Nationalism And The Ukrainian Military

Nationalism and the

Ukrainian Military

Andrew K. Fesiak Carleton University Ottawa, Canada 1998

Abstract Nationalism is a very dangerous ideology which has caused a great deal of conflict throughout the world. Since Ukraine is a culturally, politically, linguistically and religiously divided society, it is difficult for the country to decide on which historical symbols, traditions, figures and groups should be used in order to inculcate patriotism into the Ukrainian military and the masses. The glorification of historical nationalist symbols, traditions, figures and groups are not acceptable to the majority of Ukrainian servicemen nor the population in general. However, this has not stopped nationalist groups from attempting to use their history to raise patriotism in the military and society; an action which has been causing an opposite effect and growing tensions. This paper examines the effects of nationalism on the development of the contemporary Ukrainian military, and society, and the reasons why both at the present and historically, there has been little support for this ideology and the activities of its advocates.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the late Dr. Yuri Prozorov whose advice, help and friendship was immeasurable. Unfortunately, he did not live long enough to see the completion of this paper.

Table of Contents ABSTRACT...................................................................................................................................................II ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.........................................................................................................................III TABLE OF CONTENTS.............................................................................................................................IV INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................................1 THE CASE OF UKRAINE.....................................................................................................................................1 NATIONS AND NATIONALISM.................................................................................................................6 WHAT IS A NATION?...........................................................................................................................................6 WHAT IS NATIONALISM?.....................................................................................................................................7 Exit, Voice or Integration?.......................................................................................................................9 WHAT IS UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM?.................................................................................................................11 THE EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT UKRAINE............................................................................13 WESTERN UKRAINE.........................................................................................................................................13 CENTRAL, EASTERN AND SOUTHERN UKRAINE....................................................................................................13 UKRAINE’S IDEOLOGY......................................................................................................................................15 NATIONALISM AND UKRAINIAN MILITARY TRADITION............................................................21 KIEVAN-RUS..................................................................................................................................................22 THE COSSACKS...............................................................................................................................................22 Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky.................................................................................................................23 Ivan Mazepa...........................................................................................................................................24 THE UKRAINIAN REVOLUTION..........................................................................................................................29 The Ukrainian Revolution and Ethnic Minorities..................................................................................36 UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM DURING WORLD WAR II.............................................................................................38 Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).....................................................................................39 Development of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)...........................................................................45 SS Galician Division..............................................................................................................................50 Conclusions............................................................................................................................................52 UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE CREATION OF THE MILITARY.................................54 The August Coup....................................................................................................................................63 UKRAINIANISATION IN THE UKRAINIAN MILITARY AFTER INDEPENDENCE....................70 NATIONALIST TRADITION IN THE CONTEMPORARY UKRAINIAN MILITARY....................78 HUMANITIES PREPARATION...............................................................................................................................78 OTHER FORMS OF UKRAINIANISATION................................................................................................................86 HAS UKRAINIANISATION BEEN SUCCESSFUL?........................................................................................................88 THE NATIONALIST DEBATE AMONG THE UKRAINIAN POPULATION....................................96 THE GOVERNMENT..........................................................................................................................................96 POLITICAL PARTIES..........................................................................................................................................99 UKRAINIAN SOCIETY.....................................................................................................................................101 CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................................................105 APPENDIX I...............................................................................................................................................107 APPENDIX II..............................................................................................................................................108 BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................................................................................................................110

Introduction Since the fall of Eastern Europe’s Socialist systems in 1989 and the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, nationalism has again emerged as a major factor on the European and, indeed, world stages. The wave of nationalism unleashed by the end of the Cold War has reached across the globe and has produced a wide range of effects on the areas it has touched. In Canada, Quebecois nationalism has been revived and strengthened in recent years with the nationalist Bloc Quebecois party actually having held enough seats in the Canadian parliament to be named the official opposition. In Scotland, there have been calls for independence and even Hawaii has had some signs of a growing independence movement in recent years. Eastern Europe has historically been one of the most volatile areas in the world in regards to nationalism and the ethnic tensions caused by the variations of this ideology. The most recently detailed effects of nationalism in the region have been the wars on the territory of the former Yugoslavia where former friends and neighbours have been killing each other in order to create ethnically pure homelands. The former Yugoslavia, though by far the most violent, is not the only region which has undergone serious ethnic tensions in recent years. Countries such as Romania and even the relatively westernised Czech Republic have experienced serious problems in regards to the treatment of ethnic minorities in their states due to the existence of exclusive forms of nationalism. Although nationalism has been a problem throughout Eastern Europe the case of Ukraine is different.

The Case of Ukraine Ukraine is situated in a strategically important location at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. It is one of the countries which divide Russia and the West. The country’s armed forces are one of the largest in Europe and until recently possessed nuclear weapons. With a highly educated population and an industrially developed economy, Ukraine has the potential of becoming one of Europe’s most economically and industrially powerful states. Its population is ethnically, religiously, linguistically and politically diverse. Ethnic Ukrainians account for 72 percent of Ukraine’s total population of 52 million inhabitants. The next largest, and by far the most important ethnic minority, is the Russian population which accounts for 22 percent of Ukraine’s total population. All together, there are more than 100 different ethnic groups residing in Ukraine. In terms of religion, the population of the country is divided among Christians, Jews and Muslims; the Christian community is further divided by its several denominations (i.e. Roman-Catholics, Ukrainian-Catholics, Ukrainian Orthodox, Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox, Russian Orthodox etc.). Ukraine is politically divided between those citizens who are in favour forming a closer relationship with the West and those who would prefer closer ties with Russia and the CIS. Linguistically, the country is divided between Ukrainophones and Russophones. Ukraine’s greatest accomplishment since becoming independent is the fact that it has managed to avert the type of violent conflicts which many former Soviet and East European states have witnessed. This has been the result of Ukraine’s liberal policies towards its ethnic minorities and other groups. Due to the vast diversities in Ukrainian society, it is important that no group remain completely alienated. The Ukrainian leadership is well aware of the diversity in their society and the problems that the estrangement of any one group may cause. For this reason, the citizenship law which was passed on October 8, 1991 entitled all Soviet citizens who were permanent

residents of Ukraine at the time of the law’s passing the right to claim Ukrainian citizenship.1 The law was intended to increase the support for independence among Ukraine’s ethnic minorities by showing them that an independent Ukraine would guarantee and respect their rights. The government also moved to ensure that no group within Ukrainian society was left alienated by Ukrainian independence by guaranteeing their rights in various individual laws, declarations and the Constitution. Indeed there are several articles in Ukraine’s 1996 Constitution that establish these rights: Section 2. Article 24. “Citizens have equal Constitutional rights and freedoms and are equal before the law. There are no privileges or restrictions based upon race, colour of skin, political, religious and other beliefs, gender, ethnic and social origin, property, ownership, position, place of residence, based upon language or other circumstances.” Section 1. Article 10. “The free development, use and protection of Russian and other languages of national minorities is guaranteed in Ukraine.” Section 1. Article 12. “The state assists in the consolidation and development of the Ukrainian nation, its historical consciousness, traditions and culture, as well as in the development of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious features of all native nations and national minorities of Ukraine.” Section 2. Article 53 The law guarantees to representatives of national minorities the right to study using their native language or to study native language at state and municipal educational establishments as well as through national and cultural societies.

Indeed, when compared to its neighbours (or even many Western states), Ukraine’s laws in regards to its ethnic minorities are quite liberal and accommodating; a factor which has definitely added to the lack of ethnic conflict in the country. However, the existence of laws, which are beneficial to various Ukrainian minorities, does not rule out the possibility of an eruption of tensions or even conflicts between them. This becomes especially true when the state cannot fund many of the policies stated in its laws. Although the Ukrainian people are an old nation, politically Ukraine is a new country. The Ukrainian government must now deal with such issues as the creation of laws, foreign policy, defence, the economy and education etc. As with all states, Ukraine must provide a historical legitimisation of itself to its citizens. It must show that it has a tradition of existence and a history. Ukraine must create a patriotism that can bind all of the country’s citizens. Previous Ukrainian attempts to create a state have usually ended in failure because of a lack of support among the population. Ukraine’s history of state building has proven that when the government alienates the country’s various groups, the state collapses. This was the case in 1919 with the Petliura government which, because of policies which alienated various groups, collapsed due to a lack of support within the country. As noted above, Ukraine is trying to create a state, which is inclusive of the various political, ethnic, religious and linguistic groups which inhabit the country. However, like 1

Verhovna Rada Ukrainy, Zakony Ukrainy, (Kiev: Instytut Zakonodavstva, Vol. 2, 1996) 217.

every country, Ukraine needs its citizens to be loyal. Ukraine therefore needs to instil some form of patriotism or nationalism into its citizens. For people to express either of these sentiments it is first necessary for them to identify themselves as belonging to a nation, that is, a large group of people who have something in common. But what do Ukraine’s citizens have in common with one another? If Ukraine creates an ideology which offends or discriminates against certain groups, this will prevent these groups from identifying with Ukraine as their nation. Historical education has become somewhat of a problem in an independent Ukraine that is trying to treat its numerous groups fairly. How does one approach the teaching of a history that is filled with conflicts between the groups in question? When studying a historical conflict between one of the existing groups; which of them should be held in a positive light and which of them should not? For example, when examining Ukrainian history during World War II should the government favour Soviet forces as the liberators of Ukraine or should they support the various nationalist groups such as the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) as defenders of Ukrainian statehood and independence? But which OUN: OUN-M or OUN-B?2 This is a rather important and possibly explosive issue which the Ukrainian government must deal with. The Ukrainian military is a microcosm of the various groups which make up Ukrainian society. However, a majority of the military’s officer corps is comprised of ethnic Russians and Russophones and it is especially important that these two groups not be alienated by the Ukrainianisation process which is currently being conducted in the Ukrainian military. After Ukraine became independent in 1991, the three Soviet military districts (Odessa, Kiev and Transcarpathian) that were situated on Ukrainian territory were taken over and put under the control of the Ukrainian state by a decree of then chairman of the Supreme Rada, Leonid Kravchuk. To turn this former Soviet military force into one which would be loyal to the Ukrainian state, the Ukrainian government started a process of Ukrainianisation. The process of Ukrainianisation involves replacing Soviet military traditions with their Ukrainian counterparts. Ukrainian is to be used as the main language for communication purposes; Ukrainian history and traditions are to be taught in military educational institutions; Ukrainian symbols, regalia and medals are to be introduced, and; an oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian state is required. The main purpose of the Ukrainianisation process is to bring about a rise in national-patriotic feelings in the military and legitimise the need to defend the country by instilling a sense of duty to, and loyalty for, the Ukrainian state. For example, it will be necessary to convince an ethnic Russian why he should risk his life and fight against Russia in protecting Ukraine, if the need were ever to arise. The main process of Ukrainianisation in the military is carried out through the military educational system and the military print media. However, the Ukrainianisation program is running into problems since it is difficult for all the parties involved to agree on the appropriate aspects of Ukrainian nationalist military history which should be glorified. Many groups may be left alienated by glorifying controversial events or figures in Ukrainian military history and using certain symbols and regalia that might carry negative connotations.3 This could cause them to question their allegiance to the Ukrainian state which would play a crucial role in the Ukrainian military’s effectiveness in a military confrontation. It is very often the case in Ukrainian military history that heroes for one group are enemies for another. Therefore the problem for Ukrainian military policy makers is which parts of 2

OUN-M refers to the group led by Andriy Melnyk whereas OUN-B refers to the group led by Stepan Bandera. This is extremely important towards keeping unity in the Ukrainian military. Using symbols or regalia, for example, which are connected with the UPA may alienate many eastern Ukrainians and ethnic minorities such as the Russians, Poles and Jews who were massacred by UPA units. Thus for Ukraine’s eastern population and ethnic minorities, using the UPA’s black and red flag or dedicating warships or military academies to Stepan Bandera, is more or less the Ukrainian equivalent of Germany making the same dedications to Adolf Hitler. However, using symbols or regalia connected with the Soviet period (eg. hammer and sickle or red star) may alienate many Western Ukrainians who look unfavourably towards Soviet rule. 3

Ukrainian military history should be taught at military institutions as part of the educational curriculum and accepted as Ukrainian military tradition. The Ukrainian military has been very susceptible to the pressures of interest groups. Of the various political, ethnic and linguistic groups, nationalists have been especially active in applying great pressure on military decision-making from personnel appointments to the themes in historical education. Unfortunately, much of Ukrainian nationalist military history is filled with episodes of collaboration with foreign occupiers and atrocities against a variety of groups residing in Ukraine. It is thus counterproductive to serve as part of a tradition for the army of a liberal-democratic country made up of such diverse groups. Glorifying Ukrainian nationalist history can only alienate a variety of groups within Ukraine and thus negatively affect the military effectiveness of the military and loyalty to the Ukrainian state. It would be especially unwise to alienate the already restless Russian minority in Ukraine. Further alienation of this group would only result in an increase in separatist and antiindependence attitudes and question their loyalty in a potential military conflict. History shows that Ukrainian independence has failed in the past because nationalist politicians have consistently alienated Ukraine’s various social, political, ethnic, linguistic or religious groups. It appears that the only tradition which is all unifying is that of the Ukrainian Cossacks. Given the history of Ukraine, and the country's current ethnic and political makeup, efforts to impose a nationalist ideology are directly opposed to longstanding pan-Slavic sentiments held by a large segment of the population. Consequently, the effort to pursue a nationalist political agenda will not likely be effective and may, in fact, prove to be counterproductive to its desired ends. To test this argument, this essay examines the Ukrainianisation programme in the Ukrainian military. It will review the policy, educational system, and news media of the various military branches to find out what the Ukrainian military is doing, and why, with regard to nationalism in Ukrainian military traditions.

A Note on the Structure of the Essay The issue being discussed is very controversial, thus it was necessary to properly introduce the problem with a lengthy introduction. In Chapter 1, I discuss nationalist theory, and show which nationalisms are most likely to cause conflict. Chapter 2 examines the various regions in Ukraine and shows that there is a difference between the nationalistic West and the more pan-Slavic and pro-Russian, Centre, South and East. This chapter also discusses the reasons why Ukrainians voted for independence and argues that it was for socioeconomic rather than nationalistic reasons. Chapter 3 gives a historical background of the various nationalist figures and groups in order to understand why they are not, and have never been, supported in Ukraine. Chapter 4 examines the creation of the military in contemporary Ukraine and shows that its creation was not due to nationalist reasons. Furthermore it shows that the majority of the servicemen did not swear allegiance to Ukraine due to nationalist feelings but due to the same socio-economic reasons as society in general. An important corollary of this fact is that swearing allegiance to Ukraine did not mean that military servicemen would be prepared to fight against Russia if the need were to arise. Chapter 5 discusses the initial methods used to instil patriotism into the new Ukrainian military through the Ukrainianisation program. Initially, the program began glorifying Ukrainian nationalist history and traditions which caused great tensions within the military. Due to these tensions, the principal advocates of this approach were later removed. Chapter 6 discusses the present situation in the military in regards to military-patriotic education and the Ukrainianisation program. It shows that the nationalists are still trying to glorify their history and traditions, a goal that is not supported by the majority of servicemen. An accompanying survey reveals that the military-patriotic education and Ukrainianisation programs have failed in their goals of raising patriotism. It shows that the attitudes of Ukrainian servicemen are largely divided between Western Ukraine and the other regions.

Chapter 7 examines the actions and attitudes of the government, political parties and society. It shows that the government does not support the various Ukrainian nationalist groups although it does support the glorification of the Soviet army. This chapter also shows how divided Ukraine is in terms of political culture and historical memory.

Nations and Nationalism What is a nation? If Joseph Stalin’s concept of a nation is to be accepted, Ukraine is not a nation. Stalin argued that: “A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.”4 According to Stalin, only when all of the necessary characteristics are present does a nation exist. Max Weber would disagree. According to Weber, a common language is not completely necessary in order for a nation to exist. He gives the example of Switzerland and suggests that although four official languages exist, the Swiss are, nonetheless, one nation. Nations define themselves in different ways. Switzerland is a nation which does not stress language as an important criterion for becoming a member, as there are four official languages. Weber claims that nations are too various to be defined in terms of any one criterion, but he affiliates nations to ethnic communities as populations unified by a myth of common descent. What distinguishes the nation is a commitment to a political project. A nation, says Weber, is a “community of sentiment, which could find its adequate expression only in a state of its own, and which thus normally strives to create one.”5 According to Karl W. Deutsch: “Membership in a people essentially consists in wide complementarity of social communication. It consists in the ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders. This overall result can be achieved by a variety of functionally equivalent arrangements.”6 Thus, according to this view, a Swiss Italian would be able to communicate easier with a Swiss-German than with an Italian from Italy because they are part of the same nation and define things in the same way. In the end it would appear that the concept of the nation is rather ambiguous. There are various definitions and it would appear that nations define themselves in whatever way they like. Thus if Switzerland feels that it is a nation, that is made up of four different ethnic groups with four different languages, then it is. The only real criterion may then be whether these ethnic groups feel themselves to be part of this nation. Thus, as an example, if Quebecers do not feel that they are part of the Canadian nation, then they are not; no matter how much other Canadians may feel that they are. However, people may be convinced into believing that they are part of a nation by showing that they have a common history, descent, culture, economic ties, language etc,. This can be achieved through the manipulation of history. One of the factors that defines a nation is the type of nationalism it espouses. Thus, if Canadian nationalism defines the nation as including Quebecers, and if Quebecers define themselves as being part of the Canadian nation, then both will be part of one single nation. However, if Canadian nationalism is exclusive and defines the nation as not including Quebecers, then it will not, and in turn, Quebecers will adopt a nationalism of their own.

What is nationalism? It has often been suggested that historians create nationalism. It is they who will 4

John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith ed., Nationalism,(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 20, qtd. in Bruce Franklin, ed. The Essential Stalin: Major Theoretical Writings 1905-1952 (Croom Helm: London, 1973. 5 Sukumar Periwal ed., Notions of Nationalism, (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995) 99. qtd. in Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik, (Tübingen, 1924) 484. 6 John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith ed., Nationalism,(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 20, qtd. in Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, 2nd edn. MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1966.

create national heroes and historic memory. Historians have the power to change people’s perceptions so that they may actually think that they are part of a particular nation by emphasising common descent, traditions, history, symbols etc. At the same time, historians can and do attempt to emphasise the separateness of nations by showing historical conflict between the nations in question. Outlining a nation’s enemies is an important task for many nationalist historians. It is relatively common to try to raise the level of nationalism in a country by portraying that country as having suffered at the hands of another country throughout history. Complementing this by showing a country’s history as including various independence struggles is conducive to raising the levels of nationalism in a nation. There are different kinds of nationalism which range in terms of exclusivity. Each type of nationalism, will have different sorts of ramifications on the country’s foreign relations and internal cohesion. The type of nationalism will also determine the likelihood of conflict either within the country or with other countries. The nationalisms that will be dealt with in this paper are: official nationalism, social nationalism, economic nationalism, ethnic nationalism and integral nationalism. Ethnic nationalism, which is one of the most exclusive forms of nationalist ideology, has been described as “the nationalism of ethnic groups…who define their nation in exclusive terms, mainly on the basis of common descent.” 7 The result of this form of nationalism is that outsiders may not join the nation by simply adopting the language, religion, or customs of the ethnic majority. National or ethnic affiliation is widely considered a matter of one’s blood belonging. Therefore, assimilation cannot make an outsider part of the majority ethnic group since they will always have the ‘blood of an outsider’. Even when the outsider’s children are born to a spouse of the dominant ethnic group, the children may only partially be considered insiders and, in fact, to a larger extent will be considered outsiders since their blood is supposedly not “pure”. One need only look at the period following the First World War to see how instrumental ethnic nationalism was in the development of new states in Central and Eastern Europe. These states emerged where there had been none for centuries due to the disintegration of multinational formations such as the Austro-Hungarian, German, Russian, and Ottoman Empires. During the Interwar Period, as time progressed and economic situations deteriorated, a new kind of nationalism was born in Europe which for the most part replaced ethnic nationalism. This new ideology came to be known as integral nationalism. Integral nationalism, though closely related to ethnic nationalism, is even more extreme and exclusive. To answer the question of what exactly integral nationalism is, we could look onto the following list describing its characteristics: (1) a belief in the nation as the supreme value to which all others must be subordinated, essentially a totalitarian concept; (2) an appeal to mystically conceived ideas of the solidarity of all individuals making up the nation, usually on the assumption that biological characteristics or the irreversible effects of common historical development had welded into one organic whole; (3) a subordination of rational, analytic thought to the “intuitively correct” emotions; (4) expression of the “national will” through a charismatic leader and an elite of nationalist enthusiasts organised in a single party; (5) glorification of action, war, and violence as an expression of the superior biological vitality of the nation.8 This list not only describes the characteristics of integral nationalism, but also Mussolini's 7

G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991) 51-54. in Charles F. Furtado, Jr. “Nationalism and Foreign Policy in Ukraine”, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 109, Number 1, (1994): 90. 8 John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963) 13.

Fascism and Hitler's National Socialism; all of which were considered forms of integral nationalism. It becomes somewhat obvious why both ethnic and integral nationalism can be harmful to a country’s security. If a nation accepts ethnic or especially integral nationalism is an ideology, it becomes easier for its leaders to convince the population of the necessity of war or the necessity to discriminate against groups in society which are ‘harmful’ to the national cause. Both of these ideologies exclude ethnic and indeed other minorities from their idea of which groups make up the nation. This, in turn, means that such groups are usually excluded from positions of power, their rights within society are not guaranteed and in fact, are often trampled on and abused. The Nazis are a good example of what a nation instilled with integral nationalism is capable of doing. After the German nation had accepted integral nationalist ideology, it was relatively easy for Nazi leaders to convince the Germans of the necessity of expanding the Reich’s borders at the expense of other countries and also to pin the blame on Germany’s troubles on the Jews. This then made it easier for Nazi leaders to involve the population in its various evil plans without whom the Nazis could not have possibly done half of what they did. Ethnic and integral nationalism quite often lead to conflict, which can be expressed as a revolt within the country by those groups being abused or even separatism (though this is not the only reason for separatism), especially when the minority group is compactly settled in a certain region of the country. Irredentist claims may also occur when: a) a state with ethnic or integral nationalist ideologies makes claims on a neighbouring state due to the existence of members of its national group existing in that neighbouring state; or b) when members of the national ethnic group of a neighbouring state who reside in a state which expresses ethnic or integral nationalist ideologies are being abused, or are perceived as being abused. Other forms of nationalism, which are much less exclusive than the two abovementioned theories, include social nationalism and official nationalism. Official nationalism is the most prevalent form of nationalism and, not surprisingly, the type most compatible with other variants. Essentially based on patriotism 9, official nationalism is the nationalism of the state, a form that encompasses all those legally entitled to be citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity, national identity, and culture.10 This somewhat diluted form of nationalism is existent in every state which means that it may simply be called a normal phenomenon among states. Social nationalism is only slightly more exclusive than official nationalism. This form of nationalism is most characteristic of nations that define themselves “by social ties and culture rather than by common descent.” 11 Although social nationalism “stresses a shared sense of national identity, community, and culture,” it also allows outsiders to “join the nation if they identify with it and adopt its social characteristics.”12 The final form of nationalism which will be examined is economic nationalism. This form of nationalism manifests itself in the economy by showing favouritism towards things produced in one’s own country. However, ownership of the means of production is very important in economic nationalism, therefore, if something is produced in one’s country but owned by non-nationals, a preference will be made for the good which is made in the country whose means of production are owned by a national of that country. This sort of nationalism has as its goal the economic well-being of the inhabitants of the nation. 9

Patriotism is described as affection for one’s country, or one’s group, loyalty to its institutions, and zeal for its defense. Patriotism does not depend on a certain anthropology nor does it assert a particular doctrine of the state or of the individual’s relation to it, whereas, nationalism does. See Elie Kedourie Nationalism and Self Determination in John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith ed., Nationalism,(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 49. 10 Furtado 88. 11 Ibid 89. 12 Ibid.

Economic nationalism may also result in nationalisation of industries especially if they are owned by non-nationals. Probably the most important part of economic nationalism for the purposes of this paper are those which result in protectionism. Protectionism may take the form of protecting a nation’s industry or economic well-being. The implementation of trade barriers against foreign goods is the most common form of protectionism. In the last few years before the dissolution of the USSR, economic nationalism was expressed not by introducing barriers to imports but rather by imposing barriers to exports of the nations’ goods due to their short supply.

Exit, Voice or Integration? There are a number of different ways in which ethnic minorities may react upon finding themselves within the borders of a new nation-state. These can be expressed as: exit, voice, or integration.13 Exit, which is the most extreme form of ethnic minority reaction to the creation of a new nation-state, may occur either in group or individual form. The individual form of exit refers to an individual member of an ethnic group who may decide to physically leave the new state as a reaction to its creation. The country of destination, though often the ethnic homeland of the member of the ethnic minority is not exclusively so. The destination of emigration from the new nation-state may also be to a third country which accepts new immigrants. This has been the case with Soviet and East European Jews who have often emigrated to North America instead of Israel. Individual exit may have negative consequences for the new nation-state in a number of ways. The individuals in question may take part in agitation or propaganda activities aimed at the nation-state they emigrated from which are detrimental to that state’s security or image. Examples of such actions are numerous among ethnic groups residing in North America who form lobbies to influence the foreign policies of their new states. Cuban-American influence on US foreign policy towards Cuba is a good example. Another consequence of individual exit is possible harm inflicted upon an economy due to a departure of a significant portion of the nation’s workforce. Examples of just such a problem are found in Bulgaria and Central Asia. When a significant portion of Bulgaria’s ethnic Turkish minority emigrated to Turkey in 1988, the country was left with a labour shortage in the countryside which was detrimental to the nation’s economy. In Central Asia, the emigration of the Russian minority has left the countries of the region with a deficit of skilled workers, which has had serious repercussions on the economies of those states. Group exit is more serious to a state’s territorial integrity and security. This form of exit entails the complete separation of the ethnic minority from the new nation-state by way of secession. Threat of such an action is most dangerous when the ethnic group resides in an area which borders their ethnic homeland. Examples of such actions can be found in Nagorno-Karabakh where the ethnic Armenian minority is in favour of joining Armenia or in Eastern Slavonia or Bosnia (Republika Serbska) where the ethnic Serbs are in favour of joining Serbia. Ethnic groups which reside in areas that do not border their ethnic homelands may also call for secession; examples of this are Trans-Dniestria where the Russian population is distant from its ethnic homeland but is in favour of separation from Moldova. The second option which ethnic minorities may take when confronted with finding themselves within the confines of a new nation-state, is voice. Voice relates to the participation of the ethnic groups in question in the new nation-state with simultaneous demands for ethnic recognition.14 The ethnic group in question may demand such things as the guaranteeing of access to education in their own language and the free, unrestricted use of 13

The theories of exit, voice, or integration are taken from Ian Bremmer, “The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 46, No. 2, (1994): 261-283. 14 Ian Bremmer, “The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 46, No. 2, (1994): 263.

their language, government support in the development of their culture, and a guaranteed percentage of reserved seats in elected bodies such as the state’s legislature. Ethnic voice can either be a liberal movement which calls for changes in favour of the ethnic group or a conservative movement which calls for the safeguarding of the group’s established privileges and power. There are many methods in which the ethnic group may strive to attain its goals such as through joining the government by being elected to parliament, influencing the government by means of lobby groups, demonstrating against the government or even resorting to violence such as terrorism. The most important aspect of the voice option is that the ethnic group in question does not unconditionally accept or adopt the new national culture. In fact, the ethnic identity of the group is actually maintained or even strengthened. The final option available to ethnic minority groups is that of integration. The characteristics of this option are that the foremost identity of the ethnic group is not their own ethnicity, but rather the new nation in which they find themselves. Thus an example would be a federalist Quebecer whose primary allegiance is to Canada, followed by that of Quebec. The integration option usually entails the learning of new languages, acceptance of national education and the adoption of the culture and traditions of the dominant nation. By choosing integration the ethnic group does not necessarily give up its own traditions but rather keeps them within the private realm of the home or a small group of friends. The reaction of ethnic groups to finding themselves as a minority within the boundaries of a new state will depend largely upon the type of nationalist ideology adopted by the titular nation. If forms of ethnic or integral nationalism are adopted by the titular nation then chances are that the ethnic minorities will respond by either Exit or Voice. If the affected ethnic minority finds itself in a country close to the boundaries of their ethnic homeland then the chances of group exit in response to ethnic or integral nationalism are quite likely. The Voice option will be taken if the nationalism adopted by the titular nation is not overly threatening to the ethnic minority, nor overly liberal and accommodating. If either social or official nationalisms are the ideologies practised by the titular nation, then there is a good chance that the response by the ethnic minority will be some form of integration. In order to diminish the chances of conflict it is therefore very important that the titular nation adopt a nationalism that will be conducive to good relations with its ethnic minorities. It can be said that ethnic or integral nationalism directed towards a particular ethnic group will be responded to with ethnic or integral nationalism by that group. Conflict is the most probable outcome. This certainly appears to have been the case in the Interwar Period when the growth of integral nationalism across Central and Eastern Europe finally led to the Second World War.

What is Ukrainian Nationalism? Nationalism is an ideology which began to shows signs of existence in Ukraine early in the nineteenth century among small educated groups though it was considerably later that groups of a political nature were formed. It began to develop in the Ukrainian lands at the same time as Marxian socialism became an influential ideology in the Russian Empire; an interaction which added particular flavour to Ukrainian nationalism. Ukrainian nationalism has gone through various stages of development. Though at first social nationalism was prevalent, after the failure of the Ukrainian Revolution, the Ukrainian nationalist movement developed mostly integral nationalist traits. However, following the Second World War, ethnic nationalism became prevalent especially in Ukrainian émigré circles. In contemporary Ukraine there are, of course, various shades of nationalism however the most prevalent among Ukrainian nationalists appears to be ethnic nationalism.

Although initially the primary aim of Ukrainian nationalists was the establishment of a truly independent state, in contemporary Ukraine, the primary goal is the preservation of that state followed by the preservation and development of Ukrainian language and culture. One of the most important parts of Ukrainian nationalist ideology has been to demonstrate that Ukrainians are different from their neighbours and that throughout their history Ukrainians have been abused by these neighbours while living in the same state. For this reason nationalists have felt that the only way to end such abuse would be to establish an independent country. A major reason for nationalist thought lies in a tendency to view things in terms of ethnicity. Thus these perceived abuses are viewed as having been initiated by various ethnic groups against ethnic Ukrainians. Therefore nationalist views of history and politics tend to view developments in terms of ethnicity, while either ignoring or minimising other factors. For example, negative aspects of Tsarist rule are seen as having been the abuse of ‘Ukrainians’ by ‘Russians’. The fact that ethnic Russian peasants were equally abused is disregarded. The famine in the early 1930s, is considered a Russian genocidal policy to liquidate ethnic Ukrainians, though the fact that the famine also affected ethnic Russians in Russia is ignored. Ukrainian nationalists felt that the only way of escaping these perceived abuses would be to create their own independent state. An important part of Ukrainian nationalist historiography is to show that Ukrainians have throughout their history struggled against the abuses of other ethnic groups. The focus of contemporary Ukrainian nationalism is to portray Russia as Ukraine’s primary enemy both today and in the past, though their views appear to have little support outside of Western Ukraine. Ukrainian nationalists are frightened by the claims of Russian nationalist politicians on Ukrainian territories such as Crimea and “Novaya Rossia” and believe that they deny Ukraine the right to statehood. They feel that Russians cannot accept that Ukraine is a separate nation and that Ukraine should be independent.

The Emergence of Independent Ukraine

Armed with the various theories of nationalism it will be much easier to understand Ukraine’s domestic, foreign and security policies. It can generally be stated that Ukraine is divided between its western oblasts on the one hand and its central, eastern and southern oblasts on the other hand in terms of religion, ethnic composition, political culture and language. These differences are due to the political separation of the nation during the great majority of the last few centuries.

Western Ukraine Western Ukraine which consists of Galicia, Volhynia, Polisia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia has, almost consistently since the 13th century, been under the domination of various foreign, non-Eastern Slavic powers. The peoples inhabiting the Western Ukrainian lands were quite often mistreated by their rulers and regularly forced to compete with the surrounding ethnic groups in order to survive. This has had a definite impact on Western Ukrainian political culture which can be most commonly described as consisting of ethnic nationalist leanings. During the Interwar Period and the Second World War, the Ukrainian nationalism which existed in Western Ukraine was actually of the integral type and was closely related to German Nazism. In fact, Ukrainian integral nationalists collaborated with the Nazis before and during the war. Following World War II, Ukrainian integral nationalists were either liquidated by the Red Army and NKVD or fled to the West, including such countries as Canada, the USA, Australia and Argentina, where they then agitated against the USSR until its dissolution and are attempting to exert their influence today. Though it is preferable not to generalise, it is relatively safe to say that the majority of Western Ukrainians hold relatively negative views of Russia, and Eastern institutions like the CIS, but view the West and its institutions in a positive light. 15 Western Ukraine, it may be argued, is the main supporter and impetus for closer Ukrainian integration with NATO and the West. However, this in no way means that Western Ukrainians are somehow more democratic than Ukrainians in the other regions. Pro-Western views do not signify a democratic political culture.

Central, Eastern and Southern Ukraine Central, Eastern and Southern Ukraine have a completely different history than their Western Ukrainian counterpart which in turn has affected the development of these regions’ political cultures. Although separated from Russia during short periods of time, these regions have usually been united with Russia either as part of Imperial Russia or the Soviet Union. Since the Ukrainian, Belarussian and Russian nations used to be a single state during the Kievan Rus period, these cultures and languages are quite close and mutually understandable. Whether in a positive or negative fashion, the treatment of this region and its peoples by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union was usually not very different from that of Russia itself. Central, Eastern and Southern Ukraine usually shared the same victories and defeats as their Russian neighbours.16 These are probably the most important reasons why ethnic or integral nationalism never developed in this part of Ukraine and why the existence of pan15

It should be pointed out that Transcarpathia is somewhat different from the rest of Western Ukraine and the people there do not hold such negative views of Russia and the East.

Slavism and Slavophilism was, and is, more prevalent. Although pan-Slavism and Slavophilism have in recent years taken on a different form from their historical roots, the main ideas remain constant. Pan-Slavism in Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, is now centred on the creation of a state which would incorporate the three Eastern Slavic nations, rather than all Slavs in general. Most inhabitants of Central and especially Eastern and Southern Ukraine view Russia as a friendly, even brotherly state and, in fact, are inclined to view Ukraine’s integration with Russia and the East in a positive light. This suggests the absence of a strong struggle against the Russians as an ethnic group, in order to culturally survive, or, their acceptance of Russian culture as either very close to, or no different from, their own and that they are actually one people. Nationalist attempts to depict the Russians as enemies in order to raise nationalist sentiment, in especially Southern and Eastern Ukraine are, therefore, bound to fail as they have throughout history. Most Western and nationalist historians try to explain the lack of nationalist feelings in the region as due to the fact that the Southern and Eastern Ukrainians have been dominated by Russia for a longer period of time whereas Western Ukrainians had only been under Russia’s influence since 1939.17 However nationalism in Eastern Europe usually developed when a nation struggled against the oppressive influences of another nation. Therefore, if they have been as oppressed as nationalists suggest, it would make sense that Central, Southern and Eastern Ukraine would be even more nationalistic than Western Ukraine especially since the Russian Tsar’s banning of the Ukrainian language, the destruction of the Central Rada, collectivisation, the famine and purges all happened to Central, Southern and Eastern Ukraine, not Western Ukraine. Since this is not the case, it can be explained by either: 1) the Central, Southern and Eastern Ukrainians not seeing themselves as having been collectively abused as Ukrainians by the Russians (disliking the Tsar would not mean not liking Russians, especially since Russians also disliked the Tsar); or 2) the East not seeing itself as a completely different nation from the Russians (this would make sense since the two groups are Eastern Slavic and did grow out of the same kingdom of Kievan Rus’). One important reason why Western Ukrainians are more anti-Russian whereas Ukrainians in other regions are not may be due to the fact that Western Ukrainians, and especially Galicians, are Polonised in their language, political culture and religion and therefore naturally see themselves as being different from Russians. Although it is difficult to generalise by stating that Ukrainians in Central, Eastern and Southern Ukraine have negative attitudes towards the West, anti-Western sentiment has definitely increased in recent years due to reasons which will later be discussed in this paper. Without doubt the fact that there exists a large minority of ethnic Russians in this part of Ukraine must also be taken into account as an influential factor in the region’s pro-Russian and pro-CIS sentiment. Ukrainians in Central and especially Eastern and Southern Ukraine tend to ‘socially communicate’18 easier and have closer and better relations with ethnic Russians across the border in Russia than they do with Western Ukrainians. A 1996 survey conducted among Ukraine’s population seems to also suggest that Ukrainians citizens are quite receptive of Russians. Sixty-seven and a half percent of respondents said they would 16

It is quite interesting to note that events such as the famine of 1932-33, which took place in the Central, Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine and not the Western part (since it was not yet part of the Soviet Union), is usually used as anti-Russian/Soviet propaganda by Western Ukrainian nationalists though not by Ukrainians from the other regions. This does not mean that these peoples do not consider the famine a great tragedy but rather that they are more likely to blame Stalin and his subordinates instead of ethnic Russians or the entire Soviet government. The fact that the famine also took many lives in various parts of Russia itself is one of the reasons ethnic Russians themselves are not blamed. 17 This argument seems to have little validity especially when the examples of other nations are observed. Quebecois nationalism is an example of a nationalism which has not died out but has existed though stifled for a long time. Poles though divided between three empires were equally as nationalistic and always wanted to recreate their own state since they saw themselves as different from all those who dominated them and had strong historical examples of being independent. Within Western Ukraine, one must also wonder why Transcarpathian Ukrainians, who had only been under direct Russian influence since 1944, are not as nationalistic as their Galician neighbours and view Russians much more favourably? 18 See above for Karl Deutsch’s definition of a nation.

accept Russians as members of their family as compared to 16.2 percent of respondents who felt the same about Americans.19 It is important to understand that a lack of nationalism in Central, Eastern and Southern Ukraine does not necessarily signify a lack of patriotic feelings. Even the lack of support for Ukrainian independence does not signify anti-Ukrainian feelings. It simply signifies a different set of priorities. Furthermore, one should not consider ethnic Ukrainian Russophones as not patriotic because they are less likely to speak Ukrainian. Nor should one automatically believe that Russophone Ukrainians do not identify with being Ukrainian. Many if not most Russophone Ukrainians consider themselves as being equally as Ukrainian as Western Ukrainians and very often are offended by suggestions which might claim the contrary. The difference is that for Western Ukrainians being Ukrainian is their single most important identity whereas for Russophone Ukrainians ethnicity is often not an issue and being Eastern Slavic is also an important identity. In some surveys this Eastern Slavic identity is expressed as simply being “Soviet”. However, it is also true that until the dissolution of the USSR some Eastern Slavs simply did not bother to raise the question of which ethnic group they belonged to.

Ukraine’s Ideology Due to the influences of the nation’s ethnic nationalist West and pan-Slavic Central, Eastern and Southern regions, the Ukrainian government has been forced to develop a balanced foreign and security policy. The result has been the adoption of a pragmatic social nationalist ideology in the development of these policies. These policies can be considered as falling into the social nationalist camp for a number of reasons. Ukraine is a state which is centred around the Ukrainian ethnicity. According to the Constitution, Ukrainian is the official language and the traditions and history of ethnic Ukrainians are regarded as those which are the backbone of the country. However, all ethnic minorities are allowed to freely develop and use their own languages and cultures. Such activities are even supported through government funding, though at a minimum level due to the present state of the economy. Moreover, these groups are not expected to assimilate. The Ukrainian nation is based on citizenship. For these reasons, Ukraine can be considered social nationalist and not official nationalist. Therefore when speaking of the Ukrainian nation, the government is including all ethnic and other minorities.20 When Ukraine declared independence, all Soviet citizens residing on the territory of Ukraine at the time, regardless of ethnicity, religion, place of birth, language etc., were automatically eligible to become Ukrainian citizens. Ukraine does not hold any territorial claims against other states regardless of the existence of Ukrainians in those states. Furthermore, unlike Ukraine’s ethnic nationalists who consider Russia to be Ukraine’s former “master” and present enemy, the Ukrainian government actually views Russia as a fraternal state, regardless of the fact that their relationship since independence has been at times problematic. In order to understand the nature of Ukraine’s state policies it is first necessary to undertake an examination of recent developments in Ukraine and the former USSR since independence. We will begin with an examination of the reasons for the dissolution of the USSR. The usual reasons for the dissolution of the USSR have been clouded in such Cold War rhetoric as the Soviet peoples’ longing for ‘freedom and independence’, or their wishes to finally break away from the ‘chains of Communism’. Other explanations are based on ethnic tensions between various groups due to the rise of ethnic nationalism. In Ukraine’s 19

It can be assumed that the reason the figure is not higher for Russians is due to the Western Ukrainian factor. See Economic Culture of Ukrainian Population, Kiev: Democratic Initiatives Centre, February (1996) 5. 20 See Constitution of Ukraine.

case the Western view has been that the nation’s historical ethnic nationalism which manifested itself in Ukrainians’ dislike of the Russians and yearning to be independent of their colonising ‘Big Brother’ was an important factor in voting for independence. Although it is true that the reasons for voting for independence in Western Ukraine were largely due to factors which are explained by using ethnic nationalist theory, the same can not be said for the majority of the country’s citizens. The reasons for voting for independence in Central, Eastern and Southern Ukraine were due to economic nationalism. Though there are many explanations, the main reason most Soviet citizens supported the independence of their republics was due to the rise of economic nationalism which had these people believe that their standards of living would improve once their nations gained independence. During the final years of the USSR’s existence, when shortages were on the rise, there was a common illusion among Soviet citizens that their republic (or in some cases even oblast) was economically providing disproportionately more to the other republics than it was receiving in return. In Ukraine’s case, this economic nationalism made people think that they would enjoy a standard of living which would rival that of the most prosperous countries of Western Europe if only they would stop being ‘forced to give away’ that which they produced to the other republics. One of the elements that greatly added to this myth, and the growth of economic nationalism, was a widely published study by a major German Bank which compared Ukraine to some of the Western European members of the G-7 in terms of industrial and agricultural production of various commodities. In almost every category, Ukraine ranked as one of the top three producers of the given commodity.21 In another German study, much boasted of by Leonid Kravchuk, Ukraine was rated as the Soviet republic most likely to succeed as an independent state; followed by the Baltics and then Russia. 22 The conclusion reached by unsuspecting Ukrainians was that Ukraine could enjoy a standard of living similar to the countries of Western Europe. The reason why it was not enjoying such a standard of living was, of course, because it was ‘giving away’ its wealth and getting nothing in return from the other Soviet republics. Or so it was believed. In order to solve the problem of shortages, some republics, and even oblasts, developed economic nationalist policies by limiting or completely forbidding the export of various deficit goods out of their territory of jurisdiction. Ukraine, for example, introduced a coupon system so that only people residing in Ukraine could purchase goods in Ukrainian shops (The coupons were used in conjunction with the rouble when making a purchase). The result of such a decline in trade was, unfortunately, a worsening of the economic situation of not only the other Soviet republics but, ironically, the republics that carried out such policies. The use of economic nationalist levers were to lead the republics to an even greater level of independence. Following the 1991 August Putsch, the leaders of the three Eastern Slavic republics found common ground to destroy the Soviet Union with the signing of the Belovezhaya Treaty forming the Commonwealth of Independent States. Throughout the Gorbachev Era, the West had promised increasing amounts of economic aid if the Soviet Union were to implement certain pro-market and democratic reforms.23 Although Perestroika had made considerable changes to the social and economic fabric of the Soviet Union, certain leaders like Russian President Boris Yeltsin complained that reforms were moving much too slowly. The ‘Belovezhaya Trio’ believed that, if independent, the West would help their republics by showering them with money in various forms of economic aid. Although this view may have been naïve, the three leaders’ assumptions were not ungrounded for some of the states of Central and Eastern Europe, after the events of 1989, actually did receive substantial promises of economic aid from the West. Regardless of these promises, the amounts that were actually given were far less than that which was promised. A new 21

Vechirniy Kyiv, August 30, 1991. Holos Ukrainy April 3, 1991. 23 Phyllis Bennis & Michel Moushabeck ed., Beyond the Storm, (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1991) 114. 22

‘Marshall Plan’ was not what the West was about to offer them. Believing that with independence their standard of living would improve, it can be understood why a majority of Ukrainians, including ethnic Russians and other minorities living in Ukraine, voted for independence during the December 1, 1991 referendum. Ukrainians who had been living through serious economic decline wanted to improve their lives in any way they saw fit. Faced with a newly uncensored media which constantly exaggerated both the difficulties of Soviet life and the ‘good-life’ of the West, what Ukrainians began seeing fit was to implement a system of economic nationalism by voting for independence. With independence in place Ukrainians could then keep all of their goods in their own republic. Ethnic nationalist anti-Russian sentiments and feelings of being a colony of the USSR, though prevalent in Western Ukraine (only 20% of Ukraine’s inhabitants live in this region), the Baltics, and some Caucasian republics, were not the predominant attitude of the majority of Soviet citizens and especially not the majority of Ukraine’s citizens or even ethnic Ukrainians. Many experts now agree that: “Except in the western parts of Ukraine, the motor force for independence was socio-economic in nature.”24 Ironically Ukrainian independence was not a victory for Ukrainian nationalists since the Communists still remained in power. In actual fact, with Ukraine now independent the Ukrainian communists strengthened their power even more vis-à-vis the nationalists since they could no longer be removed by, and no longer took orders from, Moscow. There are various facts which support the economic nationalist argument of Ukraine’s independence vote and which also refute the nationalist thesis of Ukrainian independence. The election of the former head of the Communist party of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, as Ukraine’s first president suggests that the electorate could not have been overly anti-Soviet, anti-Communist nor pro-nationalist. This is also reflected in the fact that the leftwing parties in Ukraine today make-up the strongest block in the country. The nationalist parties and leaders have always received very few votes in Ukraine outside of their political strongholds in the Western oblasts.. The defeat of Kravchuk in the 1994 presidential election was due to his perceived nationalist leanings and destruction of the economy. His replacement with a president who vowed to integrate Ukraine with Russia and make Russian the second official language suggest, moreover, that nationalism is definitely not supported and the standard of living is really what matters. As one writer put it: “Kuchma’s victory, in this sense, gave the majority of the Ukrainian population the possibility to feel that it was their state and not just that of Kiev writers and Lviv dissidents.”25 Of course, since then, times have changed and it is relatively safe to predict that Kuchma will also be defeated in the next election for the same reason as his predecessor. Although during the 1991 referendum, 90% of voters supported independence, polls taken since then, with an economy that has deteriorated, have consistently shown that a majority of the electorate now favours Ukraine’s reintegration with the countries of the former USSR. A relatively recent study has shown that 59% of Ukrainian citizens feel their country’s interests would be best served if the government “sought confederation with Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and other former Soviet Republics.”26 If Ukrainians were at all nationalistic, the polls would certainly show a different result. It is an interesting phenomenon that regions like Crimea which voted in favour of Ukrainian independence by a majority in December 1991 became separatist following independence. What has brought about this change? Since independence, democracy and its 24

Alexander Motyl & Bohdan Krawchenko. “Ukraine: from Empire to Statehood” in Ian Bremmer & Ray Taras. New States, New Politics: Building the Post Soviet Nations. (Cambridge U. Press, Cambridge, 1997): 244. For another discussion of how socio-economic factors were the main reasons for voting for independence in Ukraine see Bohdan Nahaylo, “The Birth of an Independent Ukraine”, RFE/RL Research Institute, Report on the USSR, vol.3, no. 50, December 13, 1991. 25

Oleksandr Hurevich. “‘Tret’oi syly’ chekaty ne vypadaye.” Den’, No. 213, November 26, 1997. Volodymyr Zviglyanich. “The Specter of Integration in Russia: Lessons for the West and Ukraine,” A Political Portrait of Ukraine: Bulletin. Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 8 (1997): 17. 26

institutions have been strengthened; people’s freedoms have been expanded; economic and social reforms are steadily proceeding (though failing); there is more food in the shops and no more line-ups. What could possibly be the reasons for their separatist desires, after having voted in favour of Ukraine’s independence in 1991? It seems the only viable answer is that the standard of living has greatly deteriorated thus causing people to second guess the merits of the economic nationalism which resulted in Ukraine’s independence.27 There is, however, a second argument, linked to economic nationalist theory, as to why the majority of Ukrainians and members of ethnic minority groups in Ukraine voted in favour of independence. It is that many people did not really understand what independence was and were actually misled by their leaders. Ukrainians did not think that they would end up in another country separated from Russia and the other Soviet republics. Instead, they thought that they would be together in one country with the other Soviet republics, but in control their own economy. Actually, it appears that Boris Yeltsin may also have believed this. What many Ukrainians did believe was that with independence the “Communists” would not get their hands on their goods and no longer ruin the economy. This argument may in fact explain why many Ukrainians voted overwhelmingly in favour of the March 17, 1991 referendum for both questions and why Crimeans who voted in favour of independence shortly thereafter started trying to reunite with Russia.28 Since Russia’s economy is doing better and the standard of living is higher than in Ukraine (which was not the case during the Soviet period), people in Central, Southern and Eastern Ukraine (especially Crimea), feel that their lives would improve once reunited with Russia and the other former Soviet states. Thus these separatist or ‘unionist’ tendencies, which will only increase with any worsening of Ukraine’s economic situation, could pose a serious threat to Ukrainian security since they could destroy the country. However, there are other factors involved in Ukrainian attitudes towards reunification. Boris Yeltsin, with the bombing of the Russian Duma in October 1993 and the attack on Chechnya has probably done more to discredit a renewed union than Ukrainian nationalists could ever hope doing themselves. However this does not mean that this situation will last forever. When Russia begins to treat Ukraine as an equal partner (which is beginning to be the case) and refrains from involvement in local armed conflicts, the number of Ukrainians supporting a new ‘union’ will certainly increase. 29 It is interesting to compare the Ukrainian and the Baltic independence referendums and the voting patterns of local ethnic minority groups. Although ethnic Russians and other Slavs made up relatively large proportions of the Baltic populations the votes in favour of Baltic independence were huge. The reason for this is that ethnic Russians and other Slavs like their indigenous counterparts actually supported Baltic independence. Ironically, the same people who helped these countries achieve their independence are now being alienated and have had their rights seriously curtailed. Why, one might ask, did they vote in favour of independence?30 Certainly it was not because they felt that the Baltic states should be independent due to historical factors or because they disliked their Russian Communist ‘overlords’ or possibly because they felt that this was the best way to preserve the Baltic languages and cultures. However, these certainly were the feelings of many and probably most native Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians. The only plausible explanation for the local Russians and other Slavs to vote for independence was their belief that this would raise their standards of living. The reason why these people are not exercising the Voice or 27

For a discussion of these sentiments among the population see Elizabeth Pond, “Is Ukraine European?”, Europe, March 1995, No. 344, p.26 (2) 28 For a discussion of this theory see: Paul S. Pire, “National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine”, Europe Asia Studies, Vol. 48, No. 7, (1996): 1079-1104. 29 See for example: Chrystyna Lapychak, “The Quest for a Common Destiny,” Transition, vol.2 No. 18, (6 September 1996): 8. 30 For a discussion of this see: Ian Bremmer & Ray Taras, ed. Nation and politics in the Soviet successor states. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 176, 200 & 216.

Exit options regardless of the discrimination levelled against them in the Baltic states is because their standards of living are relatively better than those in Russia and the other former Soviet states. Why is it important for a study on nationalism in the Ukrainian military to look at the reasons for the support of Ukrainian independence among the population? It is important in order to illustrate the lack of support for ethnic nationalism among the greater proportion of the population. It is also important in order to understand the reasons why Ukraine has not adopted most of the Ukrainian nationalist military traditions in its armed forces, which to the majority of Ukraine’s citizens are not only foreign but in some cases downright criminal. The greater proportion of the population, which is not nationalistic, has never been nationalistic and does not support the glorification of Ukraine’s ethnic and integral nationalist history, will simply reject such an approach and disillusionment with the country’s independence will increase. Whatever happens in the military will affect the rest of Ukraine since military service is mandatory and the armed forces, as in the Soviet period, are an important socialising institution. This means that any bad feelings towards Ukraine can grow in the armed forces and later spread throughout society. Glorifying the exploits of Ukrainian nationalist history would not only increase separatist or pro-union demands from the local population but would also lead to a demise in loyalty and thus combat effectiveness among non-Western Ukrainians and ethnic minority troops.

Nationalism and Ukrainian Military Tradition The nationalist not only does not disapprove of atrocities committed by his own side, but he has a remarkable capacity for not even hearing about them. George Orwell, “Notes on Nationalism,” 1945 History is something that has always been used to instil nationalism. Every regime uses history to its own advantage in order to justify its own existence, claims to territory or even reasons for not trusting another state. In Ukraine, by manipulating history, nationalist groups have been trying to make a generally Russophile population anti-Russian. According to Ukrainian nationalist historiography, Ukrainians have always struggled to create an independent state. Russians and Russia are the usual scapegoat for Ukrainian nationalists as to why Ukraine did not gain its independence during various periods of history. They cannot accept that their many defeats throughout history were due to faults of their own or simply the unpopularity of their cause among the Ukrainian population. Instead, they try to blame others for their problems and the usual scapegoats are, the Russians; though Poles and Jews also have their place. Since the most important concept for nationalists is the existence of the state, and since they feel that this concept is threatened by the lack of nationalism in Ukraine, it is necessary to show that Russia has been, and remains, Ukraine’s primary enemy since that is the country with which a great deal of Ukrainians want to reunite. This is why there is a focus in Ukrainian nationalist history to depict Russia as the enemy.31 Depicting Russia as the enemy may also be an important step in reclaiming ‘lost lands’ which are now part of Russia. Ukrainian nationalist maps of Ukraine, very often show the Ukrainian ethnographic territory as stretching from Krakow to practically the Volga river. Therefore, in order to create a ‘Greater Ukraine’, it is first necessary to convince the population who the enemy is. Then, it becomes a great deal easier to convince people that the enemy is occupying Ukrainian lands; which then makes it easier to convince them that it is necessary to reclaim those lands.32 The following chapter will examine some of the episodes in Ukrainian military history which are being used as part of the military-patriotic education program in the contemporary Ukrainian military. The purpose is not to give an in-depth history of Ukraine or of the nationalist movement but rather to show the reader which parts of Ukrainian history are most acceptable, which are most controversial, and where opinions differ between nationalists and their ideological adversaries. By examining these episodes in Ukrainian history it will also be clearer why certain nationalist groups could cause problems if glorified in a democratic Ukraine which cherishes good relations with its ethnic minorities and neighbours. One important side theme will be to answer the question of whether it is true that Ukrainians have always conducted an ‘independence struggle’ throughout their history, as the nationalists suggest and is it due to the fault of Russians that Ukrainians have not been able to realise this dream of independence?

Kievan-Rus 31

In a hypothetical situation where a majority of Ukrainians wanted to reunite with Poland, it is quite probable that the major focus of Ukrainian nationalist history would be against Poland. 32 During an interview, one veteran of the SS Galician Division was upset that other nationalists were forcing their views upon Ukrainians and thus scaring them. He suggested that they proceed slowly and when Ukrainian independence was secure, and the Ukrainian military sufficiently strong, Ukraine could then reclaim its ‘lost lands’ from its neighbours.

Kievan Rus is the name of the first and mightiest Kingdom of the Eastern Slavs. It was established in the late 9th century and lasted until the mid 13 th century when it was finally destroyed by the Mongols. Studies of the origins of Kievan Rus are relatively controversial though largely academic. Some historians known as ‘Normanists’ argue that Kievan Rus was created by the Varangians who were invited to rule over the Eastern Slavs. The ‘antiNormanists’ however argue that the Varangians were not invited to rule over the Eastern Slavs and that Kievan Rus was an entirely Eastern Slavic creation. Whether or not the Varangians created Kievan Rus the fact is that the kingdom did end up being controlled by Eastern Slavs and that their culture was dominant. At the height of its existence, Kievan Rus was the largest and most powerful kingdom in Europe. During the Kievan Rus period the Eastern Slavs first developed a real military force under the leadership of such Varangian princes as Askold and Dir, Oleh, Ihor and Sviatoslav. This military proved to be quite powerful and managed to expand the country’s borders to include much of the territory of present day Ukraine, European Russia and Belarus. The kingdom’s armies also managed to extract favourable trade concessions from the Byzantine Empire by invading it on numerous occasions. Culture and religion were also to blossom during the existence of Kievan Rus. In 988 AD, during the rein of Volodymyr the Great, Kievan Rus adopted the orthodox form of Christianity from the Byzantines; an step which then prompted a massive drive to construct churches throughout the kingdom. Later during the rein of Yaroslav the Wise (978-1054), Kievan Rus obtained its first code of law, the ‘Ruska Pravda’. The Kievan Rus period is considered a proud period of history for all Eastern Slavs and is looked upon positively by all of the different groups in Ukrainian society. Ukrainian nationalists tend to view Kievan Rus as the first Ukrainian state and argue that Russia cannot trace its roots to Kievan Rus; Russian nationalists view Kievan Rus as the first Russian state; non-nationalists more objectively view it as simply the first Eastern Slavic state. In any case, all sides appear to be in favour of Kievan Rus.

The Cossacks The Cossacks are, without doubt, the most widely loved and respected warriors in Ukrainian history. They are the most central historical figures in Ukrainian culture and are one of the greatest embodiments of the Ukrainian nation. However, the Cossack period also happens to be where differences begin to arise between nationalists and anti-nationalists. It is generally accepted by historians that the Cossacks came into existence in the last two decades of the 15th century. As Eastern Slavic peasants began fleeing the oppression of their Polish overlords they settled in the largely uninhabited areas below the rapids located on the Dnipro River where they survived by fishing, hunting and, at times, by looting Tatar caravans. Although the majority of those who fled to the unsettled lands were Eastern Slavs, and especially Ukrainians, other ethnic groups such as Moldavians, Poles and even Tatars also came. What they all had in common was their longing to be independent and free of oppression. For this reason, they adopted the name “Cossack” which was the Turkic word for free and independent men. The Cossacks defended themselves from Tatar slave raids by banding together for protection and eventually forming a real army. As the Cossacks became increasingly stronger they not only managed to protect themselves and the Eastern Slavs from the Tatars, but also managed to attack the Tatars and Ottoman Turks in their own strongholds. They became so powerful that they were even known to have invaded the Ottoman capital in order to free Eastern Slavic slaves and loot the city. The Cossacks soon became known for their fierce bravery, excellent fighting abilities and their devout defence of Orthodox Christianity which

was often used as a rallying cry in their battles against their enemies. The Cossack’s accomplishments did not go unnoticed among the Polish magnates who soon began to employ some of the Cossacks to protect their land holdings and later even the frontiers of Poland. At this point, it is important to make a distinction between the various Cossacks which existed on Ukrainian soil. The Cossacks, that were employed by the Poles and began living in the Polish controlled towns, were known as registered Cossacks. The more numerous Cossacks who lived south of the Dnipro rapids and were totally independent of Polish rule became known as the Zaporozhian Cossacks. As Polish oppression increased against the Eastern Slavic peasants, the Cossacks would often rise up in rebellion and fight against the Poles. Each side took turns defeating the other in various battles which basically resulted in a stalemate until the advent of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky.

Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky Polish oppression of the Eastern Slavs continued to increase until it finally reached a breaking point in the middle of 17th century. The situation among the Polish occupied Eastern Slavs was ripe for revolution and it was at this point that Bohdan Khmelnitsky’s life also dramatically changed. Khmelnitsky had been living the life of a registered Cossack on his estate in the town of Chyhyryn that was located approximately 180 km south-east of Kiev. His life had been relatively quiet for a few years when one day his estate at Subotiv was raided by a local Polish magnate (Pan) named Daniel Czaplinski who proceeded to appropriate its possessions and flogged the Cossack leader’s son who later died of his injuries. The death of Khmelnitsky’s wife shortly after the incident is said to have been due to the terror she experienced during the raid. Khmelnitsky’s search for justice through the Polish legal system and his ties to the King of Poland only managed to get him arrested. With no choice left to him, Khmelnitsky with the aid of his friends managed to escape and fled to the Zaporozhian Sich (stronghold) like so many of his ethnic brethren. While among the Zaporozhian Cossacks, Khmelnitsky was elected their Hetman and proceeded to seek justice for himself and his countrymen. What followed was to be known as the Revolution of 1648, when the Eastern Slavs liberated themselves from Polish domination. However, the liberation and the freedom which followed was not concrete. One of the reasons that the Cossacks were able to defeat the Poles was due to help from the Crimean Tatars. However, at critical points in various battles the Tatars would simply withdraw thus leaving the Cossacks to be defeated by the Poles. The Tatars were interested in simply keeping a military balance in the region with neither the Poles nor the Cossacks gaining a decisive upper hand. This stalemate was a serious dilemma for Khmelnitsky and the Cossacks since the situation of the Eastern Slavs had hardly changed since the outbreak of hostilities with Poland. Khmelnitsky had appealed to the Russian Tsar for aid during various points in the war against Poland. Initially, the young Tsar Alexei was still politically weak and facing a serious revolt through the summer and fall of 1648. These problems understandably put the Tsar in no position to help the Cossacks against Poland. However, when the Tsar was again approached by Khmelnitsky’s officials on numerous occasions in 1652 and 1653 his position had changed significantly enough that he finally agreed to the Cossack request of extending his protection over them. The result was the signing of the Pereyaslav Agreement of 1654 which united the Cossack held Eastern Slavic lands with Muscovy. Bohdan Khmelnitsky is considered Ukraine’s greatest military hero; a fact that has been respected by both the Russian Empire and Soviet Union. During the Soviet period, one

of the highest ranking military medals was named in Khmelnitsky’s honour. Nonetheless, Khmelnitsky like most figures in Ukrainian history is a rather controversial one. He is admired by most groups in Ukrainian society for having freed Ukraine of Polish oppression. Most Ukrainians citizens (including ethnic Russians) also admire Khmelnitsky for having reunited the Eastern Slavic lands of Ukraine and Russia. However, exactly for this reason, among Ukrainian nationalists he is looked down upon for having made the ‘mistake’ of plunging Ukraine into ‘300 years of Russian oppression’. Nonetheless, Ukrainian nationalists do consider Khmelnitsky a hero since he is considered to have created an independent Ukrainian state. Jews are definitely not in favour of Khmelnitsky because they blame him for one of the worst massacres of their people in history. Poles feel the same way. It is rather interesting to note that Ukrainian Uniates are big supporters of Khmelnitsky regardless of the fact that they too were massacred, as they were considered to have betrayed the Orthodox religion. Regardless of the opposition to Khmelnitsky among Poles and Jews, the mass admiration of the Hetman is probably far too strong for anyone to challenge. The fact that the revolution took place so long ago also tends to decrease any resistance to using Khmelnitsky as a heroic figure.

Ivan Mazepa Ivan Mazepa is one of the most controversial leaders in all of Ukrainian history and certainly the most controversial Cossack leader. Unlike Khmelnitsky who is admired throughout Ukraine, Mazepa is either liked or disliked depending on which side of the cultural, political and linguistic border of Ukraine one is located. The controversy surrounding Mazepa involves his defection to the side of Swedish King Charles XII during the Great Northern War (1700-1721) against Peter I of Russia. Ukrainian nationalists argue that Mazepa joined the Swedes in order to ensure the victory of Ukraine’s independence. Non-nationalists argue that Mazepa was a traitor who was only interested in his own well-being and that of the Cossack elite. Ivan Mazepa was born in 1639 into a family of Cossack gentry. His father joined the armies of Bohdan Khmelnitsky during the Revolution of 1648 apparently in order to improve the precarious status he held in the Polish Commonwealth. In his youth, Mazepa studied at a Jesuit college in Warsaw. While there, his intellectual abilities were noticed by the Polish ruling circles. This connection quickly led to his employment as a page at the Polish court of King Jan Kazimierz who was interested in “creating a circle of pro-Polish Orthodox Ukrainians”.33 Later, along with two other young members of the Polish nobility, he was sent to study in Western Europe for three years, compliments of the Polish court. Upon his return to Warsaw, the highly intelligent and sophisticated Mazepa, who by this time could speak Polish, German, Italian, French, Dutch, and Latin, was sent on diplomatic missions to the Cossacks on behalf of the Polish king. However, Mazepa’s diplomatic activity only lasted about four years until his employment was terminated due to an alleged involvement in romantic affairs with the wives of important Polish nobles. After spending a few years on his father’s estate, Mazepa entered the service of the Right-Bank Hetman Petro Doroshenko where he quickly rose through the ranks to become the general aide-de-camp in the Cossack General Staff. While on his way to the Crimea to convince the Tatars to join Doroshenko against the Poles, Mazepa was captured by the Zaporozhian Cossacks who at the time were fiercely anti-Crimean Tatar and pro-Muscovite. The Zaporozhians imprisoned Mazepa and later sent him to Moscow. However, due to his charm and intellect, the sly Mazepa was not only released but even gained favour in the Russian court. Upon his release, Mazepa was sent to serve with the Hetman of the Muscovite allied 33

Paul Robert Magocsi, A History of Ukraine. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996): 240.

Left-Bank Cossacks, Ivan Samoilovych. Ivan Mazepa once again showed his genius for rising rapidly in political ranks by eventually being promoted to the position of general aidede-camp in the General Staff of the Left-Bank Cossacks. A few years later in 1687, unfairly blamed for the failure of a Muscovite military campaign against the Crimean Tatars, Hetman Ivan Samoilovych was arrested by the Muscovite Regent Sophia. Elected as his replacement was none other than the Muscovite favourite, Ivan Mazepa. On his appointment, as all new Hetmans following Ukraine’s unification with Russia, Mazepa swore allegiance to the Muscovite Tsar and confirmed Ukraine’s inclusion within the confines of the Muscovite state. During Mazepa’s first few years as Hetman, he was as loyal to the Russian crown as any Hetman before him. His loyalty earned him great favour with Russian rulers and allowed Mazepa to become one of the richest feudal lords in all of Europe.34 It is estimated that Mazepa owned 20,000 estates and 100,000 peasants in Ukraine and 20,000 serfs within Russia.35 Viewed in Ukraine as an outsider due to his years of serving the Polish crown, Mazepa started to make political allies by enriching the Cossack starshyna (officer class) and the Orthodox Church. It was for his activities during this period that Mazepa is now recognised as having made many contributions to the construction of churches and funding of cultural and educational establishments in Ukraine.36 However, regardless of what the elites may have thought of Mazepa, there is a great deal of evidence to show that the common peasant and Cossack masses despised him. In addition to detesting him for having enriched himself at their own expense, Mazepa’s reintroduction of serfdom into Ukraine made him as popular as the Polish magnates who had enslaved the Ukrainian peasants prior to the Khmelnitsky uprising.37 The reintroduction of serfdom was not the only aspect of Mazepa’s rule that reminded his countrymen of their grim lives under Polish rule. Mazepa’s court in the Cossack capital of Baturin resembled the Warsaw residence of the Polish king. In fact, the disdain for the Hetman was so great that it resulted in several uprisings against his rule which Mazepa skilfully crushed. Probably the most famous of the uprisings was that led by Petro Ivanenko-Petryk who was a politically well-connected Cossack scribe. Petryk fled to the Zaporozhian Sich and began to incite the Zaporozhians to rise up and free Ukraine from the yoke of Mazepa’s rule and Muscovite tyranny with the help of the Crimean Tatars and Ottoman Turks. Although Petryk’s campaign failed, his movement nonetheless reflected the great displeasure among the Ukrainian population towards Mazepa’s rule. It is interesting to note that although Petryk also fought for an independent Ukraine, he has not entered the pantheon of Ukrainian nationalist heroes. The Zaporozhian Cossacks had a great dislike for Mazepa who tried to subjugate them to his rule. On numerous occasions, Mazepa openly made known that it was “necessary to destroy that ‘damned nest.’”38 Mazepa staunchly protected his own interests at the expense of the interests of the state. A good example is the case of Semen Paliy, a Cossack colonel in Polish occupied Right-Bank Ukraine, who, in 1702-1704, led a smaller version of the 1648 Khmelnitsky uprising. During the uprising the tide turned against Paliy’s forces and his capital, Fastov, was besieged by the Poles. However, during the siege of Fastov, the Swedes attacked Poland from the north thus relieving the pressure from Paliy’s forces. At this moment, Mazepa convinced Peter I to let him occupy Right-Bank Ukraine and thus reunite the country. However, upon entering Right-Bank Ukraine “in order to guarantee himself from danger from the side of the nationally popular Paliy, Mazepa, with Peter’s conformity, gave orders for him to be arrested and sent to Siberia.” 39 Later, after Mazepa’s defection to the side of the Swedes, Peter I understood his mistake and released the popular colonel who then took part 34

Orest Subtelny, Ukraina: Istoria. (Kyiv: Lybid’, 1993): 205. O.M. Dmytrenko ed., Volodari Het’manskoi Bulavy: Istorychni portrety. (Kyiv: Varta, 1995): 390. 36 Subtelny, Ukraina: Istoria 206. 37 Mazepa forced the peasants to work 2 days per week for their Cossack gentry or Orthodox church landlords. See Magocsi 241 and Dmytrenko 390. 38 I. Krypyakevych et al. Istoria Ukrains’koho Viys’ka. (Lviv: Svit, 1992): 228. 39 Subtelny, Ukraina: Istoria 208. 35

in the Battle of Poltava on the Russian side against the forces of Charles XII and Ivan Mazepa. Initially, the Cossack Hetman’s relations with the young Tsar Peter I were very close. Although Peter set out to rid his court of those who had been loyal to Sophia, Mazepa was an exception. It is very possible that the westward looking Tsar took favour to the Hetman due to their common travels and knowledge of Western Europe. Without doubt, the Hetman’s craftiness and skill at winning people over to his side was a great help in gaining favour with Peter I. Mazepa worked closely with Peter during his various military campaigns. When Peter decided to attack the Turkish fortress of Azov, Mazepa ensured the participation of the LeftBank and Zaporozhian Cossacks. Mazepa also secured the participation of the Cossack armies in Peter’s battles against the Swedes during the initial years of the Great Northern War. Peter thanked the loyal Hetman by showering him with new estates and peasants to work the land, and by bestowing the highest military honours and titles upon him. The young Tsar had complete faith in Mazepa and refused to listen to any of the criticisms made against the Hetman by other Cossacks; a mistake the Tsar would later regret. The turning point in the relationship between the two allies is a cause for debate. Ukrainian nationalists tend to argue that Mazepa was finally fed up with seeing his men sent to various corners of the Russian empire in order to fight and die in Peter’s wars. It is said that at times up to 75% of Mazepa’s forces were killed in some of Peter’s campaigns. Nationalists also argue that the final act which sealed Mazepa’s defection to the Swedes was when Peter refused to send his troops to help Mazepa’s forces against the Swedes who were heading towards Ukraine. Peter maintained that he could not spare a single soldier due to his own serious predicament with the Swedes and that Mazepa would have to defend himself. Mazepa regarded Peter’s refusal to defend Ukraine as a breach of the 1654 Pereyaslav Agreement which therefore released Ukraine of its obligations to the Tsar. In this sense, Mazepa was only looking after the interests of his own people and state. Due to his disillusionment with Peter, Mazepa decided it was in his country’s best interests to be independent. Though these arguments do seem quite plausible, Mazepa’s abysmal record concerning the treatment of his own people and state tend to weaken this view. Non-nationalist historians point to different reasons for Mazepa’s defection to the Swedes. It appears that Peter’s Westernising reforms were beginning to interfere with Mazepa’s own influence and power. Mazepa feared that he would lose political and military power in Ukraineas Peter advanced an idea to integrate the Cossack armies into a modern Russian military. If such a plan were ever to have been implemented, Mazepa’s position would basically have been reduced to that of a general. Another very real explanation for Mazepa’s defection, however, might be that Mazepa saw that the military tide was turning against the Russian Tsar and that it was once again necessary to join the wining side just as he had done numerous times throughout his life. Charles XII was one of history’s greatest military geniuses and Mazepa himself paid testimony to the young king’s amazing military victories throughout Europe. One by one, Charles’ forces defeated the armies of the coalition of Poland, Saxony, Denmark and Russia. It seemed to Mazepa, and most of his European contemporaries, that Charles could not be stopped. Although Mazepa had begun secret negotiations with the Swedish installed Polish king Stanislaw Leszczynski as early as 1705, it is generally believed that he did not make his final decision to join the Swedes until 1707. Nonetheless Mazepa kept quiet about his plans to join the Swedes until Charles XII’s armies actually entered Ukraine in 1708. At this point Mazepa sent his diplomatic representative to sign an agreement with the Polish and Swedish kings. The Ukrainian-Swedish part of the agreement was purely military in nature, however the provisions signed with the Polish king were political. According to the provisions of the accord, “Ukraine was to come under the authority of the Polish king with rights analogous to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Mazepa obtained the provinces of Polotsk and Vitebsk and the

title of ‘Prince’.” 40 Peter was warned of Mazepa’s defection both by Colonel Iskra and a high Cossack official, Vasili Kochubey. The Tsar not only disregarded their charges but actually put them on trial and then handed them over to the Hetman who executed them in July 1708. 41 Thus, when Mazepa finally defected to the Swedes, no one was more surprised than Peter himself. Although Peter had been warned about Mazepa’s defection, he refused to believe it until Mazepa joined Charles’ headquarters at Korop on October 25, 1708. At this point, Peter, called together a council of the Left-Bank Cossacks in order to elect a new Hetman. The position was filled by the commander of the Starodub regiment, Cossack Colonel Ivan Skoropadsky. Peter’s other response to Mazepa’s defection was to attack and destroy the Hetman’s capital at Baturin, and massacre all of its inhabitants including women, children and the elderly. Before joining the Swedes in Korop, Ivan Mazepa had promised Charles XII that he would supply an army of 30,000 Cossacks. However, only 2,000-4,000 men followed the Hetman to the Swedish side. The rest of the Cossacks remained loyal to the Russian Tsar. Furthermore, many of those Cossacks who did follow Mazepa abandoned him once they found out his true intentions. According to Swedish sources, only 1,500 Cossacks remained with Mazepa.42 In contrast to the Swedish predicament, the Russian forces “were daily reinforced by thousands of Cossacks, who constantly harried the Swedish foragers.”43 For their part, the Zaporozhians were very divided and undecided about which side to support. During the Swedish occupation of Ukraine, the Zaporozhians were summoned by Mazepa to join the Swedish side. According to Zaporozhian customs, any such move would have to be put to a vote among all the Cossacks present at the Sich. The vote to join Mazepa was defeated. At this point, Kost Hordienko, the Commander of the Zaporozhian Cossacks who had supported Mazepa’s plan, sent a large number of the Zaporozhians who opposed joining Mazepa to the fortress at Kodak. Then, in a bid to ensure that the remaining troops would remain anti-Tsarist, Hordienko prevented the written appeals of the new Hetman Ivan Skoropadsky and Peter I from being read to the Zaporozhians. Therefore, when the issue was put to a second vote, a majority supported joining the Swedes and Mazepa. This sort of voting continued back and forth over a protracted period of time with neither side gaining a decisive victory in the voting. In the end, it was the constant flowery promises made by Ivan Mazepa, Charles XII and Kost Hordienko to the Zaporozhians which finally convinced about 8,000 of them to defect to the Swedish side. However, Mazepa’s luck in providing troops for the campaign was once again to run out. Due to their disrespectful treatment by Charles XII not as an army but rather as a bunch of ‘cut-throats’, many Zaporozhians soon abandoned Mazepa’s cause. Furthermore, the ‘national uprising’ against Tsarist rule which Mazepa was so desperately counting on, did not happen. Instead, the Ukrainian population appears to have overwhelmingly supported the Tsar. According to one of the leading historians of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, D.I. Yavornitsky, “…(Mazepa) did not understand the true ideals of the common people that made up the Little Russian masses.44 The entire history of Little Russia worked towards unification with Great Russia and in general the common masses were drawn towards the Muscovite Tsar.”45 The nationalist argument that the reason for the lack of support for Mazepa was because the Hetman did not psychologically prepare the Ukrainian population for an alliance with the Swedes against the Russians does not appear credible. Although the reason a certain 40

Dmytrenko ed., 395. Michael T. Florinsky. Russia: A History and an Interpretation. Vol.1 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959): 341 42 J.F.C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World. vol. II (New York: Da Capo Press, 1955): 172. 43 Ibid. 44 ‘Little Russians’ was how Ukrainians at the time were called. The word ‘Ukrainian’ only became prevalent much later. 45 D. I. Yavornitsky. Istoria Zaporozhskykh Kozakiv. (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, tom 3, 1993): 289. 41

portion of the population did not join Mazepa is due to their loyalty to the Tsar, the most important reason probably lies in the fact that people simply hated Mazepa due to his past record. If that were not enough, the fact that Mazepa wanted to once again subjugate his country to Polish rule was considered treasonous among a people who knew only too well the suffering that their forefathers had experienced at the hands of the Polish magnates. Furthermore, Semen Paliy’s anti-Polish insurrection only proved that life for Ukrainians under Polish rule was still unbearable. According to Yavornitsky: “The Zaporozhians were hostile towards the Russian government as soon as questions concerning the protection of Cossack rights from the encroachment of Moscow were raised. They strictly protected the legacies and national ideals of their forefathers. But regardless of all of this, the mass of the Zaporozhian army wanted to remain with Russia and in no way with Poland and even less so with Turkey. Turkey for the Zaporozhians was a country of infidels, Poland, was a country of magnates. The Zaporozhians never became friends with the hated Turks nor the pompous and swindling magnates. The Zaporozhians always felt more comfortable in muzhik Russia than in aristocratic Poland where every type of farmhand considered himself a magnate, where class prejudice and a strict caste system played and until this very day continue to play a huge role…. The ideals of the common Cossack masses was to retain the freedom of their ancestors though under the ‘good and philoprogenitive Russian monarch.’” 46 Although there had been various smaller battles and skirmishes between the Russian and Swedish led forces, the great turning point was the Battle of Poltava on June 27, 1709. Due to various factors, not least of which was the lack of Ukrainian support of Mazepa and his allies, the Russian forces, supported by the Ukrainian Cossacks, prevailed in what was to be one of the most important battles in European history. Russia’s victory at the Battle of Poltava secured Peter’s ‘Window to the West’ and made the country one of the Great Powers of Europe. For the Swedes, their loss at Poltava resulted in the ending of their status as a Great Power. For the Ukrainians and the Cossacks, the freedoms and autonomy won during the uprising of 1648 were to slowly be eroded until they were on an equally exploited par with all other Russian subjects. Along with Charles XII, Mazepa fled to the Turkish fort of Bendery. The defeated and broken Hetman died on August 22, 1709.

The Ukrainian Revolution Although Ivan Mazepa is a controversial figure, his name does not raise the emotional level nearly as much as do the various figures and armies in twentieth century Ukrainian history. There is a very logical explanation for this which lies in the fact that many members of contemporary Ukrainian society either witnessed or have close family members who took part in many of the events of this century. Although history books may convince people to be either in favour or against a certain historical personality or organisation, there is nothing more convincing than to hear about a certain episode from one’s loved ones or better yet, having personally taken part in that episode. For this reason, twentieth century Ukrainian history is the most controversial period in the nation’s existence and also the most difficult in which to reconcile the various groups in Ukraine. Due to the oppression and hardships caused by centuries of Tsarist rule and also World War I, the Russian Empire finally crumbled when military units joined demonstrators 46

D. I. Yavornitsky, 289. Please note that this book was originally written in 1897.

in setting up the first Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies in Petrograd in March (February by the old calendar) 1917. The Petrograd Soviet was copied throughout the former Russian Empire, including Russian administered Ukraine. Although initially the Soviet was represented by certain members in the Russian Duma (parliament), before long, tensions arose between the two power structures. The two greatest reasons for the initial creation of the Soviets which led to the abdication of the Tsar, food shortages and a desire to end the war, were not dealt with by the Duma then called the Provisional government. As a result of these tensions, the Soviets no longer recognised the authority of the Provisional Government and thus a power struggle ensued. In Ukraine, where the situation was somewhat different, there arose three different forces which struggled for power: 1) the Central Rada,47 composed of various political parties and organisations that, although socialist, was more defined by its national conscious orientation; 2) the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies set up in various cities and was composed of various political parties with a class conscious orientation; and 3) the Executive Committee of the Council of Combined Social Organisations (IKSOOO) composed of political elements which supported the Provisional Government. However, the lines between these three organisations were actually quite blurred, and some of them actually overlapped and initially all three of them recognised the supremacy of the Provisional Government in Petrograd. Some Ukrainians even believed that the Central Rada was itself a Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. For its part, faced with the problems of a war and revolution, the Provisional Government in Petrograd ignored the problems that existed in the provinces. Due to the lack of interest in Ukraine and faced with anarchy as a result of the loss of the old power structures, the Central Rada proclaimed itself the supreme representative body of the Ukrainian lands within the former Russian empire in its first ‘Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada to the Ukrainian Nation residing in Ukraine and Beyond its Borders’: “Let Ukraine be free. Without separating from Russia, without breaking with the Russian state, let the Ukrainian people have the right to manage its own life on its own soil.” 48 Because the Central Rada’s declaration was so critical of the Russian Provisional Government and as it only addressed ethnic Ukrainians, the ‘First Universal’ was bound to cause problems. Some sources have suggested that various social and ethnic groups including ethnic Russians and Jews were immediately opposed to the Central Rada’s First Universal. Russian nationalists were opposed to the First Universal on account of its dividing the “single and undivided Russia” while Socialists of various ethnic backgrounds were opposed to the declaration as it suggested a division of the working class movement along ethnic lines. It is interesting to note that some sources believe that the greatest reason for proclaiming the First Universal was pressure from Ukrainian military organisations. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, who was elected the first president of the Central Rada and was one of the foremost nationalist Ukrainian historians, states that it was due to pressure from military deputies who represented 1,736,000 armed Ukrainians in the Tsarist army that the First Universal was proclaimed: “The army deputies, several thousand in number, meeting in St. Sophia Square in Kiev took an oath not to leave the city until a suitable proclamation had been issued by the Ukrainian government, and demanded autonomy within a Russian Federation.”49 Hrushevsky goes on to argue that the Central Rada received so much support from the “people and army” for Ukrainian autonomy that it decided to act. Following the proclamation of the First Universal, the Provisional Government in Petrograd finally sent a delegation to Kiev, headed by Alexander Kerensky, in order to hold talks with the leaders of the Rada. The outcome was a compromise reached between the two sides which called for the Central Rada to refrain from making any further demands for autonomy until the convocation of an all-Russian constituent assembly. The Central Rada 47

Rada is Ukrainian for Soviet. P.P. Tolochko, ed. Ukrainska Tsentralna Rada: Dokumenty i Materialy. (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, tom 1, 1996): 101. 49 Michael Hrushevsky. A History of Ukraine. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941): 526. 48

would be allowed to rule the Ukrainian lands under its control through directions received from the Provisional Government. The agreement was outlined in the Central Rada's Second Universal. The compromise reached between the two sides did not alleviate their differences and their relations continued to worsen. However, the compromise did manage to enhance the image of the Central Rada in the eyes of the population and some political organisations who previously had not recognised its legitimacy. As the year 1917 progressed, the situation in the former Russian Empire continued to deteriorate. Several attempts were made to overthrow the Provisional Government by both the Bolsheviks and by the right wing forces of General Lavr Kornilov; though none succeeded. Finally after a second try, on November 7, 1917 (October 25th by the old calendar), the Bolsheviks backed by the masses managed to overthrow the Provisional Government. Before the October Revolution had even succeeded, it was already being criticised by the leadership of the Central Rada. Although some members of the Central Rada’s ‘Mala Rada’ tried to condemn the October Revolution in a resolution as solely the fault of the Bolsheviks, it was finally decided that in fact the Provisional Government due to “its bourgeois class tactics and imperialistic continuation of the war” was more to blame than the Bolsheviks.50 In the end, a resolution was passed which criticised the take-over of power by the Petrograd Soviet of Worker’s and Soldier’s Deputies, and made clear that the Central Rada was against this ‘revolt’ and would “stubbornly battle all attempts to support this revolt in Ukraine”.51 The Bolshevik members of the Central Rada immediately protested the resolution’s condemnation of the October Revolution as a ‘revolt’ and withdrew their membership in the ‘Mala Rada’. Nonetheless, for a short time, the Bolsheviks and the Central Rada managed to remain somewhat co-operative. Thus the relationship between the Bolsheviks and the Central Rada immediately commenced on a less than friendly course. Faced with the anarchy of the October Revolution and a perceived Bolshevik threat, the Central Rada decided to proclaim its Third Universal in which it announced the creation of the Ukrainian National Republic which was federated with Russia. The tensions between the Central Rada and the Bolsheviks would continue to grow, however, as the Central Rada continuously challenged the authority of the Bolsheviks. In a letter dated December 3, 1917, entitled “Manifest to the Ukrainian People with Categorical Demands Addressed to the Ukrainian Rada”52, Lenin made it clear that his government “recognise(d) the Ukrainian National Republic and its right to completely separate from Russia or enter into a treaty with the Russian Republic on federated or alike relations between them.”53 Lenin also stated that his government supported the autonomy and even independence of all the formerly subjugated nations of the Russian Empire. As proof of such a policy, Lenin mentioned the fact that his government had not made any attempts to restrict the national rights or independence of the Finnish people regardless of the bourgeois nature of that republic. However, there were a number of points which Lenin made clear in his letter to the Mala Rada, and Commissar of Nationalities Joseph Stalin later elaborated upon, which the Bolsheviks could not tolerate: 1) the independent withdrawal of Ukrainian military units from the front which was leading to the destruction of a common front, tying up supply trains headed for the front and ultimately prolonging the war; 2) the disarming of Soviet and Red Guard Units in Ukraine; 3) the support the Mala Rada was giving to the Kadet and Kaledin conspiracy and revolt against Soviet power by allowing their armies through Ukrainian territory while not allowing Soviet armies the same service in order to come to the aid of their own forces. Lenin’s letter stated that if the Soviet of People’s Commissars did not receive a reply to the letter within 48 hours it would regard the Central Rada in a state of open war against Soviet power in Russia and Ukraine. 50

Tolochko ed., note 270, pg. 562. Tolochko 363. 52 V.I. Lenin. Polnoe Sobranie Sochineniy. (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, vol. 35, 1974): 143. 53 Ibid. 51

However, Stalin made it clear that the Bolsheviks were not against the Central Radaas a whole but rather the policies of its General Secretariat which was seen as clearly counterrevolutionary due to its support of Kaledin whose forces had been massacring Bolshevik supporters in Rostov. Stalin also pointed out that the Rada’s belief that the Bolsheviks were opposed to Ukrainian sovereignty was bogus since Lenin himself had already openly recognised the sovereignty of the Ukrainian National Republic. In fact, Stalin stated, the Bolsheviks were prepared to go even further and recognise the independence of the former subjugated nations of the Russian Empire if they so chose, whereas Kaledin was well-known to have been opposed to the independence of Finland.54 On December 17, 1917, the ‘All-Ukrainian Congress of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies’ was convened in Kiev. The Central Rada, already aware of the Bolshevik tactic of gaining power through the Soviets, sent a large amount of its candidates to the Soviet in which the Bolsheviks became vastly outnumbered. When the Congress decided to reject Lenin’s ultimatum the Kiev Bolsheviks along with a few other deputies moved to Kharkiv where the local Soviet was dominated by Bolshevik-led workers. At that time, in Kharkiv, another congress of Soviets was being held with participants from across Eastern Ukraine and was renamed the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies. On December 25, the Congress declared the formation of a Soviet Ukrainian government, where most, although not all, ministers of the government were Bolsheviks. Thus with the Central Rada rejecting the Bolshevik ultimatum and the formation of a Soviet government, the stage was set for a confrontation between the two opposing sides one based in Kiev, the other in Kharkiv. Although skirmishes had already been breaking out in Ukraine between followers of the Bolsheviks and those of the Central Rada since the October Revolution, the most serious military conflict between the two sides started with the arrival of a Soviet Russian military force led by Vladimir Antonov–Ovseenko, a native of Chernihiv, Ukraine. Antonov– Ovseenko sent a ‘motley band’ of 600-800 men from Kharkiv under the command of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Mikhail Muravyev to attack the Central Rada forces in the beginning of 1918.55 While Muravyev advanced, anti-Central Rada uprisings began to take place in various cities under the control of the Central Rada. As the fighting continued, the areas under the control of the Rada contracted as an increasing amount of its military forces either disbanded themselves or joined the Bolshevik cause. In response to the ongoing conflict the Central Rada proclaimed its Fourth Universal in which Ukraine was proclaimed an independent state. Some members of the Central Rada had hoped that this would result in a cease in hostilities, however, it did not. The fighting between the Central Rada and Muravyev’s band lasted in and around Kiev from January 29 to February 8, 1918. This small force was sufficient enough to defeat the Rada’s forces and establish Soviet power in the city. By the time Muravyev entered the city, as the General Secretary of the Central Rada Volodymyr Vynnychenko frankly admitted, “the vast majority of the Ukrainian population was against us.” 56 However, how could a country whose leadership had not so long ago stated that it had 1,736,000 supporters within the Russian Imperial Army be defeated by a ‘band’ of 600-800 men? According to Hrushevsky: “Under the influence of the demoralising Bolshevik propaganda the ranks of the regular Ukrainian army had become depleted, and the task of mobilising new forces required additional time.”57 Hrushevsky, admits that once the Central Rada retreated from Kiev it relied on Germany to return Ukrainian prisoners of war captured from the Russian army, and on Austria to supply ‘Ukrainian regiments’ and “volunteer 54

See I.V. Stalin. Sochineniya. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, vol. 4, 1947):621. 55 George F. Kennan. Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920: Russia Leaves the War. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989): 185. 56 V. Vynnychenko. Vidrodzhenya Natsii. (Vienna, vol.2, 1920): 216. 57 Michael Hrushevsky. A History of Ukraine. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941): 545.

legions from Galicia to assist the Ukrainian government”.58 This suggests that only Galician Ukrainians were interested in preserving Ukrainian independence as the Central Rada could not recruit enough non-Galician Ukrainians to join the army. As for the Ukrainian prisoners of war from the Imperial Russian army, Hrushevsky states that they were being taught to be Ukrainian nationalists so that they would fight against Russia if Ukraine went to war with it; a policy which in fact backfired.59 Hrushevsky asserts that it was Bolshevik propaganda that made the Ukrainian population support them.60 However, the fact that it was only Bolshevik propaganda which influenced the Ukrainian population is a rather precarious argument. If Ukrainians had supported the Central Rada and Ukrainian independence then no amount of propaganda would have made any difference. This is the case with Poland whose population, also faced with Bolshevik propaganda, did not support them due to the strong existence of nationalism among the Polish people. According to one member of the Central Rada, and leader of the Jewish “Bund”, M.G. Rafes, the Ukrainian population ended up hating the leadership of the Central Rada due to their ‘Ukrainianisation’ policy. This Ukrainianisation policy included 1) the expulsion of the Russian language from schools and its replacement with the compulsory study of Ukrainian which was especially opposed by the Russian and Jewish populations; 2) the modification of the ethnic composition of the proletariat which led to a massive dismissal of the workers of the Arsenal factory, railroad workers and Post Office and Telegraph workers; 3) To remove from Kiev those people who had moved there within the last year, a policy aimed mostly at Jews.61 Rafes states that policies such as these turned even those people who once hated the Bolsheviks into their supporters. With regard to the Central Rada’s declaration of independence in the Fourth Universal, he mentions that “even the Kulak peasant elements, with all of their inclination towards Ukrainianisation felt no sympathy for the idea of dividing from Russia.”62 One thing is certain; whether they were foreign military or diplomatic personnel, Ukrainian members of the Central Rada, or Bolsheviks, all sources agree that the Central Rada had little support among the Ukrainian population. This would suggest, therefore, that the Central Rada’s legitimacy was rather questionable. The day after the Bolsheviks entered Kiev, the Rada signed the Treat of Brest-Litovsk with the Germans. According to George Kennan, the Soviet forces led by Muravyev pressed frantically ahead with a military offensive against the Rada because they wanted to prevent the signing of a separate German-Ukrainian treaty.63 The fact that the Rada wanted to sign a separate treaty was seen as undermining the Bolsheviks and removing some of their bargaining powers vis-à-vis the Germans. Less than two weeks after signing the treaty, due to a secret agreement between the Central Rada and the Germans, though officially due to a breakdown in negotiations with the Bolsheviks, the Germans, along with the Central Rada, renewed hostilities and on March 1, 1918 entered Kiev. The Rada was reinstalled “but naturally in a position of complete dependence on the Germans.”64 Although some people, such as Hrushevsky, have stated that Bolshevik power was brought to Ukraine on the “edge of bayonets”, Vynnychenko is of a different opinion. Responding to such suggestions he states that “without the Ukrainian masses no northern bayonets would have had any power.” He then says, “but that Ukrainian power was returned by way of heavy German guns, though no one bragged about it, is the bitter truth.”65 After the Central Rada’s victory by way of the German army, its legitimacy and 58

Ibid. Ibid. 542. 60 Hrushevsky 540-541. 61 M.G. Rafes. Dva Goda Na Revolyutsii: Evolyutsia I Raskol “BUNDA”. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoye Izdatel’stvo, 1920): 78. 62 Ibid. 63 Kennan 366-377. 64 Kennan 186. 65 V. Vynnychenko. Vidrodzhenya Natsii. (Vienna, vol.2, 1920): 299. 59

popularity was at an even lower level than it had been prior to their retreat; a situation which was only to become worse. One of the clauses in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk stipulated that the Central Rada would supply the Germans and Austrians with 300 truckloads of grain per day as a kind of tribute for their help in defending Ukraine against the Bolsheviks.66 In order to get this grain, the Central Rada was forced to requisition it from the peasants who gradually reduced their sowings and concealed their grain from the Rada agents. Proof that it was not the Rada that genuinely ruled the country was revealed when grain shipments fell behind schedule. The Germans then took it upon themselves to requisition the grain and punished peasants who refused in German military courts. Another way the Germans tried to punish the peasants was by taking away millions of acres of their land and returning it to the wealthy land owners. “The result was a wave of peasant revolts and guerrilla wars designed to disrupt the German requisitions: bridges and railway lines were destroyed and German units were attacked from the woods. The Ukrainian countryside was thrown into chaos.”67 The Germans, who blamed the Rada for the disorder in Ukraine, engineered a coup at the end of April 1918, installing into power the puppet regime of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, one of Ukraine’s richest landowners who had been an aidede-camp of Nicholas II. The Skoropadsky regime or Hetmanate, has never received much support, either during its existence or even at the present. It seems that the only real supporters of this puppet regime today are Skoropadsky’s family. What is important to note about the Hetmanate is that it was a dictatorship created and supported by the German Army which represented the interests of the large landowners and well-to-do peasants. Many of the socialist oriented reforms of the Central Rada were reversed, thus cancelling many of the gains of the revolution. With the approval of the large landowners, German army units were sent on punitive expeditions against the Ukrainian peasantry who refused to co-operate with the puppet regime and continued to lead armed uprisings. The forced collection of fines and shooting of hostages had become quite common during this period. However, there were certain positive aspects of the Skoropadsky period. A significant impact was made upon the educational system. Many Ukrainian language schools were established along with new universities, libraries, and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Nonetheless, the Skoropadsky regime was known as one which worked in the interest of the Russian and Russified elite. Once it was obvious that the Hetmanate’s days were numbered due to the defeat of Germany in World War One, on November 14, 1918, Skoropadsky carried out his own coup in which he abandoned the idea of Ukrainian statehood and proclaimed the federative union of Ukraine with a future non-Bolshevik Russia. However, this act convinced the opposition Directory, led by Vynnychenko and Petliura, that the time was ripe for an overthrow of the Hetmanate. The Directory then organised an army to fight against the Hetmanate’s forces which was made of some discontented peasants but most importantly the ‘Sich Riflemen’, a former battalion within the Austrian Army made up of Galician and Bukovinian Ukrainians led by Evhen Konovalets and Andriy Melnyk; two figures which would become more important in later years. However, the forces of the Directory (which at the time were actually allied with the Bolsheviks) and the Hetmanate (which was still backed by the Germans) fought to a stalemate until December 14, 1918 when the German army finally departed Kiev and returned to Germany. On December 19, the Directory’s forces entered Kiev. Skoropadsky had already left the country for Germany, ending a regime which had lasted only 8 months. One of the first things which the Directory did was to re-establish the Ukrainian National Republic under the leadership of the Directory. However to speak of a single government controlling the entire country would be incorrect. Until October 1920, the country was in a state of chaos, with the only real power being held by those who owned a 66

Orlando Figes. A People’s Tragedy. The Russian Revolution 1891-1924. (London: Random House, 1996): 548. Ibid.

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gun. Ukraine during this period was the centre of various movements, including the Whites, Reds, Ukrainian Nationalists, Ukrainian Anarchists, foreign armies and various other warlords. In this time of chaos, even the Bolshevik party was divided. While the Russiancentred Bolsheviks were holding talks with the Directory and assuring them that they would recognise the Directory’s authority, the Ukrainian Bolsheviks began organising a ‘provisional’ Soviet Ukrainian government. Then, without Lenin’s approval or knowledge, the Ukrainian Bolsheviks launched an attack on the Directory in the middle of December 1918.68 Two months after the Directory had come to power its rule came to an end when the Ukrainian Bolshevik armies entered Kiev in February 1919. Regardless of the fact that Lenin was opposed to the invasion, the Bolshevik armies “were greeted by the population with every show of enthusiasm.”69 They then established the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Their rule would last until August 1919 when again they would be driven out of Kiev, though this time by White armies from the east and forces loyal to the Ukrainian National Republic from the West. One accomplishment of the Directory was the unification of the ‘West Ukrainian National Republic’ with the Ukrainian National Republic on 22 January 1919. However, relations between the two sides could hardly be considered friendly. Each side had diametrically opposed goals which precluded the possibility of any long-term co-operation between them. Whereas the Western Ukrainians led by Yevhen Petrushevych expected to receive aid from the Entente (which by this time was occupying various cities and regions in the former Russian Empire) and wanted to co-operate with General Denikin, Petliura favoured co-operation with Poland. Thus each side favoured co-operation with the other’s mortal enemies; a disagreement that would have dire consequences for the Ukrainian independence movement. Eventually each side proceeded with its own plans. Petliura eventually signed an agreement with Poland which recognised Western Ukraine as part of Poland; a complete stab in the back to those Ukrainians living in Western Ukraine. The signing of the Treaty of Warsaw between Petliura and the Poles eventually led to the invasion of Ukraine by the Poles and Petliura’s forces in May 1919. However, by the beginning of June the Poles and Petliura’s forces were again evicted from Ukraine by the Red Army. For its part, the Galician Ukrainian Army of the West Ukrainian National Republic, without any authorisation from its leader Petrushevych, signed its own agreement with General Denikin in November 1919. The agreement made the Galician Ukrainian Army a part of Denikin’s White Army; a move which completely alienated them from Petliura. In an even more interesting turn of events, in January 1920 the Galician Ukrainian Army which had just fought on the side of the Whites, joined the Bolsheviks as the Red Galician Ukrainian Army.

The Ukrainian Revolution and Ethnic Minorities The Central Rada for its part had understood quite early on that it would be necessary to accommodate the various ethnic minorities in Ukraine if it were to be successful. Thus the Rada did for the most part try to incorporate the concerns of Ukraine’s ethnic minorities into its decision-making processes. A ‘Secretariat for Nationality Affairs’ was set up to deal with the concerns of the ethnic minorities. ‘National-Personal’ or ‘National-Cultural’ autonomy was granted to Jews, Poles and Russians, though not to any of the other minorities which would have to petition the government for such a status. This autonomy would guarantee an individual of the ethnic group in question the protection of his or her language or culture regardless of where they lived. 68

Ibid.706. E.H. Carr. A History of Soviet Russia: The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1920. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Vol. 1, 1978): 301. 69

The ethnic minorities themselves were well represented in the Central Rada. For example there were 50 Jewish, 20 Polish and 54 Russian deputies in the Central Rada and 5 Jewish, 2 Polish and 8 Russian members of the Mala Rada. Members of ethnic minorities also received posts in the General Secretariat and later a Ministry of Jewish Affairs, Ministry of Russian Affairs and a Ministry of Polish Affairs were created. However, regardless of the various concessions made to the ethnic minorities, all were opposed to Ukrainian independence and to separation from Russia. Although the Central Rada had become quite accommodating towards ethnic minorities, the situation would change during the Skoropadsky and Directorate periods, though for various reasons. Whereas Skoropadsky destroyed the autonomous status of the Jews, the anarchy during the short existence of the Directorate prevented it from protecting their well-being. The result was a wave of pogroms which resulted in the death of as many as 100,000 Jews. Although it is said that various political and military groups took part in the pogroms much if not most blame by Jewish scholars has been put on Petliura while he was leader of the Directorate after Vynnychenko’s resignation. Ukrainian nationalists argue that Petliura was not aware of the pogroms and that he had no power to control his military commanders who took part in pogroms, thus the pogroms were not Petliura’s fault. In fact some nationalists have even called Petliura the “defender of the rights of national minorities, especially of the Jewish population of Ukraine.”70 Ukrainian nationalists point to Petliura’s famous order of August 26, 1919 forbidding pogroms as evidence of his defence of the Jews. However, there is sufficient evidence to show that Petliura was at least to some degree responsible for the pogroms. According to various authors Petliura accused all Jews of being supporters of his worst enemies, the Bolsheviks. Although Petliura himself might not have been anti-Semitic, his antipathy towards the Jews, which led to a failure to take any disciplinary actions against his ‘otamans’ whose forces had committed pogroms, was seen as allowing such brutalities to continue. In fact, not only did Petliura not discipline the guilty ‘otamans’ but he actually promoted many of them. Vynnychenko felt that Petliura was more concerned in upholding his popularity among his ‘otamans’, than maintaining discipline among them.71 Even Petliura’s August orders issued 8 months after the pogroms had begun were seen as being too little too late and issued so as to please foreign public opinion which was at the time very much against the Petliura regime. Petliura needed the help of the Western European Great Powers in order to ensure the survival of his regime. However, due to the pogroms carried out by his armies, the citizens of these foreign countries were against aiding Petliura. According to Vynnychenko: “And when the Bolshevik, Social-Revolutionary or Denikin press paints Petliura as a ‘pogromchik’ it must openly and without hiding the truth be admitted that this man fully merits this dark reputation.”72 According to a former Jewish member of the Central Rada, A.I. Goldelman, in 1919 the Jewish population of Ukraine was in such a condition that it considered the Bolsheviks their only defenders from the pogroms.73 Why did the Ukrainian independence movement fail during the Revolutionary period? The main reason for the failure was that most ethnic Ukrainians themselves were not in favour of an independent Ukraine and its separation from Russia. During the revolutionary period, Ukrainians who were for the most part peasants, were more interested in improving their socio-economic situation than creating an independent country. Once Ukrainian nationalists failed to improve the lot of the peasants their cause was doomed to failure. Even 70

Mykola Livytsky. “Bortsi za Nezalezhnist’ Ukrainy: Slovo Pro Petliuru.” Literaturna Ukraina, (September 12, 1991): 5. 71 V. Vynnychenko in S. A. Alekseyev ed. Revolutsia na Ukrainie Po Memuaram Byelykh. (Moskva: Gosudarstvenoe Izdatelstvo, 1990): 327. 72 Ibid. 73 F. Y. Gorovsky et al. Evrei Ukrainy: Kratkiy Ocherk Istorii. (Kiev: Ukrainsko-Finskiy Institut Menedzhmenta i Biznesa, chast’ 2, 1995): 20.

some Ukrainian nationalists themselves have admitted the impossibility of their cause. In a written report to the Head Otaman Symon Petliura dated December 30, 1918, on the situation of the Ukrainian war effort, the head of the Ukrainian Army Headquarters’ Operational Department Colonel M. Kapustyansky74 stated that only the Galician Ukrainian members of the army were trustworthy soldiers; especially when fighting against the Poles. He stated that the Central and Eastern Ukrainians who were drafted, and were the most numerous part of the Ukrainian forces, could hardly be relied upon to fight against the Bolsheviks. “Furthermore, does the peasantry and working class wish for independence in the pure form? To this question, unfortunately, one can only answer in the negative.” 75 Colonel Kapustyansky observed that the majority of Ukrainians “want co-operation with Russia. Of course not subordination to Russia but rather a federation of equals.”76 The colonel observed that the main goal of the peasants was to rid the country of the ‘hated’ Germans and their puppet Skoropadsky and to obtain land. He noted that the main reason the majority of the peasants had risen up was due to social factors. He then stated that: “a portion of the peasantry and especially the workers who have not felt the effect of Bolshevism on their own skin, feel great sympathy towards the Bolsheviks, and believe that it is they who most vividly express the will of the people.”77 Ukrainian nationalists often blame the “Russian Bolsheviks” for their defeat. They attempt to convey the message that had it not been for the Bolsheviks having ousted them from power, they would still be governing the country. Thus the argument is made that the Russians destroyed Ukrainian independence. However, if Ukrainians nationalists, as they claim, represented the people of Ukraine then why was there room for the growth of opposing movements like that of the Anarchist leader Nestor ‘Bat’ko’ Makhno? Rarely do Ukrainian nationalists explain why their various governments were also opposed by the Ukrainian peasant masses lead by Makhno. Makhno’s movement was in fact the only one on Ukrainian soil which was fully independent and relied 100% on the strength of the people of Ukraine. Even the Ukrainian Bolsheviks could not make such a claim. Makhno’s army fought against all the combatants of the Civil War though at times it would ally itself with the Bolshevik forces to fight against the Whites and at times it would fight against the Bolsheviks. Their main goal was to protect the Ukrainian peasants against all their enemies. To this day Bat’ko-Makhno is considered a hero in the Southern Ukrainian oblasts which his movement defended. In fact Makhno was even glorified in a popular Soviet pop song written during the Perestroika period. The fact that Ukrainians nationalists needed the help of foreign powers to establish their authority only further discredited their cause in the eyes of the average Ukrainian. The fact that the Russians throughout Ukrainian history have not been considered a completely ‘foreign’ power was once again proven during the Ukrainian revolution when Russian help was important in establishing Bolshevik power in Ukraine. Nonetheless, although Russian help was important, without the support of Ukrainians themselves, the Bolsheviks would never have been able to establish themselves in Ukraine. In fact, the Bolshevik armies that defeated the Ukrainian nationalist forces contained a strong native Ukrainian element.78There is much evidence to suggest that This would be a lesson which neither past nor future Ukrainian nationalists leaders would learn and which again and again would doom their movements to failure.

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Kapustyansky later became one of the leaders of the OUN-M. M. Kapustyansky. Pokhid Ukrainskykh Armiy na Kiev-Odesu v 1919 rotsi. (Munich: Vydavnytstvo “Khvylyovoho”, Knyha persha, chastyny I i II, 1946): 23. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 See for example. I. L. Hoshuliak. ‘Pro prychyny porazky Tsentral’noi Rady’, Ukrainskyy Istorychnyy Zhurnal. (no.1, 1994): 31- 44. 75

Ukrainian Nationalism during World War II The most divisive and important part of Ukrainian history in Ukraine today is that which flows from World War II. Ukrainians fought on all sides of the conflict, and Ukraine and its peoples were devastated more than any other nation. There is practically not a single family in Ukraine today that did not suffer the loss of a family member. Over 8 million Ukrainians died at the hands of the Nazis, their allies and various other collaborators.79 It is the Second World War, or to be more precise the ‘Great Patriotic War’, that to this day acts as a historical glue between the many peoples of the former USSR, and especially the Eastern Slavs. Ukrainians did not fight the war as a lone ethnic group but rather as senior members of the Soviet Union. And thus it is as citizens of the Soviet Union that most Ukrainians remember the war. In almost every city and town of Ukraine there are monuments which remind one of the heroic exploits of the Soviet people and of the savagery of its enemies. The Soviet Union emerged from the war victorious and as a new Superpower. It practically single-handedly defeated the German war machine which threw an estimated eighty to ninety percent of its forces against the Soviet Union. This simple fact meant that the war in Europe after 1941 was for the most part a war between the Soviet Union and Germany. Twenty-seven million Soviet lives were lost; most not as fighting casualties but rather murdered at the hands of the Germans and their collaborators. Such statistics are usually alien to the typical Westerner and especially North American, who for decades as a result of the Cold War, was taught almost nothing about Soviet participation in the war. Ukrainian men and women who participated in the war still to this day proudly wear their medals won during the conflict. However, for some Ukrainians living in Western Ukraine, the situation is somewhat different and more complex. Since the country gained its independence, many Ukrainian nationalist émigrés, have returned to Ukraine and begun to influence the Ukrainian population especially in Western Ukraine. With the coming of Glasnost, Soviet historiography has been shown to be largely false. Thus under the influence of Ukrainian nationalist émigrés, who are almost entirely form Western Ukraine, Soviet historiography has been replaced with Ukrainian nationalist historiography; though both are equally false. Some Western Ukrainians and especially Galicians, see their heroes in the various nationalist military formations which sprung up prior to, and during, the war. For them the Soviet Union was the enemy and the Red Army were not liberators but rather occupiers. Probably, no other country in Eastern Europe has this sort of historically dividing problem as does Ukraine. For Ukraine, the war continues.

Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) Ukrainian integral nationalist groups first began to appear in Galicia and in other centres of Ukrainian émigré activity in the early 1920s. Among the most important groups were the ‘Ukrainian Military Organisation’ (UVO) established in 1920 (which narrowly failed to assassinate Pilsudski on his first official visit to Lviv in 1921) and student groups such as the ‘Union of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth’ which was founded in 1926. The history of present day Ukrainian nationalism has its roots in the Interwar Period when the 79

See I. T. Mukovsky & O. Y. Lysenko. Zvytyaha I Zhertovnist’: Ukraintsi na Frontakh Drukhoi Svitovoi Viyny. (Kiev: Poshukovo-Vydavnyche Ahentstvo “Knyha Pam’yati Ukrainy”, 1997): 566. And A.A. Voytsehovsky in M.V. Koval’,ed. Ukraina v Drukhi Svitoviy Viyni: Uroky Istorii ta Suchasnist’, Materialy Mizhnarodnoyi Naukovoyi Konferentsii (27-28 zhovtnya 1994). (Kiev: Natsionalna Akademiya Nauk Ukrainy, Instytut Istorii Ukrainy, 1995): 181.

organisations mentioned above convened in Vienna between January 28 and February 3, 1929 to form what was to be known as the ‘Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists’ (OUN). Although there were other Ukrainian nationalist organisations in existence, such as the followers of Skoropadsky, who were closely linked to the Nazis, and the Ukrainian National Republic leadership, which was dispersed between various European capitals, the most important and most fanatical group was the OUN. The OUN arose at a time when the disenchanted peoples of Europe chose between Communism and Fascism as their ideology; the OUN chose the latter. If Germans were unhappy with the outcome of WWI and the Treaty of Versailles for having their rights as a nation curtailed then one can imagine how upset Ukrainian nationalists were with a settlement which not only curtailed their national interests but completely denied them an independent country of their own like so many other nations had gained after World War I. If the German result was the National-Socialist party then the Ukrainian nationalist response was the OUN. It should therefore be no surprise that a Ukrainian integral nationalist organization found its beginnings after World War I.80 The Western Ukrainian oblasts were not part of the Soviet Union until 1939 and in the case of Transcarpathia, 1944. Galicia which is the most fiercely nationalistic region of Ukraine was part of Poland. Though under Austro-Hungarian rule, the Poles in Galicia had been chauvinistic enough towards their Ukrainian neighbours, in independent Interwar Poland, the Poles were even more violent towards the large Ukrainian minority. As is very typical of such a situation; extreme nationalism was met with extreme nationalism. As a response to the harsh treatment of Ukrainians at the hands of the Poles, the OUN was formed as an underground organisation which was to carry on the struggle both by political means and by force against all oppressors of the Ukrainian nation. During the Interwar Period, one of the most important functions of the OUN was to partake in various terrorist acts against mostly the Polish but also Soviet governments. Among the many figures assassinated by the OUN were the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs General Bronislaw Pieracki, Polish Consul Tadeus Goluwka and O. Mayilov, a Soviet consular official in Lviv. Other actions taken by the OUN were the mass burning of the properties of Polish landowners in the summer of 1930, bombing of opposition newspapers and the murder of their editors. One of the most popular OUN actions was the holding up of post offices which it had done on countless occasions.81 Although the OUN was quite popular among certain radical segments of the Ukrainian population living in Interwar Poland it was certainly not popular among most legal parties and organisations including the Greek-Catholic Church. In fact, the popular GreekCatholic Metropolitan, Andrei Sheptytsky, publicly denounced the terrorist activities of the of the OUN. The OUN was directed for eight years by the former commander of the Sichovi Striltsi and UVO, Evhen Konovalets, until his assassination by Pavel Sudoplatov, a young Ukrainian NKVD (Soviet secret police) agent, on May 23, 1938. During Konovalets’ time as leader of the OUN, the organisation managed to establish close contacts with their ideological brothers, the German Nazis. In fact, relations were so close that the OUN’s headquarters were moved to Berlin from Rome in 1940 where it remained until the end of the war. A good example of the close relationship between the OUN and the Nazis is the case of Stepan Bandera who would later became the leader of the OUN-B faction. Bandera was captured by the Polish authorities after his part in the assassination of Polish General Bronislaw Pieracki and after being tried was to be executed. The Nazis, however, intervened on his behalf and managed to convince the Poles to reduce Bandera’s penalty down to a 80

See Appendix I for the Ten Commandments of the OUN, which is useful in understanding their thinking and also points to the fact that violence was a central part of this organisation. This may also throw some light on why nationalists today are so intent on seeing the OUN-UPA recognised as heroes in Ukraine. 81 For the most detailed and official OUN account of OUN actions see: Petro Mirchuk. Narys Istorii Orhanizatsii Ukrainskyh Natsionalistiv. Munich: Ukrainske Vydavnytstvo, vol. 1, 1968.

prison term. After the Nazis invaded Poland in 1939, they released Bandera and his followers.82 Having infiltrated the OUN, the NKVD was well aware of the contacts established between the Nazis and the OUN. Fearing the outbreak of war between the USSR and Nazi Germany, the NKVD leadership decided to disrupt the OUN in a way it was certain would affect its operations. By assassinating Konovalets, the NKVD was correct in assuming that it would be a severe blow to the OUN and its effectiveness against the USSR. As a result of his own wishes according to his will, Konovalets was replaced by Colonel Andriy Melnyk, his chief of staff in the Sichovi Striltsi. Melnyk, however, though an able leader, was unable to balance the differences between the fiercely radical Galician youth who knew nothing but a life of hardships under the Polish dictatorship and the calmer older generations who had at least some periods of stability in their lives. Melnyk was seen as being far too soft and distanced from the ‘revolutionary’ struggle which was being carried out by young Galician Ukrainians in Poland. The result of the disillusionment with Melnyk was a split in the OUN between the older, more moderate elements led by Melnyk (OUN-M) and the more radical and violent elements when a parallel OUN leadership led by Stepan Bandera (OUN-B) was formed on February 10, 1940. The split in the OUN was to have dire consequences for the Ukrainian nationalist movement throughout the war (and in fact the split still plays a significant role in Ukrainian nationalist politics today). The death of Konovalets left the OUN unprepared for the events which were about to happen in Eastern Europe in 1938, most important of which was the destruction of Czechoslovakia and the creation of an independent Carpatho-Ukraine. Prior to the destruction of Czechoslovakia, Carpatho-Ukraine was a province called Subcarpathian Rus’ which in 1945 became incorporated into Soviet Ukraine as the Transcarpathian Oblast. The population of Subcarpathian Rus’ was for the most part Ukrainian/Rusyn, although there was also a compact minority of ethnic Hungarians living in the southern regions of the province. Following the Munich Pact of September 30, 1938, whereby France and Britain agreed to Hitler’s demand for the acquisition of the Sudetenland, the rump state of Czechoslovakia became a federal republic in which Subcarpathian Rus’ was granted autonomy and shortly afterwards renamed Carpatho-Ukraine. The province of Subcarpathian Rus’ had not by any means been a stronghold of Ukrainian nationalism, a fact which has even been admitted by official OUN sources. 83 In fact, there were three different ideological directions into which Ukrainians/Rusyns living in the province could be divided: 1) the Russophiles who were in favour of joining the Soviet Union; 2) Magyarophiles who were in favour of joining Hungary; and 3) Ukrainophiles who were Ukrainian nationalists and therefore in favour of an independent state. According to official OUN sources, during the Interwar Period, Ukrainian nationalists, though supposedly not members of the OUN, had been involved in assassinating members of the Russophile and Magyarophile factions. Carpatho-Ukraine was politically dominated by the Ukrainophile faction. Once Carpatho-Ukraine became autonomous it attracted the attention of the OUN which hoped that Carpatho-Ukraine would become the stepping stone to the creation of a state which would unify all of the Ukrainian lands. The Germans, who were determined to use Ukrainian nationalism to undermine and destroy the USSR played up the idea of Carpatho-Ukraine as the beginning of a unified Ukraine. The Germans even opened a consulate in the Carpatho-Ukrainian capital of Khust and signed economic agreements with its government. The OUN became actively involved in setting up a military force in CarpathoUkraine called the ‘Carpathian Sich’. Although the force was led by locals it was largely manned by Galician Ukrainians. This military force was used to defend the Carpatho-Ukraine 82

Gerald Reitlinger. The SS: Alibi of a Nation, 1922-1945. (New York: A Da Capo Press, 1957): 204. and Pavel Sudoplatov. Special Tasks. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1994) 23. 83 See Petro Mirchuk. Narys Istorii Orhanizatsii Ukrainskyh Natsionalistiv. Munich: Ukrainske Vydavnytstvo, vol. 1, 1968.

against the frequent guerrilla attacks by irregular Hungarian and Polish forces. On March 15, 1939 the Germans decided to put a final end to the newly federated Czechoslovakia when they marched into Prague. Carpatho-Ukraine was of little significance to the Germans who allowed the Hungarians to attack the province. Left to fend for itself, on March 15, 1939, Carpatho-Ukraine declared its independence; an action which meant nothing to the Hungarians. In what was to become the first armed conflict of World War II, the Carpathian Sich fought against the invading Hungarian armies who within a few days managed to occupy the entire country. For the OUN, the Carpatho-Ukrainian affair was to be an important factor in its split. The younger OUN members felt that the OUN leadership had not done enough to help the Carpatho-Ukrainian government. There were criticisms from what would later be called the OUN-B or Banderivtsi, that the ‘Provid’ (directorate) of the OUN had acted opportunistically and with all of its military experience had not attempted to lead the Carpathian Sich nor even train it.84 Thus ended an experiment which Ukrainian nationalists had hoped would be the foundation of an independent Ukraine. Although the experience should have taught the OUN that the Germans had no interest in creating an independent Ukraine, it did not. Instead, it was only to be the first of a series of set-backs for the OUN at the hands of their supposed friends the German Nazis. Nonetheless, it appears that it would take much more for the OUN to finally understand what the Nazis really thought of Ukrainians. In fact the question could be asked whether any member of the OUN had actually read Hitler’s best-seller, Mein Kampf, where Nazi attitudes towards the Slavic ‘subhumans’ were clearly outlined. Another event which took place in 1939 was the organisation of the ‘Nationalist Military Detachments’ (NMD) by the OUN which had the blessing and support of the Germans.85, Regardless of their close friendship with the Nazis, however, the OUN would once again be disappointed when the Germans and Soviets signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939 which divided Poland between them, giving the Ukrainian lands to the USSR. The Germans allowed the NMD a brief foray into Poland, however, due to the pact, it was disbanded. Despite these developments, the OUN believed the Germans would still help establish an independent Ukraine and its co-operation with Berlin continued. Members of the OUN were subsequently used as spies for the Nazi regime in the Western Ukrainian lands which would be of critical importance to the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.86 The German Army had begun training Ukrainian nationalist volunteers to fill police roles in the soon to be German occupied territories of the Soviet Union as early as 1940 in various camps in Germany and Austria. Both the OUN-M and OUN-B took part in this program by sending their members to be trained.87 Later these Ukrainian nationalist ‘police officers’ would be sent around Ukraine and would gain notoriety as some of the most brutal murderers of Jews, Communists, Soviet partisans and other elements considered undesirable to the Nazis.88 Tensions between the two OUN factions intensified as both groups started to compete for influence among the Germans by trying to show that they, in fact, were the true representatives of the Ukrainian nation.89 Although one of the criticisms of the OUN-M by the OUN-B was that the OUN-M had taken care to maintain good relations with Germany regardless of the many setbacks they had caused the Ukrainians, the OUN-B seemed no better. In the spring of 1941, the OUN-B 84

Ibid. 560. Peter J. Potichnyj. Ukrainians in World War II Military Formations: An Overview. In Yury Boshyk. Ukraine During World War II: History and Aftermath. (Edmonton: University of Toronto Press, 1986): 62. 86 Anonymous. personal interview. September 18, 1998. 87 Magocsi, 626. 88 Martin C. Dean. “The German Gendarmerie, the Ukrainian Schutzmannschaft and the ‘Second Wave’ of Jewish Killings in Occupied Ukraine: German Policing at the Local Level in Zhitomir Region, 1941-1944.” German History, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1996): 169-192. 89 Subtelny, Ukraina: Istoria 568. 85

made an agreement with German army officers that provided that the Germans would allow the Banderivtsi to carry on political activities in the Ukrainian areas which would be conquered, while the Reich would be left completely free to control the economy.90 In April 1941, the Germans allowed a OUN-B request for the formation of another military formation composed of Banderivtsi supporters which was named the ‘Legions of Ukrainian Nationalists’ (LUN). The LUN was divided into two groups: Nachtigall and Roland. The Nachtigall battalion was composed of refugees from the former Polish districts of the ‘Generalgouvernement’ whereas the Roland battalion was composed of former members of the Carpathian Sich who had fled to Austria. Nonetheless, each battalion, which was made up of about 600 men, was officered by Germans. Altogether, it has been estimated that “fifteen thousand Ukrainians served in the German army in 1941 as scouts, parachutists, saboteurs, and interpreters.”91 When the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, both Roland and Nachtigall advanced alongside the regular German forces. Roland was sent into Bessarabia whereas Nachtigall marched into Galicia. Accompanying Nachtigall into Galicia were other OUN-B activists led by Yaroslav Stetsko a high ranking member of the OUN-B leadership. Once having entered Lviv, on June 30, 1941, Stetsko, on behalf of Stepan Bandera and the OUN-B, proclaimed the act of a sovereign Ukrainian state which would “tightly co-operate with great National-Socialist Germany which under the direction of its leader Adolf Hitler is creating a new order in Europe and the world and is helping the Ukrainian nation to liberate itself from the Muscovite occupation.” It was also announced that: “The Ukrainian National Revolutionary Army which is being created on the Ukrainian lands, will continue to fight together with the German army against the Muscovite occupation for a sovereign state and new order in the entire world.”92 However, the proclamation was not recognised by the other Ukrainian nationalist groups who believed that Ukrainian sovereignty had already been proclaimed by the Central Rada during the Ukrainian Revolution and that a Ukrainian ‘government’ was already in existence. Regardless of the kind words in relation to Germany and its leader, Adolf Hitler, the Germans, who had not been forewarned about the OUN-B’s actions, reacted negatively towards the OUN-B leadership by having some of them shot and many of them put under house arrest including Bandera and Stetsko.93 The Nachtigall and Roland battalions, were then returned to Germany where they were reorganised into Guard Battalion 201 which was later sent to Belorussia to combat Soviet partisans. Upon retreating from the Western Ukrainian oblasts the NKVD undertook an operation to eliminate any groups which could potentially collaborate with the Nazis. The result was that the NKVD massacred the unfortunate inmates of Soviet prisons, regardless of nationality, crime, age or gender, who could not be moved east along with the retreating Soviet authorities. In light of the massacres, the Ukrainian nationalists who accompanied the Germans into Lviv demanded that “all Jews must immediately be killed.”94 The result was a massacre of members of the local Jewish population but also Russians, communists and Soviet sympathisers, by OUN-B members, the Nazis and other Ukrainian nationalists. Although Ukrainian nationalists have tried to deny their complicity in the massacres by putting all the blame on the Germans, there is more than enough evidence which points in the direction of the Ukrainian nationalists.95 In fact it has even been alleged that Nachtigall also 90

John A. Armstrong. Ukrainian Nationalism. (Englewood: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990): 52. Armstrong. 51. 92 I. F. Kuras, ed. Natsionalni Vidnosyny v Ukraini: Zbirnyk Dokumentiv i Materialiv. (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1994): 251. 93 Basil Dmytryshyn. “The SS Division ‘Galicia’: Its Genesis, Training, Deployment.” Nationalities Papers, Vol. XXI, (1993): 55. 94 Armstrong, 54. 95 For example see: Raul Hilberg. The Destruction of the European Jews. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961. Samuel Drix. Witness to Annihilation: Surviving the Holocaust, a Memoir. Washington: Brassey's, 1994. Khonigsman, IA. S. Katastrofa l'vovskogo evreistva. Lvov: L'vovskoe obchshestvo evreiskoi kul'tury im. Sholom-Aleikhema, 1993. F. Y. Gorovsky et al. Evrei Ukrainy: Kratkiy Ocherk Istorii. (Kiev: Ukrainsko-Finskiy 91

murdered 23 Polish professors in Lviv after having interrogated them at their headquarters.96 This first wave of massacres against the Jews took place in various Western Ukrainian cities and was to last until July 8, 1941.97 As the German Army advanced further into Ukraine, it was followed by members of both OUN groups who began installing their people into local government administrations, police forces and the media. The Banderivtsi, due to their proclamation in Lviv, were not allowed to operate completely openly; however, the Melnykivtsi (OUN-M) did have approval of the occupying Germans and worked with them more closely. The Banderivtsi, for example, sent 1,500 such propagandists into Soviet Ukraine who were known as ‘pokhidni hrupy’ (expeditionary groups). Among the goals of these groups was: 1) to proclaim the act of a sovereign Ukrainian state; 2) to organise the ‘state apparatus’; and 3) to construct a Ukrainian army from former soldiers of the Red and Polish armies.98 However, due to the total lack of nationalist sentiment in the former Soviet Ukraine, the OUN people simply managed to alienate themselves from the locals with their integral nationalist outlook. Needless to say, their work was a complete failure. The dispute between the two OUN factions was to have dire consequences as both sides vied for support among the Ukrainian population. Although both groups had resorted to violence almost from the beginning of their split, it was to become much more serious as the German occupation of Ukraine continued. On August 30, 1941, two senior OUN-M leaders, Senyk and Stsiborsky, were assassinated by a member of the OUN-B. The event led to an open war between the two integral nationalist organisations which resulted in the death of thousands of members of the two groups. It has been estimated that Bandera’s OUN killed more than 4,000 members of the OUN-M and its sympathisers.99

Development of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) In 1940, Taras Borovets, a member of an association named the ‘Ukrainian National Rebirth’ began consulting the leadership-in-exile of the Ukrainian National Republic and the OUN-M in order to agree to the creation of a partisan organisation in Volhynia which was subsequently known as the ‘Poliska Sich’. This organisation was to become the nucleus of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Once the Germans invaded Ukraine, Borovets, who then took the name ‘Bulba’, contacted the Germany army in order to secure permission to develop his organisation whose goal was to fight against Soviet stragglers and partisans.100 With a force of 10,000 men, in August 1941, Bulba’s force cleared the Polisian and northern Volhynian woods of communist supporters. Bulba’s force remained friendly to the German army and according to Bulba “had spilled no German blood.”101 Initially, the OUN-B did not co-operate with Bulba in creating the UPA since they felt that they should be in full control of any such organisation. Bulba, wanted to make the UPA a multi-party organisation under the control of the UNR in exile and thus the talks with OUN-B collapsed.102 Though the Nazis had been massacring hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, only in November 1942, when the Germans began breaking up the OUN-B controlled police units, Institut Menedzhmenta i Biznesa, chast’ 2, 1995): 20. Alexander Dallin. German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945: A Study in Occupation Politics. (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1957): 119. And many others. 96 F. Y. Gorovsky et al. Evrei Ukrainy: Kratkiy Ocherk Istorii. (Kiev: Ukrainsko-Finskiy Institut Menedzhmenta i Biznesa, chast’ 2, 1995): 130. 97 Ibid. 129. 98 Armstrong, 61. 99 А.S. Chaykovsky. Nevidoma Viyna. (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo ‘Ukraina’, 1994): 218. Though the war between the two OUN groups is no longer violent, it has actually continued to this day. In émigré communities some nationalists are still quite divided by which, of the now many OUN splinter groups, one belongs to. 100 Armstrong, 71. 101 Armstrong, 103. 102 Taras Bulba-Borovets. Armiya Bez Derzhavy. (Lviv: “Poklyk Sumlinya”, 1993): 83.

did the OUN-B begin organising its own partisan movement. Nonetheless, these partisan units which it also named the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) did not fight against the Germans but rather undertook operations to rid the lands they occupied of ethnic Poles and Soviet partisans. The OUN-B also attempted to unite some of the other smaller nationalist partisan units under its command. In doing this it made good use of its secret police, the ‘Sluzhba Bezbeky’ (SB), which actively liquidated any political opponents and enemies of the OUN-B. Among its recruits were the German-trained Ukrainian police officers, many of whom had actively played a part in the ‘Final Solution’. In order to mobilise young Ukrainians into their ranks, leaders of the OUN-B UPA at times used ‘provocations and disinformation’ thus leaving those called upon no choice but to join.103 The Bulba group remained independent and to differentiate itself from the OUN-B’s UPA and its tactics, it renamed itself the ‘Ukrainian People’s Revolutionary Army’ (UPRA). Although Bulba’s group continued its actions against Soviet partisan groups (later also against German military units and Polish partisans) it now had to also fight against the UPA. On August 19, 1943, the UPA attacked the UPRA and took some captives. All were later murdered, including Bulba’s wife Hanna. Following the attack, an order was given by the UPA leadership to disarm the UPRA. This action finally terminated the existence of the UPRA and its activities.104 In the fall of 1943 a similar fate awaited the Melnyk partisan groups. The disarmed OUN-M formations usually joined the UPA though some in Volhynia joined the 600 man 31st Punitive Detachment of the SS. Among the many actions taken by this detachment was the burning of the village Pidhaytsi along with all of its inhabitants.105 The UPA’s Commander-in-Chief, who was under the firm control of the OUN-B leadership, was Roman Shukhevych, the same man who had been the most senior Ukrainian officer in the Nachtigall battalion. The UPA was divided into three main groups: UPA North, UPA South and UPA West. It operated almost exclusively in the Western Ukrainian lands though operations in the Transcarpathian lands were next to nil.106 It has been estimated that the total number of UPA members numbered between 40,000-80,000. Though some nationalist sources place the numbers at over 100,000. UPA apologists have always maintained that the UPA had fought against both occupiers of Ukraine: the ‘Russian Soviets’ and the German Nazis. However, when did the UPA begin to fight against the Germans? The answer to this question, according to Ukrainian nationalist sources, is that Bulba’s group only began military operations against the Germans at the end of 1942 and beginning of 1943 whereas the OUN-B’s UPA began in February 1943107; almost two years following the German invasion. The extent of UPA military operations against the Germans also seems to have been rather minimal; especially when compared to their operations against the Soviet partisans. It is estimated by nationalist historians themselves that, in all, the UPA carried out 47 actions against the Germans from the beginning of its existence until January 1944 when it began cooperating with the Nazis against Soviet forces.108 After analysing the claims of various UPA members and historians, and German documents, Ukrainian historian A. S. Chaykovsky has come to the conclusion that the UPA in fact fought very little against the Germans. Moreover, he believes that the reason the UPA began military operations against the Germans was 103

I. T. Mukovsky & O. Y. Lysenko. 413. Ibid. 414. And Chaykovsky 228. 105 V.V. Dz’obak. Deyaki malovidomi storinky diyal’nosti OUN-UPA na zakhidnoukrainskykh zemlyakh v 19431944 rr. (Nauk.-metodychni pratsi z istorii SRSR.- K., 1991): 87. As quoted in I. T. Mukovsky & O. Y. Lysenko. 414. 106 Armstrong, 225. 107 Mykola Lebed’. UPA, Ukrainska Povstanska Armiya: Yiyi Heneza, Rist i Diyi u Vyzvol’niy Borot’bi Ukrainskoho Narodu za Ukrainsku Samostiynu Sobornu Derzhavu. (?: Vydannya Presovoho Byura UGVR, 1946): 25. 108 See O.V. Shylovtsev. in M.V. Koval’,ed. Ukraina v Drukhi Svitoviy Viyni: Uroky Istorii ta Suchasnist’, Materialy Mizhnarodnoyi Naukovoyi Konferentsii (27-28 zhovtnya 1994). (Kiev: Natsionalna Akademiya Nauk Ukrainy, Instytut Istorii Ukrainy, 1995): 22. 104

because they felt they were losing influence over Western Ukrainians who were starting to join the Soviet partisans or groups such as Bulba’s. 109 The Soviet partisans were carrying on a rather successful propaganda campaign among Western Ukrainians by portraying the UPA and OUN as Nazi collaborators. The UPA needed to show Ukrainians that it was in fact protecting them from the terror inflicted upon them by the Nazis, thus they would carry out limited raids in order to prove the point. According to one American Ukrainian nationalist historian Yaroslav Bilinsky, “the regional leadership of the OUN (in Volhynia) advised the establishment of armed groups for self-defence lest in despair the Ukrainian population should join the Bolsheviks.”110 Furthermore, Chaykovsky believes that the reason the UPA was not directed by the OUN-B leadership to fight the Nazis earlier was due to the belief that the Germans would help them establish an independent Ukraine.111 Another reason the UPA attacked the Germans was to secure weapons, ammunition, and foodstuffs.112 Already one year before the liberation of Ukraine from the Nazis, the OUN-B was making plans to fight the Soviet forces at its Third Congress. At this time, it started making contact with the Germans, Romanians and Hungarians. An agreement was made with the Hungarians that each side would not attack the other. Although the UPA tried to make a similar agreement with the Romanians, the talks collapsed. However, they did come up with an agreement with the Germans with whom they managed to work quite closely.113 According to Alexander Dallin, once the Germans retreated from Ukraine, “the increasingly hard-pressed UPA was again prepared to work against the Red Army in step with the Wehrmacht, which on its part was willing to supply it with arms and goods in order to maintain a small ‘second front’ behind Soviet lines.” 114 In August 1944, the Germans even parachuted a Wehrmacht captain behind Soviet lines to the UPA in order to co-ordinate a twopronged attack on the Red Army. According to one UPA report: “the leadership of the UPA has recognised that it cannot wage the struggle against the Bolsheviks by itself and has repeatedly asked the Wehrmacht for support in the form of arms.”115 In fact, during their talks with the Germans, the OUN-B acknowledged: “The Ukrainian people and the Banderivtsi well understand that they can only gain independence with the help of one of the greatest nations of Europe.”116 As the Red Army and the front moved closer to Western Ukraine, the UPA began to hide and thus ceased any military activity. However, after the front had passed the UPA again sprang into action. As the Soviet forces began to push the Germans back west and advanced closer to Western Ukraine, the OUN-B believed that the Western Ukrainian population might well receive the Soviet forces, which would be a blow to the prestige of the OUN-B, and that ‘unreliable’ elements would even join Soviet forces in fighting against the UPA. In order to solve these problems the OUN-B leadership ordered that the SB (OUN-B secret police) destroy undesirable elements and make the killings look like the work of Soviet agents. 117 Once the Soviets entered Western Ukraine, the UPA Commander-in-Chief, Roman Shukhevych, ordered: “…To endeavour so that not a single village recognise Soviet authority. The OUN should act in such a way so that all those who have recognised Soviet authority be destroyed. Not scared but physically destroyed! It should not be feared that people will damn us for cruelty. Of the 40 million Ukrainian population let there remain only 109

Chaykovsky, 222-223. and O.V. Shylovtsev. in M.V. Koval’. 21. Yaroslav Bilinsky. The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964): 121. 111 Chaykovsky, 220. 112 I. T. Mukovsky & O. Y. Lysenko. 416. 113 See Chaykovsky, 237-239. 114 Alexander Dallin. German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945: A Study in Occupation Politics. (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1957): 621. For more confirmation of Nazi-UPA collaboration at this time see M.V. Koval’. “OUNUPA: Mizh “Tretim Reykhom” i stalinskym totalitaryzmom.” Ukrainskyy Istorychnyy Zhurnal. No. 2-3, (1994): 97. Armstrong. 136-137. 115 From various documents quoted in: Dallin, 622. 116 Chaykovsky, 240. 117 Ibid 241. 110

half --- there is nothing dreadful about this.”118 Although the war in Europe had ended by May 1945, the UPA’s war against the USSR had not. OUN-UPA members, who had not yet fled the country, continued fighting against the Soviet government although their morale was at a definite low point. In a secret document dated November 12, 1945, the UPA leadership asked itself: “Why today in the terrain does the ‘Agentura’119 exist? Why do Komsomol organisations exist? Why have the Western Ukrainian lands provided their grains to the government faster than the East? Why did Ukrainians die at Berlin or Sakhalin for their executioners rather than on their own lands in the defence of the life and existence of other generations? Why are there desertions from the UPA? Why in the field did there exist and still exist fighting bands, which have caused us much harm? The answer is short and clear. Because the masses are not trained, not revolutionised.120 Nonetheless, the UPA carried on its military operations against the Soviet Union up until 1952, when it was finally liquidated by Soviet troops. The UPA’s and especially the SB’s tactics in fighting the Soviet government following the Red Army’s liberation of Western Ukraine were to certainly be as brutal as Shukhevych suggested they be. Among the tactics used to combat the Soviet government were assassinations of people who worked in government administrations, or even those who agreed to work on collective farms or other Soviet sponsored projects. To prevent defections from its ranks, the UPA and SB unleashed a terror campaign in order to keep the population in line. Anyone considered an enemy would be treated in a most barbarous way. Very often, the UPA methods included tortures and defiling the corpses of supposed Soviet collaborators. Villagers were often forced to watch as the UPA murdered its victims by hacking them to death with axes. It was not infrequent for the UPA to slaughter the spouse and children of suspected Soviet collaborators. The methods were various but were always meant to be extremely barbaric in order to scare the locals from co-operating with the Soviets. 121 However, the Soviet authorities used the UPA methods against them in propaganda campaigns to show the Western Ukrainians that the UPA was simply a fascist organisation whose sole purpose was to terrorise innocent Ukrainians. As time went by, whether through force or coercion from the Soviet security apparatus, or their own utter dislike of the UPA, more and more people ended up helping the Soviet authorities against the UPA. The methods used by the Soviet security apparatus though definitely harsh and often no better than that of the UPA, did finally bring an end to the conflict. UPA supporters continuously argue that the UPA fought a two front war against the Nazis and the Soviet Union. What is always omitted, however, is the third front against Polish partisans and, most of all, ethnic Poles. This conflict in fact has had very long-lasting repercussions as it has negatively affected relations between Poles and Ukrainians to this very day. Once the OUN groups invaded Soviet Ukraine they began to give orders to remove the Poles from Ukraine. It has been estimated that between 60,000-80,000 Poles were massacred during this conflict by the UPA.122 In their reprisals, the Polish nationalists were just as brutal in massacring Ukrainians. In order to finally end this conflict in the Polish territories, in 1947, the Polish government undertook what was called ‘Akcja Wisla’ in which all Ukrainians in south-eastern Poland were forcibly moved to the former German lands. The 118

V.I. Klokov in M.V. Koval’,ed. 140. and Chaykovsky 242. Locals who informed the Soviets about the activities of the UPA. 120 Read: ‘nationalistically indoctrinated’. Natsionalni Vidnosyny v Ukraini: Zbirnyk Dokumentiv i Materialiv. (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1994): 283. 121 See Jeffrey Burds. “AGENTURA: Soviet Informants’ Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48”, East European Politics and Societies, vol.11, no. 1, (Winter 1997): 89-130. and Bilinsky 133. 122 Subtelny, 583. 119

Polish action, though devastating to the innocent communities living in the area, did manage to end UPA military activities in Poland since there was no reason for them to continue fighting in an area devoid of Ukrainians. Nationalist historians have always argued that the UPA was multiethnic and that it had among its fighters peoples from various Soviet nations. However, proof of these ethnic minorities is practically non-existent. In attempting to show that it was not anti-Semitic, nationalist historians always argue that the UPA even had Jews in its ranks who worked as doctors. However, even Jewish historians agree that the UPA did have Jewish doctors in its ranks. Aharon Weiss confirms the existence of Jewish doctors in some UPA units, however, he also states that when the Germans retreated from Ukraine, the Jewish doctors in the UPA were slaughtered 123; a detail nationalist historians have ignored. Weiss also argues that although the OUN’s primary goal was to rid Ukraine of the Russian Bolsheviks, their secondary goal was to settle their scores with the Jews. 124 Although Poles may feel that it was they, not the Jews, who were second on the OUN’s hit list, the fact remains the same; the OUN acted barbarously towards the ethnic minorities inhabiting Ukraine. Soviet historians have always argued that the OUN-UPA simply served Nazi German interests behind a cloud of wanting to create an independent Ukrainian state; nothing else. Ukrainian nationalists on the other hand argue that the OUN-UPA did indeed struggle for an independent Ukrainian state. It is definitely true that the OUN-UPA did struggle for an independent Ukraine though the methods by which the struggle was carried out were anything but noble; however due to their integral nationalist ideology this should be no surprise. However, by fighting amongst themselves during the entire duration of the war, it would appear that for the OUN-UPA and other nationalist groups what was most important was an independent Ukraine with themselves as the rulers. It is true that there were probably many UPA soldiers who honestly felt that they were defending Ukraine and who did not commit crimes against humanity. Some Ukrainians who fought in the ranks of the UPA were forcibly conscripted either through coercion or through other methods, therefore it would be unfair to label all members of the UPA as war criminals. Nonetheless, these people were very likely a minority and in any case cannot be considered heroes. Stalin was certainly extremely brutal and deserves to be vilified, however, this does not mean that those who fought against him were any better or would have created a better society. In defending themselves on charges of collaborating with the Nazis, some Ukrainian nationalists argue that Stalin was just as guilty of collaboration with the Nazis as was the OUN since he had signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty. This may be true however there is one large difference: no serious group is trying to make Stalin a hero in this day and age whereas Ukrainian nationalists are trying to glorify the OUN-UPA. It is normal that Stalin is now in disfavour due to the various atrocities committed while he was in power. In this same logic, the OUN-UPA is also not regarded in a favourable light by most Ukrainians but rather as the brutal organization it really was. Such is the case with General Andrei Vlasov and his Russian Liberation Army who are condemned in Russia as Nazi collaborators. Some of the greatest criticisms of the OUN-UPA during the war, however, do not come from Soviet or communist sources but rather from Ukrainian democrats. Ukrainian democrats criticised the OUN alliance with the Nazis and referred to them as Ukrainian ‘Quislings’. Although Ukrainian democrats disliked the USSR they nonetheless supported it against Hitler. They felt that Hitler would only enslave Ukraine if he won, whereas they believed that there was a possibility that the USSR would, with pressure from its Western allies, let Ukraine gain its independence.125 123

Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster, ed. Ukrainian-Jewish relations in historical perspective. (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988): 417. 124 Ibid. 412.

SS Galician Division After a request by the OUN-M and other Ukrainian nationalist leaders in April 1943, the Nazis created a unit in the German army known as the SS Galician Division (technically the 14th Volunteer Grenadier Division of the Waffen SS, 1 st Galician). The creation of the division was launched in Lviv with official pomp and ceremony. The division was even blessed by the Ukrainian Catholic Church.126 The commanders, uniforms, language of command and weapons etc., of the division, were all German. Nonetheless, the Ukrainian nationalists secretly hoped that the division would be the nucleus of a Ukrainian National Army which would, of course, free Ukraine. Though the nationalists wanted to call the division ‘Ukrainian’, the Germans refused. In any case all the recruits from the division were from Galicia; an area in which German occupation politics were much less brutal towards the ethnic Ukrainians, compared to the rest of Ukraine though equally as harsh towards other ethnic groups. Furthermore, the UPA, due to ‘tactical’ considerations was still not operating in the area.127 This meant that Galician Ukrainians who were already the most nationalistically minded of all Ukrainians could, with relatively little difficulty be convinced to join the division. In fact, according to various nationalist sources, although initially the OUN-UPA leaders were opposed to Galician Ukrainians joining the formation, later they supported it. The OUN-UPA believed that the division was a good way in which to train their people in warfare. The result was that 82,000 men volunteered for the division of which 27,000 were accepted by the Nazis. Ultimately 13,000 young Galician Ukrainians became soldiers in its ranks.128 The division received its training initially in Debica, Poland but later was transferred to Neuhammer in Silesia. When the division was ready for combat at the end of June 1944, it was sent to reinforce the 13th German Army Corps which was located near the Western Ukrainian town of Brody. On July 18, 1944, while engaged in its first military operation, the SS Galician Division was completely encircled and then decimated by Soviet forces. When the Soviet forces became aware of the division’s presence at the time of the battle, they put in a special effort to annihilate the Nazi collaborators. 129 In all, the battle was a disaster for the division. Of the 11,000 soldiers sent to the front, 7,000 men were lost, most either killed or wounded and captured by the Soviet army. Eventually, 3,000 soldiers managed to break out of the Soviet encirclement and regroup further west.130 Some of the survivors did, however, join the UPA. In fact, during the battle, the UPA even offered to help the division fight the Soviet army though its offer was turned down.131 The surviving members of the division were sent back to Neuhammer where their numbers were brought up to a strength of about 11,400 men. In October 1944, the division was sent to suppress an anti-German rebellion by the Slovak Army, which included the Slovak Minister of Defence, which was trying to free the country of the Nazi occupation. Soon enough, Slovak partisans also joined the rebellion. The SS Galician Division managed 125

N. IA. Hryhoriïv. The War and Ukrainian democracy : a compilation of documents from the past and present. (Toronto : Industrial and Educational Pub. Co., 1945): 182. 126 An act which along with other demonstrations of support for the Nazis and Ukrainian nationalists were among the reasons which led to its prohibition in 1945 by the Soviet government. 127 Oleh Lysiak. Brody: Zbirnyk statey i narysiv. (Munich: Vydannya Bratstva kol. voyakiv Pershoi UD UNA, 1951): 59. 128 Boshyk. 77. 129 Wolf-Dietrich Heike. The Ukrainian Division ‘Galicia’, 1943-45. (Toronto: The Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1988): 45. 130 Ibid. 53. 131 Ibid. 48.

to successfully suppress the Slovak rebellion; though how this was conducive to the establishment of an independent Ukraine is rather puzzling. Because it ‘performed well in Slovakia’, in early 1945 the division was sent to Slovenia to fight against Tito’s partisans.132 At the end of March 1945, while engaged in an encircling action against Tito’s partisans, the division received an order from the head of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, to immediately disband. Apparently Hitler himself felt that the soldiers of the division were poor soldiers and wanted to transfer their weapons to a new division manned by ethnic Germans being created for the defence of Nuremberg. However, since the Germans had neither the troops nor the transport vehicles required to manage such an operation, the order was rescinded. Following their stay in Slovenia the division was transferred to the southeastern part of Austria where it battled Soviet forces of the Third Ukrainian Front. Again after fierce fighting the division was largely destroyed. At the end of April 1945, just days before the end of the war, the Germans finally allowed the Galician Ukrainian nationalists to rename the SS Galician Division into the 1st Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army. The division was also allowed to use Ukrainian nationalist symbols, be commanded by Ukrainian nationalists and swear allegiance to the Ukrainian people instead of Hitler and Nazi Germany as was the previous practice.133 Once the division was reformed its nominal commander-in-chief became General Pavlo Shandruk, a former UNR ‘otaman’ whose military unit during the Petliura days was infamous for carrying out pogroms against Jews.134 Nonetheless, Germans officers still commanded each unit. Before the war had even ended, Captain Makarushka, a senior Ukrainian officer in the division, made contact with the approaching British forces and agreed to the division’s surrender to the British instead of the Soviet army. The British instructed the division to assemble at Volkermarkt which was the base for a strong force of Tito’s partisans. At this point, the memoirs of Wolf-Dietrich Heike, the Chief-of-Staff of the SS Galician Division, shed some light on this interesting episode. “At Makarushka’s remark that Tito’s partisans would not tolerate the presence of the Division in the Volkermarkt district until the Allies arrived, the British commander simply instructed the Ukrainians to hold Volkermarkt until they did arrive. When reminded by Makarushka of the fact that the partisans were allies, the commander simply repeated his instructions.”135 Finally the SS Galician Division surrendered to British and US forces at Radstadt, Austria after which they were eventually transported to Rimini, Italy. As it became clearer that the end for Germany was near, the Nazis began releasing the various Ukrainian nationalist leaders from jail (Melnyk had been imprisoned on January 26, 1944 and Bulba was imprisoned while in Warsaw to ask for German help in November 1943). Between September and October 1944 all the major Ukrainian nationalist leaders had been freed. The reason for their release was to create support for the German war effort from the more than 2 million Ukrainians who were now in Germany as forced labourers, prisoners of war and military collaborators who retreated with the German army. Finally, after weeks of negotiating an agreement was made with the Germans which was approved by both Bandera and Melnyk. This agreement led to the creation of a ‘Ukrainian National Committee’ whose head was none other than General Pavlo Shandruk. The committee achieved very little however. It tried to create an army composed of Ukrainians in Germany but constant bickering between the Ukrainian nationalists and the Russian Nazi collaborator General Andrei Vlasov, who had some Ukrainians under his control, annulled any real progress. In the end, the only real achievement of Shandruk’s committee was to make contact with the allied military quarters before the end of the war and agree to the evacuation of the SS Galician Division, and individual Ukrainian nationalists, to 132

Basil Dmytryshyn. 67. For the text of the oath of allegiance to Hitler and Nazi Germany see I. T. Mukovsky & O. Y. Lysenko. 447. 134 Magocsi 505. 135 Heike 129. 133

Western countries. Saved by countries like the USA, Britain and even the Vatican, these Ukrainian nationalists repaid their rescuers by being put to good use in fulfilling propaganda and intelligence roles against the USSR during the Cold War. With this knowledge, it becomes clearer why the British strangely instructed the division to fight Tito’s partisans. In fact the same Ukrainian nationalists had influenced the CIA and SIS (British intelligence) enough that these organisations actually tried to militarily support the UPA; though specifically for their own purposes. Beginning in 1949, the CIA air dropped supplies and émigré agents to UPA guerrillas in their fight against the USSR. As many as 75 guerrilla leaders were sent to the UPA over a four year period. For its part, the SIS sent 18 agents in the spring of 1951. However, by this time the UPA had been practically defeated and thus the USA and Britain stopped sending their ‘aid’ shortly thereafter.136

Conclusions Did Ukrainians support the Ukrainian nationalists and their goals during World War II? An answer is provided by one of those nationalists himself. In his memoirs Army Without a State, Taras Bulba-Borovets states: “If the Ukrainian nationalist movement had not totally forbidden all other points of view and had based its ideology and party platform not on authoritarian “great leaderism” but rather on the basis of wider representation as in Western free countries, then, certainly, all Ukrainians would have poured into its ranks.”137 BulbaBorovets’ statement confirms that Ukrainians were not supportive of the various Ukrainian nationalist movements. According to Dallin: “Although claiming to speak for the Ukrainian people, they [the Ukrainian nationalists] met initially with little popular support in the Soviet Ukraine. They formed partisan units but refrained from attacking the Germans. Their leaders were put in German jails and concentration camps; yet when released in 1944, they again rallied to the Nazi side to resume the struggle against Moscow.”138 The Ukrainian nationalist movement during World War II, like other times in Ukrainian history, had again failed. Again the movement relied on foreign elements to achieve Ukrainian independence and again the majority of Ukrainians rejected such an approach. Instead, over seven million Ukrainians served in the various branches of the Soviet army139 in order to free their country from Nazi Germany, its allies and their collaborators. Ukrainians made up one-third of all people serving in the Soviet army during World War II, thus the question of which camp most Ukrainians stood in is an absurd one. 140 The nationalist movement’s brutal massacres of Ukraine’s ethnic minorities and chauvinistic attitudes towards the Russian culture and language only worked to further alienate them from the Ukrainian masses. Even Ukrainians in Western Ukraine eventually grew annoyed at the brutal tactics used by the nationalists. Nationalists are trying to create images of the Ukrainian struggles for independence where there really is no or very little historical basis. They very often portray Ukraine as suffering at the hands of its enemies, especially Russia, although this is also not often the 136

See Christopher Andrew & Oleg Gordievsky. KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990): 321. Jeffrey Burds. “AGENTURA: Soviet Informants’ Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48”, East European Politics and Societies, vol.11, no. 1, (Winter 1997): 114. Christopher Simpson. Blowback: America’s Recruitment of Nazis and its Effect on the Cold War. (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988): 173. 137 Taras Bulba-Borovets. Armiya Bez Derzhavy. (Lviv: “Poklyk Sumlinya”, 1993): 15. 138 Dallin, 122. 139 I. T. Mukovsky & O. Y. Lysenko. 561. 140 Ihor Smeshko, “Comments” The Military Tradition in Ukrainian History: Its Role in the Construction of Ukraine’s Armed Forces. Conference Proceedings (Cambridge, Mass.: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 1995): 59.

case. They try to show that Ukraine was a colony of Russia during Soviet times and that Ukraine had no rights. That also try to emphasise that Ukrainians were not allowed to speak and learn Ukrainian, that there was Russification, that there was a famine which the Russians forced upon Ukraine, and that the ‘Russians’ stole Ukrainian industrial and agricultural production among other things. Though some of these arguments do have some validity, the nationalists have failed to convince most Ukrainian citizens of their view of history although in certain cases they do seem to have convinced people in the West. This chapter has discussed some of the most important periods in Ukrainian history which are glorified by Ukrainian nationalists who are in favour of their inclusion into the military-patriotic education program in the military and also Ukrainian schools in general. Among the most important points to remember are: 1) there is a great difference between ‘Ukrainian nationalists’ and ‘Ukrainians’. Ukrainian nationalists have struggled for independence, but the majority of Ukrainians have not; 2) Ukrainian independence has always failed most importantly because the idea and its leaders have not been supported by Ukrainians themselves. Quite often the actions of the nationalists have alienated Ukrainians; 3) though anti-Tsarist tendencies among Ukrainians have been apparent, this has not translated into an anti-Russian attitude. Throughout history Ukrainians have not been in favour of attempts to completely separate Ukraine from Russia as the nationalists claim; 4) nationalist collaboration with foreign powers (which Russia is not considered to be), especially if aimed against Russia, has always been opposed by the majority of Ukrainians; 5) contrary to the arguments of Ukrainian nationalists, many nationalist groups were not supported by their contemporaries in Ukraine at the time of their existence, thus there is no reason why they would or should be supported now; 6) the actions of the various nationalist groups during World War II were anything but noble and should not be glorified. Furthermore, from a totally military point of view their actions can hardly be used as an example for a real army.

Ukrainian Independence and the Creation of the Military

According to the Soviet Constitution which was in effect until October 7, 1977, the Ukrainian SSR had the right to create and maintain its own armed forces. However, with the passing of the new Soviet Constitution in 1977, followed by the new Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on April 20, 1978, this right was eliminated. Therefore the idea for the creation of an independent Ukrainian military actually predated Ukraine’s independence and was not a nationalist invention in contemporary Ukraine. In the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s there were a number of non-nationalist reasons which once again gave birth to the idea to create an independent Ukrainian military which included 1) the Afghan War; 2) the Chernobyl disaster; 3) Didivshchyna; and 4) prevention of the use of the military by reactionary forces in hotspots around the USSR and in Ukraine itself. Probably the most important reason for the idea to create an independent Ukrainian military had its roots in the war in Afghanistan where, like other Soviet citizens, Ukrainians were sent to fight and die. Being the unpopular war that it was, many Ukrainians and other Soviet citizens were desperate to keeps their sons away from the conflict. The solution to this problem was to keep Ukrainian recruits from serving outside the borders of the quiet and peaceful Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Due to the Chernobyl disaster Ukrainians were concerned about another such accident and wanted to rid their republic of everything and anything nuclear. With the large numbers of Soviet nuclear weapons in Ukraine there was a fear that there could be an accident. It was felt that the only way to rid Ukraine of nuclear weapons would be to control the military forces on its soil. Didivshchyna, a brutal form of hazing, was a long-time problem in the Soviet Armed Forces that became increasingly dangerous as the socio-economic situation in the USSR deteriorated. Didivshchyna, which comes from the word ‘grandfather’, referred to the unofficial and banned tradition of initiation which new recruits underwent at the hands of those soldiers who were already past their first year of service. These older soldiers were thus called ‘Didy’ or grandfathers. At times ‘Didivshchyna’ would result in serious injuries or even deaths. With the increased reports of serious injuries and deaths by the newly uncensored media, many Soviet citizens worried about sending their children to serve in such dangerous conditions. Many saw the solution to the Didivshchyna problem as creating a Ukrainian Armed Forces. The final reason which gave birth to the idea of an independent Ukrainian military was the need for the prevention of the use of the military by reactionary forces in various hotspots around the USSR. In the final years before the dissolution of the USSR there was a rise in ethnic conflicts and also violent crackdowns by reactionary local military forces on demonstrators. For the same reasons as with the Afghan War, Ukrainians were unwilling to send their sons to risk their lives in such places which for them were unimportant and hoped to prevent such events in their own republics. Once again the only way to insure that their children would not be sent to such places was by keeping them at home and controlling the military forces in the republic. There were also some extreme anti-Soviet reasons held by ethnic nationalists on the need to create a Ukrainian military. The nationalists in Western Ukraine, like in Georgia, Moldova and the Baltic republics, took the view that the Soviet military was an ‘occupying force’ which had kept Ukraine in a colonial status and enslaved its peoples.141 For this reason they called for a boycott of the draft, since according to Article 51 of the 1949 Geneva Convention an occupying power cannot force the citizens of the occupied territory to serve in 141

See for example: “Obrashcheniye k voyennosluzhashchim”, Ukrainskaya Respublikanskaya Partiya, (undated).

the armed forces of the occupying country.142 The nationalists also called for the Soviet military’s departure from the republic and for Ukrainian officers to burn their military membership cards and to go AWOL. 143 One of the most popular demands among nationalists was to eliminate the Communist Party’s influence in the armed forces through the institution of the Zampolit (political education officer). Most nationalist groups also called upon the Ukrainian Supreme Rada to ensure that Ukrainian conscripts only served within the republic’s borders. Certain nationalist groups even created their own paramilitary structures. Rukh, for example, formed a ‘legal’ paramilitary group in Lviv called the ‘Rukh Guard’ whose official task was to maintain civil order during demonstrations. The group is said to have taken part in Rukh organised demonstrations in Lviv, Kiev and the January 21, 1990, ‘human chain’ which linked Lviv with Kiev.144 The nationalists themselves, however, have admitted that the real purpose of the ‘Rukh Guard’ was to protect Rukh against Soviet security organs.145 Although nationalist demands may have had some success in Western Ukraine, it appears that their calls were largely left unanswered in the other parts of Ukraine. According to one public opinion poll conducted after the March 1990 republican elections, only 31 percent of Ukrainians were in favour of a boycott of the draft compared to 38 percent of Russians and 87 percent of Lithuanians.146 The reason for such an attitude towards the draft was that the vast majority of Ukrainian citizens felt that the Soviet Armed Forces were their own and not a foreign force.147 Due to the three non-nationalist points mentioned above, when the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine was drafted by the Ukrainian Supreme Rada on July 16, 1990 148 the following provisions regarding the military were included in Article IX on External and Internal Security: •

The Ukrainian SSR has the right to its own Armed Forces.

•

The Ukrainian SSR has its own internal troops and organs of state security subordinated to the Supreme Rada of the Ukrainian SSR. The Ukrainian SSR determines the form of military service of the citizens of the republic. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR take part in active military service, as a rule, on the territory of the Republic and cannot be used for military aims beyond its borders without the agreement of the Supreme Rada of the Ukrainian SSR.

• •

•

The Ukrainian SSR solemnly declares its intention in the future to become a permanently neutral state which does not take part in military blocs and adheres to the three non-nuclear principles: not to accept, not to manufacture and not to acquire nuclear weapons. 149

The principles for the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine were intended to be used as the basis of Ukraine’s participation in the creation of a new Union Treaty between the 142

V. Hrynevich et al., Istoriya Ukrainskoho Viyska, Lviv: Vydavnytstvo “Svit”, 1996: 752. See for example “Obrashcheniye k voyennosluzhashchim”, Ukrainskaya Respublikanskaya Partiya, (undated). 144 Hrynevich 753. 145 Ibid. 146 Arthur H. Miller, William M. Reisinger, and Vicki L. Hesli, “Public Support for New Political Institutions in Russia, the Ukraine and Lithuania,” Journal of Soviet Nationalities, 1, no. 4 (Winter 1990-1991): 97. 147 Ibid. 148 Even the drafting of the Declaration is not evidence of nationalist, anti-Russian or anti-Soviet sentiment in Ukraine’s Supreme Rada. The declaration was drafted a full month after Russia’s declaration of sovereignty of June 12, 1990. If anything, Ukraine was simply keeping up with the flow of political events in the Soviet Union. 149 Verhovna Rada Ukrainy, Zakony Ukrainy, Kiev: Instytut Zakonodavstva, Vol. 1, (1996) 8. 143

Soviet republics. However, since the adoption of a Union Treaty had been delayed the movement towards the creation of a Ukrainian military was also postponed. Any real intentions of the Supreme Rada to create a military were not acted upon until at least a year later. In fact, it has been pointed out that the one concern uniting most of the Supreme Rada Deputies was not whether or how to create an army but how to stop Ukrainian conscripts from serving in conflict zones outside of the republic.150 On July 30, 1990 the Ukrainian Supreme Rada adopted the resolution On the fulfilment of terms of military service for citizens of Ukraine and the use of workers of Ukrainian law enforcement agencies outside of the republic. The resolution called for the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR to develop a plan of action by September 15, 1990 on transferring Ukrainian citizens to the territory of the republic to fulfil their terms of military service. It became quite clear, however, that the Council of Ministers was in no rush to develop such a plan since the deadline had passed without any action on the matter. According to Rukh, the Council of Ministers had limited itself to the “creation of a Committee on ties with the USSR Ministry of Defence with rather vague functions and authority.” 151 Rukh also sent a statement to the head of the Ukrainian Supreme Rada and the country’s future president, Leonid Kravchuk, which stated the following: The Secretariat of the Popular Movement of Ukraine ‘Rukh’, considers as indispensable: 1) for the Supreme Rada to prepare an appeal to conscripted military servicemen of Ukrainian citizenship stationed outside of the republic guaranteeing their transfer to Ukrainian territory and to indicate an appropriate timetable for its fulfilment. 2) …to accelerate the execution of the resolution of the Supreme Rada of the Ukrainian SSR “On the fulfilment of terms of military service for citizens of Ukraine.” 3) …to organise the fulfilment of military service within the borders of the republic of the those servicemen who have already arbitrarily abandoned their place of service. 4) for law enforcement agencies of the republic to refrain from judicial sanctions against this category of citizens.152 Due to the fact that Kravchuk ignored and never responded to Rukh’s appeal and because of the Council of Ministers’ inaction regarding military servicemen, Rukh called for a public rally to be held on September 30, 1990 in Kiev to discuss the problem, followed by a strike on October 1.153 On October 10, 1990, the Supreme Rada passed a resolution which admitted the failure of the July 30 resolution in returning the republic’s citizens who were serving in either the military or law enforcement agencies and being used to settle interethnic disputes. The new resolution called for their return and instructed the Council of Ministers and executive committees of the oblast, city and regional Councils of People’s Deputies to tighten their control over the draft. Although the resolution strongly stipulated that Ukrainian conscripts were not to be used in the settlement of interethnic conflicts it did not ban their use outside of the republic for other purposes. However, the Council of Ministers was called upon to introduce a quota for the number of Ukrainians that would serve outside of the republic. Another aspect of the resolution was the creation of a Supreme Rada committee on external and internal security, and a plenipotentiary delegation for the purpose of conducting consultations with the USSR Supreme Rada, government and Ministry of Defence. The plenipotentiary delegation was made up of various People’s Deputies and included Lyudmila 150

Kathleen Mihalisko, “Ukrainians Ponder Creation of a National Army”, Report on the USSR, February 22, 1991. 151 Sekretariat Narodnoho Rukhu Ukrainy, Zvernennya Do Hromadyan Ukrainy, September 21, 1990. 152 Ibid. 153 Letter signed by Leonid Kovalchuk, Press Tsentr Druhykh Vseukrainskyhh Zboriv Narodnoho RUKHu Ukrainy (undated).

Trukhmanova, head of the republican branch Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers. During talks with the USSR Ministry of Defence which rejected the Ukrainian resolutions, the delegation was offered assurances that no more than 30 percent of conscripts would leave Ukrainian territory.154 However, representatives of the Soviet Armed Forces had told the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers that the number of conscripts serving outside of Ukraine was between 3040 percent.155 Although Leonid Kravchuk supported the Supreme Rada’s resolutions on military service, reports have suggested that he was against the creation of a Ukrainian military or any structure that could possibly weaken the authority of Soviet military planners.156 It is, therefore, not surprising that all of Ukraine’s resolutions regarding military matters remained largely on paper. Furthermore, the Supreme Rada resolutions only dealt with the republic’s short-term conscripts and not its full-time officers or servicemen. This was to be a trend which would manifest itself in later resolutions until Ukraine’s independence and signified a reluctance to actually form an army. In fact the sovereignty declaration only stated that Ukraine had the ‘right’ to its own armed forces, and not that it was actually going to create armed forces anytime in the near future. The declaration did however concretely state that it was the Ukrainian Supreme Rada that would decide all questions related to conscription. When taking these two facts into consideration, the Supreme Rada was indeed attempting to do as it had promised; no more, no less. Though there is no evidence of the Rukh strike had any effect on the Supreme Rada, the student hunger strike which began a day later on October 2, 1990 did cause a reaction from this body. Although there was little proof of anyone really going hungry among the hunger strikers 157, on October 17, 1990, the Supreme Rada adopted a resolution to study their demands. One of the six demands made by the students, called for the Supreme Rada to adopt a law which would prevent Ukrainian recruits from being stationed beyond the borders of Ukraine without their consent. In the second point of the Supreme Rada’s resolution the students’ concerns regarding military service were addressed. The resolution also promised that before December 31, 1990, the Supreme Rada would adopt laws On the Fulfilment of Conscript Military Service of Ukrainian Citizens on the Territory of Ukraine, and On Alternative Military Service, and would create the “necessary state organs”. 158 The Supreme Rada’s resolution was successful in ending the student hunger strike. However, since only the demand calling for the replacement of the head of the Council of Ministers, V.A. Masol, was fulfilled, it would appear that the strike was a failure. With regard to military matters, the only action taken by the Supreme Rada before the self-declared deadline of December 31, 1990 was to amend articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR to read: “Terms regarding the fulfilment of military service of Ukrainian SSR citizens is determined by legislation of the Ukrainian SSR”; and: “The duties of state organs, civil organisations, officials and citizens concerning the security of the country and strengthening of its defence capabilities is determined by legislation of the Ukrainian SSR.” 159 Thus, the amendments fell well short of ensuring that Ukrainian citizens would only serve in Ukraine. In fact there is no evidence to suggest that the amendments were reactions to either the Rukh strike or the student hunger strike. 154

Kathleen Mihalisko, “Ukrainians Ponder Creation of a National Army”, Report on the USSR, February 22, 1991. 155 Ibid. 156 Ibid. 157 Having been a student at Kiev State University’s Faculty of Journalism at the time, the author often visited the site of the hunger strike and was well informed of its state of affairs. From the appearance of the strikers, one could hardly tell that any of them had lost any weight after two weeks of a hunger strike. In fact with their tents pitched below the monument to Lenin and the Bolsheviks, the strike appeared more like a camping trip than anything else. The rather jovial mood of the strikers also raised doubts in many people’s minds as to whether the strikers were really not eating. 158 Postanova Verhovnoi Rady Ukrainskoi RSR: Pro rozhlyad vymoh studentiv yaki pryvodyat’ holoduvannya v.m. Kievi z 2 zhovtnya 1990 roku., 17 October 1990. 159 Verhovna Rada Ukrainy, Zakony Ukrainy, Kiev: Instytut Zakonodavstva, Vol. 1, (1996) 29.

Following the Supreme Rada’s Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine, various nationalist groups began working out their own concepts for the creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In November 1990, at the second Rukh congress, the Concept of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was drawn up by the Committee on Military Problems of the Council of Rukh Committees. According to the Rukh ‘concept’, the military-political situation in the world and within the USSR had significantly changed and thus the country no longer required such a large military and the enormous expenditures that went along with it. It argued that the USSR was in crisis and that there was a need to replace it with a ‘commonwealth of sovereign states’ and to adopt new approaches in the building of armed forces. It added that conservative forces were intent on preserving the old union structures and were spending excessively high shares of the GNP on defence which was causing a deep crisis in the economy, curtailing social programs, and raising tensions in society. The author’s of the ‘concept’ argued that the changes in the world had created a crisis in the military doctrine, military reforms and the socio-economic and legal situation of military servicemen. They then went on to blame the situation on conservative forces who they said were trying to preserve the union by using the armed forces to suppress the national-democratic movement in the union; an act which stimulated a growth in anti-military feelings, boycotts of the draft, and the growth of national consciousness among military servicemen whose wishes were to serve within the boundaries of their own republics. The creation of republican armed forces was supposed to solve these problems. Throughout its text, the ‘concept’ leaned on the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine as the basis for the need to create a Ukrainian military. The suggested path to creating the armed forces was by way of “intelligent compromise between various political forces on the basis of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine with the consideration of real conditions.” Furthermore it stated that this route “presupposes the implementation of consecutive steps in the evolutionary transformation of the Armed Forces of the USSR on the territory of Ukraine into the Armed Forces of Ukraine with the preservation of the battlereadiness of the forces and defence capacity of the republic.” 160 Rukh’s ‘Concept’ then gave two different versions of how the above-mentioned goal was to be achieved. The first version called for: 1. A demand by the Ukrainian Supreme Rada to the Ministry of Defence of the USSR to create a Soviet Armed Forces Main Command in Ukraine which would co-ordinate all decisions concerning the livelihood of the troops with the Supreme Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. The Soviet Ministry of Defence was to control all operational, tactical and strategic questions of the forces; 2. The creation of a Ukrainian Supreme Rada Commission on Defence and Security which was to study various problems concerning the Soviet Armed Forces stationed in Ukraine and their reformation; 3. The creation of a military department subordinated to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine which was to: a) form a Republican Military Commissariat; b) create a military doctrine; c) deal with the drafting and staffing of territorial units; and d) deals with questions related to the subordination of Soviet Armed Forces in Ukraine to the Ukrainian government. All questions related to the military use and tactical aims of these forces was to be agreed upon with the Soviet Armed Forces Main Command; and, 4. On the basis of the Soviet Armed Forces Main Command in Ukraine, the Supreme Rada creates a Ukrainian Armed Forces Command and places full jurisdiction of all former Soviet military formations and units in the republic under its own control‚ forms military units in accordance to the military doctrine and international obligations and treaties signed by the Ukrainian Supreme Rada as a full-fledged member of the United Nations. The second version of the Rukh ‘Concept’ was similar to the first. The only real differences were that nowhere in the second version did it call for negotiating with the USSR Ministry of 160

Kontseptsia Vooruzhenykh Sil Ukrainy: Proekt, Ekho, No. 24, July 1991.

Defence and that the former Soviet forces were to be ‘Ukrainianised’. It is clear that Rukh’s concept was to create a republican armed forces, not the armed forces of an independent country. It also appears that the authors of the concept believed Ukraine would and should sign a new union treaty between the republics and the centre to transform the USSR into a ‘commonwealth of sovereign states’. This, however, did not imply that there would be no central government. Regardless of what was published in the concept, by its second congress Rukh had transformed itself from a popular all-embracing movement into a nationalist front which was calling for Ukraine’s full independence from the USSR. Ukraine’s first Defence Minister Kostiantyn Morozov has stated that the Rukh ‘concept’ was, “taken as the basis of the work of the Supreme Rada on legislation concerning issues of the formation of the Armed Forces.”161 Regardless of Morozov’s claims, the Rukh ‘concept’ did not appear to make any impact upon Ukraine’s politicians at the time. In an interview published two days prior to the August coup, Morozov, then commander of the Kiev Military District, made absolutely no references to the document or even the need to create a Ukrainian armed force. In fact, speaking of the USSR, he proudly stated that: “The army has and will always serve the Fatherland;”162 obviously not a statement which a Ukrainian nationalist would make. It appears that only after he was asked to become Ukraine’s defence minister did this ethnic Russian’s Ukrainian ‘national consciousness’ suddenly blossom. Indeed, Morozov became even more nationalistic than many of the Ukrainian nationalists themselves. In an article published in a number of Ukrainian newspapers in 1991 prior to the August Coup, Levko Lukianenko, the leader of the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP), former political prisoner and later Ambassador to Canada, outlined his party’s ideas on the creation of a Ukrainian military. The URP’s proposal was relatively similar to that of the Rukh concept with the exception of its view on nuclear weapons and its rather antagonistic wording and use of ethnic nationalist jargon. The proposal consistently referred to the central union government as the ‘Empire’, Ukraine as it’s ‘colony’, and Ukrainians as ‘slaves’. Soldiers from outside of Ukraine were referred to as ‘foreigners’.163 One of the URP program’s first points was to ‘Ukrainianise’ the existing Soviet forces in Ukraine and send the ‘foreigners’ out of the republic. A gradual transition from the use of the Russian language into Ukrainian of the entire armed forces was an important part of the concept. However, unlike Rukh, the URP made it clear that full independence should be Ukraine’s ultimate goal. Until that goal was reached, it called for the creation of a ‘Ukrainian Republican Army’ to defend the nation. One of the major differences between the Rukh and URP proposal was with regard to nuclear weapons. Lukianenko was opposed to dividing the nuclear weapons among the 15 republics because such an action would scare the West which would then support the ‘disintegrating empire’ against the ‘national-liberation forces’. He argued that although the smaller Soviet republics could become non-nuclear states (and rather quickly), Ukraine could not do the same as it had vast quantities of uranium and took part in the production of nuclear weapons. Lukianenko went on to argue that Ukraine could only give up its nuclear potential when the rest of the world’s nuclear states did the same. This effectively meant that Ukraine’s chances of ever giving up its nuclear arsenal would be rather slim to none. The URP’s ideas for the creation of a Ukrainian military also included the gradual transformation of the recruitment policy from one of conscription into one of a professional army composed of volunteers. At its founding congress on July 28, 1991, the Union of Officers of Ukraine (UOU) produced a Concept of the Ukrainian Army which like the Rukh and URP concepts was intended to act as a blueprint for the creation of a Ukrainian military. The UOU’s first concept called for the recognition of the Soviet Armed Forces in Ukraine as an ‘army of 161

Konstantyn Morozov, “The Formation of the Ukrainian Military, 1991-95” The Ukrainian Review, (1996): 9. Leninskoe Znamya, August 17, 1991. 163 Levko Lukianenko “Ukrainskaya Armiya: kak ee sozdat’?” 1991 (untitled newspaper from archive of Narodna Armia Editor Vasyl’ Bilan). 162

occupation’ and therefore called for it to be disbanded and removed from Ukraine. In its place was to be created a Ukrainian military force. Although this was the concept which most UOU members agreed with, it was nonetheless recognised that the adoption of such a concept could lead to a civil war in Ukraine.164 For this reason the UOU adopted a second concept. Although many of the UOU’s members were also members or supporters of Rukh and the URP, nonetheless the second concept did have some significant differences. The first reason why the UOU felt there should be a ‘restoration’ of the Ukrainian Army was because of the republic’s ‘right’ to an armed forces as stipulated in the Declaration of State Sovereignty. Although there were various other reasons why the UOU felt it necessary to create a Ukrainian military one of the most interesting was because it felt that “the monopoly of CPSU165 control of the leadership of the army creates a constant threat of martial law in the republic.”166 It was indeed an accurate prediction of what was to appear in the form of the August Coup only weeks later. Although exaggerated, another reason for creating a Ukrainian army was “the growth of national consciousness of military servicemen and their desire to serve in the Ukrainian Army and defend the sovereignty of Ukraine.”167 The UOU document called for the ‘departyzatsia’ (removal of the influence of political parties) of the Ukrainian Army and appointment of a civilian defence minister. It called for a multistage transition of the military from one of the mixed principle (i.e. professional officers and conscripts) into a fully professional force. One difference which the UOU concept called for, which its Rukh and URP counterparts did not, was the “use of national and historical traditions in the construction of the Ukrainian Army.” 168 Only later would it become evident which army’s traditions it preferred. Somewhat like the URP and Rukh documents the UOU concept called for a gradual transformation from a Soviet military into a Ukrainian one. However, in its concept the UOU appeared more inclined to co-operating with the Soviet government when it stated that “the transition from the Union to a Ukrainian Army is to take place in stages taking into consideration the strategic interests of Ukraine and the USSR.”169 The UOU concept also included a military-economic component which called for the establishment of Ukrainian government control over the military-industrial complex located on Ukrainian territory and its eventual conversion into civilian production. Much of the concept dealt with the social protection of military servicemen. Interestingly enough, one of the points under the heading of social protection stated that military servicemen should have “the right to take part in political activity until the introduction of departyzatsia [removal of political party influence] in the army.”170 It would appear that the reason for such a right was in order to allow Ukrainian nationalist military personnel to fight against the influence of the CPSU. The UOU document stated that although the President was to be the Commander-inChief the highest ranking body controlling the Ukrainian Army was the Supreme Rada. The document went on to detail the division of powers and responsibilities of the Supreme Rada, President and Ministry of Defence. While the various nationalist groups were forwarding their ideas on how to create a military, the Ukrainian Supreme Rada was dedicating its time to the protection of the republic’s conscripts in the Soviet Armed Forces. On July 5, 1991 the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Rada passed a number of documents which pertained to the protection of Ukrainian conscripts. 164

Interview with Konstyantyn Morozov, “Peremozhe Natsional’na Idea” Flot Ukrainy, September 16, 1995. Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 166 Halychyna, August 3, 1991. 167 Ibid. 168 Ibid. 169 Ibid. 170 Ibid. 165

One of the major components of the July 5 documents was the creation of a commission to inquire into the death or injury of Ukrainian military conscripts. It was clearly stated that the organisation and functioning of the commission was not to break any existing laws nor interfere with the work of the courts, military tribunals or public prosecutors. The commission was to be composed of People’s Deputies, and representatives of the appropriate ministries, departments and civil organisations. When necessary and of their own desire, parents of the conscript in question or their representatives were also to be included.171 Included with the documents was an appeal to People’s Deputies of all levels, their executive committees, commanders of military and naval units, military servicemen, draftees and their parents and civil organisations of the republic. The appeal stated that every year thousands of Ukrainian citizens were drafted into various Soviet military units and that “military service for our people was always a reason for special pride and a matter of honour and conscience. It was and remains a sacred, honourable duty of every citizen.” 172 It continued by praising most units of the Soviet armed forces and looking to the future signing of a new Union Treaty wrote: “In the Armed Forces of the Union of Sovereign States, we perceive a powerful stabilising factor and reliable guarantor of peace.”173 In appealing to ‘future soldiers’ the document stated that, “desertion, evasion from the fulfilment of military duties was always considered among our people as not only a crime but also a disgrace.”174 It was very obvious by its words that the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Rada did not intend to create its own armed forces, nor did it agree with the nationalists regarding the state of the Soviet Armed Forces and their calls for Ukrainian draftees to desert. It was also clear that Ukraine saw itself as a part of the future ‘Union of Sovereign States’. The appeal went on to state that according to Ukrainian legislation, the republic’s military conscripts could only serve outside of Ukraine on a voluntary basis with their written agreement. Although the Presidium praised the Soviet Armed Forces it did acknowledge that there were problems and that it would do everything in its power so that Ukrainian citizens would not risk their lives while fulfilling their military duty. The July 5 resolution called for the Cabinet of Ministers to prepare various legislation by October 1, 1991 with regard to conscripted military service, alternative non-military service, and the legal and social protection of military servicemen and their families. This preparation was one of the most important reasons why Ukraine was able to enact such military-related laws relatively quickly following its declaration of independence. However, the resolution also called for close co-operation with Soviet military and government structures regarding the formulation of legislation on conscripted military service and to fulfil the November 15, 1990 decree of the USSR President ‘On measures to realise the propositions of the Committee of Soldiers Mother’s.’175 The resolution showed that Ukraine was obviously not working against the Soviet government but rather with it and also following certain Soviet government initiatives in military reform. The Ukrainian Supreme Rada’s attitude at the time was a far cry from the actions of such republics as Moldova, Georgia and the Baltics which constantly worked against USSR institutions and laws. Although it was very important for the Ukrainian Supreme Rada to prevent its citizens from dying in ‘hot spots’ around the USSR, it was even more important not to make a ‘hot spot’ of their own republic. For this reason, Ukraine was not about to implement any laws or resolutions which could antagonise its own population or cause a conflict with the centre. 171

Prezydia Verhovnoi Rady Ukrainskoi RSR, Polozhenya pro spetsial’nu Komisiiu pry Prezudii Verhovnoi Rady Ukrains’koi RSR po rozhlyadu zvernen’ hromadyan respubliky z pytan’ zahybeli abo kalitstva viyskovosluzhbovtsiv pid chas prohodzhenya strokovoi viyskovoi sluzhby. Prezydia Verhovnoi Rady Ukrainskoi RSR: Kiev, July 5, 1991. 172 Prezydia Verhovnoi Rady Ukrainskoi RSR, Zvernennya Prezudii Verhovnoi Rady Ukrains’koi RSR do Rad narodnykh depytativ usikh rivniv, ikh vykonavchykh komitetiv, komanduvannya viys’kovykh chastyn I korabliv, viyskovosluzhbovtsiv, pryzovnykiv ta ikh bat’kiv, hromads’kykh orhanizatsiy respubliky. Prezydia Verhovnoi Rady Ukrainskoi RSR: Kiev, July 5, 1991. 173 Ibid. 174 Ibid. 175 Ibid.

The August Coup On August 19, 1991, the so-called ‘State Committee on the Extraordinary Situation’ took power and proclaimed a state of emergency in the USSR. Given the danger the failed ‘August Coup’ had represented and the subsequent proclamation of Ukraine’s independence by the Supreme Rada, the idea of creating an independent Ukrainian military force was brought to the fore. Since there was a perceived danger that the Soviet military might side with the coup plotters, the most pragmatic thing to do was to prevent such a possibility in the future by actually controlling the military at the republican level. On August 24, 1991, three days after the end of the coup, Ukraine proclaimed its independence and began the creation of its own armed forces. In a resolution entitled ‘On Military Formations in Ukraine” the Supreme Rada decided: “1) to subordinate all military formations located on the republic’s territory to the Supreme Rada; 2) to create a Ministry of Defence of Ukraine; 3) for the Ukrainian government to begin the creation of Ukrainian Armed Forces, Republican Guard and a unit to defend the Supreme Rada, Cabinet of Ministers and National Bank of Ukraine.”176 A few days later the Presidium of the Supreme Rada adopted resolutions which subordinated both the border troops and Ministry of Internal Affairs troops to Ukrainian control. On September 3 the appointment of Major General of Aviation Konstantyn Morozov as Minister of Defence was approved by the Supreme Rada. On the same day the Ukrainian Supreme Rada issued a statement to all Soviet military personnel stationed in the republic that the creation of Ukraine’s own military was to ensure that troops “would not be used against the people of Ukraine or other sovereign states.”177 However, for the nationalists, Ukrainian history taught that the existence of a strong military was necessary to protect the nation’s statehood from outside enemy aggression. Russia’s role in the creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, following Ukraine’s declaration of independence, is unclear. Some sources state that both newly appointed Soviet Defence Minister Shaposhnikov and Chief of the General Staff Lobov might have actually encouraged the creation of a Ukrainian military or at least did not oppose such a move.178 Furthermore, according to a Pentagon report on the USSR armed forces at the time, Lobov had been quoted “as having called for the creation of republican defence ministries and republican armies.”179 Only later would Russia’s opposition to the creation of an independent Ukrainian military be clear. Upon his appointment, Morozov was authorised to draw up plans for the creation of a Ukrainian military which he began immediately. In doing so, Morozov drew upon the UOU and its Concept of the Ukrainian Army.180 Morozov then forwarded his plans for approval to the Supreme Rada. The final document which was approved on October 11 became known as the Concept of Defence and Construction of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The official Ukrainian government concept was made up of five separate sections: 1) Conditions and factors influencing the construction of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; 2) Main principles in the creation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; 3) Organs of military administration; 176

Verhovna Rada Ukrainy, Postanova Verhovnoi Rady Ukrainy Pro Viyskovi Formuvanya na Ukraini, Kiev: Verhovna Rada Ukrainy, August 24, 1991. 177 Kathleen Mihalisko, “Laying the Foundation for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.” Report on the USSR, November 8, 1991. 178 Ibid. 179 Ibid. 180 Interview with Konstyantyn Morozov, “Peremozhe Natsional’na Idea” Flot Ukrainy, September 16, 1995.

4) Provision of financial and economic needs; 5) Social protection of military servicemen. The Concept of Defence and Construction of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was somewhat different from the original UOU concept. The main difference was that whereas the nationalist documents outlined steps Ukraine was to take in the creation of a Ukrainian military, the Ukrainian government’s concept detailed the armed forces’ composition and the reasons for their existence. Since Ukraine had actually already taken over all of the Soviet military forces on its soil there was no need to make a detailed plan of how a Ukrainian military would come into existence. A major difference was also the lack of any anti-Soviet or anti-Communist rhetoric. One of the more important parts of the document was the section on the Social protection of military servicemen. The concept stated that all privileges for military servicemen and their families as established in Soviet legislation were to be safeguarded, and that their rights could not be restricted due to ethnicity, mother tongue, religion or political beliefs. It also stated that representatives of the Supreme Rada would be present in all military garrisons to protect the rights of the servicemen and that a ‘Social Protection Unit’ would be created in the Ministry of Defence. The concept promised that only officers who were of pensionable age and had obtained housing would be retired due to the restructuring of the military. Moreover, military servicemen were allowed to take part in business activity in their spare time. The concept did a great deal to raise support for a Ukrainian military among Soviet military personnel stationed in Ukraine. However, not everyone was so supportive of the Supreme Rada’s actions. Immediately prior to the announcement of Ukraine’s military concept, USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev had gone on record as condemning efforts to set up national armies as “dangerous, frivolous, irresponsible, and unconstitutional.” 181 The Ukrainian actions also flew in the face of USSR Defence Minister Evgenii Shaposhnikov’s warning that he would not agree to the division of the Soviet Armed Forces or their weaponry.182 The Supreme Rada’s actions also raised major concerns in some major Western countries such as the USA which condemned Ukraine’s plans to form its own armed forces.183 On November 4, 1991, the Supreme Rada adopted two separate laws which dealt with the National Guard of Ukraine and the Border Troops. The law on the National Guard of Ukraine transformed the former Ministry of Internal Affairs Troops into the National Guard of Ukraine. Its first commander was Colonel V. Kukharets, the former commander of a Dnipropetrovsk convoy brigade.184 The law named a whole list of tasks which the National Guard was to perform including: 1) the protection of Ukraine’s constitutional order; 2) participation in the upholding of emergency situations as called for by Ukrainian law; 3) participation in the liquidation of the results of accidents, catastrophes or elemental calamities; 4) helping the Border Troops; 5) participation in military activities against foreign attack and the protection of Ukraine’s security; 6) the defence of diplomatic and consular representatives of foreign states on the territory of Ukraine; and 7) participation in the defence of civil order.185 The use of the National Guard for any other purposes not written in the law was forbidden. It 181

Mihalisko. Ibid. 183 Ibid. 184 Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine – A New Military Power?” Jane’s Intelligence Review, (February 1992) 90. 185 Verhovna Rada Ukrainy‚ Zakony Ukrainy‚ tom 2 (Kiev: Institut Zakonodavstva‚ 1996) 233. 182

was highlighted in Article 6 of the law that citizens of Ukraine regardless of ethnicity or religion could become members of the National Guard. However, it was directly stated that the “state language” (i.e. Ukrainian) was to be used in the National Guard of Ukraine. The participation of National Guardsmen in political parties, organisations or movements was forbidden as was the existence of such institutions in the National Guard. The National Guard was subordinated to the Supreme Rada of Ukraine. Formation of the Border Troops of Ukraine was somewhat trickier since it meant the take-over of the Soviet Borders Troops on Ukrainian territory which were a part of the KGB and among the most loyal of any Soviet military formations. Members of the Soviet Border Troops were chosen for their loyalty to the Soviet Union and were always in top physical and mental condition. The recruiting process was extremely stringent and only the best were ever recruited. All of these factors meant that it was important that the law be delicately formulated so that the existing Soviet border troops would find the law acceptable. The main work of the Border Troops was to ensure the inviolability of the state border of Ukraine and the safeguarding of the country’s economic zones. In case of foreign attack the Border Troops were to be the front-line of defence and were to be allowed the use of any of the Ukrainian Armed Forces military hardware. All matters related to rank and military designation were to be identical to that of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Border Troops were to be administered by the ‘State Committee on the Protection of the State Border of Ukraine’ which itself was to be accountable to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. The main law regulating the actions of the Border Troops was the law ‘On the State Border of Ukraine’ and the Constitution of Ukraine. Like the National Guard of Ukraine the Border Troops were banned from being members of any political parties, organisations or movements. However, unlike the National Guard the law on the Border Troops did not require the Border Troops to use Ukrainian. The Border Troops were put under the command of Lieutenant General V. Hubenko who stated that their main focus, as before, would be the southern and western parts of the republic. Interestingly enough he also stated that: “There will be no barbed wire, no control strip, nor any other attributes of the border on the frontier with Belarus, Russia and Moldova.”186 On December 6, 1991, the laws ‘On the Defence of Ukraine’ and ‘On the Armed Forces of Ukraine’ submitted by Defence Minister Morozov, were adopted by the Supreme Rada. On the same day the Supreme Rada also passed a resolution entitled ‘On the text of the Military Oath.’ The law ‘On the Defence of Ukraine’ outlined Ukraine’s concept of defence and the various responsibilities for the defence of the country for the Supreme Rada, President, Defence Council, Cabinet of Ministers, Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces, citizens, organisations and business and other ministries and local governments. The law also detailed the course of action and various responsibilities of the above mentioned entities in times of war, martial law, mobilisation and demobilisation. One of the more interesting points in the law was related to military-patriotic education. Although the Ministry of Defence was in charge of conducting military-patriotic education within the Armed Forces, the Supreme Rada, Council of Ministers of the Crimean Republic, oblast, city and regional Councils of People’s Deputies were responsible for its provision within the population at large. In a country as diverse as Ukraine this would mean completely different forms and directions of military-patriotic education which would very likely contradict each other. The law ‘On the Armed Forces of Ukraine’ detailed the tasks and obligations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine along with the principles of its existence. The purpose of the Armed Forces was for the defence of the independence, territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine. In response to the didivshchina and possibility of coups within the Soviet military, the law stipulated that the UAF was being built on a number of principles, including, 186

Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine – A New Military Power?” Jane’s Intelligence Review, (February 1992) 90.

democracy and humanism; supremacy of the law; accountability to the constitutional organs of legislative and executive power; non-partisanship; the guarantee of social and legal protection of military servicemen. The UAF was to be composed of land forces, air defence and airforces, and naval forces. The President of Ukraine was the Commander-in-Chief of the UAF. As in the National Guard the operational language was to be the ‘state language’ and political parties and movements were banned. However, the law on the UAF also stipulated that “the military-patriotic education of military servicemen is to be realised using the nationalhistorical traditions of the people of Ukraine.” What exactly these traditions were was omitted, however the fact that the term ‘people of Ukraine’ was used as opposed to ‘Ukrainian people’ is not without significance. Use of the term ‘Ukrainian people’ could have been interpreted as meaning ethnic Ukrainian nationalist traditions which would be exclusive of the country’s various ethnic groups. Therefore by using ‘people of Ukraine’ all of Ukraine’s ethnic groups, and their military traditions, could be considered valid. The military oath187, which all military servicemen stationed in Ukraine were required to take, began to be implemented in January 1992 and became an additional bone of contention between Ukraine and Russia, who was in favour of preserving a joint CIS military. Nonetheless within three months more than 80 percent of the military personnel stationed in Ukraine took the military oath thus ending any chances of Ukraine’s participation in the CIS Joint Armed Forces.188 This also persuaded Russia to finally begin the creation of its own armed forces. One of the most important aspects of all the newly adopted military laws was the inclusion of clauses concerning the protection of the social and legal status of military servicemen and members of their families. This actually became the most crucial aspect in gaining support among the estimated 1.5 million servicemen stationed in Ukraine for the creation of a Ukrainian military and the country’s independence itself. Defence Minister Morozov appealed to all troops stationed in the republic to vote in favour of Ukraine’s independence promising them guaranteed social and legal rights.189 It would not have seemed like a farfetched promise since the military laws which had already come into existence prior to the elections did include sections related to the social and legal rights of military servicemen. For the servicemen who were annoyed with their perceived lack of social and legal protection in the Soviet Armed Forces, both a Ukrainian military and independence was appealing. The result was massive support for Ukrainian independence during the December 1, 1991 referendum. The Black Sea Fleet, which since independence has been Ukraine’s largest foreign policy problem and probably the most active opponent of Ukrainian independence, actually voted 80% in favour of Ukrainian independence.190 It has also been noted that 2/3 of the estimated 1.5 million Soviet military personnel stationed in Ukraine apparently backed Ukraine’s independence.191 Morozov’s promise of social and legal protection for military personnel was finally enshrined in the law ‘On the Social and Legal Protection of Military Servicemen and 187

The resolution ‘On the text of the Military Oath’ read as follows: “I (family name, first name and patronymic), enlist into military service and solemnly swear to the people of Ukraine always to be faithful and devoted to them, to fulfil my military duty with honesty and conscientiousness, to follow the orders of my commanders, to steadfastly follow the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, to safeguard state and military secrets. I swear to defend the Ukrainian state, to firmly stand on guard for her freedom and independence. I swear never to betray the people of Ukraine.” Verhovna Rada Ukrainy, Postanova Verhovnoi Rady Ukrainy Pro Tekst Viyskovoi Prysyahy, Kiev: Verhovna Rada Ukrainy, December 6, 1991. 188 Konstantyn Morozov, “The Formation of the Ukrainian Military, 1991-95” The Ukrainian Review, (1996): 10. 189 Kathleen Mihalisko, “Laying the Foundation for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.” Report on the USSR, November 8, 1991. 190 Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine – A New Military Power?” Jane’s Intelligence Review, (February 1992) 88. 191 Bohdan Nahaylo, “The Birth of an Independent Ukraine”, RFE/RL Research Institute, Report on the USSR, vol.3, no. 50, December 13, 1991.

Members of their Families’ adopted on December 20, 1991. The law offered the same protection for military servicemen and their families as for other Ukrainian citizens. The law stated that servicemen were allowed to either practice a religion or not practice any religion and were admitted to freely express either their religious or atheistic beliefs. Servicemen were guaranteed the inviolability of their personal freedom. They could only be arrested by the decision of a court of law, or due to the sanctions of a procurator, or by orders of a commander in accordance with the disciplinary statutes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Military servicemen and members of their families were given guarantees that they would be supplied with permanent living quarters. This was extremely important, especially since many servicemen were coming back from Eastern Europe with their families and had no place to live. Until a permanent dwelling could be found, it would be the responsibility of military units to provide a service dwelling or pay for the renting of a private dwelling for the servicemen in question. Free health care and the free use of sanatoriums and other therapeutic establishments was also guaranteed. However, the law took away the right of servicemen to take part in business activity as had been originally promised in the Concept on Defence and Construction of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The law did a great deal to raise support for the creation of an independent Ukrainian military. When the oath of allegiance began to be implemented among military units in Ukrainein January 1992, within 3 months more than 80% of the former Soviet servicemen stationed in the country took the oath. The importance in gaining support for the Ukrainian military was well-expressed by one military officer who swore allegiance to Ukraine: “In Ukraine there are 3 laws guaranteeing the status of military servicemen. It ends up that Ukraine is the first state in the CIS to undertake concrete steps in the sphere of social protection of military servicemen. That means we can serve.”192 The nationalist UOU used Ukraine’s liberal social and legal protection laws to convince military personnel stationed in Ukraine to take the oath of allegiance. In an interview with Literaturna Ukraina, the head of the UOU, Vilen Martirosian, admitted that the union had actively worked to convince military personnel that they would gain more socio-economic help from the Ukrainian state than from the Russian parliament. 193 Military servicemen appeared to have been convinced. Only approximately 10,000 officers refused to take the oath and were therefore transferred to other former Soviet republics.194 Although implementing the military oath among military servicemen was deemed the best way to ensure allegiance to Ukraine, the policy had many faults. The most obvious and important fault was whether the servicemen that swore allegiance to Ukraine were really sincere? Ukrainian nationalists have been especially critical of the loyalties of many of Ukraine’s military officers whom they deem to be ‘anti-Ukrainian’. Although this charge may be an exaggeration, many officers were either pro-Russian, or at least not anti-Russian, a perspective nationalists are very suspicious of. Although ‘anti-Ukrainian’ may be an exaggeration, whether these servicemen are ready to defend Ukraine is a different question which the nationalists are rightly concerned about. Can such officers be trusted to defend Ukraine? Having sworn their allegiance to Ukraine was a rather weak act especially when one considers the fact that the same servicemen had also sworn allegiance to the USSR and broken that oath by swearing allegiance to Ukraine. The possibility of these servicemen someday swearing allegiance to a third state cannot be ignored. In fact, historical precedents have already been set during the Civil War years when villagers in Ukraine and Russia were rumoured to have constantly switched sides depending on which forces were occupying their area. When asked about the swearing of allegiance to Ukraine, Border Troop Brigade Commander Captain Igor Alferyev had this to say: “Don’t forget, we swore allegiance not to Ukraine nor to the President of Ukraine. We swore allegiance to the people of Ukraine who 192

Narodna Armia March 17, 1992. “Ukrainskomu Viysku – Buty! Konferentsia Spilky Ofitseriv Ukrainy v Krymu”, Visti Kombatanta, vol. 2, 1992: 47. 194 Konstantyn Morozov, “The Formation of the Ukrainian Military, 1991-95” The Ukrainian Review, 1996. 193

as you know are multinational.”195 In a hypothetical situation where Ukraine becomes embroiled in a conflict with another state, the above sentiment may suggest that many of Ukraine’s military officers might refuse to take orders from the President or government of Ukraine to engage in battle. The scenario becomes even truer if the enemy is to be Russia. How can the massive support for independence and the swearing of allegiance to Ukraine be explained? One answer can be found in the Ukrainian promise of social and legal rights to military servicemen. However, this alone would not have been enough to cause such a high rate of positive votes for Ukrainian independence. Indeed the military, like the civilian population, must also have been convinced that Ukraine’s standard of living would be higher if Ukraine would be independent. However, the whole notion of what independence really meant was probably unclear to many voters. It has become quite evident that many voters in Ukraine in fact voted for independence from the CPSU and its version of the Soviet Union but not from Russia, Belarus and the other countries of the former USSR. Such a conclusion is even more evident among military units stationed in Ukraine.196 There is evidence in various interviews and articles published in Narodna Armia, the official organ of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, that military servicemen were really not clear about the meaning of independence and especially regarding the independence of the Ukrainian military. Many in fact believed that regardless of independence there would still be some sort of a ‘Union’. Therefore if the perception of members of the military was that Ukraine was still together with Russia and Belarus, what difference would it make to swear allegiance to Ukraine? In one article the author asks: “How will relations between the two militaries [i.e. Ukrainian and Union] be constructed on the territory of a single state?”197 In another article published on October 18, 1991, the author states that one of the most important questions being asked among military personnel is: “Will the military be undivided or will each republic have its own armed forces?”198 In answering his own question the author sheds some light on the attitudes of military servicemen stationed in Ukraine. He states that although most military personnel believe that the armed forces will remain united this is not necessarily what will happen. He then goes on to argue in favour of creating republican armed forces. In regards to nuclear weapons he argues that they should remain under ‘union’ control. This chapter has discussed the creation of the contemporary Ukrainian military and has shown that the original ideas for creating such a force were not inspired by nationalist factors although nationalist groups did actively pursue the matter. Ukrainians were not against the Soviet military but were in favour of keeping their sons safe from various armed conflicts and didivshchina. Although nationalist groups tried to influence the Ukrainian government in creating a military they were only successful after the August Putsch. Furthermore, this chapter shows that even Soviet military servicemen were overwhelmingly in favour of Ukraine’s independence although like the general population, for socio-economic rather than nationalistic reasons, which the Ukrainian government was well aware of. The majority of military servicemen did not fully understand that the Ukrainian military would be truly independent of the other former Soviet republics’ military forces and thus their oaths of allegiance to Ukraine are not a guarantee of their loyalty to Ukraine during a military conflict.

195

Narodna Armia March 17, 1992. See for example S. Koryukov, “Referendum i Armia: Tochka Zreniya” Narodna Armia, October 17, 1991. The author of the article explicitly states that Ukraine will always be tied to the other Soviet republics and that sovereignty does not mean self-isolation. 197 Narodna Armia, October 19, 1991. 198 Narodna Armia, October 18, 1991. 196

Ukrainianisation in the Ukrainian Military After Independence Under present-day conditions of war, even as ever before, will victory depend ultimately upon the state of the combat morale of the warring armies. Men who have mastered their equipment and who are strong in political conviction will be the victors. Our Soviet forces consist of such men. Soviet Defence Minister Marshal Grechko The existence of factors such as patriotism or nationalism among members of a country’s armed forces is a very important aspect in military training and national defence. According to one of the most influential military theorists, Carl von Clausewitz, the principal moral elements of war are “the skill of the commander, the experience and courage of the troops, and their patriotic spirit.”199 He argued that each was equally important. When comparing physical and moral factors of an army he writes, “One might say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely honed blade.”200 An excellent example of how patriotism can be the influencing factor in a war is the various Arab-Israeli wars. Israel and the Arabs have often had equally good weapons systems in past wars. Indeed, in some respects, Arab systems could even be said to have been better. Also, Israel has always been outnumbered by its opponents in the amount of soldiers it has had. However, Israeli training of personnel and their educational system has been much more advanced when compared to their Arab neighbours. Israeli combatants knew what they were fighting for, were more patriotic, and better disciplined. Israeli patriotism is undoubtedly one of the most important reasons why such a small country surrounded with so many enemies has always emerged victorious in its military confrontations. The Soviet Armed Forces was actually very successful in instilling their servicemen with a feeling of patriotism towards their country. Political indoctrination did not begin in the armed forces, it began in school from a relatively young age (as in most societies) and continued through such parallel organisations as the little Oktobrists, the Pioneers and the KOMSOMOL. In the Soviet Armed Forces, 30 percent of the soldiers’ two year service time was allocated to political studies, which was very important in raising the level of Soviet patriotism.201 The most important test for the Soviet military in defending their country came during the Second World War when they were invaded by Nazi Germany. According to British Air Commodore E.S. Williams, “Had Hitler in 1941 possessed any real knowledge of the Soviet soldier’s psyche it is unlikely that he would ever have launched ‘Barbarossa’”202 Soviet soldiers were psychologically prepared to die for their country. There are countless stories in the former Soviet Union which depict the patriotism of Red Army soldiers during the war. There are stories of soldiers wrapping grenades around themselves and throwing themselves under approaching German tanks as a last resort to destroying the enemy. The amount of patriotism felt by Soviet citizens towards their country was unquestionably the most important reason why the Soviet Union emerged victorious during the war and the use of history was an important factor in raising their level of patriotism. According to one Soviet military specialist: “An important role in the education of young soldiers in the spirit of Soviet patriotism during the war was played by propaganda of the 199

Carl von Clausewitz. On War. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976): 186. Ibid. 185. 201 E.S. Williams. The Soviet Military: Political Education, Training and Morale. (London: The MacMillan Press, 1987): 5. 202 Ibid. XIII. 200

revolutionary and military traditions of the Soviet people and their armed forces, the heroic past of the Russian and other nations of our country.”203 Following the war, the military organisation in charge of instilling patriotism into the ranks was the Main Political Administration (MPA). In all military units, air force regiments and naval ships the man responsible for carrying out MPA orders was the Deputy Commander for Political Affairs, also known as the ‘Zampolit’. In Western studies of the Soviet Armed Forces, the effectiveness of the Zampolits in instilling patriotism into Soviet Army staff has been considered quite successful. Their use of history was a very important factor in the success of their work. One of the most important factors in instilling a sense of patriotism into Soviet soldiers (as in other militaries) was to depict the enemy as an evil beast who was intent on destroying their country. In this way hatred was used as a way of instilling patriotic feelings into the troops. During the ‘Great Patriotic War’ the Komsomol (Communist Youth League) played a role later entrusted to the Zampolit. “Komsomol organisations worked hard on showing the beast like appearance of the enemy, the anti-human essence and ideologies of fascism, and the aggressive ambitions of Hitlerite Germany. A huge role in this was played by newspapers and magazines, which systematically published articles, correspondence, notes on the criminal intentions of Hitler and his subordinates, criminal aspects of the fascist army.”204 The use of hatred of the enemy continued to be used as a method of instilling patriotism right until the end of the Soviet period, the only difference being that the enemy was no longer Nazi Germany and fascism, but rather NATO and especially the USA and its capitalist ideology. This hate message was certainly considered of ‘paramount importance’ by some Western observers.205 When Ukraine became independent, the work of instilling the troops with patriotism, which the MPA had done, was taken over by the ‘Social Psychological Service’ (SPS). The idea for the SPS was originally developed in 1986-87 by a civilian philosophy professor who after independence was made an honorary Major-General, Volodymyr Mulyava. Originally the SPS was not intended for use in the armed forces but rather among the Ukrainian population in general.206 Once the Ukrainian military had been established the Union of Officers of Ukraine (UOU), decided that there was a need to carry-out a Ukrainianisation program in the military. As a result, Mulyava’s SPS idea was put into action. The SPS was implemented on March 5, 1992 with Mulyava as its first head after the Ministry of Defence and the Supreme Rada came to an agreement regarding the direction and objectives the SPS was to assume. Part of the objectives of the SPS read as follows: “To rally the servicemen around the ideal of an independent Ukrainian state, instilling in them a consciousness of the historical development of Ukrainian independence….and a deep sense of respect and love for Ukraine, its people, culture, traditions and churches.”207 In an article published in Narodna Armia, General Mulyava defended the SPS against accusations that it was exactly like the MPA. The following statement explains why he felt it was not. “The idea of self-sufficient value of human individuality, respect of the solitude and dignity of every person, have always been a component of the Ukrainian ‘national idea’, which attracted and naturally included in to the Ukrainian socium representatives of other nations, peoples and ethnic groups, who lived on the territory of Ukraine and sincerely took part in the national-liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people. And the Social-Psychological Service strives to realise exactly this idea.”208 Mulyava’s SPS, which was also supposed to teach ‘non-repressive relations’ and ‘non-violent conflict resolution’, did more to create conflicts and repression in the UAF than 203

V.G. Yeremin & P.F. Isakov, Molodyozh’ v Gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny (Moskva: Mysl’, 1984): 82. Ibid. 83. 205 Willaims. 75. 206 Volodymyr Mulyava, personal interview, May 31, 1996. 207 Narodna Armia, January 22, 1993. 208 Narodna Armia, November 25, 1992. 204

any other organisation since independence. Under Mulyava’s control, the SPS was instructed to espouse the Ukrainian ‘national idea’.209 Furthermore, the teaching of the ‘nationalliberation struggle’ meant that the SPS was to teach Ukrainian nationalist history and glorify all the anti-Russian and anti-Soviet military formations which existed. However there is a legal excuse for their actions. Nationalists have interpreted section 11 of the ‘Law on the Armed Forces of Ukraine’ which states that “the military-patriotic education of military servicemen is to be realised using the national-historical traditions of the people of Ukraine”, to mean ‘nationalist’ traditions including OUN-UPA and the SS Galician Division.210 Mulyava believed that the best way to implement the Ukrainian ‘national idea’ was through the ideology of the Ukrainian Cossacks. “We don’t look at the Cossacks as simply a military formation or a social entity, but as a state of the soul, as a way of life and a method of behaviour. Through analysis we have found that Ukrainians are in essence a Cossack nation. The Cossacks were the highest embodiment of ‘national patriotism’.”211 However, Mulyava also extended his Cossack myth to include the Sichovi Striltsi, OUN-UPA and the even the SS Galician Division, all of which he has said were Cossack military formations. All of these military forces were considered ‘heroic’ military formations in the ‘national-liberation struggle’ by Mulyava. His treatment of the UPA was especially propagandistic and antagonistic, in which he glorified in Narodna Armia for its desire for the “complete liberation of the Ukrainian people from the Russian-Bolshevik yoke and for their wish to unify all ethnic Ukrainian lands in an independent Ukrainian state without wealthy landowners, capitalists, and without Bolshevik magnates, KGB spies and Communist party parasites.”212 Mulyava also glorified the OUN-UPA for its ‘multi-ethnic character’ and belief in the ‘equality of all nations inhabiting Ukraine’; and for its ‘democratic ideals’ and ‘humanitarian principles’. In fact Mulyava portrayed the OUN-UPA as an organisation with highly ‘democratic’ principles. The SPS went out of its way to support and glorify nationalist military organisations of the Second World War era. For example, the SPS was the initiator and organiser of a fiftieth anniversary celebration of the UPA in Kiev, and invited UPA veterans from Western countries to Kiev for the celebrations. SPS officers greeted the UPA veterans at the train station and settled a few thousand of them into living quarters of the UAF’s higher militaryeducational establishments in Kiev. Apparently the UPA veterans were overjoyed at their treatment as ‘heroes’ by the SPS and some of them were brought to tears.213 Soviet army war veterans were, however, less impressed by the SPS’s treatment of the UPA veterans and some of them even attacked the UPA veterans as they marched down Kiev’s main street. In general, the SPS’s relations with Ukrainian nationalist émigrés was quite close. Ukrainian nationalist organisations in the USA, and especially Canada, actively supported the SPS by donating various books, literature, and even computers. Much of the donated literature and books was related to the propagandistic nationalist view of Ukrainian history. Mulyava stated: “I would not be able to name one Ukrainian organisation in Canada which did not strive to help the UAF.”214 However Mulyava has admitted that many people in the UAF were against this help and did not want to accept it, an attitude which he claims to have eradicated. At this point it is necessary to comment upon one organisation which was closely linked to the SPS and its ‘Ukrainianisation’ campaign; the Union of Officers of Ukraine 209

The reason for using the phrase ‘national idea’ instead of nationalism is due to the fact that the Ukrainian population views ‘nationalism’ in a very negative light. Nationalists argue that this is due to decades of ‘Soviet propaganda’. A more realistic answer is probably due to the actions of Ukrainian nationalists themselves. Nonetheless, there is hardly a Ukrainian citizen today who is not aware of the real meaning of ‘national idea’. 210 Hryhoriy Temko. (Major-General, Deputy Head of the Main Administration for Educational Work) personal interview, June 13, 1995. 211 Volodymyr Mulyava, personal interview, May 31, 1996. 212 Narodna Armia, November 25, 1992. 213 Volodymyr Mulyava, personal interview, May 31, 1996. 214 Ibid.

(UOU). The work of the SPS was to aided by the UOU which began to grow in favour with the newly appointed Defence Minister of Ukraine, Konstantyn Morozov. In fact, most SPS officers were members of the UOU, including Mulyava himself. Morozov stated that he would support and co-operate with the UOU; a statement which certainly added to its initial growth and popularity. The UOU claimed a membership of 20,000 215 individuals throughout Ukraine, most of whom were middle-ranking officers between the ranks of major to colonel.216 The ranks of the UOU became filled with ethnic and integral nationalists and from the outset it was populated by anti-Communist, anti-Russian and even anti-Semitic sentiment.217 Over 85% of its members where ethnic Ukrainians.218 However, a more telling statistic is that over 70% of its members were Western Ukrainians.219 One of the UOU’s goals was to eliminate from the UAF ranks any servicemen considered to be ‘disloyal’ and ‘unpatriotic’ to the Ukrainian state. At the time, the UOU claimed that 90% of the UAF’s higher officer corps and 70% of the general officer ranks were composed of non-ethnic Ukrainians, most of whom were ethnic Russians220. The UOU was highly suspicious of the loyalty and patriotism of the officer corps and felt that many officers who swore allegiance to Ukraine were insincere. According to one survey, 60% of officers who had sworn allegiance had done so because of housing, the stable social situation, and access to foodstuffs.221 Even Morozov complained that some officers had had sworn allegiance believing that eventually the armed forces of Ukraine would be united again with Russia in the CIS.222 Unofficial surveys confirmed that the majority of officers would not fight in a conflict if the enemy was Russia.223 The UOU claimed that only 30% of Ukrainian officers were prepared to defend Ukrainian independence while another poll which asked “Are you ready to defend Ukraine with arms in hand?” was answered positively by only 8% of respondents.224 Morozov, an ethnic Russian, became quite involved with the UOU and even took part in its congresses. The Defence Minister, who had become a strong Ukrainian nationalist overnight, even promised Ukrainian nationalist émigrés that the Ukrainian military would learn, among others, the glorious traditions of the armies of the UNR, UPA and SS Galician Division.225 Morozov even made membership in the UOU a precondition for any promotion in the UAF; a move which was bound to cause dissent among the largely non-nationalist officer corps.226 The way in which the UOU tried to realise its goal of eliminating what it felt were disloyal officers from the UAF ranks resembled a witch-hunt. It gathered intelligence in units considered hostile to Ukraine, conducted political campaigns and tried to control personnel 215

Volodymyr Saladyak, (Deputy Head of the Union of Officers of Ukraine), personal interview, May 24, 1995. John Jaworsky. The Military-Strategic Significance of Recent Developments in Ukraine. Operational Research and Analysis, Directorate of Strategic Analysis, Project Report No. 645 Ottawa: Department of National Defence, (August 1993): 99. 217 During one interview with a high ranking officer who worked in the field of ‘military-patriotic’ education in the UAF, when asked to comment about then Defence minister Shmarov, the officer responded by saying that ‘he is a Jew’. Calling someone a Jew is typically used by ethnic and integral nationalists in order to denounce an opponent. 218 Jaworsky. 99. 219 Volodymyr Saladyak, (Deputy Head of the UOU), personal interview, May 24, 1995. 220 Pavel K. Baev & Tor Bukkvol. “Ukraine’s army under civilian rule.” Jane’s Intelligence Review, (January 1996): 10. 221 Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrott. 167. 222 Ibid. 223 Pavel K. Baev & Tor Bukkvol. 10. 224 Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrott, ed. State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1995.): 167. 225 Visti Kombatanta. No. 3, 1992. 226 Alexander N. Besedin,. (Head, Department of Military Psychology, University of the Ukrainian Armed Forces), personal interview, June 3, 1995. Also Pavel K. Baev & Tor Bukkvol. 10. 216

policy and appointments. In fact the UOU used tactics which were rather similar to those used by political commissars during the Stalinist period. People could be denounced and thus removed due to what the UOU considered ‘disloyalty’.227 The UOU even began pressing President Kravchuk and the Defence Ministry to launch a purge of non-Ukrainians and former high-ranking communists from the UAF.228 The UOU was also known to defend its members against disciplinary actions regardless of whether the person in question was at fault or not.229 Its actions led to the undeserved dismissal of many Russian officers and prompted more than 200 officers to file applications for voluntary dismissal from the UAF.230 One of its other goals was to replace the ethnic Russian officers with ethnic Ukrainians who were serving in the former Soviet Union although this policy seems largely to have failed. Many Ukrainian officers serving in the Russian military decided not to return due to Ukraine’s worse economic situation as compared to Russia and especially due to the relatively higher standard of living enjoyed by officers in the Russian armed forces. The UOU became increasingly politicised and extremist and was criticised for being a “war party’. It criticised the Ukrainian government for giving up the Soviet nuclear weapons on its soil and for making any concessions with Russia in regards to the Black Sea Fleet, the CIS or any other issues. UOU members often acted recklessly by seizing Black Sea Fleet vessels and shore infrastructure in order to ‘nationalise’ it for Ukraine. Its attitude towards Russia, which it considers Ukraine’s enemy, was and remains extremely hostile and even dangerous. In the belief of Volodymyr Saladyak, the Deputy Head of the UOU, Ukraine should go to war with Russia which he says is ‘a burglar breaking into our home’. However, he said since Ukraine does not have its “own Ukrainian army” this is not possible at the present time. According to Saladyak, it is Russia that is giving the orders to the UAF. For this reason, the UOU is in favour of creating a ‘Ukrainian National Army’231, to be composed of Ukrainian nationalists.232 The fact that the UOU is highly anti-Russian has been strengthened by its close relations with Ukrainian nationalist émigré groups. The British-based ‘Association of Former Ukrainian Combatants’ which is composed of UPA and SS Galician Division veterans, actually wrote the UOU statute as well as provided it with financial and educational support. At least 20 UPA veterans have even officially joined the UOU;233 as have an unspecified number of SS Galician Division veterans. The UOU also has close contacts with other Ukrainian nationalists émigré organisations in North America and Europe which provide funds and have even supplied the UOU with things such as fax machines and photocopiers. However, the greatest help has come in the form of nationalist literature of which it receives a large amount. An important part of this literature are propagandistic books and journals which glorify the SS Galician Division and the OUN-UPA. The UOU is a fervent supporter of these nationalist military formations which it considers to be ‘heroes for the national-liberation struggle’. It should come as no surprise that the UOU feels that the official ideology of the UAF should be ‘Ukrainian nationalism’.234 One of the UOU goals was also to promote Ukrainian nationalist military traditions by which it aided the SPS by distributing its nationalist literature provided by émigré 227

Volodymyr Bezkorovainy. (Admiral, Former Commander of the Ukrainian Navy), personal interview, October 11, 1997. 228 Taras Kuzio. “Ukraine’s Young Turks—The Union of Ukrainian Officers.” Jane’s Intelligence Review, (January 1993): 26. 229 Volodymyr Bezkorovainy, personal interview, October 11, 1997. 230 Stephen Foye. “Civilian-Military Tension in Ukraine.” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 25, 18 (June 1993): 64. 231 In fact the official logo of the UOU has the words ‘Ukrainian National Army’ written right on it. 232 Volodymyr Saladyak, personal interview, May 24, 1995. In fact the official logo of the UOU has the words ‘Ukrainian National Army’ written right on it. 233 Volodymyr Saladyak, personal interview, May 24, 1995. 234 Taras Kuzio. “Ukraine’s Young Turks—The Union of Ukrainian Officers.” Jane’s Intelligence Review, (January 1993): 25.

nationalists among Ukrainian military units. The UOU was also heavily represented in the various Ukrainian military newspapers and journals which would publish articles glorifying the nationalist views of history along with their various military formations and nationalist ideology including that of the father of Ukrainian integral nationalist thought, Dmytro Dontsov. However, the UOU’s demand that Zampolits be forcibly retired seems not to have been implemented. Certainly many members of the SPS staff were former Soviet army officers who were discharged for dissent in the form of ‘nationalist activity’. However, the other officers who were to fulfil the work of the SPS were former Zampolits from the MPA who instead of taking guidance from MPA headquarters in Moscow would now take orders from the SPS in Kiev. However, this in itself practically ensured that there would be trouble since the leadership of the SPS was the most staunch Ukrainian nationalist component of the UAF and the Zampolits were the most staunch Communists and Soviet patriots. However, not all Zampolits were openly opposed to the SPS. Since Defence Minister Morozov had made it clear that membership in the UOU was a precondition for any promotion, many Zampolits became ‘nationalists’ over-night.235 In essence, the MPA method of using hatred as a tool to instil patriotism into the servicemen was used by the SPS, though in a slightly more subtle way. Automatically, by glorifying the Ukrainian ‘national-liberation struggle’ the SPS was accusing Russians of having been the enemy. But if that were not enough, the SPS and UOU really were acting in a manner completely hostile to ethnic Russians and for that matter non-Western Ukrainians in general. Since Russians are not, and have never been considered ‘the enemy’ by the majority of Ukrainians, nor by the Ukrainian government, the practice could only eventually backfire. As the Central Rada’s efforts to ‘Ukrainianise’ the former Tsarist army had failed, so had the efforts of the UOU and SPS. It is rather understandable with their chauvinistic, antiRussian, and anti-Communist activities that the SPS and UOU would eventually cause a great deal of dissension within Ukrainian military and political circles. In early 1993, 155 left-wing People’s Deputies officially complained about the growing politicisation of the UOU including its glorification of the OUN-UPA and depiction of Russia as Ukraine’s ‘main enemy’.236 Mulyava was often criticised for turning the SPS into an organisation resembling the ‘Gestapo’ and implementing Petliurite and Banderivtsi ideology into the UAF.237 The last straw finally came in October 1993, when after facing increasing opposition in the Supreme Rada and openly criticising President Kravchuk and the Massandra Accord signed between Russia and Ukraine, Morozov was forced to resign.238 Morozov was replaced by Vitaliy Radetsky, the Commander of the Odessa Military District, on October 8, 1993, who quickly acted to defuse the problems with the UOU and SPS. Radetsky agreed that the SPS was a very important component of the armed forces and thus wanted to make it more ‘professional’. After meetings with SPS staff, Radetsky finally replaced Mulyava with Anatoli Kobzar and renamed the SPS the ‘Main Administration for Educational and SocialPsychological Work of the Ministry of Defence’. According to General Mulyava, the real reason for the restructuring of the SPS and his replacement was due to the fact that ‘anti-Ukrainian’ forces could see that he and the SPS were creating a ‘real’ Ukrainian armed forces and this scared them. Another reason he states is because he attacked ‘communists’ who were serving in the UAF and had them removed. However, it is without doubt that the most important reason for Mulyava’s dismissal was due 235

This has in fact become a problem in Ukraineand the former Soviet states where the staunchest communists have all-of-a-sudden become the biggest nationalists. It is quite probable that these people who were probably never really ‘communists’ are now most probably not really ‘nationalists’. During one interview, a National Guard commander in Eastern Ukraine upon hearing that one of his former comrades is now a staunch nationalist, laughed and said that before Ukrainian independence, the same person had been a staunch communist. According to the former commander of the Ukrainian navy, V. Bezkorovainy, many people became ‘nationalists’ since they felt that this would further their careers. 236 Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrott. 169. 237 Narodna Armia, November 25, 1992. Also Volodymyr Mulyava, personal interview, May 31, 1996. 238 RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 10, 17 January 1994.

to his rabid nationalism and anti-Russian views and alienation of the officer corps through his glorification of nationalist armies and his attack on the Soviet army. Radetsky made it clear that the process of ‘Ukrainianising’ the armed forces would be slowed down. Through its extreme nationalism not only did Mulyava not get rid of ‘Didivshchyna’ in the armed forces, which was one of the SPS’s goals, but seems to have expanded it. According to some reports, the ‘Didivshchyna’ has now ‘pitted servicemen from one area of Ukraine against those from another, along ethnic or linguistic lines.’239 The anti-nationalist Radetsky also pursued the radical UOU. Officially Radetsky was opposed to military personnel involving themselves in politics and thus began to clamp down on the UOU. According to UOU sources, the union barely survived Radetsky’s term in office as Defence Minister. The once powerful union began to rapidly lose members until its numbers hit approximately 4,000 people. The UOU claims that people dropped out of the union for fear of losing apartments, jobs, and retirement pensions.240 However other sources state that the union had already begun to lose members prior to Radetsky’s appointment due to the fact that it failed to pursue one its second most important goal which was the protection of the social, economic and legal interests of military servicemen.241 After the 1994 presidential elections, Radetsky, due to his support of President Kravchuk during the election campaign, was replaced by a civilian by the newly elected President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma. The new Defence Minister, Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov, was equally as anti-nationalist as his predecessor and is said to have even removed the portraits of famous Cossack Hetmans from the walls of the General Staff’s headquarters.242 Although Shmarov did a great deal to enhance Ukraine’s co-operation with the West through NATO’s ‘Partnership For Peace’ program, he like Radetsky was criticised by nationalists for having also brought Ukraine closer to the CIS which according to former Defence Minister Morozov has “halted the processes of Ukrainianisation of the Army, and ….is depriving the Ukrainian Army of the possibility of becoming Ukrainian.”243 The UOU was highly critical of Shmarov for his ‘anti-Ukrainian’ attitude and ‘selling out’ of Ukraine to Russia. Conspiracies are typical of the thinking of ethnic and integral nationalists and thus some UOU members secretly believed that Shmarov was ‘a Jew’ and that Ukrainian military units were taking orders from Moscow. In fact, the UOU was even more critical of Shmarov than it was of Radetsky who they believe ‘at least confronted the Russian Ministry of Defence.”244 The UOU even attempted to organise an officer’s rally in mid-July 1995, however, their severe accusations against the Defence Minister failed to attract more than a few dozen listeners.245 It was obvious that the UOU was no longer what it once was. In February 1995 Shmarov replaced Anatoli Kobzar, the head of SPS’s successor the ‘Main Administration for Educational and Social-Psychological Work of the Ministry of Defence’ for ‘misconduct’ though more probable reasons are related to the latter’s support of Kravchuk during the 1994 presidential election campaign. His replacement was MajorGeneral Sytnyk who still maintains his position the present time. Shmarov is said to have been unpopular within military circles and definitely unpopular among nationalists both in the armed forces and the Supreme Rada. Some nonnationalists are also said to have been opposed to Shmarov since he was a civilian who they felt was incompetent in military matters. However, there have been reports that one thing that definitely irked some senior military officers was Shmarov’s “meddling in such completely 239

John Jaworsky. “The Transition from a Soviet Military in Ukraine to a Ukrainian Military.” The Military Tradition in Ukrainian History: Its Role in the Construction of Ukraine’s Armed Forces. Conference Proceedings (Cambridge, Mass.: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 1995): 71. 240 Volodymyr Saladyak, personal interview, May 24, 1995. 241 STATUT Spilky Ofitseriv Ukrainy, Kiev, 1994. 242 Pavel K. Baev & Tor Bukkvol. 9. 243 Konstantyn Morozov, “The Formation of the Ukrainian Military, 1991-95” The Ukrainian Review, 1996. 244 Volodymyr Saladyak, personal interview, May 24, 1995. 245 Pavel K. Baev & Tor Bukkvol. 10.

innocent affairs as young recruits giving a helping hand at the generals’ dachas.”246 Finally, the beginning of July 1996, Shmarov was removed and replaced by the Commander of the National Guard, Lt. General Oleksandr Kuzmuk. Officially Shmarov was forced to resign due to the military’s desire for a military man as Defence Minister and because of ‘shortcomings’ in the Ukrainian Navy. However, Ukrainian commentators have suggested the real reason was due to opposition from nationalist politicians and the fact that Kuchma came to a compromise with them in order to secure the appointment of Pavlo Lazarenko as Prime Minister.

246

Ibid. 9.

Nationalist Tradition in the Contemporary Ukrainian Military

Ukrainianisation and military-patriotic education has continued in the Ukrainian military under every Defence Minister, although the levels of officially sanctioned nationalist education have varied. Ukraine does not have an official ‘ideology’ as many people feel that this would mean ‘nationalism’; which as previously mentioned is viewed in a very negative manner by most Ukrainians. Furthermore, it is impossible to combine the nationalist and panSlavic traditions which are at the core of Ukrainian society, in order to create an all-unifying ideology. Although the government is making an effort towards reconciliation of the two sides, thus far it has failed. The absence of an ideology has posed many problems for the Ukrainianisation program in the military and, indeed, even for the teaching of history in civilian schools. The result has been a regionalization of beliefs within the military and even society. Depending on where one lives or serves in Ukraine, one may be taught nationalist versions of history or the pan-Slavic versions of history. This in itself is dividing Ukrainians into two separate nations and is creating tensions and conflicts within society. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence is more than aware of the tensions in Ukrainian society, and of the problems that may arise by the glorification of nationalist history. However, this has not stopped the development within the military educational system of nationalist tendencies. The Main Administration for Educational Work of the Ministry of Defence (MAEW) determines what is taught in the military educational system. The Ukrainianisation work by the MAEW is carried out through ‘humanities preparation’, lectures, museums, ‘svitlytsi’ and the media. The following chapter will take a closer look at the work of this administration to see how the Ukrainianisation program is being implemented and the effects of nationalism on the program.

Humanities Preparation During the Soviet period, the MPA held centralised control over everything that was being taught and every military unit in the Soviet Armed Forces was received the same education, regardless of location. The Military Publishing House prepared and produced most of the materials used by the Zampolit. Today, Ukraine’s situation is quite different. The Ukrainian military has its own publishing house, called ‘Varta’, that, instead of publishing educational materials, it is used by the Ministry of Defence to publish military-legal handbooks such as ‘Military Legislation and Laws of Ukraine: Short Reference-Book for Officers’ and ‘Acting Statutes of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’. A significant reason why the Ministry of Defence and the MAEW have not published a history textbook which can be used in its Ukrainianisation program is due to financial difficulties. However, a more probable reason is the lack of will to officially publish a controversial history text. The danger with such a situation is that what is taught in the military can and is affected by outside interest groups providing their own materials for use in propaganda work in the military. As such, nationalists especially concerned with the well-being of the military attempt to exert their influence on the Ukrainianisation program. The work of the MAEW covers all branches of the Ukrainian military including the UAF, Border Troops, and National Guard and, in theory, all branches should be taught the same subjects. Humanities preparation is carried out by giving lectures, conducting seminars

and through individual study. Twice per year, the MAEW publishes what is called a ‘Thematic Plan of Humanities Preparation of Military Servicemen and Workers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ in the various armed forces newspapers. The Thematic Plan is divided into sections for each category of military servicemen as follows: 1) General and Staff Officers (80 hours of study per year); 2) Officers of Formations and Units (80 hours of study per year); 3) Warrant Officers and Contract Military Servicemen (80 hours of study per year); 4) Workers of the UAF (20 hours of study per year); 5) Conscripted Military Servicemen (136 hours of study per year); There are five main subjects which are studied: 1) History of Ukraine; 2) History of the Ukrainian Armed Forces; 3) Military Law; 4) Pedagogy and Psychology; 5) Theory of State Independence; Each subject area in the Thematic Plan contains various themes and questions which are to be studied. Thus according to the plan published in a June 1998 edition of Vartovi Neba, the official newspaper of the Air Defence Forces, the questions and themes for Conscripted Military Servicemen for the summer period are as follows: 1) History of the creation and development of the Air Defence Forces of contemporary Ukraine (in honour of Air Defence Forces Day) (6 hours of study) 2) Courage and heroism of the defenders of the Fatherland during World War II. (2 hours of study) 3) Social protection and the main directions of its actualisation. (2 hours of study) 4) You are the hope of the Fatherland, people and President. Love of Ukraine, of your own people, is the source of the spiritual strength of a soldier. (2 hours of study) 5) What do you know about the culture of mutual relations and military etiquette? Do you know how to conduct yourself in society and in your collective. (role training) (2 hours of study) 6) Undivided Authority – an important principle in the recruitment and development of the contemporary armed forces of Ukraine. The educational meaning of disciplinary practice. (6 hours of study) 7) Statutory interrelations – an important condition in the solidarity of military collectives, the strengthening of highly moral humane norms in the interrelations of military servicemen. (6 hours of study) 8) The international legal regulation of military conflicts. The code of conduct of participants in military activities. (6 hours of study) 9) The main periods in the formation of the Ukrainian nation, stages in the formation of statehood and the moulding of the modern territory of Ukraine. (in honour of Ukrainian Independence Day.) (6 hours of study) 10) History and contemporary situation of the Ukrainian Cossacks. (2 hours of study) 11) The Ukrainian Revolution. The UNR and its military formations. (4 hours of study) 12) Ukraine and Ukrainians in the Second World War. The fight against fascism and contribution to victory. (6 hours of study) 13) Historical effluence of contemporary material culture of the Ukrainian people: customs, trades, economy, ecology. (4 hours of study) 14) The Ukrainian language – basis of the spiritual and artistic culture, science and education of the Ukrainian nation. (2 hours of study) 15) History and prominent cultural monuments of the region where you are serving. (2 hours of study)

16) Religion and the church in the history of the Ukrainian people. (2 hours of study) 17) Fine arts of Ukraine: history and contemporaneity. (4 hours of study) 18) Medical enlightenment work in the military unit. Prophylaxis of drug addiction and AIDS sickness. (2 hours of study) 19) Examinations for the winter term. (2 hours exam) Students are given a test related to these themes and questions once per year in which a commission from the MAEW takes part. Since the SPS days the themes and questions have changed considerably, are less antagonistic, and contain considerably less nationalist history. An example of SPS historical questions during 1993 included: 1) Kievan Rus, and its role in the historical fate of the Ukrainian people. The GalicianVolhynian state – continuing the traditions of the Kievan state. 2) The military campaigns of the Kievan princes. 3) Objective and subjective reasons for the origins of the Ukrainian Cossacks as a separate societal state. The Cossack army and its martial arts. 4) The Ukrainian Cossack state. 5) The Western Ukrainian lands between 1900-1919. The creation of military formations. Ukrainian Sichovi Striltsi. The Ukrainian Galician Army. 6) The military forces of Ukraine the Central Rada and Hetman P. Skoropadsky. The Ukrainian Navy. 7) Interwar Ukraine under the power of the Totalitarian regime. The Famine years, 1932-33. Stalinist repression in Ukraine. The socio-economic situation of the Western Ukrainian lands. 8) Ukraine in the plans of the Totalitarian regimes and the development of the Ukrainian national idea during World War II. 9) The UPA fight for a Ukrainian state independent of German and Communist occupation. 10) Ukrainians during World War II in the Soviet Army and the armies of the Allies. 11) Ukraine after the war (1945-1985). The renewal of Ukrainian statehood in 1991. The MAEW also publishes articles in the various Ukrainian military newspapers under the heading ‘Aid to Humanities Preparation Group Leaders’, that deals with the abovementioned themes and questions. Each article begins with the stated question and at the end, a short bibliography is provided which each Humanities Preparation Group Leader or as they are more commonly referred to, Educational Work Assistant (though they are still often called Zampolits), is supposed to use in order to formulate lecture and seminar notes on the given topic. However, most of the background information which is used by the Education Work Assistants come from other sources either published in the various newspapers or journals on the initiative of their editors, or from books that are found in libraries located on the military bases. This is where the greatest problems begin. During the Gorbachev era, the government admitted that much of Soviet history was tainted with omissions of facts, or even utter falsification of the truth. This led to a backlash in which all Soviet historiography was criticised and assumed to be false. For this reason, Soviet history books have, for the most part, been discarded. However, since neither the Ukrainian government nor most academic institutions have the financial resources available to publish new literature to actually replace the Soviet books, the outcome has been to rely on foreign sources of information. With few exceptions, the majority of books are from Ukrainian nationalist émigrés living in the West who, for the most part, have some connection to one of the now many branches of the OUN. The result is that the Soviet falsifications of history have been replaced by an equally false Ukrainian nationalist version which glorifies the exploits of the OUN-UPA, SS Galician Division, Petliura and the Directory, Mazepa and other nationalist heroes while at the same time denouncing any non-nationalist heroes regardless of whether they are Ukrainian or not.

The outcome is the alienation of most of Ukrainian citizens and the opposite result of what the MAEW is trying to achieve. Among the organisations sending literature to Ukraine is the journal Visti Kombatanta which is the official bimonthly published by the veterans of the SS Galician Division or as they now prefer to be called the ‘1st Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army’. The journal itself is funded by advertisements from a wide range of some of the most well-known and successful businesses in the Ukrainian émigré community. The journal is very active in sending not only its journal but also books on the SS Galician Division either directly to the libraries of Ukrainian military units or nationalist organisations in Ukraine such as the UOU, which then distribute the materials to the military throughout Ukraine. However, the literature sent by Visti Kombatanta can hardly be considered academic let alone unbiased. Most of the literature is actually written by former veterans, though one book is written by a professor, Taras Hunczak, who is well-known for denying Petliura’s complicity in the pogroms and for claiming that the various Ukrainian nationalist organisations during World War II were not anti-Semitic. It should come as no surprise then that the SS Galician Division is glorified as a heroic unit which took part in the ‘nationalliberation struggle’ for independence against the Soviet and German occupation of Ukraine by all of these authors. Visti Kombatanta has been known to publish its literature in Ukraine although due to corruption from the Ukrainian side, it appears that they are now refraining from the practice.247 A considerable volume of Ukrainian nationalist historical literature is distributed and sold in Ukraine by nationalist émigré organisations. In fact, as happened during World War II, there is competition between the various nationalist groups for historical and political influence in Ukraine. Everyone from supporters of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky to Taras Bulba-Borovets, and the Melnyk and Bandera OUNs are operating in Ukraine to glorify their heroes. However, it appears that the most powerful organisation is the OUN-B, which has also been the most successful in publishing books which glorify Bandera, the OUN-B and UPA. The great majority of books which are used by the Ukrainian military in teaching history are published by foreign authors of Ukrainian descent. Due to the fact that the Ukrainian economy is in such horrible condition, most Ukrainian scholars are hard-pressed to find funding and thus the Ukrainian military is forced to rely on foreigners and their version of history. However, there are some books which have been published in Ukrainerecently which deal with certain periods of Ukrainian history differently than foreign nationalist publications. Various interviews have confirmed that the fact that the majority of books that are used have been written by foreign nationals is viewed in a quite negative manner by many Ukrainian servicemen.248 It should be mentioned that there are also those Educational Assistants who, to some extent, still use Soviet history books in the preparation of their lectures, though how often this is the case and whether this is due to opposition to the nationalist literature is not known.249 One of the most important sources of information for the Educational Assistants are the military newspapers and journals which often publish their own historical materials which are not submitted by the MAEW. In fact, most articles related to Ukrainian history are published on the initiative of the editors themselves. During the Soviet period, the main 247

According to one of its editors, Visti Kombatanta came to an agreement with the staunchly nationalistic Ukrainian National Guard journal Viysko Ukrainy to publish one of the SS Galician Division books in Ukraine. It has been alleged that only a small amount of the books were published with the rest of the money aimed towards publication being pocketed by the editor of Viysko Ukrainy, which is now called Surma. However, it appears that it is not untypical of opportunistic people to have painted themselves in nationalist stripes over-night due to the fact they know they may profit from the aid of nationalist émigrés. 248 Vitaliy Nepytaylenko. (Captain, Educational Assistant in the National Guard), personal interview, June 3, 1995. and Hryhoriy Temko. personal interview, June 13, 1995. 249 Anonymous. personal interview, August 10, 1998.

political journal for the Zampolits was ‘Communist of the Armed Forces’. Other military journals or newspapers such as ‘Krasnaya Zvezda’ would then copy the political line from this journal and publish articles accordingly. However, as there is no official ideology in Ukraine today, the newspapers and journals vary greatly in their political perspectives. The following is a list of the most important Ukrainian military publications available to Educational Assistants, with a short description of their viewpoints. Narodna Armia This daily is the most important, influential and widely distributed newspaper and was previously known as ‘Leninskoye Znamye’ though renamed Narodna Armia on October 1st1991 when it was established as the central organ of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. In fact the creation of Narodna Armia was Defence Minister Morozov’s very first directive. When Narodna Armia was first published, it was entirely in Russian. This was also the language stated in its application for registration. However, it now publishes articles solely in Ukrainian. Narodna Armia has published articles which have glorified various nationalist military forces such as the OUN-UPA and even the SS Galician Division though most historical articles initially dealt with the Cossacks, Ukraine’s borders, and Ukrainians in Crimea. Ukrainian nationalist émigrés have been an influence in what is published and have often been the authors of articles which deal with World War II Ukrainian nationalist military formations. As with most émigré publications, these articles do not address negative concerns about the history of these formations. Nationalist émigrés like everywhere else have also been very helpful in providing Narodna Armia with both financial aid, nationalist literature and even computers.250 Although Narodna Armia was initially nationalist, its positions have changed of late. A large number of the historical articles which have recently been published have dealt for the most part with the Ukrainian Cossacks. Narodna Armia has been known to not only harshly criticise the actions of the Russian government in relation to Ukraine but also the Ukrainian government itself. One article stated that Russian citizens were being ‘psychologically prepared for war’ with Ukraine and criticised the Ukrainian government for being too soft on Russia.251 The editor of Narodna Armia is also a member of the UOU. Regardless of all of the nationalist perspective of Narodna Armia, the overwhelming majority of historical articles that are published deal with the heroic exploits of the Soviet armed forces and Ukrainian servicemen during the Great Patriotic War which in fact is the case with most Ukrainian military publications. This does not mean that the articles give the Soviet view of the war by glorifying Stalin or making any excuses for his mistakes. There are a great variety of articles which deal with lesser heroes involved in the liberation of Ukraine from the Nazis and their collaborators. Recently, Narodna Armia has even begun to publish articles by authors who have criticised the OUN-UPA for its activities during the war.252 Flot Ukrainy This is the official newspaper of the Ukrainian Navy and is published in Sevastopol, Crimea on a weekly basis. The newspaper publishes some articles in Ukrainian and some in Russian; a fact most likely due to its location in the Russophone Crimea. The effects of nationalist teachings are probably most dangerous in Crimea where there is the largest and most volatile Russian minority in Ukraine and where both the Russian Black Sea Fleet and 250

Vasyl’ Bilan. (Colonel, Editor of Narodna Armia) personal interview, May 28, 1995. Narodna Armia. February 27, 1997. 252 See: Narodna Armia. July 29, 1998. 251

Ukrainian Navy are based. There already exists a sort of information war between Ukrainian and Russian military newspapers (Flag Rodiny) who seem to be trying to influence not only each others’ military personnel but also the local population. 253 It appears that this is where nationalism is really being countered by nationalism. Flot Ukrainy, has appeared to carry the most nationalistic articles relating to the twentieth century Ukrainian nationalist military formations of all Ukrainian military newspapers. Because the Russophone population of Crimea is located in a place where the exploits of the Red Army were among the most heroic during the Revolution, Civil War and Great Patriotic War, and their pride in this history is among the greatest in Ukraine, any glorification of Ukrainian nationalist militaries or criticism of the Soviet army is seen as especially antagonistic. Ukrainian nationalists have already caused a rise in anti-Ukrainian feelings in the area, and any additional glorification of hated groups such as the OUN-UPA could cause a serious backlash. In any case, such glorification certainly does not promote better Ukrainian-Crimean or Ukrainian-Russian relations. Flot Ukrainy’s is also extremely critical of the Russian government and the Black Sea Fleet and often publishes articles attacking both. The newspaper typically attacks the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine and often publishes articles to suggest that by doing this Russia is breaking international law and is imperialistic. Flot Ukrainy is often known to publish articles which attack the record of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the USSR itself.254 Recently, on the front pages of Flot Ukrainy, an interview was published with Ukrainian nationalist émigrés who visited Sevastopol and complained about the usage of the Russian language in Crimea and in the Ukrainian Navy. They also complained about a Ukrainian boat which came into Sevastopol harbour and was greeted with the Russian song ‘Kalinka’.255 The views of Flot Ukrainy are potentially destabilising, as many Crimeans may feel that these are the official views of the Ukrainian government; a fact which will definitely not instil them with loyalty to Ukraine nor create harmonious relations on the peninsula.256 Prykordonnyk Ukrainy This is the official weekly publication of the ‘State Committee in Affairs of the Protection of the State Border of Ukraine’ more commonly known as the Border Troops. Though most articles are published in Ukrainian, Russian is also frequently used. The Border Troops were among the most elite troops among all Soviet military formations. The border troops were an arm of the KGB and were chosen for the outmost intelligence, physical fitness, and loyalty and patriotism to the Soviet Union and the CPSU. With this in mind, it is understandable that the official newspaper of the Ukrainian Border Troops is also among the least nationalistic and, in fact, can be considered antinationalist. This does not mean, however, that it is anti-Ukrainian, as some nationalists portray it. According to its editor, Vasyl Klymenko, it would be impossible to change the minds of people who worked in such an elite force for so many years over-night. The newspaper therefore refrains from publishing any articles which glorify the nationalist militaries. In fact under its old editor, S.F. Volkov, who retired in early 1995, Prykordonnyk Ukrainy very often published historical articles which furiously attacked the OUN-UPA as traitors, Nazi collaborators and war criminals. Prykordonnyk Ukrainy, like most other military newspapers, also publishes articles which glorify the exploits of the Soviet armed forces and especially the Soviet Border 253

See for example: Flag Rodiny. June 20, 1995. See for example: Flot Ukrainy. July 4, 1998. 255 Flot Ukrainy. July 25, 1998. 256 For Ukrainian government views see Chapter 7, The Nationalist Debate Among the Ukrainian Population. Although all of these publications are ‘official’ publications of the National Guard, Border Guards and Ministry of Defence, this does not mean that their content and views are approved by these agencies. In fact as evidenced by their very different content there seems to be very little control over what they publish. 254

Troops. However, whereas during the Soviet period these articles would mention ‘nationalist bandits’ who illegally tried to cross the Soviet border, now, the articles speak of ‘border trespassers’. The editor personally finds it very distasteful that there are people who used to be highly patriotic Soviet servicemen who have suddenly become Ukrainian nationalists. He sees such people simply as opportunists who will change their stripes with every change of government.257 Vartovi Neba This is the official weekly newspaper of the Air Defence Forces which is published for the most part in Ukrainian. Vartovi Neba does publish articles in relation to certain episodes of nationalist history such as the Ukrainian revolutionary period though the articles are more factual than propagandistic. Furthermore, it is not typical of Vartovi Neba to engage in political debates criticising either Russia, Ukraine’s communists or any other groups. However, probably the most important indicator of where Vartovi Neba stands in regards to Ukrainian nationalism is displayed directly on the front cover of every issue where it proudly displays the diploma of honour, with the hammer and sickle emblem of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which it received from the Presidium of the Supreme Rada of the Ukrainian SSR. Surma/Viysko Ukrainy Surma, formerly Viysko Ukrainy, is the official journal of the National Guard, which is widely considered to be the most nationalistic military force of all Ukrainian military formations. The journal is likewise nationalistic and goes much further in glorifying Ukrainian nationalist militaries such as the OUN-UPA and SS Galician Division than any other military publication in the country. The journal not only receives financial support from the Ukrainian nationalist émigré community but initially even had nationalist émigrés on its editorial board, which may at least partially explain its political outlook.258 Among the organisations which sponsor the journal are the US based ‘Society of UPA Soldiers’ and the UOU (in fact the editor, Colonel Volodymyr Korkodym is a UOU member). Among the three foreigners who were on the editorial board were two retired US military officers of Ukrainian origin, and Taras Hunczak whose book on the SS Galician Division and views on Ukrainian nationalist-Jewish relations have already been discussed. It should be no surprise that the journal has published articles in support of keeping Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal, about the evils of the Soviet Union and Russia in general, and other highly nationalistic views. In fact, Surma not only publishes all its articles in Ukrainian but even uses the spellings which were used before the literary reforms of the 1920s in Soviet Ukraine. Ukrainian émigré nationalists never recognised these reforms and thus continue using the old spellings. Many nationalist publications in Ukraine have now switched back to this old form of spelling. Clearly the Educational Assistant’s job in offering an objective view (as is supposed to be the case according to the MAEW) is extremely difficult. Thus the reactions of the Educational Assistants to what they are supposed to teach is quite varied. Since many Educational Assistants do not believe in the content of the lectures, they either simply briefly mention the topic in passing without comment, or make comments with harsh remarks to the historical information which is presented. However, it is clear that, the military, like Ukrainian society, is quite divided about what is taught. This division has a great deal to do 257

Vasyl Klymenko. (Editor of Prykordonnyk Ukrainy) personal telephone interview, August 17, 1998. According to Korkodym, Surma decided that the editorial board would consist of only people who live in Ukraine. Volodymyr Korkodym. (Editor of Surma), personal interview, June 7, 1995. 258

with where the Educational Assistant was raised. According to Alexander Besedin, head of the Department of Psychology at Kharkiv’s University of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, since Ukraine is multiethnic the University of the UAF teaches patriotic and internationalist education which to them is one and the same goal —“that you can’t teach people patriotism and to also hate other nations…this practice has shown that this approach leads to fascism.”259 Instead, Besedin states, that they teach people to respect the traditions and cultures of the many peoples of Ukraine. Reactions by the students to the MAEW lectures vary from those who are genuinely interested in, and accept, what they are being taught, to those who laugh at the nationalist history and viewpoint, to those who are outright hostile to the glorification of nationalist history. According to Major-General Hryhoriy Temko, the Deputy Head of the MAEW who is in charge of formulating its program, while giving a lecture in Odessa on the OUN-UPA, the audience reacted in a hostile manor to the given information and arguments broke out. Temko admits that much of the audience blasted him and claimed that he was lying and making things up. There is somewhat of a battle being conducted between various individuals in the Ukrainian military over influence in the military-patriotic education program. Although the UOU has lost influence and is now almost invisible as a player in the Ukrainian military it still has many members in influential positions including the editors of some of the military newspapers and Major-General Hryhoriy Temko himself. Temko believes that the OUN-UPA and SS Galician Division are heroes in the Ukrainian ‘liberation struggle’ and that the history of the Soviet army should not be taught since, according to his interpretation, it would be contrary to statute 11 of the Law on the Armed Forces of Ukraine which states that the education of the armed forces should be based on the ‘national-historic’ traditions of the Ukrainian people. Temko admits however, that his interpretation is not supported by the Ministry of Defence nor many members of the Supreme Rada, though this has not stopped him from continuing to glorify Ukrainian nationalist history.260 Temko has also admitted that the MAEW in 1995 had prepared a textbook on Ukrainian military history though the Ministry of Defence refused to publish it officially due to a lack of funds. Temko has suggested, however, that the real reason for not publishing the textbook was due to the Ministry’s “opposition to the teaching of national-historic traditions”.261 He also claims that the large number of ethnic Russians in the Ministry is an important reason for opposition to the textbook.262 A more likely reason for the Ministry of Defence’s refusal to publish the textbook is fact that it deifies organisations such as the OUNUPA and SS Galician Division while omitting the Soviet army’s place in Ukrainian history.

Other Forms of Ukrainianisation After the Ukrainian military was initially created, among the first things that changed were names of various military objects, military symbols and medals. However, even the choice of symbols in Ukraine poses a problem as it took two votes and threats to dissolve the Supreme Rada in order to finally accept the ‘Tryzub’ as Ukraine’s national emblem.263 Therefore, in order not to offend anyone many of the names in the UAF were changed to reflect the Cossack period with the most common name used being that of Bohdan 259

Alexander Besedin (Head of the Department of Psychology, University of the UAF, Kharkiv) personal interview, June 20, 1995. 260 Hryhoriy Temko. personal interview, June 13, 1995. 261 Hryhoriy Temko. personal interview, June 13, 1995. 262 Hryhoriy Temko. personal interview, June 13, 1995. 263 Visti Kombatanta. No.2, 1992. Non-nationalists found them unacceptable because they viewed them as closely related to the OUN-UPA and other nationalist groups.

Khmelnitsky. Although Ukraine has attempted to be as balanced as possible in the use of names and symbols, Ukrainian nationalist symbols of the World War Two era are completely omitted. However, this is not the case when it comes to Soviet names and symbols or even those of the Tsarist era.264 Defence Minister Kuzmuk has more than once awarded the title of ‘Hero of the Soviet Union’ to distinguished veterans of the Great Patriotic War, 265 and often congratulates such military units as the “24th Mechanised Samaro-Ulyanov, Berdichev Iron, Order of the October Revolution, Thrice Red Flag, Order of Suvorov and Bohdan Khmelnitsky Division” on the 80th anniversary of their creation.266 President Kuchma also often awards such medals as the ‘Georgi Zhukov Medal’ for participants of the Great Patriotic War. All famous dates of the Soviet army’s liberation of Ukraine and even the USSR, such as the liberation of Kiev, Battle of Kursk, and liberation of Ukraine, are celebrated annually by orders of the President and Minister of Defence. This positive attitude towards Soviet symbols and names has caused many nationalists to complain that the military is not Ukrainian. The fact that the OUN-UPA and SS Galician Division traditions, symbols and names are not used, whereas the Soviet ones are, has many nationalists wondering why the Ukrainian military holds these ‘foreign’ traditions so close to their hearts while it rejects the ‘Ukrainian’ traditions?267 Museums and ‘Svitlytsi’ (reading rooms) are another way in which the Ukrainianisation process is being carried out. Outside of Western Ukraine, little has changed in the museums themselves with images of Lenin simply being replaced with images of the Ukrainian flag and state symbol, the ‘Tryzub’. All other exhibits that show the exploits of the Soviet army are largely still intact. However, this is not the case in Western Ukraine, where many museum exhibits now include, or are solely dedicated to, the nationalist ‘liberation struggle’ of Ukraine conducted by such organisations as the OUN-UPA or even the SS Galician Division. The Svitlytsi, which are basically reading rooms, are usually decorated with the Ukrainian flag, state symbols, poems by famous Ukrainian poets such as Taras Shevchenko and images of local war heroes. Of course, books are a major part of the Svitlytsi, consisting of the same nationalist publications as in the military libraries. Another way in which the Ukrainianisation program has been implemented is through the use of posters and signs found on the grounds of military bases. These posters and signs have been set up all over the bases in place of Soviet posters. Themes include excerpts from the Ukrainian military codes and laws, Oath of Allegiance to Ukraine, and quotes by Ukrainian authors such as Shevchenko, Ivan Krypiakevich, and the historian and leader of the Central Rada, Mykhailo Hrushevsky. Other themes include the Ukrainian national anthem, ‘Shche ne vmerla Ukraina’ (Ukraine is Yet to Die). The themes are always about loving ones’ country or defending the independence of Ukraine (quotes by Krypiakevich). However, when asked whether military people actually read these posters one officer replied that if they were paid enough and received apartments, maybe they would. But since they have to think about more important things such as buying food, clothing etc. for their families or paying for living quarters there is no time or interest to be thinking about the posters.268 However, again, the existence of such patriotic posters and signs depend on their location. There are reports that Soviet posters and signs are still in existence on some military bases, though in fewer numbers, they are now mixed in with their Ukrainian equivalents.269 Language is one of the most important aspects of the Ukrainianisation program. Ukrainian nationalists consider language to be of the utmost importance. Those who do not speak Ukrainian are hardly considered to be Ukrainian by nationalists. However, the 264

See for example:Vartovi Neba. No. 32-34, March 1998. where President Kuchma awards the ‘The Order of Alexander Nevsky’ 223rd Rocket Brigade the honorary status of ‘Terebovlyanska’. 265 Narodna Armia. July 22, 1998. 266 Narodna Armia. July 25, 1998. 267 Visti Kombatanta, 5-6, (1996): 41. 268 Anonymous. personal interview, May 18, 1995. 269 Anonymous. personal telephone interview, August 10, 1998.

Ukrainian language is no longer being taught in the UAF since it is supposed to be learned in school before a recruit serves in the military. All lectures and seminars are also supposed to be conducted in Ukrainian. However, due to the fact that many Educational Assistants are not fully fluent in Ukrainian, many switch to Russian or use interpreters. Most of the time, Russian is the language used in the Ukrainian military since this is the language most widely known by the officer corps. This has provoked widespread condemnation from Ukrainian nationalists both in Ukraine and among Ukrainian émigrés who often do not consider the Ukrainian military to be truly Ukrainian. One commentator wrote “Today in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, those who consider their native tongue not to be the Ukrainian language (and therefore it must be understood, nor do they consider the Ukrainian state as theirs) make-up 90% of all senior officers.”270 In fact one of the largest problems with Ukrainianisation in both the military and society is the fact that it is more a ‘Galicianisation’ program, which is intent on glorifying Galician traditions, than one that attempts to focus on traditions that are common to all of Ukraine’s citizens. The most significant difference between ‘Ukrainianisation’ and ‘Galicianisation’ is that ‘Galicianisation’ introduces nationalist ideology into Ukrainian society and the armed forces. Ukrainians living outside of Galicia are very much opposed to these nationalist Galician traditions which they have absolutely no connection to nor love of. In fact recently, anti-nationalist criticism has even taken on an anti-Galician and anti-Uniate flavour.271

Has Ukrainianisation been successful? As part of the research for this paper a sociological survey was conducted among 366 Ukrainian military servicemen of all ranks represented by all of the branches of the military except the Border Troops, in Western, Central, Eastern and Southern Ukraine and was completed in early 1996. The questionnaires were made available in both Ukrainian and Russian to ensure full comprehension of the stated questions. The questions in the survey were designed to find out whether the Ukrainianisation program has been effective in instilling a sense of nationalism or patriotism in Ukrainian military servicemen, and whether the glorification of nationalist ideals has succeeded. (For the actual questionnaire, please see Appendix II.) The survey closely resembles the Ukrainian population in terms of ethnicity with 74.7% of respondents being ethnic Ukrainians (slightly higher than the actual 73%), 20.5 % being ethnic Russians (slightly lower than the actual 22%), with the remainder being of various ethnic backgrounds. Unfortunately, however, one of the problems with this survey is that, coincidentally, ethnic Ukrainians who originate from Western Ukraine are overrepresented thus complicating the results in questions which show the difference between the attitudes of ethnic Ukrainians and other ethnic groups. Although Western Ukrainians only make up 20% of Ukraine’s total population, 43.7% of survey respondents claimed to be originally from Western Ukraine. For this reason, the figures which show the attitudes of the servicemen depending on which region of Ukraine they are from may be more accurate in depicting the real attitudes existing among Ukraine’s military servicemen. Tables 1 and 2 test the respondents’ level of patriotism, nationalism and love and respect of Ukraine and its armed forces. The figures for each region may have been interpreted in a different way by the respondents from each of the regions. The figures for Western Ukraine are most probably influenced by a higher level of nationalism whereas figures for Central Ukraine though possibly influenced by a certain level of nationalism are 270

Vechirniy Kiev. January 11, 1997. Komunist. No.39, September 1997.

271

more likely influenced by patriotism. Eastern and Southern Ukraine’s low response to the affirmative is probably due to a lack of patriotism and non-acceptance of Ukraine’s flag as a state symbol. It becomes obvious that the further east a person lives the less patriotically inclined one is towards Ukraine and its armed forces. Among respondents from Western Ukraine, the level of positive response is highest, with 58.8% of respondents answering ‘Yes’. Table 1. Do you feel proud when Ukraine’s national flag is solemnly being raised? Yes Rather yes than no Rather no than yes No Difficult to say

Western Oblasts 58.8% 17% 7.2% 4.6% 12.4%

Central Oblasts 42.3% 19.2% 8.7% 12.5% 17.3%

Southern and Eastern Oblasts 28.7% 10.6% 8.5% 22.3% 29.8%

Central Oblasts 40.4% 14.4% 13.5% 19.2% 12.5%

Southern and Eastern Oblasts 25.3% 14.7% 8.4% 28.4% 12.8%

Table 2. Do you feel proud in belonging to Ukraine’s army? Yes Rather yes than no Rather no than yes No Difficult to say

Western Oblasts 52% 15.8% 10.5% 6.6% 15.1%

The answers given to the question in Table 3. are most related to the respondents’ professional opinion of the Ukrainian military. Servicemen from all three categories answered in a very similar way. However, the possibility that at least some Western Ukrainians are not more pleased with the contemporary Ukrainian military may be due to the fact that they feel that it is not a ‘real Ukrainian army’, which is definitely the attitude of most Ukrainian nationalists today. Table 3. Do you feel proud, on the whole, of the contemporary Ukrainian army? Yes Rather yes than no Rather no than yes No Difficult to say

Western Oblasts 34.2 % 14.5 % 15.1 % 21.7 % 14.5 %

Central Oblasts 34.6 % 7.7 % 18.3 % 31.7 % 7.7 %

Southern and Eastern Oblasts 30.9 % 12.8 % 5.3 % 38.3 % 12.8 %

The responses in Table 4. are very similar to those related in the Tables 1 and 2. A clear majority of Western Ukrainian respondents where more likely to answer the question in the affirmative rather than in the negative. Only half of the Central Ukrainians were proud of this history while in Eastern and Southern Ukraine most people were either not proud or found it difficult to say. Table 4. Do you feel proud of the history of the military formations of the Ukrainian people? Yes Rather yes than no Rather no than yes No Difficult to say

Western Oblasts 53.0 % 20.5 % 4.0 % 11.9 % 10.6 %

Central Oblasts 41.3 % 9.6 % 8.7 % 18.3 % 22.1 %

Southern and Eastern Oblasts 27.1 % 12.5 % 8.3 % 32.3 % 19.8 %

Tables 5 to 15 list the names of various famous figures in both Ukrainian and Russian history. Names were listed in chronological order. Whereas in Tables 1, 2 and 4, the responses of Central Ukrainians tended to be half way between Western Ukrainians, and Southern and Eastern Ukrainians, in Tables 5 to 15, where there are differences of opinion between the 3 groups, the Central Ukrainians are firmly on the side of the Southern and Eastern Ukrainians. The most highly ranked individuals in which there is a consensus appear to be military leaders including Russians such as Suvorov, Kutuzov and Zhukov, though this is not the case with Mazepa or Morozov. The greatest differences in opinion are with various political leaders such as Peter I, Petliura, Hrushevsky, Bandera and Melnyk. Bohdan Khmelnitsky was the historical figure most positively rated by respondents of

all three regions, while Joseph Stalin was rated as the most negative figure. However the reasons for rating Khmelnitsky so high are probably different for each region. While Western Ukrainians probably favour Khmelnitsky more for having led the liberation struggle against Poland, the other regions probably also consider his reunification with Russia as a positive accomplishment. Table 5. Please tell us how you rate the activities of the personalities listed below:

B. Khmelnitsky

Western Oblasts

Central Oblasts

Southern and Eastern Oblasts

Positive Negative Difficult to say Unknown to me

83.6 % 5.3 % 11.2 % 0%

86.9 % 3.0 % 10.1 % 0%

83.3 % 2.1 % 14.6 % 0%

It interesting to note that while giving Mazepa a positive rating of 70.1% the Western Ukrainians did not give his enemy, Peter I, a correspondingly negative rating. Western Ukrainians were relatively divided about how they feel about Peter I, who received a slightly more positive than negative rating. Table 6.

I. Mazepa

Western Oblasts

Central Oblasts

Southern and Eastern Oblasts

Positive Negative Difficult to say Unknown to me

70.1 % 9.5 % 19.7 % .7 %

35.5 % 18.3 % 40.9 % 5.4 %

26.0 % 40.6 % 33.3 % 0%

Both Central, and Southern and Eastern Ukrainians preferred Peter I, even more than Western Ukrainianspreferred Mazepa. While there was not a large difference in the positive ratings of Mazepa between Central, and Southern and Eastern Ukrainians, the Southern and Eastern Ukrainians disliked Mazepa twice as much as did the Central Ukrainians. Table 6.

Peter I

Western Oblasts

Central Oblasts

Southern and Eastern Oblasts

Positive Negative Difficult to say Unknown to me

44.1 % 42.1 % 13.8 % 0%

75.8 % 14.1 % 10.1 % 0%

76.6 % 4.3 % 18.1 % 1.1 %

The famous Russian Tsarist military leaders, Suvorov and Kutuzov are ranked very highly by respondents from all three regions. Both Central Ukraine and Southern and Eastern Ukraine considered Suvorov, followed by Kutuzov, as their most positive personalities. Western Ukrainians even ranked them an average of 5% higher than Mazepa. Table 7.

A. Suvorov

Western Oblasts

Central Oblasts

Southern and Eastern Oblasts

Positive Negative Difficult to say Unknown to me

74.5 % 5.5 % 18.6 % 1.4 %

91.0 % 3.0 % 5.0 % 1.0 %

86.5 % 2.1 % 10.4 % 1.0 %

M. Kutuzov

Western Oblasts

Central Oblasts

Southern and Eastern Oblasts

Positive Negative Difficult to say Unknown to me

75.9 % 2.1 % 21.4 % .7 %

89.9 % 3.0 % 7.1 % 0%

84.2 % 3.2 % 10.5 % 2.1 %

Table 8.

Hrushevsky was rated highly only by the Western Ukrainians. Less than half of all respondents from Central, and Southern and Eastern Ukraine gave Hrushevsky a positive rating, though a few responded negatively. A great deal of people simply found it ‘difficult to say.’ Table 9.

M. Hrushevsky

Western Oblasts

Central Oblasts

Southern and Eastern Oblasts

Positive Negative Difficult to say Unknown to me

74.1 % 7.5 % 15.6 % 2.7 %

48.0 % 11.2 % 35.7 % 5.1 %

36.2 % 16.0 % 40.4 % 7.4 %

Petliura, the other personality from the Ukrainian Revolutionary era did not receive very positive ratings from any of the regions although he did receive a very negative rating from the Southern and Eastern Ukrainians. Table 10.

S. Petliura

Western Oblasts

Central Oblasts

Southern and Eastern Oblasts

Positive Negative Difficult to say Unknown to me

50.3 % 27.2 % 21.8 % .7 %

20.2 % 41.4 % 36.4 % 2.0 %

10.5 % 65.3 % 23.2 % 1.1 %

The two Ukrainian nationalist figures in the survey from the World War Two era did not receive very positive ratings even from the Western Ukrainians. Bandera was viewed as the most negative figure out of all the personalities for the great majority of Southern and Eastern Ukrainians. The fact that a very large majority of Southern and Eastern Ukrainians found it ‘difficult to say’ anything about Melnyk shows that he is not well known and that the OUN-M is not doing a very good job in informing people about him for if they had he probably would have had at least a higher negative rating. Table 11.

S. Bandera

Western Oblasts

Central Oblasts

Southern and Eastern Oblasts

Positive Negative Difficult to say Unknown to me

51.0 % 32.2 % 16.1 % .7 %

16.2 % 50.5 % 31.3 % 2.0 %

6.3 % 68.8 % 24.0 % 1.0 %

A. Melnyk

Western Oblasts

Central Oblasts

Southern and Eastern Oblasts

Positive Negative Difficult to say Unknown to me

32.9 % 22.9 % 28.6 % 15.7 %

6.3 % 31.3 % 51.0 % 11.5 %

3.3 % 26.7 % 62.2 % 7.8 %

J. Stalin

Western Oblasts

Central Oblasts

Southern and Eastern Oblasts

Positive Negative Difficult to say Unknown to me

6.9 % 81.3 % 11.1 % .7 %

14.1 % 62.6 % 21.2 % 2.0 %

23.9 % 47.8 % 27.2 % 1.1 %

G. Zhukov

Western Oblasts

Central Oblasts

Southern and Eastern Oblasts

Positive Negative Difficult to say Unknown to me

76.2 % 8.4 % 14.0 % 1.4 %

87.4 % 5.3 % 6.3 % 1.1 %

79.3 % 7.6 % 13.0 % 0%

L. Kravchuk

Western Oblasts

Central Oblasts

Southern and Eastern Oblasts

Positive Negative

46.6 % 16.2 %

29.0 % 37.0 %

15.2 % 55.4 %

Table 12.

Table 13.

Table 13.

Table 14.

Difficult to say Unknown to me

37.2 % 0%

33.0 % 1.0 %

29.3 % 0%

K. Morozov

Western Oblasts

Central Oblasts

Southern and Eastern Oblasts

Positive Negative Difficult to say Unknown to me

19.0 % 21.1 % 41.5 % 18.4 %

15.2 % 28.3 % 54.5 % 2.0 %

25.0 % 21.7 % 43.5 % 9.8 %

Table 15.

In regards to the various armed forces, only the Cossacks and the armies of Kievan Rus can be considered all-uniting. While a large majority of Western Ukrainians view the Sichovi Striltsi in a positive light, the OUN-UPA is viewed positively by less than half of the respondents, while the SS Galician Division received very little support. Respondents from the other regions of Ukraine gave a very high rating to the Soviet army. Table 16. How do you evaluate the role in Ukraine’s history of the following military formations?

Army of Kievan Rus

Western Oblasts

Central Oblasts

Southern and Eastern Oblasts

Positive Negative Difficult to say Unknown to me

81.0 % 1.4 % 14.3 % 3.4 %

85.3 % 0% 12.7 % 2.0 %

75.8 % 1.1 % 23.1 % 0%

Ukrainian Zaporozhian Cossacks

Western Oblasts

Central Oblasts

Southern and Eastern Oblasts

Positive Negative Difficult to say Unknown to me

90.5 % 1.4 % 6.1 % 2.0 %

91.1 % 2.0 % 5.9 % 1.0 %

74.7 % 5.5 % 19.8 % 0%

Russian Imperial Army

Western Oblasts

Central Oblasts

Southern and Eastern Oblasts

Positive Negative Difficult to say Unknown to me

24.1 % 52.4 % 22.1 % 1.4 %

37.8 % 23.5 % 36.7 % 2.0 %

45.5 % 11.4 % 43.2 % 0%

Sichovi Striltsi

Western Oblasts

Central Oblasts

Southern and Eastern Oblasts

Positive Negative Difficult to say Unknown to me

69.0 % 14.1 % 16.2 % .7 %

52.2 % 15.2 % 31.5 % 1.1 %

27.5 % 15.4 % 57.1 % 0%

OUN-UPA

Western Oblasts

Central Oblasts

Southern and Eastern Oblasts

Positive Negative Difficult to say Unknown to me

49.7 % 30.2 % 18.1 % 2.0 %

17.9 % 49.5 % 28.4 % 4.2 %

3.5 % 65.1 % 29.1 % 2.3 %

SS Galician Division

Western Oblasts

Central Oblasts

Southern and Eastern Oblasts

Positive Negative

34.9 38.4

8.2 75.5

4.4 80.0

Table 17.

Table 18.

Table 19.

Table 20.

Table 21.

Difficult to say Unknown to me

23.3 3.4

11.2 5.1

14.4 1.1

Soviet (Red) Army

Western Oblasts

Central Oblasts

Southern and Eastern Oblasts

Positive Negative Difficult to say Unknown to me

34.7 % 37.4 % 27.2 % .7 %

70.0 % 9.0 % 21.0 % 0%

73.6 % 4.4 % 22.0 % 0%

Table 22.

Table 23. What is your attitude towards Ukraine’s proclamation of independence? Approve Rather approve than do not Rather do not approve than approve Do not approve Difficult to answer

Western Oblasts 72.2 % 9.9 % 3.3 %

Central Oblasts 52.4 % 13.6 % 7.8 %

Southern and Eastern Oblasts 31.9 % 10.6 % 10.6 %

7.3 % 7.3 %

19.4 % 6.8 %

36.2 % 10.6 %

Table 24. What is your attitude towards the collapse of the Soviet Union? Approve Rather approve than do not Rather do not approve than approve Do not approve Difficult to answer

Western Oblasts 53.6 % 11.1 % 5.9 %

Central Oblasts 22.5 % 12.7 % 8.8 %

Southern and Eastern Oblasts 12.8 % 12.8 % 6.4 %

13.7 % 15.7 %

46.1 % 9.8 %

58.5 % 9.6 %

Western Oblasts 14.3 % 42.2 % 18.8 %

Central Oblasts 11.9 % 39.6 % 19.8 %

Southern and Eastern Oblasts 11.7 % 28.7 % 25.5 %

13.0 %

22.8 %

23.4 %

11.7 %

5.9 %

10.6 %

Table 25. Do you believe there exists an external threat to Ukraine? Yes, there is a definite threat Yes, there could be a threat I doubt very much that such a threat exists I believe there is no danger of such threat Difficult to answer

The survey has shown that the regions are very divided in almost every way. In general, there is very little patriotism which shows that the Ukrainianisation program in the armed forces seems to have failed. Only Western Ukrainiansare overwhelmingly in favour of Ukrainian independence, while the other regions are much less supportive and quite divided over the issue. Few Ukrainians from any of the regions felt that there was an external threat to their country. Other felt that there could be a threat and 24% of all the respondents said that there either was or could be a threat from Russia. Which means that the overwhelming majority of respondents do not consider Russia to be a threat. The only individuals and armies that are at all unifying, are Khmelnitsky, Suvorov, Kutuzov, the armies of Kievan Rus’ and the Cossacks. Almost all other individuals and armies are viewed differently by Western Ukrainians, on the one hand and Central, Southern and Eastern Ukrainians on the other hand. Other surveys that have been conducted in the Ukrainian military also show similar trends as those arrived at in the survey conducted for this paper. In an opinion poll of 1,003 military officers conducted in the middle of 1996, 45% of respondents were in favour of Ukraine joining a Russian-Ukrainian-Belarussian security bloc, (37%) the Tashkent Collective Security Pact (8%) while 41% were in favour of Ukraine’s non-aligned status, and

only 12% favoured joining NATO.272 The same poll also showed that only 4% of the officers felt the Ukrainian army could perform its main duties, while 57% were convinced it was unable to defend the state. These results show both the lack of an anti-Russian attitude and also the lack of support of joining NATO; a move which some Ukrainian politicians are in favour of. The poll also shows the lack of confidence in the Ukrainian military by the officer corps. Another interesting and helpful sociological survey was published in 1994, by Edward Afonin of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, on order from the Ministry of Defence. In a poll conducted among 260 officers and warrant officers, Afonin found that 45.8 % of respondents felt that the lack of patriotism in the Ukrainian Armed Forces was an important problem, while another 37.1 % felt it was a very important problem.273 He also found that 47.7% of respondents felt it was advisable to use the traditions of the Russian Tsarist Army in the construction of UAF, while 27.7% felt it was fully advisable. Only 18% of the officers felt that it was advisable to use UPA traditions while 4.4 % felt it was fully advisable. The Soviet Army fared much better with 41.1% of respondents feeling it advisable and 13.6% fully advisable to use these traditions. A total of 36.1% of officers felt that it was advisable to use Cossack traditions while 11.5% felt it was fully advisable.274 The results of the above-mentioned surveys all suggest that Ukrainian military servicemen are not in favour of using the traditions of nationalist militaries in the Ukrainian military. However, probably a more important question is whether the glorification of nationalist armies and especially the OUN-UPA and SS Galician are having a detrimental effect on the loyalty of Ukrainian military servicemen? In interviews with military servicemen of various ranks the answer is largely affirmative. Even Major-General Temko, who is a great supporter of nationalist traditions, when asked whether the teaching and glorification of OUN-UPA and SS Galician Division can divide the armed forces, has admitted that “this can create a ‘fifth column’ to a certain degree.”275 Temko also agreed that it is possible that by glorifying nationalist traditions, many Ukrainian citizens, and especially Russians, would will feel insulted and would refuse to defend Ukraine. In fact he admitted that if Russia invaded Ukraine “half of Ukraine would defend and the other half would greet them with flowers.”276

272

OMRI Daily Digest, June 25, 1996. E.A. Afonin. Stanovlennia Zbroynikh Syl Ukrainy: sotsial’ni ta sotsial’no-psiholohichni problemy. (Kiev, Natsionalna Akademiya Nauk, Instytut Sotsiolohii, 1994): 211. 274 Ibid. 223. 275 Hryhoriy Temko. personal interview, June 13, 1995. 276 Hryhoriy Temko. personal interview, June 13, 1995. 273

The Nationalist Debate Among the Ukrainian Population

The nationalist debate within Ukraine is probably more important than most readers think. According to all indicators, it is an extremely divisive factor in Ukrainian society today. Thus, in order to better understand these divisions the following chapter will focus on the attitudes towards nationalism, Ukrainianisation and the glorification of nationalist militaries in the various Ukrainian regions and in the government.

The Government The Ukrainian governments led by both of Ukraine’s Presidents, Kravchuk and Kuchma, have supported an independent Ukrainian state while in office. However, as mentioned above, Kuchma came to power on a largely anti-nationalist platform which included the recognition of Russian on an equal par with Ukrainian as an official language, the recognition of dual citizenship for Ukrainian citizens and much closer relations with the former Soviet states, especially Russia and Belarus. Kuchma is well-aware of the pan-Slavic attitudes of the majority of Ukrainians and played up to such attitudes in order to get elected. However, since then he has made an about-face and denounced the pan-Slavic attitudes of his electorate. Reconciliation between the nationalists and anti-nationalists has been an important goal for the Ukrainian government under both Kuchma and Kravchuk, though it seems to be failing. One of the biggest, though not the only, dividing line between the two sides is due to the World War Two period which divides Central, Southern and Eastern Ukrainians who support the Soviet army, and Western Ukrainians who are more favourable towards the various nationalist military formations. The Ukrainian government is in a very unfortunate situation. On the one hand, it is trying not to alienate Western Ukrainians and also maintain support from Ukrainian émigrés (who, as already mentioned, mostly originate from Western Ukraine and are often staunchly nationalistic); but on the other hand it is trying to maintain friendly relations with Russia, and enhance relations with the West and Israel.277This means that the Ukrainian government cannot openly criticise the OUN-UPA or SS Galician Division, due to nationalist opposition, but nor can it glorify them due to the total lack of support of Nazi collaborators in the international community and especially Israel and Poland whose peoples suffered greatly at the hands of the Ukrainian nationalists; the result has been that the Ukrainian government has, to a large extent, acted in a very evasive but creative manner. However, upon a closer look at the Ukrainian government’s actions, it becomes apparent that the Ukrainian government does not support the OUN-UPA nor the SS Galician Division, let alone try to glorify their activities. One important way in recognising the nationalist struggle for an independent state is by extending war veterans’ benefits to those parties in question. The Ukrainian government did extend veterans’ benefits to members of the OUN-UPA under the ‘Law of Ukraine on the Status of War Veterans; Guarantees of their Social Protection’ passed by the Supreme Rada

277

In fact Kuchma has even expressed his desire for a ‘strategic triangle’ of Ukraine, the USA and Israel.

on December 22, 1995. After naming all the possible groups of Soviet war veterans, 278 including those who served in Afghanistan, the law finally mentions OUN-UPA veterans. Section II of the law makes clear who is recognised as a war veteran and eligible for veterans’ benefits. Article 6, Item 16 states: “soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army who took part in combat against the German fascist invaders on the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine in 1941-1944 who did not commit crimes against peace and humanity and who have been rehabilitated in conformity with the Law of Ukraine “On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression in Ukraine.”279 The UPA is the only group in which it is stipulated “did not commit crimes against peace and humanity.” Even Soviet NKVD troops, who are well-known to have committed atrocities, do not have such a string attached to their acceptance as war veterans. The law is in fact recognising that some members of the UPA did commit crimes against peace and humanity. Furthermore, according to Article 2 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression in Ukraine”, rehabilitation is not extended to those individuals proven to have partaken in: --treachery against the Fatherland, espionage, diversions, wreckage, sabotage, terrorist acts; --crimes against mankind and humanity, punitive actions against the peaceable population, killing, murder of citizens and complicity in this with the occupiers in the period of the Great Patriotic War; --armed incursions on the territory of Ukraine, organisation of armed formations which committed massacres, piracy, robbery and other violent acts and personal participation in these crimes; --persons who are charged with crimes against justice tied to the employment of repression, even if they themselves underwent repression.280 Thus any UPA veteran who did not partake in the above-mentioned acts is eligible to receive a war veterans’ pension. However, for an UPA veteran to deny having fought against the Soviet Union would defeat the purpose of having been in the UPA in the first place. Furthermore, the UPA is glorified for having fought against the Soviet Union up until 1952; an act which is deemed a crime by Ukrainian law and thus automatically disqualifies them from veterans’ status. Therefore, in actual fact, the UPA is not at all recognised. Another action which attests to the fact that the Ukrainian government is not about to glorify the UPA is its signing of the Polish-Ukrainian ‘Declaration on Accord and Unity’ in Kiev on May 21, 1997 by Polish President Oleksandr Kwasniewski and his Ukrainian counterpart, Leonid Kuchma, which was meant to end centuries of hostility between the two nations and start a new relationship. The two presidents acknowledged many past sins, including “the blood of Poles spilled in Volhynia particularly in the years 1942-43” and “Akcja Wisla”.281 Although it was not explicitly mentioned in the declaration, newspapers around the world made it clear that the Polish blood was spilled by the UPA. However, typical of how Ukrainian nationalists treated the story was the report in one Ukrainian émigré 278

According to the law, “former servicemen, volunteers and former combatants of extermination battalions, platoons and brigades for the protection of civilians and other formations which took direct part in combat operations to liquidate German fascist diversionary terrorist groups and other illegal formations and groups on the territory of the former USSR”(that is those Soviet citizens who fought against organisations like the OUNUPA). 279 Verhovna Rada Ukrainy, Zakony Ukrainy, (Kiev: Instytut Zakonodavstva, Vol. 6, 1996) 58. 280 Verhovna Rada Ukrainy, Zakony Ukrainy, (Kiev: Instytut Zakonodavstva, Vol. 1, 1996) 371. 281 Wspolne oswiadczenie Prezydentow Rzeczypopolitej Polskiej i Ukrainy o porozumieniu i pojednaniu. Kijow, 21 maja 1997 roku.

newspaper which stated that the declaration addressed the two major points of contention in twentieth century relations between the two the people. One of these, which it described in great detail was “Akcja Wisla” and the other which was “the killing of Poles in the Volhynian region in the Ukrainian struggle for independence during World War II.”282 Another action taken by Prime Minister Pustovoytenko and the Supreme Rada has been the creation of commissions to examine the activities of the OUN-UPA. There are two such commissions, one established by the government and the other by the Supreme Rada. The government commission was created on September 12, 1997 and its members include the Vice-Prime-Minister of Ukraine, Minister of Justice, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Internal Affairs, Minister of Finance, Minister of Information, Minister of Education, Head of the Security Service, Procurator General, President of the National Academy of Sciences and Director of the Institute of History of the National Academy of Sciences and Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies.283 It appears by the list of members of the commission that its work is quite important and may either signify the government’s willingness to finally deal with the OUN-UPA problem or to simply placate certain anti-OUN-UPA lobbies. The Supreme Rada first created a commission to study the activities of the OUN-UPA on February 1, 1993 which was made up of practically the same ministers (though the individuals were different) as the government commission stated above.284 However, the commission apparently did not complete its work before the 1994 elections thus on September 18 1995 its work was extended until March 1997. On September 13, 1996 a ‘Special Temporary Commission of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine to Assist in the Study of Questions Related to the Examination of the Activities of the OUN-UPA’ was created.285 The commission was composed of 15 People’s Deputies from various political parties and groups including the Communist Party, Socialist Party, Peasant Party, Rukh, Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, Reform, Yednist, Derzhavnist and independent members. However, with the 1998 elections to the Supreme Rada, only 6 of the 15 members of the commission were re-elected. This probably means that the commission will need to acquire new members in order to complete its work. Although the work of neither of the commissions has been finalised, the fact that the government and Supreme Rada actually created commissions to examine the activities of the OUN-UPA is significant and indicates that the issue is still very much alive and important in contemporary Ukraine. It also suggests that most Ukrainians do not support the OUN-UPA or its activities during World War Two. If they did, such commissions would never have been created. At the same time, their creation demonstrates that the government and Supreme Rada are attempting to solve the OUN-UPA problem through objective means. It can be guessed that based on the final reports of these two commissions an official policy regarding the OUN-UPA may finally be formulated which could then solve the problems of what to teach in schools and in the military regarding the OUN-UPA. However, OUN-UPA veterans are extremely perturbed by the fact that the Ukrainian authorities have not recognised them as ‘heroes in the national-liberation struggle’, which for them especially includes their fight against the Soviet Union until 1952. In one letter written by the president and secretary of the ‘Ukrainian Congress Committee of America’ to the Supreme Rada of Ukraine, in addition to demands for the recognition and granting to UPA veterans of ‘political and judicial benefits’, urged a commission to examine the crimes of the 282

The Ukrainian Weekly, No. 21, Vol. LXV, May 25, 1997. Postanova Kabinetu Ministriv Ukrainy Pro Uryadovu komisiu z vyvchenya diyal’nosti OUN-UPA. September 12, 1997. 284 Postanova Prezudii Verhovnoi Rady Ukrainy Pro prodovzhenya stroku vykonannya Postanovy Prezydii Verhovnoi Rady Ukrainy vid 1 lyutoho 1993 roku “Do pytanya pro perevirku diyalnosti OUN-UPA. September 18, 1995. 285 Verhovna Rada Ukrainy: Postanova Verhovnoi Rady Ukrainy Pro tymchasovoyi spetsialnoyi komisii Verhovnoi Rady Ukrainy po spryyannyu u vyvchani pytan’, povyazanykh z perevirkoyu diyalnosti OUN-UPA. September 13, 1996. 283

Communists. The reply by People’s Deputy Yu. O. Kryzsky, a member of the Defence and State Security Commission and Head of the Sub-Commission on the States Border, Customs and the National Guard, was to basically mind their own business and that the OUN-UPA was anything but heroic.286 The Ukrainian government’s attitude towards the SS Galician Division is quite different from its treatment of the OUN-UPA which it overtly considers as traitorous and many of its members as having committed war crimes. SS Galician Division veterans have also tried to be rehabilitated by the Ukrainian government and have sent letters to the Procurator General’s office. In one reply to a rehabilitation request published in Visti Kombatanta, the Procurator General’s office in Ivano-Frankivsk informed the individual in question that according to Article 2 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression in Ukraine”, people who served in SS and other German military formations may not be rehabilitated.287 On an other occasion a veteran who had been imprisoned by the Soviet authorities for being an SS Galician Division veteran was informed that he could not be rehabilitated. In fact, under Ukrainian law his conviction had not been dropped, but simply suspended.288 The same individual was told by the Lviv branch of the Procurator General’s office that ‘if the Germans won the war you would have been used to pull a plough for the rest of your life.” Moments like these have in fact caused a great loss of faith to veterans of the division who can now see that even in Galicia, their ‘heroic’ struggle for Ukrainian independence is not appreciated.

Political Parties The glorification of Ukrainian nationalist military formations is a serious issue in Ukraine, especially to the Supreme Rada. The parties most vocally opposed to the OUNUPA, SS Galician Division and other nationalist military formations are the Communist Party and the Socialist Party, which after the recent 1998 elections, again make up the largest ideological grouping in the Supreme Rada. ‘Tovarysh’ and ‘Komunist’ the official newspapers of the Socialist Party and Communist Party respectively, both often publish articles furiously criticising the actions of not only the OUN-UPA and SS Galician Division but even ‘traitors’ like Ivan Mazepa, Petliura and contemporary Ukrainian nationalists. However, at the same time, the Communists and Socialists are in favour of Cossack traditions though, unlike the nationalists, they argue that “National-egoism is not a Cossack ideal.”289 The Communist Party, which often refers to the nationalists as ‘national-fascists’, has been especially active in denouncing the activities of the OUN-UPA. They have even taken this fight to an international level by writing letters to the governments of Russia, Belarus, Poland, Moldova, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Israel and Yugoslavia, each of which had been affected in some way by the Ukrainian nationalists, to condemn the OUN-UPA.290 Thus, it is unsurprising that both the Communist and Socialist opposition in the Supreme Rada against the work of Major-General Temko and the MAEW. Nationalism has a negative connotation in Ukraine due to the Soviet understanding of Ukrainian nationalism which is deeply tied to such organisations as the OUN-UPA. However, there are political parties which do use and glorify the term ‘nationalism’. Such parties tend to be rather extreme in their views and can be considered to fall within the category of ethnic nationalism or even integral nationalism. Other nationalist parties which are less extreme tend to use the term ‘national idea’ or ‘national consciousness’ instead of ‘nationalism’. These parties are aware of its negative connotations among Ukrainian society and the fact that this 286

Vyzvol’ny Shlyakh, No. 7, (July 1997): 804. Visti Kombatanta. No. 5-6, (1997): 116. 288 Visti Kombatanta. No. 2, (1997): 69. 289 Den’. January 15, 1998. 290 Komunist. No. 11, March 1997. And Vyzvol’ny Shlyakh, No. 7, (July 1997): 804. 287

may hurt them at the polls. Nonetheless, due to a general lack of support for nationalism in Ukraine, these parties are almost exclusively based in Western Ukraine. The themes that all of these parties have in common is their anti-Russian stance, the special rights of ethnic Ukrainians, and the glorification of historic Ukrainian nationalist military formations and leaders. One such example is the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN), which is led by Yaroslava Stetsko, the widow of the same Yaroslav Stetsko who proclaimed Ukraine’s independence along with the arrival of the Nazis in Lviv. The KUN is a successor party to the OUN-B. In the 1994 elections one of its party platforms was that Ukrainian soldiers should be “educated on the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism, in the most noble military traditions of our history, in the spirit of princely knighthood, Cossack bravery, fearlessness of the Sichovi Striltsi and heroism of the OUN-UPA.”291 Military-patriotic education is a priority with most nationalist parties since they always fear that the state is in danger, especially from Russia. One of the many differences between nationalist and non-nationalist parties is that the nationalist agenda emphasises the armed forces and national security. One common view is that Ukraine should be a nuclear armed state until all other countries in the world give up their nuclear weapons. At times, the nationalist and anti-nationalist debates in the Supreme Rada are heated. On May 9, 1997, ‘Victory Day’, there was a clash in Lviv between Soviet army veterans and left-wing groups on one side and the local ‘Berkut’ (riot police) and Ukrainian nationalists on the other. Due to this event, Petro Symonenko, the Communist Party leader gave a speech in the Supreme Rada on May 13, 1997, condemning the Lviv city authorities for the incident. However, before he could finish his speech, extreme nationalist politician Stepan Khmara actually physically attacked the Communist leader. What followed was a fist fight involving more than 50 People’s Deputies.292

Ukrainian Society Ukraine is a very divided country and the situation does not appear to be getting any better. In a nation-wide pole conducted at the beginning of 1996, the idea of confederation with the former Soviet States was supported by 87 percent of Southern and Eastern Ukrainians. One interesting fact is that 80 percent of ethnic Russians in Ukraine supported the idea, which means that ethnic Ukrainians were actually more in favour of the idea than even ethnic Russians themselves. In Western Ukraine the situation was completely different, where two-thirds of the population solidly supported a sovereign and independent Ukraine.293 Thus in the context of the theories of “Exit, Voice & Integration” the main danger to Ukrainian security is not that some minority may separate (though this is true of Crimea) or voice its protests but rather that the majority may do this.294 The dislike between Western and other Ukrainians has not always existed. Only since World War Two and the tragic fratricidal war that took place between Ukrainians at the time, 291

Kongres Ukrainskyh Natsionalistiv. Prohrama Statut. (Kiev: Vydannya Kongresu Ukrainskyh Natsionalistiv, 1994):15. 292 Den’. No. 81, 15 May 1997. and VseUkrainski Vedomosti, 14 May 1997. 293 The Jamestown Foundation Prism: A Bi-Weekly on the Post-Soviet States. 21 March 1997. 294 Of course if one views the USSR as having been another Russian empire and Ukraine simply as one of its colonies, then it is impossible to understand why a great deal of Ukrainians today are in favour of closer integration or even forming a new union with the former Soviet states. Why would Ukrainians want to again become a subjected people? However, if one sees that this is not the case and that Ukrainians actually felt themselves as equals to the Russians during the Soviet period then it becomes clear why pro-union/integration sentiments exist.

have they been so divided. Although there were noticeable divisions even during the Ukrainian Revolution, they seem to have been more between certain leaders due to different goals unlike today where there is, to a large degree, an actual dislike between people in the East and West. The antagonism between Central, Southern and Eastern Ukraine, and Western, especially Galician Ukrainians, has actually intensified since Ukraine became independent. One of the greatest reasons for this is the ‘Ukrainianisation’ process within society, the economic crisis and plunge in the standard of living since independence and the antagonistic glorification of Ukrainian nationalism in Western Ukraine. Since the final days of the Gorbachev era, Western Ukrainian nationalists have been heading many of the local city and oblast administrations in Western Ukraine. The names of streets, schools and other institutions have been changed in honour of such people and organisations as Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych, Symon Petliura the OUN-UPA, Sichovi Striltsi and though to a much smaller extent, the SS Galician Division. However, one of the most antagonistic moves has been to remove monuments dedicated to Soviet veterans and their exploits (such as the liberation of cities) during the Great Patriotic War and replace them, as was done by Lviv City Council, with those commemorating “fighters for the freedom of Ukraine”, including the OUN-UPA and other groups that fought against the Soviet Union.295 One of the most antagonistic actions which happen on a yearly basis in some cities of Western Ukraine are the physical attacks by local nationalists, often supported by local governments, on Soviet army veterans, of whom there are many also among Western Ukrainians, during parades commemorating May 9th Victory Day. At the same time separate commemorations are always held in honour of OUN-UPA veterans.296 Not everyone in Western Ukraine supports the OUN-UPA, especially not those who had suffered from its brutalities. Some people are opposed to giving compensation to OUN-UPA veterans repressed by the Soviet government while innocent villagers are now living in poverty due to the economic crisis.297 However, glorification is not usually the case with the SS Galician Division. Although it is true that museums have been dedicated to the division along with some street names, and monuments have been constructed, there is evidence that many Western Ukrainians, including Galicians, are opposed to its glorification. Visti Kombatanta often publishes stories which admit that the SS Galician Division is not well supported by Western Ukrainians. There have been reports in Visti Kombatanta that at least one monument to the SS Galician Division which was located close to Brody was blown-up with explosives. The same article also stated that in Brody itself there is graffiti with the words “Down with the SS Galician Division!!”298 Veterans of the division understood why the Soviet government was so opposed to them. However it is especially painful to them now, when Ukraine is independent, that they have still not been recognised as heroes by Ukraine’s government and its people.299 The ‘Moskali’ are not the only people that the Nationalists in Western Ukraine hold grudges against. There have been numerous reports of anti-Polish actions in Western Ukraine committed by Ukrainian nationalists. When Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski and President Leonid Kuchma paid a visit to the monument of Adam Mickiewicz in Lviv and were greeted by Polish songs sung by the local Polish community, Ukrainian nationalists began to whistle in disapproval until the songs could no longer be heard.300 As is always the case, nationalism is countered with nationalism, and so when Polish nationalists in Peremysl, Poland, decided not to allow the yearly Ukrainian festival in 1997, 295

RFE/RL Newsline. December 12, 1997. See for example: OMRI Daily Digest No. 90, Part II, May 10, 1995. and Tovarysh No.21 (191) May 1996. 297 Vasyl’ Bilan. (Colonel, Editor of Narodna Armia) personal interview, May 28, 1995. 298 Visti Kombatanta. No. 5-6, (1997): 17. 299 See for example: Visti Kombatanta. No. 5-6, (1997): 113. 300 Den’. January 9, 1998. 296

the ever troublesome Lviv City Council denied the Poles the right to restore an old cemetery which contains the graves of Polish combatants of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict which followed World War I. Lviv City Council has also stated that the headstones must also be marked in Ukrainian. The dispute only seems to have been solved after a talk between the Polish and Ukrainian Prime-Ministers.301 What has been taking place in Western Ukraine has had an effect on the rest of Ukraine whose people are mostly anti-nationalistic. As in Western Ukraine, where many streets have been renamed in honour of the UPA and other nationalist formations, in Eastern Ukraine, it is not uncommon to rename streets in honour of various Soviet personalities or entities. Western Ukrainian nationalist have also renamed streets which were once dedicated to famous Russians (Pushkin) or other ethnic minorities, whereas in Central, Southern and Eastern Ukraine the names of streets dedicated to people such as Pushkin and Peter I continue to exist. Central, Southern and Eastern Ukrainians are very proud of their Soviet army veterans. Although in Lviv, Soviet army veterans are often denounced and treated like “occupiers”, in Kiev and elsewhere, they are treated with great respect and are thanked for their heroic acts in freeing the country.302 To this day, newlyweds place flowers at monuments dedicated to the exploits of Soviet servicemen in the Great Patriotic War. Ukrainians have also been known to visit the graves and monuments dedicated to Soviet army veterans while visiting European countries liberated by the Soviet army. Such was the case with a group of young Ukrainian athletes who while on a competition in Slovakia took the time out to visit and place a wreath at a monument dedicated to the Soviet army’s liberation of Czechoslovakia.303 Children in Central, Southern and Eastern Ukraine learn about the heroic exploits of the Soviet army against the Nazi aggressors and are still visited by veterans who tell them their war stories. The Red Army’s defeat of the Nazis is not something which is simply cherished by ‘Communists’, ‘Russians’ or ‘Russified’ Ukrainians, though it does unify Ukrainian and Russian citizens. The whole matter is more important than politics since it is a matter of individual family history. With 8 million dead and 7 million Ukrainians having served in the Red Army, it is simply a matter of respect for ones’ own roots and history. The memory of the Red Army’s defeat of Nazi Germany is something that is shared among Ukrainian ethnic groups and their veterans. The exploits of the Red Army unite various ethnic groups including Ukrainians, Russians, Armenians and Jews who are all proud of their exploits. This is even the case in North America where societies such as the ‘Russian War Veterans Society’ gather each year to commemorate the defeat of Nazi Germany by the Red Army.304 There are also Red Army veterans’ organisations in Israel who maintain contacts and exchanges with their Ukrainian and other former Soviet colleagues.305 Soviet army veterans’ groups in Ukraine have also been very active in opposing any rehabilitation of the OUN-UPA or SS Galician Division which they consider fascist collaborators. The ‘Council of Veterans’ Organisations of Ukraine’, the largest veterans’ organisation, has a membership of over 14 million people including 1 million Great Patriotic War Veterans and 5 million home front veterans306, has lead the fight against any recognition of the OUN-UPA. It has sponsored academic conferences on the Great Patriotic War and its participants, including Ukrainian nationalist military formations, and has published the conference proceedings. One of the council’s publications in 1997 was a compilation of papers presented at one of their conferences which dealt with the crimes of the OUN-UPA.307 For their part, nationalist veterans’ organisations, which unify the SS Galician 301

Den’. June 18, 1997. See for example: “Pechersk chesvuyet veteranov”, Kievskie Vedomosti. May 6, 1997. 303 “Ukrainski lehkoatletyky vshanuvaly pamyat vyzvolyteliv Slovachyny”, Den’, May 16, 1997. 304 “The Red Army Remembers…” Los Angeles Times, May 10, 1997. 305 Narodna Armia. July 31, 1998. 306 Yuri Heorhiovich. (Council of Veterans’ Organisations of Ukraine) personal telephone interview. August 24, 1998. The remainder of the 14 million figure is made up of veterans of labour and non-Great Patriotic War Soviet army veterans. 302

Division and UPA, also hold conferences, and even manage to receive funding from Ukrainian émigré groups, though they are dedicated to the glorification of their own cause.308 Another goal of the nationalist veterans’ organisations such as the “All-Ukrainian Brotherhood of the OUN-UPA” is government recognition and veterans’ benefits and influence the military-patriotic education program in the Ukrainian military which it does along with the UOU.309 Ukrainian nationalists often complain about Russification in Ukraine during the Soviet period. However, regardless of the many years of existence of such a policy when Ukraine was part of the Russian Empire and then the USSR, the Ukrainian language survived and, at least, in the 1920s even flourished. This can be compared to places like Ireland or Scotland, where the local languages are very close to extinction. However, the growth of nationalism following Ukraine’s independence and the actions taken by nationalists have had a severe backlash in non-Western Ukrainian attitudes towards especially the Ukrainian language. In a recent pole conducted throughout Ukraine, 70% of respondents favoured giving Russian some official status. However another statistic shows that Ukrainianisation has largely failed: whereas 41% of people aged 30 and up said they spoke Russian at home, 53% of people in their twenties and 57 % of people aged 15-19 said they spoke Russian.310 Thus the Ukrainian language has actually suffered more in independent Ukraine than in the Soviet Union where, according to nationalists, Ukrainian was looked down upon. However the statistics may in part be explained by the fact that when initially Ukrainian was forced on people including those in the armed forces, many people who had earlier freely studied the language subsequently refused.311 The infusion of the Galician dialect into the media and government has also caused dissent. It is popular for Eastern and Southern Ukrainians to refer to the Galician dialect as the ‘Banderivtsi’ language. One National Guard officer in Eastern Ukraine remarked “they (Galician Ukrainians) were enslaved for 300 years by the Polish ‘Pans’312 and now they want to be called ‘Pan’?!?!”313 The future does not look positive for the Ukrainian language, nor for Ukraine’s internal East-West relations. Nationalism in Ukraine is not only causing tensions between Ukrainians in the eastern and western parts of the country but may in fact be adding to nation-building processes. We may be seeing the very beginnings of the creation of two separate nations in Ukraine; one in the Western oblasts and a separate nation in the rest of the country. Both sides have different histories, heroes, political cultures and priorities, religions and even languages, since Ukrainian is prevalent in Western Ukraine whereas, to a greater degree, Russian is spoken elsewhere.314 However, this phenomenon may still be reversed which is why it is very important for the Ukrainian government to pursue a policy which will unite Ukrainians in various regions around a single vision of the future and of the past in order to form a 307

Reabilitatsii ne Podlezhat: Materialy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii 21-22 iyunya 1996 goda. Kiev: Soviet Organizatsii Veteranov Ukrainy, 1997. 308 Visti Kombatanta. No.5-6, (1997): 18. 309 Ibid. 93. 310 RFE/RL Newsline. Vol. 2, No. 154, Part II, August 12, 1998. 311 Alexander N. Besedin. personal interview, June 3, 1995. 312 This term has two closely related meanings. ‘Pan’ means ‘Lord’ or ‘Master’ however it is used in Polish as ‘Mister’ is used in English. 313 Anonymous. personal interview. May 1995. 314 The resemblance between the Serb-Croat relationship and that of the various Ukrainian regions appears to be quite close athough Serbs and Croats are considered to be two different nations. However, an argument can be made that the difference between Serbs and Croats is actually smaller than the difference between Western Ukraine and the other regions since Western Ukraine is mostly Ukrainian speaking and the other regions are mostly Russian speaking. As for Serbs and Croats, both groups actually speak the same language, though a different dialect. The real difference appears to be that Serbs and Croats have gone to war against one another thus creating historical hatreds, whereas Eastern and Western Ukrainians have not. However, war is not a necessary factor in the creation of two separate nations out of one. Belarussians and Ukrainians have never fought against one another and yet they are two separate nations which have the same roots in Kievan Rus.

patriotism which will be acceptable to all.

Conclusion

The Ukrainian military has found itself in an extremely difficult situation following the break-up of the Soviet Union. There is no money to buy new weapons systems nor even to provide housing for the officer corps. Conscripted soldiers must now leave their uniforms for the next conscript to use for the next 18 months. It is common for conscripts to come home after serving their terms in a very sorry state. Even President Leonid Kuchma, the Commander-in-Chief of the UAF, stated during an address to the military’s top brass that the people of Ukraine expect their children to return from military service alive and not as physical, spiritual, and moral cripples.315 In fact during 1997 there were 107 cases of suicide in the Ukrainian military.316 It is no wonder that desertions and the theft of military hardware are rampant. Within the first nine months of 1996, $2 million worth of military hardware and supplies was ‘missing’ from the Logistics Service alone. Needless to say, morale is at an alltime low. Thus, it is quite understandable that military-patriotic education is by no means the Ukrainian military’s greatest concern at the present time. Ukrainian citizens, including military servicemen, voted for independence for reasons of economic nationalism and the belief that their standard of living would improve. Instead, their standard of living has significantly worsened and thus most Ukrainians feel no reason to be patriotic about, or loyal to, a country which has only brought them grief. The fact that people view the government with suspicion due to various reasons not least of which is rampant corruption and the total socio-economic inequality of the population, certainly has a negative effect on how they view and feel about their country. Why would anyone want to defend a government and system which appears to cheat them and work against them? Some people may feel that if the system does not change it would be better to destroy it. Thus the answer to Ukraine’s patriotic problems may lie in an improvement of the standard of living thereby giving its citizens a reason to be proud of their country and a will to defend a system which brings them prosperity. Yet this still does not mean that the Ukrainian government may take an anti-Russian stance in its foreign policy. A majority of Ukrainians are influenced by Russian media sources which can have an important effect on public opinion in Ukraine. Another factor is Russian culture through television programs, books and music which is a factor that ties the two nations together. This culture, in fact, cannot really be called ‘Russian’ although the language of communication may be Russian, rather it is a ‘Soviet’ or ‘Eastern Slavic’ culture which unites these countries. Ukraine’s population is in fact very ethnically mixed and thus figures that show that 73% of the population are ethnic Ukrainians does not mean that these people are ethnically pure. For Ukrainians who have never been nationalistic marrying a person of another ethnic group, especially one which is really not considered very different, as is the case with ethnic Russians, was very common. Thus added to the large numbers of Russians and Russophones who make up more than half the population, are those Ukrainians who have a mixed ethnic identity and accept both Russian and Ukrainian culture. The desire for dual Russian-Ukrainian citizenship by some of Ukraine’s citizens may possibly be explained as the desire to once again be united with Russia. Dual citizenship does not necessarily mean anti-Ukrainian sentiment. Using anti-Russianism to unify Ukrainians and gain their loyalty did not work for Mazepa, Petliura or Bandera nor will it work for Ukrainian nationalists today. Though their goal is to maintain Ukrainian independence and statehood, through their antagonism of Central, Southern and Eastern Ukrainians and glorification of nationalist militaries, Ukrainian nationalists have not only failed to instil Ukrainians with 315

The Jamestown Foundation Prism: A Bi-Weekly on the Post-Soviet States. 21 March 1997. RFE/RL NEWSLINE. Vol 2, No. 19, Part II, 29 January 1998.

316

nationalism but have actually created a rise in dissent and disloyalty towards the Ukrainian state and independence. It is obvious that the majority of Ukrainians do not support ethnic or integral nationalism and since armed forces personnel are recruited from this society there is no reason for their views to be any different. Any government which uses such attitudes today will only fail in achieving its goals of unity and loyalty to the state and the continuance of Ukrainian independence.

APPENDIX I The Ten Commandments of the Ukrainian Nationalist (Decalogue) June 1929 You will attain a Ukrainian State, or die in battle for it. 2. You will not permit anyone to defame the glory or the honour of Your Nation. 3. Remember the great Days of your struggles. 4. Be proud of the fact that You are the inheritor of the struggle for the glory of Volodymyr’s Trident. 5. Avenge the deaths of the great Knights. 6. Do not speak about matters with whom you can, but only with whom you must. 7. Do not hesitate to carry out the most dangerous deeds, should this be demanded by the good of the cause. 8. Treat the enemies of Your Nation with hatred and ruthlessness. 9. Neither pleading, nor threats, nor torture, nor death shall compel You to betray a secret. 10. Aspire to expand the power, wealth, and glory of the Ukrainian state. 1.

Note The Decalogue was the OUN’s statement of principles, which every OUN members was expected to memorize. It was written by a leading member, Stepan Lenkavsky (1904-77), and first published as an insert in the underground newspaper Surma in the summer of 1929. In the original 1929 version of the decalogue, the published text begins with: “I am the spirit of the eternal natural force which protected you from the Tartar hordes and placed you on the frontier of two worlds to create a new life.” Several other sections read differently from the version translated here, and it is not known when the newer version became official. The different sections are: (7) “Do not hesitate to commit the greatest crime, if the good of the Cause demands it”; (8) “Regard the enemies of Your Nation with hate and perfidy”; (10) “Aspire to expand the strength, riches, and size of the Ukrainian State even by means of enslaving foreigners.” 317

317

Yury Boshyk. UkraineDuring World War II: History and Aftermath. (Edmonton: University of Toronto Press, 1986): 173.

APPENDIX II Questionnaire Our Ukrainian-Canadian group of researchers asks you to take part in a sociological survey. To fill out this questionnaire, you must carefully read the question and all the possible answers to it. Choose the most suitable answer and then circle the number beside it. This poll is anonymous, you need not include your name down. We thank you in advance for your participation in the survey.

A1 - For how long have you been serving in Ukraine’s army? 1234-

since 1992 since 1993 since 1994 since 1995

A2 - Are you a professional military serviceman or are you a conscript? 12-

I am a professional military serviceman. I am a conscript.

A3 – In what part of Ukraine had you been living most of your life before you joined the army? 1-

234-

56-

Western (Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Volhynian, Chernivtsi, Transcarpathian, Riven oblasts) Central ( Zhytomyr, Kiev, Chernihiv, Cherkassy, Vinnytsia, oblasts and City of Kiev) North-Eastern ( Kharkiv, Sumy, Poltava oblasts) Central-Eastern (Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Zaporizhia oblasts) Eastern (Donetsk, Luhansk) Southern (Odessa, Mykolaiv, Kherson oblasts and the Crimea)

Do you feel proud: A4- when Ukraine’s national flag is solemnly being raised? 12345-

yes rather yes than no rather no than yes no difficult to say

A5- in belonging to Ukraine’s army? 12345-

yes rather yes than no rather no than yes no difficult to say

A6- on the whole, of the contemporary Ukrainian army? 12345-

yes rather yes than no rather no than yes no difficult to say

A7- of the history of the military formations of the Ukrainian people? 12345-

yes rather yes than no rather no than yes no difficult to say

Please tell us how you feel about the activities of the personalities listed below:

A8 - B. Khmelnitsky A9 - I. Mazepa A10 - Peter I A11 - A. Suvorov A12 - M. Kutuzov A13 - M. Hrushevsky A14 - S. Petliura A15 - S. Bandera A16 - A. Melnyk A17 - J. Stalin A18 - G. Zhukov A19 - L. Kravchuk A20 - K. Morozov

Positive

Negative

Difficult to say

Unknown to me

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

How do you evaluate the role in Ukraine’s history of the following military formations?

A21 – Army of Kievan Rus A22 – Ukrainian Zaporozhian Cossacks A23 – Russian Imperial Army A24 – Sichovi Striltsi A25 – OUN-UPA A26 – SS Galician Division A27 – Soviet (Red) Army

Positive

Negative

Difficult to say

Unknown to me

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1 1 1 1 1

2 2 2 2 2

3 3 3 3 3

4 4 4 4 4

A28 – What is your attitude towards Ukraine’s proclamation of independence? 12345-

approve rather approve than do not rather do not approve than approve do not approve difficult to answer

A29 - What’s your attitude towards the collapse of the Soviet Union? 12345-

approve rather approve than do not rather do not approve than approve do not approve difficult to answer

A30 - Do you believe there exists an external threat to Ukraine? 12345-

yes, there is a definite threat yes, there could be a threat I doubt very much that such a threat exists I believe there is no danger of such threat difficult to answer

A31 – If you think a threat exists, then who is it coming from? (write your answer) _______________________________________________________________

Would you please give us some personal information: B1 – What is your rank in the army: 1234-

conscript re-enlisted after completion of conscripted service officer senior officer

B2 - In what oblast of Ukraine are you serving in the army? (write your answer) _______________________________________________________________

B3 - Your age 1- 18-24 years old 4- 40-49 years old

2- 25-29years old 5- 50 years old and older

3- 30-39 years old

B4 – What is your nationality? (write your answer) _______________________________________________________________

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