Nuclear Waste: Target For Terrorism

Nuclear Waste and Terrorism by Walt Robbins Shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S., it was widely reported that al-Qaeda had given serious consideration to crashing commercial aircraft into several nuclear plants on that day. According to journalist Jeffrey St. Clair, in his September 14, 2002 Counterpunch article (The Fire Next Time), al-Qaeda operatives Ramzi bin al-Shaibah and Khaled al-Sheikh Mohammad told AlJazeera interviewer Yosri Fouda, that future attacks on western nuclear facilities could not be ruled out. While it is true that nuclear reactors are housed in buildings that are among the most durable modern structures in existence, and have been designed to (hopefully) withstand the force of earthquakes, no one had ever conceived of a direct impact from a large commercial aircraft full of aviation fuel or from some other similar massive explosive assault. Some authorities state that the consequences would be truly catastrophic. But the real Achilles heels at nuclear plants are the adjacent spent fuel facilities, which contain major concentrations of highly radioactive material. They lack the heavy duty containment safeguard provided for the reactor, and could be considered "sitting ducks" for disastrous terror attacks. Large explosions, along with major fire resulting in radioactive release from spent fuel would have serious health, social and economic consequences for people in the surrounding geographical area. It should be noted that many of our nuclear facilities are in close proximity to the Great Lakes. Any ecological disaster resulting from terrorism could affect both Canada and the United States. Unfortunately, none of the discussion papers commissioned by the Canadian Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) deals forthrightly and directly with the need to "harden" existing spent fuel facilities at reactor-sites to better protect them from such an attack. Some of the discussion papers deal with nuclear waste security, but in rather general and overly reassuring terms. These discussion papers are available to the public from the NWMO. Commentary on the NWMO discussion documents dealing with the security of nuclear waste: In my view, the NWMO discussion papers (with the exception of the final one by Ed Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists), do not truly come to grips with the growing threat of extremist Islamic terrorism in the world, and how spent nuclear fuel could be used to further that threat. Perhaps one reason for this is that Canada, unlike many other countries, has not (at this writing) been subjected to these barbaric attacks. Another possibility is that Canadian authorities are actually working on the problem, but prefer to keep their efforts quiet----for security reasons. In any event, none of these papers directly identify, in any degree of detail, possible kinds of terrorist scenarios and how Canada could develop plans to deal with them. Mostly, the papers hide behind administrative requirements and regulations of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, almost as if somehow the rule book itself provides a wall of protection. 1 Transportation of spent nuclear fuel:

Several discussion papers emphasize that there have been no attacks on spent fuel shipments anywhere in the world. But, some also point out that there have been relatively few spent fuel shipments. If spent fuel is to be moved from reactor sites to any centralized locations, shipment frequency would increase dramatically over decades. It is hard to imagine that such a change would escape the notice of terrorists who are becoming increasingly sophisticated with their information networks and their technology for destructive acts. Lauding past performance is not a comforting response to the potential threats of the future. Assertions to the effect that attacks upon spent fuel shipments would fail, or produce very limited negative consequences, or that safeguards in the present security system are adequate, minimize the fact of the rapid advance of destructive technologies now is use or potentially available to those who wish to do us harm. And, as Mr. Bin Laden has indicated, all of us who are not in his camp, can be considered "infidels" and fair game. And by 2009, international terrorism appears to be on the increase, and using more sophisticated technologies and methods. Are contemporary spent fuel transportation casks on trucks or trains sufficiently "robust" to withstand a major, high yield type of attack? Many nuclear watchdog groups and others, point out that governments have not undertaken the kinds of full scale tests required, and therefore, the question cannot be reliably answered. As one paper points out, other transported substances might be more easily used by terrorists. Perhaps, but that overlooks the essence of the terrorist mentality and objectives; i.e., to terrorize the public. The large scale psychological impact on the public from damage, destruction and disperal of a nuclear source (as contrasted with any other substance) should never be underestimated. Any contemplated large-scale, long-time period movement of spent nuclear fuel from reactor sites to some centralized storage or repository site, is, for me, truly a "non-starter." Furthermore, I am fully confident that communities along nuclear waste transportation routes would veto any such plan. 2 Security of the storage options themselves: In spite of the reassuring words about security of the various options in some of the discussion papers, no concrete evidence has been presented that any one of the nuclear waste management options is really secure from large scale terrorist attacks. The onus has been placed upon current regulatory standards which were produced for a bygone age. Nowhere (with the exception of Ed Lyman's paper) have some of the key technical issues surrounding terrorism even been identified. Nowhere in these papers has the central issue of the need for securing and "hardening" on-reactor-site storage facilities against contemporary terrorist methodology, been addressed. As long as the reactors are operating, there will always be about a ten year (cooling off) inventory of high-level nuclear waste at the reactor sites, even if the older waste is moved somewhere else. The technical problems surrounding the security of that on-site waste must be addressed. That they have not been adequately addressed in the NWMO discussion papers dealing with the subject of security, is a very serious deficiency; one which makes the selection of a final nuclear waste management option, a dubious exercise at best. Outside of a general recognition of need, specific security problems and protections for the centralized (above or below ground) storage option were not

mentioned. Both a centralized storage facility and an underground repository facility share some of the same security risks; i.e., transportation to them, as well as vulnerability of protracted surface exposure at the destination, including loading and unloading, repackaging, and movement to the final resting place. Advocates of "permanent" underground burial in a deep geological repository have long insisted that their option is virtually completely secure; from theft, terrorism, accidents, etc. As indicated above, the permanent burial option is still subject to the security risks of transportation and the exposed surface destination. Nor does burial solve the problem of the "hot" waste that must remain at the reactor sites for a decade before being moved. Can geological repositories really remain secure for thousands, or even hundreds of years? Some scientists think not and suggest that such facilities could become "plutonium mines" of the future. An underlying premise of the burial concept is that the waste would not only become irretrievable, but the waste repositories themselves, would require "no institutional controls." Given the advance of science and technology, there is absolutely no reason to believe that a sealed-up underground facility would need any fewer institutional controls than an aboveground one. It would be prudent to assume that those in the future who might want to extract the contents of an underground nuclear burial place, will have the capabilities to do so with whatever technologies, and for whatever purposes they may then have. In any event, by now it should be crystal clear that this"out-of-sight-out-ofmind" approach was not embraced by a public which was confronted with the specter of permanent geological burial. Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., (AECL) discovered this in the 1980's while trying to implement such a program in the Canadian Shield rock in Manitoba and Ontario. More recently, media accounts of an NWMO commissioned study (Citizens' Dialogue on the Long-term Management of Used Nuclear Fuel, July, 2004) reported that "Canadians want the radioactive waste from their nuclear reactors stored within reach, not dropped down holes deep into the rocky Precambrian Shield and forgotten. And they don't trust government, industry or existing regulators with the job." In the U.S., the Commission studying the circumstances that led up to the tragic events of September 11, 2001, pointed to a "lack of imagination" on the part of the intelligence community. I note a singular lack of imagination in most of the NWMO discussion papers that deal with the subject of security and nuclear waste. There is an unmistakable aura of smugness and complacency in some of these writings which I find disquieting. They convey the message "Don't worry, we have it all under control." Anytime I hear that kind of message on a subject of this gravity--I do indeed worry. And so should we all!