: First. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution. The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show. Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage. The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void. Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null and void. Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns. The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution. Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the 1935 Constitution places COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the "the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," independently of the Executive. But there is not even a certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged results of the citizen’s assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102. Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department of Local Governments had certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines. The citizen’s assemblies did not adopt the proposed constitution. It is to my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that there have been no such citizen’s assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines. Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts.

Recognition normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do not constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in session duly assembled. This is a wellestablished principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers. The compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government does not constitute acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to declare that the people's inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence. As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well to remember that the same refers to a document certified to the President for his action under the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses, concerning legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive department of the Government. In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions therein should be given due course, there being more than prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite. Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force. Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 FACTS: The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and detained by the military by virtue of Proclamation 1081. The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General Order No.2 of the President "for being participants or for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force..." General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the power he assumed by virtue of Proclamation 1081 placing the entire country under martial law. ISSUES: 1Whether or not the declaration of martial law subject to judicial inquiry. 2) Whether or not detention of the petitioners legal in accordance to the declaration of martial law. HELD: 5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence, not subject to judicial inquiry, while 4 Justices held that the issue is a justiciable one. However, any inquiry by this Court in the present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law has become moot and academic. Implicit in the state of martial law is the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation, which is to suppress invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against imminent danger thereof. The preservation of society and national survival takes precedence. The proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to in this case. Sanidad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976 (affirming the validity of Javellana) Facts: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its

6 replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays"(Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991.On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National ReferendumPlebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V.Sanidad, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the ReferendumPlebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, ArticleXVII of the Constitution. Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16. Issue: Whether or not the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution? Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of threefourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election."Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of such amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly.

The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January10to15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments of the Constitution. Occeña v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981 (affirming the validity of Javellana) Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding. Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively. Ruling: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited. Phil. Bar Association v. Comelec, G.R. No. 72915, December 20, 1985 FACTS: 11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special

7 election. Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional “resignation” did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.” The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest. ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections HELD: The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional. The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.

B. 1987 Constitution 1. Proclamation of the Freedom Constitution a) Proclamation No. 1, February 25, 1986, announcing that she (Corazon Aquino) and Vice President Laurel were assuming power. b) Executive Order No. 1 [February 28, 1986] c) Proclamation No. 3, March 25, 1986, announced the promulgation of the Provisional [Freedom] Constitution, pending the drafting and ratification of a new Constitution. It adopted certain provisions of the 1973 Constitution, contained additional articles on the executive department, on government reorganization, and on existing laws. It also provided for the calling of a Constitutional Commission to be composed of 30-50 members, to draft a new Constitution. See: Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino, G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986; In Re: Saturnino Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160. i) As stated in Proclamation No. 3, the EDSA revolution was “done in defiance of the 1973 Constitution”. The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law [Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 407 SCRA 10 (2003)]. ii) During the interregnum, after the actual take-over of power by the revolutionary government (on February 25, 1986) up to March 24, 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution), the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law

higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during this interregnum, a person could not invoke an exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a Constitution nor a Bill of Rights [Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 407 SCRA 10]. 2. Adoption of the Constitution a) Proclamation No. 9, creating the Constitutional Commission of 50 members. b) Approval of draft Constitution by the Constitutional Commission on October 15, 1986. c) Plebiscite held on February 2, 1987. d) Proclamation No. 58, proclaiming the ratification of the Constitution. 3. Effectivity of the 1987 Constitution: February 2, 1987, the date of the plebiscite when the people ratified the Constitution [De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602]. CASES: Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003 A petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The first Resolution dismissed petitioner’s Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further proceedings allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence. ANTECEDENT FACTS President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (“EO No. 1”) creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (“PCGG”). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power : “(a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order” and "(b) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order.” The PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (“AFP Board”) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired. The AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (“Ramas”). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. The relevant part of the Resolution reads: III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION: 1. Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. 2. He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327 square meters. 3. The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at P700,000.00. 4. The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent Commanding

8 General of the Philippine Army. 5. Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was also able to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986. 6. Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent.

unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 or “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”. 2. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of the presentation of petitioner’s evidence is constitutional. 3. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaano’s house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence is constitutional.

That respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and kisses respondent.

COURT’S RULING The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and owned by MGen Ramas.

PCGG has no such jurisdiction.

7. Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income and is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary. 8. Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military equipment/items seized in her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns the P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income. This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There was an intention to cover the existence of these money because these are all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth. Were it not for the affidavits of the members of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money would have never been known. Respondents response Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out of proportion to his salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano. Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.

Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino. The Court held in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without a showing that they are “subordinates” of former President Marcos.

First Issue: PCGG’s Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents:

This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandigangbayan. The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former President Marcos by being the latter’s immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence. (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG diganbayan and Republic v. Migrino. Second Issue: Proprietary of Dismissal of case before completion of Presentation of Evidence This court DISAGREE. Petitioner has only itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time, petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for postponements and extensions. Even before the date set for the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint. The motion sought “to charge the delinquent properties (which comprise most of petitioner’s evidence) with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone

The pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against private respondents. This court holds that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the presentation of petitioner’s evidence. Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:

This issue bears a significant effect on petitioner’s case since these properties comprise most of petitioner’s evidence against private respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case against private respondents if these properties are inadmissible in evidence.

(1) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and Republic v. Migrino which involve the same issues.

On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaano’s residence a search warrant captioned “Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition.”

(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted against Ramas and Dimaano.

Dimaano was not present during the raid but Dimaano’s cousins witnessed the raid.

(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.

The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant.

(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.

The raiding team seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45; communications equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.

RULING OF THE SANDIGANGBAYAN

ISSUES 1. Whether or not the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for

Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that

9 the raiding team conducted the search and seizure “on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution.”

as Assistant Solicitor General in the Office of the Solicitor General since 1974.

Petitioner argues that a revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were “taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people.”

On 17 January 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes”.

Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents’ exclusionary right.

Petitioner was appointed Appellate Justice in the First Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court. On 7 November 1984, petitioner accepted an appointment to be Deputy Minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice; he thus ceased to be a member of the Judiciary.

The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was “done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.” The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.

Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment excepting sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Commission still adopted the amendment as Section 26,[ Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration orders would not stand the test of due process under the Bill of Rights. 1. The Constabulary raiding team seized items NOT included in the warrant. As admitted by petitioner’s witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant. On the grounds that: Q. "There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant, like for instance, jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?” A. "I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring along also the jewelries and other items, sir. I do not really know where it was taken but they brought along also these articles. I do not really know their reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that these were taken because they might get lost if they will just leave this behind.” It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies, communications equipment, jewelery and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. 2. The search warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items. The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano. The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.

The aftermath of the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 brought about a reorganization of the entire government, including the Judiciary. To effect the reorganization of the Intermediate Appellate Court and other lower courts, a Screening Committee was created, with the then Minister of Justice, now Senator Neptali Gonzales as Chairman and then Solicitor General, now Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations Sedfrey Ordoñez as Vice Chairman. President Corazon C. Aquino, exercising legislative powers by virtue of the revolution, issued Executive Order No. 33 to govern the aforementioned reorganization of the Judiciary. The Screening Committee recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the new Court of Appeals and assigned him the rank of number eleven (11) in the roster of appellate court justices. When the appointments were signed by President Aquino on 28 July 1986, petitioner’s seniority ranking changed, however, from number eleven (11) to number twenty six (26). Petitioner now alleges that the change in his seniority ranking could only be attributed to inadvertence for, otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33. Petitioner elaborates that President Aquino is presumed to have intended to comply with her own Executive Order No. 33 so much so that the correction of the inadvertent error would only implement the intent of the President as well as the spirit of Executive Order No. 33 and will not provoke any kind of constitutional confrontation (between the President and the Supreme Court). In a resolution of the Court en banc dated 29 November 1990, the Court granted Justice Puno’s request. The Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, the Honorable Rodolfo A. Nocon, is directed to correct the seniority rank of Justice Puno from number twelve (12) to number five (5). However, a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court en banc dated 29 November 1990 was later filed by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Luis A. Javellana, two (2) of the Associate Justices affected by the ordered correction. They contend that the present Court of Appeals is a new Court with fifty one (51) members and that petitioner could not claim a reappointment to a prior court; neither can he claim that he was returning to his former court, for the courts where he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment. Petitioner argues that, by virtue of Executive Order No. 33 read in relation to B.P. Blg. 129, his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals is now number five (5) for, though President Aquino rose to power by virtue of a revolution, she had pledged at the issuance of Proclamation No. 3 (otherwise known as the Freedom Constitution) that “no right provided under the unratified 1973 Constitution (shall) be absent in the Freedom Constitution”. Moreover, since the last sentence of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33 virtually re-enacted the last sentence of Sec. 3, Chapter 1 of B.P. Blg. 129, statutory construction rules on simultaneous repeal and reenactment mandate, according to positioner, the preservation and enforcement of all rights and liabilities which had accrued under the original statute. Furthermore, petitioner avers that, although the power of appointment is executive in character and cannot be usurped by any other branch of the Government, such power can still be regulated by the Constitution and by the appropriate law, in this case, by the limits set by Executive Order No. 33 for the power of appointment cannot be wielded in violation of law

9 - In Re: Letter of Associate Justice Renato S. Puno, A.M. No. 9011-2697-CA, June 29, 1992

ISSUE: Whether or not the present Court of Appeals is a new court such that it would negate any claim to precedence or seniority admittedly enjoyed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court which existing prior to Executive Order No. 33.

FACTS: Petitioner Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals, wrote a letter dated 14 November 1990 addressed to this Court, seeking the correction of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals. It appears from the records that petitioner was first appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals on 20 June 1980 but took his oath of office for said position only on 29 November 1982, after serving

HELD: It is the holding of the Court that the present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the Court of Appeals or the Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33, for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon C. Aquino in the aftermath of the people power (EDSA) revolution in 1986. A revolution has been

10 defined as “the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it”, or as “a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence.” It has been said that “the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state” and from there is derived “the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government without regard to the existing constitution.” These summarize the Aquino government’s position that its mandate is taken from “a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people.

e)

A question which naturally comes to mind is whether the then existing legal order was overthrown by the Aquino government. “A legal order is the authoritative code of a polity. Such code consists of all the rules found in the enactments of the organs of the polity. Where the state operates under a written constitution, its organs may be readily determined from a reading of its provisions. Once such organs are ascertained, it becomes an easy matter to locate their enactments. The rules in such enactments, along with those in the constitution, comprise the legal order of that constitutional state.” It is assumed that the legal order remains as a “culture system” of the polity as long as the latter endures and that a point may be reached, however, where the legal system ceases to be operative as a whole for it is no longer obeyed by the population nor enforced by the officials. It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquino’s Government which was met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signalled the point where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. The Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration and the seniority rankings of members of the Court of Appeals, including that of the petitioner, at the time the appointments were made by the President in 1986, are recognized and upheld.

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE I.

Elements of a state

A. People - refers to the inhabitants or population of a state that is politically united. Number comprising is not definite. A. Territory – the geographical profile of a State. A

State without territory is no state at all. Art. I R.A. 3046 as amended by R.A. 5446 AN ACT DEFINE THE BASELINES OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE PHILIPPINES. a) The National Territory The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. (Sec. 1, Art. 1). b) Components Terrestrial, Fluvial, Maritime and Aerial Domains c)

The Philippine Archipelago i. Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898 – Cessation of the Philippine Islands by Spain to the US ii. Treaty bet. Spain and US at Washington, Nov. 7, 1900 (Cagayan, Sulu & Sibuto) iii. Treaty bet. Great Britain & US, Jan. 2, 1930 (Turtle & Mangsee Islands) d) Other territories over which the Philippines

exercises jurisdiction i. Batanes (1935 Constitution) ii. Those contemplated in Art. I, 1973 Constitution [belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal title] iii. PD 1596, June 11, 1978 - DECLARING CERTAIN AREA PART OF THE PHILIPPINE TERRITORY AND PROVIDING FOR THEIR GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION (Kalayaan Island Group) Archipelago Doctrine The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines (2nd sentence, Sec.1, Art 1). i. This articulates the archipelagic doctrine of national territory based on the principle that an archipelago, which consists of a number of islands separated by bodies of water, should be treated as one integral unit. ii. Straight line base method: Imaginary straight lines are drawn joining the outermost points of outermost islands of the archipelago, enclosing an area the ratio of which should not be more than 9:1 (water to land); provided that the drawing of baselines shall not depart, to any appreciable extent, from the general configuration of the archipelago. The waters within the baselines shall be considered internal waters; while the breadth of the territorial sea shall then be measured from the baselines. iii. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [April 30, 1982; ratified by the Philippines in August 1983] provides (i) Contiguous Zone of 12 miles; (ii) Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 miles. Although the contiguous zone and most of the exclusive economic zone may not, technically be part of the territory of the State, nonetheless, the coastal State enjoys preferential rights over the marine resource found within these zones. See also PD 1599, June 11, 1978.

B. Government a. The agency or instrumentality through which the will of the State is formulated expressed and realized. 1.

functions: constituent vs. ministrant Constituent - mandatory for the Government to perform because they constitute the very bonds of society, such as the maintenance of peace and order, regulation of property and property rights, the administration of justice, etc. Ministrant - those intended to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people, and which are merely optional for Government to perform. CASES: ACCFA vs. FLU, 30 SCRA 649 Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration vs Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices 30 SCRA 649 – Political Law – Two-fold Function of the Government – Free Enterprise – Ministrant vs Constituent Functions FACTS: In September 1961 a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) was agreed upon by labor unions (ASA and

11 AWA) and ACCFA (Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration). The said CBA was supposed to be effective on July 1, 1962. Due to nonimplementation of the CBA the unions held a strike on October 25, 1962. And 5 days later CUGCO (Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices), the mother union of ASA and AWA filed a complaint against ACCFA due to unfair labor practices, among others, which CUGCO was able to win in court. In April 1963, ACCFA appealed the decision and while the appeal was pending, Republic Act No. 3844 was passed which effectively turned ACCFA to ACA (Agricultural Credit Administration). In March 1964, ASA and AWA then petitioned that they may have sole bargaining rights with ACA. While this petition was not yet decided upon, in the same month of March 1964, Executive Order No. 75 was also passed which placed ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration (LRPA). Notwithstanding the latest legislation passed, the trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of ASA and AWA and ruled that they have bargaining rights with ACA.. ISSUE: Whether or not ASA and AWA can be given sole bargaining rights with ACA. HELD: No. The Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA. EO 75 placed ACA under the LRPA and by virtue of RA 3844 the implementation of the Land Reform Program of the government is a governmental function NOT a proprietary function. Being such, ACA can no longer step down to deal privately with said unions as it may have been doing when it was still ACCFA. The Supreme Court also made a pronouncement which recognized the growing complexities of modern society which have rendered the classification of the governmental functions (ministrant and constituent) as unrealistic, if not obsolete. Ministerial and governmental functions continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and are absorbed within the activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it to meet the increasing social challenges of the times and move towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Hence, gone are the days where constituent functions are exclusively performed by the government and not delegated to private institutions. In this case, a constituent function is left to be performed by a private entity like ACA (formerly ACCFA). Separate Opinion on the Free Enterprise System J. Fernando – This country never practiced the free enterprise system and it has abandoned the concept of laissez faire. It is the welfare state concept which is being followed as shown by the constitutional provision on agrarian reform, housing, protection to labor and others that provide for the social welfare.

PVTA vs. CIR, 65 SCRA 416 FACTS: On December 20, 1966, claimants, now private respondents, filed with respondent Court a petition wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444. There was an answer filed by petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration denying the allegations and raising the special defenses of lack of a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. After the parties submitted the case for decision, the then Presiding Judge Arsenio T. Martinez of respondent Court issued an order sustaining the claims of private respondents for overtime services from December 23, 1963 up to the date the decision was rendered on March 21, 1970, and directing petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had already paid. There was a

motion for reconsideration, but respondent Court en banc denied the same. Hence this petition for certiorari. Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, as had been noted, would predicate its plea for the reversal of the order complained of on the basic proposition that it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444. ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions. RULING: YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government has become obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing for a distinction between constituent and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of the present time: “The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete.” The Supreme Court ruled that a reference to the enactments creating Petitioner Corporation suffices to demonstrate the merit of petitioner’s plea that it performs governmental and not proprietary functions. As originally established by Republic Act No. 2265, 12 its purposes and objectives were set forth thus: "(a) To promote the effective merchandising of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets so that those engaged in the industry will be placed on a basis of economic security; (b) To establish and maintain balanced production and consumption of Virginia tobacco and its manufactured products, and such marketing conditions as will insure and stabilize the price of a level sufficient to cover the cost of production plus reasonable profit both in the local as well as in the foreign market; (c) To create, establish, maintain, and operate processing, warehousing and marketing facilities in suitable centers and supervise the selling and buying of Virginia tobacco so that the farmers will enjoy reasonable prices that secure a fair return of their investments; (d) To prescribe rules and regulations governing the grading, classifying, and inspecting of Virginia tobacco; and (e) To improve the living and economic conditions of the people engaged in the tobacco industry." The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant consideration. The success that attended the efforts of petitioner to be adjudged as performing governmental rather than proprietary functions cannot militate against respondent Court assuming jurisdiction over this labor dispute. With that main objective there is no reason why its function should not be deemed governmental. The Government owes its very existence to that aim and purpose — to protect the people. There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As such, the petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA case. The objection of private respondents with its overtones of the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It does not necessarily follow, that just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people — these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government." The contention of petitioner that the Eight-Hour Labor Law does not apply to it hardly deserves any extended consideration.

12 Notes: "The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete.” "The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of government activity."

2.

types of government: de jure vs. de facto De Jure - (government of law) is an organized government of a state which has the general support of the people. De Facto - (government of fact) is a government which actually exercises power or control but without legal title. There are three kinds of de facto government: 1. The government that gets possession and control of, or usurps by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter; 2. That established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state; and 3. That which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated as a government of paramount force. CASES: Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, G.R. No. L-5, September 17, 1945 FACTS: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese). THE COURT RESOLVED THREE ISSUES: 1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation; 2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts; 3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them. RATIO: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have

been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them. The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation. IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law. A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.” Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.” Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of any other governments.” In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan. It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change. Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.

Lawyer’s League v. Aquino, G.R. No. 73748, 5/22/86 FACTS: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the “new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.” ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate. HELD: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that, as early as April 10, 1986, they had already voted to dismiss the petitions since on April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew the petitions and manifested that they would pursue the question by extra-judicial methods. Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics

13 where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. The community of nations recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.

Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146710, 3/2/01 Facts: - joseph erap estrada alleges that he is the president on leave while gloria macapagal arroyo claims she is the president. - erap was plagued with problems in his administration and started its sharp descent from power on October 2000 when Chavit Singson, his longtime friend and ally went on air and accused estrada of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng. The expose' immediately ignited reactions of rage - on january 19, 2001, estrada fell from power. - on january 20, 2001, turned to be the day of erap's surrender. - on january 22, 2001, the monday after taking her oath under the constitution, arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the presidency. Issue: whether or not arroyo is a legitimate president. Ruling : - the SC holds that the resignation of estrada cannot be doubted, in view of his issued press statement dated january 20, 2001. it was confirmed by his, leaving malacanang, the seat of presidency; acknowledge the oath taking of arroyo; and expressed gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve. - the press release was considered as petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. - it is held that the government of the respondent is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the edsa shrine is the oath under the 1987 constitution. Indeed it is stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the authority of the constitution. - edsa 1 is extraconstitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted. Whereas edsa II is intraconstitutional and the resignation of the sitting president had caused the succession. - resolution nos 175 and 176 expressed the support and acknowledgement of the house of representatives to gloria arroyo's assumption in power. The succession of presidency has also been accepted by majorities in all social classes in the survey conducted by pulse asia. - in view whereof, the petitions of joseph estrada challenging the respondent arroyo as the dejure president of the republic is dismissed.

3.

The Government of the Republic of the Phils. Government of the Philippines is “the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government" [Sec. 2 (1), Administrative Code of 1987].

4.

“government” vs. “administration”

which another administration may be called upon by the people to serve them. That is why we say that administration changes but the government does not. C. Sovereignty 1. Definition: The supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which that State is governed. 2. types: legal vs. political sovereignty Legal - The power to issue final commands. Political - The sum total of all the influences which lie behind the law. 3. doctrine of jus postliminium When a foreign power occupies a state and exercises the powers of government, the political laws of the said state are deemed automatically suspended but the former government automatically comes to life and will be in force and in effect again upon the reestablishment of the former government. (Taylor, International Law, p. 615.) 4. effect of suspension or change in sovereignty Political laws are abrogated; municipal laws remain in force. CASES: Co Kim Chan v. Valdez, supra (*see case above) Peralta v. Director, 75 Phil 285 Facts: Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila, was convicted of robbery as defined and penalized by section 2 (a) of Act No. 65 enacted by the National Assembly under the Japanese rule. He was sentenced to life imprisonmentby the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. After the Japanese lost in the Second World War and left the Philippines, Peralta filed a petition for habeas corpus based on the ground that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of which are repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of America”. Issue: Whether or not Peralta’s petition for habeas corpus should be granted. Held: The habeas corpus is granted and Peralta was released. The Court argued that it was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate, through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65, which penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses by imprisonment, and to try those who are accused of crimes in the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction as an instrument of the Japanese-controlled government. However, by the time of the reoccupation of the Philippines and restoration of the Commonwealth Governmentthe punitive sentence ceased to be valid as the belligerent occupants also ceased to exercise power and control over the Philippine territory. The punitive sentence under consideration, although good and valid during the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation of these Island and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.

Alcantara v. Director, 75 Phil 749 Government - is the agency which formulates expresses and realizes the will of the people. Administration - is composed of group of persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the time being. It is the administration that runs the affairs of the government for a given period of time, after

FACTS: Petitioner Aniceto Alcantara was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. The Court of Appeals modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty from arresto mayor to prison correccional. Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision on the sole ground that said court was only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during

14 Japanese military occupation, thus, a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus from petitioner. ISSUE: Is the judgment of Court of Appeals good and valid? HELD: Judgments of such court were good and valid and remain good and valid for the sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. A penal sentence is said to be of a political complexion when it penalizes a new act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate government but taken out of territorial law and penalized as new offenses committed against the belligerent occupant which is necessary for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier. Such is the case at hand, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil 856 FACTS: A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel who gave the enemy aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation and was prosecuted for the crime of treason. Petitioner contended that he cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens there to was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic. His claim is that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was already replaced by the Republic. ISSUE: 1. WON allegiance is suspended during the Japanese Occupation? 2. WON Laurel is subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code? HELD: 1. No. Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government. There is no such thing as suspended allegiance; sovereignty can may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension. What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. 2. Yes. Laurel is subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal code as there was merely a change of the name of government from Commonwealth to Republic and does not affect the act of treason made by the petitioner as the offense is made to the same sovereign people and the same government as expressed in the Constitution: "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them" (Section 1, Article II). Furthermore, a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of Section 2, Article XVI provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this constitution.

People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil 887 FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero, discovered that the

documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion – edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an article against the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code – provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be applied in the case at bar? HELD: No.The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However, the Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the change of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked provision of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.

Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77 Facts: On June 8. 1963,respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case3010 final for lack ofan appeal. On October 16. 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. Theproject of partition of lots was not signed by the parties themselves but only by therespective counsel of plaintiffs and petitioner BernarditaR. Macariola. The Judgeapproved it in his order dated October 23. 1963. One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184which was subdivided into 5 andlots denominated as Lot 1184 A-E. Dr. ArcadioGalaponbought Lot 1184 -E on July 31, 1964 who was issued transfer of certificate of Title No, 2338 of the Register ofDeeds of Tacloban City. On March 6.196 Galapon sold a portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife. On August 31. 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galaponconveyed their respective shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing &Fishing Industries Inc. where Judge Asuncion was the President and his wife Victoria was the Secretary. The Asuncions and Galapons were also the stockholder of the corporation. Respondent MacariolaCharged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judqe" for violating the following provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article 14. par. 1 &5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12. Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomucenodismissed the complaints filed against Asuncion. Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions. Ruling: No. Judge Asuncion did not Violate the mentioned provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a Judge" but was reminded to be more discreet in runs private and business activities. Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Galapon who earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot on March 6. 1965 trom Dr. Galapon after the finality of the decision which he

15 rendered on June 8. 1963 in Civil Case No 3010 and his two orders dated October and November. 1963. The said property was no longer thesubject of litigation. In the case at bar. Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effectand cannot apply to the respondent. Upon the sovereignty from the Spain •to the USand to the Republic of the Philippines. Art. 14 of this Code of Commerce, which was sourced from the Spanish Code of Commerceappears tohave been abrogatedbecause whenever there is a change in the sovereignty, political laws of the formersovereign are automatically abrogated. unless they are reenacted by Affirmative Act ofthe New Sovereign. Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H. Sec. 3 of RA 3019 citing thatthe public officers cannot partake in any business in connection with this officeorintervened or take part in his official capacity. The Judge and his wife had withdrawnon January 31,1967 from the corporation and sold their respective shares to 3rdparties, and it appears that the corporation did not benefit in any case filed by oragainst it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court ofFirst Instance from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of thecorporation on March 12, 1966 up to its incorporation on January 9.1967. The Judgerealized early that their interest in the corporation contravenes against Canon 25.

The Attorney General in representation of the Philippine Islands, a file of claim for the $80000 together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs appearing in the list of names published in the Official Gazette instituted on May, 3, 1912 by the Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by the Insular Treasurer, and after due trial in the lower court, judgment was entered in honor of the plaintiff currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and cost of cause. The Monte de Piedad then contended that the present Philippine Government cannot file suit on the ground that the obligation of the former was wiped out when their was a change of sovereignty. Issue: Whether or not the government of the Philippine Islands has capacity to file a suit against the Monte de Piedad for the recovery of the said amount. Ruling: Under the Principle of Parens Patriae, the Philippine Government being the guardian of the “rights of the people” can represent the legitimate claimants of the beneficiary and therefore has the capacity to file a suit against the appellant. The Philippine Government is not merely a nominal party that’s why it can bring and prosecute this action by exercising its sovereign powers. The supreme court then held the right of the government to file the case.

Cabanas v. Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94 Vilas v. City of Manila, 42 Phil 953 Facts: Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. 183, petitioner Vilas is the creditor of the City. After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action to recover the sum of money owed to him by the city. The City of Manila that incurred the debts has changed its sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris and its contention now is founded on the theory that by virtue of the Act No. 183 its liability has been extinguished. Issue: Whether or not the change of the sovereignty extinguishes the previous liability of the City of Manila to its creditor? Held: No. The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the municipal corporation organized under the former sovereign. The new City of Manila is in a legal sense the successor of the old city. Thus the new city is entitled to all property and property rights of the predecessor corporation including its liabilities. The court held that only the governmental functions that are not compatible with the present sovereignty are suspended. Because the new City of Manila retains its character as the predecessor of the old city it is still liable to the creditors of the old City of Manila.

II.

Doctrine of the state as parens patriae Literally, parent of the people. As such, the Government may act as guardian of the rights of people who may be disadvantaged or suffering from some disability or misfortune. CASES: Gov’t v. Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil 728 Facts: On June 3, 1863, an Earthquake took place in the Philippine Islands, which was then under the Spanish Crown, that devastated lot of civilians. Therefore n Oct. 6 of that year, a central relief board was appointed, by authority of the King of Spain, to distribute the money voluntarily contributed by donors. After a thorough investigation and consideration, the relief board allotted $365703.50 to the various sufferers name in its resolution. These were later distributed in accordance with the above mentioned allotments, the sum of $30,299.65, leaving a balance of $365.403.85 for distribution. Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte de Piedad, dated February 1, 1833, the Philippine Government, by order dated the first month, directed its treasured to turn over Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000 of relief fund in its installment of 20,000 each. These amounts received on the following dates: February 15, March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in the possession of Monte de Piedad.

FACTS: Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his child will be his beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death the child is still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits shall be administered by his brother, Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when Florentino died and so Francisco then took charge of Florentino’s insurance proceeds for the benefit of the child. On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the insurance proceeds in favor and for her to be declared as the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries. ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms of the insurance policy. HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve that case according to the best interest of that person. The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more care towards the child than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in consonance with this country’s tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the parent (mother) is observed.

III. State immunity from suits “The State cannot be sued without its consent” [Sec. 3, Art. XVI]. A. Basis There can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends [Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 83], however, it may be sued if it gives consent, whether express or implied. The doctrine is also known as the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty. CASE: Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 US 349 Argued March 21, 1907 Decided April 8, 1907 205 U.S. 349 APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII Syllabus Under Equity Rule 92, where a part of the mortgage premises has been sold to the sovereign power which refuses to waive its exemption

16 from suit, the court can, all other parties being joined, except the land so conveyed and decree sale of the balance and enter deficiency judgment for sum remaining due if proceeds of sale are insufficient to pay the debt. A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends, and as this doctrine is not confined to full sovereign powers, it extends to those, such as the territories of the United States, which in actual administration originate and change the law of contract and property. A territory of the United States differs from the District of Columbia in that the former is itself the fountain from which rights ordinarily flow, although Congress may intervene, while, in the latter, the body of private rights is created and controlled by Congress, and not by a legislature of the District. The facts are stated in the opinion. MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a decree affirming a decree of foreclosure and sale under a mortgage executed by the appellants to the appellee, Sister Albertina. 17 Haw. 82. The defendants (appellants) pleaded to the jurisdiction that, after the execution of the mortgage, a part of the mortgaged land had been conveyed by them to one Damon, and by Damon to the Territory of Hawaii, and was now part of a public street. The bill originally made the territory a party, but the territory demurred and the plaintiffs dismissed their bill as to it before the above plea was argued. Then the plea was overruled, and after answer and hearing, the decree of foreclosure was made, the appellants having saved their rights. The decree excepted from the sale the land conveyed to the territory, and directed a judgment for the sum remaining due in case the proceeds of the sale were insufficient to pay the debt. Eq.Rule 92.

Decree affirmed. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurs in the result.

B. Concept of Restrictive State Immunity Immunity is enjoyed by other States, consonant with the public international law principle of par in parem non habet imperium ([Latin: equals do not have authority over one another] In public international law, the principle that one sovereign power cannot exercise jurisdiction over another sovereign power. It is the basis of the act of state doctrine and sovereign immunity ). The

Head of State, who is deemed the personification of the State, is inviolable, and thus, enjoys immunity from suit. a) The State’s diplomatic agents, including consuls to a certain extent, are also exempt from the jurisdiction of local courts and administrative tribunals. [See PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, infra.]. i)

The appellants contend that the owners of the equity of redemption in all parts of the mortgage land must be joined, and that no deficiency judgment should be entered until all the mortgaged premises have been sold. In aid of their contention, they argue that the Territory of Hawaii is liable to suit like a municipal corporation, irrespective of the permission given by its statutes, which does not extend to this case. They liken the territory to the District of Columbia, Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U. S. 1, and point out that it has been a party to suits that have been before this Court. Damson v. Hawaii, 194 U. S. 154; Carter v. Hawaii, 200 U. S. 255. The territory, of course, could waive its exemption, Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, and it took no objection to the proceedings in the cases cited if it could have done so. See Act of April 30, 1900, c. 339, § 96. 31 Stat. 141, 160. But, in the case at bar, it did object, and the question raised is whether the plaintiffs were bound to yield. Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the immunity of a sovereign power from suit without its own permission, but the answer has been public property since before the days of Hobbes. Leviathan, c. 26, 2. A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. "Car on peut bien recevoir loy d'autruy, mais il est impossible par nature de se donner loy." Bodin, Republique, 1, c. 8, ed. 1629, p. 132; Sir John Eliot, De Jure Maiestatis, c. 3. Nemo suo statuto ligatur necessitative. Baldus, De Leg. et Const. Digna Vox, (2d ed. 1496, fol. 51b, ed. 1539, fol. 61). As the ground is thus logical and practical, the doctrine is not confined to powers that are sovereign in the full sense of juridical theory, but naturally is extended to those that, in actual administration, originate and change at their will the law of contract and property, from which persons within the jurisdiction derive their rights. A suit presupposes that the defendants are subject to the law invoked. Of course, it cannot be maintained unless they are so. But that is not the case with a territory of the United States, because the territory itself is the fountain from which rights ordinarily flow. It is true that Congress might intervene, just as, in the case of a state, the Constitution does, and the power that can alter the Constitution might. But the rights that exist are not created by Congress or the Constitution, except to the extent of certain limitations of power. The District of Columbia is different, because there the body of private rights is created and controlled by Congress, and not by a legislature of the District. But, for the Territory of Hawaii, it is enough to refer to the organic act. Act of April 30, 1900, c. 339, §§ 6, 55. 31 Stat. 141, 142, 150. Coffield v. Territory, 13 Haw. 478. See further, Territory v. Doty, 1 Pinney 396, 405; Langford v. King, 1 Mont. 33; Fisk v. Cuttabert, 2 Mont. 593, 598. However it might be in a different case, when the inability to join all parties and to sell all the land is due to a conveyance by the mortgagor directly or indirectly to the territory, the court is not thereby deprived of ability to proceed.

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending State. The cloak of protection is removed the moment the foreign agent is sued in his individual capacity, as when he is sought to be made liable for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. In Minucherv. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003, it was sufficiently established that respondent Arthur Scalzo an agent of the US Drug Enforcement Agency, was tasked to conduct surveillance on suspected drug activities within the country, and having ascertained the target, to inform the local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting this surveillance and later, acting as the poseur- buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo can hardly be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official functions or duties. He should, therefore, be accorded diplomatic immunity.

b) The United Nations, as well as its organs and specialized agencies, are likewise beyond the jurisdiction of local courts [Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations; Convention on Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies of the United Nations; World Health Organization v. Aquino, supra.]. i)

In Lasco v. UNRFNRE (United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration), 241 SCRA 681, the Supreme Court upheld the diplomatic immunity of private respondent as established by the letter of the Department of Foreign Affairs recognizing and confirming such immunity in accordance with the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN of which the Philippines is a signatory.

c) Even other international organizations or international agencies may be immune from the jurisdiction of local courts and local administrative tribunals.

17 i)

ii)

In SEAFDEC (Southeast Asia Fisheries Development Center) v. NLRC, 241 SCRA 580, and SEAFDEC v. Acosta, G.R. Nos. 97468-70. September 02, 1993, it was held that SEAFDEC, as an international agency, enjoys diplomatic immunity. It was established through an international agreement to which the Philippines became a signatory on January 16, 1968. The purpose of the Center is to contribute to the promotion of fisheries development in Southeast Asia by mutual cooperation among the member governments of the Center. The invocation by private respondents of the doctrine of estoppel is unavailing, because estoppel does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. The Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, ruling cannot apply to parties which enjoy foreign and diplomatic immunity [SEAFDECAquaculture v. NLRC, 206 SCRA 283]. In Callado v. IRRI, 244 SCRA 210, the Court upheld anew theconstitutionality of Sec. 3, P.D. 1620, which provides that the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director General of the Institute or his authorized representative. Citing International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja (and Kapisanan ng Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI v. Secretary of Labor), 190 SCRA 120, the Court stated that the letter of the Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of Labor and Employment constituted a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to international organizations, a determination held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarrass a political department of the government.

C. Typologies of suits against the state 1. Suits Against Public Officials The doctrine of State immunity also applies to complaints filed against officials of the State for acts performed by them in the discharge of their duties within the scope of their authority. Thus, in the Veterans Manpower case, the suit against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA was dismissed for being a suit against the state, since it was a suit against public officers in the discharge of official functions which are governmental in character. Likewise, in Larkins v. NLRC, 241 SCRA 598, it was noted that the private respondents were dismissed from their employment by Lt. Col. Frankhauser acting for and in behalf of the US government which, by right of sovereign power, operated and maintained the dormitories at the Clark Air Base for USAF members. a) In Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88, the Supreme Court spoke of a number of wellrecognized exceptions when a public officer may be sued without the prior consent of the State, viz: (1) to compel him to do an act required by law; (2) to restrain him from enforcing an act claimed to be unconstitutional; (3) to compel the payment of

damages from an already appropriated assurance fund or to refund tax over-payments from a fund already available for the purpose; (4) to secure a judgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy by himself without the State having to do a positive act to assist him; and (5) where the government itself has violated its own laws, because the doctrine of state immunity “cannot be used to perpetrate an injustice”. b) The unauthorized acts of government officials are not acts of state; thus, the public officer may be sued and held personally liable in damages for such acts [Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713], Where a public officer has committed an ultra vires act (beyond one's legal power or authority), or where there is a showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence, the officer can be held personally accountable, even if such acts are claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties [Wylie v. Rarang, 209 SCRA 357]. Thus, the PCGG or any of its members, may be held civilly liable (for the sale of an aircraft to Fuller Aircraft, which was void) if they did not act with good faith and within the scope of their authority in the performance of official duties [Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 142476, March 20, 2001]. Likewise, in U.S. v. Reyes, 219 SCRA 192, petitioner Bradford, Activity Exchange Manager at JUSMAG Headquarters, was held personally liable, inasmuch as the search of respondent Montoya at the JUSMAG parking lot (which subjected respondent to embarrassment) was held to be beyond the scope and even beyond the Manager’s official functions. Similarly, in Republic v. Hon. Edilberto Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124, even as the Supreme Court dismissed the suit against the Republic of the Philippines, the action for damages against the military personnel and the policemen responsible for the 1989 Mendiola massacre was upheld, inasmuch as the initial findings of the Davide Commission (tasked by President Aquino to investigate the incident) showed that there was, at least, negligence on their part when they fired their guns. c) Where the public official issued in his personal capacity, the doctrine of state immunity will not apply, even if the acts complained of were committed while the public official was occupying a public position. In Lansang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000, the petitioner was sued for allegedly “personal motives” in ordering the ejectment of the General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) from the Rizal Park; thus, the case was not deemed a suit against the State. a.

Test: will require an affirmative act from the state On the assumption that decision is rendered against the public officer or agency impleaded, will the enforcement thereof require an affirmative act from the State, such as the appropriation of the needed amount to satisfy the judgment? If so, then it is a suit against the State. CASES: Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120

18 Ruiz, Jose V. Herrera and Pablo D. Panlilio were approved by the United States Veterans Administration in Washington, D.C. Because of the technical objection to the capacity of the Allied Technologists, Inc. to practice architecture and upon the advice of the Secretary of Justice, the contract was signed on the part of the Allied Technologists,Inc. by Mr. Ruiz as President and Mr. Panlilio as Architect. When the officials of the Department of National Defense paid the Allied Technologists the contract price for the architectural engineering service, they retained 15 per cent of the sum due, for the reason that Mr. Panlilio has asserted that he is the sole and only architect of the Veterans Hospital to the exclusion of his fellow architects Ruiz and Herrera, an assertion aided and abetted by Col. Nicolas Jimenez. This action deprived Mr. Ruiz and Mr. Herrera monetary value of their professional services and damaged their professional prestige and standing.

Facts: The plaintiff filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, an action to collect a sum of money against the above defendants. He suffered injuries while undergoing a 10-month military training at Camp Floridablanca, Pampanga. He filed a claim under Commonwealth Act 400 and in April 1957 with the Adjutant General’s Office which later disallow his claim for disability benefit. After further demands of the plaintiff, the same Adjutant General’s Office denied the claim, alleging that the Commonwealth Act 400 had already been repealed by RA 610 which took effect January 1, 1950. That by the reason of the injuries suffered by plaintiff, he was deprived of his sight or vision rendering him permanently disabled; and by the reason of unjustified refusal of defendants on the claim, plaintiff was deprived of his disability pension from July 1948 totalling no less than P4,000 at the rate of P20/mo and suffered moral damages and attorney’s fees the amount of P2,000. The Philippine Veterans Administration and the Chief of Staff of AFP file separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint; that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before coming to court; that the complaint states no cause of action; and that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. Acting on the said Motion, the Court of First Instance, on March 2, 1962, rendered an order dismissing the complaint on the ground that action has prescribed. Motion for reconsideration of the said order having been denied, the plaintiff has interposed this appeal.

Issue: Whether the suit filed by the appellants against the government without its consent qualify. Held: Based from the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, the court decided that the suit should be answered not by the government but to its officials to compel them to act in accordance with the rights to be established by the contending architects, or to prevent them from making payment and recognition until the contending architects have established their respective rights and interest in the funds retained and in the credit for the work done. The order of dismissal is hereby reversed and set aside, and the case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. With costs against the defendantsappellees

Issue: Whether or not the lower court is right in dismissing the complaint. Held: The SC uphold the order of dismissal for the simple reason that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it being a money claim against the government. It was already held in the case of New Manila Lumber vs. Republic in L-14248, 4/28/60, that a claim for the recovery of money against the government should be filed with the Auditor General, in line with the principle that the State can not be sued without its consent. Commonwealth Act 327 provides: Section 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within 60 days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays after their presentation…. Section 2. The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim, may within 30 days from receipt of decision, take an appeal in writing to (c) the Supreme Court, if the appellant is a private person or entity.

The well established rule that no recourse to court can be had until all administrative remedies had been exhausted and that actions against administrative officers should not be entertained if superior administrative officer could grant relief is applicable to this case. The order dismissing the complaint is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Ruiz v. Cabahug, 102 Phil 110 (1957) Facts: On July 31, 1950 Hon. Sotero B. Cabahug (Secretary of National Defense) accepted the bid of the Allied Technologists, Inc., to furnish the architectural and engineering services in the construction of the Veterans Hospital at a price of P302,700.00 . The plans, specifications, sketches and detailed drawings and other architectural requirements submitted by the Allied Technologists through its architects, Enrique J. L.

b.

Effect when public officer acts without, or in excess of, jurisdiction CASE: Festejo v. Fernando, GR No. L-5156, March 11, 1954 (NOTE: opinion is in Spanish; read dissent of J. Concepcion and the discussion of Cruz to get an idea what the case is all about) FACTS: The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority obtained first from the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a right of way, and without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff, and against her express objection unlawfully took possession of portions of the three parcels of land and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of the three parcels of land on to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff. ISSUE: Whether or not this is a suit against the state? RULING: No, the evidence and conceded facts in finding that in the trespass on plaintiff's land defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority. When he went outside the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or destroyed its former condition and usefulness, he must be held to have designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law. Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefore, and may be sued as any other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his tortuous act. It is a general rule that an officerexecutive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he exceed the power conferred on him

19 by law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office, and not personally. In the eye of the law, his acts then are wholly without authority. ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: (6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; Separate Opinions CONCEPCION, J., dissenting: To my mind, the allegations of the complaint lead to no other conclusion than that appellee Isaias Fernando is a party in this case, not in his personal capacity, but as an officer of the Government. According to said pleading the defendant is "Isaias Fernando, Director, Bureau of Public Works." Moreover, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint, it is alleged: 4. That the defendant as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, is in charge of irrigation projects and systems, and the official responsible for the construction of irrigation system in the Philippines; We take judicial notice of the fact that the irrigation projects and system reffered to in the complaint — of which the defendant, Isaias Fernando, according to the same pleading, is "in charge" and for which he is "responsible" as Director of the Bureau of Public Works — are established and operated with public funds, which pursuant to the Constitution, must be appropriated by law. Irrespective of the manner in which the construction may have been undertaken by the Bureau of Public Works, the system or canal is, therefore, a property of the Government.

2.

Suits Against Government Agencies a. Tests i. If incorporated: consult charter If the charter provides that the agency can sue and be sued, then suit will lie, including one for tort. The provision in the charter constitutes express consent on the part of the State to be sued. *If incorporated there are always be a charter, special laws passed by congress in creating them. *Is the charter silent or not? If not then there’s no question whether it has a governmental function, it can be sued.

CASES: Bermoy v. PNC, GR No. L-8670, May 18, 1956 *General Corp. Law – charter is silent but makes reference to this law *Since the Gen Corp Law contains provision that allows you to sue or be sued, then PNC can be sued *Be careful of waivers Facts: On July 6, 1954, (24) twenty four employees from its dormitory known as Normal Hall of the Philippine Normal College, filled an action in the COF of Manila against the PNC for the recovery of salary differentials and overtime pay. The Solicitor General on behalf of the defendant answers and denies the latter liability. The court ordered it dismissed before the case was tried on the merits, on the ground that neither one of the defendants was a corporation or a juridical entity with capacity to be sued. The plaintiffs took an appeal to Supreme Court, alleging that it was an error to dismiss their case on the ground that, R.A. No. 416 took effect July, 1949 converted PNS to PNC, thus created a Board of Trustees to administer the affairs as a

corporation under section 13 of the amended Act 1455 (Corporate Law), with the power “to sue and to be sued in any court.” Issue: Whether or not the PNC as a government corporation can be sued. Held: The state has already given the consent by investing the college with express power to be sued in the court. The act Authorizes the College to be sued is also made clear in Section 6, where it is provided that “all process against the Board of Trustees shall be served on the President or Secretary thereof”. The order appealed from is re revoked and the case remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. No cost

Arcega v. CA, 66 SCRA 229 FACT: The petitioner Alicia O. Arcega, doing business under the firm name “Fairmont Ice Cream Company,” filed a complaint before the court against the respondents Central Bank of the Philippines and Philippine National Bank, for the refund from allegedly unauthorized payments made by her of the 17% special excise tax on foreign exchange. The Central Bank moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds, among others, that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action, because the judgment sought will constitute a financial charge against the Government, and therefore the suit is one against the Government, which cannot prosper without its consent, and in this case no such consent has been given. The petitioner appealed, but the court dismissed the complaint on the ground set forth in the Central Bank’s motion to dismiss. The petitioner Arcega filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution to which an opposition was filed by the Central Bank. This time, the Central Bank submitted a certification that the balance of the collected special excise tax on sales of foreign exchange was turned over to the Treasurer of the Philippines. Then the court denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as a result Arcega appealed to the Court of Appeals. Holding that the suit is indirectly against the Republic of the Philippines which cannot be sued without its consent, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Finally the petitioner filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether a suit against the Central Bank for refund a suit against the State? Held: It is not a suit against the state. The charter of the Central Bank of the Philippines authorize that it can sue and be sued. The consent of the State to be sued, therefore, has been given.

Rayo v. CFI, 110 SCRA 460 FACTS: At the height of the infamous typhoon "Kading", the respondent opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam which resulted in a sudden, precipitate and simultaneous opening of said floodgates several towns in Bulacan were inundated. The petitioners filed for damages against the respondent corporation. Petitioners opposed the prayer of the respondents forn dismissal of the case and contended that the respondent corporation is merely performing a propriety functions and that under its own organic act, it can sue and be sued in court.

20 ISSUE: W/N the respondent performs governmental functions with respect to the management and operation of the Angat Dam. W/N the power of the respondent to sue and be sued under its organic charter includes the power to be sued for tort. HELD: The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the government. Moreover, the charter provision that it can sue and be sued in any court.

PNR v. IAC, 217 SCRA 401 FACTS: The passenger express train of Philippine National Railways (PNR) and a passenger bus of Baliwag Transit Inc. collided at the railroad crossing at Barrio Balungao, Calumpit Bulacan at 1:30 in the afternoon of August 10, 1947 causing damage to the bus and its passengers, 18 of whom died and 53 suffered physical injuries. Plaintiff alleges that the collision was due to the negligence and imprudence of PNR and its engineer Honorio Cirbado in operating in a busy intersection without any bars, semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman. ISSUE: 1) Who between the petitioner and respondent was negligent? 2) Is PNR immune from suit? HELD: There is no admissible evidence to show that the bus driver did not take necessary precaution in traversing the track. Contributory negligence may not be ascribed to the bus driver for he had taken necessary precautions before passing over the railway track. The failure of PNR, on the other hand, to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman, or switchman or semaphores is evidence of negligence on their part. By the doctrine of implied powers, the power to sue and be sued is implicit from the faculty to transact private business. PNR is not exercising governmental powers, as such it is not immune from suit.

ii. If unincorporated: determine nature of primary function CASES: Bureau of Printing v. Bureau of Printing Employees Ass’n, 1 SCRA 340 Facts: Upon complaint of the respondents of the Bureau of Printing Employees Association against the Bureau of Printing, the complaint alleged that the latter have been engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing their employees, in the exercise of their right to self-organization and discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to discourage them from pursuing the union activities. The Petitioners of Bureau of Printing denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that the respondents of the Bureau of Printing Employees Association were suspending the pending result of an administrative investigation

against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations petition; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued; that said bureau is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic performing government functions. The petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion" asking for a preliminary hearing on the question of jurisdiction raised by them in their answer and for suspension of the trial of the case on the merits pending the determination of such juridical question. Issue: Whether or not the Bureau of Printing, in the proceeding in the action for unfair labor practice, lacks jurisdiction thereof. Held: The trial judge of the Industrial Court in an order dated January 27, 1959 sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary in nature,". The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the National Government and such other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake...". It has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit. Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when the interest of the service so requires. As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character. The additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are separate and distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions. As an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection.

Mobil Phils. v. Customs Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA 1120 FACTS: Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville", consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. The shipment was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment. Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the

21 undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus other damages. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued. Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit; that defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants can invoke state immunity. HELD: Now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said nongovernmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is part of the Department of Finance, with no personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, tha tof assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937).To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit .For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end.

3.

Suits Against Foreign States CASES: Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil 312 (read also the dissent of Justice Perfecto) FACTS: The plaintiffs Pedro, Gonzalo, and Leopoldo, all surnamed Syquia, are the undivided joint owners of three apartment buildings situated in the City of Manila known as the North Syquia Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments. About the middle of the year 1945, said plaintiffs executed three lease contracts, one for each of the three apartments, in favor of the United States of America at a monthly rental of P1,775 for the North Syquia Apartments, P1,890 for the South Syquia Apartments, and P3,335 for the Michel Apartments. The term or period for the three leases was to be "for the duration of the war and six months thereafter, unless sooner terminated by the United States of America." The apartment buildings were used for billeting and quartering officers of the U. S. armed forces stationed in the Manila area. Under the theory that said leases terminated six months after September 2, 1945, when Japan surrendered, plaintiffs sometime in March, 1946, approached the predecessors in office of defendants Moore and Tillman and requested the return of the apartment buildings to them, but they were advised that the U. S. Army wanted to continue occupying the premises. On May 11, 1946, said plaintiffs requested the predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman to renegotiate said leases, execute lease contracts for a period of three years and to pay a reasonable rental higher than those payable under the old contracts. The predecessor in office of Moore in a letter dated June 6, 1946, refused to execute new leases but advised that "it is contemplated that the United States Army will vacate subject properties prior to 1 February 1947." Not being in conformity with the continuance of the old leases because of the alleged comparatively low rentals being paid thereunder,

plaintiffs formally requested Tillman to cancel said three leases and to release the apartment buildings on June 28, 1946. Tillman refused to comply with the request. Because of the alleged representation and assurance that the U. S. Government would vacate the premises before February 1, 1947, the plaintiffs took no further steps to secure possession of the buildings and accepted the monthly rentals tendered by the predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman on the basis of a month to month lease subject to cancellation upon thirty days notice. Because of the failure to comply with the alleged representation and assurance that the three apartment buildings will be vacated prior to February 1, 1947, plaintiffs on February 17, 1947, served formal notice upon defendants Moore and Tillman and 64 other army officers or members of the United States Armed Forces who were then occupying apartments in said three buildings, demanding (a) cancellation of said leases; (b) increase in rentals to P300 per month per apartment effective thirty days from notice; (c) execution of new leases for the three or any one or two of the said apartment buildings for a definite term, otherwise, (d) release of said apartment buildings within thirty days of said notice in the event of the failure to comply with the foregoing demands. The thirty-day period having expired without any of the defendants having complied with plaintiffs' demands, the plaintiffs commenced the present action in the Municipal Court of Manila in the form of an action for unlawful detainer (desahucio) against Moore and Tillman and the 64 persons occupying apartments in the three buildings for the purpose of having them vacate the apartments, each occupant to pay P300 a month for his particular apartment from January 1, 1947 until each of said particular defendant had vacated said apartment; to permit plaintiffs access to said apartment buildings for the purpose of appraising the damages sustained as the result of the occupancy by defendants; that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs whatever damages may have been actually caused on said property; and that in the event said occupants are unable to pay said P300 a month and/or the damages sustained by said property, the defendants Moore and Tillman jointly and severally be made to pay said monthly rentals of P300 per month per apartment from January 1, 1947 to March 19, 1947, inclusive, and/or the damages sustained by said apartments, and that defendants Moore and Tillman be permanently enjoined against ordering any additional parties in the future from entering and occupying said premises. ISSUE: Whether or not a foreign government can be sued in the courts of another state without its consent? DECISION: The case was dismissed. Although the United States of America has not been named therein as defendant, it is nevertheless the real defendant in this case, as the parties named as defendants are officers of the United States Army and were occupying the buildings in question as such and pursuant to orders received from that Government. This is a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government, without consent from the latter, from the courts of another State. Apparently, there is a lack of jurisdiction over the case. Doing so would “unduly vex the peace of nations” (De Haber vs Queen of Portugal). Dissenting by Judge Perfecto The petition must be granted. The government of the United States of America had entered into a private contract with private citizens of the Philippines and the deed executed in our country concerns real property located in Manila, places said government, for purposes of the jurisdiction of our courts, on the same legal level of the lessors. Although, generally, foreign governments are beyond the jurisdiction of domestic courts of justice, such rule is inapplicable to cases in which the foreign government enters into private contracts with the citizens of the court's jurisdiction. Once a foreign government enters into a private contract with the private citizens of another country, such foreign government cannot shield its non-performance or contravention of the terms of the contract under the cloak of non- jurisdiction.

Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 FACTS:

22 • The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have been sued for damages by the private respondents. • Petitioner Sanders the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City and Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. • Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippine together with Wyer were both employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA, the former having been hired in 1971 and the latter in 1969. • On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time, effective October 18, 1975. Both protested to the US Department of defense and the result was a recommendation from the hearing officer who conducted the proceedings for the reinstatement of the private respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages. • In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau on May 17, 1976 (Annex "A" of the complaint) sanders disagreed with the recommendation and asked to reject the recommendation. • On November 7, 1975, before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter (Annex "B" of the complaint) purportedly corning from petitioner Moreau as the commanding general of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status and requesting concurrence therewith. The letter did not carry his signature but was signed by W.B. Moore, Jr. "by direction," presumably of Moreau. • On the basis of these antecedent facts, the private respondent filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a for damages against the herein petitioners on November 8, 1976. • Private respondent filed a case for damages alleging that the letter contains libelous libelous imputations and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights • Petitionersn argued that their acts was a mere discharge of their official duties ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were acting officially their duties? RULING: YES, Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents. Given the official character of the letters, the petitioners were being sued asofficers of the United States government because they have acted on behalf of that government and within the scope of their authority. Thus, it is that government and not the petitioners personally that is responsible for their acts.

Holy See v. Rosario, 238 SCRA 524 FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence. Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money. The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity. HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of International Law are adopted by our Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations. It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic envoy shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court. Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-propriety in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property. In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the complaints were dismissed accordingly.

USA v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 FACTS: 1. USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607) The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base, which was won by Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding. 2. USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470) Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been ascertained after investigation that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. The club manager suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators, which unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. 3. USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018) Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O’ Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by

23 petitioners, who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air Force Office. An information was filed against Bautista and at the trial, petitioners testified against him. As a result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that it was because of the latter’s acts that he lost his job.

In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified against the complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.

4. USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258) A complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against petitioners (US military officers) for injuries allegedly sustained by the former when defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them. The petitioners deny this and claim that respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus incurring the injuries. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties. RULING: The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.

In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer study of what actually happened. The record was too meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident occurred.The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties.

D. Waiver of Immunity: Consent to be Sued In order that suit may lie against the state, there must be consent, either express or implied. Where no consent is shown, state immunity from suit may be invoked as a defense by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings, because waiver of immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly and must be construed in strictissimi juris. Accordingly, the complaint (or counterclaim) against the State must allege the existence of such consent (and where the same is found), otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed [Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424].

1.

Forms of Consent a. Express Express consent can be given only by an act of the legislative body [Republic v. Feliciano, supra.], in a general or a special law. i. Thru a general law (Read Act No. 3083 and C.A. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445) An example of a general law granting consent is CA327, as amended by PD 1445, which requires that all money claims against the government must first be filed with the Commission on Audit before suit is instituted in court. See: Sayson v. Singzon, 54 SCRA 282. The Department of Agriculture may be sued for money claims based on a contract entered into in its governmental capacity, because of the express consent contained in Act No. 3038, provided that the claim be first brought to the Commission on Audit in accordance with CA 327, as amended [Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693].

It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions. There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its nonsuability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver may be implied. In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as in USA vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity of the record as the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions were not available. Accordingly, this case was remanded to the court below for further proceedings. In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprietary capacity, as they were operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity. Not even the US government can claim such immunity because by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. But, the court still dismissed the complaint against petitioners on the ground that there was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, as the petitioners acted quite properly in terminating Genove’s employment for his unbelievably nauseating act.

CASE: Amigable v. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360 Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. According to the

24 defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants. Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government. Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favour of the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due compensation—price or value of the lot at the time of the taking. Note: In Amigable v. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360, an action for the recovery of the value of the property taken by the government and converted into a public street without payment of just compensation was allowed, despite the failure of the property owner to file his claim with the Auditor General. Invoking Ministerio v.City of Cebu, 40 SCRA 464, the Supreme Court said that suit may lie because the doctrine of State immunity cannot be used to perpetrate an injustice. This ruling was reiterated in De los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 223 SCRA 11, where it was held that the “public respondents’ belief that the property is public, even if buttressed by statements of other public officials, is no reason for the unjust taking of petitioner’s property”; after all, the TCT was in the name of the petitioner. See also Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 204 SCRA 212.

ii. Thru a special law This form of consent must be embodied in a statute and cannot be given by a mere counsel [Republic v. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470]. By virtue of P.D. 1620, the grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal, and an express waiver by its Director General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity [Callado v. IRRI, supra.]. CASE: Merrit v. Government of the Phil. Islands, 34 Phil 311 Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads: An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit. Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen; Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine the amount of damages, if any, to which the claimant is entitled; and Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommended that an Act be passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts

against the Government, in order that said questions may be decided: Now, therefore, By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that: SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defendant said Government at the same. SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage. Enacted, February 3, 1915. NOTE: (The case) Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint." The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; (b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741. FACTS: It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post place there. (Maybe, tatanungin ka ni sir about sa details) By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a would in the same place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious. Dr. Saleeby noticed that the plaintiff's leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to the accident was excellent, and that after having received the injuries that have been discussed, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he

25 had lost the agility, energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor, he had to dissolved the partnership he had formed with the engineer. We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur. The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the award awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. (Damages Sought) We find nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the first. As to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so found, that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court, however, limited the time to two months and twenty-one days, which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this we think there was error, because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of six months. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only two months and twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months was spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for the whole time. We, therefore, find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is P18,075. ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance. RULING: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. The accident was due to the negligence of the ambulance’s chauffeur. As the negligence was committed by an agent or employee of the government involving tort, the inquiry arises whether the government is legally liable for damages. The State is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. The government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest. By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend his liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.

The State is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches in the public service and in the appointment of its agents. The responsibility of the State is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim. Note: Special Agent - in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official, so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390: this concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)

b.

Implied i. When state commences litigation CASES: Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., GR No. L-6060, Sept. 30, 1950 Facts: Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel for P200,000, paying P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in installments. To secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price, he executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission. For various reasons, among them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission tool possession of said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled. The Shipping Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines. Plaintiff appealed the action of the Shipping Commission to the President of the Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original contract with the Shipping Commission. Plaintiff had repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused to do so. Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ of replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances, and that after hearing, he be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof . The lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its possession of said vessel. Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff ‘s rights under the contract of sale, for the reason that when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration

26 had authority to dispose of said authority to the property, Plaintiff having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon. Plaintiff paid the required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of the vessel, he filed an action to recover possession thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of said property. The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for the possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed. Issues: Whether or not the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff to the recovery of the vessel. Rulings: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff to the recovery of the vessel. The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the state. Note: When the State commences litigation, it becomes vulnerable to a counterclaim [See: Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping, G.R. No. L6060, Sept. 30, 1950]. Intervention by the State would constitute commencement of litigation, except when the State intervenes not for the purpose of asking for any affirmative relief, but only for the purpose of resisting the claim precisely because of immunity from suit [Lim v. Brownell, 107 Phil. 345],

Lim v. Brownell, 107 SCRA 345 Facts: The property in dispute consists of 4 parcels of land in Tondo, city of Manila, with a total area of 29,151 sq. meters. The lands were, after the last world war, found by the Alien Property Custodian of the US to be registered in the name of Asaichi Kagawa, national of an enemy country, Japan, as evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 64904 to 65140.

On November 15, 1948, Benito E. Lim, son of Arsenia Enriquez, filed a formal notice of claim to the property on the theory that the lots in question still belonged to Arsenia and that she mortgaged these lots to the Mercantile Bank of China. And that the mortgaged having been foreclosed, the property was sold at public auction to Asaichi Kagawa, who, by means of threat and intimidation succeeded in preventing Arsenia to exercise her rights of redemption; and that Kagawa never acquired any valid title to the property because he was ineligible under the Constitution to acquire residential land in the Philippines by reason of alienage. Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the case over the reason that it does not have jurisdiction over the claim for rentals since the action in that regard constituted a suit against the US to which it had not given its consent. Ruling: The court decided that the order of dismissal couldn’t be sustained in its entirety. The immunity of the state from suit cannot be invoked where the action is instituted by a person who is neither an enemy or ally of an enemy for the purpose of establishing his right, title or interest in vested property, and of recovering his ownership and possession. Congressional consent to such suit has expressly been given by the US. The order of dismissal with respect to plaintiff’s claim for damages against Atty. General of the US must be upheld because congressional consent to such suit has not been granted. The relief available to a person claiming enemy property which has been vested by the Philippines Alien Property Custodian is limited to those expressly provided for in the Trading with the Enemy Act, which does not include a suit for damages for such use of such vested property. The claim for damages for the use of the property against the intervenor defendant Republic of the Philippines cannot be maintained because of the immunity of the state from suit which needs the consent of that said government. The Republic of the Philippines did not waive its right of nonsuability because Republic intervened in the case merely to unity with the defendant Attorney General of the United States in resisting plaintiff’s claims, and for that reason asked no affirmative relief against any party in the answer in intervention it filed.

ii. When state enters into a contract CASES:

On March 14, 1946, the Alien Property Custodian issued a vesting order on the authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act of the United States, vesting in himself the ownership over two of the said lots – lots 1 and 2. On July 6, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (Successor of the Alien Property Custodian), under the same statute, issued a supplemental vesting order, vesting in himself title to the remaining lots 3 and 4. On August 3, 1948, The Philippine Alien Property administrator transferred all the said four lots to the Republic of the Philippines upon the latter’s undertaking fully to indemnify the US for all claims in relation to the property transferred, which claims are payable by the US or the Philippine Alien Property Administrator of the US under the Trading with the Enemy Act.

US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 FACTS: The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the US. On May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for some projects. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. But the US informed the company that it did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US for the construction of wharves in said base that was wrongly awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.

27 respondents against petitioners for injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiffs. All cases invoke the doctrine of state immunity as ground to dismiss the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the US naval base can invoke the state immunity.

ISSUE: Are the petitioners immune from suit?

HELD: Yes. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that, State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. Note: In U. S. v. Ruiz, it was held that the contract for the repair of wharves was a contract in jus imperii, because the wharves were to be used in national defense, a governmental function. In JUSMAG Phil. v. NLRC, 239 SCRA 224, the engagement of the services of private respondent was held to be performance of a governmental function by JUSMAG, on behalf of the United States. Accordingly, JUSMAG may not be sued under such a contract. In Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon, G.R. No. 154705, June 26, 2003, it was held that contracts entered into by a sovereign state in connection with the establishment of a diplomatic mission, including contracts for the upkeep or maintenance of air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters and water motor pumps of the embassy and the Ambassador’s residence, are contracts in jure imperii. The fact that the contract contains a provision that any legal action arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines does not necessarily mean a waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity from suit.

42 - USA v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 FACTS: The cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. In GR No. 76607, private respondents re suing several officers of the US Air Force in connection with the bidding for barbering services in Clark Air Base. In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista was arrested following a buybust operation for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Bautista then filed a complaint for damages claiming that because of the acts of the respondents, he lost his job. In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioner for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force. In GR No. 80258, complaint for damage was filed by the

HELD: It is clear that the petitioners in GR No. 80018 were acting in the exercise of their official functions. They cannot be directly impleaded for the US government has not given its consent to be sued. In GR No. 79470, petitioners are not immune for restaurants are commercial enterprises, however, claim of damages by Genove cannot be allowed on the strength of the evidence presented. Barber shops are also commercial enterprises operated by private persons, thus, petitioners in GR No. 76607 cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed. In GR No. 80258, the respondent court will have to receive the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions before it can be known in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident. Note: Conversely, in U.S. v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644, the contract bidded out for barbershop facilities in the Clark Field US Air Force Base was deemed commercial. Similarly, in a companion case, U.S. v. Rodrigo, a contract for restaurant services within the Camp John Hay Air Station was likewise held commercial in character.

E. Suit allowed even without consent to be sued CASE: Santiago v. Republic, 87 SCRA 294 Facts: Ildefonso Santiago executed a deed of donation in January of 1971, with the Bureau of Plant Industry as the donee. The terms of the donation included the installation of lighting facilities and water system on the property donated and the building of an office and parking lot which should have been constructed and ready for occupancy on or before December 7, 1974. However, the Bureau failed to fulfill these terms. Santiago then filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City on August 9, 1976 naming as defendant the government of the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry. His plea was for the revocation of the deed of donation he executed in favor of the Bureau. The lower court dismissed the case based on the rule that the state cannot be sued without its consent. Santiago filed a petition for certiorari hence this case. Issue: Whether or not the State may be sued without its consent in this case. Held: Yes. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. It would be manifestly unfair for the Republic, as done, alleged to have violated the conditions under which it received gratuitously certain property, to use the concept of non-suitability as its defence. The government, to paraphrase Justice Brandeis, should set the example. If it is susceptible to the charge of having acted dishonourably, then it forfeits public trust-and rightly so. The government is the beneficiary and therefore should adhere to the highest ethical standards, which can only be ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of the people, the repository of the sovereign power. The writ of certiorari is granted and the order of dismissal of October 20, 1977 is nullified. The case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City.

28 F.

can sue and be sued) that are deposited with a bank are not exempt from garnishment [Philippine National Bank v. Pabalan, 83 SCRA 595; Rizal Commercial Bank v. De Castro, 168 SCRA 49]. In National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Quivelondo, G.R. No. 154411, June 19, 2003, it was held that if the funds belong to a public corporation or a governmentowned or controlled corporation which is clothed with a personality of its own, then the funds are not exempt from garnishment. This is so because when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. NHA is one such corporation; thus, its funds are not exempt from garnishment or execution.

Consent to be Sued not Consent to Execution of Judgment Such execution will require another waiver, because the power of the court ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment, unless such disbursement is covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law [Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 84; Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693]. CASE: Rep. v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 84 Facts: On July 7, 1969, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation and against petitioner confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40. The award is for the satisfaction of a judgment against the Phlippine Government. On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo Villasor issued an Order declaring the decision final and executory. Villasor directed the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City as well as Manila to execute said decision. The Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served Notices of Garnishment with several Banks, especially on Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with Philippine Veterans Bank Andon are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the AFP. Petitioner, on certiorari, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent Judge Villasor for acting in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of the AFP, hence the notices and garnishment are null and void. Issue: Is the Writ of Execution issued by Judge Villasor valid? Held: What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. The State may not be sued without its consent. A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent To be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since the government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. PRINCIPLE-WHEN THE STATE GIVES ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED, IT DOES NOT THEREBY CONSENT TO EXECUTION OF JUDGEMENT AGAINST IT.

1.

Exception But funds belonging to government corporations (whose charters provide that they

CASE: PNB v. Pabalan, 83 SCRA 595 FACTS: Judgment was rendered against respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA). Judge Javier Pabalan issued a writ of execution followed thereafter by a notice of garnishment of the funds of PVTA. The full amount mentioned in such writ is P12, 724.66. Philippine National Bank allege that such funds are public in character, thus, the doctrine of non-suability of a state is applicable. ISSUE: Is the respondent exempt from garnishment by virtue of the doctrine of non-suability of a state? HELD: It is well-settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. Petitioner cannot set bar to the garnishment for funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued, as is the case of PVTA, are not exempt from garnishment.

G. Suability vs. liability Liability will have to be determined by the Court on the basis of the evidence and the applicable law. 1.

Read also The Local Government Code of 1991 CASES: Merrit v. Government of the Phil. Islands, supra (pls. see complete case above) Note: In Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, supra., while consent to be sued was granted through a special law, the government was held not liable for damages, because under the attendant circumstances the government was not acting through a special agent.

Palafox v. Ilocos Norte, GR No. L-10659, Jan. 31, 1958 Facts: • Sabas Torralba was employed as the driver of Ilocos Norte and detailed to the Office of the District Engineer • While driving his truck, he ran over Proceto Palafox and the victim died • Sabas was prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence to which he pleaded guilty. • The heirs of Palafox instituted a civil case against the Province, District Engineer, Provincial Treasurer and Sabas Torralba. Issue: WON the Province of Ilocos Norte can be held liable? NO Ruling: This case highlights the general rule that local government units are not liable for negligent acts of its employees while they are performing governmental functions or duties. In this case, the driver Torralba was involved in the construction or

29 maintenance of roads which was a governmental duty. Therefore, the province cannot be held liable for his negligent act.

THE PREAMBLE; NATIONAL TERRITORY; FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES & STATE POLICIES I.

The Preamble We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. I. Meaning Preamble means “to walk before.” (Praeambulus: Walking in front) II. Function/Origin/Authorship/Scope and Purpose A. Functions 1. It sets down the origin, scope and purpose of the Constitution. 2. It enumerates the primary aims and expresses the aspirations of the framers in drafting the Constitution. 3. Useful as an aid in the construction and interpretation of the text of the Constitution. Thus, Preamble is a source of light.52 It is not a source of rights or obligations. (Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905). B. Origin/Authorship Its origin, or authorship, is the will of the “sovereign Filipino people.” The identification of the Filipino people as the author of the constitution also calls attention to an important principle: that the document is not just the work of representatives of the people but of the people themselves who put their mark of approval by ratifying it in a plebiscite. C. Scope and Purpose “To build a just and humane society as to establish a government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and the regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality and peace.” III. Social Contract Theory ASM: I submit that the Preamble is somehow a manifestation of the Social Contract Theory as it states: “We the sovereign Filipino people…in order to build a…society and establish a government… do ordain and promulgate this constitution.”

II.

Art. I. The National Territory The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. I. Territory

A. What is Territory Territory is the fixed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited by the people of the state. Territory as an element of a state means an area over which a state has effective control.55 (Read Province of Cotabato v. GRP. October 14, 2008) B. What does territory include? Territory includes land, maritime areas, airspace and outer space. Airspace o Each state has exclusive jurisdiction over the air above its territory. o The consent for transit must be obtained from the subject nation. o Aircrafts not engaged in international air service, shall have the right to make flights into or in transit non-stop across its territory and to make steps for non-traffic purposes without the necessity of obtaining prior permission and subject to the right of the State flown over to require landing. (Chicago Convention on International Civil Action) Outerspace o Sovereignty over airspace extends only until where outerspace begins. (50-100 miles from earth) Different areas beyond the land territory o Territorial Seas (12 N.mi from baseline) o Contiguous Zone (24 N.mi from baseline) o Exclusive Economic Zone/Patrimonial Sea (200 N.mi from baseline) o High seas (Waters beyond territorial sea) C. Significance of Territory Control over territory is of the essence of a state (Las Palmas case). Certain rights and authority are exercised within the state’s territory. 1. State’s sovereignty is over its: o Land territory (and airspace above it) o Internal Waters (and airspace above it and seabed under it) o Archipelagic Waters( and airspace above it and seabed under it) o Territorial Sea (and airspace above it and seabed under it) 2. The coastal state has a right against innocent passage in its internal waters. 3. The coastal state exercises authority over the area (contiguous zone) to the extent necessary to prevent infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitation authority over its territorial waters or territory and to punish such infringement. 4. The coastal state has rights over the economic resources of the sea, seabed and subsoil. D. Scope of Philippine National Territory Defined in Article I, Section 1. It includes: (1) The Philippine archipelago; (2) All other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction; (3) The territorial sea, seabed, subsoil, insular shelves and other submarine areas corresponding to (1) and (2). Moreover, (1) and (2) consist of terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains. E. Territories Covered under the Definition of Article

30 1. Those ceded to the US by virtue of the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898. 2. Those defined in the treaty concluded between the US and Spain (Treaty of Washington) on November 7, 1990, which were not defined in the Treaty of Paris, specifically the islands of Cagayan, Sulu and Sibuto. 3. Those defined in the treaty concluded on January 2, 1930, between the US and Great Britain (Treaty with Great Britain), specifically the Turtle and Mangsee islands. Passage that is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state. 4. The island of Batanes, which was covered under a general statement in the 1935 Constitution.

According to UNCLOS, in “archipelagic waters”, a right of innocent passage shall exist in these waters. But, the Philippines made a reservation, thus, “ The concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of internal waters under the Constitution of the Philippines, and removes straits connecting these waters with the economic zone or high sea from the rights of foreign vessel to transit passage for international navigation.” Bernas: The reservation is ad cautelam. The claim made in the Constitution took effect in 1973 before the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention was formulated. Article 8(2) of the Convention itself says that the new rule on archipelagic waters applies only to “areas which had not previously been considered as” internal waters. D. Philippine Archipelago

5. Those contemplated in the phrase “belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal title” in the 1973 Constitution. E. “All other territories which the Philippines has sovereignty and jurisdiction.”

The Philippine archipelago is that body of water studded with islands which is delineated in the Treaty of Paris, modified by the Treaty of Washington and the Treaty of Great Britain. III. Archipelagic Principle

This includes any territory which presently belongs or might in the future belong to the Philippines through any of the internationally modes of acquiring territory. o Batanes islands o Those belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal title (Sabah, the Marianas, Freedomland) II. Archipelago A. Archipelago Archipelago is a body of water studded with islands.

A. Archipelagic Doctrine (1989 Bar Question) It is the principle whereby the body of water studded with islands, or the islands surrounded with water, is viewed as a unity of islands and waters together forming one integrated unit. For this purpose, it requires that baselines be drawn by connecting the appropriate points of the “outermost islands to encircle the islands within the archipelago. We consider all the waters enclosed by the straight baselines as internal waters. B. Elements of Archipelagic Doctrine

Q: Do you consider the Spratlys Group of Islands as part of Philippine Archipelago? A: No. It is far from the three main islands of the Philippines and it is not covered by what was ceded in the Treaty of Paris. Q: Do you consider the Spratlys group of Islands as part of the National Territory? A: Yes. Under the 2nd phrase, “…and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty and jurisdiction…” Basis: Discovery of Tomas Cloma in the 1950s. Cloma waived his rights over the islands in favor of the Philippine government. Philippine troops then occupied the islands. Marcos issued PD 1956 constituting Spratlys islands as a regular municipality (Municipality of Kalayaan) under the Province of Palawan. In May 20, 1980, the Philippines registered its claim with the UN Secretariat. B. Archipelagic State Archipelagic state means a state constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands. (Article 46 (a) of UNCLOS) C. Archipelagic Waters According to UNCLOS, Archipelagic waters refers to areas enclosed as internal waters by using the baseline method which had not been previously considered as internal waters. (See Article 53 of UNCLOS) Article 8(2) of UNCLOS: Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method set forth in Article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously been considered as such, a right of innocent passage as provided in this Convention shall exist in those waters.

1. Definition of internal waters63 2. The straight line method of delineating the territorial sea. Straight Baseline Method- drawn connecting selected points on the coast without departing to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast. RA 3046 and RA 5446 have drawn straight baselines around the Philippines. (The problem with the straight baseline method is that it conflicts with the Law of the Sea because it recognizes the right of innocent passage inarchipelagic waters. That is why we made a reservation. However, as Bernas pointed out, the reservation is ad cautelam) C. Purposes of Archipelagic Doctrine 1. Territorial Integrity 2. National Security 3. Economic reasons It is said that the purpose of archipelagic doctrine is to protect the territorial integrity of the archipelago. Without it, there would be “pockets of high seas” between some of our islands and islets, thus foreign vessels would be able to pass through these “pockets of seas” and would have no jurisdiction over them. D. Archipelago Doctrine in Article I, Section 1 (1989 Bar Question) “The waters around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of internal waters of the Philippines” Q: Differentiate archipelagic waters, territorial sea and internal waters. (2004 Bar Question)

31 A: According to UNCLOS, Archipelagic waters refers to areas enclosed as internal waters by using the baseline method which had not been previously considered as internal waters. (See Article 53 of UNCLOS) Territorial sea is an adjacent belt of sea with a breadth of 12 nautical miles measured from the baseline of the territory.” Note: The Philippines considers all waters connecting the islands as internal waters, baselines of a state and over which the state has sovereignty. (Article 2, 3 of UNCLOS)

A. Republic Republic is a representative government run by the people and for the people. Republican state is a state wherein all government authority emanates from the people and is exercised by representatives chosen by the people. B. Essential Features of Republicanism

Internal waters refer to “all waters landwards from the baseline of the territory.” Is from which the breadth of territorial sea is calculated. (Brownlie, Principles of PIL) No right of innocent passage for foreign vessels exist in the case of internal waters. (Harris, Cases and Material on International Law, 5th ed., 1998, p.407)

The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation. The citizenry selects a corps of public functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or retained at the option of their principal.

Under Section 1, Article I of the 1987 Constitution, the internal waters of the Philippines consist of the waters around between and connecting the islands of the Philippine archipelago regardless of their breadth and dimensions including the waters in bays, rivers, and lakes.

C. Manifestations of Republicanism 1. Ours is a government of laws and not of men [Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778]. 2. Rule of the majority. [Plurality in elections] 3. Accountability of public officials. 4. Bill of Rights. 5. Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws. 6. Separation of powers.

Q: Distinguish briefly but clearly between the contiguous zone and the exclusive economic zone. (2004 Bar Question) A: Contiguous zone is a zone contiguous to the territorial sea and extends up to twelve nautical miles from the territorial sea and over which the coastal state may exercise control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea. (Article 33 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea.) The EEZ extends 200 nautical miles from the baseline. The EEZ is recognized in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Although it is not part of the national territory, exclusive economic benefit is reserved for the country within the zone. By virtue of PD 1599, the Philippine declares that it has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the natural resources of the seabed, subsoil, and superjacent waters. Other states are prohibited from using the zone except for navigation and overflight, laying of submarine cables and pipeline, and other lawful uses related to navigation and communication. Q: Distinguish the flag state and the flag of convenience. (2004 Bar Question) A: Flag state means a ship has the nationality of the flag of the state it flies, but there must be a genuine link between the state and the ship. (Article 91 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea) Flag of convenience refers to a state with which a vessel is registered for various reasons such as low or non-existent taxation or low operating costs although the ship has no genuine link with the state. (Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 5th ed., 1998, p. 425.) III.

SECTION 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

Art. II. Fundamental Principles and State Policies A. Sec. 1 and 3: Republicanism; Supremacy of Civilian Authority

Purpose: To prevent concentration of authority in one person or group of persons that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of republican institutions. “To secure action, to forestall overaction, to prevent despotism and to obtain efficiency” [Pangasinan Transporation Co. v. Public Service Commission, 40 O.G. 8th Supp. 57]. See also Tuason v. Register of Deeds of Caloocan City, 157 SCRA 613; In Re: Manzano, 166 SCRA 246. In La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004, the Court restrained itself from intruding into policy matters to allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the mineral resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable employment opportunities in the country. “The Judiciary is loath to interfere with the due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official functions”. Let the development of the mining industry be the responsibility of the political branches of government. The questioned provisions of R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995) are not unconstitutional. Application: Not “doctrinaire” nor with “pedantic rigor”; “not independence but interdependence”. In the absence of any administrative action taken against the RTC Judge by the Supreme Court with regard to the former’s certificate of service, the investigation conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Supreme Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers [Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464].

32 Principle of Blending of Powers. Instances when powers are notconfined exclusively within one department but are assigned to or shared by several departments, e.g., enactment of general appropriations law. Principle of Checks and Balances. This allows one department to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the other departments, e.g., veto power of the President as check on improvident legislation, etc.. Role of the Judiciary. The judicial power, as defined in Sec. 1, Art.VIII, “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse, of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government”. Note that when the court mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries or invalidates the acts of a coordinate body, what it upholds is not its own superiority but the supremacy of the Constitution [Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139] Read The Power of Judicial Review, supra. See also: Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183; Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792. The first and safest criterion to determine whether a given power has been validly exercised by a particular department is whether or not the power has been constitutionally conferred upon the department claiming its exercise — since the conferment is usually done expressly. However, even in the absence of express conferment, the exercise of the power may be justified under the doctrine of necessary implication, i.e. that the grant of an express power carries with it all other powers that may be reasonably inferred from it. Note also that there are powers which although not expressly conferred nor implied therefrom, are inherent or incidental, e.g., the President’s power to deport undesirable aliens which may be exercised independently of constitutional or statutory authority, because it is an “act of State”. See also: Marcos v. Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760, where the Supreme Court justified the action of President Aquino in banning the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines on the basis of the President’s residual powers. 7. Delegation of Powers Rule: “Potestas delegata non potest delegare”, based on the ethical principle that delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. D. “Democratic State” In the view of the new Constitution, the Philippines is not only a representative or republican state but also shares some aspects of direct democracy such as “initiative and referendum”. The word democratic is also a monument to the February Revolution which re-won freedom through direct action of the people.

E. Constitutional Authoritarianism Constitutional authoritarianism as understood and practiced in the Marcos regime under the 1973 Constitution, was the assumption of extraordinary powers by the President, including legislative and judicial and even constituent powers. Q: Is constitutional authoritarianism compatible with a republican state? A: Yes if the Constitution upon which the Executive bases his assumption of power is a legitimate expression of the people’s will and if the Executive who assumes power received his office through a valid election by the people. SECTION 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory. 1.

Read Sec. 18, Art. VII (Commander-in-Chief clause).

SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. A. Civilian Authority That civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military is implicit in a republican system. Still, it was felt advisable to expressly affirm this principle in the Constitution to allay all fears of a military take-over of our civilian government. It was also fittingly declared that the President, who is a civilian official, shall be the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines. Q: Does this mean that civilian officials are superior to military officials? A: Civilian officials are superior to military official only when a law makes them so. B. Armed Forces of the Philippines 1. Reasons [in the constitution] for the existence of the armed forces (1) As protector of the people and the State (2) To secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

33 (3) They may be called to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. (4) All Members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend the Constitution. 2. Composition The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and serve as may be provided by law. (Article XVI, Section 4) 3. On Politics The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics. No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to vote. (Article XVI, Section 5) Q: Is the provision an assertion of the political role of the military? A: No. The phrase “protector of the people” was not meant to be an assertion of the political role of the military. The intent of the phrase “protector of the people” was rather to make it as corrective to military abuses experienced during martial rule. Q: Does this mean that the military has no political role? A: Bernas: The military exercise of political power can be justified as a last resort—when civilian authority has lost its legitimacy. (This is dangerous.) 4 . Bar Question (2003) Q: Is the PNP covered by the same mandate under Article II, Section 3? A: No. This provision is specifically addressed to the AFP and not to the PNP, because the latter is separate and distinct from the former. (Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume V, p. 296; Manalo v. Sistoza, 312 SCRA 239)

B. Sec. 2 (part): The Incorporation clause [Sec 2. Art. II: “The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations"]. Doctrine of incorporation: By virtue of this clause, our Courts have applied the rules of international law in a number of cases even if such rules had not previously been subject of statutory enactments, because these generally accepted principles of international law are automatically part of our own laws. a) The phrase “generally accepted principles of international law’’ refers to norms of general or customary international law which are binding on all states, e.g., renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, sovereign immunity, a person’s right to life, liberty and due process, and pacta sunt servanda [Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque, G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007], b) Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or by incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law principle be

transformed into domestic law through a constitutional mechanism, such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law [Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association v. Duque, supra.] c) The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals or local courts are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. In Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 115, the reason given by the Court was that the Retail Trade National Law was passed in the exercise of the police power which cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. In Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 and In Re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984, on the basis of separation of powers and the rule-making powers of the Supreme Court, respectively. The high tribunal also noted that courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances. d) However, as applied in most countries, the doctrine of incorporation dictates that rules of international law are given equal standing with, and are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle of lex posterior derogat priori takes effect. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution [Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000, citing Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed.]. The same rule was applied in Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, where the Supreme Court said that the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. 1. Acceptance of Dualist View Implicit in this provision is the acceptance of the dualist view of legal systems, namely that domestic law is distinct from international law. Since dualism holds that international law and municipal law belong to different spheres, international law becomes part of municipal law only if it is incorporated in to municipal law.105 2. Doctrine of Incorporation (1997 Bar Question) Every state is, by reason of its membership in the family of nations, bound by the generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of its own laws. This is the doctrine of incorporation.106

34 3. International Law Traditional definition: It is a body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized states in their relation to one another. Restatement: The law which deals with the conduct of states and of international organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with some other relations with persons, natural or juridical. 4. To What Elements of International Law does the principle of incorporation apply? Since treaties become part of Philippine law only by ratification, the principle of incorporation applies only to customary law and to treaties which have become part of customary law. 107 5. Effect of Incorporation Clause International law therefore can be used by Philippine courts to settle domestic disputes in much the same way that they would use the Civil Code or the Penal Code and other laws passed by Congress. CASES: Kuroda v. Jalandoni, 42 O.G. 4282 (83 Phil 171) Facts: Shinegori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines was charged before the Philippine Military Commission for war crimes. As he was the commanding general during such period of war, he was tried for failure to discharge his duties and permitting the brutal atrocities and other high crimes committed by his men against non combatant civilians and prisoners of the Japanese forces, in violation of the laws and customs of war. Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid court because the law that created it, Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He further contends that using as basis The Hague Convention’s Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare for the war crime committed cannot stand ground as the Philippines was not a signatory of such rules in such convention. Furthermore, he alleges that the United States is not a party of interest in the case and that the two US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines. Issue: 1.Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional 2.Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules on the trial of accused war criminals, is constitutional as it is aligned with Sec 3,Article 2 of the Constitution which states that―The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. The generally accepted principles of international law include those formed during the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and other international by United Nations. These include the principle that all persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses in violation of laws and customs of war, are to be held accountable. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines abide by these principles and therefore has a right to try persons that commit such crimes and most especially when it is committed against its citizens. It abides with it even if it was not a signatory to these conventions by the mere incorporation of such principles in the constitution. The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have been equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is charged for. By virtue of Executive Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a special military tribunal and that the rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but by the very provisions of this special law.

Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tah Keh, 75 Phil 113

Facts: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese). The court resolved three issues: 1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation; 2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts; 3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them. Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them. The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation. IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law. A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.” Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.” Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of any other governments.” In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan. It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change. Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said

35 courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012. Summary of ratio: 1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed. 2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations. 3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it. ***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government) through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force) through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)

Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 1155 FACTS: Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity. ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”, because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal. HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up. As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question”. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

In re Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 FACTS: Arturo E. Garcia, a Filipino citizen, studied law, became a lawyer and practiced law in Spain. Later, he applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without taking the Philippine bar examinations. He cited the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Philippines and Spain and argued that he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines even without submitting to the required bar examinations.

HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.” For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

ISSUE: Can the petitioner validly invoke the subject treaty to justify his petition to be admitted to the practice law in the Philippines without taking the Philippine bar examinations?

Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230

from which it could clearly be discerned that said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines.

FACTS: During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the then Executive Secretary, RufinoHechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters.

RULING: [The Court DENIED the petition.] NO, the petitioner CANNOT validly invoke the subject treaty to justify his petition to be admitted to the practice law in the Philippines without taking the Philippine bar examinations. [T]he provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State cannot be invoked by applicant. Under Article 11 thereof: The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have obtained recognition of the validity of their academic degrees by virtue of the stipulations of this Treaty, can practice their professions within the territory of the Other, . . . (Emphasis supplied).

Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides

36 The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degree or diplomas to practice the liberal professions in either of the Contracting States, issued by competent national authorities, shall be deemed competent to exercise said professions in the territory of the Other, subject to the laws and regulations of the latter. . . It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal profession in the Philippine he must first successfully pass the required bar examinations. The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the lower to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.

In Lim v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002, the Supreme Court said that these provisions, along with Sec. 2, Art. II, Sec. 21, Art. VII, and Sec. 26, Art. XVIII, betray a marked antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general. Nuclear-Free Policy [SECTION 8, ART. II. “The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.”] Freedom from Nuclear Weapons A. Scope of Policy The policy includes the prohibition not only of the possession, control, and manufacture of nuclear weapons but also nuclear arms tests.

[NOTE (in relation to the incorporation clause): Pacta sunt servanda, a generally accepted principle of international law, cannot be invoked in this case since the treaty cited as justification for Garcia's petition was not even applicable in the first place.]

B. Exception to the Policy Exception to this policy may be made by the political department but it must be justified by the demands of the national interest.

C. Sec. 2 (part), 7, and 8: Renunciation of War; Independent Foreign Policy; Nuclear-Free Policy

The policy does not prohibit the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Renunciation of War

C. Implication of the Policy for the Presence of American Troops

1. Aggressive War The Philippines only renounces AGGRESSIVE war as an instrument of national policy. It does not renounce defensive war. 2. Philippines Renounces Not Only War As member of United Nations, the Philippines does not merely renounce war but adheres to Article 2(4) of the UN charter which says: “ All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with Purposes of the United Nations.” 3. Historical Development of the Policy Condemning or Outlawing War in the International Scene: 1. Covenant of the League of Nations provided conditions for the right to go to war. 2. Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928- also known as the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, ratified by 62 states, which forbade war as “an instrument of national policy.” 3. Charter of the United Nations- Prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State. Independent Foreign Policy [SECTION 7, ART. II. “The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination.”] The word “relations” covers the whole gamut of treaties and international agreements and other kinds of intercourse.

Any new agreement on bases or the presence of the troops, if ever there is one, must embody the basic policy of freedom from nuclear weapons. Moreover, it would be well within the power of government to demand ocular inspection and removal of nuclear arms. 1.

See also Sec. 25, Art. XVIII (re former US Military Bases)

[SECTION 25, ART. XVIII. “After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”] 2.

Significance of the phrase “consistent with national interest” in Sec. 8

Q: Is there absolute prohibition for the Philippines to be equipped with nuclear weapons? A: No, as stated in Section 8, Art. II, “the Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.” As such, if it is consistent with national interest, the same is not prohibited.

D. Sec. 4: Defense of the State [SECTION 4. “The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government

37 may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfilment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service.”]

5) 2. Religious sect cannot be registered as a political party (Article IX-C, Section 2(5)) 3. No sectoral representatives from the religious sector. (Article VI, Section 5 (2)) 4. Prohibition against appropriation against sectarian benefit. (Article VI, 29(2)).

Read Secs. 4 & 5, Art. XVI (Armed Forces of the Philippines provisions). Right to bear arms. The right to bear arms is a statutory, not a constitutional right. The license to carry a firearm is neither a property nor a property right. Neither does it create a vested right. Even if it were a property right, it cannot be considered absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of police power. The maintenance of peace and order, and the protection of the people against violence are constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear arms is to be construed in connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties [Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004].

D. Exceptions 1. Churches, parsonages, etc. actually, directly and exclusively used for religious purposes shall be exempt from taxation. (Article VI, Section 28(3)). 2. When priest, preacher, minister or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or any penal institution or government orphanage or leprosarium, public money may be paid to them. (Article VI, Section 29(2)) 3. Optional religious instruction for public elementary and high school students. (Article XIV, Section 3(3)). 4. Filipino ownership requirement for education institutions, except those established by religious groups and mission boards. (Article XIV, Section 4(2)).

CASES: Pp. v. Lagman, GR No. 45892, July 13, 1938 FACTS: In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do so because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law. ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional. HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. “The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.”

Pp. v Soza, GR No. 45893, July 13, 1938 Note: Same decision in Pp v. Lagman

E. Sec. 6: Separation of Church and State [SECTION 6. “The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.”] A. Rationale “Strong fences make good neighbors.” The idea is to delineate boundaries between the two institutions and thus avoid encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions. B. Who is Prohibited from Interfering Doctrine cuts both ways. It is not only the State that is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs; the Church is likewise barred from meddling in purely secular matters. (Cruz) C. Separation of Church and State is Reinforced by: 1. Freedom of Religion Clause (Article III, Section

1.

See also Sec. 5, Art. III (The nonestablishment clause and free-exercise clause) [SECTION 5. “No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.”] CASE: Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil 201 Facts: Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress (33rd IEC). In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd IEC. The question raised was the alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps. The action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows: No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium. In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. Th Act appropriates the sum of P60,000 for the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to

38 dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government".

CASES:

Issue: WON the issuance of the postage stamps violate the Constitution

Topic: Test of valid delegation “public welfare”

Held: No. There has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint).

F.

Sec. 9, 10, 11, 18, and 21: Social Justice; Human Rights [SECTION 9. “The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.”] [SECTION 10. “The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.”] {SECTION 11. “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.”] [SECTION 18. “The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.”] [SECTION 21. “The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.”] 1. 2.

See also Art. XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights) Definition of Social Justice Social Justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of the laws and the equalization of the social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. (Calalang v. Williams) Social justice simply means the equalization of economic, political, and social opportunities with special emphasis on the duty of the state to tilt the balance of social forces by favoring the disadvantaged in life.

Calalang v. Williams, 70 SCRA 726

Facts: In pursuance of Commonwealth Act 548 which mandates the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads, the Director of Public Works adopted the resolution of the National Traffic Commission, prohibiting the passing of animal drawn vehicles in certainstreets in Manila.Petitioner questioned this as it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Issues: Whether or not there is a undue delegation of legislative power? Ruling: There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, “to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines” and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic “whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest.” The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.

Ass’n of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian, 175 SCRA 343 FACTS: This case is rooted from several petitions having common legal issues questioning the constitutionality of involved laws. Brief Background Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farm workers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favour of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131,

39 instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. After which is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. G.R NO. 7977 The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare Riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation. G.R NO. 79310

The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias MillDistrict, Victorias, Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal protection. They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides: Agrarian Reform Fund-There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agrarian Reform Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS (P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the estimated cost of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth received through the Presidential Commission on Good Government and such other sources as government may deem appropriate. The amounts collected and accruing to this special fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for the purpose authorized in this Proclamation the amount appropriated is in future, not in esse. The money needed to cover the cost of the contemplated expropriation has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at this time. Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be established by the government, which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current fair market value as provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council." This compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of several modes that may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing periodically, or direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or approved by the PARC. The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the expropriation of the said land for an amount equal to the government assessor's valuation of the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation he is

unjustly required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the uniformity rule. G.R. NO. 79744 FACTS: The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the private respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him. On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his land to the private respondents. The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory Provisions refers only to emergency measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police power. The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of law and to the retention of his small parcels of rice holding as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution. G.R NO. 78742 FACTS: The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands. According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27: No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farm holding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27. The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules. The public respondent said that P.D No. 27 has been amended by LOI removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this Court in Tanada v. Tuvera. 10 As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the mentioned P.Ds, E.O’s and R.A are constitutional. 2. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 and E.O. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution. 3. Whether or not there was a violation of due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for. RULING: 1. The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and

40 we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above. The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from her. They are not "midnight" enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become in operative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it. Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions. 17 Indeed, some portions of the said measures, like the creation of the P50 billion fund in Section 2 of Proc. No. 131, and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229, have been incorporated by reference in the CARP Law.18

shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs."]

2. NO. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section declares: Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created here under, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That land owners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them there under, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead. 3. No. It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even now under R.A. No. 6657. This should counterbalance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the land owners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them there under, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."

D. Legal Meaning of the Protection Guaranteed for the Unborn.

G. Sec. 12, 13, 14: The Family; Youth; Women [SECTION 12. “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government."] [SECTION 13. “The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It

A. Family "Family” means a stable heterosexual relationship. The family is not a creature of the State. B. Effect of the Declaration of Family Autonomy It accepts the principle that the family is anterior to the State and not a creature of the State. It protects the family from instrumentalization by the State. C. Purpose of Assertion of Protection of the Unborn The purpose of the assertion that the protection begins from the time of conception is to prevent the State form adopting the doctrine in Roe v. Wade which liberalized abortion laws up to thsixth month of pregnancy by allowing abortion any time during the first six months of pregnancy provided it can be done without danger to the mother.

1. This is not an assertion that the unborn is a legal person. 2. This is not an assertion that the life of the unborn is placed exactly on the level of the life of the mother. (When necessary to save the life of the mother, the life of the unborn may be sacrificed; but not when the purpose is merely to save the mother from emotional suffering, for which other remedies must be sought, or to spare the child from a life of poverty, which can be attended to by welfare institutions.) E. Education In the matter of education, the primary and natural right belongs to the parents. The State has a secondary and supportive role. Foreign Language. The State cannot prohibit the teaching of foreign language to children before they reach a certain age. Such restriction does violence both to the letter and the spirit of the Constitution. (Meyer v. Nebraska) Public School. The State cannot require children to attend only public schools before they reach a certain age. The child is not a mere creature of the State. Those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right to recognize and prepare him. (Pierce v. Society of Sisters) Religious Upbringing. The State cannot require children to continue schooling beyond a certain age in the honest and sincere claim of parents that such schooling would be harmful to their religious upbringing. Only those interests of the State “of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance” the primary interest of

41 parents in the religious upbringing of their children. (Wisconsin v. Yoder) Parens Patriae. However, as parens patriae, the State has the authority and duty to step in where parents fail to or are unable to cope with their duties to their children. [SECTION 14. “The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men."] The provision is so worded as not to automatically dislocate the Civil Code and the civil law jurisprudence on the subject. What it does is to give impetus to the removal, through statutes, of existing inequalities. The general idea is for the law to ignore sex where sex is not a relevant factor in determining rights and duties. Nor is the provision meant to ignore customs and traditions. In Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Co. v. NLRC, 1997, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage , runs afoul of the test of, and the right against discrimination, which is guaranteed all women workers under the Constitution. While a requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried may be justified as a “bona fide qualification” where the particular requirements of the job would demand the same, discrimination against married women cannot be adopted by the employer as a general principle. 1.

See Sec. 14, Art. XIII (re working women) [SECTION 14. "The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation."] CASE: 58 - PT&T v. NLRC, GR No. 118978, May 23, 1997 Facts: Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave.[1] Under the Reliever Agreement which she signed with petitioner company, her employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private respondents services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner, this time in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods.[2] After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services were terminated. On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.[3]

When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the companys policy of not accepting married women for employment.[4] In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&Ts policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status.[5] Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992,[6] which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City. At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, private respondent volunteered the information, and this was incorporated in the stipulation of facts between the parties, that she had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her collections. She then executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner.[7] All of these took place in a formal proceeding and with the agreement of the parties and/or their counsel. On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decision declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus payment of the corresponding back wages and COLA, was correspondingly ordered, the labor arbiter being of the firmly expressed view that the ground relied upon by petitioner in dismissing private respondent was clearly insufficient, and that it was apparent that she had been discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules. On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public respondent upheld the labor arbiter and, in its decision dated April 29, 1994, it ruled that private respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her employer, PT&T. However, the decision of the labor arbiter was modified with the qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature of her acts which should not be condoned. In all other respects, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter, including the order for the reinstatement of private respondent in her employment with PT&T. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was rebuffed by respondent NLRC in its resolution of November 9, 1994, hence this special civil action assailing the aforestated decisions of the labor arbiter and respondent NLRC, as well as the denial resolution of the latter. Issue: 1. Whether or not the company policy of not accepting married women for employment was discriminatory 2. Whether or not Grace’s act of concealment amounted to dishonesty, leading to loss of confidence 3. Whether or not Grace was illegally dismissed Held: There was a discrimination. Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee. Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. Concealment did not amount to willful dishonesty.

42 Verily, private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the employer’s caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.

[SECTION 4. "The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the State may also do so through just programs of social security.'] H. Sec. 15 and 16: Right to Health; Right to Healthful and Balanced Ecology [SECTION 15. "The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them."] The provisions which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the people’s right to health and well-being are not self executory. They await implementation by Congress.

However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which should be sanctioned and therefore agreed with the NLRC’s decision that the dishonesty warranted temporary suspension of Grace from work. Grace attained regular status as an employee Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on Jan. 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure.

[SECTION 16. "The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."] Section 16 provides for enforceable rights. Hence, appeal to it has been recognized as conferring “standing” on minors to challenge logging policies of the government. (Oposa v. Factoran) While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation. These basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. (Oposa v. Factoran, 1993) On this basis too, the SC upheld the empowerment of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake Area from the deleterious effects of pollutants coming from garbage dumping and the discharge of wastes in the area as against the local autonomy claim of local governments in the area. (LLDA v. CA, 1995)

There was illegal dismissal As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. On Stipulation against Marriage In the final reckoning, the danger of PT&T’s policy against marriage is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation. Disposition: The petition of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs against petitioner.

2.

See also Art. XV (The Family) [SECTION 1. "The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development."]

1.In Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792, it was held that the petitioners, minors duly joined by their respective parents, had a valid cause of action in questioning the continued grant of Timber License Agreements (TLAs) for commercial logging purposes, because the cause focuses on a fundamental legal right: the right to a balanced and healthful ecology.

[SECTION 2. "Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State."] [SECTION 3. "The State shall defend: (1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;

2. In C & M Timber Corporation v. Alcala, G.R. No. 111088, June 13, 1997, on the issue that the “total log ban” is a new policy which should be applied prospectively and not affect the rights of petitioner vested under the Timber Licensing Agreement, the Supreme Court declared that this is not a new policy but a mere reiteration of the policy of conservation and protection expressed in Sec. 16, Art. II of the Constitution.

(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development; (3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and (4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them."]

CASES:

43 latter is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.

59 - Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993 FACTS: A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against FulgencioFactoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to: 1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country; 2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs; and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parenspatriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

I.

Sec. 17: Education, Science and Technology, etc. [SECTION 17. "The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development."] This does not mean that the government is not free to balance the demands of education against other competing and urgent demands. (Guingona v. Carague) In Philippine Merchant Marine School Inc. v. CA, the Court said that the requirement that a school must first obtain government authorization before operating is based on the State policy that educational programs and/or operations shall be of good quality and, therefore, shall at least satisfy minimum standards with respect to curricula, teaching staff, physical plant and facilities and administrative and management viability.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: 1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him; 2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government. ISSUE: Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?” HELD: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to com

In Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221, and in Philconsa v.Enriquez, supra., it was held that Sec. 5, Art. XIV, which provides for the highest budgetary priority to education, is merely directory; the hands of Congress cannot be so hamstrung as to deprive it of the power to respond to the imperatives of national interest and the attainment of other state policies and objectives. While it is true that the Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements, the exercise of this right may be regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety and general welfare. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation assumes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, in order to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance. (PRC v. DeGuzman, 2004)

60 - LLDA v. CA, G.R. No. 110120, March 16, 1994 FACTS: The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters. ISSUE: Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region? HELD: LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the

1.

I.

Read also Art. XIV (Education, Science and Technology, etc.)

Sec. 19: National Economy SECTION 19. The State shall develop a selfreliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. This is a guide for interpreting provisions on national economy and patrimony. Any doubt must be resolved in favor of selfreliance and independence and in favor of Filipinos. A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity, it is essential to national interest. (The

44 approval of the transfer of the plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorization of the change of feedstock from naptha only to naptha and/or LPG do not prove to be advantageous to the government. This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the government to run its own affairs the way it deems best for national interest.) (Garcia v. BOI) The WTO agreement does not violate Section 19 of Article II, nor Sections 10 and 12 of Article XII, because said sections should be read and understood in relation to Sections 1 and 3, Article XII, which requires the pursuit of a trade policy that “serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.” (Tanada V. Angara) The provisions of Art. II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable rights, but guidelines for legislation. The reasons for denying cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and lack of judicial authority to wade into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy-making. In Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. PhilippineCoconut Authority, G.R. No. 110526, February 10, 1998, the Supreme Court said that although the Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nevertheless reserves to the Government the power to intervene whenever necessary for the promotion of the general welfare, as reflected in Sec. 6 and 19, Art. XII. This is reiterated in Pest Management Association of the Philippines v. Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority. I n Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque, G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007, the Court held that free enterprise does not call for the removal of protective regulations. It must be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence how such protective regulations would result in restraint of trade. 1. Read also Art. XII (National Economy and Patrimony) CASES: Tanada vs. Angara, GR No. 118295, May 2, 1997 Facts: On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of The Department of Trade and Industry, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from the President of the Philippines, stating among others that "the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution". On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from the President of the Philippines likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated among others

that "the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution." On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled "Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization." On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which "Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization." The text of the WTO Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and includes various agreements and associated legal instruments. On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed the Instrument of Ratification, declaring the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) ratified and confirmed To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the Agreement Proper and "the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof." On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. The Solicitor General describes these two latter documents as follows: The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations and decisions on matters such as measures in favor of least developed countries, notification procedures etc. The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among other things, standstill or limitations and qualifications of commitments to existing non-conforming measures, market access, national treatment etc. On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. The Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due course to the petition. The court also requested the Hon. Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter referred to as "Bautista Paper,", (1) providing a historical background of and (2) summarizing the said agreements. During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the matter in controversy and (2) the transcript of proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of Philippine treaties signed prior to the Philippine adherence to the WTO Agreement, which derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of the multi-volume WTO Agreement and other documents mentioned in the Final Act. Issue: W/N the petition presents a justiciable controversy Held: Yes. The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987 Constitution, as follows: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be given due course and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation.

45 We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the government's economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty "to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.

Garcia vs. Corona, G.R. No. 132451, Dec 17, 1999 (full text) YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: On November 5, 1997, this Court in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy and Lagman, et al., v. Hon. Ruben Torres, et al.,[1] declared Republic Act No. 8180, entitled An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes, unconstitutional, and its implementing Executive Order No. 392 void. R.A. 8180 was struck down as invalid because three key provisions intended to promote free competition were shown to achieve the opposite result. More specifically, this Court ruled that its provisions on tariff differential, stocking of inventories, and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition, encourage monopolistic power, and interfere with the free interaction of the market forces. While R.A. 8180 contained a separability clause, it was declared unconstitutional in its entirety since the three (3) offending provisions so permeated the law that they were so intimately the esse of the law. Thus, the whole statute had to be invalidated. As a result of the Tatad decision, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8479, a new deregulation law without the offending provisions of the earlier law. Petitioner Enrique T. Garcia, a member of Congress, has now brought this petition seeking to declare Section 19 thereof, which sets the time of full deregulation, unconstitutional. After failing in his attempts to have Congress incorporate in the law the economic theory he espouses, petitioner now asks us, in the name of upholding the Constitution, to undo a violation which he claims Congress has committed. The assailed Section 19 of R.A. 8479 states in full: SEC. 19. Start of Full Deregulation. --- Full deregulation of the Industry shall start five (5) months following the effectivity of this Act: Provided, however, That when the public interest so requires, the President may accelerate the start of full deregulation upon the recommendation of the DOE and the Department of Finance (DOF) when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and the value of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable, taking into account relevant trends and prospects; Provided, further, That the foregoing provision notwithstanding, the five (5)-month Transition Phase shall continue to apply to LPG, regular gasoline and kerosene as socially-sensitive petroleum products and said petroleum products shall be covered by the automatic pricing mechanism during the said period. Upon the implementation of full deregulation as provided herein, the Transition Phase is deemed terminated and the following laws are repealed: a) Republic Act No. 6173, as amended; b) Section 5 of Executive Order No. 172, as amended; c) Letter of Instruction No. 1431, dated October 15, 1984; d) Letter of Instruction No. 1441, dated November 20, 1984, as amended; e) Letter of Instruction No. 1460, dated May 9, 1985; f) Presidential Decree No. 1889; and g) Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137:

Provided, however, That in case full deregulation is started by the President in the exercise of the authority provided in this Section, the foregoing laws shall continue to be in force and effect with respect to LPG, regular gasoline and kerosene for the rest of the five (5)-month period. Petitioner contends that Section 19 of R.A. 8479, which prescribes the period for the removal of price control on gasoline and other finished products and for the full deregulation of the local downstream oil industry, is patently contrary to public interest and therefore unconstitutional because within the short span of five months, the market is still dominated and controlled by an oligopoly of the three (3) private respondents, namely, Shell, Caltex and Petron. The objective of the petition is deceptively simple. It states that if the constitutional mandate against monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade[2] is to be obeyed, there should be indefinite and open-ended price controls on gasoline and other oil products for as long as necessary. This will allegedly prevent the Big 3 --- Shell, Caltex and Petron --- from price-fixing and overpricing. Petitioner calls the indefinite retention of price controls as partial deregulation. The grounds relied upon in the petition are: A. SECTION 19 OF R.A. NO. 8479 WHICH PROVIDES FOR FULL DEREGULATION FIVE (5) MONTHS OR EARLIER FOLLOWING THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE LAW, IS GLARINGLY PRO-OLIGOPOLY, ANTI-COMPETITION AND ANTI-PEOPLE, AND IS THEREFORE PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING IN GROSS AND CYNICAL CONTRAVENTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY AND COMMAND EMBODIED IN ARTCLE XII, SECTION 19 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AGAINST MONOPOLIES AND COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE. B. SAID SECTION 19 OF R.A. No. 8479 IS GLARINGLY PROOLIGOPOLY, ANTI-COMPETITION AND ANTI-PEOPLE, FOR THE FURTHER REASON THAT IT PALPABLY AND CYNICALLY VIOLATES THE VERY OBJECTIVE AND PURPOSE OF R.A. NO. 8479, WHICH IS TO ENSURE A TRULY COMPETITIVE MARKET UNDER A REGIME OF FAIR PRICES. C. SAID SECTION 19 OF R.A. No. 8479, BEING GLARINGLY PRO-OLIGOPOLY, ANTI-COMPETITION AND ANTIPEOPLE, BEING PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND BEING PALPABLY VIOLATIVE OF THE LAWS POLICY AND PURPOSE OF ENSURING A TRULY COMPETITIVE MARKET UNDER A REGIME OF FAIR PRICES, IS A VERY GRAVE AND GRIEVOUS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT. D. PREMATURE FULL DEREGULATION UNDER SECTION 19 OF R.A. NO. 8479 MAY AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID EVEN AS THE REST OF ITS PROVISIONS REMAIN IN FORCE, SUCH AS THE TRANSITION PHASE OR PARTIAL DEREGULATION WITH PRICE CONTROLS THAT ENSURES THE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST BY PREVENTING THE BIG 3 OLIGOPOLYS PRICE-FIXING AND OVERPRICING.[3] The issues involved in the deregulation of the downstream oil industry are of paramount significance. The ramifications, international and local in scope, are complex. The impact on the nations economy is pervasive and far-reaching. The amounts involved in the oil business are immense. Fluctuations in the supply and price of oil products have a dramatic effect on economic development and public welfare. As pointed out in the Tatad decision, few cases carry a surpassing importance on the daily life of every Filipino. The issues affect everybody from the poorest wageearners and their families to the richest entrepreneurs, from industrial giants to humble consumers. Our decision in this case is complicated by the unstable oil prices in the world market. Even as this case is pending, the price of OPEC oil is escalating to record levels. We have to emphasize that our decision has nothing to do with

46 worldwide fluctuations in oil prices and the countermeasures of Government each time a new development takes place. The most important part of deregulation is freedom from price control. Indeed, the free play of market forces through deregulation and when to implement it represent one option to solve the problems of the oil-consuming public. There are other considerations which may be taken into account such as the reduction of taxes on oil products, the reinstitution of an Oil Price Stabilization Fund, the choice between government subsidies taken from the regular taxpaying public on one hand and the increased costs being shouldered only by users of oil products on the other, and most important, the immediate repeal of the oil deregulation law as wrong policy. Petitioner wants the setting of prices to be done by Government instead of being determined by free market forces. His preference is continued price control with no fixed end in sight. A simple glance at the factors surrounding the present problems besetting the oil industry shows that they are economic in nature. R.A. 8479, the present deregulation law, was enacted to implement Article XII, Section 19 of the Constitution which provides: The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. This is so because the Government believes that deregulation will eventually prevent monopoly. The simplest form of monopoly exists when there is only one seller or producer of a product or service for which there are no substitutes. In its more complex form, monopoly is defined as the joint acquisition or maintenance by members of a conspiracy, formed for that purpose, of the power to control and dominate trade and commerce in a commodity to such an extent that they are able, as a group, to exclude actual or potential competitors from the field, accompanied with the intention and purpose to exercise such power.[4] Where two or three or a few companies act in concert to control market prices and resultant profits, the monopoly is called an oligopoly or cartel. It is a combination in restraint of trade. The perennial shortage of oil supply in the Philippines is exacerbated by the further fact that the importation, refining, and marketing of this precious commodity are in the hands of a cartel, local but made up of foreign-owned corporations. Before the start of deregulation, the three private respondents controlled the entire oil industry in the Philippines. It bears reiterating at the outset that the deregulation of the oil industry is a policy determination of the highest order. It is unquestionably a priority program of Government. The Department of Energy Act of 1992[5] expressly mandates that the development and updating of the existing Philippine energy program shall include a policy direction towards deregulation of the power and energy industry. Be that as it may, we are not concerned with whether or not there should be deregulation. This is outside our jurisdiction. The judgment on the issue is a settled matter and only Congress can reverse it. Rather, the question that we should address here is --- are the method and the manner chosen by Government to accomplish its cherished goal offensive to the Constitution? Is indefinite price control in the manner proposed by petitioner the only feasible and legal way to achieve it? Petitioner has taken upon himself a most challenging task. Unquestionably, the direction towards which the nations efforts at economic and social upliftment should be addressed is a function of Congress and the President. In the exercise of this function, Congress and the President have obviously determined that speedy deregulation is the answer to the acknowledged dominion by oligopolistic forces of the oil industry. Thus, immediately after R.A. 8180 was declared unconstitutional in the Tatad case, Congress took resolute steps to fashion new legislation towards the objective of the earlier law. Invoking the Constitution, petitioner now wants to slow down the process. While the Court respects the firm resolve displayed by Congress and the President, all departments of Government are equally bound by the sovereign will expressed in the commands of the Constitution. There is a need for utmost care if this Court is to faithfully discharge its duties as arbitral

guardian of the Constitution. We cannot encroach on the policy functions of the two other great departments of Government. But neither can we ignore any overstepping of constitutional limitations. Locating the correct balance between legality and policy, constitutional boundaries and freedom of action, and validity and expedition is this Courts dilemma as it resolves the legitimacy of a Government program aimed at giving every Filipino a more secure, fulfilling and abundant life. Our ruling in Tatad is categorical that the Constitutions Article XII, Section 19, is anti-trust in history and spirit. It espouses competition. We have stated that only competition which is fair can release the creative forces of the market. We ruled that the principle which underlies the constitutional provision is competition. Thus: Section 19, Article XII of our Constitution is anti-trust in history and in spirit. It espouses competition. The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason for regulation of unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle of section 19, Article XII of our Constitution which cannot be violated by R.A. No. 8180. We subscribe to the observation of Prof. Gellhorn that the objective of anti-trust law is to assure a competitive economy, based upon the belief that through competition producers will strive to satisfy consumer wants at the lowest price with the sacrifice of the fewest resources. Competition among producers allows consumers to bid for goods and services, and thus matches their desires with societys opportunity costs. He adds with appropriateness that there is a reliance upon the operation of the market system (free enterprise) to decide what shall be produced, how resources shall be allocated in the production process, and to whom the various products will be distributed. The market system relies on the consumer to decide what and how much shall be produced, and on competition, among producers to determine who will manufacture it.[6] In his recital of the antecedent circumstances, petitioner repeats in abbreviated form the factual findings and conclusions which led the Court to declare R.A. 8180 unconstitutional. The foreign oligopoly or cartel formed by respondents Shell, Caltex and Petron, their indulging in price-fixing and overpricing, their blockade tactics which effectively obstructed the entry of genuine competitors, the dangers posed by the oil cartel to national security and economic development, and other prevailing sentiments are stated as axiomatic truths. They are repeated in capsulized context as the current background facts of the present petition. The empirical existence of this deplorable situation was precisely the reason why Congress enacted the oil deregulation law. The evils arising from conspiratorial acts of monopoly are recognized as clear and present. But the enumeration of the evils by our Tatad decision was not for the purpose of justifying continued government control, especially price control. The objective was, rather, the opposite. The evils were emphasized to show the need for free competition in a deregulated industry. And to be sure, the measures to address these evils are for Congress to determine, but they have to meet the test of constitutional validity. The Court respects the legislative finding that deregulation is the policy answer to the problems. It bears stressing that R.A. 8180 was declared invalid not because deregulation is unconstitutional. The law was struck down because, as crafted, three key provisions plainly encouraged the continued existence if not the proliferation of the constitutionally proscribed evils of monopoly and restraint of trade. In sharp contrast, the present petition lacks a factual foundation specifically highlighting the need to declare the challenged provision unconstitutional. There is a dearth of relevant, reliable, and substantial evidence to support petitioners theory that price control must continue even as Government is trying its best to get out of regulating the oil industry. The facts of the petition are, in the main, a general dissertation on the evils of monopoly. Petitioner overlooks the fact that Congress enacted the deregulation law exactly because of the monopoly evils he mentions in his petition. Congress instituted the lifting of price controls in the belief that free and fair competition was the best remedy against monopoly power. In other words, petitioners facts are also the reasons why Congress lifted

47 price controls and why the President accelerated the process. The facts adduced in favor of continued and indefinite price control are the same facts which supported what Congress believes is an exercise of wisdom and discretion when it chose the path of speedy deregulation and rejected Congressman Garcias economic theory. The petition states that it is using the very thoughts and words of the Court in its Tatad decision. Those thoughts and words, however, were directed against the tariff differential, the inventory requirement, and predatory pricing, not against deregulation as a policy and not against the lifting of price controls. A dramatic, at times expansive and grandiloquent, reiteration of the same background circumstances narrated in Tatad does not squarely sustain petitioners novel thesis that there can be deregulation without lifting price controls. Petitioner may call the industry subject to price controls as deregulated. In enacting the challenged provision, Congress, on the other hand, has declared that any industry whose prices and profits are fixed by government authority remains a highly regulated one. Petitioner, therefore, engages in a legal paradox. He fails to show how there can be deregulation while retaining government price control. Deregulation means the lifting of control, governance and direction through rule or regulation. It means that the regulated industry is freed from the controls, guidance, and restrictions to which it used to be subjected. The use of the word partial to qualify deregulation is sugar-coating. Petitioner is really against deregulation at this time. Petitioner states that price control is good. He claims that it was the regulation of the importation of finished oil products which led to the exit of competitors and the consolidation and dominion of the market by an oligopoly, not price control. Congress and the President think otherwise. The argument that price control is not the villain in the intrusion and growth of monopoly appears to be pure theory not validated by experience. There can be no denying the fact that the evils mentioned in the petition arose while there was price control. The dominance of the so-called Big 3 became entrenched during the regime of price control. More importantly, the ascertainment of the cause and the method of dismantling the oligopoly thus created are a matter of legislative and executive choice. The judicial process is equipped to handle legality but not wisdom of choice and the efficacy of solutions. Petitioner engages in another contradiction when he puts forward what he calls a self-evident truth. He states that a truly competitive market and fair prices cannot be legislated into existence. However, the truly competitive market is not being created or fashioned by the challenged legislation. The market is simply freed from legislative controls and allowed to grow and develop free from government interference. R.A. 8479 actually allows the free play of supply and demand to dictate prices. Petitioner wants a government official or board to continue performing this task. Indefinite and openended price control as advocated by petitioner would be to continue a regime of legislated regulation where free competition cannot possibly flourish. Control is the antithesis of competition. To grant the petition would mean that the Government is not keen on allowing a free market to develop. Petitioners self-evident truth thus supports the validity of the provision of law he opposes. New players in the oil industry intervened in this case. According to them, it is the free market policy and atmosphere of deregulation which attracted and brought the new participants, themselves included, into the market. The intervenors express their fear that this Court would overrule legislative policy and replace it with petitioners own legislative program. The factual allegations of the intervenors have not been refuted and we see no reason to doubt them. Their argument that the co-existence of many viable rivals create free market conditions induces competition in product quality and performance and makes available to consumers an expanded range of choices cannot be seriously disputed. On the other hand, the pleadings of public and private respondents both put forth the argument that the challenged provision is a policy decision of Congress and that the wisdom of the provision is outside the authority of this Court

to consider. We agree. As we have ruled in Morfe v. Mutuc[7]: (I)t is well to remember that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, does not pass upon question or wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. As expressed by Justice Tuason: It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern. There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor: As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary. For they, according to Justice Labrador, are not supposed to override legitimate policy and x x x never inquire into the wisdom of the law. It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be the courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent, on its wisdom cannot be sustained. In this petition, Congressman Garcia seeks to revive the long settled issue of the timeliness of full deregulation, which issue he had earlier submitted to this Court by way of a Partial Motion for Reconsideration in the Tatad case. In our Resolution dated December 3, 1997, which has long become final and executory, we stated: We shall first resolve petitioner Garcias linchpin contention that the full deregulation decreed by R.A. No. 8180 to start at the end of March 1997 is unconstitutional. For prescinding from this premise, petitioner suggests that we simply go back to the transition period, price control will be revived through the automatic pricing mechanism based on Singapore Posted Prices. The Energy Regulatory Board x x x would play a limited and ministerial role of computing the monthly price ceiling of each and every petroleum fuel product, using the automatic pricing formula. While the OPSF would return, this coverage would be limited to monthly price increases in excess of P0.50 per liter. We are not impressed by petitioner Garcias submission. Petitioner has no basis in condemning as unconstitutional per se the date fixed by Congress for the beginning of the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Our Decision merely faulted the Executive for factoring the depletion of OPSF in advancing the date of full deregulation to February 1997. Nonetheless, the error of the Executive is now a nonissue for the full deregulation set by Congress itself at the end of March 1997 has already come to pass. March 1997 is not an arbitrary date. By that date, the transition period has ended and it was expected that the people would have adjusted to the role of market forces in shaping the prices of petroleum and its products. The choice of March 1997 as the date of full deregulation is a judgment of Congress and its judgment call cannot be impugned by this Court.[8] Reduced to its basic arguments, it can be seen that the challenge in this petition is not against the legality of deregulation. Petitioner does not expressly challenge deregulation. The issue, quite simply, is the timeliness or the wisdom of the date when full deregulation should be effective. In this regard, what constitutes reasonable time is not for judicial determination. Reasonable time involves the appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic. They are not within the appropriate range of evidence in a court of justice. It would be an extravagant extension of judicial authority to assert judicial notice as the basis for the determination.[9] We repeat that what petitioner decries as unsuccessful is not a final result. It is only a beginning. The Court is not inclined to stifle deregulation as enacted by Congress from its very start. We leave alone the program of deregulation at this stage. Reasonable time will prove the wisdom or folly of the

48 deregulation program for which Congress and not the Court is accountable. Petitioner argues further that the public interest requires price controls while the oligopoly exists, for that is the only way the public can be protected from monopoly or oligopoly pricing. But is indefinite price control the only feasible and legal way to enforce the constitutional mandate against oligopolies? Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes as a felony the creation of monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, cites provisions of R.A. 8479 intended to prevent competition from being corrupted or manipulated. Section 11, entitled Anti-Trust Safeguards, defines and prohibits cartelization and predatory pricing. It penalizes the persons and officers involved with imprisonment of three (3) to seven (7) years and fines ranging from One million to Two million pesos. For this purpose, a Joint Task Force from the Department of Energy and Department of Justice is created under Section 14 to investigate and order the prosecution of violations. Sections 8 and 9 of the Act, meanwhile, direct the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Industry, and Energy to undertake strategies, incentives and benefits, including international information campaigns, tax holidays and various other agreements and utilizations, to invite and encourage the entry of new participants. Section 6 provides for uniform tariffs at three percent (3%). Section 13 of the Act provides for Remedies, under which the filing of actions by government prosecutors and the investigation of private complaints by the Task Force is provided. Sections 14 and 15 provide how the Department of Energy shall monitor and prevent the occurrence of collusive pricing in the industry. It can be seen, therefore, that instead of the price controls advocated by the petitioner, Congress has enacted anti-trust measures which it believes will promote free and fair competition. Upon the other hand, the disciplined, determined, consistent and faithful execution of the law is the function of the President. As stated by public respondents, the remedy against unreasonable price increases is not the nullification of Section 19 of R.A. 8479 but the setting into motion of its various other provisions. For this Court to declare unconstitutional the key provision around which the laws anti-trust measures are clustered would mean a constitutionally interdicted distrust of the wisdom of Congress and of the determined exercise of executive power. Having decided that deregulation is the policy to follow, Congress and the President have the duty to set up the proper and effective machinery to ensure that it works. This is something which cannot be adjudicated into existence. This Court is only an umpire of last resort whenever the Constitution or a law appears to have been violated. There is no showing of a constitutional violation in this case. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

J.

Sec. 22: Indigenous Cultural Communities SECTION 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development. (See Article VI Section 5(2); Article XII, Section 5; Article XIV, Section 17; See Cruz v. DENR) ART. VI. SECTION 5. (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant,

urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. ART XII. SECTION 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being. ART XIV. SECTION 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies.

CASE: Cruz vs. Secretary, G.R. No. 135385, Dec 6, 2000 FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. ISSUE: Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution? HELD: No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation. Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

K. Sec. 25: Local Autonomy SECTION 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. Local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization” and does not make the local governments sovereign within the State or an imperium in imperio. (Basco v. PAGCOR) Decentralization of administration is merely a delegation of administrative powers to the local government unit in order to broaden the base of governmental powers. In Limbonas v. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786, the Court distinguishedbetween decentralization of administration and decentralization of power. The latter is abdication by the national government of

49 governmental powers; while the former is merely delegation of administrative powers to the local government unit in order to broaden the base of governmental powers.

limitations imposed by law. Section 26 of the Constitution neither bestows such right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right.

In Lina v. Pano, G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001, theSupreme Court said that the basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, Congress retains control of the local government units although in a significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True there are notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on local government units of the power to tax [Sec. 5, Art. X], which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority.

In Pamatong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004, the Supreme Court said that this provision does not bestow a right to seek the Presidency; it does not contain a judicially enforceable constitutional right and merely specifies a guideline for legislative action. The provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many as possible into public office. The privilege may be subjected to limitations. One such valid limitation is the provision of the Omnibus Election Code on nuisance candidates.

Thus, even as we recognize that the Constitution guarantees autonomyto local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of general supervision by the President [Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002]. a)

1.

L.

On the President’s power of general supervision, however, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter had acted contrary to law. The President or any of his alter egos, cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive, therefore, by the President or any of his alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity, because it violates the principle of local autonomy, as well as the doctrine of separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations [Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, supra.]. Read Art. X. Local Government (NOTE: Separately covered by the study of the Local Government Code of 1991)

Sec. 26: Opportunities for Public Service and AntiPolitical Dynasty SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. Purpose. The thrust of the provision is to impose on the state the obligation of guaranteeing equal access to public office. There is no constitutional right to run for or hold public office. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to

CASE: Pamatong vs. COMELEC, GR 161872, 13 April 2004 FACTS: Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. ISSUE: Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office? RULING: No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced. The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found

50 in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create. The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State. The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election. At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.

M. Sec. 27 and 28: Honesty and Integrity in Public Service SECTION 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption. (See Article IX-D; Article XI, Sections 4-15) SECTION 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. (Article III, Section 7; Article VI Sections 12 and 20; Article VII, Section 20; Article XI, Section 17; Article XII, Section 21) It is well established in jurisprudence that neither the right to information nor the policy of full public disclosure is absolute, there being matters which, albeit of public concern or public interest, are recognized as privileged in nature. (Akbayan v. Aquino, 2008) Section 28 is self executory. (Province of North Cotabato v. GRP) Read JPEPA, NERI and NORTH COTABATO cases. 1. 2.

Read Art. XI (Accountability of Public Officers) Read the salient features of the proposed Freedom on Information (FOI) bill

Full Title: "AN ACT IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN GUARANTEED UNDER SECTION TWENTYEIGHT, ARTICLE II AND SECTION SEVEN, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" Short Title: "Freedom Of Information Act Of 2008." Abstract: The bill compels all government officers to comply with requests for information on matters of public concern guaranteed under the Constitution within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of a written request. Date Filed: March 10, 2008 Principal Author: ANGARA, JUAN EDGARDO M. Date Read: March 11, 2008 Date Approved on Second Reading: April 30, 2008 Date Approved on Third Reading: May 12, 2008 Senate Bill Considered in CC: SB 3308 HB 3732 Salient Features - Information provided by Access to Information Network (ATIN) Philippines An expansive scope in terms of government agencies as well as information covered. Express legislative determination that all information in the possession or control of any government agency is of public interest. A clear, uniform and speedy procedure for access to information, including quick and certain period of compliance, and the manner of making, and responding to, requests. (Sec. 9. Procedure of Access) A proscription against excessive costs of access to information. A system of accessible and speedy remedies that a citizen who has been denied access to information may resort to. A mandate to promote a culture of openness within government, and to enhance not only the physical accessibility of information, but its understandability by the general public as well. (a) Duty to Publish Information (b) Keeping of Records (c) Accessibility of Language and Form (d) Improving Capability Presumption - There shall be a legal presumption in favor of access to information. Accordingly, the government shall have the burden of proof of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the information requested should not be disclosed. Mandatory disclosure: all government agencies shall post all the steps, negotiations and key government positions pertaining to

51 definite propositions of the government, as well as the contents of the contract, agreement or treaty in the following transactions involving public interest. Clear administrative, criminal and civil liability for violation of the right to information.

SEPARATION OF POWERS I.

In the Constitution A. The major departments (Art. VI, VII, and VIII) B. The constitutional commissions (Art. IX) C. The other independent bodies {e.g. the Electoral Tribunals [Sec. 17, Art. VI and Sec. 4 (last par), Art. VII]; the Commission on Appointments (Sec. 18, Art. VI); the Judicial and Bar Council (Sec. 8, Art. VIII)}

II.

Manner of Conferment of Power A. Express 1. Legislative power to Congress (Sec. 1, Art. VI) 2. Executive power to the President (Sec. Art. VII) 3. Judicial power to the SC and the lower courts (Sec. 1, Art. VIII) 4. Others (e.g. powers of the independent constitutional bodies) B. Implied 1. Doctrine of Necessary Implication: the grant of express power carries with it the grant of other powers that can be reasonably inferred therefrom 2. Examples i. Power to promulgate rules of procedure by the Electoral Tribunals (incident to the power to decide election contests) CASE: 61 - Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 ii. Power to punish for contempt by the legislature (incident to the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation) CASE: 62 - Arnault vs. Nazareno, 87 Phil 29 C. Inherent or incidental CASES: 63 - In re Dick, 38 Phil 41 64 - In re Sotto, 82 Phil 595

III.

Corollary Concepts A. Blending (Overlap) of Powers CASE: 65 - Springer vs. Philippine Islands, 277 US 189 B. Checks and Balances a. Lawmaking by Congress, veto by the President, override of the veto by the Congress (Sec. 27, Art. VI) b. Grant of amnesty by the president, concurrence by the Congress (Sec. 19, Art. VI) c. Entry into treaty by the president, concurrence by the Senate (Sec. 20, Art. VII) d. Conviction by the judiciary, pardon by the President (Sec. 19, Art. VIII) e. Jurisdiction of the SC and the lower courts may be reduced by the Congress (Sec. 2, Art. VIII) f. Congress may abolish lower courts (Sec. 1 and 2, Art. VIII) CASES: 66 - Ocampo vs. Secretary, L-7918, Jan 18, 1955 67 - De la Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 C. Delegation of Powers 1. General Rule: potestas delegata non delegari potest 2. Exception: instances of permissible delegation

a.

Tariff powers to the president [Sec. 28 (2), Art. VI] b. Emergency powers to the president [Sec 23 (2), Art. VI] CASES: 68 - Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil 368 69 - Rodriguez vs. Gella, 92 Phil 603 c. Legislative power to the people at large: System on initiative and referendum (Sec. 32, Art. VI) d. Legislative power to the local government units (LGUs) (See Sec. 16 and 19 of RA 7160) e. Legislative power to administrative bodies (power of subordinate legislation) 3. Tests of valid delegation: Completeness test and sufficient standard test CASES: 70 - US vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1 71 - Pp. vs. Rosenthal, 68 Phil 328 (“public interest”) 72 - Cervantes vs. Auditor General, 91 Phil 359(“simplicity, economy, efficiency”) 73 - Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil 726(“public welfare) 74 - Hirabayashi vs. US, 320 SCRA 99 75 - Pp vs. Vera, 65 Phil 56 76 - Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 77 - Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 D. Role of the Judiciary in the scheme of separation of powers (Sec. 1, Art. VIII) CASE: 78 - Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 1. Supremacy of the Constitution, not its own: upheld by the judiciary 2. Justiciable and Political Questions CASES: 79 - Tanada vs. Cuenco, 100 Phil 1101 80 - Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 81 - Daza vs. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 82 - Tanada vs. Angara, GR No. 118295, May 2, 1997 83 - Aytona vs. Castillo, 4 SCRA 1 84 - Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 33 85 - Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil 83 86 - Osmena vs. Pendatun, 109 Phil 863 87 - Vera vs. Avelino, 77 SCRA 192 88 - Phil. Bar Association vs. COMELEC, GR No. 72915, Dec. 20, 1985 89 - De Castro vs. Committee on Justice, GR No. 71688, Sept 10, 1985 90 - Romulo vs. Iniguez, 141 SCRA 263 91 - Avelino vs. Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 92 - MERALCO vs. Pasay Trans., Co., 57 Phil 825 93 - Endencia vs. David, GR No. L-6455, Aug 31, 1953 3. Expanded jurisdiction of the judiciary under the 1987 Constitution [sec. 1 (2nd par.), Art. VIII] a. Now includes determination of WON there had been GAD amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government b. Other specific instances i. Determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis of Martial Law (Sec. 18, Art. VII) ii. Formerly a political question CASE: 94 - Aquino vs. Enrile, L35546, September 17, 1974

52 ART. VI: THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT N. Powers in general A. Express 1. Plenary legislative power (Sec. 1, Art. VI) 2. Non-Legislative Power a. Canvass of presidential elections (Sec. 5, Art. VII) b. Declaration of the existence of State of War [Sec. 23 (2), Art. VII] c. Confirmation of presidential grant of amnesty (Sec. 19, Art. VII) d. Confirmation of presidential appointees (Sec. 6, Art. VII) e. Amendments to and revision of the constitution (Art. XVII) f. Impeachment (Sec. 3, Art. XI) B. Implied (e.g. power to punish for contempt during legislative investigations) C. Inherent (e.g. determination of rules of proceedings; discipline of members; exercise of the inherent powers of police power, taxation, and eminent domain) II.

Composition A. Senate (Sec. 2, Art. VI) B. House of Representatives (Sec. 5, Art. VI) 1. District representatives 2. Party-list representatives

III. Qualifications of Members (Sec. 3 and 6, Art. VI) A. Natural-born citizen (See definition in Sec. Sec. 2, Art. IV) B. Age C. Residence CASES: 95 - Marcos vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 96 - Aquino vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400 D. Additional qualifications not allowed CASE: 97 - Pimentel vs. COMELEC, etc., GR No. 161658, November 3, 2008 IV. Term of Office of the Members (Sec. 4, Art. VI, in relation to Sec. 2, Art. XVIII; Sec. 7, Art. VI) V. Elections of members of Congress under the 1987 Constitution A. 1st Elections: 2nd Monday, May ’87 (Sec. 1, Art. XVIII) B. 2nd Elections: 2nd Monday, May ’92 (Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) C. Succeeding regular elections: 3-year interval, every 2nd Monday of May, unless otherwise provided by law (Sec. 8, Art. VI) D. Special elections (Sec. 9, Art. VI) VI. Salaries/Accounts of Members (Sec. 10 and 20, Art. VI) VII. Parliamentary Immunities of the Members (Sec. 11 Art. VI) A. Privilege from arrest B. Privilege of speech and debate 1. Requisites a. Remarks made while Legislature or committee thereof is functioning b. Remarks made in connection with the discharge of official functions CASE: 98 - Jimenez vs. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876 c. Significance of the phrase “in any other place” CASE: 99 - Osmena vs. Pendatun, supra VIII. Conflict of Interest (Sec. 12, Art. VI)

IX. Incompatible and Forbidden Offices (Sec. 13, Art. VI) CASE: 100 - Adaza vs. Pacana, 135 SCRA 431 X. Inhibitions and Disqualifications (sec. 14, Art. VI) CASE: 101 - Puyat vs. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 33 XI. Sessions (Sec. 15, Art. VI; See also Sec. 4 and 10, Art. VII) XII. Officers [Sec. 16 (1), Art. VI] XIII.

Quorum [Sec. 16 (2), Art. VI] CASE: 102 - Avelino vs. Cuenco, supra

XIV. Discipline of Members [Sec. 16 (3), Art. VI] CASE: 103 - Alejandrino vs. Quezon, supra XV.

Journals [Sec. 16 (4), Art. VI] CASES: 104 - US vs. Pons, 34 Phil 729 105 - Arroyo vs. de Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 106 - Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1 A. Enrolled Bill doctrine CASES: 107 - Casco vs. Jimenez, 7 SCRA 374 108 - Tolentino vs. Secretary, 235 SCRA 630 Phil Judges Association vs. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 B. Exception CASE: 109 - Astorga vs. Villegas, G.R. No. L23475, April 30, 1974

XVI. Adjournment (Sec. 15, Art. VI) XVII. The Electoral Tribunals (Sec. 17, Art. VI) A. When constituted: See also Sec. 19, Art. VI B. BOTH legislative (political) and judicial component: required CASE: 110 - Abbas vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 166 SCRA 51 C. Exclusive right to promulgate its own rules of procedure CASE: 111 - Lazatin vs. HRET, 168 SCRA 391 D. Generally: No appeal of decisions of Electoral Tribunals E. Expulsion of its members CASE: 112 - Bondoc vs. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 XVIII. Commission on Appointments (Sec. 19, Art. VI; See also Sec. 16, Art. VII) A. When constituted B. Meetings: only while Congress is in session 1. Effect of by-passing ad interim presidential appointments C. Effect of political realignments in the House CASE: 113 - Daza vs. Singson, supra XIX.Specific powers of Congress A. Power to enact statutes 1. Origin of laws (Sec. 24, Art. VI) 2. Prohibited measures a. Law granting title of royalty or nobility (Sec. 31, Art. VI) b. Law increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC without its consent, Sec. 30, Art. VI) c. Law impairing the obligation of contracts (Sec. 10, Art. III) d. Ex post facto law or bill of attainder (Sec. 22, Art. III) 3. Title of bills [Sec. 26 (1), Art. VI] a. One title, one subject rule CASES: 114 - Lidasan vs. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496

53 115 - Philconsa vs. Jimenez, 15 SCRA 479 116 - Tobias vs. Abalos, GR 114783, Dec. 8, 1994 Facts: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative district. The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate district. Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts increased the members of the House of Representative beyond that provided by the Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the minimum population requirement was attained. Issue: (1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule? (2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of rep? (3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional requirement? Rulings: The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards to the first contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical consequence. In addition, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of representatives, the provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law”. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional. With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the requirements were not met, the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative district The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

4.

Formalities of the enactment process [Sec. 26 (2), Art. VI]

a.

b.

Rule: 3 readings on separate days; distribution of printed copies in its final form 3 days before passage Exception: presidential certification of the necessity of its immediate enactment CASE:117 - Tolentino vs, Secretary, supra FACTS: The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) contends that the imposition of VAT on sales and leases by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision of “non-impairment of contracts.” ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional on ground that it violates the contract clause under Art. III, sec 10 of the Bill of Rights. RULING: No. The Supreme Court the contention of CREBA, that the imposition of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision of non-impairment of contracts, is only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical. It is enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State's power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration. Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and the Court does not understand it to make this claim. Rather, its position, as discussed above, is that the removal of its tax exemption cannot be made by a general, but only by a specific, law. Further, the Supreme Court held the validity of Republic Act No. 7716 in its formal and substantive aspects as this has been raised in the various cases before it. To sum up, the Court holds: (1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with by Congress in the enactment of the statute; (2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes beyond those prescribed by the Constitution have been observed is precluded by the principle of separation of powers; (3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor interfere with the free exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to an education; and

54 (4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law is regressive, oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected under the Contract Clause are prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of prospective relief by writ of prohibition. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

5.

Approval of bills [Sec. 27 (1)] a. Methods by which a bill becomes a law i. President signs it ii. President vetoes the bill, but Congress overrides the veto 1. Rule: no partial veto 2. Exception: partial veto of an item/s in an appropriations, revenue or tariff bill 3. Exception to the exception: no partial veto on a condition attached to an approved item CASE:118 - Bolinao Electronics vs. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 FACTS: Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own television (channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines. They were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for operating even after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBN’s continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused damages to his department. ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages. HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated by the refusal of CBN to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures made by Valencia’s department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot claim damages there from. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill. Note: This ruling, that the executive’s veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.

iii.

President allows the bill to lapse into a law by not acting on it within 30 days

B. Power of Legislative Inquiry; Question Hour in pursuit of congressional oversight function (Sec. 21 and 22, Art. VI) SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session. CASES: 119 - Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 Facts: Senator Enrile asks the Senate to look into the matter of the alleged acquisition of the Lopa Group of the properties of Kokoy Romualdez which is a subject of sequestration by the PCGG. Senator Enrile citing probable violations of Republic Act No. 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5. The petitioners representing Ricardo Lopa who passed away prior the decision of the court issued this petition for prohibition and an issuance a temporary restraining order and/or injuctive relief enjoin the Blue Ribbon committee of compelling them to appear before them. Issues: Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that: (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process. Ruling: The Supreme court granted the petition. The committee investigation wanted by Senator Enrile is not in aid of a legislation, therefore is violative of the separation of powers between the Senate or Congress and that Judiciary. The pending civil case of the petitioners under Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan is where these issues by the Senate should be discussed. Saying further that the power of the Senate and Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation is not absolute or without limitation.

120 - Senate vs. Ermita, GR 169777, April 20, 2006 FACTS: In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they

55 were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s approval. The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws. ISSUES: 1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress; 2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and HELD: That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public decision-making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation is not disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information that is crucial to law-making. Verily, the Senate, including its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators. In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna), Teodoro Casino (Bayan Muna), Joel Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis), Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis), and Liza Maza (Gabriela) are allowed to sue to question the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the absence of any claim that an investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464 notwithstanding, it being sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws. The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets the standing requirement as it obtained three seats in the House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and is, therefore, entitled to participate in the legislative process consonant with the declared policy underlying the party list system of affording citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties who lack well-defined political constituencies to contribute to the formulation and enactment of legislation that will benefit the nation. As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al. have the standing to file their petitions, passing on the standing of their co-petitioners Courage and Codal is rendered unnecessary. In filing their respective petitions, Chavez, the ALG which claims to be an organization of citizens, and the incumbent members of the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP in behalf of its lawyer members, invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, asserting that the right to information, curtailed and violated by E.O. 464, is essential to the effective exercise of other constitutional rights and to the maintenance of the balance of power among the three branches of the government through the principle of checks and balances.

It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and personal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives, this Court held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is clothed with legal standing in view of the transcendental issues raised in its petition which this Court needs to resolve in order to avert a constitutional crisis. For it to be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance, however, it must establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. The first and last determinants not being present as no public funds or assets are involved and petitioners in G.R. Nos. 169777 and 169659 have direct and specific interests in the resolution of the controversy, petitioner PDP-Laban is bereft of standing to file its petition. Its allegation that E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda is vague and uncertain, and at best is only a "generalized interest" which it shares with the rest of the political parties. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. In fine, PDP-Laban’s alleged interest as a political party does not suffice to clothe it with legal standing. ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY The Court finds respondents’ assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of an actual case or controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is concerned. For E.O. 464 does not require either a deliberate withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the President in order to bar officials from appearing before Congress. As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials invited to the hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for any further event before considering the present case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain from passing on the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

121 - Neri vs. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008 Facts: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vsErmita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent

56 committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. Issue: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege? Ruling: The communications are covered by executive privilege. The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others. Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege: 1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.” 2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President. 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations. Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege. The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law

Notes:

Executive Privilege. It has been defined as “the right of the President and high-level executive branch officials to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately, the public”. Thus, presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings, like the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either House of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government [Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006], The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of the inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as in the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others [Neri v. Senate Committees, G.R. No. 180843, March 25, 2008], i) However, the privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information (in this case to Congress), the necessity for withholding the information must be of such a high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President (and to the Executive Secretary, by order of the President) the power to invoke the privilege [Senate v. Ermita, supra.]. ii) In Neri, a majority of the members of the Supreme Court upheld the refusal of the petitioner to answer the three questions asked during the Senate inquiry because the information sought by the three questions are properly covered by the presidential communications privilege, and executive privilege w,as validly claimed by the President, through the Executive Secretary. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and nondelegable power” (the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries) of the President; second, the communications were received by a close advisor of the President, Secretary Neri being a member of the Cabinet and by virtue of the “proximity test”, he is covered by executive privilege; and third, there was no adequate showing by the respondents of the compelling need for the information as to justify the limitation of the privilege, nor was there a showing of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

C. Power of Appropriation (Sec. 25 and 29, Art. VI) Power of Appropriation. In Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, supra., on the issue of whether the power given to members of Congress (under the 1994 GM) to propose and identify the projects to be funded by the Countrywide Development Fund was an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, the Supreme Court stated: The spending power, called the “power of the purse”, belongs to Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President. While it is the President who proposes the budget, still, the final say on the matter of appropriation is lodged in Congress. The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be. a) Need for appropriation. [Sec. 29 (1), Art. VI: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”] In Comelec v. Judge Quijano-Padilla and Photokina Marketing, G.R. No. 151992, September 18, 2002, the Supreme Court said that the existence of appropriations and the availability of funds are indispensable requisites to, or conditions sine qua non for, the execution of government contracts. The import of the constitutional requirement for an appropriation is

57 to require the various agencies to limit their expenditure within the appropriations made by law for each fiscal year. In this case, since the bid of Phokokina (P6.588B) was way beyond the amount appropriated by law (P1B) or funds certified to tbe available (P1.2B), there is no way the Comelec should enter into the contract. The Bids and Awards Committee of the Comelec should have rejected the bid of Photokina for being excessive.

for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. ii) The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.

b) Appropriation law, defined. A statute the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the Treasury.

iii) No provision or enactment shall be embraced unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. This is intended to prevent riders, or irrelevant provisions included in the bill to ensure its approval. See Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 520.

c) Classification: i) General appropriation law: passed annually, intended to provide for the financial operations of the entire government during one fiscal period.

iv) Procedure for approving appropriations for Congress shallstnctly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies. This is intended to prevent sub rosa appropriation by Congress.

ii) Special appropriation law: designed for a specific purpose.

v) Prohibition against transfer of appropriations. [Sec. 25 (5)-Wo law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations- however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriation law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. ”] See Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 209, on the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of P.D. 1177.

d) Implied [extra-constitutional] limitations on appropriation measures: i) Appropriation must be devoted to a public purpose. See Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 110 Phil 331. ii) The sum authorized to be released must be determinate, or at least determinable. See Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221, where the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service under the 1990 General Appropriations Act. According to the Court, the legislative intent in R.A. 4860, Sec. 31, P.D. 1177, and P.D. 1967, is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credit, indebtedness x x x when they become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises, x x x Although the decrees do not state the specific amounts to be paid x x x the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees x x x The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges x x x when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books in the Treasury. e) Constitutional limitations on special appropriation measures: i) Must specify the public purpose for which the sum is intended . ii) Must be supported by funds actually available as certified to by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal included therein [Sec. 25(4), Art. VI]. f) Constitutional mles on general appropriations law [Sec. 25, Art. VI]: i) Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President

v.a.) On the constitutionality of a Special Provision in the 1994 GAA which allows a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operation expenses to any other expense category, the Supreme Court, in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, supra., said that the members of Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of savings in the allotments for their operational expenses, because they are in the best position to do so, being knowledgeable of the savings available in some items of the operational expenses, and which items need augmentation However it is the Senate President or the Speaker of the House of Representatives,’ as the case may be, who shall approve the realignment. Hence, the special provision adverted to is not unconstitutional. v.b.) ln the same case, the Supreme Court upheld the Presidential veto of a provision (in the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund, 1994 GAA) which authorized the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund, on the ground that under Sec. 25 (5), Art VI such right must and can be exercised only by the President of the Philippines vi) Prohibition against appropriations for sectarian benefit [Sec 29(2), Art. VI: No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary, as such except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanaqe or leprosarium”]. See Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 SCRA

58 201; Garces v Estenzo 104 SCRA 510. In Manosca v. Court of Appeals, supra., the expropriation of the birthplace of Felix Manalo, founder of Iglesia ni Cristo, was deemed not violative of the provision. The Supreme Court said that the attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true, but such peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. vii) Automatic reappropriation [Sec. 25 (7), Art. VI: “If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress’].. g) Impoundment. The refusal by the President for whatever reason to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type [Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra.]. This power of the President is derived from Sec. 38 of the Administrative Code of 1987 on suspension. h) Appropriation reserves. Sec. 37 of the Administrative Code authorizes the Budget Secretary to establish reserves against appropriations to provide for contingencies and emergencies which may arise during the year. This is merely expenditure deferral, not suspension, since the agencies concerned can still draw on the reserves if the fiscal outlook improves. 1. 2.

Appropriation defined Limitations of Congressional power of appropriation a. Implied: public purpose; sum must be determinate or at least determinable b. Express i. Originates in House of Representatives (Sec. 24, Art. VI) CASES: 122 - Tolentino vs. Secretary, supra 123 - Abakada Guro vs. Ermita, GR No. 168056, Sept 1, 2005 (decision); Oct 18, 2005 (resolution of MR) Facts: Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, ABAKADA Guro party List Officer and et al.,insist that the bicameral conference committee should not even have acted on the no pass-on provisions since there is no disagreement between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, with regard to the no pass-on provision for the sale of service for power generation because both the Senate and the House were in agreement that the VAT burden for the sale of such service shall not be passed on to the end-consumer. As to the no pass-on provision for sale of petroleum products, petitioners argue that the fact that the presence of such a no pass-on provision in the House version and the absence thereof in the Senate Bill

means there is no conflict because ³a House provision cannot be in conflict with something that does not exist.´Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act No. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills under Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution when the Senate introduced amendments not connected with VAT. Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that R.A. No. 9337¶s stand- by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. They submit that the recommendatory power given to the Secretary of Finance in regard to the occurrence of either of two events using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark necessarily and inherently required extended analysis and evaluation, as well as policy making. Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a property right. Petitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input VAT is merely a statutory privilege, it has already evolved into a vested right that the State cannot remove. Issue: Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the Vat Reform Act is constitutional? Held: Yes. The R.A No. 9337 is constitutional. The Court is not persuaded. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution provides that All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. In the same breath, the Court reiterates its finding that it is not a property or a property right, and a VAT-registered persons entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege. As the Court stated in its Decision, the right to credit the input tax is a mere creation of law. More importantly, the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9337 already involve legislative policy and wisdom. So long as there is a public end for which R.A. No. 9337 was passed, the means through which such end shall be accomplished is for the legislature to choose so long as it is within constitutional bounds. The Motions for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court is LIFTED Therefore, the R.A No. 9337 is Constitutional.

ii. Recommendations of the president in the General Appropriations Act: mat not be increased by Congress [Sec. 25 (1)], but may be

59 decreased, EXCEPT the budget for judiciary (Sec. 3, Art. VIII) iii. Prohibition on riders [Sec. 25(2)] CASE: 124 - Garcia vs. Mata, 65 SCRA 520 Facts: The donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void. Issue: Whether RA 1600 is valid. Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill? Held: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the operation of government while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP. Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA. It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void, inoperative and without effect. SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

3.

4. 5.

iv. Approval of appropriations for Congress: follow procedure for other departments [Sec. 25 (3), Art. VI] v. Specify purpose of special appropriations [Sec 25 (4), ART. VI] vi. No transfer of appropriations; Exception [Sec. 25 (5), Art. VI] vii. Public purpose of discretionary funds [Sec. 25 (6), Art. VI] Appropriations for sectarian purposes [Sec. 29 (2), Art. VI] a. Read also Sec. 5, Art. III (on freedom of religion); and Sec. 6, Art. II (on separation of church and state) CASES: 125 - Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil 20 *If Sectarian individual is administering for the government then it does not violate Sec 29 (2). 126 - Garces vs. Estenzo, 105 SCRA 510 Automatic re-appropriation [Sec. 25 (7), ART. VI] Special funds [Sec. 29 (3), Art. VI]

D. Power of Taxation [Sec. 28 (1), (3), and (4), Art. VI]

a) Limitations: i) Rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. ii) Charitable institutions, etc., and all lands, building and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation [Sec. 28(3), Art. VI]. See Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 14 SCRA 292; Province of Abra v. Hernando, 107 SCRA 104. iii) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties [Sec. 4(3), Art. XIV]. See Abra Valley College v. Aquino, 162 SCRA 106. iv) Law granting tax exemption shall be passed only with the concurrence of the majority of all the members of Congress [Sec. 29(4), Art. VI]. 1.

General rule in taxation [Sec. 28 (1)] SECTION 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.

2.

Exemptions granted to religious, charitable, and educational institutions [Sec. 28 (3)] SECTION 28 (3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. CASES: 127 - Lladoc vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 14 SCRA 292 Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated P10,000 in cash to the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental; the amount spent for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality, as intended. In1958, MB Estate filed the donor’s gift tax return. In 1960, the Commissioner issued an assessment for donee’s gift tax against the parish. The priest lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof. Issue: Whether the Catholic Parish is tax exempt. Held: The phrase “exempt from taxation” should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties as property taxes as contradistinguished from excise taxes. A donee’s gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. It does not rest upon general ownership, but an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. The imposition of such excise tax on property used for religious purpose do not constitute an impairment of the Constitution. The tax exemption of the parish, thus, does not extend to excise taxes.

60 Notes: In relation to real property taxes

128 - Lung Center vs. Quezon City, GR No. 144104, June 29, 2004 FACTS: Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No. 1823, seeks exemption from real property taxes when the City Assessor issued Tax Declarations for the land and the hospital building. Petitioner predicted on its claim that it is a charitable institution. The request was denied, and a petition hereafter filed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA) for reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor. Petitioner alleged that as a charitable institution, is exempted from real property taxes under Sec 28(3) Art VI of the Constitution. QC-LBAA dismissed the petition and the decision was likewise affirmed on appeal by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the CBAA. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of PD 1823 and the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and Section 234(b) of RA 7160. 2. Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real property taxes. RULING: 1. Yes. The Court hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. Under PD 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation which, subject to the provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the Office of the President with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Human Settlements. The purpose for which it was created was to render medical services to the public in general including those who are poor and also the rich, and become a subject of charity. Under PD 1823, petitioner is entitled to receive donations, even if the gift or donation is in the form of subsidies granted by the government. 2. Partly No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon. The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the property taxes only. This provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA 7160.which provides that in order to be entitled to the exemption, the lung center must be able to prove that: it is a charitable institution and; its real properties are actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purpose. Accordingly, the portions occupied by the hospital used for its patients are exempt from real property taxes while those leased to private entities are not exempt from such taxes.

3.

Legislative grant of tax exemptions: needs concurrence of (absolute) majority of Congress [Sec. 28 (4)]

E. Power of Concurrence 1. To a grant of amnesty by the President (Sec. 19, Art. VII) 2. To a treaty or international agreement entered into by the President (Sec. 21, Art. VII) F.

The War Powers [Sec. 23 (1), Art. VI]