Negotiation In Identity Conflicts

NEGOTIATION IN IDENTITY CONFLICTS

Skopje, 2007

1. INTRODUCTION Intensity in creating identities, cultural diversities and practices, awakening of forgotten identities of groups and conflicts such process creates, represent the second side of the coin of globalization of international relations, postmodern societies, and those in transition towards democracy.1 Such new particularity, fragmentation, new tribalism, etc., are promoted like a global tendency. In this regard, this tendency is part of globalization and at the same time is its opposition as well. In context of the theory of nation and democracy, new questions on old topics were raised, of the kind: ‘Who are we …?’ by S. P. Huntington, on the American nation with regard to losing classical axis of domination by American Protestant white elites (WASP), and incoming Hispanicization. In another yet context questions were opened relating to the fall of politics of ‘integration’ (whatever was conceived by that term, and was not conceived within the European discourse and not so much in detail) and crisis of the European identity. Challenge to the European democracies represented nonintegrated large immigration segments, their nationals, and those who were not that. The world of ‘deep diversities’ opened, somehow at the same time, with issues relating to ‘introduction of multiculturalism’ of societies in Southeast Europe. These societies, being democratized in the normative frameworks of liberal democracy, were unpleasantly surprised by their own multicultural reality that was being politically thematized. Then, of course, there is the ‘old’ topic on challenge towards universalism of the education ethics or ethical code of the Western world, in moment of triumph of liberalism and discourse of human rights, by Eastern cultures, Islam, etc. Cultural relativism and communitarian discourses further give rise to this issue and so set down the postmodern horizon of moral without having a universal, single ethical code. Sydney Mintz calls this a universal feature/capability of a human being to create cultural values and afterwards to behave according to them; Immanuel Wallerstein says that the same feature is added by ability to use cultural strategies in order ‘to lie oneself and others’. Cf. : Sydney Mintz W., The Power of Sweetness and Sweetness of Power, 8th Lecture, Denventer: Van Loghun Slaterus, 1988; Wallerstein Immanuel, The Ideological Tensions of Capitalism, in J. Smith ed, Wesport, CT, Greenwood Press,1988. 1

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There is tendency with some authors addressing this issue to see it, let us say, from ideological/geographical aspect. That is to say, the rise of the phenomenon of group/identity topics and conflicts is outcome of the fall of ideological bastions of authoritarianism and former great monarchies. In other words, that this is supposedly the outcome of introduction of Eastern, Oriental, or, simply, non-Western values and civilization. Huntington’s inspiration to some extent is also outcome of this aura. In other words, this claims that cultural/national crises emerge in societies in transition towards democracy and such crises are explained by inherited injustice towards minority groups, unequal access to resources, actually a struggle to ‘… keep minorities from losing…’ (W. Zartman, 1996). This is the horizon of debates on territorial demarcation, secession, or irredentism in societies in transition (S. Woodward), or on instruments as discussed by W. Kymlicka: rights of self-rule, and special representation rights.2 However, a more profound and empirically more responsible analysis shows quickly that identity conflicts are not only the outcome of intergroup diversities in culture, or of primordial hatred, remembering blood, distribution of resources, etc, but also of the stress caused by contemporary mass anonymous life and the global economy, i.e., that they are equally ‘a Western phenomenon’. Then ‘fear’ (Z. Baumann) is introduced in the discourse. Namely, fear and issues on uncertainty, security, safety of human life and own group – that identity and primary links/groups provide (regardless if it is realistic or illusory). Whether you would approach this ‘awakening’ or process in defensive manner, as done by S. Huntington (with his thesis on the start of threats to Western democracies and nation-states), or you would approach it in context of further ‘democratization of democracy’, of re-establishing balance between liberal individualistic principles and group rights/justice, depends on the very profile of authors in this field. For us, it is important to define the basic character of this process, in order to be able to establish the identity of issues on its thematization in the political theory. Among other things, this debate opened new perspectives within discussions on the theory of equity, human rights, theories of Susan Woodward, Redrawing Borders in a Period of Transition , ed. Milton J. Esman and Shibley Telhami, International Organizations and Ethnic Conflicts, Cornel University Press , New York , 1995 ; Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995. 2

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transition, conflictology, crisology, and, even more important, it opened a line of new return to the notion of ‘culture’. Our subject matter in this book will be part of that front of debates relating to specifics in creating cultural identities from aspect of their confliction dynamics. This represents the basis for further theses that will address the conflict zones by means of ‘theory’ of prevention, cessation, and negotiation in identity conflicts. The basic thesis of this text that I would like to present an argument in favor of is: that there is motivation and basis to morally oppose/classify, and then prevent violence in politics; that there is no determinism in outbreaks of violence in this identity conflicts; and that it is important for the entirety of democratic opportunities in societies with multicultural structure. We would like to leave considerations of the very ‘final’ conflict resolution as well as reasons for conflict appearance, for the final section of this book. That ambition is difficult to attain on short, and even long-term by means of political experiences. This means we would agree with reasonable ambition of the text to outline a basis for living with conflicts, in conflict situation (according to U. Beck, in the risky, late-modern society; or, according to E. Gidense, with apocalyptic opportunities in societies of high modernism) that is ‘diluted’ and neutralized in context of politics and political system to such extent allowing functioning of democracy and ‘viable states’. Our aim would be to try suggesting experiences relating to processes and certain institutional solutions that serve as shock absorber for conflicts of the said type and create conditions for democracy. These democracies do not have to be necessarily well-known standards in ’the Western world’. Namely, we would here prepare ourselves for what Hermen Van Gunsteren calls ‘terra incognita of multicultural societies and their democracy’.3 All this construction I have presented needs to be consciously supported by a minimalist ethical platform. This is especially necessary when we let ourselves ‘recommend’ resolutions and methods in disputes and conflicts between diverse cultural/ethnic segments. We would borrow this minimalist ethical configuration from

H.V.Gunsteren, A Theory of Citizenship, Westviev Press, Oxford, 1998.

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few authors: sociologist Sigmund Baumann,4 and two philosophers Richard Rorty,5 and John Gray.6 Three connecting ethical judgments or theses make the ethical configuration. The first one is that violence as such is not necessary; that it is not ‘destined’ or ‘predetermined’ to conflict resolution, in any context, be it even in context of interethnic political situation. On the contrary, violence makes conditions harder and sometimes even destroys any chances for political solution. In other words, it is claimed that majority of people, experts, or ‘reasonable’ citizens can understand this and be motivated to eliminate violence, or at least its most cruel forms, from the political discourse.7 The second ethical premise refers to our attempt to suggest resolution. Then we would need to carefully avoid that modern, universalistic model, that specific universalism that is in constant search of rules that ‘will be valid on all occasions’ and of foundations that will not ‘be shaken’. We will try to clearly distance ourselves from such ‘modern’ ethics that suggests non-ambivalent, non-aporetic ethical code. Especially when such attempts hide a campaign to suppress differences and eliminate all ‘wild’, autonomous, disobedient, and uncontrollable sources of moral judgments. Modern societies practice, sometimes, moral narrow-mindedness under the pretext of promoting universal ethics. We will try to advocate another position and try to support it by political and law-based methodology and technique, which consists of the following: skepticism in ‘objectively established moral’. A moral Reference would be especially his Postmodern Ethics, published by Templum, Skopje, 2005. Richard Rorty, see in: The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, Objectivism, Relativism and Truth, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994; Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. 6 Cf. John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000; False Dawn, The Delusions of Global Capitalism, London, Gants Books, 1998; Enlightenment's Wake, Routledge, London, 1994; End-games, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1997; Isaiah Berlin, Princeton University Press, Princeton , 1996 . 7 We would like to express our gratitude especially to Richard Rorty’s pragmatic defense of moral obligations in democracy which he amounts to several conclusions: the only moral obligations of people in democracy is the capacity for empathy, elimination of humiliation of the others, and solidarity. In the cited essay, Priorities of Democracy Over Philosophy, Rorty advocates the thesis that for a functioning of a reasonable democracy, it is not necessary to have philosophical foundation of the system and universalistic ethics (this is also our point of departure). Rorty indeed concludes in powerful manner that once we have freed ourselves from the obligation to serve supernatural determinants and nonhuman sources of power and legitimacy, the only thing left to us as basis for regulation of our society is our definite human destinies and contingency, i.e. our feeling of being related to others in the group and solidarity in context of our culture. LIBERAL CULTURE is the cement of the public moral, and justification of democracy is simply based on its comparative advantages from other societies in history or the non-feasibility of Utopian projects. Such non-metaphysical advocacy of democracy represents a sound basis for us for the situation of inter-cultural evaluation so needed in mediation in interethnic conflicts. 4 5

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position is always ambivalent and depends on the individualistic responsibility of the person making moral decision. It seems this is some kind of ‘the original sin’ of moral as such. Moral judgments are undeniable aporetic, difficult to make universal, and to some extent ‘irrational’. Uncertainty, moral responsibility, and evaluation always follow every moral situation, even this one of evaluation and proposing resolution to interethnic conflicts.8 None of this put together certainly advocates a moral or cultural relativism to the ultimate consequences. This position only wants to morally conceive and/or evaluate the fact of appreciating cultural diversities and make further consideration of the question: how is it possible for people living in one country and sharing diverse cultures that even cannot be reduced to a common denominator, to have a common moral position? If it is possible to have some kind of aesthetic soft universalism, then it must come out of a self-reflexive, morally responsible and (at the same time) uncertain evaluation by citizens themselves. To evaluate what is best to do for myself and others, in concrete situation full of tensions and conflicts, as found in societies of latemodern or postmodern conditions. This would especially be the outcome of reflexive deconstruction of those small national/cultural exclusivities and statements of the type: ‘after us, the Deluge’. Deconstruction of nation-states, of nations in quest of their own states, traditional communities, or communities in search of traditions. Deconstruction of ancient and new tribes and similar vanity fairs. Anyway, consequences of the debates on value and making the policy of diversities in democratic societies operational are far from being concluded or sporadic. Namely, they become center of political discussions and social struggles. Uncertainly and importance of responsibility in that new and old situation, on how to behave vis-à-vis ‘the otherness’, become painfully sharp. If the term integration does not imply assimilation (it does not at least in context of a doctrine), then perspective is opened for ‘post-integration’, or politics of integration falls down. Of divided societies with deep cultural diversities, within one democratic system, one state. Contacts We found the viewpoints of Zigmund Baumann rather inspiring and helpful for this thesis. His thesis that we live in a society in a multitude of organizational systems and cultures and that a ‘hard’ universalism is not possible of any ethic code – opened many horizons. Equally dangerous and inspiring. On the other hand, its pointing out the role of the responsibility and uncertainty in making moral judgments again makes ethics topical in a postmodern context, making it a reasonable and necessary human struggle for elimination of fear and violence by means of politics. 8

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between cultures is present everyday on the street and ‘philia and phobia’ towards foreigners and ‘others’ grows and becomes evident as fluid. This further becomes ‘political’, within the good old definition of the political by Karl Schmidt (antagonizing opposition all the way to hostility itself). The third guiding premise in this book is that the corresponding ‘soft universalism’ of human rights and liberalist principles – is both possible and desirable. This would represent reference platform for ‘offering solutions’. Pragmatism is second such basis; it relates to success level of certain models and solutions that are operatively analyzed and proposed for conflicts in multicultural societies. I expect that topics I address in this book would be part of the reflexive discourse of ethics of postmodern cultural situations, such as the Macedonian. Although we address ‘the harder’ side of such policy – the one of conflicts, nevertheless this would be a contribution towards self-understanding of complex, structured cultural and political bodies/states such as multicultural ones.

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2. SECTION ONE DEFINITION OF IDENTITY CONFLICT 2.1. Brief fact-finding support Researches in the field of conflict resolution are basically a contemporary concept. The work of pioneers in this field, like that of Piririm Sorokin, 1937, or Quincy Wright, 1942-1951, further confirms the thesis that systematic studies with analytical ambition and relevance have appeared in recent times.9 Interest in this topic grows proportionally with the dimensions of human suffering from conflicts (especially internal conflicts and civil wars after the end of the Cold War). Humanitarian interventions based on moral judgments/arguments and expectations that solutions would be possible in order to avoid violence emerged on sites scorched by fire. Inclusiveness and mutual interconnection of the nation-states, groups, and illusion of immediateness produced by world order globalization caused these analyses to be focal point in the political debates. Systematic studies in this field exist since 1980s, and become increasingly present in the 1990s and at the start of the new millennium.10 Evolution of interests and outcome of analyses of conflict resolution go together with evolution of the term ‘international community’. This notion consists of different defocused, valuefocused groups, all the way to more ambitious projects especially in some of the parts of the international community. We would like to make a working suggestion, when using the term ‘international community’, to take in account the following factors: the leading Western democratic states and EU bodies; the international organizations such as UN, UNHCR, UNHCHR; the more influential action groups within the non-governmental sector; and the democracy-promoting groups in Asia. P. A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, American Books, New York, 1937 . Q. Wright, The Nature of Conflict , Western Political Quarterly, IV, 2, 1951. 10 For more detailed chronology, see: Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution, Sage, London 2000; Preventing Violent Conflicts, Uppsala, 1998; and William Zartman, Peacemaking in International Conflict, Washington USTP Press, 1997; Elusive Peace, Negotiation an End to Civil Wars, Brookings, Washington 1995. 9

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The aforementioned colloquial term must include certain valuemobilized communities, such as: the Muslim countries and the petroleum-producing countries; China; India; and Russia. Finally these communities should be compatible with a ‘group’ called Pax Americana, powerful grouping of countries especially connected with the American role as leader in global politics; however this group membership might change depending on focus of action. Complementary subgroups can be additionally added to the above groups. These subgroups can be identified as: Pax Democratica, a group of democratic countries with stronger valuecentered cohesion; regional groupings, such as the Group 77 or special, so-called security communities (according to words used by Karl W. Deutsch, 1957). Some authors pay special attention to the latter due to their decisiveness to carry our action when stability and security of shared values and states are threatened. I would like to set forth these designations since analysis of subject matter of conflicts has produced an almost cult term of ‘guarantors, third side, arbiters’, and the likes that refer to the socalled international community. This term can be considered basic when one talks about the so-called preventive diplomacy or preventive actions. In all these cases, mention is made of certain and some ‘international factors or community’. This is not always done in scrupulous manner. We consider it important to bring some clarity and exactness in use of this term in every concrete situation of peace agreements or conflict resolution agreements. Given these reasons, we will emphasize which group has the role of mediator, guarantor, or ‘international factor’ in every concrete situation. Given history and records of contemporary internal conflicts and civil wars that concerns us in context of techniques used in conflict resolution, we would consult mostly those after the end of the Cold War.11 Just for the sake of comparison, we would use but not so often data originating from the beginning of the 20th century, of after WW II. According to such research, the total number of armed conflicts in the 1989-1999 period was, on average, 40 – every year was For more details on all types of conflict, see: Uppsala Conflict Data Project at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University, given in Preventing Violent Conflict Past Records and Future Challenges, Peter Wallensteen, 1998, Uppsala. Very detailed map of all conflicts in Europe and of the European forces in the world is given by David A. Lake and Donald Rothschild in The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1998, pp. 174-184. 11

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marked by ongoing conflicts or by appearance of new and cessation of old conflicts, with tendency of small reduction (1989 – 47 internal conflicts; 1999 – 37 internal conflicts). The total number of internal conflicts in this period was 48; on average 1/3 of them ended with some kind of peace agreement or conflict resolution agreement. These data shows us interesting tendency of reduction of internal conflicts and corresponding increase in their number that were negotiated and terminated with some kind of settlement or agreement (according to customary standards, such agreement should last for a year at least after the conflict in order to be considered an implemented agreement). Namely, the 1945-1992 period recorded a total of 56 internal clashes, 13 of which were ended by settlement, i.e., 23% of the total number.12 Authors, who processed this issue, are within the boundaries of percentage of internal conflicts with ‘negotiated settlement’ – going from 15% (Stenadman), then 17% (Lickleader), and to the mentioned 23% (Mason and Fat), for the relatively same period. The said authors define average duration of conflicts in this correlation: 153 internal armed conflicts, with at least 200 victims, after WW II, had duration from one month to 50 years. The average duration of these conflicts was from one to six years; even 30% were shorter than one year; and yet there were conflicts of such nature lasting more than 50 years (in Burma).13 2.2. Definition of CONFLICT Let us return to the basic question in this section – definition of the term conflict, in order to be able in the next sections to specify it in context of cultural-identity groups – with complex of sources and reasons for such conflicts. Conflict in international relations, in the same way as in internal relations within a given state, is actually part of the term DISPUTE. A dispute is such situation when at least two actors (or sides in conflict, regardless of the way they are structured) find themselves in a Mason T. David and Patric J. Fett in How Civil Wars End, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40, 1996 cite the said data, but Licklider Roy in The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1995, American Science Review , 89 (3) gives somewhat lower percentage - 17 % of the total of 87 civil wars in the said period. Likewise, Stephen Stedman, in Peacemaking in Civil Wars, Boulder Co., 1991, gives a lower percentage - 15% but his period is 1900-1989. 13 See in: Patrick M. Regan, International Negotiation, op. cit. p. 366. 12

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dynamic confrontation of their interests, which they consider incompatible, incongruous. On the other hand, a CONFLICT is such phase of a given dispute when said confrontation of interests (which is a normal situation in social, especially democratic relations) has tendency to become violent, involves threats, or violence has already been used.14 Therefore what is colloquially called in everyday language and even in parts of literature a ‘conflict’, actually represents a dispute; on the other hand a conflict means a ‘violent phase’ of a given dispute. It is possible to deconstruct dispute and conflict from different aspects; in this context, two groups of definitions are mostly present in literature: one aspect of definition involves the pragmatic and phenomenological part of the term; the second aspect involves the psychological, perceptive aspect of the term dispute/conflict. Namely, according to first group of authors, it is important for a conflict to give a single, synthetic definition, which is reductive and minimalist. Afterwards, this definition can be deconstructed to its integral parts and have them in detail further explained or analyzed. This type of definitions is best represented by those given by Ross Stagner, 1967. According to him, a conflict is situation when two or more human beings desire goals and have interests they know or are aware of that they cannot implement them all together at the same time, but one. Stagner further says that there should be at least two sides in a conflict. Additionally, every side should mobilize energy to attain own goals, and every side should consider the other side an obstacle or even a threat to own individualistic goals.15 Definition given by C. R. Mitchell (1981) is within this context. According to him, a conflict represents every situation in which two or more social entities or ‘sides’ consider they have own interests that are mutually incompatible.16 What is important to add to these definitions so that the picture of the term conflict becomes meaningful for analysis, is to separate it The classical 'crises model' or conflict model is described by J. D. Morrow (1994), Game Theory for Political Scientist, Princeton, NY, USA, Princeton University Press. He says that every conflict has three players: the nature of the conflict; the challenger; and the challenged. The nature of the conflict determines it as solvable or not solvable; while the challenger draws the second move and decides whether to challenge or not the status quo. Regardless of the confronted interests, if the challenger fails to draw a confrontational move, then there is no crisis/conflict. 15 Ross Stagner (1967): The Analysis of Conflict , ed R. Stagner, The Dimensions of Human Conflict, Wayne State University Press, Detroit; Cf. Psychological Aspects of International Conflict, Brooks/Cole, Belmont, California. 16 C. R. Michell, The Structure of International Conflict, MacMillan Press, UK, !981, p.17. 14

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from the term dispute and potential conflict. This is especially important in assessing situations in internal conflicts and in efficient conflict management. Namely, crucial prospects of existence of a conflict situation are DYNAMIZATION of confronting interests, and not mere recording of their static existence. It is necessary to have concrete and active confrontation, head collision of incompatible interests of involved actors in social sphere or international relations. It is not sufficient to merely state or conclude that given actors have incompatible interests in a static situation. This is a situation of ‘potential conflict’, which can be activated, but ultimately it does not have to. Such potentially conflict situation can remain frozen, or, following change in social circumstances, it can disappear - partly or entirely. Many social situations are potentially conflictive; and yet they are not activated into conflict; as such, they cannot be defined as conflict.17 This is important because if an erroneous prospects are made and potentially conflict situations are overrated or turned into or replaced by conflict situations, then there could be poor prospects of measures required to deactivate such ‘would-be’ conflict and one might enter fully a ‘vicious circle’ of connected mistakes that would compromise the project of conflict settlement. This in turn is crucial to measures of the so-called ‘early warning’. Failing to notice the very difference between potentially conflict situation and genuine conflict situation is very frequent confusion in practice of conflict management (especially present in the so-called analyses of potential conflicts in the Western Balkans) and represents basis for many failed analyses and proposed measures addressing zones of high risk in that region. Therefore, in a word, exactness of definition of a given term implies its reduction towards basic and discrepant modifiers. It is very important to avoid non-selectivity and mixing or interference in situations that might be defined as similar to a given conflict, in order to avoid risk in having that term diluted and stretched out; this in turn would make the term analytically useless. Second set of conflict definitions addresses perceiving perspectives of involved actors. Bernard Mayer offers a rather good example of such definitions. Hence, according to this author, (…) a For similar conflict definition, see in: William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure, Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 4 . 17

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conflict, as perception, (…) consists of the belief that interests of involved actors are incompatible, in seeing them as such (actually they do not necessarily have to be); conflict as sensation/emotion (…) of confrontation, disagreement, resistance, bitterness, fear, or fury (…) in a word, its emotional component; finally, conflict as action (…) sum and articulation of actions for confronting interests (…) mobilization of energy, organization, focusing, and risk assessment, or ‘cost-profit’ analysis (its behaviorist component).18 The definition is based on existence of a value system of a group that defines itself as special and seeks social space for protection (in passive meaning) and development (in active meaning). Conflict furthermore implies making prospects/perception and mobilization by a given group on possible ‘enemies’ and how to neutralize their intentions and goals (according to L. Coser, … to hurt and neutralize the opponent…).19 Deconstruction of a conflict into its cognitive, emotional, and behaviorist elements, although fails to provide a single synthetic definition, still enables us to have a better understanding of complex of terms relating to conflict; this in turn enables increase in capacity to resolve a conflict. An example of this would be the so-called new imaginative leadership of confronted groups that exactly relates to ability of leadership to transform collective determinants, perception of interests as incompatible – into interests that can be solved or are compatible. 2.2.1. Deadly conflicts 2.2.1. Separate subgroup of definitions relating to conflicts are so-called DEADLY CONFLICTS, regardless if this are classified as rebellions, insurgencies, or belligerencies. This involves conflicts conducted with special intention to cause formidable human suffering and losses. Conflicts of organized violence resulting in manslaughter of great number of individuals or even genocide of entire groups and peoples. Bernard Mayer , The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution, Josey-Bass, San Francisco, 2000, pp. 49. This author both in more detailed and in different manner deconstructs conflicts, suggesting 'styles' of conflicts, such as: analytical versus intuitive; linear versus holistic; integrative versus distributive; conflict focused on ways out versus conflict focused on process of confrontation; emotional versus rational; direct versus indirect; threatening versus consolidation; etc.; pp. 42-44. 19 Coser L.A. , The Function of Social Conflict, Free Press, New York, 1956 . 18

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From this aspect, Lake and Rothschild, for example, make distinction on one hand between ‘large-scale’ internal conflicts producing loss of more than one thousand lives, and medium- and small-scale conflicts, on the other.20 From aspect of international law, civil wars are banned! However, they still happen! According to present and predominant interpretation of international common law, civil wars are not banned as such and so this regulates the manner of involvement of a third, interested side, as well as manner of application of principles of the international humanitarian law in this type of conflicts. The general dominant position is that civil wars represent internal affairs of the countries in which these wars take place. In spite of such doctrinal position, one still could differentiate in practice several levels of violence intensity in internal conflicts, from aspect of possibilities of involvement by a third side, and today from aspect of legal establishment of a so-called humanitarian intervention. Hence, one could make distinction between three types of internal conflicts: rebellion; insurgency; and belligerency. As far as rebellion is concerned, there is standpoint that it is an affair of internal security of a given state/government; that international law does not provide a position of interference by a third interested side; and that no ‘internationalization’ is provided for a rebellion as such.21 Certainly, definition of the term depends crucially on the proportion of forces in the field and ability of authorities to apply swift suppression/crushing down of a given rebellion. If this is not the case, then definition of an internal crisis could be modified together with the international law consequences. Hence, it would be possible for a given crisis to be reclassified now as insurgency.22 David A. Lake and Donald Rothschild (ed), The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, Princeton University Press , Princeton 1998 ; as well as Donald Rothschild, Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie , Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War, International Organization, 55/1, 2001. Cf. The Responsibilities of Democracies in Preventing Deadly Conflict , Graham Allison and Hisashi Owada, Carnegie Commission, New York, 1999. 21 According to the interpretation of the international common law, the government of a country in risk, in case of REBELLION, may insist that the neighboring countries observe strict noninterference, closing of their ports and land roads for use of rebels, etc. 22 This is what actually changed the position of the international community in the case of the crisis in Macedonia in 2001. The initial reference was the existence of gangs and criminals from Kosovo; however, after the failure of the Macedonian authorities to crush down that intervention within a month and when some of the fights with the rebels started to be conducted in certain Macedonian villages and towns (Lipkovo, Aracinovo, Tetovo), then reference of the crisis was changed and so 'a door' was opened for international intervention in the segment of transforming the clashes into a political solution and so the Ohrid Framework Agreement was made. Part of the 20

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In case of ‘insurgency’, or an armed conflict with higher intensity and longer duration, legalistically said, foreign states and the international community are allowed, as sole actor, to assume corresponding authority in interfering in the internal conflict. This is made possible without having the given states to be in a state of war with the state where an insurgency has broken out. The level of internal crisis called insurgency is used to protect commercial and private interests of foreign nationals as well as for opening the process of conflict management by a group of states representing the international community. Classification of a given internal conflict as ‘belligerency’ (that could almost imply status of a civil war) puts such conflict, legalistically said, at same level as a war between states or an international conflict. In other words, all dimensions are being opened relating to rights and obligations of sides to the conflict in full accordance with the international war and humanitarian law. The status of ‘warring sides’ given to sides to an internal conflict is extremely important since it has direct reflection on forms of peace agreements and conflict resolution.23 In this stage, third countries, guarantors, facilitators, mediators, etc., must take a rather more neutral stance. Even in such state of affairs of conflicts (according to G. Von Glan), it is nevertheless necessary to maintain that a rebellious side is an integral part of a given society and state, the government of which is fighting against such rebellious side. Recognition of being a ‘side’ or ‘party’ in a conflict gives opportunities general public in Macedonia has never accepted this and thought that the conduct of the international community regarding the Macedonian crisis was dishonest and inconsistent (by raising the question: 'What did really happen to us in 2001?', there were also insinuations by the general public in Macedonia of some kind of international plot or conspiring). For more detailed and condense definitions of the relationship of international law towards this problem, see: J. Rosenau ed, International Aspects of Civil Strife, Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal War , 1964 ; or in Problems of International Law and World Order, Problems in War Prevention by E. Castren, 1966, pp. 857- 886. 23 Here again we locate one of the confusions that are often raised in debates regarding the positions of 'the sides' in agreements such as the Ohrid Framework Agreement in Macedonia. Namely, this agreement does not have definition of the then existing situation as belligerency and does not have position of 'sides'; on the other hand, the signatories of that agreement are the legal political parties, but this is not always satisfactory for the newly created political parties of 'the rebels' who formally are not signatories but they feel they deserve most of the credit for the character of the solutions therein. They feel such agreements in a more symbolic manner – just as result of their successful actions. These new parties usually do not cherish and do not interpret the provision of such agreements in their legal sense and meaning; they only see them as 'good basis' for further demands and rights. Such interpretation of agreements can represent grounds for their weakening and abandonment, which in turn opens a new possible crisis cycle. In this moment of crisis of agreements, the role of the GUARANTORS/third countries is very crucial; these third countries must firmly insist on the provisions of the agreement and its original meaning.

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to a rebellious side to impose blockades of ports and roads and even make confiscation of assets obtained from the so-called contraband as part of military actions, without being labeled for ‘piracy’ or ‘terrorism’. 2.2.2. Identity conflict 2.2.2. Let us finally go back to definition of IDENTITY CONFLICT, being crucial to our subject matter. According to most of the definitions consulted, a synthesized one would be as follows: identity conflict is such type of conflict where given actors define themselves, their own interests, reasons, and aims of a conflict through ethnical, religious, or other cultural notions and determinants. The dominant notion used for organizing all mentioned determinants is the notion of IDENTITY, both in cases of defensive sensation of identity threats and cases of offensive activity to create opportunities for its development. Therefore, SUBJECT of identity conflicts is a group (cultural, ethnic, tribal, religious, linguistic, racial, etc.) with identity definition, which is active towards outside, towards others, and towards inside, towards own members, by means of different strategies for protection or maintaining order and discipline. Such strategies are directed towards further strengthening of identity features of a given group and strengthening of security and social status (power) of the same group. For needs of this work, we would have to take in consideration, at least in working context, the model of ‘rational actor/subject’ in identity conflicts. Being aware that many conflicts do not follow this model or even are directly opposed to it. Such situation consequently produces most of poor forecasts and even strategies for conflict management. Nevertheless, we consider that methodically, having under control the basic matrix of ‘rational actor’, we would be able to define more easily situations of its digression, where conflict of meanings, rationalities, and narratives takes place.

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Certainly this leads to reduction of usability of the ‘rational actor model’, or, at least, towards introduction of combinations with new ‘rationalities’ of viewpoints on logic of effects made by very actors.24 2.2.3. Notion of identity 2.2.3. The notion of IDENTITY, deconstructed and reassembled in a definition, should answer the question why it is so important to an individual, in his social context (group justice) and why it is important for an individual in more internal context of self-awareness, selfrealization, and intimacy. This notion is then deconstructed for several needs that it serves for accommodation of a given individual. The first one is the need of MEANING, a sense of what individuals they are and what their place in society is. This is the need to have meaning in everything they do and sacrifice for; in other words, this is need of culture and history. The second one is the need of specific sensation of COMMUNITY, a communal spirit with specifically defined part of the entirety of the human race having similar ethnic roots, language, history of rituals, religion, etc.; in other words – a culture. This is a special type of ‘intimacy’ among group members, a special type of relationship among them who do not necessarily know each other.25 Such intra-group ‘intimacy’ is the next need that the notion of identity satisfies. The last one is AUTONOMY. Therefore, autonomy implies the need to run ‘own affairs’, mostly without interference by overall society and other groups. Autonomy stimulates group spirit and team energy in action and requires to be respected such as it is - different. Charles Taylor defines IDENTITY as self-reflexive action of an individual. It is such action that develops and constructs identity by means of self-reflection, as opposed to the theses that identity is just a fixed sum of meanings in a given point in time and space. The same author substantially connects identity with notions of According to some authors (Bruce B.G. Clarke, Conflict Termination: Rational Model, US National Security Studies, Pennsylvania, Institute for National Security), 'the rational actor' functions taking in account: the goals of the conflict as the final points at which the attempts of the actor are aimed at; the manners, as methods for attaining the goals; and the means, as resources that need to be used in some concrete manner in attaining the goals. 25 In this context, Benedict Anderson talks about the nation (that might expand to all cultural groups) as 'the imagined community. See: B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, Verso, New York, 1992. 24

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authenticity, demand for recognition, diversity concept, and principle of equal dignity. Adding to this, Richard Rorty and Wang underline that the process of identity building through self-reflection differentiates various levels of meanings, desires, and values that make it. Human identity is formed by a set of ‘central desires and values’ that have a more profound meaning for him. According to the said authors, these would include: individual somatic dispositions; psychological parameters and human temperament; social roles, social group identities and cultural narratives; and the ideal identity (as project/desire). Making further connection to this line, another group of authors underlines that, in cases of identity definition, great role is played by moral conflicts and dilemmas, which an individual solves and is faced with, thus forming his own identity. Such ones would involve four types: - conflict of obligations; - conflict of goals; - conflict between moral codes or views of the world; and, - views between different moral requirements. Just for a brief moment, let us go back to the identity characteristic advocated by the said C. Taylor – to be RECOGNIZED, to be seen as such – being different, in its demand for recognition.26 Namely, to be seen in own very distinction, specialty/diversity, often can be a predominant perception for an individual, coming way before other perceptions on similarities with own fellow citizens. To be ‘recognized’, according to C. Taylor, means to be accepted in specific way – with dignity. This means with own authenticity, with affirmative social recognition and respect. The demand to recognize equal value for diverse cultures is reflection of deep human need to be unconditionally accepted. The feeling of such acceptance that also implies confirmation of the ethnic distinction and the universal potential of individuals – is essential part of the identity feeling. The policy of equal dignity is based on idea that all human beings equally deserve respect. Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, Gutman (ed) 1994; Multikulturalizam, ogledi za politikata na priznavanje, Evro-Balkan, Skopje, 2004 pp.: 25-57. Taylor says that identity is partially formed by recognition, i.e., by its absence or mistaken recognition... Actually identity recognition is part of the fundamental human rights because it has universal basis – everybody has his own identity and a universal requirement authorizes recognition of specifics. Certainly every identity implies a dialog character, sometimes in struggling with others... 26

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The note raised by Taylor is very important in context of our topic; namely that lack of recognition or, even worse, wrong identity recognition creates ‘wounds’, makes damage, produces a form of subjugation and so entraps an individual in reduced form of existence. Sometimes forms of wrong identity recognition even can imply various techniques for subjugation, should subjugated groups accept underrated pictures about themselves and their own culture. In this regard, when conflict definition uses the expression like OWN or ONESELF for the very actor in question, this refers to the notion of ethnic/cultural identity/diversity; however when using expressions of the type ‘own interests’, their incompatibility with rival ones, etc., then this refers to the notions: sensation of uncertainty; identity at risk; struggle or even fight for resources; struggle for values and social room for their reproduction; or, struggle against marginalization in social status.27 Identity can function in different contexts and serve different functions; the most important one to us is pathology of overemphasis of the basic notion that identity uses in its creation and in making distinctions from other ones. Namely – the notion of DIFFERENCE. Especially its intensive, statically conceived, made under stress, hypertrophied and conflictive/aggressive showing. Such ‘differentiation’, making differences on everything and at every moment can easily make conflicts with own surrounding. Our notional, definition-based cognitive activity unavoidably follows the line of finding reductive, distinctive features in notions, as basis for defining any one of them. The definition that would be analytically useful is unavoidably based on finding a fundamental difference from all other notions (Weber defended this long time ago). However, such differentiation becomes dangerous if it is replaced in and by reality, if it gets its own ‘reality, existing somewhere over there, outside of its pure form and separate life. If a particular group thinks its members are crucially distinctively different from all other things and find themselves in antagonism with all other things, this can then easily blur social contextualism and relations of its members. Cf. David A. Lake, Donald Rothschild, ed., The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, pp.154, 317, Princeton University Press, Princeton , 1998. In this book, Sandra Helperin claims that an ethnic conflict is a conflict about political, social, economic, cultural or territorial issues between two or more ethnic communities or groups. Cf. Dynamics Of Conflict Resolution, Bernard Mayer, p. 9, Josey-Bass, San Francisco, 2000. 27

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Some authors notice this and so underline that identity is based on making constant differences from other identities, i.e., identity is DIALOGICAL. Therefore, based not on finding similarities of the single human kind, or common denominator of equality before the law (this is presumption for democracy and constitutionality), but based on constant construction of differences – cultural and traditional. In this context, the notion of BORDER with and away from other identities represents the most important notion for consolidation of a given identity. Border, not similarity; demarcation vis-à-vis others; pathological intensification of creating taboos on closeness within given group members. Herman Van Gunsteren claims that deep groups, as he calls them, dominate social perception of its own members, their social relations, and, ultimately, their self-perception. In place of ‘normal’ political conflicts, or demand making to the system by its citizens, we have in turn constant raising doubts and threats about the very ‘citizenship’ and the fundamental consensus, i.e., the constitution of a given society. Members of such identity groups become ‘primary reality’ that determines all other things and so becomes challenge to established civil consensus. This reality is additionally sees as ‘obvious’, ‘natural’, and undeniable; by this it attains advantage over other socially constructed concords and consensuses. Confliction of self-definition and social activity of group IDENTITY, according to some authors, is universal human tendency. 28 It is much easier and more efficient to predict reactions of other people when you base such reactions on their group characteristics than on individualistic features of their members. Such slipping away into creating clichés on making group characteristics, rude oversimplification or demonization of others, is called STEREOTYPING. Sumner (1906) calls this same phenomenon ‘ethnocentrism’.29 Ethnocentrism is such ideological viewpoint where my own group is the center of everything and everything else is valued in relation to my own group… This phenomenon both favors internal relations within a given group and tends to discriminate everything outside a group. Cf. Brewer M. B. and Miller N. (1996), Intergroup Relations, N.Y., Brooks/Cole, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology , 68, 403-412; Cf. Tajfel H. and Turner J. C. (1986) The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior, (ed) Worchel S. and Austin W. Chicago, IL, Nelson-Hall, USA. 29 Sumner W. G. (1906) The Role of Evil, The Origins of Genocide, N.Y., Cambridge University Press . 28

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A desire to increase our value/importance is pathologically related to making stereotypes and ridiculing others. Very close to this is also ‘demonization of others’: what is called remembering blood and justice inflicted by history. RETALIATION or, better, collective retaliation is the operative sensation which remembering injustice turns into. This implies non-selective violence to members of the group considered to have inflicted the very ‘injustice’. It is interesting to note that individual retaliation is sanctioned in majority of known political systems; however, it seems that collective retaliation somehow ‘is tolerated’. Such intergroup tolerance and justification of retaliation gives moral stand-up for the act of retaliation (sometimes even to level of genocide!?). Collective memory of injustice and retaliation often leads to sensation of HATRED (as more durable ‘cultural’ determinant of group behavior), or, more exactly, collectively remembered hatred for members of certain groups. Such situation is recognized by: obsessive focus on hated groups/members; belief that hated group has evil characteristic per se; belief that all members of such group are equally bad and guilty; and need for retaliation motivating destruction of such group. If such ‘tendency of negative emotions’ and stereotyping is established, this in turn can be solid basis for numerous ethnoconflicts and their escalation to level of genocide. Paradoxical to the said tendency, IDENTITY, as we have said, is relational notion. It always depends on relations with and to others. Identity cannot be constructed and constituted in different manner as either notion or practice. The said operation of ‘constructing’ identity by means of exclusion, differentiation, negative assessment of others, together with constant attitude and ‘frictions’ vis-à-vis them, varies according to social conditions in given societies, especially crisis and stressful situations for groups. Identity is 'projected' always and again into society (to use the existentialist term of J. P. Sartre). Pathology of identity confliction lies in that ‘hell’ of projection towards others who are considered permanent threat to our own identity. Next important conflict resolution) is (Grillo R. D. Cohen, primordial or natural’,

identity characteristic (especially important in conclusion made by entire group of authors Bart, Epstem) – that identity is not ‘granted, as often as it seems to us, but it is constantly 21

exposed to CONSTRUCTION, namely an imposed notion. Ethnicity and identity based on ethnicity represent an entity that is constantly under construction and reconstruction. This is similar to situation of ancient, huge shrines and cathedrals whose parts are constantly being reconstructed and you are never able to seem them entirely reconstructed. Ethnicity and identity originating from ethnicity are more of PROCESS and PROJECT then implying structure or a ‘solid body’ of meanings.30 Almost no specifics of identity conflicts stem from existence of a single specific group of questions that are exclusive to these struggles (political. cultural, economic, social or territorial), but from the very manner in which they are accepted by groups as being dangerous to their group identity. Motivation force and violence of these conflicts stems from perception of threats to identity of groups in conflict. Therefore, secret of intensity and violence of such conflicts lies in the structure of perceptional/emotional determinants used in addressing usual conflict issues. If one fails to consider this, then there could be entire missing of the very reasons why certain conflicts that seem to be same (on same issues), have so different dynamic, manifested forms, duration, and epilogue. Struggle for values and perception of scarce status, power, and resources is conducted under impression that such interests are incompatible with those of other groups, that there is scarce status in given social moment, so that interest of all groups cannot be met together and at the same time; hence other groups are threat to our own interests. Motivation of all such struggle is maintenance of favorable social conditions so that there is also duration and development of culture identity of a given group (and of individuals in such group. Cf. J. Rudin. D. Pruitt, S. Kim).31 A good basis to better understand identity conflicts is definition of ‘the political’ by Karl Schmidt. The angle of viewpoint of the political For such topic of construction and hybridization of identities, we find very interesting the work of Tariq Modood, The Recognition of Religious Groups, Citizen in Diverse Societies (op.cit., pp., 175-194). In his work, the said author suggests that for identity of various minorities, mostly religious ones, the line of exclusion-inclusion is more important than the line of chances for cultural choice (as suggested by W. Kumlicka). Namely, he thinks that the so-called postmigration minorities and groups determine themselves mostly according to the chances of being included in the division of power and resources in a given society. In this process, such minorities are being 'hybridized', changed and so make demands to be recognized as such – hybrid, and being in process of changes, but with a purpose to enable inclusion of their members. 31 Dean Pruitt, The Role of Third Parties in Ethnopolitical Conflict, Orbis, 44; and Jeffrey Rubin (1986): Social Conflict, Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement, Random House, NY. 30

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is very important, when this it not determined by exclusive range or set of topics and issues, but by intensity of feelings and confrontation level. Indeed such angle does function in identity conflicts; every issue that seems not to be of priority/political nature (for example, education or network of schools), can be transformed into priority, political question and even question of profound confrontation, if ethnical communities perceive that question as crucial in their identity preservation. From such angle, identity conflicts are classified as the most complicated, most violent, and most difficult to resolve. To this end, there is corresponding need for special preparedness and knowledge of characteristics of basic factors, techniques of preventive or coercive diplomacy, and negotiation techniques (for mediators or third parties, in order to have successful resolution). Another group of identity conflict definitions, as we have already said, bears somewhat different perspective and underlines the structural parts/perspectives, and not so much the ‘synthetics’ in defining. Therefore actors fight in identity conflicts for: ‘need to have meaning’ in own existence, actions, and struggle; for need to have specific own ‘togetherness’, characteristic ‘intimacy’ of their own group, primacy of these sentiments that is different from all the rest; for need for ‘autonomy’ of life within their own group. When these values become primary in a conflict, then such conflict is defined as identity-based conflict.32 3. SOURCES OF IDENTITY CONFLICTS Identity conflicts can take place in relations between an individual and another individual; between an identity group and another identity group; and between an individual in identity group and his group as such. V. Kumlicka calls some of the said conflict zones a practice of ‘internal restrictions’ or ‘external protections; however, in his work this has more to do with issues on accommodation of a group in overall community. Intensity and psychological and social source of identity conflicts dominantly originates from and depends on feeling of individual and group UNCERTAINTY, endangering or threats. Such Cf. Bernard Mayer, The Dynamic of Conflict Resolution , Josey-Bass, San Francisco, 2000, p.19. 32

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psychological dimension can be dominant and we would call it a security dilemma. This feeling, namely uncertainty assessment, can be realistic, for example, when it is a question of inability of weak state institutions to impose control over the ‘predatory’ conduct of political elites from majority groups, or when there is inability to offer political leadership that would bring consolidation of legitimacy of state institutions and implementation of generally accepted consensus on how society would function and on what values. The latter does not mean lack of consensus; on the contrary, it is weakness in implementation, thus the effect produced is ‘chaos’ and uncertainty for identity of groups and individuals. However, that same feeling of uncertainty can be irrationally ‘conceived’; however even such feeling can equally motivate in mobilization of all energy of a given group towards protection of attacked values or towards aggression upon other groups and their members. Let us not forget that some of the major and most vicious murders in history of racial and religious persecution (that unfortunately did not end up with holocaust atrocities as such) were committed on basis of irrational mobilization to ‘cleanse’ others who were given various racially inferior or demonic attributes. Second major reason for identity conflicts is EXCLUSION of relevant identity groups from process of political decision-making (i.e., decision-making institutions and processes). Pluralistic societies, or societies that are culturally divided, form especially complex pluralism and special political milieu for this. According to Hannah Arendt, pluralism is ‘condition’ for entire political life in democracies, while ‘freedom’ is their internal reason for existence. To practice politics means to constantly process pluralism into freedom. Indeed, this process is additionally complicated in culturally divided societies where political discourses are violated by means of ‘filters’ of identity and cultural diversities and meanings. To transform this disturbing, antagonistic pluralism into viable democratic life and to create cooperativeness of individuals and groups, represent the key in constructing democracy. Further complication arises by the fact that there is no single ‘rationality’ as benchmark of offered process solutions and compromises; on the contrary, consensus must be created additionally (it is imposed, and not merely given) by constant transformation of one rational discourse into another, of one meaning into another. 24

Such ‘creation of consensus’ in context of human rights is called INTERCULTURAL EVALUATION. Deep cultural diversities make point of departure; indeed, they are ‘given, and in some way, even ‘imposed’, in construction of mechanisms that would organize their functional plurality in democracy. Such mechanisms do not have task to reduce or suppress such diversity. On the other hand, limit of this organization of plurality is not by any cost itself; rather, in context of definition provided by H. Arendt, this plurality should be transformed into freedom for individuals, and justice for group culture practices. I would like to mention this as leitmotif of complexity and possibility of constant simulation of feeling of exclusion, insufficient inclusion and, by this, threats to group identities; on the other hand, all of this ends up at higher level of confliction in policy of such situations. 3.1. Exclusion and uncertainty 3.1. Now, let us deconstruct notions: exclusion and uncertainty, to level of forms, in which they appear as concrete sources of identity conflicts. The first type/form is group strategic interactions. Group strategic interactions mean struggle for better positions, values, and resources in different fields, which a group considers crucial for its culture-reproductive circle. Most frequent topics of strategic interactions or strategic imbalance by groups are: territory (geostrategic roads or natural resources), participation in political decision making (at representational or administrative level), struggle for education resources (use of language in public or official communication), or participation in re-privatization of businesses (during transitional economic reforms), etc. Permanent source of tensions and conflicts creates position of strategic imbalance between groups in a society. Next type is lack of lawful consensus relating to rules of the game. In this case it is not question of lack of, otherwise hard to attain, full or coherent ‘value consensus’ in culturally divided 25

societies; it is question of lack of necessary, so-called thin, shallow, procedural consensus (demand making process). Lack of such institutional and fundamental value matrix can take place at two levels: lack of credible commitments, or weakness of political elites to implement negotiated constitution or procedure (frequent situation in so-called falling states and ungovermental places). In both cases, the situation of ‘ungovernableness’ of a system results in a series of erroneous perceptions regarding intentions of others, paranoiac reactions, being closed and situation of permanent stress in groups and individuals; this in turn increases sensation of insecurity and need to prepare for possible conflict. Third form (source) of identity conflicts is what is called information failures. In this case we could have two types of ‘failures’: first failures are of situational character and involve realistic difficulties in communicating true intentions and interests to rival groups. This is outcome of various reasons: for example: hostile relations previously established and communication failure because of them; intentional propaganda exaggeration of interests and intentions of groups given through the media outlets, etc. basically this is lack of true information on preferences and capacities of the other side, as well as sending pieces of information about oneself and own interests. The thesis goes on to claim that information or knowledge of true intentions might prevent outbreak of conflict; nevertheless it is possible sometimes (for instance, the genocide in Rwanda) that knowledge of true intentions can be only basis or pretext for preventive measures, because of the frightening consequences of implementation of ‘the true intentions’ of other groups. Second level of information failures involves different meaning of various information messages, notions, and interests that mean to different group cultures literally different things or that are partially different. Then we talk about a more complex problem of different ‘rationalities’ and need of interethnic evaluation of notions and appropriate transformation of their meaning into the language of different culture practices of groups (take, for instance, frequent examples of hate speech that is treated in one cultural environment as integral part of freedom of expression, while in other cultural circle it represents gross insult. Other examples would include: segments relating to rights of women; religious rituals involving physical modification of the human body; mutilation of body parts and 26

circumcision; sacrifice of an animal; arranged marriages; the socalled ‘murders for honor’, etc.). Such situation of information failure to and from other groups could represent a source of hostile communication as vicious circle of escalation, greater fear, preparations for conflict, or could even grow into a conflict trigger. Next important source (form) of conflicts is so-called ‘security dilemma'. Namely, a security dilemma describes a situation when it is difficult or even impossible for both sides to observe and learn mutual interests, intentions, and moves – directly, through straightforward communication. This in turn causes uncertainty and fear, and afterwards even cramp in preparation of a group ‘for the worse to come;’ and so this continues in a vicious circle of escalation. Because of noticeable role of psychological and perceptive matrix of conflict sources, and its dependence on how the others ‘understand’ our signs, communications and intentions and how the others react to this, some authors see ethnic conflict resolution as getting out of the vicious circle of violence through mistaken perception.33 Certainly, there exists no determinism in escalation of these tendencies of ‘conflict psychology’. A scientific matrix trying to prove such determinism would be indeed of quasi-scientific nature. Attempts to find or define social Darwinism in a conflict between ethnic groups and cultures always when they come in close contact, represent a vulgar, unsophisticated and pseudo-scientific approach, full of prejudice. Such approach always acquires black-and-white simplifications, being obsessed with relations of domination and subjugation or variants of class or ethnic struggle that ends up with ideas on genocide, ethnic cleansing, and utopias on harmonized states and ‘clean’ nations. We should underline that ethnic conflicts are never only ethnic. Ethnicity is most frequently manipulated in form, for example, of ethno-nationalism. It is always wrapped up with confusion about true reasons of a conflict, which further strengthens defensive strategy of the type: ‘let’s sit and wait’ (this was so evident for the European J. Contherman, W. D. Mars, P. D. Gaffney, and R. Vayrynen (1999): Breaking Cycles of Violence, Kumiriah Press, Connecticut . 33

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countries and their position concerning the 1991-1995 war in former Yugoslavia). That strategy encourages forms of open racism and calls for ethnic cleansing. Some authors write about classification of sources of identity conflicts from somewhat different aspects, although one can notice certain overlapping with previously cited definitions. For example, following classification is made of identity conflicts: conflict for value systems; conflicts for resources, or access to material goods.34 On the other hand, other authors cite basis for causing identity conflicts in a more diffusive way, trying to make a notion-based and sector-based locating of sources of conflicts. Hence, following fields are identified as conflictive: communications; emotions; history; structure; and values.35 This type of approach bears difficulty to break down to widespread zones/notions that directly cause conflicts. In this context, the following is cited, for example: Communication as imperfect communication (information failure represents such conflict condition/situation); Emotions as energy that fuels up conflicts, this is especially valid for irrational form of emotions; Values, as viewpoint showing what is important, what is good and what is bad in principles guiding our lives; Structure is external frame in which a conflict takes place and which has influence on that conflict: this includes (in a single interpretation) resources, decision making processes, leadership, time frames, etc.; Aspect of history produces the milieu of a conflict by supplying meanings, events, heroism of former battles, and eternal light and shining of the heroism of the fallen in these battles. ‘Human needs’ of material and development nature36 are especially cited in this context as cause of identity conflicts. They are usually hidden behind value and cultural diversities, full of historic rhetoric. It is important to identify primary reasons standing behind a given conflict, to ‘tear apart’ any ideological rhetoric in a conflict, in order to be able to address the correct procedures in solving that conflict. C. R. Mitchell, op.cit, p. 18. Bernard Mayer , op.cit. p. 9. 36 Bernard Meyer identifies in this context four basic needs with different meaning: so, he defines food with substantial meaning; home – with procedural meaning; health – with psychological meaning; and security – also with procedural meaning. Op.cit. p. 17. 34 35

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4. Conflict STRUCTURE Identity conflict structure includes following notions related to conflict: situation; behavior; psychology; escalation; diffusion; phases; and aims. C. R. Mitchell, in order to explain the structure of connected conflict phases, draws a sketch of three decisive points of a conflict: situation; behavior; and viewpoints of parties to such conflict. (Figure 1)

In the first scheme of the conflict sources that the author calls ‘instrumental’, an actor creates conflict situation and then uses conflict behavior and promotion of his own viewpoints (the conflict situation is decisive in establishing the behavior and promotion of viewpoints). And in the second scheme that the authors calls ‘expressive’, the actor, guided by the expression of his own ideological positions and viewpoints that are decisive, moves towards a conflict situation and conflict behavior. Basically, conflict situation represents a state of perceiving contrasts or incompatibility of interests of actors to a conflict. As we have already mentioned, it consists of perceiving own and rival standpoints on subject matter of a dispute/conflict, especially from aspect of: meaning of endangered values/interests of a group (centers of gravity); public support to those values (populist moment); existing legal and political limitations; resources at disposal for waging a dispute; involvement existence of ‘third sides’ to a 29

dispute/conflict and their position as allies, rivals, or neutral parties; nature of other political and legal obligations that conflict sides can have. Some authors deconstruct a conflict situation into: conflict sources; conflict standpoints and aims; and conflict behavior (C. R. Mitchell). ‘Conflict behavior’ – represents a set of actions and measures, tactics and procedures, the intention of which is attaining goals. Conflict psychology – represents a set of positions and perceptions on threats to actor’s identity or on chances of further development of such identity. Said positions and perceptions also involve forms of ‘transfer and dislocation’ of initial, original sources of conflict into the collective unconscious, replacing them with frustration or shifting the center of rage towards illusory targets and objects. Such complex of positions and perceptions also includes relaxing perceptions or conclusions that indeed something has been done for group protection and that there would be not more hostilities. Some writers call the latter group stress reduction, which again falls into category of conflict psychology. Conflict state/situation produces a ‘tunnel-like’, onedimensional, or instrumental thinking (hence, psychological positions and perceptions are very important to research). Such thinking represents operation reduction of meanings and values, of actions and evaluations of other identities, however, only from aspect of our own safety or risk. The totality of perceiving the other is very instrumental and makes us being constantly ‘under stress’ and ‘on guard’. According to many authors, conflict per se means a stressreduction process, or, getting rid of tensions and fear (already transformed into a trauma), by venting our own rage and violence at ‘the other’, which according to the staid tunnel reduction is ‘to be blamed for everything’. Hence, (figure 2):

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it is shown that stress-reduction need leads to cognitive consistency (concluding who is guilty), which in turn can be divided into three separate cognitive operations: selective perception; selective call; and group identification. All three of them lead to their ‘discharge’ into action/conflict.37 The next figure shows how this action would follow (figure 3):

Selective perception can be deconstructed into: stereotyping of the other; separation; polarization; tunnel vision; closing ranks. Selective call is then broken down into: repression and suppression (towards outside – towards others; and towards oneself, towards so-called ‘inner or domestic traitors’). Group identification on the other hand can be deconstructed into: rationalization (explanation of what is to come, why it ‘has’ to be like this and in not other way); and identification projection. 4.1. Phases of conflict 37

Op.cit., C.R. Mitchell, pp. 78 and 97 .

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4.1. PHASES of a conflict can be explained by different classifications. We would try to synthesize the most essential ones, in our view. Hence, first conflict phase is called CONTESTING. This phase establishes appearance of interest incompatibility situation in reality and gives push to confrontation of opposing intentions with diplomatic means, through media with direct contacts, or through mediators. Second phase is a phase when HOSTILITIES START APPEARING. This comes out when dispute/conflict resolution attempts fail in the first phase, and there is confrontation escalation and when at least one conflict side starts defining conditions in war terms and in terms of possible use of violent means. Then use of force becomes in essence expected. Third phase involves START OF HOSTILITIES. In this phase, group aims become ‘more rigidly controlled’, and compromise opportunity is reduced. At this level, there is escalation of means used and manners of confronting. Fourth phase is called CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. Open use of force is terminated or temporarily suspended at this stage. Conflict can be continued; however fights are ceased, while given ‘quarrel’ can move forward towards some form of resolution or even backwards towards renewal of fight and hostilities. Fifth phase represents a phase of renewed CONTESTING. This phase makes outcome recapitulation of confrontation phases by use of force; consideration is made which part of a conflict is possibly resolved or is not relevant anymore, and which part of a conflict remains unsolved and for further arguing. The nature of this phase depends on outcome of hostilities; however this is most often a phase of commencement of a political agreement on dispute/conflict resolution. Similarly, this phase could be extended by introduction of an interphase, called ‘protracted, prolonged hostilities’. They are maintained, in smaller form, partially or along the entire line of the conflict ‘front’. This in turn can lead to situation ‘of waging a conflict until exhaustion’, when sides are not able to make benefit out of the peace. Often this exhaustion from a conflict is maintained intentionally (when other option is not possible or a third side is not so powerful to apply coercive diplomacy; however, this is always done 32

with morally unacceptable high price and too many victims), in order to ‘prepare’ sides to a given conflict for a political settlement. This settlement is then imposed in light of the fact that confronting sides are unable to terminate such conflict with unilateral victory. RESOLUTION makes up the sixth phase of a conflict. From historical aspect, very few conflicts have had such outcome. Most often conflict cycles return even to the very start of such process. However, resolution as phase can be broken down into a process of political intermediation, mediation, bypassing or directing initial goals and interests of involved actors towards other dimensions (i.e., an interphase of changing initial goals when attempt is made to persuade one side in dispute that his goals are not worth such price, ultimately to diffusion level – thereby making a given dispute become non-acute, only a potential one. Actually, definition of the term ‘conflict resolution’ consists of creating a situation (most frequently as a process) where sides in conflict resolve their own major incompatible interests, or, points of contention. Generally, such situation covers three parts: renouncing all acts of mutual violence; mutual recognition and acceptance as sides that have legitimate interests (although opposite) and that shall continuously have status of sides in conflict as such; and a part dealing with reaching settlement or agreement on their confronted interests. Nevertheless, there are other authors who claim that identity conflict phases are more global and so consist of three elements: Phase of perceived discrimination (when a group feels it has been deprived of certain rights it considers belonging to it due to its own distinctive cultural, ethic or racial affiliation/diversity); Phase of consolidation – when organized group tries to mobilize persons belonging to that group from the general population for demands/struggle directed towards establishment; Phase of confrontation – when such demands are not politically processed and conflict opportunity is so opened in the field.38 According to another serial of perceptions, conflict resolution or conflict settlement could be arranged in four outcomes: Resolution that is outcome of negotiations and reaching compromise; Resolution William Zartman, Putting Humpty-Dumpty Together Again, in The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, op.cit., p. 319. 38

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that is imposed as such; No conflict resolution - a resolution that is actually not so because a given conflict continues in spite of attempts to have negotiations and pressure exerted; and Unclear conflict resolution, when some elements of conflict have initially ceased and then are renewed, or when other elements of a conflict have not ceased but have only lost momentum, etc.39 Role of third sides in conflict resolution represents important part in all of this that is the subject matter of this work. The role of ‘third side’ in this context includes, and, depends, on power to persuade (in coercive and diplomatic manner that ‘winning’ a conflict does not have to be necessarily a victory initially perceived by a side in conflict), on opportunity to exert pressure to observe agreed and promised conduct, or pressure and assistance in phase of agreement implementation. There is also mention in this context of so-called ‘negotiating trump cards’ as values that could be offered in exchange for modification of goals of the other side in conflict, when a third side gets involved in first part of its mandate, in course of negotiations. This process usually gets a better track when there is powerful and rather authority mediator. ‘Victory’ can even imply a political agreement when both sides in conflict ‘win’; for this to happen, it is necessary that both sides change during conflict their own political and operative goals. This means opening a political process known as ‘transformation of conflict’ into reaching an agreement and negotiating; a mediator holds very important position in this context. 4.2. Interphases of conflict 4.2. Following practices or terms could be identified in interphases of the aforementioned conflict phases: ESCALATION; ENTRAPMENT; TURNING POINT, or RIPE MOMENT; DEADLOCK, STALEMATE, IMPASSE – when a conflict is stuck in a ‘dead-end street’ or a ‘blind alley’, a blockade; and DIFFUSION of conflict. ESCALATION of conflict implies situation when both sides intensify instruments and energy for confrontation. As opposed to Cf. International Negotiation, G. Goertz, D. Frazier, Patterns of Negotiation in Non-War Disputes, V. 7, No. 3, pp. 342-352. 39

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conflict intensification, conflict escalation not only involves increase in energy and means of confrontation, but also special kind of intensification that is conducted with plan and intention to produce a desired effect. Hence, escalation can be ‘transitive’ when it is caused and conducted by sides in conflict and when it depends only on their own will and is initiated by a decision made by conflicting sides. Second kind is ‘intransitive’ when it is consequence of some developments in a given conflict or its negotiations. Involved sides escalate conflict on different grounds. Some escalations are outcome of rational confrontation; others are outcome of emotional reactions. The first kind of reasons or grounds would, for instance, include: escalation in order to obtain better (starting) negotiations position (some authors also call it ‘constructive escalation’ – Kriesberg and Thorson); escalation with newly perceived prospects that indeed victory can be obtained; escalation just for the sake of not losing and of imposing or coming (closer) to negotiations; escalation to justify (or cover up) means and resources so invested to that purpose, thus entering the very pit of entrapment; and even escalation in order to receive new assistance from own allies and partners. One can also include in this context a specific situation of obliging oneself with too many promises and threats, thus cornering oneself into a ‘no-exit’ position, a position of no retreat or chance for conflict mitigation, a position of only further conflict escalation (this is equally a doorway to entrapment). Second kind of escalation relates to emotional or cognitive viewpoints, or, demonization of opponent: in other words, our opponent did deserve this; he had to be punished or humiliated; this even might be expression of nervous overreaction to move made by the other side. Escalation of conflict can involve: escalation of means and energy; escalation of goals; escalation of area in which conflict is conducted; escalation of participating sides; escalation of emotional projections and demonization of opponent; escalation of obligations assumed towards own supporters so such side cannot withdraw from a conflict but can only continue the conflict; etc. Conflict escalation usually assumes forms of so-called escalation spirals. They rely on each other and basically are outcome of what is called negative reciprocity or binomial irrationality.

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Dynamic ‘propelling’ escalation is mutual distrust between sides in conflict. There is ever-present blame what side has started such escalation, what hidden intentions of that side are, etc. Escalation is maintained expecting that the other side would ultimately give up and retire. Consequently, all of this is also called ‘competitive irrationality’, being a phenomenon that enables escalation as such. Escalation and ability of one side to make threats and perform escalation, as we have said, is also used as ‘trump card’ in negotiations. Then intention of escalation in this context is to bring a more favorable position to the side starting it or to prevent the other side from considering escalation and other maneuvers. However, to use escalation in any option whatsoever would represent a risky method, the use of which can never be ultimately predicted. For escalation to be successful, it must be supported by exact data/prospects on how the other side would eventually react and whether the other side would be able to ‘bear the threat’ of escalation, and ultimately not to respond and so to open the said escalation spiral. Escalation could also be used by extremist groups of any side involved in conflict (especially when such involved side is divided in military and political wings or factions) to prevent a positive negotiating process and to bring back a given conflict back on its initial, violent position.40 Escalation is criticized, as means of blackmail and improving own position in conflict because it is too risky as such; it is only efficient provided the other opposing side does not respond with counter-escalation. Conflict escalation destabilizes compromise and makes negotiations outcome rather unpredictable. On the other hand, conflict ENTRAPMENT involves a situation when, given poor prospects in conflict initial phases, one conflict side suffers losses. Instead of making new prospects and repositioning, such side nevertheless spends ever-increasing energy and resources in order to compensate such losses thus being entrapped in spiral of greater and greater losses and downfall. Losses become increasingly greater, while conflict psychology propels such side towards regaining initial positions at any cost whatsoever. This is road of no return, a road leading to complete fall. Cf. I. William Zartman and Guy Oliver Faure (2005): Escalation in Negotiation in International Conflicts, Cambridge University Press, N.Y. pp. 251, 166, 254, 272, 185 . 40

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This entrapment is described as sinking or ‘drowning’ in ‘quicksand’; the more you fight or struggle, the deeper you sink. From aspect of rational prospects, such conflict actor would have to stop; however in order ‘to save his honor’, he continues investing in conflict and increasingly starts losing such ‘investment’. According to the prospect theory, every actor, involved in risky or conflict situation, is prepared to assume risk more for the sake of loss prevention than for the sake of making profit.41 Such entrapment is also described as ‘downhill escalation’, but not in context of de-escalation; it denotes movement or tendency towards even more intensified conflict, with gross deterioration of staring positions. In case of ‘being entrapped’, conflict actors make greater efforts and demands; they even add unrelated demands, increase costs to the very absurd; they demonize the other side, increase risks to level of unacceptability. Due to increasing losses, all of this ends up in reduction of maneuvering abilities of such conflict actors, under enhanced costs and risks. Such actors, under risk, lose sense of reality and possibilities for making definite options; ultimately, they lose alternatives and so lose power. In process of conflicts and negotiations, during internal disputes, ‘entrapment’ is fascinating phenomenon, being at the same time interesting for study, but very destructive for successful negotiations.42 In order to avoid such ‘entrapment’, actors must maintain control over given conflict, and, especially, the price/value of confrontation for attaining goals. They should control lines of losses that lead easily towards entrapment.43 At this point of analysis, we should mention that our methodological position is the term ‘rational actor’ in conflict. Nevertheless, we are well aware that such model is often deformed in conflict identities (where assessment of rational behavior and costKahneman D. and Tversky A. (1979): Prospect Theory: An Analyst of Decision under Risk , Econometrica 47, pp. 263-291. 42 Paul W. Meerts (2005) Entrapment in International Negotiations, in ed I. W. Zartman and G. O. Faure, op.cit., pp. 11-139. 43 A classical and rather sad example of 'entrapment' is the decision made by the then Serbian leader S. Milosevic to continue 'to the very end-final victory' the war in Bosnia and Croatia in the process of disintegration of former Yugoslavia, and, consequently, to reject the political agreement, wrapped up in a good package, offered by Lord Carrington at the 1992 Hague Conference on former Yugoslavia. The outcome of that entrapment was that Serbia started intensively to lose the war and ended up as the greatest loser from the process of disintegration of former Yugoslavia. Finally, it is the only republic of the former Yugoslavia which lost 'territory' – Kosovo, Montenegro, while international isolation has made it one of the poorest countries in the Balkans (something that Serbia has never been in its history). 41

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profit analysis is casualty of ideas of historic missions of own or other groups, ethno-romanticism, irrationality, and constructions). TURNING POINT, or, RIPE MOMENT, represents a development/process in conflict or moment in conflict that can make a conflict move towards settlement, and, on the other hand, in negative direction towards escalation of confrontation or clashes. Such moments mark transition from one phase into another; they are actually part of a given conflict and originate from, sometimes, unpredictable conflict dynamics. These turning points in conflict are not condition or origin of a conflict; on the contrary, they are conflict interphase that appears along confrontation.44 There are some authors who address in detail the so-called theory of turning points; accordingly, they claim to distinguish three phases of these turning points: process presumptions and elements; start process; and consequences. In contrast to the turning points, the already cited ‘ripe moment’ (according to I. W. Zartman) shows that a conflict creates a chance, on different grounds, for making a ‘U-turn’ towards agreement. This could be rising awareness of involved actors that further fight cannot bring advantages, or, that further fight simply does not pay off, is too costly and brings risks that are unacceptable; awareness that given conflict has entered a phase of fatigue or exhaustion of both sides, depletion of the kind that both sides cannot profit from a positive outcome and so have become ‘captives of the fight’. The already cited I. W. Zartman claims that such moment appears when both sides fall in a mutually hurting stalemate.45 This moment precedes and enables the moment of ‘conflict ripeness’ to create an agreement prospects. According to many authors, such moment is cultivated, created, and is not mere consequence of confrontation.46 The role of the third side/mediator is very important especially in cultivating the moment of ripeness for negotiations. This moment certainly depends on some objective factors such as the mutually hurting stalemate, exhaustion, or too high price of further confrontation with regard to values that are Cf. Druckman D. (1997): Negotiation in the International Context, and I. W. Zartman/Rasmussen, USIP, Washington DC, USA, p. 92; and especially cf. Conflict Escalation: Turning Points Analysis, ed., I. W. Zartman , op.cit, p. 185 . 45 I. W. Zartman (1989): Ripe for Resolution, Oxford, NY. 46 Cf. : Karin Aggestam (2005): Enhancing Ripeness: Transition from Conflict to Negotiation, ed., I. W. Zartman /G. O. Faure, same, p. 271. 44

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defended; however, the moment of ripeness also depends on psychological, perceptive factors, as well as on level of influence exerted by convincing. This is very clearly reflected in the manner used in opening negotiations opportunity. Whether, for example, one side in conflict has ‘saved its own honor’; namely, whether such side has not left impression of being weak by agreeing to negotiate, a weakness that the other opposing side might use later, etc. In those moments, the role of mediator is crucial in definite shifting of a conflict to a so-called pre-negotiation process. IMPASSE, DEADLOCK, and STALEMATE of conflict. Impasse is situation when a conflict gets stuck because neither side wants to make a creative step forward in coming out of it. In case of impasse, we can talk about lack of any will to step forward, and not about lack of objective opportunities (this is used more in negotiations, as established practice). On the other hand, a deadlock is situation that is more used as established practice in negotiations, equally as impasse. However, one can also find deadlock in conflicts when both sides are completely blocked and with exhausted opportunities for action in context of their positions. Without changing them, it is not possible to have objective way out of such dead-end street. Conflict stalemate is situation when each side, separately, has some of the conditions, but insufficient for conflict resolution. Neither side can win or lose, by means of own measures. There is exhaustion of means and strength of both sides, not only like in deadlock – stranded in lack of opportunity for way out, but also with exhausted opportunities for way out because both sides have tried all ways that are at disposal. This institution is typically ‘conflictive’ and is not to be found in negotiations. DIFFUSION of conflict means its further expansion into areas, sectors, and territories that were not previously part of such conflict. In this context, diffusion can be ‘vertical’, involving quality and contents of issues that are subject of a conflict; then there is ‘horizontal’ diffusion, which involves expansion of territory used for confrontation of known topics and actors. Certainly, diffusion can be also a combination of both elements. Here it is interesting to note the relationship between conflict diffusion and conflict intensity or conflict 39

escalation. Namely, diffusion can be connected in different ways with escalation. It can mean indication of conflict escalation, by increasing the substantial topics that are at issue and point of contention or by increasing the territory for waging a conflict. However, diffusion can also mean a sign of ‘diluting a conflict’, of its de-escalation through reduction of intensity of conflictive behavior when it is also outcome of increase in number of topics at issue. The latter is not completely valid for the territory as well, where a conflict is waged, because expansion of territory that is drawn into instability is always negative indicator with regard to possible decrease or resolution of conflict. Diffusion in context of territory can only be related to ‘dilution’ of conflict when there are indicators conflict intensity has gone down in the entire territory used for waging conflict and such conflict has so become a ‘low intensity’ conflict, as direct outcome of the diffusion. However, the latter does not also imply that a conflict has come closer to or has become more prepared to go over to the negotiations phase.

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5. SECTION TWO MULTICULTURE SOCIETIES AND THEIR SOURCES OF CONFLICTION 5.1. Definitions of multiculture societies and their sources of conflict ion Brightness and spectacle (to paraphrase F. Léotard) of multiculturalism, or, of cultural diversity, do not represent new phenomenon in history of politics. Its “return,” as new kind of brightness, represents a rather specific postmodern political phenomenon and is outcome of the need of cultural, primary identical meanings in light of massive, depersonalized (Sigmund Baumann) globalization structures. Expansion of culture/identity topics, even one related to confliction, is also outcome of the fall or demise of another project – the project of ‘modernism’ called national building. This in turn is directly connected to a crisis in a subproject of the main cited project – integration policy of minorities into the mainstream culture of societies in which they live. This problem has reached its peak with non-integration, namely ghettoizing, of major immigrant communities in the Western world.47 According to some referential authors (Cf. John Baylis and Steve Smith, The Globalization of World Politics, Oxford University Press, 199, pp. 190-213, 220-223), globalization has two different dimensions that mutually interconnect but bear different consequences. The first is the so-called capitalist globalization economy (where economy is politicized, and politics is economized) that is mostly seen in: integration of economic and financial markets and foreign investment, global ecological interdependence, international company expansion, energy interdependence, global social movements, non-governmental and governmental working on global scale, etc. The consequence of this is the feeling of a world without borders and of hidden mega-centers of decision making and power. The second level is more of social and communicational character with strong impact of the communication of cultures and shorter distances. This is called NETOCRATIC globalization and is based on the increased possibilities of the new ITC. By means of them, great distances are made shorter and local things become globally presented, and vice versa. This has a very strong impact on the closure of cultures and their 're-examination' in contact with others. This helps create an information global society, where communication addresses tribal identities and subcultures. This netocratic society creates its own language – NET-LATIN, based on English that uses the new informatic tribalism. Major institutions that are hit are: the nation-state; parliamentary democracy; family; education system; and class-based culture identity of human beings. Cf. NETOCRACY, Alexander Bard, Jan Soderquist, Reuters, London, 2002. Francis Fukuyama, in one of his texts published in Journal of Democracy, John Hopkins University Press, says that exactly these distorted classical identities with Islam, in context of 'West” and the Internet, make the very reason for shift of Islam (rather, some of its parts) towards 47

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‘National building’ lasted for about 200 years by means of political and cultural means. It developed its own political philosophy, theory of justice, and viewpoint on culture and its function. In such discourse, culture was considered, until the 1960s, as means of integration (voluntary, or, ‘little’ forceful), as ‘the melting pot’ of integration. All of this had a note of assimilation of ‘small cultures’ and diversities in creating a single ‘wider nation’ or cultural panorama. This was the very basis of political intervention in national building. However, the 1980s introduced a change in the role of culture. There was an ‘outburst’ of national, ethnic, gender, and regional identities. Such identities found or felt themselves to be under oppression by ‘central cultures’. Consequently, instead of becoming a venue of new consensus, culture has become an arena of conflict and political struggle; i.e., it has been politicized and has become more indicatively a political instrument. Classical meaning of culture implied culture was in its essence a unique antithesis of politics.48 Nowadays culture is accepted, even underlined, as political means or instrument. Such or similar views are shared by many influential authors like: Terry Eagleton, Michel Foucault, poststructuralists, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Jacques Derrida, Richard Rorty, Charles Taylor, etc. Such ‘new’ role of culture – in context of creation, protection, and promotion of diversities and their concurrent management at society level – has produced a new dimension in classical view of PLURALISM in democratic societies. This has produced a ‘culture pluralism’, which in turn leads us further to pluralistic, segmented societies, or nation-mosaics (Strayer), disjunctive societies (R. D. Grillo), or ‘unknown societies' (Herman Van Gunsteren), etc.

5.1. Definition of multicultural societies

militant fundamentalism, in search of illusion of classicism, stability, unchangeability and importance. 48 The most general definition of culture was: norms and rules; customs and model of behavior common to one specific group of people... Therefore, culture was something that homogenizes, something that is in possession, a segment that has its own autonomy, tradition of customs, distinction from other cultures (relational phenomenon). Because of all this, and perhaps because of something else as well, practically there is no culture theory or treatment of cultural phenomena in international relations (that remain a dominion of the hard power of states).

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5.1. A definition of cultural pluralism would be situation in a given society where complex and large culture groups exist, while practicing at the same time different forms of own common institutions, behavior models, social relations, inner organizations, and value systems – and, sometimes, even different religion.49 Diverse cultural segments observe not only different culture practice and institutions internally, within their own culture circle, on one hand, but equally their relationship to wider society and society institutions is determined by culture perception established by particular segment, on the other. The outcome of this is that the wider consensus, which these institutions are based on, is similarly under constant re-examination and pressure.50 Such societies are also called multicultural societies. Cultural pluralism becomes dominant in these societies and it globally intervenes, so to say, on the political scene, in a multi-layered manner, at local level in form of micro communities, as manner of life, and at trade and professional level. Such pluralism goes well beyond the majority-minority dynamics context, where national culture is predominated by majority-culture matrix and minorities are ‘ghettoized’ within the complex of minority rights and minority culture on the margins of the dominant culture. This ‘going beyond’ is reflected in the fact that state and political instruments cannot be used (at least in successful manner and without risk of a wider conflict) to establish hegemony of majority-nation culture matrix over diversities; hence, another harmonization method would have to be pursued. This political constellation of culture plurality is not always an outcome of the number or size of minority segments.51 It can be Cf. Charles Taylor, Iris Young, Cohen, Middleton, Grillo, and so on, in the cited works . Jurgen Habermas, in context of Kant, says about this that and equal protection proclaimed by law is not sufficient to establish a constitutional democracy... This is not even sufficient in context of recognizing diversity as constitutional category... It is necessary that we are in condition to see us as creators of laws that oblige us... Or, C. Taylor says in this context that the very recognition of diversity or the potential equal value of diverse identities is not sufficient; justice is also required, equity in the way such diversities practice their own potentials. Cf. Multikulturalizam, Evro-Balkan, Skopje, 2004, pp. 40, 135-166. 51 There is no typology of forms of ethnic-cultural diversity. However, several classifications or divisions are offered as follows. The first group involves the so-called national minorities: peoples without own state; indigenous peoples, parts of peoples living in other states as minority. The second group includes: immigrant minorities: immigrants with citizenship; immigrants without the right to become citizens (metics); refugees; asylum-seekers whose application is being processed. The third group includes religious groups: isolationists and non-isolationists. The forth group involves the so-called sui-generis groups: Afro-Americans; Roma; Egyptians; nomadic Roma; etc. 49 50

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outcome of historical agreements and practice in relations between different culture segments in a given state or of the manner used in establishing balance of power in recent transition events (conflict, civil wars, international mediation, etc.).52 We could talk about multiculture society only if this refers to culture plurality within ONE society and within ONE state. In this regard, we do not include federative states that have ‘solved’ cultural diversity in classical manner, by territorial and political division of powers between culture segments and have so re-established states/republics that fall under the majority-minority dynamics context, with one predominant national culture. *

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Complexity of politics in conditions of cultural pluralism in multiculture societies, as we have mentioned earlier, is not expressed by the fact that different culture segments practice diverse culture and institutional internal practice, but especially by the fact that they have different relations towards wider society and its micro-institutions, towards values which they are based on, thus always questioning the wider consensus.53 Reaching ‘new’ consensus in such pluralistic ambiance (only even as procedural basis for functioning of institutions) is the most serious challenge to classical conditions of democracy (from J. S. Mill, then J. Rawls, R. Dvorkin, B. Ackerman, M. Sandel, etc.) and represents front topic of contemporary discussions in the theory of democracy. At the same time, this is where ‘the secret’ of crisis or successful outcome of democratization and democracy in multicultural societies lies. We would use three values and notions in pursuing, for the needs of our topic, this transformation towards multicultural Because of this, for example, Albanians in Macedonia have different (better) situation than Russians have living in some Baltic states, although Russians represent by far greater (in percentage) minority in these countries. 53 Jacob T. Levy (1997), in his study: Classifying Cultural Rights, W. Kumlicka, I. Shapiro (eds.), New York, N.Y. University Press, says that there are the following possible exceptions made in recognition of the minority status in liberal societies: exemptions from laws that sanction or limit cultural practices; assistance for minority practice that other can make even without assistance; self-rule; external safeguards against interference in own affairs of a group; internal rules for managing their own internal affairs; incorporation of the traditional law and customs; special representation of a minority at national level; and forms of symbolic representation/recognition of cultural diversity of a minority. 52

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democracy: search for new basis of social equity/justice; multicultural citizenship/differentiated citizenship (citizenhood); and, overlapping consensus – or multiplied loyalties and identities. 54 Let us start with the thesis of Young Iris Marion that the traditionally liberal model of universal citizenship – as the right to have rights (Justice Warren first gives such definition)55 – is unjust as far as it requires renouncement of particularistic cultures, identities, and social perspective for persons belonging to minority cultures, for the sake of accepting equal formal and legal status.56 This value standpoint represents a start in overcoming the deontological attempt of J. Rawls to create social justice.57 Namely, what lacks is the universal, neutral individualism of a civil, formally equal status, and, in this context, its attempt to embed collectivist, cultural diversities of citizens through a so-called ‘soft disregard’.58 The problem is that it cannot be done by simple addition, or ‘loading’ of several more collectivist values ‘in the truck of the civil W. Kumclicka and W. Norman, in the work Citizen in Diverse Societies, think the debate in the Western societies in the last ten years about and around multiculturalism has concentrated on two topics: minority rights – multiculturalism – civic virtues and practices; and responsibility for democratic citizenhood (state citizenship-civic virtues, skills – debate). They think that the debate on the first topic has a successful end for the opportunity to combine special minority rights and liberal citizenship... ... given that the burden of proof has shifted from advocates of culturalism to its negators... while the second topic is still open and hot. Op.cit., pp. 1-4. 55 Cf. Perez v. Brownell, 356, US 44, 1958, p. 48. On the other hand, 'citizenship' (citizenhood, civism, citizenry, civility) has been treated since classical times as legal status of membership of political community. Under the Roman jurisprudence, a citizen is someone who is free to use the law, to act in accordance with the authorization of the law, and to seek protection from the law. Such legal status indicates a special relation/connection between and individual and the political community-the state. There are several groups of theories of citizenhood or citizenship: liberal; communitarianist; and republican. Liberal theories underline the individual rights towards the state (John Potter, John Rawls). They claim that society organizes civil rights and is directly opposed to a society that derives rights from group membership. Communitarianism on the other hand underlines belonging to a cultural community as basis of wider community and citizenhood or citizenship. Finally, republicanism and neo-republicanism underline public spheres of political life and ability to organize plurality in public life. 56 I. M. Young, 1989, Polity and Group Difference, Ethics, 99/2; Justice and Politics of Difference, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1990. 57 John Rawls, Teorija za pravednosta, Slovo, Skopje, 2002; Politicki liberalizam, Filip Visnic, Beograd, 1998. 58 Nathan Glazer is considered a representative of this viewpoint. He explains his viewpoint by means of several traditional liberal thesis: the concept of individual rights is sufficiently wide and so guarantees cultural diversities; the rights of association and expression of religious and other particular affiliations are sufficient to maintain the cultural diversity of groups; tolerance supports heteronomy of contemporary states; the state should not create special measures in support of minority cultural communities; and there should be appropriate and strict observation of the principle of separation of the state from ethnicity. See: Nathan Glazer , We Are All Multiculturalist Now, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1997. 54

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individualistic consensus’. This is because new collectivist values import changes and take on the brink of re-consideration the universal character of individual rights and their domination in the discourse. By own confirmation and entry in the agenda of civil consensus (through multicultural citizenship, etc.), they cause irreversible changes in the said universal character. They require new theory of liberal justice, instead of fitting into the existing, Rawls’ theory of liberal justice and citizenship of procedural kind. According to supporters of this kind of developments, such justice should be basis for a more inclusive society. Then, this society would consist of more communities; at the same time, it would be founded on the value of individual rights and legal procedures of guaranteeing minority (culture groups) rights. Therefore, social life would not require sacrifice of particularities for the sake of the common, synthetic nation identity; however, this would not make at the same time sacrifice of individual rights on the altar on culture collectivism.59 Indeed, this is a rather difficult task and could be ‘a quadrature of the multicultural circle’.60 Will Kumlicka calls the described model that he supports a ‘liberal pluralism’ and confronts it with the then still dominant liberal individualism61 of Rawls and communitarianism of Taylor.62 The cited Cf. Charles Taylor, Priznavanje gradjanskog drustva, Beogradski krug, Beograd, 2000. Also cf.: Politics of Recognition, ed., Gutman, 1994 . 60 According to John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, there are several ways to regulate ethnic conflicts: the first group involves methods of elimination of diversity: genocide; forced transfers of population; separation/secession; assimilation. The second group involves management with diversities: hegemonic control; territorial autonomy (cantonization/federalization); non-territorial (cultural) autonomy (consocietal division of power); and multicultural integration. Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation, London, Routletge, 1993, pp. 4-38. 61 Liberalism of this 'type' is an attempt to respond or create a basis for liberal interpretation of expanded citizenship or citizenhood of the so-called Marshall civil status. This appears in 1970 with the work by John Rawls, Equity Theory, 1970. Other representatives of the same paradigm are: Ronald Dvorkin (Seriously on Human Rights, 1974), Robert Nozik (Anarchy, Utopia and State, 1974), Nathan Glazer (Individual vs. Group Rights, 1983), Ronald Dvorkin (Speaking Seriously about Rights, 1985), Bruce Akkerman (Social Justice in Liberal State, 1980), Michael Sandel (The Procedural Republic and Unencumbered Self, 1984). This concept tries to develop neontological, non-value, neutral basis of civil consensus in democratic societies and to 'suck in' the cultural diversities by means of the concept of 'soft, benign neglect', or the so-called 'blindness law' – a law that is blind to diversities. This is a line leading from J. S. Mill, previously from Kant, etc. Michale Waltzer, following the line of C. Taylor, calls this liberalism 'Liberalism 1'. He defines as it an attempt to dedicate to the individual rights and to deduct from this a neutral state without cultural and religious projects. 62 Communitarianists follow a line that challenges liberal individualism of Rawls with a thesis that: liberal principles of social justice or social equity are empty without the social context, where culture and cultural identity are major determinants. According to these communitarianists, liberal paradigm is based on vain liberal consideration of the self; it avoids and violates our embedded 59

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model afterwards also opposes the model that comes out of a postmodernist debate on ‘deconstruction of subject’ and is hence even called model of differentiated, discerning citizenship and differentiated political representation (reflective representation), based primarily on cultural diversities, and not on equal civil status.63 *

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Evolution of debate on multiculturalism in the flank of the Western political theory formed several pillars. One pillar is the already cited insufficiency of the ‘bare’ individualistically postulated citizenship. Liberal ideal of equal treatment of humane rights is insufficient if it does not recognize the right to cultural diversity. Recognition of cultural identity is in context of providing individual freedom and choice; this in turn unavoidable leads to providing political instruments for protection of such identity (but not also towards enhancing normative status of persons belonging to some separate culture community). The opposite is equally valid – insisting on individualistic universalism could make a conflict resolution turn into a source of conflict in developed postmodern societies.

cultural-identity self-perceptions and procedures; and it wants to have impossible universality and objectivity. Communitarianism is inspired by and theoretically defines social criteria on citizenship as being dominantly collective, cultorological, relational and contextual. Leading names in this tendency are: Michael Sandel (The Procedural Republic and Unencumbered Self, 1984, and Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 1982), Michael Waltzer (Fields of Justice, 1982), Charles Taylor (The Sources of Self, 1989, Politics of Recognition, 1994), Daniel Bell, Alasdair McIntyre, etc. Michale Waltzer, being again on the trace of Charles Taylor, calls this communitarianist liberalism 'Liberalism 2' and defines it as an attempt that permits the state to dedicate itself to the progress of a given nation, culture, group, as far as the fundamental rights of citizens who have different affiliations are protected. Liberalism 2 has options and one of them is Liberalism 1. Liberalism 2 also has tensions that come from the attempt to make balance between individual and collective rights. But, according to this author, this is not a reason to reject it. Cf. Multikulturizam, EvroBalkan, op.cit., pp. 91-93. 63 With regard to debates on this topic in the circle of the Anglo-Saxon political theory since early 1960s, see also the very interesting M.A. thesis written by Aleksandar Jovanovski at the Faculty of Philosophy, University 'Ss. Cyril and Methodius', Skopje, 2005; Will Kumlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, Clarendon Press, Oxford,1995; Liberalism, Community and Culture, Oxford University Press, 1995; with Norman W., Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies, Oxford University Press, 2000. The following authors, together with Kumlicka, promote the line of synthesis or liberal pluralism: Joseph Ruts (National Self-Determination, 1990), Vernon Van Dyke (The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory, 1989), Chandran Kukathas, (Are There Any Cultural Rights, 1992), Jacob Levi (Classification of Cultural Rights, 1994), etc.

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The second supposition in this regard says that the right of ‘membership of culture’, the right of culture self-identification is important, valuable, and necessary to be protected and regulated by law. Such self-acknowledgment of individuals through a specific culture is necessary for preserving identity and prosperity of persons belonging to a given society, and for acknowledgment of their civil status.64 Such premises then make way for debates involving dialectics between multiculturalism and civism, through concepts of multicultural citizenship (of Will Kumlicka, etc.) and so-called differentiated (discerning) citizenship/civism (of Iris Marion Young).65 *

*

*

Definitive communitarian axiom in cited debates is the position that it is necessary to insert culture/community as an important intermedium in the liberalist relationship of an individual and the state. This especially relates to so-called ‘essential communities/groups’ that are established by having common past, history, language, etc. Some of the key authors in this field construct different aspects of this relationship; in this regard, we consider contributions by following authors more important: Charles Taylor and his ‘social thesis; Alasdair McIntyre and his reconstruction of social redistribution system, underlining importance of the so-called membership of culture, as medium distributing goods and values. According to this author, there can be no objective, impersonal moral standards of individualism; on the other hand, there is prevalence of what he calls culture ‘emotivism' that determines the individual choice of a human being by means of a series of rewards and punishments that a community offers and uses as threat to its members. Mike Sandel uses the term ‘situated self’ that precedes the so-called unloaded self To back up their thesis, the authors sharing this viewpoint cite three key arguments: the argument of equality – persons belonging to minority cultures are unjustifiably ignored at the culture market; the argument of historical agreements – by means of agreements the status of different minorities has already been regulated in many states; the value of cultural diversity – cultural pluralism is also worth or valuable from aspect of benefits it carries to the majority cultures by making them self-acknowledge and re-examine and develop. 65 This author classifies 'the fears' of the classical liberals (W. Kumlicka and W. Norman, according to this author) into several questions: concern about losing the equal civil status; concern about 'politicization of minority rights' expressed in proclamation of self-styled leaders; tendency towards overemphasis amid exclusivity of diversity and status; concern about creation of pluralism of mono-cultures or uni-cultures; concerns about erosion of civil skills supported by the individuality of the civil status. Op.cit., pp. 31-40. 64

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of an individual (i.e., a premise stipulating that our self, consciousness, and action are deeply interwoven with communal practices of the culture where we have been formed; our self is not free and unloaded). Michael Waltzer sheds further light on this primary membership of culture under economic aspect, claiming that distribution of primary goods certainly implies membership of certain human community.66 The concept of differentiated citizenship, which represents some kind of response to the aforementioned dilemmas confronting the then practice of liberal democracy, is very delicate to implement (it is much easier to theoretically explain) because it encroaches and relativizes the notion of ‘rule of law’ or of law-based state, as basis that implies equality of all persons before the law and universality of human rights, which in turn make up the grounds of contemporary liberal democracy. Namely, such institution establishes de facto simultaneous legal systems, or, at least simultaneous parts of one legal system – different ones for different ethnic or culture minorities and persons thereof. The aforementioned shows there cannot be mention in such cases of accepting a single, common term or notion of Justice which society is based upon; rather this refers to a process of common accommodation (modus vivendi), a democratic coexistence of different communities (communitarian accommodations). Liberalism as such has no problem with appropriate level of ‘individualization’ in applying human rights protection provided for by law. Liberalism has no problem with, for example, the so-called affirmative actions, inverse or positive discrimination, special measures, etc., for segments of a population (persons belonging to ethnic groups, indigenous peoples, gender-based or age-based groups, etc.). Therefore, in such context it is question of relatively small segments of the law, i.e., exemptions from the principle of equality as liberals understand it, especially relating to cases of traditional rites or traditional clothes used by immigrant communities or of tribal rituals of indigenous peoples. However, when elements of different cultures and different legal systems start growing and become complete per se to which these different legal segments apply – then this creates several parallel or concurrent legal systems See the following books about this debate: A. McIntyre, Po doblesta, Tabernakul, Skopje, 1998; M. Sandel , Liberalism and The Limits of Justice, 1982, Cambridge University Press; C. Taylor, Sources of Self: The Making of Modern Identity, Cambridge University Press, 1989; M. Waltzer, Podrucja pravde, Filip Visnic, Beograd, 2000. 66

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in one state, or, several ‘rules of law’ in one political system. This experience is rather new to the ’democratic taste’ known and practiced to date and reminds us of the medieval Europe based on the caste system. Hence, this creates great resistance in liberal circles with regard to both conception and practice. If one adds the ‘social thesis’ of Taylor to all of this – namely, analysis from aspect of the context in which the said differentiated citizenship is being discussed today, especially: experience of nonintegration of most of ethnic communities in the mainstream of traditional European cultures, their forced or voluntary ghettoizing; criminalization; connecting them to or media-based propagandistic presentation of their connections to terrorism or militant Islam; reactions like, for example, phobia of Islam and Muslims, and reactive phenomenon of so-called cultural racism, etc. – then the situation with debate on multicultural citizenship becomes problematic and politicized towards confrontation. The way out seems difficult and still unclear. One of influential concepts in this direction is that of ‘liberal pluralism’ (as promoted by W. Kumlicka and others). It is based on several premises that are interesting and important for analysis. Most important of them are: defining which and what kind of culture identities are important and so should be given priority – what to do with other multitude of identities and diversities; second, what about the respect of human rights inside, among persons belonging to autonomous identity groups, which are relevant at macro level and are networked in the political decision making (i.e., the well-known paradigm: whether there can be tolerance for the intolerant, authoritarian micro groups both towards their own group members and towards ‘the outside’, towards the rest of society. According to Waltzer, the so-called Liberalism 2 has this quality.); and third, what is and how to obtain equilibrium in whole society. What does it mean having confrontation and somebody to arbitrate it? And how can we process conflicts in conditions of a multicultural citizenship?67 If we would analyze these bases of cultural accommodation in a multicultural society, probably the first one would be most problematic of the cited premises. The one used in constructing so-called societal Will Kumlicka says that societal culture is based on shared language, societal institutions... in public and private life... which is beyond than common religious beliefs, life-styles or family traditions... and it is also territorially complete. In: Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford University Press, pp. 18, 76. 67

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identities, societal cultures, pervasive cultures (term used by Mergelit and Rutz), or, essential communities. These could be also called ‘historical communities’ and fall within the theoretical domain called by I. Kant ‘noumenal, self-choosy selfness’.68 As such, they are only relevant in constructing society of multicultural citizenship. Namely, according to these authors, such cultures emanate rigid identities for their own members and so surpass all other possible identities, while self-defining perceptions are refracted through them. The essence of societal culture is included in meanings, i.e., manners of self-evaluation of society: values, norms, choices, and goals it presents to its own members as manner of life and identity. The term ‘societal cultures’, rigidly determined as constitutive element of multicultural citizenship and nevertheless influential, leads its authors into series of unintentional exaggerations and mistakes. First we could assail the classification into ‘essential and unessential’ identities; this is especially established with these authors in their classification into ‘national minorities’ and indigenous peoples (that should be considered seriously and are entitled to all rights provided for) on one hand, and, ethnic groups and immigrant communities (actually it seems that one does not know what to do with them); however, the latter, even at the very outset, are ranked as ‘secondclass communities’!? Certainly, this is unfounded and does not hold water in context of the latest tendencies in expanding ‘minority rights’ or rights of cultural diversity of these and even of many other cultural identities and diversities. Such classification also implies per se an indefensible dosage of arbitrariness in the act of attributing such (societal) status to a given community, which many authors have noted and criticized.69 Some of the aforementioned authors further introduce two, additional thesis in the said term in order to make it more appropriate to the liberal traditions. This is the notion of ‘entry into culture’ or membership of culture, and, accordingly, ‘right of exit’ from it, which in turn should make a given culture pluralistic and tolerant and at the same time should protect the individualistic choice made by Such 'self' or 'selfness' is further given elaboration in communitarianist manner by M. Sandel and A. McIntyre with theses that: a self does not precede but is formed by the communitarian goals of the community... it is impossible to make demarcation between ME from MY GOALS..., or that: the story of my life is always embedded in the story of the community that I derive my identity from... In: Po doblesta, McIntyre, Tabernakul, Skopje, 1998. 69 Cf. Bikhu Parekh: Dilemmas of a Multicultural Theory of Citizenship, Constellation Vol 4, No. 1, pp. 54-62, 1997; or, John Gray and Iris Marion Young: in op.cit. 68

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persons.70 On the other hand, the second group of perhaps somewhat more successful terms denotes classification into ‘external protections and internal restrictions’, as attempt to deconstruct group dynamics and political practice of collective rights and creation of functional multicultural accommodation (adaptation). The first group of notions represents more theoretical constructs, because of the fact, which B. Parekh and C. H. Gray see clearly: namely, membership of culture ‘does not exist’ as individualistic choice in the rational sense of the word. A person ‘belongs’ to a culture and this is very difficult to change by own choice; and for certain, especially handicapped groups (women, children…), this is impossible to do without a serious threat to own life.71 This is true because it originates from the internal phenomenology of creating identity and group behavior. This is created on basis of underlining DIFFERENCES vis-à-vis their identities and underlining the notion of BORDER towards the others, and not based on seeking a common denominator, as the democratic position of equality of individuals before the law. This makes the key difference between the two dynamics and politics that come out of the aforementioned – the democratic, individualistic vs. the group, communitarian. The entire dynamics of creating common culture and history is mythological construct of creating community spirit (imagined, according to B. Anderson) that is of beneficial influence, that creates significance of historic mission, goals, and meaning of individual life in such community spirit. Such ‘culture placenta’ should also deliver another important goal – protection and certainty of individuals sunken with their heads in the collectivist, warm and cozy ‘pulp’ of meanings and safety – contrary to challenges in making choices and depersonalization ‘over there, outside’ in the globalist world and national majoritarian cultures. The price of such ‘certainty in meanings’ implies the so-called ‘internal restrictions’ or taboos of individualistic free choices. Internal restrictions are intended to protect a given group from destabilizing influence internal discord among group members – in other words, In this context, in addition to the already said Kumlicka, we have to note the effort by Chandran Kukathas who says that ... the liberal community should recognize the legitimacy of the cultural communities as a political subject... if the latter accept and support the individual projects and protect the minorities inside minorities... In: Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights, Political Theory 20, 1992 . 71 Cf. Bhikhy Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2000, and, Culture Pluralism and Limits of Diversity, Alternatives 20, 1995; C. H. Gray, Postmodern War, Semiotex, New York, 1997. 70

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decisions made by individual members should not have any influence on traditional group procedures and customs. On the other hand, external protections are intended to protect a group from influence by external factors in context of supremacy by the majority, imposing alien or other’s practices.72 This institution is acceptable and accepted in the liberal discourse of modern democracy, in form of affirmative actions (inverse discrimination; positive discrimination; or specific measures) and special measures that enable maintaining and reproduction of minority cultures. Nevertheless, there is a problem coming from the over-extensive practice of internal restrictions, where challenge towards a wider consensus based on individual human rights is rather clear and open. Regardless of the fact if cited institutions would be accepted and/or criticized, or even another road would be taken towards incompatibility, non-communication of diverse cultures under one political ‘sky’, in one state – in other words, such problem amounts to how to provide and apply new political consensus, and prevent imposing by the majority (not even in indirect form). We would like to elaborate this problem in more detailed fashion, since it is the key element surrounding conflict situations in multicultural societies; accordingly, it should be known in order to be able to prepare negotiations strategy of avoiding or solving conflicts. *

*

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Let us begin with the thesis of John Gray that multicultural citizenship and liberal discourse hiding behind it do not function in illiberal societies and within illiberal minorities. In other words, even ‘civic virtues’ and high political culture of William Gallstone – which liberal pluralists consider as equally important as institutional arrangements are for a multicultural society to function – cannot lead to firmly established consensus, but mostly to a temporary MODUS VIVENDI.73 This model of accommodation or modus vivendi lies in W. Kumlicka , op.cit., p. 35 . Wiliam Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues and Duties in Liberal State, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 221-224. Here, Galston distinguishes four groups of skills: social skills as independence, free-thinking; economic skills as work ethics, delay of selfgratification, accommodation to economic and technological changes; political skills as ability to respect the rights of others, preparedness to raise demands only if supported, preparedness to get involved in public discourse. The quality of citizenship is a function of the preparedness to take part in such community where civic virtues are necessary together with the procedural-institutional arrangement. 72 73

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between the minimal threshold of shared and accepted liberal principles of equity as impartiality on one hand, and the maximalist aspirations of the communitarian position on incomparable and immeasurable diversities and meanings of various cultures in one segmented society. This line of criticism also pertains to the theory coming out of the postmodern fascination with ‘deconstruction of the subject”, as represented by Iris M. Young within feminist debates, through her front notion of ‘differentiated, discerning citizenship’.74 Deconstruction of the subject resulted in deconstruction of its hard identities. According to these authors, there was none of them, and hence ideas advocated by pluralists on special, historical identities do not hold water or represent ideology. All of this turned into a simulacrum of overlapping identities that are too far dynamic, unclear and changeable – indeed more changeable than what Donald Horowitz wanted to say with the note that ethnic identity is not static; it changes with the environment …75 The thesis of advocates of differentiated, discerning citizenship claims that such identity has never been firm and defined; it has always been fluctuating. Hence, it is ideology, and not science or theory, to consider any of those identities predominant, ‘firm’, and determining. This then takes them to the term ‘differentiated citizenship’, as innovative principle that is based on reduction of injustice among ethnic and culture groups in a given society, and on supporting justice inside them. Indeed, they have similar ambition like the one of cultural, liberal pluralists; nevertheless, the means used are somewhat more radical. There are no ‘nomoi’ any more like primary groups, societal, historical groups; nevertheless, the landscape has become more radical and dynamic towards expressively more mobile overlapping identities, even to the level of simulacrum of identities without subject. Second, as John Gray emphasizes, a cultural discord, or not having a single model of truth and justice is more radical. Namely, such society has no perspective of agreed procedural basis of equity, in sense of common value-based placenta and procedure for conflict resolution.76 Iris M. Young, op.cit. D. L. Horowitz , Ethnic Groups in Conflict , University of California Press, Berkeley, USA, 1985 . 76 According to John Rawls, the model of individualist justice is modified in direction of creation a theory of equity that is based on several premises: principle of equal freedom for all participants; freedom may be restricted only for the sake of freedom; every person should have the right of the 74 75

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Deep diversities are not ‘rational’ and cannot lead to overlapping consensus even of neutral type (they lead the theory of equity of Rawls into crisis). It is not possible to separate the public advocacy for equity and private moral arguments of what is good and bad in given culture groups. Some of those groups deny definitively and in detail freedom as option or understand it in very different manner than liberals do. Although justice as equity (in case of Rawls) represents an instrument of cooperation, collaboration, and avoidance of conflicts and is not an instrument for concluding truth and final moral judgments, even this does not have to be yet shared as important by some of culture groups. Some groups think that such ‘softness and dullness’ of the moral judgments is rather expression of decadency and disintegration of the moral code of people and that to die for own truth still represents the only good and important deed that makes man a human being. This position in non-militant versions is denial of cooperation, deliberate marginalization, and ignoring the outside world. The cited Rawls’ concept of justice as equity is an attempt to treat the political fact of cultural diversities in pragmatic manner, so that conflicts could be settled in non-violent way. Such concept of justice is neither meta-ethic nor metaphysical; it is political. In this segment, liberal pluralists and postmodern deconstructionists accept it; however both of them think it is insufficient, naïve, and inapplicable in society of deep diversities. Both J. Gray and W. Kumlicka claim that cultural pluralism is not a mere political fact but axiological position as well. Namely, cultural pluralism discusses different stories on meaning of life originating from different rationalities. By this, most extensive overall system of equal freedoms; and all of this can be agreed in basic procedural consensus because it is based on the neutral principle of the greatest use, i.e., of the least common denominator. If such ideal principle could be adopted, then one could go to the second realistic principle of intervention of the most endangered, but again in the name of freedom and the previous ideal concept of contracted equity. The system of Rawls is based on the optimistic opportunity for a complementary consensus, which in turn is based on a reasonable calculation, of system of rationality that is considered universal. It is also based on values (desirability of freedom) and moral judgments that were also considered universal. The system is then based on the separation of such discourse and the possibility in private life to practice radically diverse cultural options. This means that every individual should clearly understand that he should prefer such 'equity' to his own benefit in public life and politics, preceding his own system of beliefs of what is good and what is bad and immoral. According to Rawls, justice reduced or amounting to equality is a condition for a democratic society to be faced with unknown systems of personal and group cultural truths and justices, provided that this does not threaten his own stability and efficiency. Indeed, it is very clear that this system is in crisis if it cannot be reduced to the basic, 'thin', essential rationality (even only as political pragmatics) about what is just, how to avoid conflicts, and whether conflicts need be avoided after all?

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cultural pluralism cannot be divided, i.e., to demand every individual split himself in public rationality of Rawls’ kind, and in private – diversity (another rationality) of every individual culture. This is untenable, schizophrenic position and results in destruction of the global consensus in such societies. From this point onwards, theoretical consequences of cited authors are different. One of them nevertheless goes back to possibility of having a thin, procedural consensus (like the one with Rawls) among different groups (because he thinks identities are not definite and unchangeable, so it would be possible to stimulate liberal values in them, and suppress patriarchal, repressive, and fundamentalist values and wants to see state intervention in minority cultures (Kumlicka). On the other hand, the second author is rather pessimistic on possibility of external intervention in discourse of cultures and takes more radical version of ‘splitting’ the state into different jurisdictions, jurisprudences, legal systems for different cultures in one state (J. Gray). We find the epistemological note by C. Taylor referring to this confrontation of values very productive (using a term coined by HansGeorg Gadamer - ‘fusion of horizons’). He says that in evaluating other cultures we should move along a wider horizon where we reach our judgments, which are outcome of partial transformation of our starting standards. Genuine value judgments imply a fused horizon of standards. They assumed that studying other cultures would not make transformation. Hence we do not make our judgments only on basis of own starting standards. In this regard, evaluation is open, both towards and for the sake of change. Assuming values implies a universe where diverse cultures add to one another by means of very different types of contribution. This does not mean that everything is equivalent, equal, or having equal contribution. Genuine evaluation also includes perspective of civilization progress; and yet this is done carefully, from a benchmark position of winning human freedom.

* * * The debate in the camp of ‘the deconstructionists’, on the other hand, took the line of defining the already said differentiated, discerning citizenship (something close to J. Gray’s position), and even beyond, to elaboration of a concept of democratization of

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democracy by means of the so-called mirror representation and deliberative democracy.77 An important component of this line is pointing out the limits and risks in uncritical acceptance of the identity concept, in form of the so-called rigid ethnic identities and their participation in the distribution of power. It was done by pointing out other non-identity communities, gender identities, and handicapped groups that are today outside and remain outside in their marginalization and in society with power divided among ‘the hard identities’. The consequence of this was entire permeation of the character and division of identities (criticism of identity logic); underlining the importance of preservation of individual human rights within identity communities (opening of identity); as well as further pluralization of political actors by means of numerous non-identity communities and handicapped groups. Instrument ‘deconstructionists’ considered possible for embedding this new plurality into democracy – is the cited new participative, deliberative democracy and mirror representation.78 The problem we can point out as kind of criticism as well as a fact to think about in context of all this review of theoretical classifications and explanations of new plurality in the post-modern, is in the fact that such type of explosion of pluralities of identity and nonThe concept, introduced by I. M. Young, developed another relationship towards identities, drifting from the so-called hard identities, or nomoi. Namely, this author pointed out the appearance of non-identity communities by means of criticizing the logic of the identity of genderbased constellations and rights; and of handicapped communities and social groups that can remain such even in context of division of power among the hard identity groups. Groups, according to this viewpoint, should represent in politics according to their interests, attitude and social perspective. Cf. Iris M. Young Polity and Group Difference : A Critique of the Idea of Universal Citizenship, Ethics, 99/2, 1989, pp. 250-274. 78 There is interesting distinction, made by some of these authors (Jane Mansbridge) in support of the deliberative democracy, between: the descriptive and substantial political representation. The former represents, possibly, all or almost all, while the latter is classical example where the biggest, most often territorially concentrated, identity groups only are represented. In case of the former, the descriptive, the parliament is transformed into 'a circus tent' of great diversity of the represented microcosms of local and interest-based communities. Cf.: J. Mansbridge , Descriptive Representation in Communicative Settings.. .. Kumlicka, Norman (ed.), 2000, pp. 99123. On the other hand, Charles Taylor presents a very interesting criticism against the deconstructionists that he calls 'new followers of Nietzsche'. According to him, they have a cynical attitude that produces a hypocritical chain thus failing to answer or respond to the question of cultural pluralism and even distorting it into a question of power and strength. They prefer to not seriously consider cultural pluralism and claim that all value judgments are based on standards that are essentially imposed by power structures. They then claim that those standards further base those power structures in reflexive manner. Cf. Multrikulturalizam, Evro-Balkan, 2004, Skopje, pp. 58-59. 77

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identity character is ASYMMETRIC from aspect of motivation power for political action, and even more important to us, from aspect of possibility to become violent and use force in solving own status and perspective of accommodation. Possibility for violent conflict and denial of social consensus by use of force – is by far greater in context of ethno-religious diversities among groups, than it is with others. Such hard identity variables as: civil wars; violence; secession; federalism; closed consensual democracy; ethnic rights connected to territory; ethnic cleansing (violent or ‘silent’); autonomous and yet authoritarian minorities, have marked, imposed, and even ‘colonized’ the debate (have created epistemological ‘whirlpool’) in discourse of social plurality in transition of multicultural societies, after the fall of communism, as well as in traditional democracies. This practice was connected to the ‘bad’ European history of conflicts and civil wars; there was even an example in history of decolonization and self-determination of nations. However, nothing could compare with the astonishment in theory and practice concerning resurrection of ethnic nationalism (when it was considered ‘resolved’) after the dissolution of the communist federations and accommodation of ethnic communities in the transition countries of Southeast Europe. Hard variables of identity accommodation in democracy have enhanced own theoretical presence also due to the increasingly evident failure of the project of ‘integration’ of old and new immigration minorities in European countries. This recent process is very influential in theory since it had nothing to do with violentness of transitional multicultural societies; on the contrary, it has evolved in the peaceful, decadent, postmodern, and prosperous Europe. This makes the problem of multiculture and accommodation of cultural diversities even more universal and identifies the need in search of a new liberal justice for plural postmodern societies.

5.2. Sources of confliction and conditions for democracy and constitutionalism in these societies

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5.2. Nevertheless, let us make attempt to sum up the debate in the theory of multicultural citizenship and define out the end position for the needs of further conflict research. Namely, these debates singled out the so-called hard and soft position on multicultural citizenship. The debates also showed intervention in conflict prevention requires pragmatically political, and on long-term, stabilizing conception basis, a justice concept that identified the need for intervention and lays down foundations for future political structure after a conflict. Regardless of sometimes rather pessimistic theory on possibility of a soft universalism of the human rights concept and justice based on them, it is at least implicitly needed and present, floating in esoteric manner around every social action for prevention or settlement of conflicts. Therefore, the discussions underlined the so-called hard version of multiculturalism that advocates essential shift in our understanding of the civil stratus. Identity groups should be given extensive formal-legal and constitutional protections and positions so that they would be able to govern their own members in accordance with their own culture – nomos. Very often, this assumes various forms of home rule, autonomy, and official inclusion in political representation and public administration. Such tendency should be able to reduce or even eliminate injustice among groups (this is above all in interest of this viewpoint). This position also concentrates on conflict resolution among identity groups or between identity group members and the state, while neglecting conflict discourse inside of every identity group. Negative outcome of this overestimation is the syndrome of socalled multicultural vulnerability. This represents a situation when due to advantages given to group representation and neglecting of intragroup relations, group elites are given autonomy to behave in authoritarian and repressive manner within their own group for the sake of preserving unity of a group. The paradox lies in the fact that in the intention to have intergroup justice – accept is placed on importance of group representation and protection of minority culture in politics and public discourse; this in turn can have as consequence increase in intra-group pressure, hierarchies, and intolerance of individuals, at the expense of their own individual rights. In such case,

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‘external protections’ (Kumlicka) stimulate ‘internal reactions’ of illiberal type. In the soft version of multiculturalism, this weakness has been noticed; hence, multiculturalism is based on a more balanced tendency for accommodation of identity groups simultaneously with protection of individual civil rights. In this version, the genuine test for multicultural citizenship is how minority rights or rights of cultural diversity coexist with individual rights.79 This version has adopted perhaps the key position in the multicultural ‘story’, such as coexistence, or relationship in stabilization of identities with others in one social environment in one state.80 This theory does recognize the tenacity and function of ‘the historical identities; however, the theory also claims that moment of accommodation of an identity group in wider society is never just an act of recognition of a group by the state but also opening of a given group to influence of values ‘from the outside’ aiming at its internal relations and hierarchies. The state by ‘recognition of identity’ can also finish an important function for an identity group; namely, to decide which one of opposing, sometimes even conflictive interpretations of identity of such group (that are made by its internal factions) would be recognized and become dominant. The state can prevent internal group discord (there is also risk that the state can cause it), because ‘to be recognized’, to institutionalize your own culture means patronage, power; it means that state recourses and opportunities for socio-cultural communications would be aimed at you. Of great importance is that such position of soft multiculturalism in principle creates legitimacy of interference, intervention in intragroup conflicts and so creates opportunity for optimism of postconflict solutions. If we take for example the opposite viewpoint: that identity groups are defined and closed entities, which negotiate or talks to the outside world through controlled channels and ‘semiconductors’ – then peace, evolution, and compromise are always only of political Cf. W. Kumlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, ibid . One could even perhaps accept the position of 'imagination' of identities or nations of B. Anderson, or 'invention' or construction of traditions and identities of E. Hobsbawm. Cf. Eric Hobsbawm, The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Verso, London, 1991. 79 80

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and temporary (never of permanent) character because they have no future, they do not create new situation but only a status quo until the next conflict and reaching new balance of power. Then it would be impossible to have one multicultural society; this would only be a phase of transition towards ‘settling the score’ among involved identity groups and creating microcosms of ethnically ‘clean’ identities. This idea is not entirely paranoiac since it has been present at least as hidden ideal and concept at many negotiations on conflict resolution.81 Therefore, with regard to the question if it is possible in principle to make intervention in intra-group identity relations for the sake of conflict prevention or resolution – this author and this work are inclined to accept possibility of intervention, with full responsibility for such intervention and all reservations of a minimalist-valued and strictly utilitarian concept of such intervention. Such concept would be based on elimination of violence as method in politics in conflict resolution and in protection of human rights and rights of cultural diversity, within the framework of the so-called ‘soft universalism’ of their importance and extension. On the other hand, identity groups can respond to state policy through several policies of their own: policy of assimilation; policy of limited, restrictive culturalism; and policy of reactive culturalism.82 The last two actualize multiculturalism. Limited culturalism is said to exist when an identity group, in addition to its own practice, makes such practice and even efforts to integrate part of the outside culture and change itself more intensively (in such case, emphasis on external protection is higher, while the given group adapts its internal restrictions). Reactive culturalism exists when a given group refuses the aforementioned and insists on it own traditions that it considers clearly distinctive from the rest of society. Such group makes use of external protections and at the same time even enhances its own Bosnia and the Dayton Accord are the most topical negotiations disasters of this kind. Part of 'the greater-nation concepts' of Serbs and Albanians in the Balkans are of the same kind. The genocide in Rwanda is the most notorious slaughterhouse of the same concept. 82 Cf. Ayelet Shashar, Multicultural Jurisdiction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 28-44. 81

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internal restrictions. ‘Nomoi’ of such groups do not want to adapt themselves and so make the consensus of wider society very critical. *

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If we were to construct a working model that is most probable to us, closest to our conception viewpoints and is framework for methodology of ‘intervention’ from aspect of its positions in conflict negotiations – then it would consist of: - Position of ‘soft universalism’ of human rights as general point of departure; - Possibility afterwards to reach position of limited culturalism; this would imply departing from conformation of the state of reactive culturalism and possibility to have change towards limited culturalism; and - Constructing such consensus meaning a constant process of reaching agreement (at worse, only modus vivendi; and at better, agreement on values) in overcoming violence as method of conflict resolution.83 Therefore, our position/model would be multicultural society where cultural diversities assume the character of ‘deep diversities’ that cannot and refuse to be melted into a common identity of the nation, or to be assigned to equality of the civil status (at least not entirely, insisting on precedence of justice for groups over equality of human rights for individuals). However, in contrast to fatalism of this dividing tendency, we still are of the opinion that there is chance of group identity evolution (as concept, we do accept that it is constructed regardless how it might seem rather ‘historical’ and firm at a given moment), and that such evolution is relational, determined This is very important point of the concept, a possibility of evolution towards limited culturalism. Namely, this is a possibility that is evolving on long-term in the social accommodation of a cultural group, and yet it is a possibility that is created in explosive manner and in conditions of stress caused by conflict situation. What we have previously described as 'ripe moment' of a conflict actually mean that – a group shifts from hard, extremist positions (reactive or even militant culturalism) because of assessing the cost of continuing the conflict or of being exhausted from it, to phase of preparedness for negotiations and evolving culturalism that an agreement would certainly bring. This is very important information or knowledge when a negotiator must have when he approaches a moment of solving a conflict. W. Kumlicka also notes about the possibility of evolution of a group cultural identity that there are liberal traditions inside every culture and that they should be found, enhanced, supported, and pulled out to the surface so that evolution of group identity and communications with others would be possible. Ibid. 83

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with interaction with other groups, wider society, the state, and international intervention.84 However, it is important not to deceive ourselves with ‘cover concepts’ in search of false harmony and consensus. Cultural antagonisms are realistic and open. It is impossible to expect that such antagonisms would be solved by means of Rawls’ recipe of dividing into public and private spheres: public rationality – choosing equity as the least harmful denominator, and, privately practicing Justice – choosing good and bad in accordance with culture dogmas. Such schizophrenic split into ‘a rational and into a naturallyculturological’ personality of his behavior in one state is not likely to function. Respect of the common consensus from aspect of John Gray, on line of Hobbes’ ‘fear of harm’, would perhaps have some chances to function. Namely, this requires culture groups to accept respecting certain minimal rules of procedure and being tolerant due to fear of own survival (or fear of serious harm) if they fail to behave so. This would be a consensus, at the start as some kind of ‘modus vivendi’, constantly unstable equilibrium that certainly needs strong administration and monopoly of force, which would be guardian of the consensus and punisher of violators, or in its worse form it would lean on fear of retaliation. When we try to graphically present the correlation of the consensus or double loyalties of individuals towards own cultural groups and wider society (especially in transitional, multicultural societies), it looks thus: 84

In the first case, the correlation of loyalty towards the culture of own group and towards the state are in blocking balance; in the second case, loyalty towards own group is by far greater; and in the third case there is small but sufficient predominance of loyalty towards the state, maintaining rather high level of loyalty towards the culture of own group. The third case is that case that would be stabilizing and desirable in transitional multicultural societies and would lead towards consolidation of constitutionalism and democracy in those societies.

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The idea is to avoid falling in what Amartya Sen calls ‘plural monoculturalism’ where dialog is conducted with the assumption to confirm stereotypes and not to overcome or reduce their impact. There is also the idea to create an opportunity (not to compel) for multiculturalism that would open room for dialog with the assumption of Charles Taylor and Gadamer: to start with own culture positions; and yet to change the, in contact with other cultures and values; finally, to draw conclusions through evolved own culture viewpoints, viewpoints that include the feedback of making contacts with ‘the others’. In other words, to provide opportunity for extended horizons of Gadamer. It is our opinion that even in case of radical cultural diversities, it is possible to find what Kumlicka calls ‘liberal values’ in every culture through constant dialog with other values that are not liberal; or are illiberal. In this context, it is important for us not to be guided by the method of having final solutions, but by insisting of the very DIALOGUE as norm of exit strategy. By such approach, it would be possible to have rather different exit solutions of democratic systems in multicultural societies. Namely such solutions could show to be complicated, slow, costly system of procedural dialog. However, their value and functionality for a given society must be evaluated in relation to the price and danger of potential violent conflict, and in context of traditions of such society of living together. In a word, there are no models to recommend, although there are basic lines to follow. We think it is important to make emphasis in this approach as well that, regardless how final solutions are open-ended, one of those lines, some kind of liberal criterion of intervention and dialog promotion still exists (at least some kind of ‘super soft universalism’ of human rights). In attempt to have closer definition of the position of harmonization, or intervention in the culture sphere of identity groups, I would like to propose THE THEORY OF COORDINATION, in place of the imposing liberalism. This term has been borrowed from coordination discourse between international law and national legal systems of countries in law implementation in contemporary international relations. International law has many analogous points with law in these multicultural societies. According to John Gray, 64

coordination between different jurisdictions involving diverse cultural segments resembles the relationship between international law and national laws. The following offers the essence of the aforementioned theory of coordination: principles of international law are basically valid and may not be ignored (without grave implication); however, the very manner of their implementation is left to happen in the tradition of national legal systems. Some basic guidelines are mentioned, in order to prevent misuse, deformation, and nonobservance of international norms; nevertheless manner and pace of implementation is left to national systems. The institution of ‘margin of appreciation’ (i.e., margin of allowed deviation in application of some norm guided by traditions of a national law) is well-known even in rendering decisions concerning cases brought before international courts. In our case, these international norms are analogous to the soft universalism of human rights and fundamental principles of democracy, while their implementation is left to cultural traditions (with certain reservations and guidelines, they are of benefit to protection of individual rights of man). For such system to function, a very important condition is ‘the openness’ of society to external arbitration or assessment of the IMPLEMENTATION of agreements and actions made. Paradoxical element in multicultural societies is the relationship between the basic energies created by tensions and conflicts that originate from localism, particularism, and closure of cultural identities on one hand, and on the other hand the state of basic need to include in conflict resolution globalizing elements, some type of international soft arbitration! Very few conflicts were solved by remaining closed. Most of conflict resolution was done by certain form of international involvement and guarantees, Because relations between identities is full of distrust and fear, evaluation and opinion by ‘third’ party or arbiter offering good services (in which all actors have some trust) is an important factor in internal consolidation.

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So, it remains to explain positions on CONSENSUS and its making as process in multicultural societies.85 Culture-related facts represent epistemological objectivity that is different from so-called ontological objectivity (provided it exists). Namely, culture-related facts do exist and depend on agreements and consents reached by men on and around them. Therefore, consensus is in principle POSSIBLE. However, consensus in multicultural societies cannot be the same consensus found in homogeneous liberal cultures/democracies. Consensus in multicultural societies is a delicate combination made up of liberal values and individual identities. Namely, such consensus cannot be GIVEN as CONDITION upon which one state is constructed. One cannot APPEAL for such consensuses to be accepted by all individuals and groups, because it is not clear what it contains or should contain as set of values in order to be accepted as basis for further work. Consensus in multicultural societies cannot be attained by appeals for unity and its moralization. It is more of a PROBLEM than a condition. It is something like ambiguous frame that is WORTH existing and building, to be filled with values it has (yet) to come to. From such aspect, consensus is not position, but METAPOSITION. Being metaposition, such consensus does not represent higher type of value or higher type of consent on values; it is DIFFERENT type of consent. Such consent resolves conflict ethics, or values of different identities. Consensus of this type is not able to do it by imposing a system pf presumed liberal values; this cane be done by constant dialog among diversities and by citizens’ action in state of civil freedom. Consensus in multicultural citizenship is competent, constant working (management) with diversities or difference coming out of the identities. These differences are sometimes hard debates on lack of freedom, dependence, and fear and violence, and not only on human rights and democracy as such. Hence, we have said earlier that such consensus cannot be granted as previous condition but only ASSIGNED or imposed as problem, only with POSSIBLE outcome from organizing these differences. Therefore, this means that such consensus should be negotiated and it should be reached by civic action that happens in state of freedom. Consensus is not a thing one has or possesses; it is See interesting debate on this - in: Herman Van Gunsteren (1998), A Theory of Citizenship, Westview Press, Oxford. 85

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only an imperfect and incomplete exercise on consent among citizens. The only two conditions for consensus are state of FREEDOM and DIALOGUE.

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In context of needs of our topic, conflict resolution, i.e., negotiation in identity conflicts, the segment that deals with CONDITIONS for successful outcome of the project: institutional building and successful functioning of democracy in multicultural societies – is very important. Second side of examination of conditions for success also involves aggravating circumstances or factors, those about crisis and failure of the same project. We have intention to address exactly this issue in the last part of this section of the book; this in turn would enable us enter the key section relating to negotiation in identity conflicts in multicultural societies. Let us start with ‘repetition’ of pairs of different terms/values that contain, in somewhat simplified manner, models of modernism and postmodernism and are borrowed from Herman Van Gunsteren. Therefore, Policy of national building, a front term of modernism in politics, is opposed, replaced with (more of a tendency than a standard) creolization in global structure in postmodernism; emancipation politics (educational paradigm) is replaced with life style politics; equality is replaced with differentiation and difference; organization and hierarchy are replaced by reorganization and ‘networking’; rationality is replaced with rationalities; clear, fixed identities are replaced with multiplied and overlapping identities; indirect representation and indirect democracy are replaced with ad hoc presentation and mirror, deliberative democracy; pragmatism in politics is replaced by fundamentalism in politics (we mean here failure to make comprising and synthetic identities at national level). Out of the said series, let us single out transformation of political representation from predominantly indirect (as standard in liberal democracies) towards ‘mirror, inclusive, deliberative’ representation, because this shows the tendency of so-called RE67

DEMOCRATIZATION of democratic societies by inclusion of culture diversities. Therefore, the tendency (if one could identify it in this manner) is for the civil status (and national identity through it) to both include all citizens – as equal before the law, and to accept and treat them as equally valuable and legitimate members of the community. The change that includes culture pluralism is not at all simple; on the contrary, it is turbulent. Such change, because of its symbolism and struggle of symbols of diverse cultures, mostly involves the public sphere of political representativeness in said struggles and then goes down institutionally to level of civil networking and micro communities and life styles. Thus, we come to the first CONDITION for success of democratic politics in multicultural societies, being INCLUSIVE politics/representativeness. The second condition is preservation of legal system and preservation of society as ‘governable’. This is very important in the first part of the intervention, because eventual downfall of these societies in a more serious conflict would make then ungovernable and fallen from within on longer term. Experience has shown that in such cases ‘the starting situation’ becomes definitively lost and very different methods of post-conflict management would be then required. This ‘urgent’ plan/condition requires that at least two pillars be set in advance (perhaps not elaborated in all details, but being properly directed): the first pillar address design of a constitutional frame that will protect and promote individual human rights and will also provide inclusion and efficient representation of different groups; the second pillar is equally important: protective mechanisms for creating neutral and efficient administration. The third condition would be clear and open orientation towards political promotion of identities. This condition is closely related to the first one – inclusiveness, and treats it very clearly and openly. Namely, as we have mentioned just a while concerning ‘the symbolism’ of struggles, it is important that an identity of a political community be expressed in the political sphere and in the sphere of institutional building, above all and more then in the civil sphere or that of life styles, manner of life (semi-public, semi-private). If this condition is met, then it will enable identities to ‘be relaxed’ from convulsion and fear that they will be by-passed in distribution of 68

power; this in turn enables better chances for development and multiple and overlapping identities. By this, chances are made to construct a consensually based structure of authority and later in perspective a symbiotic ‘national identity’. The fourth condition would involve development of civic virtues, especially tolerance and accepting others as being different and equally valuable in atmosphere of freedom for communication between cultural discourses. The fifth condition implies participation in employment and development of market economy, having share in resources and social opportunities. The sixth condition means that society be ‘kept open’ for international soft arbitration (expert assistance or political stimulus) in sensitive normative zones of regulating culture rights. The seventh condition is international networking of such countries in wider security and economic integration processes. This condition can be shown to be vital to implementation prospects of any agreement in a given such country, and can permanently solve culture conflicts, or at least to pull them out of their violent stage. With development prospects that are provided by wider integration processes and their ‘soft power’ (power to make reforms by offering assistance and examples, and not pressure and threats), multicultural states have opportunities for longer stabilization and development. Aggravating factors stand as counterpoint to conditions for success, being as follows: - existence of intensive feeling of security threat (disintegrated former complex states; undefined borders, etc); - weak states or lack of institutions with authority and power to implement law or agreement; - lack of any traditions of liberal and democratic conduct and observance of procedures, or even existence of traditions of authoritarian government and ‘destroyed human material’ on the long run;

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- fallen economies, poverty, gray and criminal economy; discriminatory and exclusive political institutions (exclusion of entire culture groups); - traditions of culture discrimination, bulling by the majority, and problematic construction of history and historical memories of groups (as antagonizing, enemy, retaliation, messianic, etc.); - isolation of such state, its non-involvement in international security and economic arrangements (states that are ungovernable, criminaloid, which are split among the warlords, forgotten places, black holes). Special problem are countries in transition that assume form of ‘illiberal democracies’. Such countries, in addition to the previously cited negative tendencies, also have painful experiences with their own political elites who, instead of leading the process towards democracy thus mobilizing even minimal common basis for consensus, easily slip into ethnic nationalism and populism. Instead of understanding the specially underlined role of responsible leadership towards democracy and constitutional state, the opposite is very frequent – negative mobilization on grounds of ethnic nationalism, connected to organized crime and endemic corruption. Thus, the notorious bad equilibrium of transition is created. Given such atmosphere, culture groups become closed or entrapped in permanent antagonism, while interethnic conflict lives in collective group narrations with realistic or imagined events and dynamics.

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6. SECTION THREE NEGOTIATION IN IDENTITY CONFLICTS Actors or sides in conflict do create such conflict and they can solve it. There is no hidden plot or historical determinism that drives or prevents them in doing something to this end. Experts can analyze and even develop theories on this, which might help or impede, however the very sides are the ones solving such dispute/conflict. This is the first starting assumption. The second one is that there are no conceptional or practical reasons to treat use of violence as necessity or inevitable thing in politics and especially in identity conflicts. Every attempt to employ prevention, mediation, or negotiation for conflict resolution uses the said two presumptions as point of departure. 6.1. Definition of negotiation 6.1. Definition of NEGOTIATION means that this is the final stage in conflict resolution. Negotiation is process of confrontation and discussion involving all sides on their different and opposing interests and goals in formal procedure, by which they try to reach jointly acceptable agreement.86 Negotiation is usually conducted in three global phases: preliminary negotiations or pre-negotiations; argumentation, contesting, confrontation, or, direct negotiation; and, implementation. Yet, another, somewhat different approach would include the following: pre-negotiation activities; conceiving possible agreement and architecture of final agreement; and, discussion on all important details that would enable having a final balance of the agreement. Certainly, in this context a special phase would be considered in the W. Zartman, Pruitt, Berman, Hopmann, Faure..., define negotiations in similar manner – namely, like a process whereby involved sides combine and/or keep their own different positions in a single way out... Or, at another place in the below cited work: negotiations includes exchange of proposals for the purpose of reaching common solution starting with different positions, while the process is guided by the thicks of reciprocity... See in: Escalation and Negotiation... cited work, pp. 4, 11. 86

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very implementation of the basic agreement; sometimes, a separate agreement would be required for this.87 By means of such negotiation process, involved sides can reach final conflict resolution, or could just try ceasing hostilities and possible conflict escalation. Perhaps, another motive or outcome for involved sides could be to have confirmation or recognizance of asymmetric situation of forces in a given moment of their conflict, and, afterwards, to gain advantage or capitalize such situation by starting negotiations. If we try to exhaust the list of possible reasons to be used by involved sides in conflict in making decision to commence negotiations for solving their conflict, then this list perhaps might seem like this: - the first reason is rather of cognitive-rational type: assessment that own interests cannot be further realized by conflict and that a situation of mutually hurting stalemates (Zartman) for involved sides emerges in the field. Such stalemate situation would be overcome by starting negotiations; - fear of conflict escalation all the way up to endangering the very existence of one or both sides in conflict; - change of involved sides or change of political relations and constellations inside involves sides, thus making possible for moderate leaders to assume power or posts; - change of attitude or positions of involved sides about the other side, thus making possible for moderate viewpoints, new prospects of cooperation, etc., to come to the foreground; - tactical gaining time and room for ‘a break or rest” from conflict, and then consolidation of forces and options; -intervention or interference by the international community by means of confidence-building measures and security measures; - process of learning and promotion of mutual relations between involved sides towards new, reconciliatory contexts and with new development perspectives (most often this means an offer to get integrated into wider economic and security arrangements, and so on), etc. At the outset of negotiations, involved sides can communicate directly, by means of written communications or of a third side 87

Cf. International Negotiation, Kluwer Law International , London-The Hague, 7/3 , 2002 .

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(intermediary; mediator; facilitator; moderator; a go-between representative offering his good services). Negotiation as such basically and most often is voluntary; however, the consent of involved sides to come to the negotiating table can be likewise obtained under ‘pressure’ from a third side, mediator, or the international community in form of certain regional organization, protective power, etc. 6.2. Pre-negotiation institutions 6.2. Before we go forward to detailed analysis of negotiation process, it would be of further interest and for the sake of the subject matter of this book, to explain institutions, or processes that very often precede negotiations. These instruments also can be conducted on their own, without arriving to a negotiation process. These instruments often have a common name:conflict prevention activities. Preventive activities can be of nature of STRUCTIURAL or OPEARITVE prevention. Structural prevention deals with change or exerting influence on basic conditions, reasons and circumstances that could lead to conflicts, thus assisting involved states by means of different projects to get ready for integration into security and economic structures. The given assessment is that those structures would contribute to definite stabilization. On the other hand, operative prevention is a system of measures and activities that directly prevent appearance or escalation of a conflict. Such measures would include inter alia: freezing of financial assets owned by involved sides deposited in foreign banks; arms embargo; economic embargo; rapid response system in or around the conflict area; punishing involved sides for their irresponsible or intolerable conduct by sue of other effective sanctions; pressure towards creating institutions and procedures for negotiation; internationalization of conflict in international organizations and bodies and pressure from such aspect to reach agreement; etc. Briefly, preventive activities are aimed at prevention of development or conflict situation and its escalation to destructive proportions. This is done by means of direct pressure on such destructive conduct, its resources and development of so-called 73

super-ordinate goals intended for involved sides to enable them a way out without losing own dignity and feeling defeated. In context of the predominant character of preventive activities, such activities could be: political (diplomatic, including coercive diplomacy as well); expert (analytical and data and information gathering); and legal.88 - Preventive diplomacy Preventive diplomacy is non-coercive collection or set of diplomatic actions aimed at localizing a dispute or conflict before reaching level or proportions of wider confrontations, and attempt to guide involved sides towards dialog and agreement. Preventive diplomacy has been promoted as special set of actions since 1960s by the UN (Michale Lund, Dag Hammarksjold, 1960, UN; Thompson and Gutlove, 1994). We note that preventive diplomacy could be used in three situations: for conflict prevention – when efforts are aimed at prevention of outbreak of violence between involved sides regardless of reasons or sources of dispute; prevention of escalation of already existing conflict – when efforts are aimed at prevention of conflict expansion by additional means, in further or wider territory and additional actors; and post-conflict prevention – when efforts are aimed at preventing renewal of hostilities when an agreement has been already reached and its implementation has started.89 Like all other diplomatic measures, this also needs to be supported by coercive diplomacy or diplomacy of threats as its ‘background’ in order to demonstrate real-life efficiency and effectiveness. The UN and EU engagements in the Balkans by means of such preventive diplomacy had clearly shown the need of such connection. - Early warning Terms that are used in context of conflict prevention or conflict management are numerous. Out of them, the following are more frequently seen: conflict control; conflict regulation; conflict resolution. Terms that are used in the procedures of conflict management are: conflict avoidance; conflict prevention; conflict settlement; conflict solving (conflict resolution, conflict solution – in context not of a final act, but in context of a series of actions). 89 Cf. Breaking Cycles of Violence, cited work, p. 99. 88

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Early warning is complex activity of gathering, analyzing, and delivering information on and around a crisis region and involved sides in order to have preparation of well-founded diplomatic and other actions for conflict prevention. Intention of gathering data on involved sides and circumstances of a conflict lies in preparation of alarmed-based independent fact-finding and identification of crisis.90 It is considered that this institutions has been ‘devised’ in 1992 In the Report prepared by 28 member countries of the so-called Brant Commission. Contrary to intelligence services and their activities of similar type, early warnings motivated by universal humanitarian, and not by national interests. Some authors distinguish conflict early warning (CEW), from humanitarian nearly warning (HEW). The latter is concentrated on warning factors that might lead to violence, and if a conflict has already emerged, concentrate on factors that lead to ceasefire, truce and protection of peace-keeping forces in the field. Therefore, contrary to national intelligence information, early warning is not focused on threats that appear for a certain country, but it is intended for improvement of conditions leading to effective conflict management. Early warning networks/constructions are built by independent information sources and analytical experts/centers that analyze, develop and interpret information – thus developing strategic scenarios in short-term, mid-term and long-term reports. Early warning needs to be made systematically and in ‘network’ of connection with other analytical centers and power centers, in order to develop a system of efficient exchange of information and all its parts to get chance to understand what goes on in other parts and segments. This in turn would help detect ‘the great picture’ of conflict factors, without taking in account only one of them. Most frequent problems facing this exceptionally important operation of early warning (EW) are of the following type: - drowned or overwhelmed information. Supply of excessive less important or even unimportant information, so the main point gets lost and basic threat cannot be noticed; - information crushed by other crises or false crises or alarms. This makes real threat less visible or even almost unnoticeable; this is usually described by the anecdote of bear hunting when hunters get ‘dazed’ or attracted by different, smaller, unimportant animals that 90

Klaas Van Walraven,

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come out of the bushes or cross the path of the hunters, and finally the hunters lose track of the bear); - information dead-ending; this usually happens when relevant pieces of information get into the hands of irrelevant decision-makers and so there is no effect or even feedback of what has been done with such information. All of the aforementioned point to the conclusion that early warning is very important analytical operation; as such, it is basis of every serious diplomatic action, humanitarian military action, or other preventive operation, international monitoring or so-called peacekeeping, peace-making process. - Facilitation Facilitation, facilitators, assistance, assistant – all of these in conflict resolution mean: a process undertaken by a third side, country(-ies) involving political and expert assistance to involved sides to reach mutually acceptable solutions. Assisting in conflict resolution process is less ambitious and with less pressure inspired diplomatic activity then mediation is. - Mediation Mediation is international law institution involving peaceful conflict resolution by a which a third side helps involved sides to come to terms in order to solve given conflict. In principle mediators do not create solution that is afterwards imposed to involved sides; on the other hand, mediators are more engaged in assisting involved sides to come to such solution by themselves. However, given the very fact that mediators as such indeed have the right to propose solutions to be given for further consideration to involved sides, and also given the fact that a mediator is very often an authoritative side that has influence on both sides in conflict, his proposal has enough weight of a pressure to be accepted. Such mediators, go-betweens, or intermediaries are chosen among senior politicians, and reputable diplomats from countries that have shown influence, strong integrity, experience and knowledge in given area. They should provide or secure an atmosphere where every involved side would feel respected, heard, and safe about its interests. 76

Mediators should be discreet, unbiased, and salient. However, mediators and mediation very often can represent ‘a conservative action’; this happens when a mediator takes the situation in the field and balance of power between involved sides as something for granted (often this could be a very unbalanced and unfair situation). Likewise, mediators could develop their own motive for such mediation process and this could have an impact on the conflict. Mediation includes its own paradox: in order to have successful mediation, a mediator needs to be strong and influential; however, this can be reflected by corresponding ‘underestimation’ of involved sides, putting them in the background and compromising them.91 - Arbitration Arbitration is application of legal norms in solving a dispute or part of it, along mediation activities. This is most easily done in accordance with arbitration rules and procedures (that are international law standard). - Reconciliation Reconciliation means a longer process of solving antagonisms that were basis of certain culture identity conflict Some authors call this institute ‘transforming’ (Lederach), or peacemaking (Curle). Usually this process covers three elements of the solution: emotional cognitive and behavioral. This chart (borrowed from C. R. Mitchel, cited work, p. 297) is effective in showing positioning of the best choice of a mediator in a given conflict, taking in due consideration the circumstances of his strength, influence, and impartiality: 91

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In its entirety, ‘reconciliation’ helps individuals and groups create ways and go through a process of own self-recognition and ‘healing’ by accepting ‘the other’ as equally worth. Reconciliation should ‘release’ victims of obsessive need to retaliate that also results in pain and suffering: to create a safe zone so that perpetrators of atrocities confess such crimes and discover all others who know them so that that whole truth about sufferings see the light of day, and when it is possible for such perpetrators to express regrets and repentenance; and finally, reconciliation should break the vicious circle of violence and mutual harm. Very often Desmond Tutu, the Archbishop of South Africa, is rightfully cited in context of the importance of reconciliation. He says that reconciliation is not some nebulous and symbolic politics; it is very pragmatic politics. Without forgiveness there is no future. It is good when this procedure also develops institutions of regular and lasting communications – interactions by individuals and groups whereby they are faced (in initial stages) with suffering they went through; later; such institutions can also serve for solving other possible conflict situations. Important element of reconciliation represents educational programs that ‘reconstruct’ history, collective memory of groups and make them learn it again together. This method again underlines importance of emotions in this type of conflicts. Emotions can sometimes play key role and understanding them has a role in the finish has well. 6.3. Diagnostic operation/situation 6.3. Let us go back to our major topic in this section – negotiation as strategy in conflict resolution.92 Connecting to the definition of negotiation as process, in the pre-negotiation phase such process starts with a DIAGNOSTIC situation/operation. Diagnostic situation means a pre-phase in pre-negotiation when involved sides, and mostly the third side, the arbiter or mediator, makes analysis which factors in the future negotiation process are most important, which factors have to be noticed in advance and to On the other hand, a conflict can be terminated in the following ways: with confirmation a victory by one involved side; with a long-term status quo, or with 'dying out' of such conflict; with acceptance of a defeat-capitulation; and with series of strategies for conflict settlement by means of negotiations. 92

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prepare himself for them, and which factors can be left to be developed during negotiation and then to take position and determine method or technique of approach. Certainly, it is most important for a mediator to understand – and for us it is also important as expert aspect of the analysis – that involved sides in negotiations, in order to enter all that process, must make three different DECISIONS conditioned by three different factors. The first one is to decide to have mutual negotiations; the second is about manner and topics of negotiations, concerning actually what negotiations would be all about; and the third is whether negotiated or agreed things wold be implemented or delivered in reality. Every decision depends on series of separate factors. Only by understanding this division and conditionally, we could be able to see all decisive factors of the process and to project a negotiation strategy and tactics. Key questions to be solved by negotiator/mediator in this diagnostic phase are: - Who, or what SIDE, or which faction as part of an involved side has capacity to make decision that shall be respected, and who has capacity to act (who controls the field and the people). This aspect deals with current situation in context of diving lines or balance of power between involved sides and internally, within involved sides that will sit on the negotiation table; - What effect's would be produced by individual ACTIONS undertaken by the mediator or by the involved sides before commencement of negotiations? This aspect deals with consequences of preparatory actions by the mediator, for example – making certain extremist wings of involved sides come to the negotiation table (whether negotiation would be stopped or would continue in such case; what needs to be done in such situation, etc.). This aspect also threats the question of an action undertaken in the meantime in the field and its consequence. Also the attitude of involved sides towards the question who and what kind of experts are to be engaged in the team of the mediator, etc.;

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- What are the main GOALS of negotiations In the concrete case: ceasefire; democratic consolidation; establishment of international norms in a given area, etc.; What the main RESOURCES for the negotiations, and vice versa are; the resources for the involved sides to continue the conflict. This aspect has shown to be very important for the successful outcome of negotiations, and even more as pressure on the resources of the involved sides thus blocking their ability to go on with the conflict; this in turn makes even higher chances for successful negotiations. - What the main OBSTACLES to successful negotiations are: for example, lack of information or early warning analysis; lack of means/resources; lack of interest and motivation with involved sides or with the international community to make pressure to terminate the conflict; lack of will to act, etc.; - What are THE RIPE MOMENTS for making a turnabout In the conflict towards negotiations; what are the windows of opportunity for intervention and making pressure to commence negotiations; - What are the prospects for IMPLEMENTATION of possible agreement to finish the negotiations; who would be guarantors of the implementation; what resources would be at disposal; what pace and what agreement for implementation would be offered; etc. - Diagnostic operation and analysis are part of PRENEGOTIATIONS or the pre-negotiation phase. They are intended:93 to prepare all elements in a given or limited time and space that would transform conflict conduct into negotiations. They especially concentrate on creation of opportunities for informal mutual ‘recognition of involved sides’ as side that are legitimate to negotiate; their informal meetings are organized; testing is made of the level of consent on certain key ideas to appear later at the negotiation table, etc. Pre-negotiations can supply political leaders of involved sides in a conflict with certain essential information around the conflict, how that conflict is seen from the outside, from important international power centers. During pre-negotiations, political leaders can test the 93

See in: Karin Aggestam , Enhancing Ripness , cited work , pp. 271-292.

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potential validity or acceptance of the so- called trial balloons of ideas and solutions. Pre-negotiations can also be transformed into a so-called twotrack diplomacy. Namely, even after start of formal negotiations when pre-negotiations should end as such, a parallel line of check and contacts between involved sides and mediator may still be maintained that would not have same weight as that of formal proposals and negotiations; this would serve to check acceptability of some solutions that would appear later on the negotiation table. Such ‘two-track diplomacy’ is also a form of pressure for constructiveness of involved sides in negotiations, and a technique for avoiding proposals unacceptable to some involved side, thus blocking the negotiation process. Speaking about pre-negotiations, again one can see the importance of the role of third sides, mediators and intermediaries, in cultivation of that ripe moment that opens a negotiation process, for technique in approaching involved sides, taking in account their specific and cognitive, perceptive viewpoints on a conflict and their own role in it. 6.4. Classification of types of negotiations 6.4. Negotiations can be classified into several types: - DISTRIBUTIVE negotiations: these are negotiations that make distribution of existing power, control of the field and requests between involved sides, and between themselves by means of a draft final agreement – excluding anything new as content and topic to negotiations. Such negotiations are focused on what can be drawn out of existing situation and are framed in the effort to reach mutual compromise. The question raised by this type of negotiations is how to distribute the limited resources (distribution of ‘the booty’ or ‘the war trophy’); the basic element of these negotiations is how one side can present the other as narrow choice as possible (to the limit of ‘take or leave’ – a fait accompli). This type of negotiations tries to NORMALIZE a conflict situation by means of an agreement and very often is the first part of a longer negotiations process. Such arrangement tries to implement a ceasefire or some kind of cessation of open hostilities, of violent 81

strategies. However, this could remain only on solutions of this type of negotiations. Distributive negations have point of departure in the assumption that a given conflict is ‘zero-sum game’ and distribution is always a gain by one side at the expense of the other, and vice-versa. Such type of negotiations, basically, were the Dayton Process and the Dayton Agreement; probably the first part of the negotiations on decentralization (i.e., territorial division) of Kosovo would be of this type. - INTEGRATIVE negotiations: they are such form of negotiations where in course of negotiating there is increase in alternatives of solutions (‘the cake’ to be divided between the involved sides is made bigger and bigger); a so-called creative approach is used in solving problems. Namely, negotiators on their own or a mediator try to increase the benefits that are at disposal to involved sides; they try to add new sectors and topics for discussion and possible new objects for distribution and cooperation. Such negotiations have their point of departure that enlargement ‘of the cake to be divided’ increase options for successful solution since now involved sides have more room for maneuvering – make compromise in one area and then have compensation in another. Mention is also made in this context of post-conflict arrangements also being part of ‘the cake’, originally part of the agreement implementation phase; nevertheless, they can be offered to involved sides even in course of negotiations as compensation for made compromises. Elements of this involve very often packages such as economic and financial assistance, integration in wider security and economic integrative processes, and membership or stable partnership in international organizations. This type of negotiations requires a partnership relationship from involved sides and a creative approach during negotiations, which cannot be always accomplished. In this type of negotiations, the skills of the third side come to the foreground to offer serious guarantees and sponsorship for successful implementation of what is offered. Two types of negotiations – distributive and interactive – certainly can be combined in order to have a better result. One of combination formulas is the so-called ‘Pareto optimal’ or ‘Pareto efficiency’ in the model of ‘zero-sum game’. This namely proves that 82

interrogative negotiations actually raise chances of successful distributive outcomes.94 For example, Druckman (1999) cites 16 aspects through which negotiations can be monitored and relate to such categories as: involved sides; topics; process; conditions; or successful outcome of these. According to the manner of conducting negotiations, authors classify them negotiations modeled in sequences (Douglas, Zartrman, Gulliver, Pruitt, Druckman…), or negotiations in cyclical model (Coddington, Snyder and Diesing, Cross…). Both approaches have central point in locating the turning point during negotiations, after which the process turns towards finding solution and way out. Similar basis for classification of negotiations, but with somewhat different names, are the following: negotiations on normalization and innovative negotiations; or, security and functional negotiations.95 6.5. Characteristics of identity negotiations 6.5. As we have underlined several times, negotiations assume their own specifics when we deal with groups that are in conflict and yet they differ and the conflict relates to their cultural identity. Similarly like in the literature on conflicts to date especially on the so-called ideological conflicts that were considered even more difficult than interest-related conflicts, identity conflicts make this difficult even deeper in context of their resolution. Group identity (‘We vs. They’) requires specific negotiation techniques and especially good choice and preparation of the third side that mediates. Most crucial problems in the pre-negotiation phase of such type of negotiations that need to be resolved and faced are: identification of involved sides; attracting them to come to negotiations; offering an outcome that should seem attractive and serious to them; and finally involved sides should be convinced in productive outcome, in finding For this, see: Guy Oliver, Deadlocks in Negotiation Dynamics, in Escalation and Negotiation.. .. (ed), W. Zartman, G. Oliver, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 23-53 . 95 For this, see also in: International Negotiation , A Journal of Theory and Practice, 7/3, 2002 The Hague-London, pp. 332, 380. 94

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solutions that should oppose risk of compromization, wasted time and positions. * * * Perhaps the key moment in negotiations is choice of sides that would be legitimate negotiators. This is called RECOGNITION of the sides that will site on the negotiation table. A real drama can be opened on this question. A mediator should commence this operation by the method: ‘what is seen’, what is striking in a conflict. Namely, to make choice out of those actors who are active in the field and represent a factor in a conflict, and presumably would be present as such at its denouement. This is the part dealing with the major or mostly involved actors in a conflict. However, a mediator should also define the so-called grass-root actors. Namely this can include the target groups of people where a conflict takes place – people who are potential victims, passive actors or semi-active factors in a conflict and yet they would be important in the implementation of a conflict agreement in the field when that agreement would be reached. A mediator should create an atmosphere of mutual acceptance of opposed sides (recognition of involved sides) and to make consideration of possible conditioning of negotiations start. In doing so, a mediator should assess whether conditions raised for negotiations start are only ‘saving one’s honor and dignity’, a rhetorical figure of speech intended for supporters and backers of one involved side, for international media, etc., or nevertheless these conditions are essential to genuine interests of involved sides. Most important operation in this regard is overcoming ‘the syndrome of weakling’. Namely sometimes involved actors/sides in a conflict although prepared to start negotiations are not able to do it formally because they are afraid that such gesture would be interpreted by the other sides as manifestation of weakness, thus hurting own position even before the start of negotiations. Proposal for negotiations, understood as weakness of the side stating it, could even cause increase military actions by the other side and represent a reason for conflict escalation. 84

Hence the question is which side would propose negotiations. The paradox of warring sides says this is not a simple job to do, because of creates perception of weakness, defeat, or futile attempts to avoid defeat; so involved sides are often reluctant to show this. Therefore they might even go on with such conflict, although they are objectively prepared for that. In case of this type, the proposal made by the third side/mediator represents the key in obtaining consent to start negotiations. This could even be the key to unlock the deadlock: which side will be the one making proposals for negotiations. Such negotiations proposal could be reinforced by explaining the position of the international community on the said conflict and and impossibility of both sides to gain advantage by military means. Such explanation given by a serious mediator can be used by any involved side to convince its extremist wings why such negotiations should be accepted. Briefly, a negotiations proposal made by a serous mediator can be a way out for every involved side to commence negotiations without showing any signs of weakness’ i.e., to solve ‘the syndrome of weakling’. Actually this type of assessment of the ripeness of starting negotiations or of the genuine THRESHOLDS of pushing in making compromises and protection of interests of involved sides must be done by a mediator in all phases of a negotiation process. They create maneuvering space for a mediator to make pressure towards compromise and outcome. Next operation of similar kind as the previous one that a mediator must constantly make is called finding the MCL – maximum level of concession with involved sides. This is a very delicate and brave assessment of what are true and false threshold of inflexibility of involved sides. Namely, this is the level or moment after which an involved side supposedly is not ready any more to continue conceding and negotiating, a thing publicly stated by such side. This position should be identified and differentiated from genuine thresholds of concession after which, if pressure continues, one of involved sides will retire from negotiations or would be cornered to accept (due to huge pressure) but eventually would get compromised and discredited and would not be able to deliver promises.

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A successful negotiator manages ‘to play’ and come close to a compromise by maneuvering between false and genuine levels of concession by involved sides. * * * Special problem in choosing actors who will negotiate is introduction in negotiations of so-called EXTREMIST OPTIONS or extremist wings of involved sides.96 This is at the same time a need and problem. It represents a need because it raises conditions for success that we would list afterwards. On the other hand, this could be problem at the very outset for this reason: negotiations as such can be made feasible by moderate, reasonable and political wings, as opposed to resistance by extremist and military wings. And then suddenly such extremists are ‘rewarded’ by being included in negotiations. This can insult and be politically harmful to moderate, reasonable options because their moderateness is not rewarded or appreciated, at least not adequately, while use of force by extremists and their obstructions to that moment suddenly are rewarded by being included in negotiations. Hence moderate wings raise the question: what is then motivation to be ‘moderate’? This question could be very dangerous for negotiation process. This operation is risky and can end up by moderate forces leaving negotiations. At the same time, after making assessment of such risk, a mediator considers inviting extremists to negotiations; this is undoubtedly useful for the following reasons: chances for successful outcome become higher because all possible options for obstruction of negotiations are included in these negotiations and are not left outside, to be destructive for the result. Finally, all options about demand making are closed; namely all important things are processed at the negotiation table. Paradoxically, but experience of history of negotiations often shows that extremists having already come to the negotiation table show themselves to be clearer and more prepared for a solution, thus enabling effective closing of a dispute. The power of groups as factor of their inclusion in given negotiations mostly depends on three cumulative factors: capacity for violence and disintegration of negotiations; size of a given group and organization; and connections and networks of allies of such groups and organizations. Cf. Dean G. Pruitt, Negotiation Theory and Development of Identity, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Virginia, USA, 2001. 96

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Analysis of their conduct at negotiations shows that ‘extremists’ know more clearly ‘what they want’, while moderates know better ‘what they do not want'. Hence, this creates or cements moderates in a conservative position that has no clear viewpoint about a positive list of solutions (since their political wing did not have any debate on this); on the other hand, the agenda of military, extremist wings is a list of clear demands and goals. They can be unacceptable at first sight, and yet extremists may be well ready to make compromises with them. If an essential part of their goals is realized, extremists could abandon the rest.97 ‘Extremist’ military wings at the same time have no or have less risk that someone more extremist than they are would assault them for making compromises or concessions in negotiations. The are, so to say, the last level after which there is no one to challenge the agreement. Anyhow, this question of internal split in one or both involved sides in a conflict is complex problem for a mediator who has to consider it in phase of making choice of negotiation sides.98 Usual recommendation for a mediator is ‘to wait’ for different parts of one involved side to reach a minimal joint position and then to appoint their joint representatives. However, when this is seemingly impossible or takes took long, then a mediator can open options of pressure and sub-mediation towards a provisional joint platform that would be modified or strengthened depending on the course of negotiations. Then we come to the next problem for a mediator in negotiations: to secure equal negotiating position for opposing sides. He has to see negotiations as debate between equal sides. However such ideal is sometimes very hard to achieve. Actors can have different power or influence, as an aggregate of several capacities (ability to mobilize violence and destroy a negotiation process, control of the field in context of people and territory, as well as support from international factors and allies), that are difficult to equalize with Similarly, see also in: C. Mitchell and Michael Banks, Conflict Resolution, cited work, p. 34 . The extremist wings of NLA and their leader Ali Ahmeti were not directly present on the negotiation table during the negotiations on the Ohrid Framework Agreement, following the 2001 conflict in the Republic of Macedonia; however it is be noted here that NLA was constantly 'consulted' and represented by the involved foreign mediators. On the other hand, direct negotiators and signatories of the Agreement were the official political parties of the Albanians in Macedonia; and yet, the demands of the extremist military wings were also 'introduced' in this manner in the negotiations. The end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict could be, however paradoxical it might seem, closer to a solution when Hamas from the Palestinian side and Ariel Sharon and Likud (previously in power) from the Israeli side definitely make decision to enter the peace negotiations in accordance with 'the road map'. 97 98

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formal activities on negotiation table. Mediators, because of that fact and own interest to be successful, very often have tendency to be rather conservative. Namely, this means to take the position in the field as the given position to be used as point of departure. However, this does not have to be in accordance with principles of legality or legitimacy in international law. Namely those who exercise actual control by use of force did not necessarily acquire it by lawful means; this does not have to mean that such people are fighting for legitimate goals either. This might result in an absurd position for a mediator who for the sake of being successful should be ‘unjust’ and should even legalize injustice and violence?! Certainly this ha been noticed as a problem. This is solved by taking in due consideration the circumstances of every specific mediation, in accordance with the general principles of the jus cogens norms of international law – i.e., in accordance with protected values; however it seems there is still much room for the realpolitik or for embedding positions of power from the field into such international frames. However, this needs additional asymmetrical pressure and designing negations position towards global legality of involved sides.99 For example, very often there is pressure on ’the government forces’ in order to enable formal equality of ‘the rebels’.100 One of possible process solutions for such imbalance in the power of involved sides in negotiations is to shift the debate towards common contributions, creativity, and inventiveness of the negotiations process and to defocus from fixation for power imbalance. A legitimate mediator/mediation cannot politically and lawfully 'legalize' a position of an involved side that, for example, commits ethnic cleansing or even a genocide; however, the position of EU and the USA towards the regime of Milosevic in Serbia, during the Conference on former Yugoslavia and the mediation of Lord Carrington relating to the dissolution of SFRY, was tolerated for a long time in spite of such atrocities in Croatia and in Bosnia, until the very moment when it was clearly seen that the Milosevic regime did not want at all any agreement on relatively peaceful dissolution of former Yugoslavia. Since that moment in 1992, the position of the international community changed and even turned against that regime. Had Milosevic accepted peace in 1992, it is very likely that no international war tribunal like the one in the Hague would have ever been established even for the atrocities committed previously. 100 Such was the case of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement in Macedonia. The international community exerted huge pressure on the Macedonian government security forces in the early phase of the conflict to restrain and not escalate the situation so that the conflict could be quickly modified on the negotiation table. At the same time, the international community 'transformed' its vocabulary and so 'transformed' the agenda of 'the Albanian bandits and criminals' (attributes used personally by the then NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson in early 2001, at the start of the provocations at the Macedonia-Kosovo border) from ethno-nationalist and exclusive into an agenda of minority rights. As such, it was acceptable for international mediation that resulted in the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. 99

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* * * Let us note here that the choice of ‘the third side’, mediator, intermediary, or a go-between, is very important, sometimes even very crucial for the negotiation process. In case of identity conflicts, this is very often a central operation making other things dependent. A mediator ideally should have an aggregate sum of several important features, or predisposition for successful mediation. The first group among them involves: personal credibility and integrity (a.k.a. in literature as salience) together with the political experience and potentials in this type of diplomacy make up the socalled subjective nucleus of characteristics. The second group of characteristics is ‘background support’, contained in the position of states or international organizations in the name of which a mediator acts upon. This factor has decisive importance for the political capacity for pressure and convincing the actors in all stages of the negotiating process and exceptional importance for the agreement implementation. The third factor is structural position of disinterest and impartiality of a mediator towards the distributed positions of conflict actors, combined at the same time with a strong motive and interest in seeing a given conflict be resolved. At the same time, two energies are shown: the one to be just and fair, and the one to show interest to stop violence and solve the conflict. An important element in such position, that was confirmed in series of experiences in mediation in identity conflict in Africa and former communist countries of Southeast Europe is that mediation is efficient if it its international support involves real-life and effective ‘coercive diplomacy’. Coercion, in case of supporting mediation, must be strictly guided by principles of international law implementation which defines: selectivity, proportionality, demonstration of used force, and intention of elimination of the unwanted practice and not causing extensive effects in interference of ‘the internal affairs’ of the state where such conflict has emerged. In a word, this is a clear political agenda that underlines the role of the international factors and expresses their stated will to solve the conflict in question and to have such military option. The mediator is often chosen from third parties that sides in a conflict have trust in or tradition of cooperation. 89

The mediator includes in the process of pre-negation and negations many of his skills and potentials (relating to sociological assessments, anthropology, international relations, history, etc.), and his experiences in making contacts. A mediator offers means of communications (provided involved sides do not have direct communications) and resources for this. A mediator should offer procedural solutions, draft measures and facilitatory analysis and operations. A mediator can supply conflict sides additional information they do not have or have not paid attention to. That is to say, he enables a process to reach solutions. A mediator provides political coverage and representativeness of the process in the international media. A successful mediator makes involved sides feel ‘safe and sound’, that nothing wood happen to them from behind their back and that their interests would be understood and respected. It is always wise and methodologically good for a mediator to reconsider his motives for participation in the negotiation process. This is intended for him to show and control his eventual own interests in a conflict and towards involved sides. Mediation, as we have said, has own paradox. Namely, in order to be effective, it should be directed by powerful and influential person; and yet in order be equally successful it should enable involved sides to implement their agreement and not to have a mediator imposing himself to the sides and so dominate the process. Mediation could be organized and monitored (provided involved sides agree on this) by a parallel secondary diplomatic track for ‘exercising the solution of individual questions – Diplomacy 2’. This diplomacy, by means of activities of lower diplomatic level, would examine certain solutions and models by means of the so-called decommiting formula. A mediator has important role in identity conflicts when everyone is stuck in situation when offered solutions in a given phase of the negotiation process are acceptable in principle to negotiators/involved sides; however, they are not prepared to accept them in public since they are afraid of the possible response to such acceptance that might be negative with their domestic public or with rival political options of the same side. There can be even a media reaction towards the negotiators being ‘traitors, compromisers, 90

incapable, etc.’ There can be even an outbreak of public protests and staging demonstrations or riots on such occasion. The mediator has a very important role in two directions in such moments: the first is to convince involved sides/signatories that offered solutions are indeed fair, standard, supported and confirmed by international law and practice and to calm down their ‘trembling hand’ which prevents them to sign the agreement. This is called ‘trembling hand syndrome’, when a hand of a signatory person trembles before affixing his own signature on a document. This not only happens because of weaknesses or ignorance of conflict actors about the type of solutions being offered, but also because of the character of the identity conflict that represents confrontation of values, history and signs, and not merely interests and solutions. Every side/signatory involved in such conflict asks himself whether he is really that subject who is entitled to historical right to finalize such request (for example, use of language, symbols, religious freedom, political participation ,etc.) in the name of its own people or group in a definite way in a given agreement? Maybe future generations would condemn the signatory and call him a traitor? In such moments ‘the hand starts trembling'. This is the description of circumstances of a situation that is frequent in identity negotiations in moments of finding agreements and solutions. The role of a mediator is decisive in this. He should reconcile such connection of offered solutions with history, mythology and ideology of the nation or of the ethnicity in question and to redirect the debate towards concrete solutions. He should present the solution as fair, good, or at least harmless to 'the cause’ of such group. In such given situation, a mediator shows his true position in relation to actors and his robustness to convince and make them adhere to the procedure. 101 Likewise, these are moments when a mediator also shows his position towards the media outlets that cover the negotiations, i.e., the manner that makes them part of negotiations. He should establish measures for constant briefing that are not counterproductive to the negotiations process and position of The negotiations on the 2001 Framework Agreement in Ohrid, in the Republic of Macedonia, were very characteristic in this context. The very strong and powerful team of international mediators (EU represented by Leotard, and the USA by Pardew) assumed the role of de facto representing the positions of the Albanian minority in Macedonia concerning the government positions. They were solving the frequent appearances of 'the trembling hand syndrome' with the Albanians on issues relating to the use of their language or the university instruction in Albanian language; they did this vis-a-vis the Macedonians on issues relating to the unitary character of the state and use of the Albanian language in the national parliament. 101

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negotiators; however he should also meet the justified expectations for information from media outlets that cover the negotiations. He should even go further: create opinion and suggest viewpoint that would assist the negotiations. As the position of the media and the picture they create about the negations become of constitutive meaning for manipulation or assistance to the negotiators, and the international community and its public opinion, then the relationship towards the media is not secondary but a crucial part of the negotiations process. 102 The mediator should also establish contact with the domestic groups that oppose the negotiators, to try to keep them informed, to ‘get them involved’ in manner that underlines the importance, and international interest in solving the conflict and warns them of the consequences in making irresponsible manipulation with the negotiations for narrow, partisan interests. Finally, the position of mediator can also involve elements of coercion (most often informal). A strong position of the mediator enables him to make informal but efficient threats for failing to deliver promises and failing to observe procedures. Such position can make failing to observe procedures politically costly and unattractive as option for eventual obstruction.

6.6. Negotiations process and techniques 6.6. The negotiations in identity conflicts are conducted at several levels simultaneously and among several entities of which all are not formal negotiators. Inter alia, this fact accounts for their complexity and high politicization. The first level is negotiation between the formal participants, i.e. the negotiating parties represented by their diplomats. The second level constitutes of informal ‘negotiations’ between the represented political actors and those that are not represented In this context one could follow the intensity of interference by the European countries, for instance, in the Bosnian conflict, during the process of dissolution of former Yugoslavia, directly depending on the attitude of the European general public towards the images from the battleground broadcast by the European media outlets and present every night in homes of the European viewers. 102

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and are an opposition to the negotiating party (in the same bloc). The third level is between the represented political actors and their voters or the political public they represent. Graphically, it would look thus:

In this respect and on account of this complexity, the negotiation process in identity conflicts demonstrates additional fluctuation and has an upward-downward line at all levels simultaneously: at the formal triangular structure (parties-mediator) and, in certain manner, vertically, between the various informal ‘participants’. 93

Nevertheless, the one that dominates and that sets topics is the formal line of negotiation, but even it may sometimes give in before media interpretations or political discussions on the line negotiating party-political party-the public.103 Experience has confirmed that if there is greater connection and trust between the negotiators and their own bases, agreements are more easily reached and their implementation is more stable. Furthermore, in view of the referred relation, the mediator is recommended to bring to the negotiating table the whole variety of parties and movements of the negotiating parties, thus creating condition for making the negotiation, though more complex, more stable, unchallenged, and the outcome implemented.104 - Negotiations start Technically, the negotiations start by informing the negotiating parties about the time, the venue, and the formal participants. Additionally, a draft agenda of the negotiation is distributed on scheduled dates and potentially a series of working information and ‘non-papers’ for certain transitional technical negotiations. The manner of distributing the invitations for start of negotiations is not considered significant for detailed discussion, although in literature attention is paid to the formal procedure of their delivery. What is important is that the principle of equality of the parties implies equal procedural approach in this act, as well. The negotiations start with a stage of welcoming the participants by the mediator or the host of the negotiation and of expressing conviction that the procedures will be conducted in fair, informal, confident manner and that they will lead to the root of the problem (directly). At this stage, the participants and the experts are introduced (by the actors and the mediator), as well as the provisional agenda for start of bargaining.105 For that reason, sometimes a soft or strict isolation of the negotiators is preferred to, as was the case with Camp David, during the negotiations on Bosnia, or at the second stage of the negotiations for the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. 104 For this reason, in the negotiations on the status of Kosovo between Serbia and the representatives of Kosovo Albanians, the international community endeavors that the party of the ‘Kosovars’ represent all of their relevant political entities. 105 In more formal negotiations, the participants exchange letters of authorization, which are archived by the mediator together with his or her own accreditation and by which they are 103

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The second stage starts when the mediator gives the floor to the parties to present their views on the problem and its sources, as well as their views on the main obstacle to its resolution. This stage can last two or three days and sometimes even more if the parties rejoin the views of the other party or delay the process from entering the subsequent stages for tactical reasons. The third stage is an invitation by the mediator to the parties to present their positions on resolving the conflict in the form of draft resolution with consequences. This stage is principal, potentially very tense, and full of reversals, standstills, and euphoria. The major proposals and counter-proposals, possible resolutions or interruptions occur at this stage. In addition, it is the first time at the negotiating table that the actors realize the dimensions of the demands and the viewpoint of the other party. In case they are ‘unacceptable’, the party faces a stark choice of breaking off the negotiations and resume the conflict as before or present their counter-proposals and resume the negotiations in order to change the military course of the events. When such dilemmas arise, the active role of the mediator and his capability to assess the MLC (maximum level of concessions) of each party are of great importance, as they enable him to press and convince the parties to resume the negotiations. Negotiating should not be expected to be an easy or enjoyable process in which the parties develop friendship and reach joint decisions in relaxed manner. In fact, it is precisely the opposite, but it is important for the mediator to always bear in mind the need for the negotiators to go through this procedural process and to maintain firm control of the agenda of the process at all times. The parties need to be aware of the fact that, in spite of the unpleasantness and the clashes, this process does lead somewhere and that it is not a waste of time, energy, and credibility. It is also important that at this stage of explication be pointed out what the mediator cannot expect from the parties, i.e. the actors, and what the negotiations are not. That is, it cannot be expected that the actors change their positions and main interests in the course of the negotiations. Such occurrences may happen at intellectual sessions, such as brainstorming or brain washing sessions, but not at provided with the capacity to negotiate and mediate in the conflict, respectively.

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negotiations. Negotiations should be conducted with the expectation that the positions of the parties, while not changing in their essence, will agree with each other, will be set at the level of realism and that the parties will endeavor to make the best for their interests from that position into a mutually acceptable resolution. At the final part of this stage, a sub-stage, as it might be said, is reached in which the vital hot points that constitute the basic dispute about the final resolution are identified from the plethora of contentious issues. In the remaining part of the negotiations, the actors and the mediator focus on their resolution. Usually, in the later stages of the negotiations the mediator must take into consideration the ‘inclusion’ in the process of the socalled ‘grass roots’ of the conflict, i.e. the people from the area where the conflict takes place, the people who are its victims, who ‘pay’ the highest price for its occurrence and who are important for the realization of the agreement for its resolution. Technically, negotiations are usually conducted in sessions of six hours a day at the most, three hours in the morning and three in the afternoon. Occasionally, when the isolation of and the pressure on the particularly antagonized parties from the international community is great, the schedule can be a means for increasing the pressure and for an idiosyncratic ‘exhaustion’ of the parties, with frequent informal meetings and discussions for resolutions.106 The optimal number of negotiators together with the mediator around the negotiating table, according to certain experiences in this area, is up to twelve people (four from each party and four from the side of the mediator). Strictly speaking, negotiation techniques can be the following: - Face-to-face (tacit, bargaining) negotiations. This technique enables direct verbal or written discussion of the parties and their proposals. It implies reactions to the proposals The negotiations on Bosnia in Dayton are a characteristic example of application of this ‘technique’. 106

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and remarks of the other party, making this technique tense by definition. - Fragmentation of the negotiations. This technique implies such conduct of the negotiations where the whole of the dispute is fragmented into smaller parts or issues, which are approached and negotiated on separately. This technique is also called step-by-step approach. In this approach, at the beginning the minor issues or the issues on which the parties hold closest positions are selected.107 The rationale behind this technique is that it can be expected (and experience has confirmed) that the process will be stimulated by ‘small’ successes and agreements on minor issues at the beginning, thus enabling the process as a whole to gain momentum and movement. As a result of the potential initial agreement about the positions on minor issues, it is expected that the representatives of the parties will start addressing each other more freely, that some personal ‘chemistry’ will develop between the diplomats in light of the expectation that resolution and success will be achieved. All participants need these successes at the beginning. The fragmentation makes them possible on the condition that the topics for start of the negotiations are carefully selected, that a pragmatic approach is adopted and that ideological issues and values are avoided.108 - Technique of including so-called contingency clause. In the Ohrid negotiations in Macedonia in 2001, the first issues that were selected were the issues of ceasing the clashes, the position on the unity of the state (unitary principle), and later the contentious issues were approached: dimensions of the use of the languages of the minorities, police and army recruitment, and university level education. In the negotiations on the status of Kosovo (Ahtisaari, 2006-7), the levels of protection of the rights of the minorities and the issue of decentralization were approached first, followed by the major issue of the status and the form of independence of that entity. 108 Naturally, there are counter-examples, as are the negotiations for the status of Kosovo. In spite of the relative successes with the initial issues of decentralization (which were convenient for the Serbs), the Serbian party entirely rejected the final formula for ‘conditional independence of Kosovo’. Unsurprisingly, the diplomats and the analysts who are acquainted with the issue expected this as the ‘technique’ which the Serbs have applied ever since the regime of Milosevic for this type of negotiations (on issues they considered exclusively ‘theirs’): participation in the negotiations for anything which is of Serbian interest, but by the point of final resolution, which was always rejected on account of some ‘consistent’ positions, whether it was about the plan of Lord Carrington for peaceful dissolution of SFRY at the 1992 Hague Conference on former Yugoslavia, or about the negotiations for Kosovo. Only the Dayton negotiations were different because the situation on the field, the isolation of the negotiators and the strong pressure from the mediators prevented such maneuvers of the Serbs. 107

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This technique implies that the agreement includes a clause by which certain sections or even the entire agreement may be opened for revision after a certain period. This technique intends to incorporate an element of temporariness, impermanence in the agreements with hope that the parties will accept the agreement more readily. The starting point is the experience that the parties are ‘closed’ to accepting provisions that permanently resolve a certain issue. This increases their responsibility and causes the ‘trembling hand syndrome’, which is discussed above. It is possible that the pressure from the grass-root level and rival parties increases until it becomes intolerable to the negotiating party, resulting in its withdrawal from the negotiations. Such situations are countered with the inclusion of a contingency clause, which relieves, in a certain manner, the situation of an atmosphere of ‘fatality’, of once and forever made decisions, and provides a possibility for the parties to address certain issues or the entire agreement, after the period envisaged by the clause, on their own initiative or through the mediator.109 - Shuttle diplomacy Technique of so-called shuttle diplomacy. This technique implies robust and strong role of the third party – the mediator in the negotiations. It exerts active and strong pressure on the parties to reach an agreement by submitting series of proposals, insisting on regular contacts and persisting that the parties present their views on the proposals, thus progressing one step at a time. This may be combined, at a certain point ('the ripe moment' of the negotiation process), with a proposal of a package of overall resolution to the dispute by the mediator and renewed pressure on the parties to accept the package on the grounds of ‘take it or leave it’, without negotiations for the details of the package. This technique can be combined with temporary isolation of the negotiating parties at a suitable site for conducting negotiations and with strong safeguards for the parties if they accept the agreement. This technique implies a powerful third party, which possesses Such clause is included in the Accord regarding the name dispute between Macedonia and Greece and it envisages a period of 7 years; such clause, which envisages a period of 10 years, was included in the last proposal of the mediator M. Nimitz for compromise on the resolution of the dispute submitted in 2006. 109

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instruments for coercive diplomacy or diplomacy of coercion and capacity to offer safeguards and rewards for constructiveness.110 - Bypassing Bypassing, or circumventing, is a technique with which when the negotiators or the mediator encounter an issue which is particularly complex and conflicting for the actors or when they anticipate that a certain issue is such before it is put forward for discussion, they suggest, formally or informally, that it be bypassed (postponed) or resolved by means of bypassing resolutions or proposals. For example, if they encounter the issue of territorial demarcation of a certain disputed area, they can propose to postpone its resolution, and in the meantime a referendum of the local population conducted under international monitoring or a similar measure that will determine the future demarcation of the dispute area can be agreed. In similar manner, for the issues of the overall constitutional, status position of an entity, the direct denomination of the status can be bypassed by listing a series of prerogatives. Occasionally, although non-ambiguity of agreements is recommended, keeping the resolutions ambiguous and subject to different interpretations is a necessity that can provide an answer to or way out from critically conflicting stages. This approach takes into consideration that a period of time under close international monitoring will facilitate the explanation and clarification of the issue resolutions in the agreement, which have been left ambiguous or have been bypassed. The risk of this approach is, naturally, that the ambiguous or bypassed resolutions can be permanent source of disagreement and new conflicts. However, basically the break-out of new conflicts or renewal of old hostilities primarily do not depend on the ambiguity of resolution but in the general climate and will to settle or resume the conflict (by the actors) and on the power and authority of the international mediators. The latter should press for ending the conflict and prepare a plan for implementation that will engage and duly reward the constructive actors. Thus, the motives for renewal of the disputed ambiguous parts will diminish and disappear.

Classic examples for this method are the Oslo talks between the Palestinians and the Israelis, Dayton, the Ohrid Agreement in its second stage. 110

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- ‘Double interpretation’ Technique of leaving intentional ‘double interpretation’, different reading, or interpretation of certain provisions of the agreement. This technique provides for deliberately leaving certain parts or provisions of the agreement open to partial different interpretation by each actor. With this technique, rather than bypassing the disputed issue is legally resolved but the resolution is later interpreted differently and each party can present it according to their political needs and their voters. For example, the same provisions for the status of the municipalities in a given entity whose structure is negotiated can be interpreted by one party only as decentralization, while the other party can interpret them as special status of the municipalities similar to cantonization or cultural autonomy. This allows the actors to present the same provisions as ‘their success’ in the negotiations. This can be useful, especially in the part of the negotiations called ‘marketing of the agreement’. Naturally, the scope of the different interpretations must not reach a level of different legal interpretation of the provision concerned, which is guaranteed by the mediators and their experts.111 - 'Logrolling' 'Logrolling' (tit-for-tat) or trade-off. This technique of exchange of concessions is based on the endeavor to trade one concession of one party with a similar one of the other party. This can be accomplished within one topic or for a concession from a different area of the whole of the dispute. It is important that the parties have a feeling of fair ‘exchange’, which would enable the agreement to ‘live’. The restraining framework of this exchange, which largely depends on the will of the parties and feeling of balance, lies in what is called ‘international standards in the area’. The mediator should be An illustrative example for this is the provisions for the use of the languages of the ethnic communities of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement in Macedonia. There, the same provisions, later regulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia on basis of this Agreement, allow for the Macedonians to define the use as restrictive and classified-by-name official use of another language beside the official Macedonian language (which is exclusively used in international relations), and whereas the Albanians can interpret the same provision (Article 7 of the Constitution) as ‘official use of the Albanian language'. Such solution is applied in the document on Kosovo proposed by the mediator Ahtisaari, where the Albanians interpret the status of the Serbian municipalities only as expanded decentralization, while the Serbs interpret it as de facto cantonization, special autonomy, asymmetric decentralization etc (in order to avoid partition of Kosovo). 111

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fully acquainted with the situation of the international norms and standards as well as the international practice in the area and be fully aware and responsible when proposing resolutions by exchange of concessions that they comply with the standards. The reason for this is that the set ‘breakthroughs’ can cause negative reactions from the international community when the agreement is published because they provide unwelcome precedent that could be used in other similar conflicts. Such overcoming exchanges can cause a reaction of additional withdrawal of the parties when the negotiating process settles down and when they see from distance what they have accepted and where it leads them.

6.7. PROBLEMS or OBSTACLES during the negotiations - Re-entry problem; - Impasse, deadlock; - 'Trembling hand syndrome' There are numerous problems, which can arise in the course of the negotiations. Naturally, they depend on the difficulties related to the basic matter of negotiation, but some of them can be classified into ‘typical’ obstacles or problems that occur as ‘regularity’ in different stages of the negotiations. Some of them are: - Re-addressing an already resolved issue ( re-entry problem); - Impasse, deadlock, standstill, blockade; - Trembling hand syndrome, or hesitation, uncertainty and lack of readiness to take responsibility for signing the agreement or a crucial resolution. Practically, all of the above-mentioned have been explained in the context of situations in the course of the negotiation process but the situation of deadlock or impasse will be discussed further since it is frequent, has several dimensions, and poses a number of dilemmas, especially to the mediator in the negotiations. According to a series of definitions, the deadlock or impasse is a situation in the negotiations when the two parties (or at least one of them) exhaust all possibilities for further leniencies and concessions, still maintaining considerable differences in the positions from the 101

other party. In such situation, it seems that further bringing closer of the positions of the parties is not possible and the negotiations come to a standstill.112 Therefore, impasse is a standstill in the dynamics of making concessions and reaching compromises in the negotiation process. It should be distinguished from the similar term ‘stalemate’, i.e. status quo, which is defined as standstill in the dynamics of the conflict on the field where military clashes take place. In a situation of a deadlock, each party realizes its own limitations to the demands of the other party and reacts to them. The deadlock is a situation in which the process of making concessions is strained to its limits. It is then that the parties and the mediator realize the true dimensions of the opposing interests and positions.113 According to some conflict resolution authors, the deadlock is a predictable and useful part of the negotiations when the negotiators realize the true dimensions of the different interests and test the actual limits of the mutual leniencies. Only in these situations can the mediator realize the actual MLC (maximum level of concessions) of the two opposing parties. Without deadlock, according to these views, the negotiations are not ‘real’ and the parties have not explored the absolute limits of neither themselves nor the other party.114 For the purpose of breaking the deadlock with new dynamics of resolutions. The use of deadlock by the parties as tactical means should be distinguished from the ‘real’ deadlock, where they are actually facing a dilemma about further concessions and as a consequence of which See also: Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts, W. Zartman, G. Olivier, pp 2632, quoted work. Unlike impasse, as standstill in negotiations, in the quoted work, G. Olivier distinguishes the situation of ‘stalemate’, which refers to the situation of status quo in military actions, i.e. impossibility for further escalation of the clashes. 113 The deadlock is recognized by a series of conspicuous actions by the parties, such as: the meetings are fruitless and the important issues are not discussed; the answers are complicated and vague and no serious conclusions area achieved; the same arguments are presented repeatedly while being indifferent to the ones of the other party; one of the parties states that it does not have mandate for further negotiations etc. Theory classifies the reasons for the deadlock into: cognitive, personal, contextual, structural, and process-behavioral. See Escalation and Negotiation ... op.cit., p.31. 114 According to G.O. Faure in the quoted work, the deadlock is a situation, which presumes equality of the parties from the aspect of division of power. Otherwise, without deadlock one of the parties can impose its will on the other party. p. 27. 112

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the negotiation process becomes paralyzed. One of the parties can construct, simulate a tactical deadlock if it considers that the negotiations progress ‘too fast’, that the parties do not have enough time to realize where the agreed resolutions lead them and that they need a break in order to evaluate all dimensions of the hitherto accepted agreements. There can also be reactions from the ‘bases’ of the parties that the negotiations are ‘suspicious’, or a media reaction for the harmfulness of the negotiations aimed negatively at the negotiating parties etc. In such cases, the parties may conclude that a tactical deadlock can be a temporary exit serving the purpose of gaining time and consolidating their positions. In situation of deadlock, the parties have several options for action: to withdraw from further negotiations; toughen their demands and positions; issue threats to the other party and submit new counter-demands; enter (track 2 diplomacy) subsidiary negotiations only with the mediator for braking the deadlock. The strategies for breaking the deadlock usually rely on the ability of the mediator, as well on a combination of contextual circumstances. Some of these strategies are the following: - Modification of the context of the problems that are negotiated, above all through creating a new agreement formula. It consists primarily of issue aggregation and inclusion of new information important for the negotiations, as well as adding new dimensions and possibilities for maneuvering aimed at breaking the deadlock. - Defocusing of the deadlock through the introduction of other ‘important’ issues for negotiation. Shift of the focal point, bypassing the deadlock issue. Creating new focal points that shift the process from its fixation for certain issues. This is performed together with the indication to the mutual loses of both sides from continuing the deadlock (mutually hurting stalemate, W. Zartman); - Increasing the external pressure from a powerful third party (one that supports the mediator, as well as another party, which has influence over the parties) and indicating the possibility of international isolation of the parties if the deadlock is not broken; - Indicating the devastating consequences to the interests of the parties from the prolongation of the deadlock and potential

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expansion of the crisis resulting in undesirable human and material loses. An important factor to the efficiency of these strategies is the cognitive aspect of the breaking the deadlock, which we shall call ‘saving face’. In other words, even when the parties are prepared to break the situation of deadlock, they may find themselves in a situation of not being able to ‘resume the negotiations’ without assistance from the mediator. They are worried not to leave an impression of weakness and hesitation, of yielding or bowing to the pressure from the other party or from outside.115 Therefore, even if they are prepared to break the deadlock, it will not take place unless a third party takes the initiative and presents an exit ‘platform’. In this situation, the breaking of the deadlock is conducted by the mediator via a combination of strategies. This is usually carried out with a technique of separate negotiations with each side and creating a NON-PAPER – an informal draft of possible resolutions by which the process is unlocked and progress is attained.

6.8 Summary of negotiation procedures in a case of negotiations, from the aspect of the mediator 6.8. This is a draft exercise illustrating an invented case of negotiations in a brief and condensed form. What would be the activities undertaken by the parties and by the mediator and the dynamics of the process as a whole? The mediator in the negotiations, selected in accordance with a proposed system (see diagram on corresponding page) from a ‘third party’, which is politically and diplomatically powerful, and influential with the conflict actors, but at the same time personally uninterested and neutral, i.e. which is a sufficiently respectable mediator with experience in the field, starts the pre-negotiations. Initially, the mediator needs to convince the actors that the negotiations will be successful (that they will not bring them incrimination) and that their postponement poses risk. According to Lockett M, Culture and Problem of Chinese Management, Organizations, Studies, 1988, pp. 474-495. In societies with predominant group-oriented culture, the informal social credit which is received with actions of ‘preserving, saving and losing honor’ is of vital importance. 115

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Then, the mediator needs to approach the key operation of identifying the negotiating PARTIES from the numerous actors involved in the conflict. The most important question at this stage is to compose a single negotiating party from the political and the radical military wings and actors of each conflict party. This can pose a particularly difficult problem since, as we have mentioned, the political wings may feel ‘punished’ for their moderation with the act of bringing radical wings to the same negotiating side. On the other hand, the radical wings are pushed to compromise by the same act of sitting to negotiate (with the ‘enemy’), which is good and important for the mediator. At the same time, this is also important for the mediator from the aspect of having all options from each side around the same negotiating table. The mediator needs to be especially convincing in order to compose a single negotiating party from such different and sometimes warring actors on one side of the table. The mediator will possibly not be able to assemble a single negotiating team from such actors, but then he needs make a decision which of the actors will be defined as a party and which will be maintained in the gravitation of the negotiation process, being regularly informed and consulted, in an informal position of ‘shadow actor’. This control and consultation serves the purpose of ensuring that the negotiation process significantly represents all options and that the agreement will not be threatened eventually by someone that was not included in the process. Subsequently, the mediator must decide which of the so-called grass-roots actors – the population in whose territory the conflict takes place and who are essentially its greatest victims – will be included in the process and at which stage. Finally, the mediator must carefully choose his expert support. The experts assist the mediator, especially in drafting resolutions and the legal outline of the agreement. The role of the experts and the mediator in proposing resolutions is particularly important as it creates a matrix for the concrete and a precedent for future resolution of similar conflicts. Therefore, the experts must be well acquainted with the international standards in the field together with the traditions and the balance of forces in the dispute in question.

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Upon assembling negotiating parties and expert support, the mediator enters the nest stage of defining the procedure for conducting the process. Usually, the work should be divided into ‘plenary’ meeting sessions – all actors at one meeting – working (face-to-face) meetings with each side. The optimal timing is usually two separate sessions of three hours every day. The mediator must maintain control of the agenda at each stage of the process. If it is not possible to fully control the topics imposed in the course of the negotiation, the mediator should be able to set the angle from which they are approached. At the initial ‘plenary’, the meeting attended by both parties in full composition, the experts and the mediator, the latter opens the negotiations by welcoming the parties and the actors. Afterward, the parties are given the floor to present their own views on the essence of the dispute and its possible resolutions. The control of the agenda at this stage primarily refers to the potential aggravation of tone between the parties since this may well be the first occasion they directly face the viewpoint, argumentation, and demands of the other party. Historical digressions and rhetoric for historical justice and injustice between the parties are fairly common. Without violating the right to presentation, the mediator should lead this part of the discussion towards effective conclusion without considerable aggravation of the atmosphere.116 In the continuation of the negotiations, the mediator holds meetings with each party and opens the stage of actual proposals for resolution of parts of the dispute by a non-paper prepared in cooperation with the experts. At this stage, the approaches of addressing the minor issues prior to the major ones are used: ‘step by step’ and ‘bypassing’ of specifically difficult issues, breaking impasses, setting focal points There is an entire series of studies dedicated to the interpretation of gestures in negotiations both of the parties and the mediator. For our purposes, this aspect is less interesting, but for those who might be interested follows a list of related literature: Charles B. Craver, Effective Legal Negotiation and Settlement, Michie Co. Virginia, 1986; Cuff and Villere, Games Negotiators Play, Business Horizons 70, 1976; H. Cohen, You Can Negotiate Anything, Lyle Stuart 1980; D. Drukman, Negotiations, Sage, 1977; C. Karrass, The Negotiating Game, Crowell, 1970; E. Levin, Negotiating Tactics, Fawcett, 1980; Lowental, A General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy and Behavior, Kansas Law Review, 69, 1982; G. Nierenberg, The Art of Negotiation, Cornerstone, 1968; A. Rich, Interracial Communication, Harper and Row 1974; Rubin J. and Brown B. The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation, Academic Press, 1975 etc. 116

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etc., all for the purpose of attaining initial, small but successful breakthroughs.117 If the negotiations on parts of the dispute are successful and if consent is reached on the resolutions proposed in the non-papers, the mediator should endeavor to coordinate and strengthen the resolutions at a plenary meeting by formal consent and ‘draft’ agreement. A major problem that should be avoided at this stage is readdressing issues whose resolutions have been coordinated. The mediator needs to maintain the pace of the negotiations by the so-called ‘bicycle theory’ of regular proposals and counterproposals, offering advantages and requesting concessions from both parties alternatively. When an agreement, which should keep the parties in form by the final signing, is reached, the agreement is actively ‘marketed’ as a particularly successful outcome of the constructiveness of all actors involved in the negotiation. In agreement with the parties, the mediator should undertake the presentation of the negotiation to the media. Maintaining elements of ‘secrecy’ in the part of resolutions, which are agreed on with the parties, the mediator should present the spirit of constructiveness and support for the negotiations. The mediator should naturally undertake the holding of regular briefings and indirect consultations with the conflict actors that are not at the negotiating table. Finally, at a particular stage of the negotiations the mediator involves the grass-roots actors, the representatives of the population that suffers most from the conflict. Their participation is especially important at the final stage of the negotiations, when the compensations for suffered consequences and the implementation of the agreement are discussed.

The general form of the ‘non-paper’ is actually an unofficial document in which a resolution is drafted. This form does not bring reaction by the potentially unsatisfied party as it is unofficial and can be withdrawn as if it never existed; but it is a good instrument to explore and define a possible resolution that can afterward be officially proposed. 117

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6.9.

IMPLEMENTATION of the agreement

6.9. The implementation of the agreement is the final stage of the process of conflict negotiation and settlement. This stage is of interest to us not only as a special stage of the negotiations by itself, in all details, but from the aspect of its retroactive influence on the previous negotiation stages. This is performed primarily through the continuation of the role of the mediator, the third party, the guarantors as a kind of ‘appeal instance’ if the agreement is not implemented as agreed; or through the importance of the implementation for full pacification of the conflict; or on the contrary, the failure to implement as a factor for active renewal of hostilities. Therefore, negotiation experience has suggested that the stage of implementation be negotiated as a separate part. Initially, the implementation should resolve the problem of frequent greater expectations from the agreement than it can actually achieve. This idiosyncratic ‘disappointment’ over the agreement when it is finally published ‘urbi et orbi’ may be shared by the parties and the international community alike. At this stage, it most efficient that the mediator should assume the duty of ‘marketing’ the agreement as reasonable success. Nevertheless, this is a task for each party to fulfill in their part of the grass-root level. Subsequently, the mediator undertakes a role of moderator for fulfillment of the safeguards and the promises given by third parties in the course of the negotiations, and which have become a constitutional part of the success of the agreement itself. According to the data from specialized literature, between 1940 and 1992, negotiations on conflict settlement were started for only half of the domestic armed clashes, and only half of those negotiations were successfully implemented. The remainder are agreements that reached a standstill somewhere in the implementation or became subject to disappointments and new conflicts.118 For example, full-fledged pacification was reached in the clashes in: Laos, China, the Philippines, Angola, Afghanistan, Chad, Uganda, Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, partly in Bosnia before Dayton, but in each of these cases one or both actors decided later in the implementation stage to not comply with their obligations under the agreement. None of these cases can be 118

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This supports the thesis presented at the beginning of this text that the negotiators actually make a special political decision (separated from the ones to start negotiations) that concerns the determination to implement the agreed. The implementation stage distinguishes a sequence of activities (as a sub-stage) called post-conflict prevention. It consists of a more active role of the third party and the mediator, including coercive threat in order to prevent renewal of disputes and conflict behavior by the opponents to the agreement or factions of the parties to the agreement.119 It is a part that is especially active before the implementation of the agreement starts paying dividends that are more serious. Just as every agreement that is intended to last, these agreements frequently contain parts that ‘lustrate’ or remedy the committed injustices and war crimes, parts that ‘render justice’. Those parts are particularly difficult for implementation. Namely, with these parts each side faces itself, its factions and base, since it needs to bring its people to justice. The forms of lustration vary from forming ad hoc courts for war crimes and genocide through forms of reconciliation by forgiveness (Desmond Tutu) to revealing the truth to the world and the families of the victims (confrontation of hangmen and victims through cathartic communication of grief and forgiveness). The determination and the closing of this stage at the beginning of the implementation is of great importance as it will enable the opening of its more long-lasting sub-stages called reconciliation or structural conciliation. This involves part concerning the change of educational matrices, public communication, and media, and the proclaimed successful in the negotiation. For further details, see: Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution, Sage, London quoted work p. 135; Uppsala Conflict Data Project, SIPRI Yearbook 1998; World Armaments and Disarmaments, London, Oxford University Press; Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997; World Military and Social Expenditures 1996, World Priorities, Washington, DC USA Ruth Leger Sivard; Barbara F. Walter, in International Negotiation, V.7, No 3, 2002, Kluwer Law International, London pp. 301-303; Stabilizing Peace After Civil War, C. Hartzell, M. Hoddie, D. Rothschild, in International Organizations, V. 55, No. 1, 2001, pp. 192-199, California University Press, San Diego, USA. 119 Of 38 civil wars and related reached agreements, after the unsuccessful implementation only 14 (37 %) returned to the position of complete renewal of conflict and hostilities. Five years after the signing of the agreement, 68% of the agreements, in which there were strong external safeguards from a third party, persisted, compared to the 32% in which there were no such safeguards. Taken from: International Organizations, quoted work, p. 195.

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change towards social conditions of togetherness and healing of the wounds from the conflicts. The most important part of the implementation, the part called integrative content of the agreement, is the operative plan for assistance in the revitalization and restoration of order (legal and political relations) and the economic activity of the conflict parties. In this context, hitherto experience teaches two important lines: the first is that the assistance should be well-timed, well-planned in terms of quality and quantity, and aimed at actual segments of the system; and the second is that it should be monitored and assessed in accordance with the results. The greatest and most frequent problems that need to be resolved in this stage are: the absence of partner in the form of functional administration system of the contracting parties that will manage the assistance towards successes; and corruption. Those who wage war are poor administrators and managers. However, those who wage war and consider themselves crucial for the success do not easily give place to other managerial elite that needs to conduct sustainable government and attain results from the assistance. It does not suffice only to patch what was demolished. What is important is to lay the foundations of a system that is self-sustainable and will continue to function. Theoretically, this is divided into two separate strategies: institutional building and capacity building for implementation of laws and assistance.120 The system should persist and develop into a regular, neutral, and efficient administrative service of the citizens. Corruption is a serious problem in the implementation of agreements, especially of the agreements that envisage larger and longer-serving international forces on the territories of the parties that were in conflict. According to UN reports on their positions in the Balkan region, for example, the new officers start showing signs of corruption and ‘adaptation’ to the environment in which they work after a period of six months. Hitherto experience suggests that the assistance in the implementation is shared between the third parties (the guarantors), for example: the Americans and NATO perform the 'hardware' side of the implementation (the exercise of pressure, forming courts, demarcation forces etc.), while the European Union assumes the part of economic assistance, transfer of knowledge in building sustainable society, i.e. the 'software' side. 120

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The corruption of the elites of the parties that were in conflict is an endemic problem (they consider that they should reward themselves for their ‘success’ from the assistance from the guarantors). If these two types of corruption deteriorate, the implementation faces its most serious obstacle to success. There is no cure-all for corruption, but an efficient system of monitoring the facilitation of assistance (by the guarantors) that will include coercive diplomacy and coercive threats for the manner in which it is conducted (if there are corruptive occurrences) is absolutely necessary. A second means are the training programs for the administration at all levels that provide education in management and administrative skills for normal utilization of assistance, as well as functioning of the system as a whole. In order to have time for all this to be achieved and accomplished, the implementation must have an integrated earlywarning system for the items to which the agreements are always most sensitive: human and minority rights, division of power and disarmament, displaced persons, refugees, the particularly vulnerable parts of the population etc. This all goes to show that the stage of implementation of agreements is a complex and delicate process, and how much the overall spent material and energy for the entire previous negotiation in effect depend on it. It must be taken into consideration when promises and safeguards are given in the course of the negotiations, and it necessitates conducting special negotiation and formulating detailed plans.

Author:

Dr. Ljubomir Danailov Frčkoski

In Skopje, on the very day of 25 April 2007.

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