Accelerator Transmutation Of Nuclear Waste

Accelerator Transmutation of Nuclear Waste Modern Day Alchemy by Walt Robbins The idea of permanent underground burial of irradiated nuclear fuel wastes was best summed up by Dave Taylor of the Concerned Citizens of Manitoba organization. Calling it the “Outhouse Solution,” he described the process: “Dig a hole, bury the waste and cover it up.” But I still have hopes that a truly scientific solution can be found to deal with nuclear waste. Could Accelerator Transmutation (ATW) be that solution? In the final two chapters of volume III of the Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga(http://www.nukeshaft.ca), I included a number of references and comments about ATW technology. I argued that ATW should be investigated sufficiently to determine it's viability as an option for the final and permanent destruction of high-level nuclear waste and weapons plutonium. ATW is a process in which long-lived radioisotopes are converted to short-lived ones and inert substances by neutron bombardment using a linear accelerator. For a variety of reasons, ATW was, for many years, relegated to the backwaters of scientific research. It did not emerge as a popular nuclear waste management option, either inside or outside of the nuclear establishment. The preferred option inside the establishment was clearly geological isolation. In 1980, when I became involved in the underground research controversy in Manitoba, it was apparent that the problem of nuclear waste "disposal" had virtually become the exclusive domain of the geo-scientific community. Other scientific disciplines had been relegated to the sidelines. The underground burial advocates took control of substantial public resources and became the principle influence on public policy in nuclear waste generating countries. Some of the early Canadian reports and studies I read, perfunctorily dismissed non-geological options (transmutation among them), and went on to extol the virtues (as well as to prejudge the success) of geological isolation of nuclear waste. That the geological option was seized upon by the world's nuclear establishment is easily explained in that it promised a relatively quick fix for the mounting stockpiles of irradiated nuclear fuel waste at the reactor sites. The waste would soon be out of sight, out of mind, a situation which could facilitate the development of more nuclear energy. Or so the nuclear establishment thought. Even the U.S. National Research Council in a 1996 study presented a rather lukewarm analysis of ATW. That study concluded that the state of the art of any transmutation process was insufficient to justify a delay in the opening of the first nuclear waste repository. As for Canada, the nuclear establishment was not involved with ATW research and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Review Panel on nuclear waste, avoided ATW "like the plague." Not only did the main scientific and nuclear establishments take a dim view of ATW, some of my favourite and most highly respected U.S. nuclear watchdog organizations, rendered rather harsh judgements of the technology.

In December, 1999, Amy Shollenberger, senior policy analyst for Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy Project said that The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) "... should not continue to spend money researching the Accelerator Transmutation of Waste (ATW) system because it will not offer a viable solution to the nuclear waste problem facing the United States." In the March/April 2001, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Arjun Makhijani, President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER), citing many scientific and technical problems, suggested that transmutation research had been "driven by political forces intent on propping up the nuclear power enterprise." In a May 24, 2001 statement, Edwin Lyman, Scientific Director of the Washington based Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) said that "implementing DOE's ATW concept would vastly increase the environmental, safety and proliferation risks from nuclear power, cost taxpayers a fortune and almost certainly fail to achieve its primary purpose, which is to simplify nuclear waste disposal. The U.S. nuclear watchdog groups were, in part, reacting to Sen. Pete Domenici's,(R-N.M.), March, 1999 initiative to breath life into the fledgling ATW program, by securing funds for further research. In FY 1999, in the Energy and Water Appropriation Act, the U.S. Congress directed DOE to conduct a study of ATW and to prepare, a "road map" which would forecast needed research areas, time table, costs and schedule. Released November 1, 1999, the road map, with considerable international scientific input, described in detail, a five year, $281 million project. By July, 2001, DOE's advanced accelerator application (AAA) grants were being distributed to some of the major U.S. universities. Why, in 1999, did ATW suddenly emerge from it's position of relative obscurity? The simple explanation is that it was now being clearly linked to facilitating the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository program and to the future of nuclear energy. As stated in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) news release " If ATW technology could be successfully implemented to overcome all technical issues, it could potentially facilitate the long-term management of a repository system." And in the words of DOE official, Dr. Stan O Schriber, "ATW holds the promise of making nuclear power more acceptable to the general populace by minimizing the amount of material that has to be stored in a repository and by reducing the length of time over which a geologic repository must be licensed." (As for the length of time, in one of his reports, Los Alamos scientist Francesco Venneri stated that "The goal of the ATW nuclear subsystem is to produce three orders of magnitude reduction in the long-term radio toxicity of the waste sent to a repository, including losses through processing. If the goal is met, the radio toxicity of ATW-treated waste after 300 years would be less than that of untreated waste after 100,000 years.") The DOE and the U.S. nuclear industry underground burial advocates have neatly coopted ATW to their own ends. They have concluded that some day they might need it to help them justify and sell Yucca Mountain as well as more nuclear energy development to a skeptical U.S. public. But would it?

It seems that the nuclear energy and underground waste burial advocates will stop at nothing to get their waste repository "up and running." Why should the public more readily accept the nuclear garbage dump, simply because it is augmented by a 5 year ATW research project? Suppose the ATW research does not pan out? Then, the repository, full of dangerous nuclear waste and plutonium, would eventually be sealed up with all of the risks that would entail. Even Canada’s (industry dominated) Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) weighed on the issue. In its final report, it rejected ATW, blithely ignoring some of the facts presented to it by its own consultants. It dismissed the ATW option of transmuting nuclear waste to low-grade or even inert substances because it "...is not yet sufficiently advanced for implementation and long-term management of the residual materials would still be required." It cites a report from French nuclear authorities that "industrial implementation of transmutation cannot be seen until the years 2040-2050 at best." And yet, NWMO is perfectly willing to wait some three hundred years before a dubious underground repository is permanently closed. But, in NWMO Background Paper: 6.5 Technical Methods: Range of Potential Options for the Long-Term Management of Used Nuclear Fuel, by Phil Richardson & Marion Hill, Enviros Consulting, it is stated that "It is recognized internationally that the possibility that P&T (partitioning and transmutation) could become a readily available and very attractive treatment option in several decades time, (and) could be a reason for choosing storage rather than disposal." (Italics supplied) Furthermore, in NWMO Background Paper: 6-1 Technical Site Storage Systems for Used Nuclear Fuel, by SENES stated that the dry storage facilities of irradiated power sites currently have a design life of 50 years of dry storage containers is thought to be 100 years

Methods: Status of Reactor Consultants Limited, it is fuel at Canada's nuclear and that "...the actual life or more."

Put two and two together, and you have a compelling case for continued on-site storage, with augmented security, coupled with some serious research and development into transmutation technologies, (which to my knowledge, no one in Canada is pursuing). I've referred to some of the risks of underground burial throughout the first three volumes of the Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga. One of the greatest concerns now, is that reactor-grade plutonium, including that produced by the "burning" of MOX (weapons plutonium) fuel, would be sitting in nice, neat underground vaults, just waiting for extraction by future terrorists, rogue states or other disaffected members of society. It may actually be the easiest way to get their hands on these dangerous substances. Reactor grade plutonium can be used to manufacture a crude but highly destructive nuclear weapon. Other concerns about a repository include nuclear waste transportation accidents, human intrusion, repository failure and environmental contamination, stemming from a wide variety of possible causes. ATW should not be used as an adjunct to an underground repository program, to help promote future nuclear energy development. I believe that ATW research should proceed on it's own merits, it's main purpose being a clear determination as to whether or not the technology can safely

eliminate weapons grade plutonium and high-level nuclear waste without the need for additional management processes, i.e., underground repositories. I understand the concerns of the anti-nuclear organizations. I realize that any scenario that removes nuclear waste as a “problem” for the industry could lead to a change in public perceptions, which would benefit its reactor expansion hopes and dreams. Perhaps. But I still would prefer to see the waste destroyed rather than buried to the potential detriment of future generations. Currently, it is difficult to determine just how much progress, if any, is being made on ATW technology. My internet searches in 2007-8 revealed very little contemporary information on the subject. I know that some work is going on in various universities and laboratories. But I get the distinct impression that the "hell bent for underground burial establishment" effectively put ATW out of business, at least for now. However, times are changing. In the U.S., the Obama Administration has made drastic cuts to the 2009 federal budget for the on-going nuclear waste project at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. It is likely that the U.S. government will re-assess the entire nuclear waste program. Hopefully, it will take a new look at the potential of ATW to deal with the problem of the disposition of irradiated nuclear fuel waste.