Ny B9 Farmer Misc- Wh 1 Of 3 Fdr- Key Decisions Timeline 443

Key Decisions Timeline September 11: Before 0900: Rice was preparing to go to a 0900 staff meeting and "thought to myself what an odd accident." She called the President and he asked her "what kind of plane?" She passed along the initial press reports and said "That's all we know right now, Mr. President." (The Day That Changed America, Newsweek, Dec 31, 2001, Evan Thomas) Later, at the staff meeting: (Newsweek) Rice was about "three people in" when her assistant handed her a note saying that a second plane had hit the World Trade Center. "I thought, This is a terrorist attack'," she said. Her aides recall that she stopped talking in midsentence. "I have to go," she said and got up abruptly and began wallking, quickly, to the White House Situation Room. Just before 0900: The Vice President is told that an airplane had hit the World Trade Center (Meet the Press, Sep 16) VP turned on the TV and saw the second plane go in and "that triggered the thought: terrorism, that this was an attack..." Then Rice came to VP's office, joined by Scooter Libby and Mary Matalin and "we started talking about getting the Counterterrorism Task Force up and operating. I talked with the President. We discussed a statement that he might make, and the first statement he made describing this as an act of apparent terrorism flowed out of those conversations. Later, after VP went to PEOC: First thing I did was pick up the phone and call the President again, and strongly urged him to delay his return. Russert: You told him to stay away from Washington? VP: "I said, 'delay your return. We don't kow what's going on here, but it looks like, you know, we've been targeted.'" Russert: Why did you make that judgement? VP: "...my basic role as vice president (sic) is to worry about presidential (sic) succession. And my job, above all other things, is to be prepared to take over if something happens to the president (Sic)." (Meet the Press) Same Interview: "Russert: What's the most important decision you think he made during the course of the day? VP: ".. .this question of whether or not we would intercept incoming commercial aircraft." "We decided to do it." 090?: An FA A ATCSCC written advisory "sterilized" the New York air space, meaning that all aircraft in the airspace of the New York Center were ordered to leave that airspace (Garvey testimony) 0944: President Bush reached the VP in the PEOC (Woodward 9:39 plus 5 minutes) "We're at war," Bush said, and told Cheney to give the congressional leadership a briefing. (Same sequence) Bush to staff, ""That's what we're paid for boys. We're going to take care of this. And when we find out who did this, they're not going to like me as president. Somebody is going to pay." (Woodward) (Same sequence) "Soon Cheney was on the phone again to the president urging that he authorize U.S. military aircraft to shoot down any additional commercial airliners that

were controlled by hijackers. It would be a momentous decision,but Cheney, normally cautious, insisted that giving the American fighter pilots the authority to fire on commercial airliners, even if they were full of civilians, was the only practical answer." "You bet, " Bush said. He gave the authority. (Woodward before 10:30) 0945: "All airborne aircraft were told to land at the nearest airport—the first time in our history that all civil aircraft in the United States were grounded (Garvey Sep 21 Testimony before the Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure) 0945: Secret Service agents ordered the White House and Eisenhower Executive Office Building evacuated (Woodward and Balz) At some point: VP officially implemented the emergency continuity of government orders which provided for evacuating Speaker Hastert and President Pro Tern Byrd (Woodward and Balz) 0950+/-: The air threat conference call After Flight 77 hits Pentagon and by 0955 (apparently): Rumsfeld back in building and in the NMCC. Pentagon officials urdered up the airborne command post used only in national emergencies. They sent up combat air patrols in the Washington area and a fighter escort for Air Force One. They also ordered AW ACS radar and surveillance planes airborne along the East and West Coasts. Commanders worlwide were ordered to raise their threat alert status four notches to "Delta," the highest level. Rumsfeld raised the defense condition - signaling U.S. offensive readiness - to Def Con 3, the highest it had been since the Arab-Israeli war in 1973. U.S. officials also sent a message to the Russians, who were planning a military exercise not far from Alaska, urging them to rethink their plans." (Woodward and Balz, Washington Post, Jan 27, 2002) [One outcome of Condition Delta, NORAD commanders ordered the Cheyenne Mt doors closed, first time in 43-year history. Scott, Aviation Week June 3, 2002] 1000?: Rumsfeld and Rice conversations with Russian MoD and President Putin re Russian Strategic Aviation Exercise (source?) 1030: Cheney to Bush, again. The White House had received a threat saying, "Angel is next." [Codeword for Air Force Once] (Woodward) (few minutes later) Cheney to Bush. Urged the president not to return to Washington. "There's still a threat," he said. The President agreed to divert to Barksdale (Woodward) 1039: A formal Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) was issued closing all operations at all airports (Garvey testimony) 1041: VP called the President and urged him not to return. AF One was on way to Washington. Rice agreed and had told President same thing. AF One altered course for Barksdale. (Woodward and Balz. 1216: FAA command center reported that U.S. airspace had been cleared of all commercial and general aviation aircraft. (Woodward and Balz) 1236: President statement at Barksdale. "Make no mistake, we will show the world that we will pass this test." (Woodward)

After 1330: Bush reached Rumsfeld, "We'll clean up the mess and then the ball will be in your court and Dick Myers's court." (Woodward) 1530: NSC VTC meeting (President at Offut) Concerning airplanes, President said he wanted to get the airlines flying again. "We'll fly at noon tomorrow." (Woodward) 1630: POTUS to Ms. POTUS, "I'm coming home, see you at the White House." (Woodward) 2100: NSC meeting after President's address to the nation was reduced in size at 2130 (Woodward, woodward and Balz)) Evening: Peter Fisher, the executive branch's man in change of the United States financial system, Treasury Secretary O'Neill's point man on policy on markets, interests rates, and the like, spent the evening on the phone talking to Lindsey; Richard Grasso, the Chairman and CEO of the NYSE; and Harvey Pitt, Chairman of the US Securities and Exchange Commission. The President wanted the markets open by Thursday, Lindsey kept reapeating. Fisher and Pitt were game. Grasso was dubious. (Brill p. 42) September 12: Morning: Bush to Hughes, "Let's get the big picture, a faceless enemy has declared war on the United States of America. So we are at war." (Woodward, p. 41) Remarks by Deputy Treasury Secretary Ken Dam. Secretary O'Neill has cancelled the remainder of his Asia trip and is expected later today. I have been in constant communication with him. The Secret Service has activated its emergency plan. For the record, Customs never closed the US borders. Commercial cargo continues to flow into the US. (PO-601) The Bond Market Association decided to close the fixed income market. Trading resumed the next day, September 13. (Statement: Treasury Secretary O'Neill, Sep 20, to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs) During the Day: Fisher had travelled to New York and met with the CEOs of key Wall Street banks and broerages. Verizon drove the start-up equation. Net result was an agreement to run a test on Saturday and shoot for Monday. Fisher knew from a conference call during the train ride that the bond markets would open on Thursday. (Brill p. 42) Evening: By this time Larry Lindsey's office had received calls from representatives of the big three auto companies about port and border delays. Since the 11th: Mitchel Daniels, Director of OMB, had come up with a "back-of-theenvelope guess" of about $20B needed immediately. By late Wednesday his estimate was being talked about on Capital Hill (Brill p. 48) 2300: Mineta conference call with the CEO's of the airlines to tell them they weren't going to fly unless and until a whole raft of new regulations were implemented. They should also understand that a lot more regulations were on the way, from the Congress and the White House (Brill p. 32)

September 13: "The Secretary's [Mineta] decision was made after a series of meetings throughout the day and night Wednesday (Sep 12) with White House and Cabinet officials, Federal Aviation Administration Administrator Jane Garvey, aviation industry leaders, as well as intelligence and law enforcement representatives. (Statement of U.S. Secretary of Transportation Norman Y. Mineta) Senators Schumer and Clinton met with the President and Schumer asked for an additional $20B for New York. Bush: "You got it." (Brill p. 49) There were so many domestic issues related to the crisis crowding the agenda of the constantly meeting NSC that on Thursday, Joshua Bolten, a deputy chief of staff ws made the chair of a rump Domestic Consequences Principals Committee, which would include roughl a dozen senior staffers and key cabinet members. (Brill p. 50) Unbeknownst to Ashcroft, Vice President Cheney and two aides, counselor Matalin and C/S Libby were already talking about creating a job for someone to run the home front war from the White House. (Brill p. 53) September 14: Department of Treasury announced the establishment of an inter-agency team dedicated to the disruption of terrorist fundraising, to ultimately be transformed into a permanent Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center in OFAC. (Jimmy Gurule, Under Secretary of Enforcement Statement PO-614) Bolten's agenda for the morning included easing the Customs clampdown and making sure the stock markets stayed on track to open on Monday and that once opened a systems failure wouldn't shut it down again. (Brill p. 51) By Friday, Libby and Matalin would already be discussing ideas with Cheney about who the coordinator should be. The three would quickly zero in on one name: Tom Ridge, the Republican governor of Pennsylvania. (Brill p. 55) September 16: Sunday. Ashcroft appeared on a Sunday talk show and spoke to legislation he was proposing to give his agents and prosecutors more tools to go after terrorists. Congress and the White House were not aware. (Brill pp. 73-75) September 17: At the White House where top staffers had received the airline group and promised them aid, President Bush convened a meeting later that day that included, Card, Bolten, Lindsey, and key people from the Transportation Department to figure out what kind of aid made sense. (Brill p. 71) September 19: Fisher, in a meeting with Lindsey and others in the White House, heard Lindsey say that the President had ordered that they make sure no airlines go bankrupt before Christmas. (Brill p. 81)