Nupi Lan Manipur Women S Agitation, 1939

SPECIAL ARTICLES

Nupi L a n : Manipur Women's Agitation, 1939 Sanamani Yambem The N u p i Lan, which started as an agitation by Manipuri women against the economic policies of the Maharaja and the Marwari monopolists, later on changed its character to become a movement for constitutional and administrative reform in Manipur. The original demands of the women were confined to the banning of rice exports, but later their demands also included changes in the Darbar and the administrative set-up. The importance of the N u p i Lan lies in the fact that it prepared the ground for the leading role played by the women of Manipur in the emergence of a new Manipur after the end of the Second War. I Introduction TO apologists of the combined feuda listic-imperialist rule of the Maharaj; — Manipur and his Political Agent The outbreak of the Nupi Lan or the women's Agitation of 1939 in Manipur was merely an awkward situatior which Gimson (Political Agent in Manipur, 1933-45), had to face;1 bul to the people of Manipur it market a dividing line between the oppressive economic and administrative policies followed by the Maharaja and the Political Agent, and the new Manipuj which emerged out of the Nupi Lan The event also showed that political consciousness had grown among the people of Manipur. The Nupi Lan, can perhaps be bcttei understood if we have some idea of the position of women in Manipuri society. Women in Manipur hold a high and free position, and all internal trade of the country is managed by them. The practice, in Maaipur is to have bazars at convenient spots by the roadside where a group of women gather either in the morning or in the evening and sell rice, vegetables, fish tobacco, salt, o i l , baskets and other things. In Imphal, the capital of Manipur, there is a market which is believed to have been founded by Khagemba about the year 1580.2 In this market, k n o w n as Khwairamband Bazar, over two thousand women occupy regular stalls while an even larger number are seated outside. The whole market has always been managed by the women; this practice is still continuing. Apart from the economic activities, the market is also an important venue of social and political interaction. It was this aspect of the Khwairamband Bazar which played a crucial role in the outbreak of the Nupi Lan in 1939. Rice provides a means of livelihood not merely to the producers, the farm-

e r , but also to the women folk. In 'he agrarian economy of Manipur, rice plays a crucial role, and the division of labour between the farmer who grows it and the women who sell the hnal product is a traditional one. The involvement of women with the production and marketing of rice is an integrated one, from the time of transplantation upto the selling of the final produce. The role of women in the economy of the state is indeed crucial, and a boycott of the market by them would mean a virtual hartal of the whole bazar, severely affecting the economy. However, in contrast to this high level of participation of the women in the economy of the state, their social status is not enviable. After the Manipuri-Burmese War of 1817, and the seven years of devastation of the Manipuri countryside that followed i t , the male population of Manipur was greatly reduced. This probably led to the ready social sanction given to the practice of polygamy. The result was that Manipuri women, even while they positively contributed to the economic prosperity of the state, also needed to look for a husband to gain social security, Thus the woman of Manipur, despite her economic 'independence', cannot be termed as an emancipated, satisfied participant in Manipuri society and economy. The Anglo-Manipuri Wax of 1891, further reduced the male population of Manipur 3 resulting in the greater acceptance of the practice of polygamy, and increased dependence on women for the upkeep of the family. The Manipuri women also continued to cherish the feelings of political independence even after Manvpur's 'annexation'. When, in 1904 (just 13 years after 'annexation') the Political Agent, Maxwell, tried to reintroduce Lalup (a system of forced labour which had been abolished) and force the people of Imphal to rebuild the b u n i t - d o w n house of the Assistant

Political Agent, it was the women of Imphal that rose up in protest. The violent agitations and demonstrations led by the market women had to be dispersed by the use of force but u l t i mately the British had to b u i l d the houses at their own expense.4 When, in 1925, the state authorities increased the water tax, there were widespread demonstrations against this measure. The main participants in this agitation were again women. 5 The point to be noticed here is that these agitations were ail led by the tradeswomen, similar to those that were to take a leading role in the women's agitation of 1939.

II Politics of Rice British interest in Manipur at the early stage of their conquest was purely strategic, and the taking over of the administration in their hands was a sequel to the Anglo-Manipuri War of 1891. 6 Unlike in Mysore and Baroda where the relations of these states w i t h the British Government were allowed to remain more or less unchanged, Manipur was considered as a state which had rebelled against the British as a whole. 7 Manipur, in B r i tish eyes, had forfeited its rights to exist as a separate state. Direct British administration continued upto 1907 when Churachand was installed as the Maharaja. After the Kuki rebellion of 1919,8 British administration began to acquire two major characteristics; (a) The Maharaja was made responsible for the administration of the state and was assisted by a Darbar, the President of which was selected by the Governor of Assam. The Maharaja, however, had the power to veto any resolution of the Darbar. (b) The Darbar was the highest o r i 825

February 2 1 , 1976 ginal and appellate court, both in civil and criminal matters. The administration of the h i l l areas and the British Reserve Area was under the control of the Political Agent, and was beyond the jurisdiction of the Darbar. The opening up of Manipur by the British had its own economic implications.'The valley area of Manipur is a rice growing area and rice is its main product. While trade between Manipur and the outside areas in Assam was conducted even before 1891, it was only after 1891 that large scale export of rice began. It was reported as early as 1892-93 that rice was being freely exported to Kohima; 9 and it is recorded that in 1894-95 some 8,000 maunds ,of rice were exported to Kohima. 10 Upto the t u r n of the century the export of rice from Manipur was restricted to the Kohima area; and considering the fact that at times of scarcity in the valley there was no way of importing foodgratns, this export of rice was considerably checked and regulated. Apprehensions were expressed by Maxwell, the Political Agent, about the possibilities of rice scarcity. " I still think that when thousands of people are on the verge of starvation and there is no means of importing food to the valley, the export of rice, however small, should be prohibited. Let me express the hope that the occasion may not arise to fight out this disputed point." Even so, rice exports for that year (1898-99) was recorded as 36,430 maunds. 11 W i t h the turn of the century we notice that the rice export policy began to assume a peculiar character. T i l l the introduction of motor vehicles, rice was carried mainly in bullock and hand carts. But w i t h the introduction of motor vehicular transportation the rice export trade was captured by the i m migrant Marwari entrepreneurs. As long as the rice trade was under the control of the local population there was little resentment against i t ; but once the Marwaris and the motor vehicles took over, the whole character of the export trade changed. The first major impact of the motor vehicular traffic on the export of rice was felt in 1925 when export of rice was permitted for a period of only six months, and was subsequently stopped from February 1, 1926, because of the rise in the price of rice. 1 2 It may be noted that export of rice had been stopped earlier, in 1921; but while the earlier embargo was due to genuine scarcity, the 1925-26 embargo was due to price rise consequent upon the increased 326

E C O N O M I C A N D P O L I T I C A L WEEKLY outflow of rice by motorised transport The question of rice export from Manipur to British India is closely linked with the growth of Marwari capital in Manipur. The Marwari business community began their business at the beginning of this century and were settled in the British Reserve Area beyond the jurisdiction of the State Police. They gradually captured the cotton and handloom trade. Prominent Marwaris were Kasturichand and Sons, Ganeshlal, Guru Dayal and others. 13 The Marwaris excelled in the export of rice through the growing vehicular traffic. They made further progress when the Maharaja and the Darbar gave them the monopoly of the Cart Tax, a levy on rice exported. In 1933 the Cart Tax contract was transferred from Sadasakh Mansukha Roy Saroagi to Mangolchand Meghraj, The following year, Meghraj made a profit of Rs 33,215 from the Cart Tax monopoly after paying Rs 73,000 to the State.14 A year later the state collected Rs 91,250, out of the total amount of Rs 1,24,865 realised by the Cart Tax monopolist. 16 Rice export came under two categories — the Cart Tax and the L a i Pass. The former allowed free movement of rice, the exporters merely paying the levy known as the Cart Tax. Under the latter category rice was exported under a contract between the Manipur State and the Government of Assam. Under the Government contract rice was exported to the Kohima C i v i l Station, the Assam Rifles posted at Kohima, Sadia and other parts of Assam. We thus notice that there were two parallel monopolies for the export of rice: the Cart Tax, a Marwari monopoly, and the Lal Pass, a State monopoly. The area under rice cultivation in Manipur between 1921 and 1939 i n creased by merely 18,838 acres, while the volume of rice exported increased by 2,92,174 maunds. Rice export from Manipur reached an all-time record of 3,72,174 maunds in 1938, the year before the outbreak of the Nupi Lan, A situation had thus arisen where any failure of the harvest in the following year would result in severe shortages. The accompanying Table indicates the nature and trend of rice export from Manipur. In 1939, while the world saw the outbreak of the Second W o r l d War, Manipur witnessed the uprising of its women. 16 Excessive rain during JulyAugust of that year had seriously damaged standing crops. Further heavy rains in September-October had an

adverse effect upon the harvesting of early paddy. Again, in mid-November hailstorm destroyed most of the standing crops ready for harvesting, and the harvest was badly affected.17 This combined w i t h the large quantity of rice exported in the previous year, resulted in severe shortages. In view of the anticipated bad harvest the Darbar in its meeting of September 13, 1939 passed a resolution demanding that export of rice be stopped. 18 The urgency of the matter was perhaps realised by the Darbar, for this particular resolution was placed in advance of other resolutions of the day.19 The resolution had to gain the concurrence of the Maharaja before it became an order; and the Maharaja while concurring w i t h the Resolution pointed out that the ban on export would no apply to the Government contract we Assam Rifles in Kohima and Sadiya, The Darbar which again met on September 23 agreed to the request of the Political Agent for the export of rice to the Kohima Civil Station. 21 The Darbar, however, reserved the right to stop this export anytime; it also expressed apprehensions about famine in. Manipur. Under another resolution passed on the same day, the Darbar approved a scheme whereby no rice could be exported from Manipur, w i t h out the permission of the Political Agent. It also defined 'export' as the movement of rice along the ManipurDimapur Road to any place beyond Sekmai.22 The Darbar also refused to grant permission for the export of chira and ushana (flattened and parboiled rice) apprehending that this would lead to export of rice after being converted to chira and ushana) But the Maharaja, while approving other resolutions of September 23, 1939, did not give his consent to resolution No 4, pertaining to the export of chira and ushana. He argued that the quantity of ushana and chira in stock was small and, if they were not exported ithin a reasonable period they would rot, as they were not consumed by the people of M a n i pur and Kohima. 24 Meanwhile the Darbar also refused an appeal from the Maharaja for allowing export of rice to the Dacca Battalion. 23 Applications from individuals asking for the re-opening of the rice export were also refused by the Darbar. 28 In fact, at this period, the Darbar was considering the idea of having the rice trade as a state monopoly. 27 However, when the Darbar met on November 9, 1939, there was a dramatic reversal in the rice export policy. Export of rice was

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February 21, 1978 thousand women gathered under the guidance of those women who had been responsible for the rounding up of bullock-cart drivers who had tried to sell rice to the Marwaris The Darbar apprehended that there would be famine in Manipur unless the export of rice was banned. It asked the Land Settlement Officer and Land Revenue Officer to give an early report on the size of the year's harvest.34 The President of the Darbar was also asked to ascertain the quantity of rice available in the market, and the average quantity of rice being exported. 35 The near famine condition, and the general apprehensions of the people, could perhaps have been controlled had the Darbar and the Maharaja taken immediate preventive measures. However, no such preventive measures were taken.

to be resumed from November 24, 1939;28 following the orders of the Maharaja, it was in fact resumed from November 2 1 , 1939.29 Thus the rice export was stopped only for a period of forty days — from September 14 to November 21, 1939. As the discussions and resolutions passed by the Darbar indicate, the Darbar was in favour of state monopoly of rice export trade as a measure to control it, However, there was strong opposition to it from the Maharaja. It would perhaps not be wrong, therefore, to assume that the decision to re-open rice export trade by the Darbar on. November 21 was taken under heavy pressure from the Maharaja, who in turn was pressurised by the Cart Tax monopolists and other merchants. This re-opening of the rice export was directly responsible for the outbreak of Nupi Lan on December 13, 1939.

Ill

N u p i Lan Before the outbreak of Nupi Lan, the price of rice was Rs 1.12.0 per maund; this rose to two rupees a maund just before the December upsurge. 30 According to some participants in Nupi Lan, the price of rice was even higher, The price of paddy too rose sharply. 31 Conditions were fast approaching a near famine situation and the main sufferers were the peasants. Since there was no other source of income or means of livelihood, the peasants were forced to sell their

stocks of rice to the Marwaris. There was also a great scarcity of purchaseable rice. The women who traded in rice and paddy were now deprived of their means of livelihood Meanwhile all available stocks of rice were being bought by the foreign traders. (Persons other than the original inhabitants of Manipur were categorised as foreigners, and a separate office to deal w i t h them was maintained by the State.) Foreign traders had set up rice mills to m i l l and export rice. This combined w i t h the bad harvest hit the poor people hard. 33 On December 11, just before the outbreak, many small traders arrived as usual at the Khwairamband Bazar, but there was not even a Meruk (one mexuk is almost equal to one seer) of rice for sale. There were fifty to sixty women retailers that evening and they were all disappointed to find that there was no rice to buy. However, they all prepared for an agitation the next day. Other campaigns against the price rise were on the move. L Kanhai and L Babun campaigned for a boycott of the cinema halls because of the famine conditions. They also met the disappointed women retailers. They immediately went to the foreign traders' houses to check any buying of rice from the local farmers. A rumour meanwhile bad spread that some bullock cart drivers were being rounded up by the women and handed over to the police, 33 On December 12, thousands of women began gathering around the Darbar office petitioning for the immediate stoppage of the export of rice. A b o u t two

While the Darbar was in session, the women demonstrators who had gathered around the office began shouting slogans — "Stop the export of rice immediately'', "Stop the running of mills", etc. The members of the Darbar fled through the back-door. But Sharpe, the President of the Darbar, was immediately surrounded by the women and had to face them alone. He told them that orders for a ban on the export of rice could not be issued without the sanction of the Maharaja who was away at Nawadeep on pilgrimage. The women — whose number had by then swollen to about 4,000 — then went along w i t h Sharpe to the telegraph office, and confined h i m , the Civil Surgeon and other officers there, 36 They refused to allow the President of the Darbar and other officers to leave the telegraph office u n t i l the receipt of the necessary orders from the Maharaja, They also prevented the Commandant of the 4th Assam Rifles who had arrived there on hearing about the confinement of the officers) from rescuing the confined men. At about 2.45 in the afternoon, when a platoon of the Assam Rifles arrived .the women seemed to weaken a little at the sight of guns and bayonets. At this moment one of the women from the crowd repeatedly shouted "Vande Mataram" and "Manipur Mata Ki Jai". 37 This raised their morale and they became more militant and aggressive. The situation became so dangerous that the sentry on the steps of the office sounded his bugle, and the troops charged in to clear the grounds. Amidst a fusilade of stone, the women were pushed back. But although the ground was cleared the women did not disperse; they remained on the road outside the compound. It was not until midnight 327

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY that the officers could leave the telegraph office, In the event, 21 women were seriously injured, some receiving bayonet wounds. 34 This was denied by the officials; five women were removed to the Civil Hospital while the others received first aid in the compound of the telegraph office.39 The magnitude and intensity of the women's agitation can perhaps be judged from the fact that troops had to be called to disperse them and maintain law and order. The firmness of conviction and the singleminded. ness of the women who agitated that day cannot be underestimated, especially in view of the fact that this was achieved w i t h o u t male leadership or participation. It w o u l d be proper at this point to consider whether the agitations of December 12 were w h o l l y spontaneous. The women possessed a high degree of conciousness and it is possible that they themselves organised the agitation. Some women even lay down in front of the lorries loaded w i t h rice and ready to move c u t It is thus clear that Manipur women never lacked m i l i tancy once they were convinced of their purpose. On December 14 the President of the Darbar received a message from the Maharaja asking the Political Agent to stop the export of rice, and an order banning it was promptly issued. The women then turned their attention to the rice mills. They were able to extract written promises from the m i l l owners that they w o u l d not run their mills. However news of a m i l l owner who had soaked rice and boiled some paddy to convert it into par-boiled rice, led to some 10,000 women marching that night to one of the largest rice mills. It was only after the removal of electrical connections to the mills that the women could be persuaded to go home. On December 15 the Darbar considered whether the telegram of the Maharaja implied a ban on the export of rice to the Kohima C i v i l Station and Assam Rifles at Kohima and Sadiya. This was not clearly indicated in the Maharaja's telegram. In view of the agitation a resolution sanctioning t h i r t y state m i l i t a r y police and fifteen Dolai Pabas at the disposal of the Police Member was adopted. The Darbar's action showed that it was not always necessary to receive the Maharaja's prior approval for the implementation of an order. The women agitators therefore had a point when they urged that the Darbar need not wait for the Maharaja's sanction for the imposition of an embargo on rice export

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IV Role of Manipuri M e n While the women of Manipur were agitating, what were the men doing? On the evening of December 12, the Branch Secretary of the N i k h i l Manipuri Mahasabha, L Kanhai Singh, and T Ibotombi Singh, along w i t h others requested the elders of the Mahasabha to discuss the agitation of the women. The Mahasabha, however, said that it had nothing to do w i t h i t . On the contrary, it suggested that an appeal should be made to the Judicial Member of the Darbar. These young members of the Mahasabha had therefore no alternative but to wait for the arrival of the President of the Mahasabha Hijam lrabot Singh, who was then away at Cachar. On December 13, a meeting called "by the dissenting members of the Mahasabha was held at the Police Bazar, as the Khwairamband Bazar market was under a hartal. This was a small gathering which passed off peacefully. W i t h the arrival of lrabot Singh at Imphal on December 16, the N u p i Lan entered a new phase. The upsurge which so far had been led solely by the women, now received male support. The day after his arrival lrabot called a meeting of the w o r k i n g committee of the N i k h i l Manipuri Mahasabha to discuss the N u p i Lan: in this meeting, sharp differences between lrabot and other members were revealed. The other members of the Mahasabha were against the movement, and lrabot opted out of the Mahasabha. On December 24 he formed a new political organisation called Manipur Praja Samelini at a meeting held at the Police Grounds. 40 The tempo of this movement, particularly among the women, was further revived on December 29. Seme rice carters who had been thrown i n t o the gutters by the women agitators lodged a complaint w i t h the Political Agent and named five women as the assailants. The Agency police thereupon asked the State police to produce the women for recording their statements. A large crowd of women objected to this. They beseiged the Inspector of the State Police Thana for several hours for having kicked a Manipuri Brahmin woman, Chhabi, in front of the people.41 From December 13 the women had boycotted the Khwairamband Bazar, Large public meetings were organised w i t h lrabot as the principal speaker. Under his leadership, Manipuri men also took part in the movement At a

meeting held at the Police Bazar on January 9, 1940, lrabot was arrested under section 124 of the Indian Penal Code. He was charged w i t h making inflammatory speeches. On March 22 the Darbar passed a resolution to keep lrabot under arrest for three years. He was to be kept at the Imphal Jail for some time before being taken to Cachar Jail, The Darbar passed another order prohibiting all public gatherings in the Police Bazar from January 13, 1940. This, however, did not deter the people from organising meetings at places other than the Police Bazar. After the arrest of lrabot, his followers took up the cause of the women. L Kanhai led and organised numerous meetings all over Imphai except the Police Bazar. A form of Civil Disobedience movement then followed, and many people began refusing to pay the feudal dues and taxes like the Panchanapet (five anna) tax. In May 1910, the members of the Praja Samelini built a bamboo bridge at Naharup, thereby defying the ferry tax order. Thus the movement initiated by the women received active support from their male counterparts. The boycott of the Khwairamband Bazar continued and this became a matter of concern to the authorities since the economy of the state w o u l d suffer if women continued the boycott. The situation did not improve throughout 1940. This led the Governor of Assam to demand a full detailed report on the situation." Gimson in his reply to J P Mills, pointed out that the boycott of the Bazar began on December 12, 1939, as a spontaneous protest against what was called the "Bayonet Charge" and continued as a protest against foreign merchants. As long as the leaders of the agitation were active, the boycott was complete. But after the arrest of four women leaders in January 1940, the situation was near normal- though the Women's Bazar continued to be empty. In August, the Political Agent issued an order that, since the stalls in the Women's Bazar had been empty for so long, he would allot them to anyone he chose. Even this threat d i d net bring back the women, though it gave rise to some excitement. However, Gimson did not make any new allotment as that would have led to ill-feeling and resentment43 After the order of August 1940, the women filed a petition signed by K u mar! and Rajani of Sagolhand, Maipakpi of Thangmeiband, Sanatombi of Bramhapur, Nainbi of Segalambi and Ibemcha of Nongmeibung. They point329

February 21, 1978 ed out that their main grievances were (a) the unfitness of the present Darbar members, (b) the unfitness of the Police Member, (c) the illegal action cf the Inspector of Police, (d) the illegal conviction of the four women, (e) the unexpected police assualt on the public on January 14, 1940, and (f) the illegal action of Dulap Singh, A m i n , They assured that as soon as these grievances

ECONOMIC A N D P O L I T I C A L WEEKLY were redressed they would attend the Bazar.44 The handling of the Women's Boycott, in contrast to the Bayonet Charge, showed that the authorities had some appreciation of the militancy of the women of Manipur. Gimson noted that "economic distress or political excitement may lead the women of Manipur to take up other forms of agita-

tions, as they had done is the past.' 45 By the time (he boycott was in full swing, the state authorities had begun to consider the women as a force to reckon w i t h . Their handling of the boycott showed a far greater degree of caution than the action taken by them in the telegraph office incident of December 12, 1939. The grievances of the women were

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not immediately redressed; but the women certainly made themselves felt. But the boycott itself came to an end, w i t h most of the population of Imphal fleeing for safety as the War approached Manipur.

the movement, however, lies in the fact that in the emergence of a new Manipur after the end of the Second World War, it was the women of Manipur who were in the vanguard of change.

V

Notes

26 27 28

Conclusions

1

The Nupi Ian movement of 1939 was based on genuine fears and apprehensions arising out of uncontrolled export of rice from Manipur, These fears were further aggravated by the heavy rains and floods of 1939. The immediate cause of the movement, therefore, was the i n i t i a l impact of the price rise and scarcity conditions on the women, who were more vocal and volatile than the male section of the manipuri society. It was they who initiated the agitation and sustained it. W h i l e a movement for constitutional reforms in Manipur had been initiated in 1938, it was the Nupi Lan which brought the matter to a head and focussed on the inadequacies in both the economic and administrative policies of the Manipur State. While the original demands of the women were confined to the banning of rice export, their later demands also i n cluded changes in the Darbar and administrative set-up. The Nupi Lan, while postponing consideration of further reforms, nevertheless emphasised the need for them. In so far as the male participation and the role of Irabot is concerned, it is quite likely that had Jrabot not appeared at that particular moment on the scene, the movement of the women might not have received the required political support. It might have remained a purely women's agitation. But despite the role of Irabot and the participation of the males, it was the women who rose up in protest and who kept the movement alive. The boycott of the market for more than one and a half years certainly convinced the state authorities that the women of Manipur could take up any form of agitation once they were convinced of their purpose. It would perhaps not be very far f r o m the t r u t h to conclude that the Nupi Lan, which started as a rice agitat i o n directed against the economic policies of the Maharaja and the Marwari monopolists, later on changed its character to become a movement for constitutional and administrative reforms in Manipur. The uniqueness of

2 3

4 5 6

7 8 9 10 13 12 13 14 J5 16

17 18 19

20 21 22 23

24 25

Evans, Geoffery and Brat, James Anthony, "Imphal", London, 1962, p 20. Hudson. T C, "The M e i t e i s , London, 1908, p 23, The actual population figures are not available as the records of the 1891 Census held before the War were destroyed in the AngloManipuri War of 1891. Ried, Robert, "History of the Frontier Areas Bordering Assam'', Shillong, 1942, p 89. Administrative Report on the State of Manipur, 1923-24, Imphal, Laldena, "British Policy Towards Manipur, 1891-1919'', unpublished M Phil thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru University, 1973, pp 18, 58. Ried, Robert, op cit, p 7 1 , See G Bhadra, " K u k i Uprising: Its Causes and Nature'', paper for private circulation. Administrative Report for the State of Manipur, 1892-93. p 6. Administrative Report for the State of Manipur, 1894-95, p 5, Administrative Report for the State of Manipur, 1898-99, p 2. Administrative Report for the State of Manipur, 1925-26, p 5. " N u p i Lan, 1939', The Lamyanba, V o l 5, No 51, December 1973. Administrative Report for the State of Manipur, 1933-34, p 7. Administrative Report for the State of Manipur, 1934-35, p 6, It was a strong belief among the Manipuris that the years 19391940 and 1941 would be years of trouble in Manipur. They further believed that this was in accordance w i t h the predictions of the Puranas. The outbreak of the Women's War in 1939 confirmed this belief among the local population. Administrative Report for the State of Manipur, 1939-40, p 5. Manipur State Darbar Resolution No 11, Memo No 10589 of 13-91939. Sharpe, President, Manipur State Darbar, to Churachand, the Maharaja of Manipur, 13-9-1939; hereinafter referred to as Sharpe to Churachand or vice versa, Churachand to Sharpe, Memo No 287, p 1, dated 14-9-1939. Manipur State barbar Resolution No 1 of 23-9-1939. Marapur State Darbar Resolution No 3 of 23-9-1939. Manipur State Darbar Resolution No 4 of 23-9-1939; Sharpe to Churachand Memo No 1120 G of 24-9-1939. Churachand to Sharpe, Memo No 329, PT-1. dated 24-9-1939. Manipur State Darbar Resolution No 15 of 4-10-1939; and Private

29 30 , 31 32 33 34

35

36 37 38 39 40 40 41

42

31 44 45

Secretary/Churachand to Sharpe, Memo No 2698-S & J of 28-9-1939. Manipur State Darbar Resolution No 17 of 16-10-1939. Manipur State Darbar Resolution No 13 of 1-11-1939, Memo 1416G/1B-1 of 3-11-1939. Manipur State Darbar Resolution No 1 of November 9, 1939t Memo No 1433G/1-B1 of November 9, 1939. Memo No 501 PI-1 dated November 21, 1939. Administrative Report for the State of Manipur, 1940-41. Ebon, (Manipuri Daily), 12-121973: interview w i t h L Kanhai Singh, p 2, Administrative Report for the State of Manipur, 1939-40. Larnyanba, op cit, p 33-4. According to the report submitted to the Darbar by the Land Settlement Officer and Land Revenue Officer on the size of the harvest of the year 1939, there were approximately 7,400 paris of land under rice cultivation, (one pari being about 2.5 acres). The area damaged by Hoods was about 900 paris, and the average yield per pari was 29 pots (one pot being about 65 seers). Thus the amount of paddy available for consumption was about 17.50,000 pots; and putting the population of the State at 3,00,000 (1931 Census figure being 2,84,843). and the per capita consumption per year at 6 pots, the m i n i m u m requirement was less than 18,00,000 pots. A n d considering that fact that already a large quantity had already been exported, the Darbar did not rule out the possibility of rice scarcity in Manipur before the following year's harvest, (Manipur State Darbar Resolution No 12 of January 10, 1940, Memo No 2210G/ IB-I of January 12, 1940.) Manipur State Darbar Resolution No 1 of December 12, 1939, Memo No 1973-G/IB-1 of December 15, 19:39. The Hindu, Madras, 18-12-1939. Lamyanba, op cit, p 37. Ibid The Pioneer, Lucknow, 19-121939. ''Manipur Itihasta Nupi Lan'' Lannianha, Vol 5, No 52, lanuary 1974. Administrative Report for the State of Manipur, 1939-40, p 2; and Petition filed by the women of Manipur to the Political Agent, Imphal, dated September 25, 1940. M i l l s , Secretary to the Governor of Assam to Gimson Political Agent in Manipur, Confidential, DO No 710C Shiliong, dated 13-111940, hereinafter referred to as Mills to Gimson or vice versa. Gimson to M i l l s , Confidential DO No 5660 GA Imphal dated 21-31941. Petition filed by the women mass of Manipur to the Political Agent, dated 25-9-1940. Gimson to Mills, op cit 823