Ny B5 Pa Request Fdr- Commission-port Authority Correspondence 728

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James Miller From:

Begley, James [email protected]]

Sent:

Thursday, February 26, 2004 4:13 PM

To:

James Miller

Subject: RE: Phone call In answer to your question the only handout at the three meetings with FDNY was a CD of the audio recordings and a Confidentiality agreement was entered into. FYI, There is a 1994 letter from FDNY at the time the repeater was installed stating that during their radio coverage tests "the system worked exceptionally well" and asking that the repeater remain off when FDNY was not using it as it could cause interference with their other radio operations. If I haven't provided your office with a copy, I will do so.

James M. Begley Deputy General Counsel The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 225 Park Avenue South, 13th Floor New York, NY 10003 (212)435-3502 This e-mail (along with any attachments) is intended only for the use of the named addressee(s) and may contain legally privileged and/or confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this e-mail (and any attachments) is strictly prohibited. If you received this email in error, please notify me immediately, permanently delete this e-mail (along with any attachments) and destroy any printouts. —Original Message From: James Miller [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Thursday, February 26, 2004 3:00 PM To: Begley, James Subject: Phone call Jim: Please set up any meetings you are able to over the next week or two I am very flexible until March 12,2001 Thanks Jim

7/28/2004

James Miller From: Sent: To: Subject:

Begley, James [email protected]] Wednesday, March 03, 2004 1:36 PM James Miller Tenant List Info

FYI. I will see what we have in addition. CNN has detailed list of tenants, floors, sq ft, that they developed from listing service Costar that tracked signed deals so it is not accurate with respect to PA but it is an excellent start, here is weblink. http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/tenantsl.html James M. Begley Deputy General Counsel The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 225 Park Avenue South, 13th Floor New York, NY 10003 (212) 435-3502 This e-mail (along with any attachments) is intended only for the use of the named addressee(s) and may contain legally privileged and/or confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this e-mail (and any attachments) is strictly prohibited. If you received this e-mail in error, please notify me immediately, permanently delete this e-mail (along with any attachments) and destroy any printouts.

James Miller From: Sent: To: Subject:

Begley, James [[email protected]] Wednesday, March 03, 2004 5:05 PM James Miller WTC Tenant Lists

FENANTLISTJUSTBETENANTLISTABOVE WTC Tenant List OWANDABOVEIMP.1PACTBOTHTOWER Note.doc (89 K...

As requested. «TENANTLISTJUSTBELOWANDABOVEIMPACT.xls» «TENANTLISTABOVEIMPACTBOTHTOWERS.xls» «WTC Tenant List Note.doc» James M. Begley Deputy General Counsel The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 225 Park Avenue South, 13th Floor New York, NY 10003 (212) 435-3502 This e-mail (along with any attachments) is intended only for the use of the named addressee(s) and may contain legally privileged and/or confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this e-mail (and any attachments) is strictly prohibited. If you received this e-mail in error, please notify me immediately, permanently delete this e-mail (along with any attachments) and destroy any printouts.

James Miller From: Sent: To: Subject:

Begley, James [email protected]] Thursday, March 04, 2004 10:29 AM James Miller WTC Tenant Lists

WTC Tenant List NISOTTWOWTCTENTENANTLISTABOVE Note.doc (65 K... NTLISTBELOW74.X.1PACTBOTHTOWER

attachments.

Pis disregard the prior e-mail with the tenant list I've been provided these instead.

«WTC Tenant List Note.doc» «NISDTTWOWTCTENANTLISTBELOW74 .xls» «TENANTLISTABOVEIMPACTBOTHTOWERS.xls» James M. Begley Deputy General Counsel The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 225 Park Avenue South, 13th Floor New York, NY 10003 (212) 435-3502 This e-mail (along with any attachments) is intended only for the use of the named addressee(s) and may contain legally privileged and/or confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this e-mail (and any attachments) is strictly prohibited. If you received this e-mail in error, please notify me immediately, permanently delete this e-mail (along with any attachments) and destroy any printouts.

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James Miller From:

Begley, James [email protected]]

Sent:

Friday, March 05, 2004 12:09 PM

To:

James Miller

Subject: RE: Information request We do not have a compilation of that information according to PAPD. They said it would have to be constructed by beginning with both the handwrittens, as your doing, and the radio transmissions. I was told that besides WTC command, PATH ESU happened to be present at the WTC that morning when the attack occurred.

James M. Begley Deputy General Counsel The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 225 Park Avenue South, 13th Floor New York, NY 10003 (212) 435-3502 This e-mail (along with any attachments) is intended only for the use of the named addressee(s) and may contain legally privileged and/or confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this e-mail (and any attachments) is strictly prohibited. If you received this email in error, please notify me immediately, permanently delete this e-mail (along with any attachments) and destroy any printouts. Original Message From: James Miller [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Friday, March 05, 2004 11:13 AM To: Begley, James Subject: Information request Jim: Attempting to come up with some numbers based on response of PAPD. Is there a document which details the number of PA PD personnel who responded to WTC prior to collapse of WTC 1. Would also like to know from which commands these personnel responded. I have attempted to use the statements provided by your office and the injury reports to come up with numbers. Hopefully, they would be consistent with the numbers you might have but I am afraid there are some who did neither a statement or completed an injury report. Yes, even if you do not have the information I expect to share with you the numbers I come up. Should have these numbers by Wednesday As to additional request for interviews I will be in a better position to respond after an internal meeting we are having on Monday. Again thanks for the help. Jim

7/28/2004

James M Begley Deputy General Counsel Law Department Port Authority of NY & NJ 225 Park Avenue South, 13th Fl New York, NY 10003 March 19,2004

/9/11 First Responder/Family /Privacy

Dear Sir: The 9-11 Commission respectively, request the following individuals be made available for interviews with Cortimission staff members in the near future: / Officer! Officer Detective! Lieutenanl Officer Sergeant Officer Officer Officer Office rl Sergeant] Captain] Officer Detective Elevator FNl The commission would like to have all interviews completed by April 22,2004 if at all possible. I can be reached at 212- 264 -1505 or on cell phone 201 264 6164. Sincerely,

James R Miller 9-11 Commission Staff

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James Miller

....-•••""•19/11 First Responder/Family /'Privacy

i

From:

Joseph Morris \_

Sent:

Friday, May 07, 2004 2:44 PM

/ j

To:

James Miller

/ I

Subject: Re: Autobio

/

I

Tom, / I I don't have any questions to be submitted, I'm prepared to testify on the pAPp actions. I certainly would expect them to be adept at what they are doing, they have been charged to complete^ a great deal. Joe / ;

— Original Message — From: JjJmes.Mj!!er To: Joseph Morns SentfFriday," May 07.2004 10:25 AM Subject: RE: Autobio

/ / . / /

I j I ! i

Joe: In addition to your personal observations of 9/11,1 believe, the commissioners will ask questions related to Incident Command Systems, inter agency communications, liaisons with either first responder entities, lessons learned and how these lessons were addressed by the PAPD po6t 9/11. Questions present as briefing material to the commissioners should be returned to me by Monday. Just want to linake sure you understand these are questions referred to the commissioners but the commissioners ban ask anything they feel will add to their understanding of the 9/11 events. In fact in other hearings they/have developed questions based on the testimony provided on the day of the hearing. They are very adept at whejt they do. —Original Message— From: Joseph Morris [mailtof Sent: Thursday, May 06, 2004 9:31 PM To: James Miller Subject: Re: Autobio OK — Original Message — From: James Miller To: Joseph Morris Sent: Thursday, May 06, 2004 5:12 PM Subject: RE: Autobio Thanks Joe. Talk with you early next week Original Message From: Joseph Morris Sent: Thursday, May 06, 2004 5:00 PM To: James Miller Subject: Re: Autobio

Joseph Morris Port Authority of NY & NJ Police Department Chief of the Department (Retired)

7/28/2004

Page 2 of3 Chief Morris began his law enforcement career on May 8, 1972 when he joined the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD). His facility assignments as a police officer included the Lincoln Tunnel Command and PATH Command as well as special assignments to Police Headquarters, Criminal Investigations Unit and the Police Academy. He was promoted to the rank of sergeant in August 1982. His facility assignments included the Port Authority Bus Terminal, NJ Marine Terminals and Newark International Airport. While a sergeant he also worked assignments at the PATH Command and World Trade Center Command. In April of 1987 he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant. His assignments included the Lincoln Tunnel Command and Police Headquarters where he worked in the Absence Control Unit, Inspectional Services and Civilian Complaint Investigations Unit. In February 1993 he responded to the World Trade Center Bombing from Police Headquarters in Jersey City to take part in the rescue and recovery efforts. He remained at the World Trade Center Complex as an onsite PAPD Commander and Department's Inter -Agency Liaison for the recovery, investigation, security and reopening operations. During this time period he interacted with the numerous local, state and federal agencies. In April of 1993, following the completion of his World Trade Center assignment he was promoted to the rank of captain. As captain, his command assignments included the Holland Tunnel, Special Investigations Unit, George Washington Bridge, Criminal Investigations Unit and Labor Relations Unit. While with the Criminal Investigations Unit he directed the PAPD investigative efforts in the TWA Flight 800 Investigation. During November 1997 he was promoted to the rank of Police Inspector remaining with the Labor Relations Unit. In November of 1998 his was rank was changed to inspector. As an inspector he remained at Police Headquarters till reassigned in May of 1999 to be the Western Zone Commander. The Western Zone command oversight responsibilities included the Holland Tunnel, NY Marine Terminals, PATH and World Trade Center Commands. During this period his responsibilities included the development of planning and operations for the Millenium/Y2K and OP/Sail 2000 Events. This assignment included being the Department's Liaison to the New York and New Jersey local and state government agencies as well as the numerous federal government agencies. In January 2001 he was reassigned to be the Commanding Officer of LaGuardia Airport. On September 11, 2001 he responded to the World Trade Center after they were attacked to take part in the rescue and recovery operations of that morning. Upon his arrival he provided leadership and direction to the mobilized police personnel from the other PAPD Commands that responded to the PAPD Mobile Command Post. The Mobile Command Post had set up in the southbound lanes of West Street just north of the Vesey Street intersection moments prior to the collapse of the South Tower. His decision making at the scene has been credited with saving a number of PAPD officers' lives. That afternoon he was designated the World Trade Center Site Commander for the

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9/11 First Responder/Family Privacy

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PAPD in its rescue and recovery efforts. On September 11th 37 members of the force were killed during their heroic rescue efforts at the World Trade Center. Those killed included Fred Morrone, the Director of Public Safety and Chief James Romito, the senior Operations Chief. On September 26,2001 Joseph Morris was promoted to the rank of Chief of the Department. He remained in that position until his retirement on January 9, 2004. He is currently employed by ManTech Security Technologies Corporation. ----- Original Message — From: James Miller To:1

I

Sent: Wednesday, May 05, 2004 9:55 AM Subject: Autobio Mr. Morris: Based on the interview you had with Sam Casperson, I composed a short biographical sketch for your review. This sketch will be provided to the Commissioners so they have some insight into who they are interviewing. If you could review and add = subtract anything you feel needs to be amended or format it as you see fit. If after 9/11 you attended any symposiums or appeared at any law enforcement functions pertinent to 9/11 activities I think we should add these appearances. As to questions, you may want to have the Commissioners ask you please send to me ASAP Information which can be brought out through direct questions allows you to have some advance notice about what may be coming and allows you to be prepared. I will also be composing 15-20 questions which you will have as soon as they are finalized. Some of these will have to do with command structure and communications. Your letter from DC has been forwarded down to headquarters for revision and an official signature. If you have any questions please call me at 212 264 4627 or on my cell phone 201 264

6164. Thanks Jim

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James Miller From:

John Farmer

Sent:

Friday, May 28, 2004 8:58 AM

To:

Jonathan Stull; Al Felzenberg

Cc:

James Miller

Subject: RE: port authority police

Al, Jonathan: As we discussed last night, I think in general we should (1) remind him that we have invited those whose views differ from ours to come forward, but (2) emphasize that our report was based on review of PA documents and police reports from 9/11, extensive discussions with PA officials, and interviews of responders, and that (3) our report was shared with PA in advance of the hearing, and they were given the opportunity to show us where we were wrong. There were no surprises here. I leave the specifics for Jim to comment on. John Original Message From: Jonathan Stull Sent: Thu 5/27/2004 6:11 PM To: Al Felzenberg Cc: John Farmer; James Miller Subject: FW: port authority police From Graham Rayman of Newsday. Below are what he claims are the PA's on-record responses to excerpts from our staff statements. He wants comment from the Commission. As you'll see, they take issue with many of our claims. Not for deadline tonight, but we need something for him tomorrow. Jonathan —Original Message From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2004 4:57 PM To: Jonathan Stull Subject: police authority police

These are the on-record responses from the Port Authority regarding the staff report's entries on PAPD. You'll see excerpts from the report followed by PA responses./gr 718-575-2614. 1. The Port Authority Police Department lacked clear standard operating procedures to guide personnel responding from one command to another during a major incident. INCORRECT. The PAPD deployed a full mobilization plan at the time of the incident as plans and past practice called for with an orderly notification process. The Central Police Desk and commands through Tour Commanders or Commanding Officers made contact. At that time, the Tour Commanders or Commanding Officers dispatched however many officers and commanders they could to the World Trade Center. As these events with national ramifications were unfolding, it was vital to retain deployment at the airports, tunnels, bridges, PATH rapid-transit rail system and ports. Officers and commanders responding were told to report to the police desk at the World Trade Center, and then to the Mobile Command Unit parked on West Street. Our estimations are that approximately 200 officers and commanders from the Port Authority Police Department responded to the scene before the first tower collapsed.

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2. At 9 am, the Port Authority Police commanding officer ordered an evacuation of civilians in the World Trade Center complex because of the danger posed by highly flammable jet fuel from Flight 11. The order was issued, however, over a radio channel, which could be heard only by officers on the Port Authority WTC command channel. There is no evidence that this order was communicated to officers in other Port Authority Police commands or to members of other responding agencies. INCORRECT. Captain Anthony Whitaker (now Chief Whitaker) was the Commanding Officer at the time. Whitaker gave the evacuation order to the police desk, they in turn notified the Central Police Desk. Due to the extreme chaos of the event that day, the Central Police Desk's communication may NOT have been received by the officers and commanders in the field. 3. At 9:11 a.m., Port Authority workers at the 64th floor of the North Tower were told by the Port Authority Police desk in Jersey City to stay near the stairwells and wait for assistance. CORRECT 4. The Port Authority Police Department lacked clear standard operating procedures for coordinating a multi-command response to the same incident. It also lacked a radio channel that all commands could access. Many officers remained on their local command channels, which did not work once they were outside the immediate geographic area of the ir respective commands. INCORRECT. As I stated earlier, PAPD are told to respond to the police desk or Mobile Command Unit. Officers and commanders communicated on Channel A until parts of that channel were rendered inoperable when the North Tower was ablaze. Their command channels were kept clear for critical incident communication. 5. Many Port Authority Police officers from different commands responded on their own initiative. By 9:30 a.m. the Port Authority's central police desk requested that responding officers meet at West and Vesey and await further instructions. In the absence of predetermined leadership roles for an incident of this magnitude, a number of Port Authority inspectors, captains, and lieutenants stepped forward at West and Vesey to formulate an on-site response plan. They were hampered by not knowing how many officers were responding to the site and where those officers were operating. Many of the officers who responded to this command post lacked suitable protective equipment to enter the complex. PARTIALLYINCORRECT. With regards to the first part of the question, officers and commanders were mobilized as I explained earlier. They were requested by 9:30 a.m. by the Central Police Desk, which further illustrates that there was a cohesive operating plan and procedures. You are correct regarding the issue of leadership and commanders. Certain commanders like Inspector Joseph Morris, who was the Commanding Officer of LaGuardia Airport assumed control as other commanders like Superintendent Fred Morrone, Chief James Romito, Inspector Anthony Infante Jr. and Captain Kathy Mazza were inside the Towers attempting to rescue those trapped. As far as protective gear, many of the officers were equipped with "bunker gear" and "Scott Packs" and the Emergency Services Units on hand also were equipped with extra gear. 6. After the collapse of the South Tower there is no evidence that Port Authority Police officers from outside the WTC command ever heard an evacuation order on their radios. Some of these officers in the North Tower determined to evacuate, either on their own, or in consultation with other first responders they came across. One Port Authority Police officer from the WTC command reported that he heard an urgent evacuation instruction on his radio soon after the South Tower collapsed. It is difficult to say that officers from outside the WTC command did NOT hear the evacuation. PAPD Sgt. Robert Kaulfers, who was killed that day, issued a mayday when the South Tower collapsed.

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7. The Port Authority's response was hampered by inadequate communication. For example, although the FDNY commanders at the North Tower advised Port Authority police and that tower's building personnel to evacuate the South Tower, shortly before 9:00 a.m., there is no evidence that this advice was communicated effectively to the building personnel in the South Tower. A vital few minutes may have been lost and, when that tower did make its announcement to evacuate at 9:02 a.m., it was the ambiguous advice that everyone may wish to start an orderly evacuation if warranted by conditions on their floor. We do not feel that the communication was "inadequate," but rather, the communication on Channel A was destroyed when the towers were afire. Tenants were physically evacuated by emergency personnel and tens of thousands were able to make it out alive due to the heroics of PAPD, FDNY, NYPD and other uniformed personnel and civilians. 8. The Port Authority's Jersey City Police desk was also unaware of the evacuation decisions when, at 9:11 a.m., it advised workers on the 64th floor of the South Tower to stay near the stairwells and wait for assistance. In general it was the practice of the Port Authority's differing commands to use localized frequencies. When officers reported from the tunnels and airports, they could not hear the commands being issued over the WTC command frequency. Please see the answers to numbers two and seven.

7/28/2004

James Miller From: Sent: To:

James Miller Monday, July 26, 2004 8:23 AM 'Begley, James'

Cc: Subject:

Sam Caspersen; Madeleine Blot RE: 9/11 Report Page 320 Comment

Jim: As to the updates on training and other steps taken they have been added to the Monograph this day. Original Message From: Begley, James [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Friday, July 23, 2004 8:34 PM To: James Miller Cc: Dan Marcus; '[email protected]'; Sam Caspersen; Reiss, Alan; Trucillo, Christopher; Madeleine Blot Subject: 9/11 Report Page 320 Comment Jim : On pg 320 of the report there is a statement that " While significant problems in command and control of the PAPD were exposed on September 11, it is less clear that the Port Authority has adopted new training exercises or major incident protocols to address these shortcomings." We've probably received hundreds of e-mails from the Commission staff in the last few months, many phone calls (including those seeking information the Commission staff couldn't get a timely response from primary sources) and requests for impromptu meetings with PA staff. All were immediately and substantively responded to. For its part, the PA in my view went way over and above any reasonable expectation in providing timely and complete information, often responding with even more information than the Commission had asked for. However, I do not recall even one occasion where the Commission staff called to explain to us in detail what these "significant problems" were, or to explore what initiatives the PA had undertaken in the Police and Emergency Management areas during the last three years. First, we need to understand better the basis for the 'significant problems' statement. I repeatedly suggested that you interview senior officers at the scene, which as far as I know you did not, ( if you did we would have liked to have been so informed) and we even offered to reach out to those who retired. We also made every PA staff member, whom you requested, available to you, except for the few who were not medically cleared because of their 9/11 experience. However, the only senior officers that I recall the Commission interviewing were Joe Morris, the CO at LaGuardia on 9/11 and Tony Whittaker the CO at the WTC on 9/11. You weren't at the original interviews of either. While you may have later talked with Chief Morris, I don't recall that you talked to Chief Whittaker. The point being that I don't recall anything in the interviews or conservations with either that, in my view, would support the assertion of "significant problems", and certainly not in the context of all the circumstances of 9-11. The other interviews of police staff didn't give us an understanding of this conclusion either. In light of this, I would have expected the common professional courtesy of being apprised of what specifically it is that the Commission was referring to and the source(s) on which the conclusion was based. However, there has been absolutely no contact with either Karl Lunan or I on this. On the other hand, we've had innumerable contacts, (often at all hours of the day and night, on weekends, holidays and during vacations) from Sam Casperson and especially Madeleine Blot (even repeatedly today through late this afternoon). I don't like to complain, but I simply find this hard to excuse, especially when the report's criticisms of PAPD are in my view completely out of context and seem to ignore what the Commission was given and told about emergency plans and training, including incident command, and told regarding standard procedures. The compulsion to be critical, if simply based on a view of the need for a written mobilization plan, or criticism of supervisors at the scene, shortly after their arrival, from a review of radio communications, don't in my view necessarily serve anyone well, if we're not given the substantive rationale for the conclusions. It certainly doesn't help us to assess and

understand whether there was actually "significant problems" that day, other than the unprecedented, horrific and chaotic terrorist devastation, which the first responders confronted, and the swiftness with which the events unfolded. But if it was deemed necessary to make those findings, then it might have been helpful to have heard from you, our point of contact in this area, so that we could address the comment on page 320. Second, I would have also expected the opportunity to provide the Commission with an understanding of what initiatives the PA, as an agency, and PAPD in its public safety and emergency response functions, had undertaken since 9/lland is planning to undertake Therefore, for your information, here are just some of the things that I am aware of. Subsequent to 9/11 the Port Authority has revised its Emergency Procedures Manuals for all facilities and included an annex on WMD. It created an Office of Emergency Management in 2002. The Police Division senior management functions were enhanced in areas such as terrorism. All officers in the field received special masks as part of their standard equipment, in the event they are faced with certain WMD events. The Chief of the Department recently issued an Interim Order--2004 Mobilization Response, which we would have told you was being issued had the Commission asked. We enhanced police radio interoperability and continue to work on that area, which as you know, due to the nature of technology, is still a work in progress. We rebuilt and increased our police force strength. In addition, this year the PA created executive management position of Chief of Public Safety and Emergency Management to which the Public Safety (Police) Department and the Office of Emergency Management report in order to better integrate and coordinate their respective functions. We built a new and greatly expanded agency Emergency Operation Center, which I believe will be fully operational this year and PAPD central police desk is relocated there. (I believe that I offered to show it to you and I believe we showed your staff it in the early stages of construction). Operation centers at our various facilities have or will be augmented. There was also a full multi-interagency field exercise/ drill involving response to a WMD incident last fall at Port Newark. Since this is not something that the Commission raised until it saw fit to make critical comment in the yesterday's report, I am sure that there are many, many other PA initiatives, including in training areas, already undertaken and/or in planning that I am unaware of. We would have surely given as much information as you needed--and more--had you asked as part of the innumerable exchanges during the last few months. We've met with Madeleine Blot for a number of hours yesterday and have given her more information in response to her numerous e-mails last night and today so that she can issue an accurate monograph. Since, we haven't heard anything from you, despite the referenced negative statement in the report, I think this needs to be a two way street as a matter of fairness. Accordingly I would ask that the monograph at least make some attempt to correct the record at page 320; indicating that the PA has apparently undertaken a significant number of post-9-11 initiatives in the Police and Emergency Management areas would seem to be the least that should be done.

James M. Begley Deputy General Counsel The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 225 Park Avenue South, 13th Floor New York, NY 10003 (212) 435-3502 This e-mail (along with any attachments) is intended only for the use of the named addressee(s) and may contain legally privileged and/or confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this e-mail (and any attachments) is strictly prohibited. If you received this e-mail in error, please notify me immediately, permanently delete this e-mail (along with any attachments) and destroy any printouts.

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James Miller From:

Begley, James [[email protected]]

Sent:

Monday, July 26, 2004 12:15 PM

To:

James Miller

Cc:

Sam Caspersen; Reiss, Alan; Trucillo, Christopher

Subject: RE: Monograph Thank you; enclosed is the Interim Order. I have given this further thought to this and, for the record, I don't think this necessarily completely corrects the record. The command and control critique is not in any context and we don't have any understanding of what is being characterized as "significant". If it's the radio and written SOP point, then can it also be clarified in the monograph so that it will not be construed as being directed toward particular individuals? More specifically, I sat in when Chief Joe Morris was interviewed by George Del Grasso and Sam Casperson. As I recall, it was perfectly clear that Chief Morris, who had been trained in the national incident command system,, took immediate control of the scene at the mobile command bus as the ranking officer when he arrived . Thereafter he was the epitome of professionalism and responsible leadership through the collapse of both towers and throughout the day in his direction and coordination of the recovery and response efforts. To the extent the report's comments could be read as a criticism of his actions, it does a disservice to his valiant efforts. The same holds true with respect to the other PAP commanders. While,]_ I the commission did not have access to Sgt. Al Devona, the incident commander at the fire command desk in Tower One, it elected not to interview the ranking officer in the lobby, tnspectol ^ Yet, when he was interviewed by NIST, it was perfectly clear that Insoi lalsp displayed professional and responsible leadership in the coordination and direction of PAPD response throughout the day. Hi& actions too were valiant and beyond reproach. I am not aware that the commission interviewed other senior PAPD command officers who fi on the nrnund. other than then Caot. Tonv Whittaker. who agreed to be tnte rvi I N,,,, .. . ewed J

James M. Begley

'""9/11 First Responder/Family

Deputy General Counsel The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 225 Park Avenue South, 13th Floor New York, NY 10003 (212)435-3502 This e-mail (along with any attachments) is intended only for the use of the named addressee(s) and may contain legally privileged and/or confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this e-mail (and any attachments) is strictly prohibited. If you received this email in error, please notify me immediately, permanently delete this e-mail (along with any attachments) and destroy any printouts. —Original Message ----From: James Miller [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Monday, July 26, 2004 9:19 AM To: Begley, James Cc: Sam Caspersen Subject: Monograph Enclosed is the update to the monograph

Subsequent to September 11, 2001, the PAPD has worked to address problems encountered. The portable ultra high frequency (UHF) radios are now programmed with all PAPD UHF

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Page 2 of2 frequencies. The PABT command radios were up graded to an UHF frequency. The PAPD has continued to review new radio technologies. The PA has revised Emergency Procedures Manuals for all facilities. These manuals include an annex on weapons of mass destruction. The PAPD has purchased special masks which have been issued to all officers as standard equipment. In order to define procedures for emergency response, the Chief of the Department has issued an interim order dealing with mobilization response. The PA created the executive management position of Chief of Public Safety and Emergency Management. This position was developed to coordinate and integrate the PAPD and Office of Emergency Management functions. The PA has also built a new Emergency Operations Center with the PAPD central desk relocated to the center. Would like to have the Mobilization order sent to the office or emailed so I can have it included in paper work Thanks Jim Miller

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