Pil Case Digest.docx

KURODA V. JALANDONI G.R. No L-2662, 26 March 1949 Petitioner: SHIGENORI KURODA Respondents: Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE Colonel MARGARITO TORALBA Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO Colonel PEDRO TABUENA Major FEDERICO ARANAS MELVILLE S. HUSSEY ROBERT PORT FACTS: Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and commanding general of the Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the country. He was tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities committed against military and civilians. The military commission was established under Executive Order 68. Petitioner assails the validity of E.O. 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the military commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him because: 1. The Philippines is not a signatory to The Hague Convention (War Crimes) on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international. 2. The participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the Commission in behalf of the United State of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is a diminution of “a personality” as an independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are a violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice law in the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 68 (ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL WAR CRIMES OFFICE AND PRESCRIBING RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE TRIAL OF ACCUSED WAR CRIMINALS) is constitutional, whether the military tribunal jurisdiction is valid. HELD: 1.

E.O. 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda.

EO 68 was enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution which renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law including The Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan) 2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest because its country and people have greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner was being charged of. 3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of this special law. MARIA ANNY G. YANONG

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YAMASHITA VS STYER G.R. NO. L-129 DECEMBER 19, 1945 Petitioner: TOMOYUKI YAMASHITA Respondents: WILHELM D. STYER, Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Western Pacific. FACTS: Petitioner Tomoyuki Yamashita, the commanding general of the 14th army group of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, after his surrender became a prisoner of war of the United States of America but was later removed from such status and placed in confinement as an accused war criminal charged before an American Military Commission constituted by respondent Lieutenant General Styer, Commanding General of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific. Petitioner filed for habeas corpus and prohibition against respondent, asking that he be reinstated to his former status as prisoner of war, and that the Military Commission be prohibited from further trying him, upon the following grounds: (He questions, among others, the jurisdiction of said Military Commission) (1) That the Military Commission was not duly constituted, and, therefore, it is without jurisdiction; (2) That the Philippines cannot be considered as an occupied territory, and the Military Commission cannot exercise jurisdiction therein (3) That Spain, the "protecting power" of Japan, has not been given notice of the implementing trial against petitioner, contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1892, and therefore, the Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try the petitioner; (4) That there is against the petitioner no charge of an offense against the laws of war; and (5) That the rules of procedure and evidence under which the Military Commission purports to be acting denied the petitioner a fair trial. ISSUE/S: 1. WON the petitions for habeas corpus and prohibition be granted 2. WON the Military Commission constituted by respondent have jurisdiction over the war crimes. HELD: 1. NO. A petition for habeas corpus is improper when release of petitioner is not sought. It seeks no discharge of petitioner from confinement but merely his restoration to his former status as a prisoner of war, to be interned, not confined. The relative difference as to the degree of confinement in such cases is a matter of military measure, disciplinary in character, beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts. Prohibition cannot issue against one not made party respondent. Neither may the petition for prohibition prosper against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer. The Military Commission is not made party respondent in this case, and although it may be acting, as alleged, without jurisdiction, no order may be issued in these case proceedings requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner. The Court further ruled that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition even if the commission be joined as respondent. As it has said, in Raquiza vs. Bradford (pp. 50, 61, ante),

MARIA ANNY G. YANONG

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“. . . an attempt of our civil courts to exercise jurisdiction over the United States Army before such period (state of war) expires, would be considered as a violation of this country’s faith, which this Court should not be the last to keep and uphold.” 2. Under the laws of war, a military commander has an implied power to appoint and convene a military commission. This is upon the theory that since the power to create a military commission is an aspect of waging war, military commanders have that power unless expressly withdrawn from them. By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, the Congress of the United States has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the laws of war in appropriate cases. EREMES KOOKOORITCHKIN V. SOLICITOR GENERAL, G.R. NO. L-1812, AUGUST 27, 1948 FACTS: In August 1941, appellee-petitioner Kookooritchkin filed with the CFI of Camarines Sur a petition for naturalization, supported by: (a) the affidavits of ex-Judge Jaime M. Reyes and Dr. Salvador Mariano, residents of Camarines Sur; (b) his declaration of intention which was sworn in July 1940, and (c) notice of hearing. The petition was filed in August 1941 but was not heard until August 28 and Sept. 30, 1947 when appellee-petitioner presented his evidence, since the province was invaded by the Japanese forces during WWI and the case records had to be reconstituted after being destroyed during the war. Appellant SolGen cross-examined appellee-petitioner’s witnesses but did not file any opposition and did not present any evidence to controvert the petition. CFI RULING: The CFI granted the petition for naturalization, finding that appellee-petitioner was a nativeborn Russian who grew up as a citizen of and was part of the military of the defunct Imperial Russian Government under the Czars. He had several stints while in military service before he joined the White Russian Army at Vladivostok and fought against the Bolsheviks until 1922 when the latter force defeated the former. Refusing to join the Bolshevik regime, he fled by sea to Shanghai, and eventually went to Manila as part of the group of White Russians under Admiral Stark in March 1923. He finally permanently resided in Iriga, Camarines Sur except during his stint in the guerrilla force in Caramoan from 1942 to July 1945. The lower court also made findings of the establishment of his family, employment, social life, his ability to speak and write English and Bicol, his good moral character, adherence to the underlying principles of the Philippine Constitution, and being a stateless refugee belonging to no State. ISSUES: (1) WON appellee-petitioner’s declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen was valid and sufficient basis for his petition for naturalization;

MARIA ANNY G. YANONG

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(2) WON appellee-petitioner sufficiently established legal residence in the Philippines and could speak and write any of the principal Philippine languages, and (3) WON appellee-petitioner was stateless refugee. HELD: (1) YES. Section 5 of the Revised Naturalization Law applies and provides that:

“[n]o declaration shall be valid until entry for permanent residence has been established and a certificate showing the date, place and manner of his arrival has been issued.” While appellee-petitioner’s declaration was reconstituted, the attached certificate referred to in the declaration was not reconstituted. The SC ruled that the law does not state that the certificate is essential to the validity of the declaration as the only requirement is for the said certificate to be issued. There is the uncontroverted fact of appellee-petitioner’s peaceful and continuous residence in the Philippines for 25 years and statement in his declaration that a certificate had been attached to the said declaration. Hence, appellee-petitioner’s declaration was valid under law in view of other competent evidence showing the facts sought to be established under the certificate that was not reconstituted. (2) YES. Appellee-petitioner has sufficiently shown legal residence in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than 10 years as required by Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law. In addition, appellee-petitioner had good command of both English and Bicol. While there may be many standards out there, none was set in the law on the required ability to speak and write any of the principal Philippine languages. Appellee-petitioner got along well with his comrades during his hazardous days in the guerrilla movement thus showing that he satisfied the requirement of the law. There was also circumstantial evidence that appellee-petitioner also ought to know how to write Bicol, which uses the same alphabet used in English and so widely used in the Philippines. Given his good command of English as shown in his testimony, appellee-petitioner could easily make use of the same alphabet in the place where he had been residing for 25 years. (3) YES. Appellant SolGen asserted that appellee-petitioner failed to show that he lost his citizenship under the laws of Russia and that Russia granted to Filipinos the same right to be naturalized citizens. However, the SC still found that lower court did not err in finding appellee-petitioner as a stateless refugee. Appellee-petitioner’s testimony that he is not a Russian citizen and that he has no citizenship is uncontroverted. There is also the well-known ruthlessness of modern dictatorships giving rise to a great number of stateless refugees or displaced persons, without country or flag. The tyrannical intolerance of dictatorships to opposition translates into beastly oppression, concentration camps and bloody purges, such that it is only natural that those who flee to other countries to escape such a situation, such as appellee-petitioner, lose all bonds of attachments to their former fatherlands.

MARIA ANNY G. YANONG

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