Pale_case Full Text_ 2 Law Student Rule.docx

BAR MATTER NO. 730

June 13, 1997

Gentlemen: Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 10, 1997. IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT PRACTICING UNDER RULE 138-A BE ACTUALLY SUPERVISED DURING TRIAL (BAR MATTER NO. 730). The issue in this Consulta is whether a law student who appears before the court under the Law Student Practice Rule (Rule 138-A) should be accompanied by a member of the bar during the trial. This issue was raised by retired Supreme Court Justice Antonio P. Barredo, counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. BCV92-11 entitled Irene A. Caliwara v. Roger T. Catbagan filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. The records show that the plaintiff in civil Case No. BCV-92-11 was represented by Mr. Cornelio Carmona, Jr., an intern at the Office of Legal Aid, UP-College of Law (UP-OLA). Mr. Carmona conducted hearings and completed the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence-in-chief without the presence of a supervising lawyer. Justice Barredo questioned the appearance of Mr. Carmona during the hearing because the latter was not accompanied by a duly accredited lawyer. On December 15, 1994, Presiding Judge Edelwina Pastoral issued an Order requiring Mr. Carmona to be accompanied by a supervising lawyer on the next hearing. In compliance with said Order, UP-OLA and the Secretary of Justice executed a Memorandum of Agreement directing Atty. Catubao and Atty. Legayada of the Public Attorney's Office to supervise Mr. Carmona during the subsequent hearings. Justice Barredo asserts that a law student appearing before the trial court under Rule 138-A should be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. 1 On the other hand, UP-OLA, through its Director, Atty. Alfredo F. Tadiar, submits that "the matter of allowing a law intern to appear unaccompanied by a duly accredited supervising lawyer should be . . . left to the sound discretion of the court after having made at least one supervised appearance." 2 For the guidance of the bench and bar, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under Rule 138-A should at all times be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. Section 2 of Rule 138-A provides. Sec. 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed the by supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic. The phrase "direct supervision and control" requires no less than the physical presence of the supervising lawyer during the hearing. This is in accordance with the threefold rationale behind the Law Student Practice Rule, to wit: 3 1. to ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or inexperience of law students, who, not having as yet passed the test of professional competence, are presumably not fully equipped to act a counsels on their own; 2. to provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to protect itself from any potential vicarious liability arising from some culpable action by their law students; and 3. to ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to practice a particular profession without possessing the qualifications, particularly a license, as required by law. The matter of allowing a law student to appear before the court unaccompanied by a supervising lawyer cannot be left to the discretion of the presiding judge. The rule clearly states that the appearance of the law student shall be under the direct control and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly 1

accredited by law schools. The rule must be strictly construed because public policy demands that legal work should be entrusted only to those who possess tested qualifications, are sworn to observe the rules and ethics of the legal profession and subject to judicial disciplinary control. 4 We said in Bulacan v. Torcino: 5 Court procedures are often technical and may prove like snares to the ignorant or the unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear for party litigants in places where duly authorized members of the bar are not available (U.S. vs. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539). For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the Rules still allow a more educated or capable person in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of the parties and in the interest of justice, the requirement for appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts is more stringent. The Law Student Practice Rule is only an exception to the rule. Hence, the presiding judge should see to it that the law student appearing before the court is properly guided and supervised by a member of the bar. The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34 Rule 138 provides; Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar. IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under the authority of Rule 138-A must be under the direct control and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school and that said law student must be accompanied by a supervising lawyer in all his appearance. Cruz v. Mina Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;[1] and the RTCs Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court. The antecedents: On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.[2] that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case. However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 2

138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.[3]

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone. In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration. On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the public respondent MeTC. After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable. On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar. Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC. On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioners Second Motion for Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC. On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the following errors: I. THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF INJUNCTION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER DESPITE PETITIONER HAVING ESTABLISHED THE NECESSITY OF GRANTING THE WRIT; II. THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW; III. 3

THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI; IV. THE RESPONDENT COURT[S] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTCS) This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.[5] Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition. The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school. Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides: RULE 138-A LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school. Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic. However, in Resolution[6] dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified: The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides: Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.[7] (Emphasis supplied) 4

The phrase In the court of a justice of the peace in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to In the court of a municipality as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:[8] SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied) which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts. Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioners appearance. Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts. Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible. It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioners appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable. Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular representation.[9] The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.[10] The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor. No pronouncement as to costs. 5

SO ORDERED. [A.C. No. 5737. October 25, 2004] FERDINAND A. CRUZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, respondent. In an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz charges Atty. Stanley Cabrera with misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he instituted several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo, the following exchange transpired: xxx xxx So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or not? The Court having been inhibited by the respondent from hearing the case, replied: You are asking for my inhibition and yet you want me to rule on his appearance xxx xxx. Thereafter, the respondent said: Because your honor, he (pertaining to the complainant) is misrepresenting himself to be a lawyer! To this the complainant remarked: Your Honor, Im not xxx xxx. Respondent, this time engulfed with anger in a raising voice said: Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; x x x. Respondents imputations were uncalled for and the latters act of compelling the court to ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public, inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondents imputations of complainants misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent was handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna! were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public. Complainant claims that respondents display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold in their dealings with society and corresponding appropriate penalty or sanctions for the said administrative violations should be imposed on the respondent. In his Comment, respondent contends that the complaint filed against him is a vicious scheme to dissuade him from appearing as counsel for the Mina family against whom complainant had filed several civil and criminal cases including him to further complainants illegal practice of law; complainants complaint occurred during a judicial proceeding wherein complainant was able to represent himself considering that he was appearing in barong tagalog thus the presiding judge was misled when she issued an order stating [i]n todays hearing both lawyers appeared; because of which, respondent stated: Your honor I would like to manifest that this counsel (referring to complainant) who represents the plaintiff in this case is not a lawyer, to which complainant replied: The counsel very well know that I am not yet a lawyer; the reason he informed the court that complainant is not a lawyer was because the presiding judge did not know that complainant is not a lawyer and complainant did not inform the presiding judge that he is not a lawyer when he stated: for the plaintiff your honor; he stated pumasa ka muna out of indignation because of complainants temerity in misrepresenting himself as lawyer; it 6

is surprising that the City Prosecutor of Pasay City filed a complaint for oral defamation against him considering that in a precedent case the Supreme Court stated: It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged (Navarrete vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 540); in another malicious prosecution being perpetuated by the complainant against the Mina family pending before Judge Priscilla Mijares of RTC Branch 108, Pasay City, they were able to prohibit the appearance of complainant as counsel for himself as authenticated by an Order of Judge Priscilla Mijares which allegedly stated among other; to wit: In connection with Ferdinand A. Cruzs motion to appear as counsel, the motion is likewise denied, movant not having satisfied the requirements and conditions under Rule 138-A, Sections 1 and 2.

Respondent alleges that when complainant filed an administrative case against Judge Priscilla Mijares when said Judge stated in Tagalog in open court Hay naku masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes! OK? the same was dismissed by the Honorable Courts Third Division which stated among others: That the questioned remarks of respondent were uttered more out of frustration and in reaction to complainants actuations and taking into account that complainant is not yet a lawyer but was already lecturing the court on a matter which is not even a point of discussion was sheer arrogance on the part of the complainant. Respondent prays that the complaint against him be dismissed for lack of merit. The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In a report, dated March 4, 2004, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months for violating Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. In her report, Commissioner Navarro stated: After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the undersigned noted that respondents averment that the utterances he made in open court is (sic) privileged communication does not hold water for the same was (sic) not relevant to the issue of the case in question under trial before the said court. Respondent did not refute the fact that the same utterances he made in open court against the complainant had been the basis for his indictment of Oral Defamation and later Unjust Vexation under Criminal Cases Nos. 02-1031 and No. 02-2136 respectively, pending trial before MTC Branch 45, Pasay City. Likewise respondent did not refute complainants allegation that in 1979 he was held in contempt and was not allowed to practice law for seven years by the Supreme Court in the administrative case filed against him by Emilia E. Andres on December 14, 1979 docketed as A.M. L-585 for his fondness in using contumacious language in his dealing with others. From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the utterance hurled by the respondent in the manner, substance and tone of his voice which was not refuted by him that appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna in whatever manner it was uttered are in itself not only abusive but insulting specially on the part of law students who have not yet taken nor passed the bar examination required of them. Respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in informing the court if it was his purpose relative to complainants appearance in court; although the latter appeared only in his behalf but not for others if he had complied with the requirements of Rule 138 (Sections 1 and 3) of the Rules of Court.

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Respondent should have been more temperate in making utterances in his professional dealings so as not to offend the sensitivities of the other party as in this case. On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution to annul and set aside the recommendation of the investigating commissioner and to approve the dismissal of the case for lack of merit. Prefatorily, we note that the IBP Board of Governors failed to observe the procedural requirements of Sec. 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on review and decision by the Board of Governors which states: SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigators report. (Emphasis supplied)

In Teodosio vs. Nava,[1] the Court stressed the important function of the requirement that the decision of the Board of Governors state the facts and the reasons on which it is based, which is akin to what is required of the decisions of courts of record, thus: For aside from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point out to the appellate court the findings with which they are not in agreement, in case any of them decides to appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the judge, or the Board of Governors in this case, reached his judgment through the process of legal reasoning.[2] In this case, the Board of Governors resolution absolving respondent of any misconduct does not contain any findings of facts or law upon which it based its ruling. Ordinarily, non-compliance with the rule would result in the remand of the case. Nonetheless, where the controversy has been pending resolution for quite sometime and the issues involved could be resolved on the basis of the records on appeal, the Court has opted to resolve the case in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of cases.[3] This case falls within the exception. We hold that respondents outburst of appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when respondent pointed out to the trial court that complainant is not a lawyer to correct the judges impression of complainants appearance, inasmuch as the judge, in her Order of January 14, 2002, noted that complainant is a lawyer.[4] Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant respondents suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an argument between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.[5] Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases. A partys right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. In Maderada vs. Mediodea,[6] this Court expounded on the foregoing provision, thus:

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This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress -- from its commencement to its termination. When they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are not considered to be in the practice of law. One does not practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself. The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows: x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.

Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.[7] On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.[8] Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.[9] WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley Cabrera for misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility is DISMISSED for lack of merit. He is, however, admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an officer of the court. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-51813-14 November 29, 1983 ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V. LUCILA, petitioners, vs. HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN, respondents. Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, disallowing the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550, both for less serious physical injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively, as well as the Order, dated September 4, 1979, denying the motion for reconsideration holding, among others, that "the fiscal's claim that appearances of friends of party-litigants should be allowed only in places where there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well founded. For, if we are to allow non-members of the bar to appear in court and prosecute cases or defend litigants in the guise of being friends of the litigants, then the requirement of 9

membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the additional requirement of paying professional taxes for a lawyer to appear in court, would be put to naught. " (p. 25, Rollo) Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries, respectively, and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila. Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of the U.P.assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in August 1979, petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their separate appearances, as friends of complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the appearances of said petitioners, and respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979, sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases. Likewise, on September 4, 1979, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayers, among others, that the Orders of respondent judge, dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979, be set aside as they are in plain violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and/or were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Upon motion, the Court, on November 8, 1979, issued a temporary restraining order "enjoining respondent judge and all persons acting for and in his behalf from conducting any proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 (People of the Philippines vs. Danilo San Antonio) and 58559 (People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Diaz) of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila on November 15, 1979 as scheduled or on any such dates as may be fixed by said respondent judge. Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states: têñ.£îhqw⣠SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar — a party to an action is authorized to appear in court and conduct his own case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by an attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, he can be aided only by an attorney. On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to determine who shall be the private prosecutor as was done by respondent fiscal when he objected to the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila. Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provide: têñ.£îhqw⣠SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. xxx

xxx

xxx

SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. — Unless the offended party has waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it separately from the criminal action, and subject to the provisions of section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense. And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is subject to the direction and control of the fiscal and that his appearance, no less than his active conduct of the case later on, requires the prior approval of the fiscal. We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in the municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed by him for the purpose. 10

Thus, in the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law student was allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before the then Municipal Court, the City Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to property through reckless imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that error was committed in the municipal court in not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his defense." The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this condition. What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the private prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case. On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under his supervision and control. Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he be allowed to appear as private prosecutor under the supervision and control of the trial fiscal. In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Parañaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the offended party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it separately and, therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of his right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer. WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979 which disallowed the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as friends of party-litigant petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan. are hereby SET ASIDE and respondent judge is hereby ordered to ALLOW the appearance and intervention of petitioners Malana and Lucila as friends of Romulo Cantimbuhan. Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on November 8, 1979 is LIFTED. SO ORDERED.

***Bulacan v Torcino

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