Philo Exam 2 Lecture Notes

20 February 2008 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, pp.1-30 Lecture Notes I. Introductory Notes 1. Idealism and materialism • One of the basic distinctions made in Western philosophy is between idealism and materialism. o Idealism claims, in general, that the structure and order of reality are primary and precede all else.  Plato is typically categorized as an idealist. We saw that, for him, things in the world received their visible qualities and distinctive configurations from the eternal Forms. Moreover, he explained the possibility of human knowledge on the basis of these forms: what we can know about things in the world comes from our knowledge of the Forms.  For Plato, there must be something like the Forms; otherwise, how can we explain the human ability to recognize commonalities in the things and situations that surround us? How else can we explain the way these commonalities are produced in the first place, if not with reference to a common Form?  Although he does not deny the existence of matter, it is considered less important than the forms. o Materialism, by contrast, takes matter as its starting point. The task of the materialist philosopher is to account for all known phenomena—including human knowledge—without positing any pre-existing entity or force that would contribute structure to the universe. Obviously, the materialist will need to carefully explain how order can arise from out of disorder, and how human consciousness—which certainly seems immaterial—can be the product of material interactions.  In the history of Western philosophy, idealist philosophies have tended to dominate. There is, however, an important materialist lineage, of which Lucretius is one of the major representatives. o We can put this question another way. A major element of philosophy has always been to provide an inventory of the basic elements of reality. (Although to some extent this task has been taken up by modern science, this is a very recent development.) o So a key question for any philosopher or philosophical system is: What elements does it allow into its inventory? Again, Plato’s basic elements are the forms. For Lucretius, the two types of thing we find in the universe are atoms and void. He will describe how the combination of these two types of elements gives rise to the world as we know it. 2. Ancient atomism o Lucretius is not the first, or the only, philosopher to propose this type of theory. As the translator explains in the Introduction, at least two thinkers prior to Socrates proposed atomic theories. o Lucretius’ more direct source, however, is the Greek philosopher Epicurus, who lived a little after Plato (341-270 BCE). In fact, all of the theories presented in On the Nature of Things are taken from Epicurus. Since most of Epicurus’ own writings have been lost, Lucretius’ work is the most comprehensive and detailed presentation of Epicurean philosophy that we have.

3. Lucretius’ life and times • As the translator admits, we don’t know much about Lucretius himself. o He was born around 94-96 BCE, and died around 53-55. He probably lived in Rome. o He lived during a time of civil strife, since the Roman Republic was in the process of becoming the Roman Empire. (Just to give you some context, Julius Caesar came to prominence toward the end of Lucretius’ life.) o Although he clearly knew Greek, he wrote this book in Latin, for a Roman audience (specifically, the nobleman Memmius). 4. Language and form of the poem • Obviously, Lucretius presents his philosophy in a way that differs greatly from Plato’s dialogues, in both language and format. Lucretius himself comments on these issues of presentation. o First, he admits that it’s difficult to translate Greek ideas into Latin: the Latin language lacks equivalents for many Greek terms (l.136-139). (For this reason, the translator notes, Lucretius invents many new words.) o Later in Book One, he explains the reasoning behind his decision to present his philosophy in verse: The poetic format is basically the “spoonful of sugar” that will make the “medicine” (in this case, unfamiliar philosophical concepts) go down easier (l.935-950).  As the translator explains, the Romans of that time were inclined to be suspicious of Greek philosophy; no doubt Lucretius hoped that his poetic presentation would win them over. II. On the Nature of Things 1. Invocation of Venus; critique of religion (l.1-145) • Lucretius begins the book with an invocation of the Roman goddess Venus. o Venus is more or less equivalent to the Greek goddess Aphrodite. Why is she invoked here? B/c of her association with nature. o The Latin word natura is related to the verb nascor, which means “to be born” or “to be generated”. As the goddess of love, Venus is also associated with fertility, growth, and genesis. Thus, given that Lucretius is writing about nature, it makes sense for him to invoke Venus, asking her to be his ally (l.24) in his attempt to explain the nature—and especially the genesis—of all things. • Following his invocation of Venus, Lucretius says of the gods in general that they spend “everlasting time enjoying perfect peace,” that they have no need of human beings, and that the divine nature “is not won over by the good things we do nor touched by anger” (l.44-49). o Like ancient Athens, ancient Rome had a polytheistic religion. According to this religion, the gods were closely involved in human affairs; fulfillment of religious duty was thought to please the gods and bring benefits, while neglecting the necessary public and private rituals was likely to anger the gods, causing misfortune both in this life and after death. o Although Lucretius grants that the gods exist, his claim that they are indifferent to human affairs is highly unorthodox. • Lucretius takes a critical stance toward existing religion. Looking to the past, he sees a history of human beings oppressed by religion, “crushed beneath its weight” (l.62-70): he sees the fear of the gods as a major source of human suffering.

Fortunately, Epicurus revolted against the tyranny of religion; Lucretius sees himself as presenting Epicurus’ teachings. o But what about morality? Surely, without the fear of the gods, human beings are likely to misbehave? Lucretius anticipates this concern, and counters with the claim that religion itself “has produced criminal and unholy actions” (l.84). • Key example: the sacrifice of Agamemnon’s daughter, Iphigenia.  As long as human beings live in fear of the gods, they will be willing to commit any unjust act in order to incur divine favor and avoid divine wrath; in particular, they are at the mercy of various seers and priests.  Thus, what is needed is to free the people of their superstitious fears— and this is the purpose of Lucretius’ poem. By explaining the nature of the gods —and especially by explaining the nature of the soul, and what happens to it after death—he will show us that there is nothing to fear. 2. First principle: Nothing comes to be out of nothing (l.150-214) • The actual presentation of Epicurean philosophy begins around l.150, with his statement of the first principle: “nothing ever comes to be from nothing through divine intervention.” o Under what circumstances do we posit divine intervention? Typically when something happens without any discernible cause. o In saying that “nothing comes from nothing,” Lucretius is saying that for anything that happens, there is a cause. o To show that things must have a cause, he imagines a world in which the opposite were true. • Specifically, with respect to genesis and reproduction: if there were no need for a cause, then anything could give birth to anything. The fact that animals and plants give rise to offspring that resemble them, shows that there is a specific cause for each offspring: a “fixed seed” (l.169). Everything needs a seed from which to grow; where there is life, especially, we can be certain that there are “seeds” of some kind that are responsible for the emergence of that life. 3. Second principle: Nothing is destroyed into nothing (l.215-264) • The second major principle of Epicurean philosophy is complementary to the first: Although “nature dissolves each thing back into its particles,” it “does not destroy things into nothing” (l.215-216). o When something dies or is destroyed, what occurs is its decomposition into smaller parts, rather than the complete annihilation of the matter that makes it up. o His argument is similar here: if things could just vanish out of existence, they would do so; the fact that this is not what happens shows 1) that some force is needed to bring about the destruction of a thing, and 2) that destruction only reduces the object to its component parts. o There is a second problem with the belief that things can be reduced to nothing: surely, given enough time (and for the Romans, the world had always existed), everything would have vanished out of existence by now. o Lucretius explains his own position: there is a very large number of what he calls “first beginnings”, which are atoms: the smallest parts into which matter can be divided. [The word “atom” comes from the Greek atomos, which literally means “indivisible”.] Although no particular thing lasts forever, matter itself is indestructible (l.244-249). 4. Invisible particles exist (l.265-328) o

• Now that Lucretius has set down these two principles, he needs to show that we can still explain everything that happens in the world. However, not everything has an immediately visible cause: for this reason, he needs to convince us that the component bits of the world are invisible, too small to be seen. • To this end, he calls upon familiar experiences in which we readily acknowledge the physical reality of something we cannot see: o Wind: Although invisible, the wind can have devastating effects. Lucretius compares them to rivers (l.280-297), arguing that the wind, like the river, must have a “body” of some kind, a body that flows and exerts force upon other things; the only difference is that the wind’s body is invisible. o Smells, heat, sound: Again, we feel the effects of these things without being able to see what is producing the effect (i.e., we can see the source of the smell or sound, but not the smell or sound itself). o Condensation and evaporation (the water leaves the cloth, but we don’t see the droplets leave) o Erosion. o Based on this evidence, we can conclude that “nature conducts her business with invisible bodies” (l.328). 5. Void exists (l.329• So, assuming that we accept that the world is composed of imperceptibly small particles, the next step is to see how these particles interact. The first thing to note is that they are not “packed tightly” together; rather, they are surrounded by a void, and every perceptible body will actually be composed of a mixture of particles and void. o The existence of a “void” was a pretty big question for much of the history of Western philosophy and science. Many ancient philosophers, most notably Aristotle, denied the existence of empty space, maintaining that the universe is entirely full of existing things (to posit empty space is too much like positing a hole in being). • We need to assume the existence of void, says Lucretius, for otherwise we’d be unable to account for the existence of motion. Since “body” (or matter) obstructs movement, there must be empty spaces—sometimes invisible, like the spaces between particles of water— through which things can pass. o In order for something to move, the bodies that block its path must be displaced. But in order for this displacement to occur, there must be somewhere hitherto unoccupied where the displaced bodies can go, as Lucretius shows with the example of the fish moving through the water (l.372-380). • For examples, he mentions the capacity of water to seep through the rock of a cave; the ability of food to nourish the entire organism (not just the mouth and stomach); the passage of sound and heat/cold through solid objects. • Furthermore, only the void enables us to explain how two objects of the same dimensions can have different weight—it’s a question of the density of the component particles (l.358-359). • A final consideration; when two things, previously conjoined, suddenly separate, obviously air will rush in to fill the intervening space; but, says Lucretius, the air does not move instantaneously; in other words, there will, if only for a moment, be a void between the objects. • The basic components of the universe are therefore as follows: bodies (which can ultimately be reduced to their smallest component parts, called “first beginnings” or atoms) and void.

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Ordinary human perception will verify that this inventory is correct and complete: our perceptions tell us that bodies exist, and we can reason, based on the behavior of these bodies, that void must exist as well. Everything that appears in the world must ultimately be reducible to either of these things.  Note l.423: “Unless trust in perception is firmly founded and flourishes, in the case of hidden things there will be nothing to which we can refer to prove anything at all…” • In other words, radical mistrust of the senses is a dead end, because our reasoning ultimately relies upon the data we receive through our senses. (This means that Lucretius will need to come up with an explanation for the situations in which our senses appear to be mistaken or to deceive us.)

22 February 2008 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, pp.13-30 Lecture Notes I. Properties and accidents (l.449-484) II. Indestructibility and composition of atoms (l.485-634) III. Critique of previous philosophers: a) Heraclitus (l.635-711) b) Empedocles (l.712-829) c) Anaxagoras (l.830-920) IV. Infinity of the universe, space, and matter (l.951-1115) Last class: Idealism/materialism; Lucretius presenting the atomic theory of Epicurus; very critical of existing (Roman) religion, with its emphasis on fear of the gods; believes that when humans understand the true “nature of things,” they will see that there is no cause for fear; two principles (nothing comes from nothing, nothing is destroyed into nothing); components of the cosmos are invisible particles (“first beginnings” or atoms) and void (empty space). Unlike Plato, Lucretius downplays the gap between being and seeming, emphasizing the need to trust our senses. I. Properties and accidents (l.449-484) • Now that Lucretius has established his basic inventory, which includes bodies (made up of atoms) and void, he needs to account for everything that would appear not to fit into that inventory. He does this by introducing the distinction between properties and accidents. These are aspects of reality that are only attributes of body and space, with no independent existence of their own. o He defines a property as “that which is never able to be disjoined and separated off without a fatally harmful disintegration” (1.451-452).  These are attributes of bodies that cannot be separated or taken away without the body changing in kind (that is, ceasing to be what it is).  His examples are weight, temperature, tangibility, intangibility. (For example, if we take heat away from fire, it ceases to be fire.) o All other attributes are accidents: “things at whose arrival and departure the nature of things remains unharmed” (l.456-457).  This category includes human social phenomena such as slavery, poverty, wealth, freedom, war, and peace. Although these relations are important, they do not themselves impact the basic nature of things. (E.g., the

atoms making up my body do not change in kind depending on whether I am rich or poor.)  Perhaps unexpectedly, time (and history) also belong to this category. • With respect to time, Lucretius argues that we cannot sense time itself, independently of phenomena of movement. Rather, we gain our sense of time from “things themselves” and the changes they undergo. • Historical events have no independent existence, but are simply accidental attributes of places and bodies. This is a world in which things that happen have much less reality than the bodies affected by these events. II. Indestructibility and composition of atoms (l.485-634) o Now Lucretius tells us a little more about the component bits of his cosmos. In particular, he needs to show that atoms are solid and indestructible. o Atoms must be solid, he argues, because if they were porous (or soft), this could only be as a result of having some void mixed in with them. But once we’re dealing with mixtures, we’re no longer looking at the most basic level of reality. Void and atoms are mutually exclusive opposites. In order for there to be a mixture, we need to presuppose the existence of components that would not themselves be mixed. o We can put this another way: since all bodies on the macroscopic level clearly contain void, there must be some absolutely solid components involved in these bodies to hold in the void. o Now, because atoms are solid in this way, they are also indestructible. Why? B/c it is the state of being a mixture that leaves bodies susceptible to disintegration: “unless a thing has void in it it cannot be crushed, broken, or split by being cut in two…And the more void each thing contains within, the more it is attacked by these things deep within and is weakened” (l.532-537). o We can reach this conclusion through other arguments. If there weren’t some fundamental, indestructible bodies in the universe, by now everything would have been reduced to nothing (l.540); and since according to the first principle, nothing can come from nothing, the fact that anything exists at all shows that indestructible bodies must exist. o Along the same lines, if matter were infinitely decomposable or infinitely divisible, nothing would exist on the macroscopic level, since “anything can be dissolved more quickly than it can be rebuilt” (l.556-557). If the component pieces were infinitely small, it would take an infinite amount of time to construct anything (this is a version of Zeno’s paradox, btw). o Moreover, when we assume that atoms are solid, we can still explain the existence of soft bodies on the macroscopic level; whereas assuming that atoms are soft or porous would leave us unable to account for the existence of solid and hard things on the macroscopic level (l.565-573). o Finally, says Lucretius, the fact that nature seems to manifest fixed patterns and tendencies (for example, the markings particular to the members of a given species) suggests that there must be components with a fixed and unchanging nature (otherwise there’d be nothing to prevent things from incessantly fluctuating over time). o Although atoms are solid, however, this does not mean that they are entirely simple; rather, each is composed of “points” or “minimal parts”, which are “endowed with

the smallest nature possible” (l.603). These parts do not and cannot ever have an independent existence, and are only ever found united together in atoms. o We need to assume the existence of minimal parts in order to explain “those things which generating matter ought to have: different connections, weight, blows, meetings, motions, through which all things take place” (l.632-634). Atoms need a certain amount of substance in order to interact with each other to form larger bodies; there also needs to be some variation among the atoms, to explain how different types of macroscopic bodies arise. III. Critique of previous philosophers • In order to clarify his own stance, Lucretius takes some time to critique the physical theories of other philosophers, showing how his theory differs from, and corrects the failings of these other theories. 2. Heraclitus (l.635-711) • Heraclitus was a Greek philosopher of the 6th-5th centuries (one of the so-called “Presocratics”. o As Lucretius notes, Heraclitus used very enigmatic language, which often makes it unclear precisely what he means. In general, he seems to posit fire as the underlying matter of the universe; he also claims that everything is constantly in flux. • Lucretius argues that fire doesn’t work as a basic element: no matter what sorts of transformations we propose, fire retains certain basic properties (e.g., heat) which would seem to prevent it from giving rise to the macroscopic bodies we know. o An additional problem lies in the Heraclitean rejection of void, which would make it impossible for fire to undergo the few changes of which it is capable. • Finally, the doctrine of flux also seems to pose a problem: for if fire changes utterly, surely it ceases to be fire? “For whatever is changed and departs from its own limits, this is immediately the death of that which it was before” (l.670-671). o For these reasons, Lucretius concludes, fire cannot be the basic substratum of reality; rather, fire itself must be the result of certain configurations of basic elements that in themselves do not resemble fire in any way. • Note Lucretius’ emphasis (l.693-700) upon the need to rely upon one’s senses: Heraclitus and his followers make the mistake of throwing out most of the evidence provided by sense data. • The same arguments hold against any theory that makes one element (air, earth, or water) the basic material of reality. 2. Empedocles (l.716-829) • Empedocles was another influential Presocratic philosopher. (Incidentally, he led a very interesting life, claiming to be a god, and reportedly died by leaping into a volcano…) o Empedocles posited the existence of four elements—fire, earth, air, and water— and claimed that these were brought together and driven apart, in a cyclical manner, by the forces of Love and Strife. o The first problem centers upon the exclusion of void: although he denies the existence of void, Empedocles grants the existence of motion, and also the existence of “soft” bodies on both the macroscopic and microscopic levels—which, as we have seen, seems to require the existence of void. The refusal to posit a limit to the divisibility of matter also leads to difficulties, as we have seen. o The second major problem stems from the nature of the elements posited by Empedocles.

These elements are infamously “hostile” to each other; how, then, can we explain their combination into relatively stable and harmonious forms? • The only way for stable combinations to arise would be if the basic elements were to change their nature upon entering into these combinations; but if they undergo such changes, surely they cannot count as basic elements. • If, on the other hand, the elements do not change, we’re likelier to end up with a “discordant heap” of matter (l.775). • In order to explain the vast variety of macroscopic phenomena, we must assume that the underlying reality does not resemble any particular aspect of these phenomena, but rather “possess a nature that is secret and invisible, so that nothing can show forth which would fight against and hinder whatever is created from being able to exist with its own character” (l.779-781). • The only way to explain the productive interactions of different things (for example, the body’s capacity to benefit from food that doesn’t resemble it) is to assume that there are certain basic elements that are common to many things. • Lucretius reminds us of the alphabet: words and sentences—that is, large blocks of meaning and sound—are composed of individual units that do not resemble them. Depending on combination, the same basic units can give rise to radically differing sounds and meanings (l.823829). 3. Anaxagoras (l.830-othing is destroyed into nothing (l.215-264) • The next philosopher to be critiqued is another Presocratic, Anaxagoras. o According to this philosopher, the basic elements do resemble the larger entities that they compose (so blood is made up of tiny bits of blood, bone of bits of bone, and so forth). In order to explain more complex bodies, Anaxagoras claims further that everything has some of every element; the character of the macroscopic body is determined by the element(s) that predominate. o Lucretius’ first criticism is that, in making the underlying reality resemble visible reality, Anaxagoras unwittingly leaves the basic elements open to the same processes of destruction that act upon macroscopic bodies. o Although Anaxagoras seems able to account for the interaction of different things (the capacity of fire to arise from wood, or again, the human body’s ability to build itself out of food that does not resemble it), his explanation seems to fall apart when we look at the decomposition of complex bodies; if wheat contains little bits of blood, for example, we would expect to see it bleed when crushed! o

IV. Infinity of the universe, space, and matter • • • •

Cannot be limited. Mental experiment of the spear. Argument that matter would have accumulated at a certain point. Nothing can set a limit to itself (void is limited by body, body is limited by void: therefore the two must always alternate, infinitely). Matter must also be infinite. Since no intelligence combines the elements (rather, they enter into various combinations through chance and necessity), if there were only a finite number of them scattered throughout an infinite space, they could never have come together in collisions to form larger bodies (p.28).

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Aristotle and co. proposed a gravitation of each element towards its natural place (e.g. the center)—but how can there be a center of what is infinite?

25 February 2008 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, pp.32Lecture Notes I. Introduction to Bk. 2 (l.1-61) II. Movement of atoms (l.62-164) a) Atoms move continuously (l.62-182) b) Downward movement and swerve of atoms (l.183-294) c) Summary of atomic motions (l.295-332) III. Atomic shapes (l.335-588) Last class: We saw Lucretius conclude his basic inventory of the cosmos by introducing a distinction between properties and accidents. Each of these is an attribute of body or void, with no independent existence apart from these things; properties are intrinsic to bodies and cannot be removed without the body ceasing to be the kind of thing that it is, whereas accidents have no intrinsic connection to the things of which they are accidents. (Social phenomena, events, and time are all accidents.) Lucretius then offered a critique of the physical theories presented by his predecessors. In general, he argued that the basic constituents of reality cannot resemble macroscopic bodies, because it would then be impossible to explain the variety and coherence of existing things. I. Introduction to Bk. 2 (l.1-61) • Lucretius opens the second part of his poem with a brief discussion of the relative worth of various good things in human existence. o First, he offers an image: how wonderful it is (or would be) to be able to contemplate the woes of the world from a safe distance!  Keep in mind that he was writing during a very tumultuous period of Roman history—there were a lot of woes to contemplate. The emphasis here is less on schadenfreude than on withdrawal.  Whereas other contemporary philosophies (such as Stoicism) advocated political engagement, the Epicurean school recommended disengagement from most worldly events. o Secondly, he points out that the 2 basic prerequisites for human happiness are relatively limited, and easy to attain: 1) freedom from physical pain, and 2) “pleasant feelings” in the mind.  In particular, we don’t require a great deal of physical luxury in order to meet these requirements—nature itself provides what we need…  …and luxury isn’t much help when we are physically suffering.  But what about the effects of luxury and worldly position upon our peace of mind? • Here, too, it doesn’t seem to make much difference: the greatest enemy of mental peace is fear, which is immune to worldly wealth and power. o The only cure for fear is knowledge: philosophy has the power to “shatter” fear and darkness by presenting “the external appearance and inner laws of nature” (l.5961).

o After giving us this reminder, Lucretius continues his analysis of the workings of the cosmos. We know that the universe is composed of an infinite number of solid, indestructible atoms and an infinite quantity of void: now he’ll tell us a bit more about these atoms—specifically, about their movements. II. Movement of atoms a) Atoms move continuously o The first thing we need to know is that atoms move continuously. Not only is the apparent solidity of things filled with gaps; but the solid components of the world are themselves in continuous motion, causing a “mutual exchange” of matter from one thing to another (l.76). o Since the universe is infinite, with no limits or borders to hold atoms in place, they must be continuously moving through the void, “borne along by their own weight or by chance by the blow of another” (l.83-84). o Objects on the macroscopic level derive much of their distinctive characteristic from this movement: hard things like rock have atoms moving in close proximity to one another, continually striking each other and rebounding, while things like air and light are composed of atoms more widely spaced. o As a model for this phenomenon, Lucretius describes the behavior of dust motes in a sunbeam, emphasizing the constant movement of these tiny particles (l.114-120). o This movement, which originates in the invisible atoms, is communicated from these atoms to the larger compounds they form, resulting ultimately in the movements we perceive on the macroscopic level (l.132-140). o The velocity of atoms varies depending upon the medium through which they must travel—that is, depending upon the density of atoms in a given region. o [At the bottom of p.35, Lucretius gives us a preview of a point he will make later in the poem: the gods have nothing to do with any of this, and “the nature of the world has in no way been created for us by the gods”—which is clear from the manifest imperfections of this world.] b) Downward movement and swerve of atoms o Now, the default direction of the atomic movement is downward: like visible objects, atoms are carried downward by their weight. The basic substratum of reality is atoms raining down through the void. o But this is not the only atomic movement; occasionally the atoms stray from their downward trajectories: “in undetermined places they swerve a little from their course, but only so much as you could call a change of motion” (l.219-220).  [“Swerve” translates the Latin term clinamen, which often appears untranslated in discussions of Lucretius.] o Why must we assume that the atoms swerve? Because otherwise there’d never be anything more than the rain of individual atoms. The atoms fall at equal rates through the void, and so without the swerve, there’d be no interactions between them to give rise to larger-scale entities (l.221-225). o The swerve of atoms is random: it occurs at undetermined points. o Lucretius defines the distance or angle of the swerve as “no more than a minimum”, by which he means the very smallest possible unit of space. Since space and matter are not infinitely divisible, there can be a “smallest possible unit”. o What’s going on with this idea of a swerve? It’s one of the most infamous aspects of Epicurean philosophy, and has often come under attack. The randomness of it has often been disturbing to philosophers who believe that everything that happens

should have a sufficient reason. From the idealist standpoint, the origin of things should have greater and more perfect order than the things it produces. To say that the universe as we know it exists because a handful of atoms randomly swerved seems counterintuitive. o What is being addressed here, however, is the problem of equilibrium. If the world were in perfect equilibrium—or perfect order—what would happen? Nothing would happen. The phenomenon of things happening or changing emerges out of disequilibrium. o The idealist answer to this problem is often to say: things happen because God or the gods make them happen. But we’ve seen that Lucretius refuses to take that route. And the only other way to explain why things happen is to assume that there is some basic disequilibrium built into the system—in this case, the random swerving of atoms.  We can see an illustration of this need for disequilibrium even in Plato, for that matter. Recall the first city dreamed up by Socrates, the so-called “healthy” city. In a sense, that city was perfectly ordered, with resources and needs, input and output, in perfect equilibrium. But for this very reason it was useless as a model; Socrates and his interlocutors were unable to see where justice and injustice could arise within such a city, b/c nothing ever happened there.  In order to get a model that worked, Socrates needed to introduce a disequilibrium, in the form of excess desires, which played the role of swerving atoms, bringing conflict and disorder to the system—and it was in response to this conflict and disorder that the system evolved. o When an atom swerves, this brings it into contact with other atoms, causing a chain reaction. o For Lucretius, the swerve of atoms has far reaching consequences: most notably, it is responsible for free will. The deviation of the atoms “bursts the laws of fate”, disrupting the causal chain, allowing for a new beginning of movement (l.254-260). o He looks at the common experience of being subject to a physical impact: although the impact causes our bodies to move, something within us is able to fight back—we aren’t simply knocked around. Similarly, our minds seem to have some independent power of motion, and are not simply slaves to the impact of various stimuli. o Since “nothing comes from nothing,” we need to assume that there is something in the atoms themselves—some built-in indeterminacy—that could give rise to the indeterminacy that we experience in our mental lives.  [Of course, we can ask whether our experience of free will accurately reflects what is going on, or whether it is simply an illusion…] c) Summary of atomic movements • We’ve seen that there are 3 basic atomic movements: the general downward fall; the collision with other atoms; and the random swerve. • These are the only movements; since the universe has no outside, and contains nothing beside atoms and void, everything that happens is a result of these atomic interactions. • For this reason, says Lucretius, it’s not surprising that “the sum total seems to stand totally at rest, except if something is moved with its own body” (l.310-311). The net effect of these various motions is a relatively stable reality that conceals the incessant activity taking place on the atomic level. Atomic disequilibrium continually gives rise to relative equilibrium on the macroscopic level.

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To remind us that the stability and immobility of the cosmos is only apparent, Lucretius invokes the experience of beholding something at a great distance: typically, the motions of a distant thing are cancelled out, such that a moving thing can appear motionless.

Atomic shapes • Now that we’ve explored the movements of the atoms, the next step is to further determine their physical constitution. o We’ve seen that although atoms are solid, each is composed of a certain number of “minimal parts”. There must be a variety of different atomic shapes, Lucretius argues: otherwise it would be impossible to explain the distinctive differences between various things. o He chooses the example of a cow and its calf for good reason, because he wants to highlight a very special form of difference that seems to go beyond what could be explained solely through the arrangement of atoms: the differences between two individuals of the same species. Although the general form is the same, there must be something to make the difference, otherwise no parent could recognize its offspring. We can also arrive at this conclusion based on observations of partially permeable objects (for example, a surface that repels rain but not light): the easiest way to explain these phenomena is to assume that atoms are of different sizes and/or shapes. o He uses the doctrine of different shapes—smooth or rough or “hooked”—to explain the different textures of various substances, as well as their various impacts upon the senses (l.395-445). o On the other hand, the variation among atoms is not infinite: even assuming that each atom is composed of several different minimal parts, which can be differently arranged to produce variation, infinite variation would require an infinite number of minimal parts, causing some atoms to “possess bodies of unlimited size” (l.482). • Infinite variety of atoms would also cause an incessant production of ever more extreme phenomena, rather than the finite range we actually experience. • Although atomic variation is limited, however, he posits that each type of atom exists in infinite quantity (so that even if it appears rare in one area, it will be plentiful in another—cf. the example of the elephants). As he mentioned earlier, we need to assume an infinite amount of atoms in order to explain the existence of anything at all. o The interactions of atoms result in an equilibrium between destructive and productive forces: “a war is waged with a well-balanced contest of the first beginnings, carried on throughout infinite time” (l.573-574).

27 February 2008 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, pp.46-62 Lecture Notes I. Discussion of the “Great Mother” (l.598-660) II. The number of atomic compounds (l.661-729) III. Atoms’ lack of properties a) Color (l.730-841) b) Other properties (l.842-864)

IV. Atoms lack the capacities of living things (l.865-1022) V. Existence of other worlds (l.1023-1104) VI. Growth and decline of the world (l.1105-1175) Last class: Lucretius presented his theory of atomic movement. There are three basic movements performed by the atoms: 1) a downward fall (the default movement); 2) the clinamen, or random swerve, in which an atom deviates from its downward movement; and 3) the collision with other atoms. Since nothing comes from nothing, everything that happens must be a result of some combination of these 3 movements. Although it’s easy to criticize Epicurean philosophy for this idea of a random atomic swerve, it serves an important function: it establishes a minimal level of disequilibrium, without which nothing would ever happen. (In many ways we’re no further ahead in our theories about how everything began: although we may have some ideas about what took place shortly after the Big Bang, there’s no way to know for certain why this cosmic event took place; which means ultimately we cannot know for certain why there is something that exists, rather than nothing at all.) Lucretius then began a more detailed description of the physical constitution of the atoms. Although there must be a variety of different atomic types in order to account for the diversity of things in the world—especially diversity among things that would seem to have the same form (such as individuals of a species)—this variety cannot be infinite. Lucretius suggested that we can infer the shapes of different atoms based upon the impacts of various substances upon our senses. (To appreciate the advantages of this approach, it’s helpful to imagine how other theories would attempt to explain the same phenomena. For example, Plato would need to explain material properties based upon the forms: if something is bitter, it would be because it partakes of the form of bitterness. The problem with trying to explain things on the basis of forms is that we end up having to posit a huge number of different forms in order to deal with the various qualities we encounter in everyday life: a form of slipperiness? A form of roughness? Etc. Here the materialist account may be preferable b/c it is more economical—that is, it can explain the same phenomena with fewer principles.) I. Discussion of the “Great Mother” (l.598-660) • Lucretius pauses in his discussion of atomic nature to give a brief evocation of the various ways in which the earth has been worshipped. Notice that he attempts to attribute a symbolic meaning to each ritual practice (the use of wild beasts and eunuchs, for example). o Not only does this help to illustrate the awe with which human beings have tended to regard nature, but it also has a somewhat “demystifying” effect: by understanding the meaning behind these often terrifying religious spectacles, we are less likely to be intimidated by them (once again, Lucretius aims to remove the element of fear from religion). o So, after describing these ancient practices and beliefs, Lucretius tells us that they are “far removed from true reasoning”: for the earth is not a goddess, but rather “lacks feeling at all times” (l.653)—it is not sentient. Thus, although we may continue to speak of the earth as though it were a divinity, we must remember that this use of language is strictly metaphorical. II. The number of atomic compounds o We know that, although atoms are infinite in number, there is only a finite number of types of atoms. o Of course, most things will be compounded of many different types of atoms;

o First of all, most existing things clearly contain several different parts, each of which seems to be composed of somewhat different matter: “So too each living creature…is composed of bones, blood, veins, warmth, moisture, flesh, and sinews, which are also all very different, formed by different shapes of the first beginnings” (l.670-672). o There are also many cases in which an object is the source of something that does not resemble it (for example, the fire that would seem to be hidden within wood). o Finally, many objects appeal simultaneously to several senses: for example, a piece of fruit (touch, sight, smell, and taste). Since each sense appears to be sensitive to different sorts of particles (so that we don’t normally taste colors or hear perfume), this indicates that there are several different types of particles composing this kind of object. o On the other hand, although many different combinations of atoms are possible, the possibilities are not infinite: “it must not be thought that all particles can be connected in all ways” (l.700-701). o The analogy with the letters of the alphabet is repeated verbatim here: from a finite number of different letters, combined in a large (though finite) number of different ways, we get an expressive medium whose possibilities are practically limitless. o Similarly, in nature not every combination is possible; otherwise “monstrosities” would be the rule rather than the exception, and bodies—especially living bodies— would not be continually expelling matter from themselves. o Finally, the fact that each atom is limited in its connective capacities allows us to explain why all the various elements are not homogeneously mixed together: we have distinctive regions of the world—earth, air, and liquid bodies—as well as distinctive parts in each organism b/c each atomic type “prefers” to connect with certain other types. IV. Atoms’ lack of properties • A major question for materialist theories is whether (and which) macroscopic physical qualities are already present in the building blocks of reality. o Since these macroscopic qualities are important aspects of order, idealist theories tend to assume that they are always already present as formal principles (e.g., a form of whiteness, a form of bitterness). o We’ll see Descartes grapple with this issue as well: what is the status of qualities such as color, heat, texture, shape? Which of these qualities seem to be invariant (and therefore intrinsic to a particular object?) o As we’ve already seen, Lucretius treats most macroscopic properties as emergent phenomena, i.e., things that are not present on the atomic level, but which emerge as a product of the interactions of various atoms. a) Color • He devotes a great deal of space to demonstrating that color cannot be a property of the atoms themselves. • First of all, it’s clearly possible for us to conceive and to experience objects without color: blind people do this all the time, and so do the rest of us when we encounter an object in the dark. (In other words, color is not something that invariably accompanies our experience of a given object.) o He argues that, in order to be an atomic property, a given quality must be invariant (since atoms themselves are unchanging and eternal): qualities that are sometimes manifest and sometimes not must therefore be excluded.

o We can explain color on the basis of the different atomic shapes and combinations, whereas if we assume that the atoms themselves are colored, it becomes very difficult for us to explain the ways in which color changes (e.g., the changing colors of the ocean depending on the weather: if the atoms of the water were themselves blue-green, it would make no sense for them to turn white in places when the water was agitated—not to mention the fact that a handful of water isn’t remotely blue-green!) o It doesn’t help to attribute to atoms the capacity to be any and every color, for then we’d have a world in which everything was equally multicolored—or apt to change color incessantly. o Just as we accept that other properties such as sound and smell do not exist at the atomic level, we should also admit that the atoms themselves are colorless. b) Other properties • For the same sorts of reasons, the atoms lack most other macroscopic properties (moisture, temperature, odor, texture). • The atoms must be unchanging: therefore they cannot possess any qualities that are clearly subject to change. IV. Atoms lack the capacities of living things o But what about some of the more extraordinary macroscopic qualities—such as the capacities we see in living things? o The key example here is sensation, which seems to be an important dividing line between organic and inorganic nature. Because it is such an intrinsic capacity of living beings, sensation was often attributed to the component bits of these beings. If life isn’t there all along, how can we explain its emergence? • According to Lucretius, atoms lack sensation.  Nature continually exhibits the capacity to generate life out of inanimate matter: a typical ancient example was the emergence of worms out of damp earth. (This was believed to be a case of “spontaneous generation”: since it was not immediately apparent where all of these worms came from, the assumption was that they spontaneously emerged from the earth. There were similar theories in circulation regarding the appearance of maggots in rotting flesh; again, the intervening step in which eggs were first deposited was overlooked by ancient observers.)  But more generally, we see the transformation of the inanimate into the animate whenever we eat: matter without sensation becomes “sensitive” when it is incorporated into a living being (and the converse, when a formerly living body decomposes into inert matter). It would seem that it’s the arrangement of atoms, rather than any intrinsic qualities, that gives rise to sensation. • Of course, not just any random mixture of matter will produce life (l.889-890); for Lucretius, life depends upon a special type of atom (“soul atoms”), which is imperceptible, and which must enter into the appropriate combination with other atoms. o For the sake of argument, however, let’s assume that the component bits of sensitive beings are themselves sensitive: what consequences follow? o First of all, we notice that no part of a living organism retains sensation when it is separated from the whole (e.g., an amputated limb loses its capacity to sense). In order for atoms to experience sensation, therefore, they must in themselves be “like whole animals” (l.914). o But at that point they seem to lose their key atomic traits: not only would they seem to be subject to death and destruction (like all living things), but it’s hard to imagine how they might combine in larger wholes.

o When several human beings assemble in a group, what we get is just a group of human beings—not a new organism that would be composed of their totality. o If we try to get around this problem by assuming that atoms change in nature when they combine, it’s difficult to see why we needed to attribute these capacities to them in the first place. • Further evidence: when we strike a living organism, the result is often to render it either dead or unconscious (that is, permanently or temporarily unresponsive, lacking in sensation). If sensation were a property of the atoms themselves, it would be difficult to see why this would occur. Lucretius theorizes that striking the organism can “drive out” the atoms responsible for the combinations—the “life-giving knots” which produce sensitivity as a property of that organism. V. Existence of other worlds • Lucretius’ next major claim is rather unorthodox, at least for his time period: there is an infinite number of worlds in the cosmos. (Compare this to Aristotle, who placed the earth at the center of the cosmos…) o His argument is simple: given an infinite amount of void and an infinite amount of atoms, it makes no sense that their interactions would have managed to produce only one world. Rather, we would expect countless worlds to be generated through the same mechanisms and components responsible for our own. o He draws an analogy between earthly species and the world as a whole: just as there are no species with a membership of one, we should expect that the larger-scale entities that make up our world—things like the sun, the ocean, and the sky—also have counterparts elsewhere in the cosmos. o This is not a theologically neutral claim for Lucretius: since it would seem inconceivable that the gods could be in charge of countless other worlds in addition to this one, we must assume—since nature includes these other worlds—that the gods are not in charge of nature. (The concept of an absolutely omnipotent deity is quite foreign to Greek and Roman polytheism; moreover, each god tended to be associated with particular earthly regions.) o In other words, nature is autonomous; and since nature is what we as human beings have to deal with, fear of the gods is unnecessary and pointless. VI. Growth and decline of the world o Lucretius concludes this section of the poem with a general theory of growth and decline. • Things grow—that is, add atoms to their bodies—only up to a certain point; there seems to be a built-in limit to development for everything, a point at which “nature forcefully reins in growth” (l.1121). • This limit is not arbitrary: at a certain point, distribution of matter becomes an issue (for example, circulation of nourishment through the veins of a living thing, l.1136). • Having attained their limit, things begin their decomposition: this is owing to the continual impacts of atoms and larger bodies upon the organism, damaging its structure (like a wall subjected to a battering ram). The organism begins its decline precisely when what it takes in can no longer keep up with what it loses through this perpetual assault from its environment. o Lucretius seems to believe that the earth as a whole has entered into this stage of decline (a common belief among the ancients, who saw their own

time period as a decline from a “golden age” when the earth was more fertile and therefore required less labor, and when life was characterized by peace and physical well-being, rather than conflict and suffering). o Of course, on a cosmic scale the decline and eventual demise of our world means very little, as there are many other worlds; since the underlying atoms are not affected, the cosmos as a whole will persist eternally. 29 February 2008 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, pp.63Lecture Notes I. The fear of death (l.1-93) II. The nature of the soul (l.94-416) III. Proofs for the mortality of the soul (l.417Last class: Lucretius continued his description of atomic nature. First, he explained that there is a finite number of possible compounds of combinations of atoms: otherwise, the world would manifest far less order than it does. (If anything could combine with anything, there’d be nothing to prevent all the atoms from being homogeneously mixed together.) Next, he emphasized the lack of macroscopic properties on the atomic level. Any property that changes cannot be a property of the individual atoms themselves (since these atoms do not change). In particular, we saw, atoms lack sensation—that is, they are not themselves living beings. Rather, the capacity for sensation arises out of the combination of some atoms—so-called “soul atoms”—with other atoms to form an organism. He concluded the section with an argument for the existence of other worlds in the cosmos, and a general theory of growth and decline: things grow only as large as their structure intrinsically permits, and they decline as the result of continual impacts from surrounding atoms. Not only does this befall individual things, moreover, but it also happens to entire worlds; in fact, he sees our own world as having entered the stage of irreversible decline. (Since other worlds are continually coming into being, however, the cosmos as a whole is eternal.) I. The fear of death (l.1-93) • Lucretius begins Bk 3 by a praise of Epicurus. Here he makes it clear that his own role is to follow and transmit Epicurean philosophy, rather than to present any competing theories of his own. • The chief virtue of Epicurean philosophy is to dispel fear. It has this effect for 2 reasons: o It presents a more accurate picture of the gods as blissfully detached from human affairs; o It explains what befalls us after death, debunking the frightening myths of a shadowy afterlife or underworld (Acheron) filled with punishments. o But it’s not enough simply to explain that the afterlife does not exist; Lucretius must describe the nature of the human mind and soul, so that he can prove that these things are coterminous with the body. In other words, the reason why need not fear post-mortem punishments is that bodily death means the death of the entire person, such that there is nothing and no one left to experience anything, good or bad. o With regard to the fear of the death, Lucretius points out a contradiction in the practices of many people: although they claim to have no fear—or at least, to rank the fear of death far below other fears pertaining to life—their actions indicate otherwise. o This becomes apparent especially in times of trouble, when supposedly rational people are apt to worry about placating the gods.

 Remember Cephalus: even if you spend your entire life disregarding popular beliefs about death and the gods, when it’s a question of your own death, it’s hard to be so confident (hence the impulse to cover your bases through various sacrifices). o We can also attribute many other earthly behaviors to the fear of death: for example, the striving for power and wealth (this would have been a constant in Roman society, especially in the upper classes). We desire these things because they seem to stave off death or to put some distance between it and ourselves. o Sadly, through this very attempt to defeat death our own lives can become intolerable—sometimes to the point where suicide seems like a viable option. o The only cure for this fear is knowledge: specifically, knowledge of the nature of the mind and soul. II. The nature of the soul (l.94-416) 1. Corporeality of the soul o The mind—and the soul in general—shares the same corporeal (material) nature as the rest of our bodies. o Terminological note: the soul (Latin anima) is what is responsible for the animation of the body—that is, the fact that it is a living body rather than a dead one. The mind (animus) is the part of the soul responsible for consciousness, emotion, thought, etc. The mind acts as a control center for the soul, which responds to mental impulses. o Lucretius rejects one common theory of the soul, which is that it would be, not a physical thing, but an organizational state or principle—a “harmony”—giving life to the body. According to such a theory, consciousness would be diffused throughout the body, rather than being localized (l.99-104). o He refutes this theory by pointing to cases in which the mind can experience a feeling (pleasure or pain) contrary to that which is experienced by the body. (For example, feeling happy despite the fact that you have a stomachache.) Sleep is another good example: although the body is inert, the soul experiences all sorts of things as it dreams. o If the soul were really just a “harmony” of the body, with no distinct nature of its own, we wouldn’t expect it to have any experiences distinct from those of the body as a whole. o But the soul isn’t confined to a single part of the body, either: it extends throughout our limbs and extremities (l.119-120). 2. The mind is joined together with the soul o Next, Lucretius elaborates upon the relationship between the mind and the soul: although the two “are held joined together with each other and make one nature from each other”, the mind—which is believed to be located in the chest, rather than in the head—is in charge. o The fact that we tend to feel strong emotions in our chest suggests that this is where such emotions originate. o Because it is localized, the mind can have pleasures and pains independent of those in the rest of the body. o On the other hand, we know that the mind is connected with the soul, and the rest of the body, based upon the fact that extremely strong mental stimuli—such as fear—have an impact upon the rest of the body (he gives the example of someone who faints from extreme fear).

o How do we know for certain that the mind and soul are corporeal? We know because it seems to follow necessarily from the interaction between mind/soul and body. o On the one hand, we see that the body responds to the impulses it receives from the mind, just as it would respond to a “push” from an external force. In order to have this kind of effect upon matter, the mind and soul themselves must be material (otherwise it’s hard to see how they can have any effect at all). o On the other hand, we see clearly that what happens to the body also affects the mind: when someone runs us through with a spear (l.170) our mind isn’t remotely detached from this state of affairs. 3. The atoms of the soul o Therefore, the soul is material. This means that it is made up of tiny atoms. The atoms making up a soul differ from other atoms with respect to their size and texture: they are “exceedingly small” and fine-grained. • We can deduce the size of these atoms based upon the movements we observe in the soul. When we have an impulse to perform some action, our limbs move practically instantaneously; this means that something has carried the message from our mind to the rest of our body with lightning rapidity. • We know, however, that larger and heavier particles have much less mobility than smaller, lighter ones (poppyseeds vs. rocks, l.197203). • A second piece of evidence: when we die, the soul leaves the body. (Since the soul is responsible for life, this is an obvious claim.) Yet despite the departure of the soul, the body retains its original weight and physical configuration, which suggests that whatever is removed must be extraordinarily tiny. 4. Types of soul atoms o Although all the particles of the soul are very tiny, however, they cannot all be of the same type: in fact, there are four different types of atoms at work. o Here Lucretius is attempting to account for all the phenomena associated with the soul. o Three of these things have to do with the physical qualities that distinguish a living body from a dead body: the living body emits breath, heat, and air. o The fourth type of soul atom is responsible for sensation in the living body. This final type is the finest particle of all. (On line 275 Lucretius describes this as “the soul of the whole soul”—just as the soul is the invisible force responsible for the movements of the body as a whole, the fourth type of soul atom is most invisible aspect of the soul that nevertheless directs its movements. o Looking at the other three types of atom, Lucretius can now use their differences to explain differences of temperament observable among various animals and human beings (a predominance of heat leads to anger, a lot of breath leads to fear, a lot of air leads to calmness). 5. Unity of soul and body • In the next stage of his argument, Lucretius emphasizes the interdependency and inextricability of mind, soul, and body. • Remember that, for Lucretius, we explain the various properties of a thing by assuming that it contains different types of atoms. One question we can ask is whether a given property—that is, a given type of atom—can be removed from a thing without causing its destruction.

He gives 2 examples: the removal of fragrance from frankincense, and the removal of heat from water. The former cannot take place without destroying the thing itself, whereas the latter can. The question is, are soul and body related in the way that frankincense is to its fragrance, or in the way that water relates to heat? On the one hand, the body seems clearly to depend upon the soul for its growth and motion; the body cannot lose its soul without immediately beginning to lose its physical integrity as well. o But the soul would seem to be equally dependent upon the body for its own functioning. • For example, sensation: although the soul is what causes sensation in the body, it is the body that experiences this sensation—this is obvious from the fact that sensation ceases when our sense organs are damaged or destroyed. • Sensation occurs when the various soul-particles scattered throughout our body are struck by other particles from the outside world: this motion then gets communicated from one soul particle to another. o The most crucial part of the soul is the mind: although the body can continue to function having lost a limb (and the soul-particles it contains), once the mind is gone, the rest of the soul quickly follows. 

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III. Proofs for the mortality of the soul o Now that he has explained the constitution and functioning of the soul, Lucretius will attempt to demonstrate that the soul cannot survive the death of the body. He will give several arguments and types of evidence to support this point: 1. The soul is made of ultra-fine particles—finer even than fog or smoke, and far finer than water. But the thing about smoke or water is that, unless contained by some other structure, they tend to dissipate (e.g., what happens to water when its container is shattered). We would expect a similar thing to happen to the particles of the soul once they leave the body: since they acquire their cohesiveness from the body, they’ll lose it upon departure. 2. Our mental powers do not remain constant over time, but vary according to our physical state: just as our bodies grow and decline, so do our minds. Our minds are also affected by the diseases and injuries suffered by our bodies, not to mention the ingestion of physical substances such as alcohol. Now, if the soul were able to function independently of the body, we would expect it to be unaffected by these types of events. 3. In general, to be susceptible to confusion and hindrance is a sign of mortality; that is, the fact that the soul is at all affected by any physical cause indicates that a sufficiently strong cause will be enough to destroy it. 4. It’s possible for the mind and character to be changed: like the body, it can suffer from illness and be improved by medicine. But changeability is itself already the beginning of death: “what is immortal does not allow its parts to be rearranged nor anything to be added nor a tiny bit to flow away” (l.518-519). 5. Soul atoms tend naturally to be dispersed; the body serves the function of keeping them in proximity to each other. But they must be in some proximity to communicate with each other (i.e., to form a functioning totality). Thus, when they are no longer confined within the body, these particles will cease to communicate and the soul will cease to exist. 5 March 2008

Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, pp.78-92; pp.127Lecture Notes I. Further evidence for the mortality of the soul (l.624-823) II. Why we should not fear death (l.824-977) III. The meaning of hell (l.978-1023) IV. The heroism of Epicurus (Bk. V, l.1-54) V. The nature of the gods VI. The mortality of the world Last class: Lucretius presented his theory of the mind and soul. I. Further evidence for the mortality of the soul (l.624-823) • The atoms responsible for sensation operate in the following way: b/ they are “held in by the whole body commingled through veins and flesh, through sinews and bones, and are unable to leap apart at great distances freely, thus enclosed they set in motion sense-bearing motions” (l.565-570). o It is the mutual proximity of the soul atoms that allows them to communicate; and our experience of consciousness and sensation arises precisely from out of this communication. In other words, there are two prerequisites for sensation: 1) the distribution of soul-atoms throughout the body; 2) their communication and contact with one another.  Again, this is not unlike modern theories of the nervous system (so that, when the lines of communication are severed, we no longer sense a given part of the body).  According to this kind of theory, sensation is a phenomenon that arises globally (remember his earlier argument that individual atoms are not equipped with sensation). • We tend to imagine the soul as though it still were equipped with various physical senses (esp. sight and hearing) after death: this would follow from the belief that it is immortal, since the soul is what causes the body to be capable of sensation. • In both ancient and more recent times, artists and writers have depicted the souls of the dead in this way. o But Lucretius has already shown us that functioning bodily sense organs are required in order for sensation to take place, and a disembodied soul has no access to such organs. o As further evidence that sensation results from the communication of atoms distributed throughout the body, Lucretius offers an anecdote from the battlefield: when a limb is suddenly severed, it takes a little time for us to realize it—and this is precisely what we would expect if the body were constructed the way he describes it. What causes this time lag is the fact that there are still active soul-atoms in the severed limb that only “learn” they are detached when they attempt and fail to communicate with the atoms in the rest of the body; similarly, the rest of the body learns that a limb has been severed when the body’s soul atoms try and fail to contact those in the severed limb.  The only other possible explanation would be that there are several complete souls scattered throughout the body; but in that case the totality making up an individual is still composite, and still subject to dissolution.

o One common ancient theory suggested that the soul was repeatedly incarnated in various living things. Although immortal, however, the soul did not retain its memories from one lifetime to another.  Plato proposes a version of this theory in several of his dialogues.  Lucretius asks: what is the “cash value” of such a belief? In particular, if there is no continuity of experience from one lifetime to another, how is this any different, practically speaking, from the assumption that the soul is destroyed along with the body? o When we ask what allows for the continuing identity of consciousness, continuity turns out to be a key factor. If this continuity perishes, then in a very real sense the previous identity has been destroyed. o There are other issues with this theory as well. In the first place, if the soul can exist independently of the body, why would it ever become embodied in the first place? Surely it would spare itself a lot of suffering and inconvenience by remaining incorporeal. o But even assuming that the soul has good reason for wanting a body, how do we explain the regular appearance of certain psychological features in certain species? (If souls circulated freely among bodies, surely “living creatures would have mixed up manners” (l.749). o Even if souls circulate only within the limits of a particular species, there’s no good reason why the experience accumulated in one lifetime would not transfer to the next (leading to infants being born wise, etc.). Again, if the soul undergoes change upon entering the body, this indicates that it is mortal. o Lucretius next presents the ludicrous image of a throng of souls hovering around whenever there’s a chance of conception, squabbling over which one gets to inhabit the newly-conceived organism.  Finally, the fact that the mind is localized within the body shows that it can’t exist just anywhere: if we accept that thought does not and cannot take place in our feet, then why would we expect that it could occur floating in the air? II. Why we should not fear death (l.824-977) o “For if by chance someone is going to do badly and suffer in the future, the person who could do poorly must exist at that time too” (l.861-863). In order to suffer, we must exist—and specifically, there must exist the prerequisites for consciousness and sensation. Since the soul is dispersed at death, there will be no consciousness present to experience suffering. o Thus the common concern for how the corpse is treated is misplaced. (Note: for many of the ancients, this was a really big deal.) We worry about this because we haven’t fully thought through the consequences of death. o Similarly, the ancients feared the afterlife because of the absence of various earthly pleasures—especially the lack of any ability to continue to participate in one’s earthly affairs and relationships. o What the traditional accounts fail to mention is that, in addition to lacking the ability to enjoy these things, the dead person lacks any desire for them—so it’s not a deprivation after all. o Taking sleep as his model, Lucretius reminds us that “no one misses himself or his life, when both his mind and body equally rest in sleep” (l.919920)—only when already conscious do we desire the continuation of consciousness and fear its dissolution.

o Nor should we view our mortality as an injustice, since it applies to everyone, and is a precondition for the production of anything new. III. The meaning of hell (l.978-1023) o Lucretius next turns to the traditional accounts of punishment after death, and argues that these are allegories of what we experience in life. (Once again, he is trying to take away the terrifying power these images have over us, by explaining their true significance and thereby de-mystifying them.) o Each of these figure can be seen as representing the torments we undergo while alive: we are consumed with desires and anguish, we struggle incessantly against overwhelming opposition, we experience everything nature has to offer without ever really enjoying it. • We only assume that these things will occur after death based on extrapolation from existing earthly penal systems. (Ancient practices of justice often emphasized torture.) • As it is, the greatest suffering we experience stems from our fear—which is, at bottom, the fear of death. [We’ve skipped Bk. IV, which focuses upon the way in which we perceive and think. His basic theory is that every existing thing is continually shedding images of itself, like a snake shedding its skin: these images circulate continuously, entering our senses (which causes perception) and our minds (which causes thought and dreams). For the ancients, the fact that we often dream of the dead was taken to be evidence that the soul survives after death; Lucretius explains that this is simply the result of our encounter with left-over images of the dead person (images that have survived the person herself). He also addresses the validity of sense perception with a lengthy discussion of optical illusions. He claims that our senses do not deceive us, even in these cases: rather, we go astray when we make faulty inferences based upon our perceptions. (We’re do not perceive falsely; rather, we interpret falsely.) Lucretius also argues at length against romantic/erotic love, suggesting that it’s better just to enjoy sex without getting emotionally involved.] IV. The heroism of Epicurus (l.1-54) • As usual, Lucretius opens the section with a more general discussion; in this case, more praise of Epicurus. • He compares Epicurus to the Greek hero Herakles (=Hercules), who performed many feats of monster-slaying. The twist is that Epicurus is even greater than Herakles; for whereas Herakles killed monsters that human beings could easily have avoided anyway, Epicurus tackled the fears and desires that torment all human beings on a daily basis. V. The nature of the gods (l.110-234) o Although Lucretius has already given us some indications about the gods— specifically, that they don’t intervene in human affairs—he must now explain in more detail both what sort of beings the gods are, and how it is that human beings came to have erroneous ideas about them o In dealing with the gods, Lucretius first attacks the traditional association of the gods with the heavens (sun, moon, planets, stars). He argues that the mind and its activities cannot exist just anywhere; rather, they exist only in certain bodies, bodies with the form of animals. o Moreover, the gods do not and cannot have their dwelling place in our world. Since the gods are made of more “rarefied” matter than us (as is evidenced by the fact that they are invisible to us), it would make no sense for them to live in the same material world

as we do. Rather, their habitat must be in keeping with their nature. (In the same way that a fish can’t live on land, and a tree can’t live in the clouds, a god can’t live on earth.) o Lucretius devotes the most space to the issue of the relation of the gods to human beings. o First, there is the question of whether the gods are in any way responsible for the creation of the world and of humans. The main problem here is one of motivation: why would beings who already have everything they need want to create us? o Ancient traditions often claimed that the gods created human beings because they required the sacrifices we perform for them. But this doesn’t make much sense: what good does our gratitude do the gods? By definition, the gods would seem to have no need of us. o Another possible explanation is that the gods created humanity out of a desire for something new. But again, it’s hard to reconcile this desire for the new with the assumption that the life of the gods is already perfect: the desire for the new is typically associated with dissatisfaction with what already exists. o Finally, we could argue that the creation of humanity was an act of altruism on the part of the gods. But what harm could it have done us never to have been created? (It’s the same as his argument for why we don’t suffer after death: you need to exist in order to suffer.) • A second problem: where would the gods have gotten the idea to create us? According to what pattern would they have formed us? It makes more sense to assume that humanity is the result of random collisions of atoms. To design something, you need a pattern; but no pattern exists when it’s a question of making something entirely new. (Remember that for Lucretius, there are no preexisting forms floating around out there: when we impose a form upon something, we must therefore draw upon existing things as models.) • Aside from all this, however, Lucretius thinks we can confidently assert that the world was in no way created or arranged for our benefit. The proof is that it seems very badly designed from the point of view of human comfort and well-being. Most of the earth is not suitable for human life, and the parts of it that are require a lot of invested labor before they produce the minimal requirements for human survival. Moreover, the world is full of hazards: there are countless other organisms that constantly threaten our survival (death by wild beasts was a far more common occurrence back then—but nowadays we could cite the example of bacteria and viruses). • In many ways we are worse off than the other animals, which seem to maintain themselves from birth with far less difficulty than we do. V. The mortality of the world • We saw at the end of Bk. II that Lucretius believes that the world itself is subject to decline and death. Now he’ll argue this point in greater detail. • It’s clear that entities of the same approximate scale as human beings are as mortal as us; we can see them come and go. But when it’s a question of the earth itself, we’re looking at a much larger scale than we’re accustomed to dealing with. Lucretius begins with the major components: land, air, water. o The earth beneath our feet is constantly growing and declining. It seems to give up parts of itself through processes of evaporation and erosion, while it regains matter when organisms die and rot. o Similarly, bodies of water observably fluctuate in volume.

o The argument for the mortality of air is a little more complicated, but the theory is as follows: everything is always in the process of giving off particles (this is his theory of perception), which add to the sum total of air. But obviously the air must give some of this matter back, or else the entire world would have melted into air by now. Like land and water, the air is in a state of growth and decline. o Even the light of the sun and the stars seems to come and go. It seems that new light must be constantly produced (otherwise when a cloud blocked the sun, the area beneath the cloud would not fall into shadow, because the light cast by the sun would still be there). o Another argument comes from history. If the world had always existed—which was the assumption of many philosophers—then we would expect recorded history to go back a lot further than it does. The finite—and relatively small—number of recorded events is enough to suggest, not only that the world has a definite beginning point in time, but that this beginning was not very long ago. [Since Lucretius seems to think that the earth is already in a state of decline, this means that its lifespan isn’t particularly long.] o Some ancient thinkers tried to account for this by positing a cycle of growth and destruction of human civilizations (for example, the various legends of a flood that wiped out all existing societies). The problem is that to be susceptible to these sorts of upheavals already means that the world is mortal; again, it’s just a question of when it will succumb to destruction. o The only eternal items in the world are atoms and void: any mixture of these will ultimately perish, because being a mixture means being inherently unstable. 7 March 2008 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, pp.78-92; pp.127Lecture Notes I. II. III. IV. V.

The mortality of the world (l.235-416) The origins of the world (l.417-508) Celestial phenomena (l.509-782) Origins of life (l.783-924) Development of human society

I. The mortality of the world • We saw at the end of Bk. II that Lucretius believes that the world itself is subject to decline and death. Now he’ll argue this point in greater detail. • It’s clear that entities of the same approximate scale as human beings are as mortal as us; we can see them come and go. But when it’s a question of the earth itself, we’re looking at a much larger scale than we’re accustomed to dealing with. Lucretius begins with the major components: land, air, water. o The earth beneath our feet is constantly growing and declining. It seems to give up parts of itself through processes of evaporation and erosion, while it regains matter when organisms die and rot. o Similarly, bodies of water observably fluctuate in volume. o The argument for the mortality of air is a little more complicated, but the theory is as follows: everything is always in the process of giving off particles (this is his theory of perception, as well as the reason for the inevitable decline and decay of all existing things), which add to the sum total of air. But obviously the air must give

some of this matter back, or else the entire world would have melted into air by now. Like land and water, the air is in a state of growth and decline. o Even the light of the sun and the stars seems to come and go. It seems that new light must be constantly produced (otherwise when a cloud blocked the sun, the area beneath the cloud would not fall into shadow, because the light cast by the sun would still be there). o Another argument comes from history. If the world had always existed—which was the assumption of many philosophers—then we would expect recorded history to go back a lot further than it does. The finite—and relatively small—number of recorded events is enough to suggest, not only that the world has a definite beginning point in time, but that this beginning was not very long ago. [Since Lucretius seems to think that the earth is already in a state of decline, this means that its lifespan isn’t particularly long.] o In general, the mortality of the world as a whole—including the heavens— follows from the fact that the universe or cosmos is much larger than the world. In other words, the world as a whole is spatially finite. But anything spatially finite by definition has something outside of it, something that will ultimately break down its limits—its integrity— and thereby dissolve it.

II.

The origins of the world • Since the world is mortal, this means it cannot always have existed throughout infinity; therefore it must have had a beginning point. • Remember that the default motion of atoms is the fall through the void; the reason why anything larger than atoms exists is that at some point one or more atoms swerve from this downward trajectory, which brings them into contact with other atoms. • These random connections between atoms eventually give rise to the particular combinations that can become living things. Lucretius emphasizes the absence of any plan or intelligence behind this process. • So what happens? • First of all, when one atom swerves, this sets in motion a chain reaction causing a “storm” of colliding atoms (l.436). • Lucretius has already shown, however, that the number of possible atomic combinations is finite. Thus the storm immediately begins to subside, as the atoms find their preferential combinations. It’s like when we have a mixture of oil and water: given the chance, the oil molecules will not stay mixed with the water molecules, but will rise to the surface of the water and join with each other there. Similarly, since each atomic particle has its own specific density, each finds its appropriate level (aether above air, air above earth, etc—this process is described on pp.139-140). III. Celestial phenomena (l.509-782) • Before discussing the origins of life, Lucretius takes a long time explaining the mechanics behind the movement of the sun, moon, and stars. • The reason for this is simple: celestial phenomena have always been a primary source of superstition and religious faith. (Granted, it’s no longer common nowadays to identify the planets with divinities, but there’s still a sizeable portion of humanity that grants some credence to the claims of astrology.) The observable regularities in celestial movements filled ancient human societies with wonder, and with the conviction that some divine power must be responsible for originating and maintaining this orderly behavior. On the other hand, apparently anomalous events such as eclipses filled human beings with fear, convincing them that the order of the cosmos was being shaken by the wrath of these same divine powers.

• Therefore, Lucretius needs to explain both the regularities and the apparent anomalies. With respect to the regularities, he shows that they are simply results of the atomic interactions he has already described (for example, he attributes the motions of the stars to the existence of air currents). With respect to the anomalies, he shows that these, too, are a part of the cosmic order, and are in no way the “symptoms” of divine intervention. • Note that, for some phenomena, it’s impossible to give “a single and straightforward explanation” (l.614). His point is not that these things are absolutely inexplicable, but that there seem to be multiple possible causes for them—as well as possible variations upon the order to which we are accustomed (e.g., the phases of the moon, l.731-736). In the absence of any reason to prefer one of these reasons over the other, we should be open to multiple explanations. o What’s really important here—and what makes Lucretius similar to modern scientists—is a combination of faith and the recognition of fallibility: on the one hand, Lucretius acknowledges that we don’t yet have all the answers, and should be open to multiple explanations in many cases; but on the other, he is profoundly committed to the belief that everything is ultimately explicable on the basis of rational principles, and that we have the power to intelligently choose one type of explanation (e.g., atomism) over another (e.g., divine intervention). IV.

Origins of life (l.783-924)

o Turning back to the question of the origin and development of the cosmos as we know it, Lucretius tackles the question of life. o The earth is seen as the origin of all living things: not only vegetable life, but also animal life. • Plant life comes first; Lucretius compares the growth of plants upon the earth’s surface to the growth of hair, fur, and feathers upon the skins of animals (in other words, the earth as a whole is treated like a giant organism) (l.788789). • Next comes animal life. Some existing theories at the time claimed that animal life had always existed; some claimed that animals were created by the gods; nowadays, of course, we tend to favor a theory of evolution of more complex life forms out of less complex ones. Lucretius’ theory is somewhat unique: the first members of each animal species originate in “wombs” upon the surface of the earth. (Much like the “noble lie” given by Socrates, in which the citizens are said to have been born from the earth itself). This is Lucretius’ answer to the question, Which came first—the chicken or the egg? • At a certain point, however, and as a result of the aging of the world, the process of genesis changes and becomes indirect: instead of the earth directly generating all organisms, many of these organisms acquire the capacity to reproduce themselves, whereas the world becomes less fertile than previously (p.149). o Once again, note the emphasis upon the complexity and contingency of the process of genesis: not every organism initially generated by the earth has the capacity to survive. If it cannot both sustain and reproduce itself, it is destined to perish; the gods are not about to intervene to save it from its inherent design flaws. o Some species, naturally less adept at self-preservation, have entered into symbiotic relationships with the human species, which protect them in exchange for the useful products and services they provide.

o Finally, Lucretius denies that various mythological creatures ever existed—in particular, the kinds consisting of some combination of actually existing animals (e.g., the centaurs = human + horse; satyrs = human + goat). o What rules out the survival of these species is the incompatibility between their parts (for example, the vastly differing rates of development and lifespan for a human being and a horse; or the different nutritional requirements of a human and a goat). o The point here is that “nature”—that is, the particular laws governing the constitution and interactions of atoms and void—cannot be overruled: there is no realm of the supernatural that would exist in defiance of the laws of nature (although there may well be aspects of nature that we do not yet fully understand). If something seems to fly in the face of what is naturally possible, this is strong grounds for assuming that it doesn’t exist. V.

Development of human society

o Lucretius next takes up the question of how human society evolved into the forms we now see. His purpose here is to provide a rational account capable of replacing the mythological traditions. o He therefore begins with human beings in an entirely “wild” state, showing how, over time, these beings came to reproduce themselves and to become “civilized”. o You’ll notice that he takes particular care to show how the various skills and technologies—agriculture, weaving, metallurgy—came into existence. It’s necessary for him to explain these the origins of these forms of knowledge because typically they were said to be gifts from the gods. (For example, many cultures have legends associated with the discovery of fire; the ancient Greeks claimed that it was a gift from the Titan Prometheus, who stole it from the gods and was subsequently punished for his theft.) To justify his claim that the gods do not intervene—and have never intervened—in human affairs, Lucretius must give plausible accounts for how these skills could emerged naturally as a result of experience, trial, and error. o He also debunks the myth of a “golden age” at the dawn of history, in which human beings lived in greater ease and harmony (pp.152-153); in particular, they were subject to the predation of wild beasts, the violence of the elements, and scarcity of food. o The case of language is somewhat interesting. Rather than assuming that it was the invention of a single individual—who then would have taken it upon him- or herself to bestow names upon the things in the world (an activity often associated with magical efficacy) Lucretius insists that language emerged more or less simultaneously within the human species as a whole, a result of the deployment of a natural capacity. o His point is similar to one made by some modern philosophers of language: human language is a social phenomenon (a private language, in a world in which nothing like a language existed anywhere else, would be impossible—to have a language you need at least two speakers, which is why most “private languages” are generated by twins). o He also emphasizes the continuity of human language with the vocalizations employed by animals: if dogs, horses, and birds can use different sounds for different situations, why is it so surprising that human beings would be able to do the same thing (p.155)?

o The next step is to look at the rise of political organization (here Lucretius focuses upon Roman history). In particular, the origins of social hierarchy: initially based upon preferential treatment of the strongest and most beautiful individuals, social position soon came to depend upon the distribution of property. And although property itself is initially distributed according to criteria of physical merit, the mechanisms of inheritance cause it to be liberated from these criteria after a handful of generations has passed: wealth/property itself, rather than being the result of merit, becomes the criterion for merit within society. o Social ambition is attributed to the desire to “ground” this merit: a wealthy person desires to reinforce his/her fortune with social status (fame, political power). Lucretius’ stance upon these ambitions is clear: it’s best to remain detached from such things, since by raising yourself above others, you invite attacks fueled by their envy. o He gives a rough account of Roman history: first the monarchies, then their overthrow, followed by the republican style of government with emphasis on obedience to law (rather than to the whim of an all-powerful individual). o His account of the rise of “justice” is similar to that given by Glaucon in the Republic: people agree to obey the laws because they are tired of violence and civil unrest. In particular, when each individual reserves the right to avenge the harm done to him/her by another, this quickly leads to escalating violence on both sides (p.157). • Finally, there is the question of how human beings acquire their beliefs concerning the gods. It’s a case of true perceptions (the gods are great, intelligent, blissful, and immortal) and unjustified assumptions (therefore the gods must be responsible for various aspects of the world). o As Lucretius makes clear, it’s the lack of a rational explanation for phenomena that gives rise to fear, and to the impulse to attribute these phenomena to some invisible agency (hence his preceding explanation of the workings of the heavens).