Pil Cases.docx

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents. RESOLUTION PUNO, J.: On January 18, 2000, by a vote of 9-6, we dismissed the petition at bar and ordered the petitioner to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.[1] On February 3, 2000, the petitioner timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. He assails the decision on the following grounds: "The majority decision failed to appreciate the following facts and points of substance and of value which, if considered, would alter the result of the case, thus: I. There is a substantial difference between an evaluation process antecedent to the filing of an extradition petition in court and a preliminary investigation. II. Absence of notice and hearing during the evaluation process will not result in a denial of fundamental fairness. III. In the evaluation process, instituting a notice and hearing requirement satisfies no higher objective. IV. The deliberate omission of the notice and hearing requirement in the Philippine Extradition Law is intended to prevent flight. V. There is a need to balance the interest between the discretionary powers of government and the rights of an individual. VI. The instances cited in the assailed majority decision when the twin rights of notice and hearing may be dispensed with in this case results in a non sequitur conclusion. VII. Jimenez is not placed in imminent danger of arrest by the Executive Branch necessitating notice and hearing. VIII. By instituting a 'proceeding' not contemplated by PD No. 1069, the Supreme Court has encroached upon the constitutional boundaries separating it from the other two co-equal branches of government. IX. Bail is not a matter of right in proceedings leading to extradition or in extradition proceedings."[2]

On March 28, 2000, a 58-page Comment was filed by the private respondent Mark B. Jimenez, opposing petitioners Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. On April 5, 2000, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of Action and Filing of Reply. Thereafter, petitioner filed on June 7, 2000 a Manifestation with the attached Note 327/00 from the Embassy of Canada and Note No. 34 from the Security Bureau of the Hongkong SAR Government Secretariat. On August 15, 2000, private respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion for Leave to File Rejoinder in the event that petitioner's April 5, 2000 Motion would be granted. Private respondent also filed on August 18, 2000, a Motion to Expunge from the records petitioner's June 7, 2000 Manifestation with its attached note verbales. Except for the Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of Action, the Court denies these pending motions and hereby resolves petitioner's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. The jugular issue is whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. We now hold that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. First. P.D. No. 1069[3] which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court, viz: "Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing; Service of Notices. (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order . . . Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing thereof. (2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case." It is of judicial notice that the summons includes the petition for extradition which will be answered by the extraditee. There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand from the petitioner Secretary of Justice copies of the extradition request from the US government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation. We cannot write a provision in the treaty giving private respondent that right where there is none. It is well-settled that a "court cannot alter, amend, or add to a treaty by the insertion of any clause, small or great, or dispense with any of its conditions and requirements or take away any qualification, or integral part of any stipulation, upon any motion of equity, or general convenience, or substantial justice." [4] Second. All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in light of their intent. Nothing less than the Vienna Convention on the

Law of Treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory provides that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose."[5] (emphasis supplied) The preambular paragraphs of P.D. No. 1069 define its intent, viz: "WHEREAS, under the Constitution[,] the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations; WHEREAS, the suppression of crime is the concern not only of the state where it is committed but also of any other state to which the criminal may have escaped, because it saps the foundation of social life and is an outrage upon humanity at large, and it is in the interest of civilized communities that crimes should not go unpunished; WHEREAS, in recognition of this principle the Philippines recently concluded an extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia, and intends to conclude similar treaties with other interested countries; x x x." (emphasis supplied) It cannot be gainsaid that today, countries like the Philippines forge extradition treaties to arrest the dramatic rise of international and transnational crimes like terrorism and drug trafficking. Extradition treaties provide the assurance that the punishment of these crimes will not be frustrated by the frontiers of territorial sovereignty. Implicit in the treaties should be the unbending commitment that the perpetrators of these crimes will not be coddled by any signatory state. It ought to follow that the RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that will minimize if not prevent the escape of extraditees from the long arm of the law and expedite their trial. The submission of the private respondent, that as a probable extraditee under the RP-US Extradition Treaty he should be furnished a copy of the US government request for his extradition and its supporting documents even while they are still under evaluation by petitioner Secretary of Justice, does not meet this desideratum. The fear of the petitioner Secretary of Justice that the demanded notice is equivalent to a notice to flee must be deeply rooted on the experience of the executive branch of our government. As it comes from the branch of our government in charge of the faithful execution of our laws, it deserves the careful consideration of this Court. In addition, it cannot be gainsaid that private respondents demand for advance notice can delay the summary process of executive evaluation of the extradition request and its accompanying papers. The foresight of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes did not miss this danger. In 1911, he held: "It is common in extradition cases to attempt to bring to bear all the factitious niceties of a criminal trial at common law. But it is a waste of time . . . if there is presented, even in somewhat untechnical form according to our ideas, such reasonable ground to suppose him guilty as to make it proper that he should be tried, good faith to the demanding government requires his surrender."[6] (emphasis supplied) We erode no right of an extraditee when we do not allow time to stand still on his prosecution. Justice is best served when done without delay.

Third. An equally compelling factor to consider is the understanding of the parties themselves to the RP-US Extradition Treaty as well as the general interpretation of the issue in question by other countries with similar treaties with the Philippines. The rule is recognized that while courts have the power to interpret treaties, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is accorded great weight.[7] The reason for the rule is laid down in Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, et al.,[8] where we stressed that a treaty is a joint executive-legislative act which enjoys the presumption that "it was first carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was adopted and given the force of law in the country." Our executive department of government, thru the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), has steadfastly maintained that the RPUS Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 do not grant the private respondent a right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition process. [9] This understanding of the treaty is shared by the US government, the other party to the treaty.[10] This interpretation by the two governments cannot be given scant significance. It will be presumptuous for the Court to assume that both governments did not understand the terms of the treaty they concluded. Yet, this is not all. Other countries with similar extradition treaties with the Philippines have expressed the same interpretation adopted by the Philippine and US governments. Canadian[11] and Hongkong[12] authorities, thru appropriate note verbales communicated to our Department of Foreign Affairs, stated in unequivocal language that it is not an international practice to afford a potential extraditee with a copy of the extradition papers during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. We cannot disregard such a convergence of views unless it is manifestly erroneous. Fourth. Private respondent, however, peddles the postulate that he must be afforded the right to notice and hearing as required by our Constitution. He buttresses his position by likening an extradition proceeding to a criminal proceeding and the evaluation stage to a preliminary investigation. We are not persuaded. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.[13] His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation.[14] As held by the US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis: "An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty." [15] There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.[16] In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent

standards.[17] In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction [18] while a fugitive may be ordered extradited "upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case."[19] Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. [20] The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nation's foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite.[21] As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. This we hold for the procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action."[22] The concept of due process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure."[23] Fifth. Private respondent would also impress upon the Court the urgency of his right to notice and hearing considering the alleged threat to his liberty "which may be more priceless than life."[24] The supposed threat to private respondents liberty is perceived to come from several provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 which allow provisional arrest and temporary detention. We first deal with provisional arrest. The RP-US Extradition Treaty provides as follows: "PROVISIONAL ARREST 1. In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request for extradition. A request for provisional arrest may be transmitted through the diplomatic channel or directly between the Philippine Department of Justice and the United States Department of Justice.

3. The Requesting State shall be notified without delay of the disposition of its application and the reasons for any denial. 4. A person who is provisionally arrested may be discharged from custody upon the expiration of sixty (60) days from the date of arrest pursuant to this Treaty if the executive authority of the Requested State has not received the formal request for extradition and the supporting documents required in Article 7." (emphasis supplied) In relation to the above, Section 20 of P.D. No. 1069 provides: "Sec. 20. Provisional Arrest.- (a) In case of urgency, the requesting state may, pursuant to the relevant treaty or convention and while the same remains in force, request for the provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extraditionmade in accordance with Section 4 of this Decree. (b) A request for provisional arrest shall be sent to the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila, either through the diplomatic channels or direct by post or telegraph. (c) The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation or any official acting on his behalf shall upon receipt of the request immediately secure a warrant for the provisional arrest of the accused from the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of the province or city having jurisdiction of the place, who shall issue the warrant for the provisional arrest of the accused. The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation through the Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall inform the requesting state of the result of its request. (d) If within a period of 20 days after the provisional arrest the Secretary of Foreign Affairs has not received the request for extradition and the documents mentioned in Section 4 of this Decree, the accused shall be released from custody." (emphasis supplied)

b) the location of the person sought, if known;

Both the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 clearly provide that private respondent may be provisionally arrested only pending receipt of the request for extradition. Our DFA has long received the extradition request from the United States and has turned it over to the DOJ. It is undisputed that until today, the United States has not requested for private respondents provisional arrest. Therefore, the threat to private respondents liberty has passed. It is more imagined than real.

c) a brief statement of the facts of the case, including, if possible, the time and location of the offense;

Nor can the threat to private respondents liberty come from Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069, which provides:

2. The application for provisional arrest shall contain: a) a description of the person sought;

d) a description of the laws violated; e) a statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest or finding of guilt or judgment of conviction against the person sought; and f) a statement that a request for extradition for the person sought will follow.

"Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served anywhere within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice. . .

(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case." (emphasis supplied)

officials. His access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data is also unlimited.[33] The deference we give to the executive department is dictated by the principle of separation of powers. This principle is one of the cornerstones of our democratic government. It cannot be eroded without endangering our government.

It is evident from the above provision that a warrant of arrest for the temporary detention of the accused pending the extradition hearing may only be issued by the presiding judge of the extradition court upon filing of the petition for extradition. As the extradition process is still in the evaluation stage of pertinent documents and there is no certainty that a petition for extradition will be filed in the appropriate extradition court, the threat to private respondents liberty is merely hypothetical.

The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered by our government. More and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational crimes.

Sixth. To be sure, private respondents plea for due process deserves serious consideration involving as it does his primordial right to liberty. His plea to due process, however, collides with important state interests which cannot also be ignored for they serve the interest of the greater majority. The clash of rights demands a delicate balancing of interests approach which is a "fundamental postulate of constitutional law."[25] The approach requires that we "take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation."[26] These interests usually consist in the exercise by an individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the governments promotion of fundamental public interest or policy objectives on the other.[27] In the case at bar, on one end of the balancing pole is the private respondents claim to due process predicated on Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . ." Without a bubble of doubt, procedural due process of law lies at the foundation of a civilized society which accords paramount importance to justice and fairness. It has to be accorded the weight it deserves. This brings us to the other end of the balancing pole. Petitioner avers that the Court should give more weight to our national commitment under the RP-US Extradition Treaty to expedite the extradition to the United States of persons charged with violation of some of its laws. Petitioner also emphasizes the need to defer to the judgment of the Executive on matters relating to foreign affairs in order not to weaken if not violate the principle of separation of powers. Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its evaluation stage, the nature of the right being claimed by the private respondent is nebulous and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak, we accord greater weight to the interests espoused by the government thru the petitioner Secretary of Justice. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, we held that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government."[28] Under our constitutional scheme, executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines.[29]Executive power includes, among others, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans and the power to enter into treaties or international agreements.[30] The task of safeguarding that these treaties are duly honored devolves upon the executive department which has the competence and authority to so act in the international arena.[31] It is traditionally held that the President has power and even supremacy over the countrys foreign relations. [32] The executive department is aptly accorded deference on matters of foreign relations considering the Presidents most comprehensive and most confidential information about the international scene of which he is regularly briefed by our diplomatic and consular

In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process requires a determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to whether procedural protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss."[34] We have explained why an extraditee has no right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request for his extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition for extradition. The extraditee's right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage of the extradition process to accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information of the basis of the request for his extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of the government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign relations. Needless to state, this balance of interests is not a static but a moving balance which can be adjusted as the extradition process moves from the administrative stage to the judicial stage and to the execution stage depending on factors that will come into play. In sum, we rule that the temporary hold on private respondent's privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to the United States. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party. We end where we began. A myopic interpretation of the due process clause would not suffice to resolve the conflicting rights in the case at bar. With the global village shrinking at a rapid pace, propelled as it is by technological leaps in transportation and communication, we need to push further back our horizons and work with the rest of the civilized nations and move closer to the universal goals of "peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations." [35] In the end, it is the individual who will reap the harvest of peace and prosperity from these efforts. WHEREFORE, the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision in the case at bar promulgated on January18, 2000 is REVERSED. The

assailed Order issued by the public respondent judge on August 9, 1999 is SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on August 17, 1999 is made PERMANENT. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25 is enjoined from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 90314

November 27, 1990

LOIDA Q. SHAUF and JACOB SHAUF, Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DON E. DETWILER and ANTHONY PERSI, Respondents. REGALADO, J.: In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners would have us reverse and set aside the decision rendered by respondent Court of Appeals on August 22, 1989, in CAG.R. CV No. 17932, entitled "Loida Shauf and Jacob Shauf, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus Don Detwiler and Anthony Persi, Defendants-Appellants,"1 dismissing petitioners’ complaint for damages filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch LVI, Angeles City, in Civil Case No. 2783 thereof, and its subsequent resolution denying petitioners’ motion for the reconsideration of its aforesaid decision. court,2 Clark

As found by respondent Air Base is one of the bases established and maintained by the United States by authority of the agreement between the Philippines and the United States concerning military bases which entered into force on March 26, 1947. The Third Combat Support Group, a unit of Clark Air Base, maintains a Central Civilian Personnel Office (CCPO) charged with the responsibility for civilian personnel management and administration. It is through its civilian personnel officer that the base commander is responsible for direction and administration of civilian personnel program, including advising management and operating officials on civilian personnel matters. Acting for the commander, the civilian personnel officer is the administrative official in charge of the activities of the CCPO, and the commander relies on him to carry out all aspects of the civilian personnel program. The CCPO personnel program encompasses placement and staffing, position management and classification. The Third Combat Support Group also maintains an Education Branch, Personnel Division, which provides an education program for military personnel, U.S. civilian employees, and adult dependents, assigned or attached to Clark Air Base. Its head, the education director, is responsible directly to the base director of personnel for administering the education services program for Clark Air Base. In this capacity, and within broad agency policies, is delegated to him the full responsibility and authority for the technical, administrative and management functions of the program. As part of his duties, the education director provides complete academic and vocational

guidance for military dependents, including counseling, testing and test interpretation. During the time material to the complaint, private respondent Don Detwiler was civilian personnel officer, while private respondent Anthony Persi was education director.3 Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the United States Air Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, GS17109, in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified. As found by the trial court, she received a Master of Arts degree from the University of Sto. Tomas, Manila, in 1971 and has completed 34 semester hours in psychology-guidance and 25 quarter hours in human behavioral science; she has also completed all course work in human behavior and counseling psychology for a doctoral degree; she is a civil service eligible; and, more importantly, she had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS 1710-9 level for approximately four years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976. 4 By reason of her non-selection to the position, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf filed an equal employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, for alleged discrimination against the former by reason of her nationality and sex. The controversy was investigated by one Rudolph Duncan, an appeals and grievance examiner assigned to the Office of Civilian Personnel Operations, Appellate Division, San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. and what follows are taken from his findings embodied in a report duly submitted by him to the Equal Opportunity Officer on February 22, 1977.5 On or about October 1976, the position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, became vacant in the Base Education Office, Clark Air Base. A standard Form 52 was submitted to the Civilian Personnel Office to fill said position. The Civilian Personnel Division took immediate steps to fill the position by advertisement in the Clark Air Base Daily Bulletin #205 dated October 21, 1976. As a result of the advertisement, one application was received by the Civilian Personnel Office and two applications were retrieved from the applicants supply file in the Civilian Personnel Office. These applications were that of Mrs. Jean Hollenshead, an employee of the DOD Schools at Clark Air Base, Mrs. Lydia B. Gaillard, an unemployed dependent, and Mrs. Loida Q. Shauf. All three applications were reviewed and their experiences were considered qualifying for the advertised position. On November 11, 1976, the application of Loida Q. Shauf was referred to Mr. Anthony Persi, with the applications of Mrs. Jean Hollenshead and Mrs. Lydia Gaillard, to be considered for the position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, Mr. Persi, after review of the applications, stated that upon screening the applications he concluded that two applicants had what he considered minimum qualifications for the position. The two applicants were Mrs. Hollenshead and Mrs. Gaillard. In the case of Loida Q. Shauf, Mr. Persi felt that her application was quite complete except for a reply to an inquiry form attached to the application. This inquiry form stated that the National Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri, was unable to find an official personnel folder for Loida Q. Shauf. Mr. Persi said that as a result of the National Personnel Records Center, GSA, not being able to find any records on Loida Q. Shauf, this raised some questions in his mind as to the validity of her work experience. As a result of his reservations on Loida Q. Shauf’s work experience and

his conclusions that the two other applications listed minimum qualifications, Mr. Persi decided to solicit additional names for consideration. Subsequently in his correspondence dated November 12, 1976, Mr. Persi returned the three applications to the Civilian Personnel Office without a selection decision. Mr. Persi also requested in his correspondence that the Civilian Personnel Office initiate immediate inquiry to the Central Oversea Rotation and Recruiting Office (CORRO) for the submission of a list of highly qualified candidates. He further stated in his correspondence that the three applicants who had indicated an interest would be considered with the CORRO input for selection. As a result of Mr. Persi’s request, an AF Form 1188 "Oversea Civilian Personnel Request" was submitted to CORRO on November 12, 1976. This request in fact asked for one Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9. The form listed the fact that local candidates are available. However, instead of getting a list of candidates for consideration, Mr. Persi was informed by CORRO, through the Civilian Personnel Office in their December 15, 1976 message that a Mr. Edward B. Isakson from Loring AFB, Maine, was selected for the position. Mr. Persi stated, when informed of CORRO’s selection, that he had heard of Mr. Isakson and, from what he had heard, Mr. Isakson was highly qualified for the position; therefore, he wished to have the selection stand. This statement was denied by Mr. Persi. Mr. Isakson was placed on the rolls at Clark Air Base on January 24, 1977.6 Said examiner, however, also stated in his findings that, by reason of petitioner Loida Q. Shauf’s credentials which he recited therein, she is and was at the time of the vacancy,7 highly qualified for the position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9. In connection with said complaint, a Notice of Proposed Disposition of Discrimination Complaint, dated May 16, 1977,8 was served upon petitioner Loida Q. Shauf stating that because the individual selected did not meet the criteria of the qualification requirements, it was recommended "that an overhire GS 1710-9 Assistant Education Advisor position be established for a 180 day period. x x x. The position should be advertised for local procurement on a best qualified basis with the stipulation that if a vacancy occurs in a permanent GS 1710-9 position the selectee would automatically be selected to fill the vacancy. If a position is not vacated in the 180 day period the temporary overhire would be released but would be selected to fill a future vacancy if the selectee is available." During that time, private respondents already knew that a permanent GS 1710-9 position would shortly be vacant, that is, the position of Mrs. Mary Abalateo whose appointment was to expire on August 6, 1977 and this was exactly what private respondent Detwiler had in mind when he denied on June 27, 1977 Mrs. Abalateo’s request for extension of March 31, 1977. However, private respondents deny that Col. Charles J. Corey represented to petitioner Loida Q. Shauf that she would be appointed to the overhire position and to a permanent GS 1710-9 position as soon as it became vacant, which allegedly prompted the latter to accept the proposed disposition. Contrary to her expectations, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf was never appointed to the position occupied by Mrs. Abalateo whose appointment was extended indefinitely by private respondent Detwiler.9

Feeling aggrieved by what she considered a shabby treatment accorded her, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf wrote the U.S. Civil Service Commission questioning the qualifications of Edward Isakson. Thereafter, said commission sent a communication addressed to private respondent Detwiler,10 finding Edward Isakson not qualified to the position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, and requesting that action be taken to remove him from the position and that efforts be made to place him in a position for which he qualifies. Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf avers that said recommendation was ignored by private respondent Detwiler and that Isakson continued to occupy said position of guidance counselor. Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf likewise wrote the Base Commander of Clark Air Base requesting a hearing on her complaint for discrimination. Consequently, a hearing was held on March 29, 1978 before the U.S. Department of Air Force in Clark Air Base.11 Before the Department of Air Force could render a decision, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf filed a complaint for damages, dated April 27, 1978, against private respondents Don Detwiler and Anthony Persi before the Regional Trial Court, Branch LVI at Angeles City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2783, for the alleged discriminatory acts of herein private respondents in maliciously denying her application for the GS 1710-9 position. Private respondents, as defendants in Civil Case No. 2783, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that as officers of the United States Armed Forces performing official functions in accordance with the powers vested in them under the PhilippineAmerican Military Bases Agreement, they are immune from suit. The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Consequently, private respondents filed an Answer reiterating the issue of jurisdiction and alleging, inter alia, that defendant Persi’s request to Central Oversea Rotation and Recruiting Office (CORRO) was not for appointment of a person to the position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, but for referrals whom defendant Persi would consider together with local candidates for the position; that the extension of the employment of Mrs. Abalato was in accordance with applicable regulation and was not related to plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf’s discrimination complaint; that the decision was a joint decision of management and CCPO reached at a meeting on June 29, 1977 and based on a letter of the deputy director of civilian personnel, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, dated June 15, 1977; and that the ruling was made known to and amplified by the director and the deputy director of civilian personnel in letters to petitioner Loida Q. Shauf dated August 30, 1977 and September 19, 1977. The parties submitted a Partial Stipulation of Facts in the court a quo providing, in part, as follows: a) In October 1976, the position of guidance counselor, GS-1710-9, at Clark Air Base was vacant;

b) Plaintiff Loida Q, Shauf, a qualified dependent locally available, was among those who applied for said vacant position of guidance counselor, GS-1710-9; c) Plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf at the time she filed her aforesaid application was qualified for the position of guidance counselor, GS-1710-9; d) Civilian Personnel Office accomplished and forwarded to CORRO an AF Form 1188 covering the position of guidance counselor, GS-1710-9, applied for by plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf; e) U.S. Department of Defense Instructions (DODI) No. 1400.23 under Policy and Procedures provides that-

and Recommended Decision in the Discrimination Complaint of Mrs. Loida Q. Shauf, No. SF 071380181 dated 3 July 1978.13 Thereafter, on March 8, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs: 1) The amount $39,662.49 as actual damages or its equivalent in Philippine pesos in October 1976 as reported by the Central Bank of the Philippines or any authorized agency of the Government; 2) The amount of P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;

"Where qualified dependents of military or civilian personnel of the Department of Defense are locally available for appointment to positions in foreign areas which are designated for U.S. citizen occupancy and for which recruitment outside the current work force is appropriate, appointment to the position will be limited to such dependents unless precluded by treaties or other agreements which provide for preferential treatment for local nationals."

3) Twenty (20%) percent of $39,662.49 or its equivalent in Philippine Pesos in October 1976 as reported by the Central Bank of the Philippines or any authorized agency of the Government, as attorney’s gees, and;

And Air Force Regulation 40-301 dated 12 May 1976 in par. 2 c (1) thereof provides that-

SO ORDERED.14

"c. Selection or Referral of Eligible Applicants From the 50 States: (1)CORRO makes selection, except as provided in (3) below, for oversea positions of Grades GS-11 and below (and wage grade equivalents) for which it has received an AF Form 1188, and for higher grade positions if requested by the oversea activity."12 Likewise, a Supplement to Partial Stipulation of Facts was filed by the parties on October 6, 1978, which reads: 1. Under date of 30 September 1978, plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf through her counsel, Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Valmonte Peña & Marcos, lodged an appeal before the Civil Service Commission, Appeals Review Board, from the decision of the Secretary of the Air Force dated 1 September 1978 affirming the EEO Complaints Examiner’s Findings and Recommended Decision in the Discrimination Complaint of Mrs. Loida Q. Shauf, No. SF 071380181 dated 3 July 1978, x x x; 2. The aforesaid appeal has not been decided up to now by the Civil Service Commission, Appeals Review Board; and 3. Plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf has not instituted any action before any federal district court of the United States impugning the validity of the decision of the Secretary of the Air Force dated 1 September 1978 affirming the EEO Complaints Examiner’s Findings

4) Cost(s) of suit.

Both parties appealed from the aforecited decision to respondent Court of Appeals. In their appeal, plaintiffs-appellants (herein petitioners) raised the following assignment of errors: 1. Lower court gravely erred in holding that the actual and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees may be paid in Philippine Pesos based on the exchange rate prevailing during October 1976 as determined by the Central Bank; 2. Lower court gravely erred in limiting the amount of moral and exemplary damages recoverable by plaintiff to P100,000.00 15 On the other hand, defendants-appellants (private respondents herein) argued that: 1. The trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint on the ground that defendants-appellants, as officers/officials of the United States Armed Forces, are immune from suit for acts done or statements made by them in the performance of their official governmental functions in accordance with the powers possessed by them under the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement of 1947, as amended; 2. The trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint for a) non-exhaustion of administrative remedies; and b) lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over

the subject matter of the case in view of the exclusive jurisdiction of an appropriate U.S. District Court over an appeal from an agency decision on a complaint of discrimination under the U.S. Federal Law on Equality of opportunity for civilian employees;

criminal acts is a rule of domestic law, not of international law. It applies to cases involving the relations between private suitors and their government or state, not the relations between one government and another from which springs the doctrine of immunity of a foreign sovereign.

3. The trial court erred in holding that plaintiff-appellant Loida Q. Shauf was refused appointment as guidance counselor by the defendants-appellants on account of her six (female), color (brown), and national origin (Filipino by birth) and that the trial court erred in awarding damages to plaintiffsappellants.16

I. The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the international community.18

As stated at the outset, respondent Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, dismissed herein petitioners’complaint and denied their motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition, on the basis of he following grounds: The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance not in accord with law and/or with applicable decisions of this Honorable Court. Respondent court committed grave error in dismissing plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint and(a) in holding that private respondents are immune from suit for discriminatory acts performed without or in excess of, their authority as officers of the U.S. Armed Forces; (b) for applying the doctrine of state immunity from suit when it is clear that the suit is not against the U.S. Government or its Armed Forces; and (c) for failing to recognize the fact that the instant action is a pure and simple case for damages based on the discriminatory and malicious acts committed by private respondents in their individual capacity who by force of circumstance and accident are officers of the U.S. Armed Forces, against petitioner Loida Shauf solely on account of the latter’s sex (female), color (brown), and national origin (Filipino).17 Petitioners aver that private respondents are being sued in their private capacity for discriminatory acts performed beyond their authority, hence the instant action is not a suit against the United States Government which would require its consent. Private respondents, on the other hand, claim that in filing the case, petitioners sought a judicial review by a Philippine court of the official actuations of respondents as officials of a military unit of the U.S. Air Force stationed at Clark Air Base. The acts complained of were done by respondents while administering the civil service laws of the United States. The acts sued upon being a governmental activity of respondents, the complaint is barred by the immunity of the United States, as a foreign sovereign, from suit without its consent and by the immunity of the officials of the United States armed forces for acts committed in the performance of their official functions pursuant to the grant to the United States armed forces of rights, power and authority within the bases under the Military Bases Agreement. It is further contended that the rule allowing suits against public officers and employees for unauthorized acts, torts and

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has been formally impleaded.19 It must be noted, however, that the rule is not also allencompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As we clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. Vs. Aligaen, etc., et al.:20 "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent."21 The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.22 In the case of Baer, etc. vs. Tizon, etc., et al.,23 it was ruled that: There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of the decision reached by this Court. Petitioner, as the Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo, does not possess diplomatic immunity. He may therefore be proceeded against in his personal capacity, or when the action taken by him cannot be imputed to the government which he represents. Also, in animos, et al. Vs. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, et al.,24 we held that: "x x x it is equally well-settled that where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property, the

public official proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be invoked. It has no application, however, where the suit against such a functionary had to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner. x x x. The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. 25 The agents and officials of the United States armed forces stationed in Clark Air Base are no exception to this rule. In the case of United States of America, et al. Vs. Guinto, etc., et al., ante,26 we declared: It bears stressing at this point that the above observation do not confer on the United States of America blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions. II. The court below, in finding that private respondents are guilty of discriminating against petitioner Loida Q. Shauf on account of her sex, color and origin, categorically emphasized that: There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs’ complaint that plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf was refused appointment as Guidance Counselor by the defendants on account of her sex, color and origin.

In defending his act, defendant Persi gave as his excuse that there was a question in his mind regarding validity of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf’s work experience because of lack of record. But his assertion is belied by the fact that plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf had previously been employed as Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base in 1971 and this would have come out if defendant Persi had taken the trouble of interviewing her. Nor can defendant free himself from any blame for the non-appointment of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf by claiming that it was CORRO that appointed Edward B. Isakson. This would not have happened if defendant Persi adhered to the regulation that limits the appointment to the position of Guidance Counselor, GS-1710-9 to qualified dependents of military personnel of the Department of Defense who are locally available like the plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf. He should not have referred the matter to CORRO. Furthermore, defendant Persi should have protested the appointment of Edward B. Isakson who was ineligible for the position. He, however, remained silent because he was satisfied with the appointment. Likewise, the acts of the defendant Detwiler in rejecting the appointment of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf were undoubtedly discriminatory. Plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf twice applied for the position of Guidance Counselor sometime in 1975 and in October 1978. Although she was qualified for the postision, her appointment was rejected ny the defendant Detwiler. The two who were appointed, a certain Petrucci and Edward B. Isakson, were ordered removed by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. Instead of replacing Petrucci with the plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, the defendant Detwiler had the position vacated by Petrucci abolished. And in the case of Edward Isakson, the defendant Detwiler ignored the order of the U.S. Civil Service Commission to have him removed according to the testimony of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf. In connection with her complaint against the defendants, plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf was presented a Notice of Proposed Disposition of her Discrimination Complaint by Col. Charles J. Corey, Vice Commander, Third Combat Support Group, Clark Air Base, which would entitle her to a temporary appointment as Guidance Counselor with the implied assurance that she would be appointed in a permanent capacity in the event of a vacancy.

She is a female, brown in color and a Filipino by origin, although married to an American who is a member of the United States Air Force. She is qualified for the vacant position of Guidance Counselor in the office of the education director at Clark Air Base. She received a Master of Arts Degree from the University of Santo Tomas, Manila, in 1971 and has completed 34 semester hours in psychology-guidance and 25 quarter hours in human behavioral science. She has also completed all course work in human behavior and counseling psychology for a doctoral degree. She is a civil service eligible. More important, she had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS-1710-9 level for approximately four years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976.

At the time of the issuance of said Notice, defendants knew that there would be a vacancy in a permanent position as Guidance Counselor occupied by Mrs. Mary Abalateo and it was understood between Col. Corey and plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf that this position would be reserved for her. Knowing this arrangement, defendant Detwiler rejected the request for extension of services of Mrs. Mary Abalateo. However, after plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf consented to the terms of the Notice of Proposed Disposition of her Discrimination Complaint, defendant Detwiler extended the services of Mrs. Mary Abalateo indefinitely. This act barred plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf from applying for the position of Mrs. Mary Abalateo.

In filling the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, defendant Persi did not even consider the application of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, but referred the vacancy to CORRO which appointed Edward B. Isakson who was not eligible to the position.

To rebut the evidence of the plaintiffs, defendant cited the findings and conclusions of Mr. Rudolph Duncan, who was appointed to investigate plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf’s complaint for discrimination and Col. Charles J. Corey, Vice Commander, Third Combat Support Group that defendants were not guilty of Discrimination.

It is pointed out, however, that Mr. Rudolph Duncan found plaintiff loida Q. Shauf to be highly qualified for the position of Guidance Counselor at the GS-1710-9 level and that management should have hired a local applicant. While Col. Corey characterized the act of defendant Persi as sloppy and recommend that he be reprimanded. In any event their findings and conclusions are not binding with this Court. To blunt the accusation of discrimination against them, defendants maintained that the extension of the appointment of Mrs. Mary Abalateo was a joint decision of management and Central Civilian Personnel Office, Clark Air Base. Nonetheless, having earlier rejected by himself the request for extension of the services of Mrs. Mary Abalateo, defendant Detwiler should not have concurred to such an extension as the reversal of his stand gave added substance to the charge of discrimination against him. To further disprove the charge that the defendants discriminated against plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf for her non-appointment as Guidance Counselor on account of her being a Filipino and a female, counsel for the defendants cited the following: (1) that Mrs. Mary Abalateo whose appointment was extended by the defendant Detwiler is likewise a female and a Filipino by origin; (2) that there are Filipinos employed in the office of the defendant Persi; and (3) that there were two other women who applied in 1976 with the plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf for the position of Guidance Counselor. The contention of the defendants based on the allegations enumerated in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding paragraph is without merit as there is no evidence to show that Mrs. Mary Abalateo and the Filipinos in the office of the defendant Persi were appointed by the defendants. Moreover, faced with a choice between plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf or Mrs. Mary Abalateo, it was to be expected that defendant Detwiler chose to retain Mrs. Mary Abalateo as Guidance Counselor in retaliation for the complaint of discrimination filed against him by plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf. Finally, as to the contention based on the allegation in No. 3 of the preceding paragraph that there were two other women applicants in 1976 with plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, the record reveals that they had minimum qualifications unlike plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf who was highly qualified.27 Elementary is the rule that the conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons.28 Absent any substancial proof, therefore, that the trial court’s decision was grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures, the same must be accorded full consideration and respect. This should be so because the trial court is, after all, in a much better position to observe and correctly appreciate the respective parties’ evidence as they were presented.29 In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which suggests any arbitrary, irregular or abusive conduct or motive on the part of the trial judge in ruling that private respondents committed acts of discrimination for which they should be held personally liable. His conclusion on the matter is sufficiently borne out by the evidence on record. We are thus constrained to uphold his findings of fact. Respondent Court of Appeals, in its questioned decision, states that private respondents did, in fact, discriminate against petitioner Loida Q. Shauf. However, it

deemed such acts insufficient to prevent an application of the doctrine of state immunity, contrary to the findings made by the trial court. It reasons out that "the parties invoked are all American citizens (although plaintiff is a Filipina by origin) and the appointment of personnel inside the base is clearly a sovereign act of the United States. This is an internal affair in which we cannot interfere without having to touch some delicate constitutional issues."30 In other words, it believes that the alleged discriminatory acts are not so grave in character as would justify the award of damages. In view of the apparent discrepancy between the findings of fact of respondent Court of Appeals and the trial court, we are tasked to review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct findings based on the record. A consideration of the evidence presented supports our view that the court a quo was correct in holding herein private respondents personally liable and in ordering the indemnification of petitioner Loida Q. Shauf. The records are clear that even prior to the filing of the complaint in this case, there were various reports and communications issued on the matter which, while they make no categorical statement of the private respondents’ liability, nevertheless admit of facts from which the intent of private respondents to discriminate against Loida Q. Shauf is easily discernible. Witness the following pertinent excerpts from the documents extant in the folder of Plaintiff’s Exhibits: 1. Notice of Proposed Disposition of Discrimination Complaint, dated May 16, 1977 (Exhibit "G"). B. Mr. Anthony Persi was totally inept in the recruitment practices employed in attempting on fill the GS 1710-9 Assistant Education applicable DOD regulations. In addition, he failed to conduct an interview of qualified personnel in the local environment and when the qualifications of the complainant (sic) were questioned by Mr. Persi he did not request a review by the CCPO nor request an interview with the complainant (sic). Mr. Persi failed to follow Department of Defense Instructions Number 1400.23, under Policy and Procedures which states-"Where qualified dependents of military or civilian personnel of the Department of Defense are locally available for appointment to positions in foreign areas which are designated for US citizen occupancy and for which recruitment outside the current work force is appropriate, appointment to the positions will be limited to such dependents unless precluded by treaties or other agreements which provide for preferential treatment for local nationals." Attachment to Air Force Supplement to FFM 213.2106 (b) (6) lists the positions of Guidance Counsellor, GS 1710-9, as positions to be filled by locally available dependents. An added point is the lack of qualifications of the individual selected for the GS 1710-9 positions as outlined under X-118 Civil Service Handbook. x x x31 2. Letter of the Director of the U.S. Civil Service Commission, San Francisco Region, dated October 27, 1977, addressed to Mr. Don Detwiler, concerning Mr. Edward B. Isakson whose file was reviewed by the Commission (Exhibit "K"). The position of Guidance Counsellor is one for which the Commission has established a mandatory education requirement that may not be waived. An individual may not be assigned to such a position without meeting the minimum qualification requirements. The requirements, as given in Handbook X-118, are completion of all

academic requirements for a bachelor’s degree from an accredited college or university and successful completion of a teacher education program under an "approved program" or successful completion of required kinds of courses. On review of his record, we find that Mr. Isakson has a bachelor’s degree but he does not show completion of a teacher education program. To qualify for Guidance Counselor on the basis of coursework and semester hour credit, he would need to have 24 semester hours in Education and 12 semester hours in a combination of Psychology and Guidance subjects directly related to education. We do not find that he meets these requirements. xxx We can appreciate the fact that Mr. Isakson may be working toward meeting the Guidance Counselor requirements. Nonetheless, he does not appear to meet them at this time. We must, therefore, request that action be taken to remove him from the position and that efforts be made to place him in a position for which he qualifies. 32 3. Letter of the Staff Judge Advocate of the Department of the Airforce addressed to Mr. Detwiler, dated January 25, 1977 (Exhibit "L"). 1. The attached memo from Captain John Vento of this office is forwarded for your review and any action you deem appropriate. I concur with his conclusion that there is no evidence of sex or ethnic bias in this matter. I also concur, however, that there were certain irregularities in the handling of this selection. xxx 3. Considering the above, it is most unfortunate that the filing of this latest Guidance Counselor vacancy was not handled wholly in accordance with prescribed policies and regulations. This is not to suggest that Mrs. Shauf should necessarily have been hired. But, she and other qualified candidates should have been given the consideration to which they were entitled. (At no time now or in the past have Mrs. Shauf’s qualifications ever been questioned.) Had that happened and management chose to select some qualified candidate other than Mrs. Shauf, there would be no basis for her complaint. 4. It is my understanding that Mrs. Shauf has filed a formal EEO complaint. While I am convinced that there was no discrimination in this case, my experience with EEO complaints teaches me that, if Civil Service Commission finds that nonselection resulted from any kind of management malpractice, it is prone to brand it as a "discriminatory practice." This usually results in a remedial order which can often be distasteful to management. x x x.33 The initial burden is on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case or discrimination. Once the discriminatory act is proven, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate

some legitimate, undiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s rejection. 34 Any such justification is wanting in the case at bar, despite the prima facie case for petitioner Loida Q. Shauf. Private respondents’ defense is based purely on outright denials which are insufficient to discharge the onus probandi imposed upon them. They equally rely on the assertion that they are immune from suit by reason of their official functions. As correctly pointed out by petitioners in their Memorandum, the mere invocation by private respondents of the official character of their duties cannot shield them from liability especially when the same were clearly done beyond the scope of their authority, again citing the Guinto, case, supra: The other petitioners in the case before us all aver they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States. However, this is a matter of evidence. The charges against them may not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are imputable to the United States of America, which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment. III. Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. This is a carry-over from Article II, Section 9, of the 1973 Constitution ensuring equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed. Under the Constitution of the United States, the assurance of equality in employment and work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed is also given by the equal protection clause of the Bill of Rights. The 14th Amendment, in declaring that no state shall deprive a person of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, undoubtedly intended not only that there should be no arbitrary spoliation of property, but that equal protection and security should be given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights, and that all persons should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness ands acquire and enjoy property. It extends its protection to all persons without regard to race, color, or class. It means equality of opportunity to all in like circumstances.35 The words "life, liberty, and property" as used in constitutions are representative terms and are intended to cover every right to which a member of the body politic in entitled under the law. These terms include the right of self-defense, freedom of speech, religious and political freedom, exemption from arbitrary arrests, the right to freely buy and sell as others may, the right to labor, to contract, to terminate contracts, to acquire property, and the right to all our liberties, personal, civil and political-in short, all that makes life worth living.36 There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in committing the acts complained of have, in effect, violated the basic constitutional right of petitioner Loida Q. Shauf to earn a living which is very much an integral aspect of the right to life. For this, they should be held accountable.

While we recognize petitioner Loida Q. Shauf’s entitlement to an award of moral damages, we however find no justification for the award of actual or compensatory damages, based on her supposedly unearned income from March, 1975 up to April, 1978 in the total amount of $39,662.49, as erroneously granted by the trial court. Evidence that the plaintiff could have bettered her position had it not been for the defendants’ wrongful act cannot serve as basis for an award of damages, because it is highly speculative.37 Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf’s claim is merely premised on the possibility that had she been employed, she would have earned said amount. But, the undeniable fact remains that she was never so employed. Petitioner never acquired any vested right to the salaries pertaining to the position of GS 1710-9 to which she was never appointed. Damages which are merely possible are speculative.38 In determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork. Without the actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages is erroneous.39 Consequently, the award of actual damages made by the trial court should be deleted. Attorney’s fees, however, may be granted and we believe that an award thereof in the sum of P20,000.00 is reasonable under the circumstances.1âwphi1

discrimination case filed by petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, No. SF 071380181. Said appeal has not been decided up to now. Furthermore, it is basic that remedial statutes are to be construed liberally. The term "may," as used in adjective rules, is only permissive and not mandatory, and we see no reason why the so-called rules on the above procedural options communicated to said petitioner should depart from this fundamental . petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these remedies, but is entitled as a matter of plain and simple justice to choose that remedy, not otherwise proscribed, which will best advance and protect her interests. There is, thus, nothing to enjoin her from seeking redress in Philippine courts which should not be ousted of jurisdiction on the dubious and inconclusive representations of private respondents on that score. WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17932 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are hereby ORDERED, jointly and severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees, and the costs of suit.

IV. Finally, private respondents postulate that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf failed to avail herself of her remedy under the United States federal legislation on equality of opportunity for civilian employees, which is allegedly exclusive of any other remedy under American law, let alone remedies before a foreign court and under a foreign law such as the Civil Code of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

In a letter of the Department of the Air Force in Washington, D.C., dated September 1, 1978 and addressed to petitioner Loida Q. Shauf,40 the appeal rights of the latter from the Air Force decision were enumerated as follows:

THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR SOERATMIN, and MINISTER COUNSELLOR AZHARI KASIM, petitioners, vs. JAMES VINZON, doing business under the name and style of VINZON TRADE AND SERVICES, respondent.

-You may appeal to the Civil Service Commission within 15 calendar days of receipt of the decision. Your appeal should be addressed to the Civil Service Commission, Appeals Review Board, 1990 E Street, N.Q., Washington, D.C. 20415. The appeal and any representation in support thereof must be submitted in duplicate. -In lieu of an appeal to the Commission you may file a civil action in an appropriate U.S. District Court within 30 days of receipt of the decision. -If you elect to appeal to the Commission’s Appeals Review Board, you may file a civil action in a U.S. District Court within 30 days of receipt of the Commission’s final decision. -A civil action may also be filed anytime after 180 days of the date of initial appeal to the Commission, if a final decision has not been rendered. As earlier noted, in a Supplement to Partial Stipulation of Facts filed by the parties on October 6, 1978, it was manifested to the trial court that an appeal was lodged by counsel for petitioners on September 30, 1978 before the Civil Service Commission. Appeals Review Board from the decision of the Secretary of the Air Force in the

DECISION AZCUNA, J: This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2002 and its Resolution dated August 16, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66894 entitled The Republic of Indonesia, His Excellency Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counselor Azhari Kasim v. Hon. Cesar Santamaria, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 145, Makati City, and James Vinzon, doing business under the name and style of Vinzon Trade and Services. Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps. It is likewise stated therein that the agreement shall be

effective for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry. [1]

petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim waived their immunity from suit.

Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of the said agreement, or before August 1999, they informed respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister Counsellor Azhari Kasim, who was expected to arrive in February 2000. When Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration in March 2000, he allegedly found respondents work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement in a letter dated August 31, 2000. [2] Petitioners claim, moreover, that they had earlier verbally informed respondent of their decision to terminate the agreement.

On May 30, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed decision denying the petition for lack of merit.[6] On August 16, 2002, it denied herein petitioners motion for reconsideration.[7]

On the other hand, respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Respondent cites various circumstances which purportedly negated petitioners alleged dissatisfaction over respondents services: (a) in July 2000, Minister Counsellor Kasim still requested respondent to assign to the embassy an additional full-time worker to assist one of his other workers; (b) in August 2000, Minister Counsellor Kasim asked respondent to donate a prize, which the latter did, on the occasion of the Indonesian Independence Day golf tournament; and (c) in a letter dated August 22, 2000, petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin thanked respondent for sponsoring a prize and expressed his hope that the cordial relations happily existing between them will continue to prosper and be strengthened in the coming years. Hence, on December 15, 2000, respondent filed a complaint [3] against petitioners docketed as Civil Case No. 18203 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 145. On February 20, 2001, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines. The said motion further alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim are diplomatic agents as defined under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and therefore enjoy diplomatic immunity.[4] In turn, respondent filed on March 20, 2001, an Opposition to the said motion alleging that the Republic of Indonesia has expressly waived its immunity from suit. He based this claim upon the following provision in the Maintenance Agreement: Any legal action arising out of this Maintenance Agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by the proper court of Makati City, Philippines. Respondents Opposition likewise alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim can be sued and held liable in their private capacities for tortious acts done with malice and bad faith.[5] On May 17, 2001, the trial court denied herein petitioners Motion to Dismiss. It likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration subsequently filed. The trial courts denial of the Motion to Dismiss was brought up to the Court of Appeals by herein petitioners in a petition for certiorari and prohibition. Said petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66894, alleged that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the Republic of Indonesia gave its consent to be sued and voluntarily submitted itself to the laws and jurisdiction of Philippine courts and that

Hence, this petition. In the case at bar, petitioners raise the sole issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts decision that petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the abovementioned provision in the Maintenance Agreement. The petition is impressed with merit. International law is founded largely upon the principles of reciprocity, comity, independence, and equality of States which were adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.[8] The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States.[9] As enunciated in Sanders v. Veridiano II,[10] the practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. [11] A contrary attitude would unduly vex the peace of nations.[12] The rules of International Law, however, are neither unyielding nor impervious to change. The increasing need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity. This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.[13] In United States v. Ruiz,[14] for instance, we held that the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station is an act jure imperii. On the other hand, we considered as an act jure gestionis the hiring of a cook in the recreation center catering to American servicemen and the general public at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City,[15] as well as the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City.[16] Apropos the present case, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. Is the foreign State engaged in the regular conduct of a business? If the foreign State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial activity, and in this case it has not been shown to be so engaged, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii.[17] Hence, the existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of

sovereign immunity from suit. The aforesaid provision contains language not necessarily inconsistent with sovereign immunity. On the other hand, such provision may also be meant to apply where the sovereign party elects to sue in the local courts, or otherwise waives its immunity by any subsequent act. The applicability of Philippine laws must be deemed to include Philippine laws in its totality, including the principle recognizing sovereign immunity. Hence, the proper court may have no proper action, by way of settling the case, except to dismiss it. Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal. It must be given explicitly or by necessary implication. We find no such waiver in this case. Respondent concedes that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is a sovereign function. On the other hand, he argues that the actual physical maintenance of the premises of the diplomatic mission, such as the upkeep of its furnishings and equipment, is no longer a sovereign function of the State. [18] We disagree. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador. The Solicitor General, in his Comment, submits the view that, the Maintenance Agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. In such a case, it cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit. As to the paragraph in the agreement relied upon by respondent, the Solicitor General states that it was not a waiver of their immunity from suit but a mere stipulation that in the event they do waive their immunity, Philippine laws shall govern the resolution of any legal action arising out of the agreement and the proper court in Makati City shall be the agreed venue thereof. [19] On the matter of whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim may be sued herein in their private capacities, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides: xxx 1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisidiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of: (a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;

(b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State; (c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions. xxx The act of petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim in terminating the Maintenance Agreement is not covered by the exceptions provided in the abovementioned provision. The Solicitor General believes that said act may fall under subparagraph (c) thereof,[20] but said provision clearly applies only to a situation where the diplomatic agent engages in any professional or commercial activity outside official functions, which is not the case herein. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 66894 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the complaint in Civil Case No. 18203 against petitioners is DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST’ SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION

Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

October 26, 2012 § 1 Comment

FACTS: Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty. On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States. On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty.

RULING: Petition dismissed. The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.

“Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.

“The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.

“Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.

“In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA VS. VINZON G.R. No. 154705, 2003 June 26

FACTS Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, entered into Maintenance Agreement with respondent. The agreement stated that the respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy buildings and the official residence of petitioner. Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of the said argument, they informed respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall be of the discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister Consellor Azhari Kasim. When the latter assumed the position, he allegedly found respondent's work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement, Hence, the Indonesian embassy terminated the agreement, The respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful, hence, filing a complaint before the RTC.

ISSUE 1. Whether the petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the Maintenance Agreement

3. Under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomat shall enjoy immunity from criminal jurisdiction, except in case of: (a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the recovering State; (b) an action relating to succession which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person; or (c) action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions. The act of the petitioners in terminating the Maintenance Agreement is not covered by the exceptions.

Shauf v. CA Loida Q. Shauf & Jacob Shauf, petitioners v. Hon. CA, Don E. Detwiler & Anthony Persi, respondents Second Division Doctrine: official v. personal capacity Keywords: void for overbreadth Date: November 27, 1990 Ponente: Justice Regalado

2. Whether the actual physic maintenance of the premises of the diplomatic mission is no longer a sovereign function of the State Facts: 3. Whether the petitioners may be sued herein in their private capacities

RULING 1. No. The mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis. If the foreign State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial activity, and in this case it has not been shown to be engaged, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii. Hence, the existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action arising out of the agreement shall be settled according tot he laws of the Philippines and by a specified court is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit. Submission of a foreign state must be clear and equivocal. It must be given explicitly or by necessary implication, The Court finds no such waiver herein.

2. No. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. A sovereign State establishes a diplomatic mission which necessarily include its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities for the same purpose. It is therefore clear that the petitioner was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into contract with respondent.

Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified. By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her nationality and sex. Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be selected to fill a future vacancy if she’s available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary Abalateo’s was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateo’s appointment was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to said position. She claims that the Abalateo’s stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation. Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil Service Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court, etc. RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual damages + 20% of such amount as attorney’s fees + P100k as moral & exemplary damages.

Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit. Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a suit against the US government which would require consent. Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule allowing suits against public officers & employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines & is not part of international law. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces

Held: No they are not immune. WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17932 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are hereby ORDERED, jointly and severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.

Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent."The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which suggests any arbitrary, irregular or abusive conduct or motive on the part of the trial judge in ruling that private respondents committed acts of discrimination for which they should be held personally liable. There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs' complaint that plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf was refused appointment as Guidance Counselor by the defendants on account of her sex, color and origin. She received a Master of Arts Degree from the University of Santo Tomas, Manila, in 1971 and has completed 34 semester hours in psychology?guidance and 25 quarter hours in human behavioral science. She has also completed all course work in human behavior and counselling psychology for a doctoral degree. She is a civil service eligible. More important, she had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS-1710-9 level for approximately four years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976. In filling the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, defendant Persi did not even consider the application of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, but referred the vacancy to CORRO which appointed Edward B. Isakson who was not eligible to the position.

Ratio: They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him.

Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. This is a carry-over from Article II, Section 9, of the 1973 Constitution ensuring equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed..

It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction

There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in committing the acts complained of have, in effect, violated the basic constitutional right of petitioner Loida Q. Shauf to earn a living which is very much an integral aspect of the right to life. For this, they should be held accountable

Respondents alleged that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf failed to avail herself of her remedy under the United States federal legislation on equality of opportunity for civilian employees, which is allegedly exclusive of any other remedy under American law, let alone remedies before a foreign court and under a foreign law such as the Civil Code of the Philippines. SC: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these remedies, but is entitled as a matter of plain and simple justice to choose that remedy, not otherwise proscribed, which will best advance and protect her interests. There is, thus, nothing to enjoin her from seeking redress in Philippine courts which should not be ousted of jurisdiction on the dubious and inconclusive representations of private respondents on that score.