Pil-mikes-march-15-2019.docx

G.R. No. L-5731 June 22, 1954 HERBERT BROWNELL, JR., as Attorney General of the United States, petitioner-appellee, vs. SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA, respondent-appellant.

G.R. No. 17958

February 27, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.

FACTS It is evident, therefore, that the consent of the Philippine Government to the application of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 to the Philippines after independence was given, not only by the Executive Department of the Philippines Government, but also by the Congress, which enacted the laws that would implement or carry out the benefits accruing from the operation of the United States law. The respondent-appellant, however, contends that the operation of the law after independence could not have actually taken, or may not take place, because both Republic Act No. 8 and Republic Act No. 477 do not contain any specific provision whereby the Philippine Property Act of 1946 or its provisions is made applicable to the Philippines. It is also contended that in the absence of such express provision in any of the laws passed by the Philippine Congress, said Philippine Property Act of 1946 does not form part of our laws and is not binding upon the courts and inhabitants of the country.

ISSUE WON The Philippine Property Act of 1946 is part of the law of the land after independence

On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape. Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy

WON the CFI has jurisdiction

it must be stated that the consent of a Senate to the operation of a foreign law within its territory does not need to be express; it is enough that said consent be implied from its conduct or from that of its authorized officers.

WON the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force

G.R. No. L-554 April 9, 1948 HAW PIA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, defendantappellee.

This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by George L. Tubb and Wesley Tedrow, citizens of the United States but residents of the Philippines, under written contract of employment with the Army of the United States. It appears that sometime between January 13, 1947, as appearing in the "charge sheet" submitted by respondent, the herein petitioners were apprehended by the authorities of the United States Army and have since been held in custody. On January 28, 1947, petitioners were formally charged by said authorities with violations of Articles of War regarding misappropriation of United States Government property destined for military use, said acts having been committed within premises occupied by the United States Army under lease contracts. Petitioners now come before this Court alleging that they are being unlawfully deprived of their liberty and that Philippine courts have exclusive jurisdiction over their arrest, confinement and imprisonment because (1) they are not persons subject to military laws, (2) martial law is no longer enforced. Plaintiff-appellant’s indebtedness to the defendant-appellee China Banking Corporation in the sum of P5,103.35 by way of overdraft in current account payable on demand together with its interests, has been completely paid, on different occasions to the defendant Bank China Banking Corporation through the defendant Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., that was appointed by the Japanese Military authorities as liquidator of the China Banking Corporation. The trial court held that, as there was no evidence presented to show that the defendant Bank had authorized the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., to accept the payment of the plaintiff’s debt to the said defendant, and said Bank of Taiwan, as an agency of the Japanese invading army, was not authorized under the international law to liquidate the business of the China Banking Corporation, the payment has not extinguished the indebtedness of the plaintiff to the said defendant under Article 1162 of the Civil Code.

In the case at bar, our ratification of or concurrence to the agreement for the extension of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 is clearly implied from the acts of the President of the Philippines and of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, as well as by the enactment of Republic Acts Nos. 7, 8, and 477. 1. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. 2.

laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed.

ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua. U.S. Crim. Code.: whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.

A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. G.R. No. L-1325 April 7, 1947 GEORGE L. TUBB and WESLEY TEDROW, petitioners, vs. THOMAS E. GRIESS, respondent.

RULING/DISCUSSION There is no question that a foreign law may have extraterritorial effect in a country other than the country of origin, provided the latter, in which it is sought to be made operative, gives its consent thereto (express or implied)

WON US has jurisdiction

By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." It is a settled principle of International Law that a foreign army allowed to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. this principle has been consistently embodied in treaties of military character among friendly nations and has been accepted by all the countries of the world. The most authoritative writers on International Law firmly concur in this rule. petitioners who belong to the military personnel of that army are charged with violations of Articles of War for offenses committed in areas under the control of the United States Army, thereby giving said army jurisdiction over their person and the offenses charged, petition is dismissed,

Whether or not the Japanese Military Administration had authority to order the liquidation or winding up of the business of defendant-appellee China Banking Corporation, and to appoint the Bank of Taiwan liquidator authorized as such to accept the payment by the plaintiff-appellant to said defendant-appellee

YES. The Japanese military authorities had power, under the international law, to order the liquidation of the China Banking Corporation and to appoint and authorize the Bank of Taiwan as liquidator to accept the payment in question, because such liquidation is not confiscation of the properties of the bank appellee, but a mere sequestration of its assets which required the liquidation or winding up of the business of said bank. The sequestration or liquidation of enemy banks in occupied territories is authorized expressly by the United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs F.M. 2710 OPNAV 50-E-3.

Maximo HILAO, Class Plaintiffs, PlaintiffAppellee, v. ESTATE OF Ferdinand MARCOS, Defendant-Appellant. No. 95-15779.

G.R. No. 108813 December 15, 1994 JUSMAG PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division) and FLORENCIO SACRAMENTO, Union President, JPFCEA, respondents.

This is a class suit civil case for damages for torture, summary execution, disappearances and illegal detention of over 9,539 Filipino complainants, filed before the United States courts in April 1986. It was anchored upon the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) of 1789 which statute allowed damage suits against foreign entities who have taken refuge in US soil for crimes committed elsewhere. As the Marcos family had fled to Hawaii upon the victory of the EDSA Revolution, the Federal District Court of Hawaii assumed jurisdiction over their persons. Upon the death of Marcos in 1989, his estate was substituted as defendant.

WON Marcos liable

The principle of “command responsibility” that holds a superior responsible for the actions of subordinates appears to be well accepted in U.S. and international law in connection with acts committed in wartime, The United States has moved toward recognizing similar “command responsibility” for torture that occurs in peacetime, perhaps because the goal of international law regarding the treatment of noncombatants in wartime – “to protect civilian populations and prisoners from brutality” -is similar to the goal of international human rights law. Torture Victim Protection Act: A higher official need not have personally performed or ordered the abuses in order to be held liable. Under international law, responsibility for torture, summary execution, or disappearances extends beyond the person or persons who actually committed those acts--anyone with higher authority who authorized, tolerated or knowingly ignored those acts is liable for them. it is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated March 21, 1947. Hence, we agree with petitioner that the suit is, in effect, one against the United States Government, albeit it was not impleaded in the complaint. Considering that the United States has not waived or consented to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot not prosper.

Private respondent was one of the seventy-four (74) security assistance support personnel (SASP) working at JUSMAG-Philippines. 1 He had been with JUSMAG from December 18, 1969, until his dismissal on April 27, 1992. When dismissed, he held the position of Illustrator 2 and was the incumbent President of JUSMAG PHILIPPINES-FILIPINO CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (JPFCEA), a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. His services were terminated allegedly due to the abolition of his position.2He was also advised that he was under administrative leave until April 27, 1992, although the same was not charged against his leave. On March 31, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Employment on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from service by JUSMAG. 3 He asked for his reinstatement. JUSMAG then filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of the United States. It further alleged lack of employer-employee relationship and that it has no juridical personality to sue and be sued

Immunity of State from suit is one of these universally recognized principles. In international law, "immunity" is commonly understood as an exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. 16 This is anchored on the principle of the sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal has no power over an equal). As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities ( jure imperii). 22 The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts ( jure gestionis). We also hold that there appears to be no basis for public respondent to rule that JUSMAG is stopped from denying the existence of employer-employee relationship with private respondent. He deserves a more compassionate treatment. Unfortunately, JUSMAG is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court

G.R. No. 79253

March 1, 1993

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and MAXINE BRADFORD, petitioners, vs. HON. LUIS R. REYES, as Presiding Judge of Branch 22, Regional Trial Court of Cavite, and NELIA T. MONTOYA, respondents. G.R. No. 74135 May 28, 1992 M. H. WYLIE and CAPT. JAMES WILLIAMS, petitioners, vs. AURORA I. RARANG and THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

M. H. Wylie, in his capacity as assistant administrative officer of the U.S. Naval Station supervised the publication of the "Plan of the Day" (POD) which was published daily by the US Naval Base station. The POD featured important announcements, necessary precautions, and general matters of interest to military personnel. One of the regular features of the POD was the "action line inquiry." On February 3, 1978, the POD published:

WON American naval officers who commit a crime or tortious act while discharging official functions still covered by the principle of state immunity from suit

‘This is not to mention "Auring" who is in herself, a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal. ‘

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. the POD as part of their official functions. As a rule, public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith.

The private respondent then commenced an action for damages for defamation and libel. The subject article in the US Newsletter POD dated February 3, 1978 mentions a certain "Auring" as ". . a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal."

In response to the complaint, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss anchored on three grounds:

G.R. No. L-35645

May 22, 1985

1. immune from suit; 2. cannot be sued without its consent 3. lack of jurisdiction the United States invited the submission of bids for the projects

Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent.

WON USA can be sued

State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER, petitioners, vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.

Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the United States two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. In its complaint, the company alleges that the United States had accepted its bids because "A request to confirm a price proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid pursuant to defendant United States' bidding practices."

In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. MAKASIAR, J., dissenting: The petition should be dismissed.

In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by Wilham I. Collins, Director, The letter said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating.

G.R. No. L-11786

the company sued the United States of America for specific performance and damages. plaintiff and defendant entered contract for stevedoring service at the U.S. Naval Base.

September 26, 1958

HARRY LYONS, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (651 United States Naval Supply Depot, U.S. Navy, Philippines), defendant-appellee. [G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000] JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

vs.

DECISION

Cited Lyons vs. the United States of America

WON USA can be sued

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation.

First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFAs determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.

the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases.

[G.R. No. 142396. February 11, 2003] KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents.

Sometime in May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise also known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher.

WON Respondent has diplomatic immunity

The criminal charge followed a buy-bust operation conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to have been seized.

The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the buy-bust operation conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest.

Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Manila for damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the Philippines is a signatory, grants him absolute immunity from suit, describing his functions as an agent of the United States Drugs Enforcement Agency as conducting surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed to be the source of prohibited drugs being shipped to the U.S., (and) having ascertained the target, (he then) would inform the Philippine narcotic agents (to) make the actual arrest."

November 29, 1972

THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION and DR. LEONCE VERSTUYFT, petitioners, vs. HON. BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Rizal, MAJOR WILFREDO CRUZ, MAJOR ANTONIO G.

Dr. Leonce Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the Host Agreement executed on July 22, 1951 between the Philippine Government and the World Health Organization. When petitioner Verstuyft's personal effects contained in twelve (12) crates entered the Philippines, they were accordingly allowed free entry from duties and taxes.

under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.[5] As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty. if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature.

Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision acquitting the two accused.

G.R. No. L-35131

when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a private person the state can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level of an individual from which it can be implied that it has given its consent to be sued under the contract.

WON the Judge can determine diplomatic immunity

this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, 8 and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction.

RELLEVE, and CAPTAIN PEDRO S. NAVARRO of the Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC), respondents.

Respondent judge issued on March 3, 1972 upon application on the same date of respondents COSAC officers search warrant No. 72-138 for alleged violation of Republic Act 4712 amending section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code 3 directing the search and seizure of the dutiable items in said crates.

The Court, therefore, holds that respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.

the Office of the Solicitor General appeared and filed an extended comment stating the official position of the executive branch of the Philippine Government that petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, he did not abuse his diplomatic immunity, and that court proceedings in the receiving or host State are not the proper remedy in the case of abuse of diplomatic immunity.

G.R. No. 85750

September 28, 1990

INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION COMMISSION, petitioner vs HON. PURA CALLEJA IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS AND TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES (TUPAS) WFTU respondents.

A. As an aftermath of the Vietnam War, the plight of Vietnamese refugees fleeing from South Vietnam's communist rule confronted the international community. In response to this crisis, on 23 February 1981, an Agreement was forged between the Philippine Government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees whereby an operating center for processing Indo-Chinese refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be established in Bataan ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing center in Morong, Bataan. Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file members employed by ICMC The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it is an international organization registered with the United Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity. B. Initially, IRRI was organized and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as a private corporation subject to all laws and regulations. However, by virtue of Pres. Decree No. 1620, promulgated on 19 April 1979, IRRI was granted the status, prerogatives, privileges and immunities of an international organization. the Kapisanan filed a Petition for Direct Certification Election with Region IV, Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment. IRRI opposed the petition invoking Pres. Decree No. 1620 conferring upon it the status of an international organization and granting it immunity from all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings under Philippine laws.

whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunites to ICMC extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws

There can be no question that diplomatic immunity has, in fact, been granted ICMC and IRRI being specialized agencies. The Executive Branch of the Government that ICMC and IRRI enjoy immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarrass a political department of Government. "Specialized agencies" are international organizations having functions in particular fields. The theory behind all three propositions is said to be essentially institutional in character. "It is not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with the elements of functional independence necessary to free international institutions from national control and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their members. 13 The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies concerned. ICMC's and IRRI's immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic rights. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 17 provides that "each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party." Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC the the Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded. Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of dispute with management as, in fact, there had been organized a forum for better management-employee relationship as evidenced by the formation of the Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM) wherein "both management and employees were and still are represented for purposes of maintaining mutual and beneficial cooperation between IRRI and its employees." it is inaccurate to state that a certification election is beyond the scope of that immunity for the reason that it is not a suit against ICMC. A certification election cannot be viewed as an independent or isolated process. It could tugger off a series of events in the collective bargaining process together with related incidents and/or concerted activities, which could inevitably involve ICMC in the "legal process,"