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+UPDATED AUGUST 28, 2008+ ABANDONMENT, of employment To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor when manifested by some overt acts. Tomas Lao Construction vs. NLRC, 344 Phil. 268, 284 (1997). Abandoning one’s job means the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment and the burden of proof is on the employer to show a clear and deliberate intent on the part of the employee to discontinue employment. ([2000V1468] IMELDA B. DAMASCO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANILA GLASS SUPPLY and BONIFACIO K. SIA, respondents., G.R. No. 115755, 2000 December 04, 2nd Division) ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT The withdrawal or recantation of the complainant by the administrative charges does not necessarily result in the dismissal of the administrative case. We have repeatedly ruled that: withdrawal of a complaint or subsequent desistance by the complainant in an administrative case does not necessarily warrant its dismissal. Administrative actions cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the complainant who may, for reasons of his own, condone what may be detestable. Neither can the Court be bound by the unilateral act of the complainant in a matter relating to its disciplinary power. The Court does not dismiss administrative cases against members of the Bench merely on the basis of withdrawal of the charges. Desistance cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction to investigate and decide the complaint against the respondent. To be sure, public interest is at stake in the conduct and actuations of officials and employees of the judiciary. And the program and efforts of this Court in improving the delivery of justice to the people should not be frustrated and put to naught by private arrangements between the parties. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

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An administrative decision must first be appealed to administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. The power of judicial review may therefore be exercised only if an appeal is first made by the highest administrative body in the hierarchy of the executive branch of government. (VICTOR G. VALENCIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as Executive Secretary, HON. ERNESTO GARILAO, Secretary of Agrarian Reform, CRISOSTOMO M. CORPIN, Regional Director, DAR Region VII, SANTOS GARGAYA, JULIANO MAGDAYAO, CRESCENCIANO FRIAS, FEDERICO JARE, ROSENDO LOBRESCO, ERNESTO LOBRESCO, FELICIANO LOBRESCO, CATALINO MANTAC, VICTORIANO MONTE-FALCON, FRANCISCO OBANG, AMBROSIO SEMILLANO, ROGELIO TAMAYO and EDILBERTO LOBRESCO, respondents. 2003 April 29 2nd Division G.R. No. 122363) ADMINISTRATIVE RULES For it is axiomatic that administrative rules derive their validity from the statute that they are intended to implement. Any rule which is not consistent with statute itself is null and void. [GMCR Inc. vs. Bell Telecommunication Phils., Inc., 338 Phil 507, 525 (1997)] ([2000V1021] SGMC REALTY CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (OP), RIDGEVIEW REALTY CORPORATION, SM INVESTMENTS CORPORATION, MULTI-REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP., HENRY SY SR., HENRY SY JR., HANS T. SY, MARY UY TY AND VICTOR LIM, RESPONDENTS., G.R. NO. 126999, 2000 AUGUST 30, 2ND DIVISION) AGENT, the act of an 1. The act of the agent is the act of the principal itself. (JOSE Y. SONZA, petitioner, vs. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, respondent., G.R. No. 138051, 2004 Jun 10, 1st Division) 2. The rule is that if the act of the agent is one which requires authority in writing, those dealing with him are charged with notice of that fact. Powers of attorney are generally construed strictly and courts will not infer or presume broad powers from deeds which do not sufficiently include property or subject under which the agent is to deal. The general rule is that the power of attorney must be pursued within legal strictures, and the agent can neither go beyond it; nor beside it. The act done must be legally identical with that authorized to be done. In sum, then, the consent of the respondent to the assailed provisions in the deed of absolute sale was not obtained; hence, the assailed provisions are not binding on it.(WOODCHILD HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner, vs.ROXAS ELECTRIC AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., Respondent., G.R. No. 140667, 2004 Aug 12, 2nd Division) AGRICULTURAL TENANCY 2

1. Agricultural Tenancy is the “physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both.” (Section 3 of Republic Act No. 1199 or The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines (“RA 1199”) 2. There must be substantial evidence on the record adequate enough to prove all the elements of tenancy, to wit: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of the harvests. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. (EPITACIO SIALANA, Petitioner, versus MARY Y. AVILA (deceased) substituted by her heirs, JAMES AVILA, EDWARD AVILA, JEORGE AVILA and MILAGROS AVILA, Respondents. 2006 Jul 201st Division G.R. No. 143598) 3. A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove this allegation. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. As we ruled in Chico v. Court of Appeals: "Each of the elements hereinbefore mentioned is essential to create a de jure leasehold or tenancy relationship between the parties. This de jure relationship, in turn, is the terra firma for a security of tenure between the landlord and the tenant. The leasehold relationship is not brought about by a mere congruence of facts but, being a legal relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that relationship should be primordial." Thus, the intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important. The requisites of a tenancy relationship are as follows: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of the harvests. All these requisites are necessary to create tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy laws may be invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants. (AMANDO G. SUMAWANG, Petitioner, versus ENGR. ERIC D. DE GUZMAN, Respondent. 2004 Sept 8 2nd Division G.R. No. 150106) 3

ALIBI 1. The appellant also faults the trial court for failing to give weight to her defense of alibi. Appellant’s alibi could not prevail over the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution. Alibi as a defense is inherently weak and for it to serve as basis for an acquittal, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime. The appellant failed to meet these two requirements. Jaime Alarcon’s house where appellant claimed to be sleeping at the time of her arrest, was only 10 meters from the tricycle terminal where she was arrested by the officers. Thus, the trial court was correct in ruling that the alibi of appellant was not enough to acquit her of the charges. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, versus LITA AYANGAO y BATONG-OG, Appellant., G.R. No. 142356, 2004 April 14, 3rd Division) APPEAL 1. An appeal is a "resort to a superior (i.e. appellate) court to review the decision of an inferior (i.e. trial) court or administrative agency." As a statutory remedy to correct errors which might have been committed by the lower court, the object of an appeal is simply and solely the protection of the accused. The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and is not a natural right or part of the due process. Like any other right or privilege, it may be waived. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO F. PARADEZA, accused-appellant., G.R. No. 144590, 2003 February 7, 2nd Division) ARREST Is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. 1. Section 6 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, provides thus: SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information. 4

Pursuant to the aforequoted rule, the judge of the trial court is mandated to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence to determine whether probable cause exists and pursuant to its own findings, either dismiss the case immediately if no probable cause exists, or to issue the warrant of arrest in the absence of probable cause. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, versus DAVID S. ODILAO, JR. Respondent., G.R. No. 155451, 2004 April 14, 2nd Division) 2. The general rule is that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, thus: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant and warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. Searches and seizures are as a rule unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between persons and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants and warrants of arrest. Be that as it may, the requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute. There are certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to search of moving vehicles. Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN and ROSITA NUNGA y VALENCIA, accused. AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN, accused-appellant., G.R. No. 136860, 2003 January 20, 3rd Division) 3. Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto, thus: "Section 5. Arrest without Warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: 5

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN and ROSITA NUNGA y VALENCIA, accused. AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN, accused-appellant., G.R. No. 136860, 2003 January 20, 3rd Division) 4. In the present case, the informant arrived at the police station at 5:00 A.M. on August 13, 1999 and informed the officers that the appellant would be arriving at 6:00 A.M. (just an hour later) that day. The circumstances clearly called for an immediate response from the officers. In People vs. Valdez, this Court upheld the validity of the warrantless arrest and corresponding search of accused Valdez as the officer made the arrest on the strength of a similar on-the-spot tip. In the case at bar, though all other pertinent details were known by the officers except the date, they could not have applied for a search warrant since the validity of a warrant was only for 10 days. Considering that the officers did not know when the appellant was going to arrive, prudence made them act the way they did. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, versus LITA AYANGAO y BATONG-OG, Appellant., G.R. No. 142356, 2004 April 14, 3rd Division) 5. A search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence, pursuant to Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. Warrantless searches and seizures may be made without a warrant in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) search of a moving motor vehicle, (3) search in violation of custom laws, (4) seizure of the evidence in plain view, (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures, (6) stop and frisk and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. These instances, however do not dispense with the requisite of probable cause before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. In warrantless search cases, probable cause must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court held that: (1) the police officers are presumed to have regularly performed their duties, in the absence of proof of ill or improper motive on their part to falsely impute a serious crime against Sarap; and (2) the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses have more weight compared to Sarap's negative testimony. It also relied heavily on the testimonies of Chief of Police Guarino that in view of the urgency of the case, they proceeded immediately to the house of Conrado Ricaforte to pursue Sarap and Amar. It concluded that the warrantless arrest was lawful considering that Sarap had committed or was actually committing a crime when arrested. It 6

ruled that the search incident to the said arrest is sanctioned under the Rules and evidence obtained therefrom is admissible. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MELLY SARAP y ARCANGELES and ROGER AMAR y MATEO, accused. / MELLY SARAP y ARCANGELES, accused-appellant., G.R. No. 132165, 2003 March 26, 1st Division) ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance. It is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney on any previous occasion or that any retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for, neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had, for as long as the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession. (WILLIAM S. UY, Complainant, versus ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES, Respondent., A.C. No. 5280, 2004 March 30, 2nd Division) BILL OF ATTAINDER 1. Bill of attainder; that is, a “legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Under then Minister ERNESTO R. MACEDA; and Former Government Officials CATALINO MACARAIG, FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, ANGEL C. ALCALA, BEN MALAYANG, ROBERTO PAGDANGANAN, MARIANO Z. VALERA and ROMULO SAN JUAN, Petitioners, Versus ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PEDRO DEL CONCHA, and ALEJANDRO and RUFO DE GUZMAN, Respondents., G.R. No. 149927, 2004 March 30, 1st Division) 2. Law is a bill of attainder as it does not leave much room for judicial determination, the guilt of the accused having already been decided by the legislature. These matters subject of petitioner’s contention have long been settled in the landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez where this Court upheld the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa 22 (B.P. 22): The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. 7

The contention that B. P. 22 is a bill of attainder, one which inflicts punishment without trial and the essence of which is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt, fails. For under B. P. 22, every element of the crime is still to be proven before the trial court to warrant a conviction for violation thereof. (JOY LEE RECUERDO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents., G.R. No. 133036, 2003 January 22, 3rd Division)

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CHECK OFF In check-off, the employer, on agreement with the Union, or on prior authorization from employees, deducts union dues or agency fees from the latter’s wages and remits them directly to the union. [Holy Cross of Davao College, Inc. vs. Joaquin, 263 SCRA 358-359 (1996).] It assures continuous funding for the labor organization. As this Court has acknowledged, the system of check-off is primarily for the benefit of the union and only indirectly for the individual employees. The pertinent legal provisions on check-offs are found in Article 222 (b) and Article 241 (o) of the Labor Code. Article 222 (b) states: "No attorney’s fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any collective bargaining negotiations or conclusions of the collective agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of the contracting union: Provided, however, that attorney’s fees may be charged against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and void." Article 241 (o) provides: "Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special assessment, attorney’s fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees may be checked off from any amount due to an employee without an individual written authorization duly signed by the employee. The authorization should specifically state the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction." Article 241 has three (3) requisites for the validity of the special assessment for union’s incidental expenses, attorney’s fees and representation expenses. These are: 1) authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members at the general membership meeting called for the purpose; (2) secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting; and (3) individual written authorization for check off duly signed by the employees concerned. Clearly, attorney’s fees may not be deducted or checked off from any amount due to an employee without his written consent. ([2000V389] EVANGELINE J. GABRIEL, TERESITA C. LUALHATI, EVELYN SIA, RODOLFO EUGENIO, ISAGANI MAKISIG, and DEMETRIO SALAS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and SIMEON SARMIENTO, JESUS CARLOS MARTINEZ III, ALBERT NAPIAL, MARVIN ALMACIN, ROGELIO MATEO, GLENN SIAPNO, EMILIANO CUETO, SALOME ATIENZA, NORMA V. GO, JUDITH DUDANG, MONINA DIZON, EUSEBIO ROMERO, ISAGANI MORALES, ELISEO BUENAVENTURA, CLEMENTE AGCAMARAN, CARMELITA NOLASCO, JOVITA FERI, LULU ACOSTA, CAROL LAZARO, NIDA ARRIZA, ROMAN BERNARDO, DOMINGO B. MACALDO, EUGENE PIDLAOAN, MA. SOCORRO T. ANGOB, JOSEPHINE ALVAREZ, LOURDES FERRER, JACQUILINE BAQUIRAN, GRACIA R. ESCUADRO, KRISTINA HERNANDEZ, LOURDES IBEAS, MACARIO 9

GARCIA, BILLY TECSON, ALEX RECTO III, LEBRUDO, JOSE RICAFORTE, RODOLFO MORADA, TERESA AMADO, ROSITA TRINIDAD, JEANETTE ONG, VICTORINO LAS-AY, RANIEL DAYAO, OSCAR SANTOS, CRISTINA SALAVER, VICTORIA ARINO, A.H. SAJO, MICHAEL BIETE, RED RP, GLORIA JUAT, ETHELINDA CASILAN, FAMER DIPASUPIL, MA. HIDELISA POMER, MA. CHARLOTTE TAWATAO, GRACE REYES, ERNIE COLINA, ZENAIDA MENDOZA, PAULITA ADORABLE, BERNARDO MADUMBA, NESTOR NAVARRO, EASTER YAP, ALMA LIM, FELISA YU, TIMOTEO GANASTRA, REVELITA CARTAJENAS, ANGELITO CABUAL, ROBERTA TAN, DOMINADOR TAPO, GRACE LIM, GADIANE JEMIE, CHRISTHDY DAUD, BENEDICTO ACOSTA, JESUSA ACOSTA, MA. AVELINA ARYAP, EVELYN BENITEZ, ESTERITA CHU, EVANGELINE CHU, BETTY CINCO, RICARDO CONNEJO, MANULITO EVALO, FRANCIS LEONIDA, GREGORIO NOBLEZA, RODOLFO RIVERAL, ELSA SIA, CLARA SUGBO, EDGARDO TABAO, MANUEL VELOSO, MARLYN YU, ABSALON BUENA, WILFREDO PUERTO, FLORENTINA PINGOL, MARILOU DAR, FE MORALES, MALEN BELLO, LORENA TAMAYO, CESAR LIM, PAUL BALTAZAR, ALFREDO GAYAGAS, DUMAGUETE EMPLOYEES, CEBU EMPLOYEES, OZAMIZ EMPLOYEES, TACLOBAN EMPLOYEES AND ALL OTHER SOLIDBANK UNION MEMBERS, respondents., G.R. No. 115949, 2000 March 16, 2nd Division) COMELEC, powers and functions Today, the COMELEC enforces and administers all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda and recalls. Election contests involving regional, provincial and city elective officials are under its exclusive original jurisdiction while all contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials are under its appellate jurisdiction. Several safeguards have been put in place to protect the independence of the COMELEC from unwarranted encroachment by the other branches of government. While the President appoints the Commissioners with the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments, the Commissioners are not accountable to the President in the discharge of their functions. They have a fixed tenure and are removable only by impeachment. To ensure that not all Commissioners are appointed by the same President at any one time, a staggered system of appointment was devised. Thus, of the Commissioners first appointed, three shall hold office for seven years, three for five years, and the last three for three years. Reappointment and temporary designation or appointment is prohibited. In case of vacancy, the appointee shall only serve the unexpired term of the predecessor. The COMELEC is likewise granted the power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, and to appoint its own officials and employees in accordance with Civil Service laws. The COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial powers but it is not part of the judiciary. This Court has no general power of supervision over the Commission on Elections except those specifically granted by the Constitution. As such, the Rules of Court are not applicable to the Commission on Elections. In addition, the decisions of the COMELEC are reviewable only by petition for certiorari on grounds of grave abuse of discretion, viz:

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Conceived by the charter as the effective instrument to preserve the sanctity of popular suffrage, endowed with independence and all the needed concomitant powers, it is but proper that the Court should accord the greatest measure of presumption of regularity to its course of action and choice of means in performing its duties, to the end that it may achieve its designed place in the democratic fabric of our government. Ideally, its members should be free from all suspicions of partisan inclinations, but the fact that actually some of them have had stints in the arena of politics should not, unless the contrary is shown, serve as basis for denying to its actuations the respect and consideration that the Constitution contemplates should be accorded to it, in the same manner that the Supreme Court itself which from time to time may have members drawn from the political ranks or even from the military is at all times deemed insulated from every degree or form of external pressure and influence as well as improper internal motivations that could arise from such background or orientation. (ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, respondents., G.R. No. 157013, 2003 July 10, En Banc) COMMON SENSE CONSIDERATION (Labor Law) The ‘common-sense consideration’ stated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes for the Court in Espejo, that if a retiree is being credited with his years of service under his first retirement in computing his gratuity under his second retirement, it is but just that the retirement gratuity received by him under his first retirement should also be charged to his account, manifestly govern the case at bar. It is but in accordance with the rule consistently enunciated by the Court as in Anciano v. Otadoy, affirming Borromeo, that claims for double retirement or pension such as petitioner’s, ‘would run roughshod over the well-settled rule that in the absence of an express legal exception, pension and gratuity laws should be so construed as to preclude any person from receiving double pension.’ ([2000V1394] ANTONIO P. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, now known as METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, and THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents., G.R. No. 139792, 2000 November 22, En Banc)

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CONFESSION 1. In People v. Javar, this Court was clear in pronouncing that any statement obtained in violation of the Constitution, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. In People v. Gomez, citing People v. Rodrigueza, this Court held that Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution requires the assistance of counsel to a person under custody even when he waives the right to counsel. Under the Constitution and existing law as well as jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOEL JANSON and RICKY PINANTAO alias "OGCO", appellants., G.R. No. 125938, 2003 April 4, 2nd Division) CONSIGNATION That in case of refusal by the lessor to accept payment of the rental agreed upon, the lessee may either deposit, by way of consignation, the amount in court, or with the city or municipal treasurer, as the case may be, or in a bank in the name of and with notice to the lessor, within one month after the refusal of the lessor to accept payment. The lessee shall thereafter deposit the rental within ten days of every current month. Failure to deposit rentals for three months shall constitute a ground for ejectment. If an ejectment case is already pending, the court upon proper motion may order the lessee or any person or persons claiming under him to immediately vacate the leased premises without prejudice to the continuation of the ejectment proceedings. At any time, the lessor may, upon authority of the court, withdraw the rentals deposited. The lessor, upon authority of the court in case of consignation and upon joint affidavit by him and the lessee to be submitted to the city or municipal treasurer and to the bank where deposit was made, shall be allowed to withdraw the deposits. ([2001V1167] SPOUSES NICETAS DELOS SANTOS, TIMOTEO ANTOLIN, AURORA PEGOLLO, and BENJAMIN MARIANO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 12th DIVISION, and MAUNLAD HOMES, INC., respondents., G.R. No. 127465, 2001 October 25, 1st Division)

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CONTEMPT, indirect/direct As defined, indirect contempt is one committed out of or not in the presence of the court that tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice. On the other hand, direct contempt consists of or is characterized by "misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same" within the meaning of Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. ([2000V1323] COMMISSIONER RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE RODOLFO R. BONIFACIO, RTC, Branch 151, Pasig City, respondent., A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510, 2000 November 06, 1st Division) CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, the accused of "Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter could not afford one) 'should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter's relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.'" In People v. Sahagun,20 [274 SCRA 208, 216 (1997)] we stated that the constitutional requirement that a lawyer should be independent was not complied with when a lawyer who just happened to be following-up a case at the NBI was asked to counsel the accused: "[T]he counselling given by Atty. Dizon to Villareal was not sufficiently protective of Villareal's rights as an accused as contemplated by the Cosntitution. To start with, Atty. Dizon is not really known to Villareal. He was requested to act as counsel because he happened to be at the NBI following-up a client's case. Given that circumstance, it cannot be expected that Atty. Dizon would give an advice to Villareal that would offend the agent conducting the investigation. Thus, it appears that Atty. Dizon did no more than recite to Villareal his constitutional rights. He made no independent effort to determine whether Villareal's confessions were free and voluntary. x x x . He did not inquire from Villareal how he was treated in the last 24-hours. He did not seek any of Villareal's relatives or friends to find out if he has any defense which Villareal was not free to disclose due to his confinement. "Atty. Dizon's lack of vigilance as a counsel is likewise underscored by the fact that he himself testified that Villareal gave his confession under the impression that he was only a witness and not an accused in the case. This revelation should have jolted Atty. Dizon and should have driven him to exert extra efforts to find out whether Villareal was tricked in making his confession. Again, he did not take an extra effort." In People v. Januario,21 [267 SCRA 608, 612 (1997)] the main evidence relied upon for the conviction of appellants was their own extrajudicial confessions which admittedly were extracted and signed in the presence and with the assistance of a lawyer who was applying for work in the NBI. We held that 13

"(s)uch counsel cannot in any wise be considered "independent" because he cannot be expected to work against the interest of a police agency he was hoping to join, as a few months later he in fact was admitted into its work force. For this violation of their constitutional right to independent counsel, appellants deserve acquittal. After the exclusion of their tainted confessions, no sufficient and credible evidence remains in the Court's records to overturn another constitutional right: the right to be presumed innocent of any crime until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. "Perfunctorily informing a confessant of his constitutional rights, asking him if he wants to avail of the services of counsel and telling him that he could ask for counsel if he so desires or that one could be provided him at his request, are simply not in compliance with the constitutional mandate. In this case, appellant Canape was merely told of his constitutional rights and posthaste, asked whether he was willing to confess. His affirmative answer may not, by any means, be interpreted as waiver of his right to counsel of his own choice." We also find that Atty. Chavez notarized the sworn statement seriously compromised his independence. By doing so, he vouched for the regularity of the circumstances surrounding the taking of the sworn statement by the police. He cannot serve as counsel of the accused and the police at the same time. There was a serious conflict of interest on his part. ([1999V1094] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ORLANDO LABTAN y DAQUIHON (At Large), alias BEBOT, HENRY FELICIANO y LAGURA and JONELTO LABTAN (At Large), accused HENRY FELICIANO y LAGURA, accused-appellant., G.R. No. 127493, 1999 December 08, 1st Division) CONSTITUTION, supremacy of It is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to the highest law of the land which is the Constitution. No law can render nugatory the Constitution because the Constitution is more superior to a statute. If a law happens to infringe upon or violate the fundamental law, courts of justice may step in to nullify its effectiveness. It is the task of the Court to see to it that the law must conform to the Constitution.(BENEDICTO ERNESTO R. BITONIO, JR., Petitioner, versus COMMISSION ON AUDIT and CELSO D. GANGAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents., G.R. No. 147392, 2004 March 12, En Banc)

14

CO-OWNERSHIP, validity of a sell of specific portion Under the circumstances of this case, the ultimate issue that needs determination is whether or not as an heir of the Alejandrino property, Laurencia may validly sell specific portions thereof to a third party. Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. [Art. 484, Civil Code.] Each coowner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same. [Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76351, October 29, 1993, 227 SCRA 472, 480.] Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, [The Estate of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 590, 603 (1996)] the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right. Thus, the Civil Code provides: "ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership." With respect to properties shared in common by virtue of inheritance, alienation of a pro indiviso portion thereof is specifically governed by Article 1088 that provides: "ART. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor." In the instant case, Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her pro indiviso share in Lot No. 2798. However, because the property had not yet been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court, no particular portion of the property could be identified as yet and delineated as the object of the sale. Thus, interpreting Article 493 of the Civil Code providing that an alienation of a co-owned property "shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to (the seller) in the division upon the termination of the coownership," the Court said: "x x x (p)ursuant to this law, a co-owner has the right to alienate his pro-indiviso share in the co-owned property even without the consent of the other co-owners. Nevertheless, as a mere part owner, he cannot alienate the shares of the other co-owners. The prohibition is 15

premised on the elementary rule that `no one can give what he does not have’ (Nemo dat quod non habet). Thus, we held in Bailon-Casilao vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 738, 745), viz: `x x x since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property. `The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property of the co-owners who possessed and administered it.’"12 [Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 684, 690 (1995)] ([1998V596] MAURICIA ALEJANDRINO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, RTC-9, CEBU CITY, and LICERIO P. NIQUE, respondents., G.R. No. 114151, 1998 September 17, 3rd Division) CONSPIRACY 1. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is always predominantly mental in composition because it consists primarily of a meeting of minds and intent. Conspiracy must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself, that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, direct proof is not required. Conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy may be proved through the collective acts of the accused, before, during and after the commission of a felony, all the accused aiming at the same object, one performing one part and another performing another for the attainment of the same objective, their acts though apparently independent were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. Direct proof of a person in agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It is enough that at the time of the commission of a crime, all the malefactors had the same purpose and were united in their execution. Once established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the degree of participation of each of them for in contemplation of the law, the act of one is the act of all. Criminal conspiracy must always be founded on facts, not on mere inferences, conjectures and presumptions. Mere knowledge, acquiescence to or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one party to a conspiracy absent the intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the common objective and purpose. Moreover, one is not criminally liable for his act done outside the contemplation of the conspirators. Co-conspirators are criminally liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiring on how and what are the necessary and logic consequence of the intended crime. (THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARMANDO CABALLERO, RICARDO CABALLERO, MARCIANO CABALLERO, 16

JR., and ROBITO CABALLERO, accused. / ARMANDO CABALLERO, RICARDO CABALLERO, and MARCIANO CABALLERO, JR., appellants., G. R. No. 149028-30, 2003 April 2, En Banc) CONTRACT/S 1. It is a time-honored rule that a contract constitutes the law between the parties and they are, therefore, bound by its stipulations. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. (R & M GENERAL MERCHANDISE, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LA PERLA INDUSTRIES, INC., respondents., G.R. No. 144189, 2001 October 5, 2nd Division) 2. When Dra. Cruz and plaintiff left the bank both of them had fully performed their respective prestations. Once a contract is shown to have been consummated or fully performed by the parties thereto, its existence and binding effect can no longer be disputed. It is irrelevant and immaterial to dispute the due execution of a contract if both of them have in fact performed their obligations thereunder and their respective signatures and those of their witnesses appear upon the face of the document (Weldon Construction v. CA G.R. No. L-35721, Oct. 12, 1987)." ([1998V156] GREGORIO FULE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NINEVETCH CRUZ and JUAN BELARMINO, respondents., G.R. No. 112212, 1998 March 02, 3rd Division) CONTRACTS, elements of a valid The lower court further ruled that all the elements of a valid contract under Article 1458 of the Civil Code were present, namely: (a) consent or meeting of the minds; (b) determinate subject matter, and (c) price certain in money or its equivalent. The same elements, according to the lower court, were present despite the fact that the agreement between petitioner and Dr. Cruz was principally a barter contract. (GREGORIO FULE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NINEVETCH CRUZ and JUAN BELARMINO, respondents., G.R. No. 112212, 1998 March 02, 3rd Division)

17

CONTROL TEST The power to control refers to the existence of the power and not necessarily to the actual exercise thereof, nor is it essential for the employer to actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee. It is enough that the employer has the right to wield that power. As to the "control test", the following facts indubitably reveal that respondent company wielded control over the work performance of petitioners, in that: (1) they worked in the barber shop owned and operated by the respondents; (2) they were required to report daily and observe definite hours of work; (3) they were not free to accept other employment elsewhere but devoted their full time working in the New Look Barber Shop for all the fifteen (15) years they have worked until April 15, 1995; (4) that some have worked with respondents as early as in the 1960’s; (5) that petitioner Patricia Nas was instructed by the respondents to watch the other six (6) petitioners in their daily task. Certainly, respondent company was clothed with the power to dismiss any or all of them for just and valid cause. Petitioners were unarguably performing work necessary and desirable in the business of the respondent company. (OSIAS I. CORPORAL, SR., PEDRO TOLENTINO, MANUEL CAPARAS, ELPIDIO LACAP, SIMPLICIO PEDELOS, PATRICIA NAS, and TERESITA FLORES, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LAO ENTENG COMPANY, INC. and/or TRINIDAD LAO ONG, respondents., G.R. No. 129315, 2000 October 02, 2nd Division) CO-POSSESSION Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessions, the one longer in possession, if the dates of possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings (Art. 538, Civil Code) ([1991V870] IGNACIO WONG, petitioner, vs. HON. LUCAS D. CARPIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V and MANUEL MERCADO, respondents. Rodolfo B. Quiachon for petitioner. Jose M. Ilagan for private respondent., G.R. No. L-50264, 1991 October 21, 3rd Division) CRIMINAL INTENT 1. Neither can we appreciate evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance. Evident premeditation exists when it is shown that the execution of a criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent. The requisites of evident premeditation are : 18

(1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; (3) an sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. Without the extrajudicial confession narrating when Sayaboc was hired to kill Galam, the testimony that the former inquired about the latter while waiting in the Roof top from 3:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. of that fateful day does not prove the time when Sayaboc decided to kill Galam. Settled is the rule that when it is not shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before that plan was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENJAMIN SAYABOC y SEGUBA, PATRICIO ESCORPISO y VALDEZ, MARLON BUENVIAJE y PINEDA, and MIGUEL BUENVIAJE y FLORES, appellants, G.R. No. 147201, 2004 January 15, En Banc) 2. In a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) appellants were in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the appellants were freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.[14] We also note that the crime under consideration is malum prohibitum, hence, lack of criminal intent or good faith does not exempt appellants from criminal liability. Mere possession of a regulated drug without legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff - appellee, vs. TIU WON CHUA a.k.a. "Timothy Tiu" and QUI YALING y CHUA a.k.a. "Sun Tee Sy y Chua," accused - appellant., G.R. No. 149878, 2003 July 1, 3rd Division) DENIAL A denial, when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving testimony, which deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible witness on affirmative matters. On the other hand, a mental retardate may qualify as a competent witness and the testimony of the victim alone, if credible, is sufficient to support a conviction. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO BACALING, accused-appellant., G.R. Nos. 133994-95, 2003 March 14, 1st Division) DEPRIVED of reason The term "deprived of reason" has been construed to include those suffering from mental abnormality or deficiency; or some form of mental retardation; the feeble minded but coherent; and even those suffering from mental abnormality or deficiency of reason. (People v. Guerrero, 242 SCRA 606). (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. PEDRO BACALING, accused-appellant., G.R. Nos. 133994-95, 2003 March 14, 1st Division) DESIGNATION 19

Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of the employee , for it is the job description that determines the nature of employment.(PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, Undersecretary of Labor and Employment, HON. HENRY PABEL, Director of the Department of Labor and Employment Regional Office No. XI and/or the Representation Officer of the Industrial Relations Division who will act for and in his behalf, PCOP- BISLIG SUPERVISORY AND TECHNICAL STAFF EMPLOYEES UNION, ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION and FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS, respondents., G. R. No.101738, 2000 April 12, 2nd Division) DOCUMENTS, public Moreover, the trial court held that the extrajudicial settlements over both Lots 6409 and 769, having been prepared and acknowledged before a notary public, are public documents, vested with public interest, the sanctity of which deserves to be upheld unless overwhelmed by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence presented by the plaintiffs to support their charges of forgery was considered by the court insufficient to rebut the legal presumption of validity accorded to such documents. ([1999V884] HEIRS OF JOAQUIN TEVES: RICARDO TEVES, ARCADIA TEVES,TOMAS ZAMORA, FELICIA TEVES, HELEN TEVES, ALFREDO OSMEÑA, ROBERTO TEVES, JOAQUIN TEVES, III, PETER TEVES, MILDRED TEVES, WILSON MABILOG, LEONILO PATIGAYON, EDUARDO PATIGAYON, ALEXANDER PATIGAYON, ALDRIN PATIGAYON, NOEL PATIGAYON, VICTOR PATIGAYON, MA. TEVES PATERNO OCHOTORENA, EXEQUILA TEVES, EMILIO JO, EMILIANA TEVES, MILAGROS TEVES, EDSEL PINILI, VICENTE TEVES, EMILIANA ISO, ALBERTO TEVES, ERLINDA TEVES, DIOSDADO TEVES, VICTORIA TEVES AND VIVENCIO NARCISO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ASUNCION IT-IT NAMELY: ELISA IT-IT, SUSANA IT-IT, NORBERTO IT-IT, ISA-AC IT-IT, JR., JAIME IT-IT, FELICITAS IT-IT, TERESITA IT-IT, ANTONIO NODADO, CORAZON IT-IT, JIMMY LERO, DANILO IT-IT, EDITA GAMORA, PACITA VAILOCES, CRIS VAILOCES, CECILIA CIMAFRANCA and CECILIA FLOR CIMAFRANCA, respondents., G.R. No. 109963, 1999 October 13, 3rd Division)

20

EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP The following elements must be present for an employer-employee relationship to exist: (1) (2) (3) (4)

the selection and engagement of the workers; power of dismissal; the payment of wages by whatever means; and the power to control the worker’s conduct, with the latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration.

Records of the case show that the late Vicente Lao engaged the services of the petitioners to work as barbers and manicurists in the New Look Barber Shop, then a single proprietorship owned by him; that in January 1982, his children organized a corporation which they registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as Lao Enteng Company, Inc.; that upon its incorporation, it took over the assets, equipment, and properties of the New Look Barber Shop and continued the business; that the respondent company retained the services of all the petitioners and continuously paid their wages. Clearly, all three elements exist in petitioners’ and private respondent’s working arrangements.(OSIAS I. CORPORAL, SR., PEDRO TOLENTINO, MANUEL CAPARAS, ELPIDIO LACAP, SIMPLICIO PEDELOS, PATRICIA NAS, and TERESITA FLORES, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LAO ENTENG COMPANY, INC. and/or TRINIDAD LAO ONG, respondents., G.R. No. 129315, 2000 October 02, 2nd Division) EX POST FACTO LAW There are six recognized instances when a law is considered as such: 1. it criminalizes and punishes an action that was done before the passing of the law and that was innocent when it was done; 2. it aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when it was committed; 3. it changes the punishment and inflicts one that is greater than that imposed by the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; 4. it alters the legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon a less or different testimony than that required by the law at the time of the commission of the offense; 5. it assumes the regulation of civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes a penalty or a deprivation of a right as a consequence of something that was considered lawful when it was done; and 6. it deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he or she become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or an acquittal or the proclamation of an amnesty. It is settled that an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Under then Minister ERNESTO R. MACEDA; and Former Government Officials CATALINO MACARAIG, FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, ANGEL C. ALCALA, BEN MALAYANG, ROBERTO PAGDANGANAN, MARIANO Z. 21

VALERA and ROMULO SAN JUAN, Petitioners, Versus ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PEDRO DEL CONCHA, and ALEJANDRO and RUFO DE GUZMAN, Respondents., G.R. No. 149927, 2004 March 30, 1st Division) FREE PATENT, application Public policy demands that one who obtains title to a public land through fraud should not be allowed to benefit therefrom. Vicente Carabbacan had been in possession of the land even. before Irene Bullungan bought the possessory rights to the land. It was therefore a misrepresentation for her to state in her application for a free patent that she had been in possession of the lot in question when the fact is that Carabbacan had been there ahead of her. G.R. No. 104296. March 29, 1996] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF IRENE BULLUNGAN, represented by her husband DOMINGO PAGGAO and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ISABELA, respondents. FORUM SHOPPING 1. The Court finds no merit in the issue of forum shopping raised by private respondent. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. [First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 280, 306 (1996) cited in Fortich v. Corona, G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998.] Because the judgment in Civil Case No. CEB-7028 is already final and executory, the existence of res judicata is determinative of whether or not petitioner is guilty of forum shopping. (MAURICIA ALEJANDRINO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, RTC-9, CEBU CITY, and LICERIO P. NIQUE, respondents., G.R. No. 114151, 1998 September 17, 3rd Division) 2. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals should have taken into consideration the fact that the petitioners were sued jointly, or as "Mr. and Mrs." over a property in which they have a common interest. Such being the case, the signing of one of them in the certification substantially complies with the rule on certification of non-forum shopping. (MR. & MRS. RONNIE DAR, MR. & MRS. RANDY ANGELES, MR. & MRS. JOY CONSTANTINO and MR. & MRS. LIBERTY CRUZ, petitioners, vs. HON. ROSE MARIE ALONZO-LEGASTO, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila, Branch 41, Quezon City and NENITA CO BAUTISTA represented by VICTORIO A. BAUTISTA, respondents., G.R. No. 143016, 2000 August 30, 1st Division) 3. It is settled that its essence is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining favorable judgment. It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. 22

(ROBERTO P. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. DOLORES NATANAUAN, RAFAELA NATANAUAN, ROMULO NATANAUAN, JR., SPOUSES ALEJO & FILOMENA TOLENTINO, PERFECTO P. FERNANDEZ, BUCK ESTATE, INC., and ZOSIMO NERA, respondents., G.R. No. 135441, 2003 November 20, 2nd Division) 4. It is settled that the pendency of an action questioning the ownership of the property does not bar the filing or consideration of an ejectment suit nor the execution of the judgment therein. The reason for this rule is that an ejectment suit involves only the issue of material possession or possession de facto, and does not decide the question of ownership. Considering this difference in causes of action, it was wrong for respondent to rule that complainants were guilty of forum shopping in filing their complaints for unlawful detainer despite the pendency of Civil Case No.1314 in the RTC and that the outcome of the ejectment suits depends on the resolution of Civil Case No.1314. (HEIRS OF JUAN and NATIVIDAD GERMINANDA by: PROCESO GERMINANDA, Heir, complainants, vs. Judge RICARDO SALVANERA, MCTC-Mahayag-Dumingag-Josefina, Zamboanga del Sur, respondent., A.M. No. MTJ-00-1246, 2000 January 28, 2nd Division) 5. The lack of certification against forum shopping, on the other hand, is generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that the failure of petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.( FELIPE G. UY, Petitioner, vs. THE LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent., G.R. No. 136100, 2000 July 24, 1st Division) 6. We note that both petitioners did not comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping. The certifications in their respective petitions were executed by their lawyers, which is not correct.10 Rollo, G.R. No. 115755, p. 14: G.R. No. 116101, pp.33-34.10 The certification of non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner or a principal party and not the attorney. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioners could have warranted the outright dismissal of their actions.11 Condo Suite Club Travel Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 125671, January 28, 2000, p. 6.11 (IMELDA B. DAMASCO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANILA GLASS SUPPLY and BONIFACIO K. SIA, respondents., G.R. No. 115755, 2000 December 04, 2nd Division)

23

FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE 1. Considering that the search and seizure warrant in this case was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the items seized in petitioner’s house, being "fruits of the poisonous tree", are "inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." The exclusion of these unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, the complaints filed against petitioner for illegal possession of firearms and explosive based on illegally obtained evidence have no more leg to stand on. Pending resolution of said cases, however, the articles seized are to remain in custodia legis. Finally, the Court notes that among the items seized by the officers were "four pcs. of disposable lighter and unestimated numbers of cellophane used for packing of shabu." These items are not contraband per se, nor objects in connection with the offense of illegal possession of firearms for which the warrant was issued. Moreover, it is highly preposterous to assume that these items were used in connection with offenses involving illegal drugs. Even granting that they were, they would still be inadmissible against the petitioner for being products of an illegal search. Hence, the subject articles should be returned to petitioner. (BERNARD R. NALA, petitioner, vs. JUDGE JESUS M. BARROSO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, 10th Judicial Region, Malaybalay City, respondent., G.R. No. 153087, 2003 August 7, 1st Division) ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS 1. As to the charge of illegal possession of firearms, the lower court ruled that the search warrant did not cover the seized firearm, making it inadmissible against appellant. He was thus acquitted of the charge. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANTONIO C. ESTELLA, appellant., G.R. Nos. 138539-40, 2003 January 21, 3rd Division) 2. In Cudia v. Court of Appeals, et al., we also reiterated the Villa ruling. The accused in that case was apprehended in Mabalacat, Pampanga for illegal possession of firearms and was brought to Angeles City where the headquarters of the arresting officers was located. The City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information in the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. We invalidated the information filed by the City Prosecutor because he had no territorial jurisdiction, as the offense was committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga and his territorial jurisdiction was only in Angeles City. We held that an information, when required by law to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. Otherwise, the court does not acquire jurisdiction. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused and the subject matter thereof. The accused’s plea to an information may be a waiver of all formal objections to the said information but not when there is want of jurisdiction. Questions relating to lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. An infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, versus HON. ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN, In her capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 19, of the City of Naga and 24

SERAFIN SABALLEGUE, Respondents., G.R. No. 153176, 2004 March 29, 2nd Division) 3. Considering that the search and seizure warrant in this case was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the items seized in petitioner’s house, being "fruits of the poisonous tree", are "inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." The exclusion of these unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, the complaints filed against petitioner for illegal possession of firearms and explosive based on illegally obtained evidence have no more leg to stand on. Pending resolution of said cases, however, the articles seized are to remain in custodia legis. Finally, the Court notes that among the items seized by the officers were "four pcs. of disposable lighter and unestimated numbers of cellophane used for packing of shabu." These items are not contraband per se, nor objects in connection with the offense of illegal possession of firearms for which the warrant was issued. Moreover, it is highly preposterous to assume that these items were used in connection with offenses involving illegal drugs. Even granting that they were, they would still be inadmissible against the petitioner for being products of an illegal search. Hence, the subject articles should be returned to petitioner. (BERNARD R. NALA, petitioner, vs. JUDGE JESUS M. BARROSO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, 10th Judicial Region, Malaybalay City, respondent., G.R. No. 153087, 2003 August 7, 1st Division) ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract of services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-license or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, that any such nonlicensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. x x x x x x x x x. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DOMINGA CORRALES FORTUNA, appellant., G.R. NO. 148137, 2003 January 16, 1st Division)

INTENT 1. In this case, Bartolo Atuan, Jr., was killed when appellant and his co-accused robbed Florfina of her bag with its cash. Robbery accompanied by a killing, or homicide 25

on the occasion of a robbery, is robo con homicidio. Thus, the prosecution amply established the following elements of robbery with homicide: (a) the taking of personal property is perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against a person, (b) the property taken belongs to another, (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi, and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, in its generic sense, is committed. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. SATURNINO TUPPAL, accused-appellant., G.R. Nos. 137982-85, 2003 January 13, 2nd Division) JURISDICTION It is the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case. It is given by law and in the manner prescribed by law. JURISDICTION AS TO THE ASSESSED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY: 1. If the property does not exceed to P20,000.00 MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT 2. If the property does not exceed to P50,000.00 METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT 3. If exceed P50,000.00 REGIONAL TRIAL COURT LACHES 1. "It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights, nor does estoppel or laches validate an act that contravenes law or public policy, and that res judicata is to be disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality." The Court further held that "the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of the public properties registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe."(EDNA COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO C. TORRES, JOSE AMO, SERGIO L. MONTEALEGRE, VICENTE C. TORRES, JOSEPH L. NUÑEZ, GLORIA SERRANO, DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO T. TORRES, LUZ G. TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD T. TUTANA, JOSE C. TORRES, JR., IMELDA CAYLALUAD, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA M. LANCION, NORBERTO CAMILOTE, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIGUE, DANTE L. MONTEALEGRE, AIDA T. GADON, ARMANDO T. TORRES and FIDELITO ECO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru the Director of Lands, respondents, / BOCKASANJO ISF AWARDEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LITA MENDOZA, MORADO PREFIDIGNO, TERESITA CRUZ and CALOMA MOISES, respondents/intervernors., G.R. No. 107764, 2002 October 4, 1st Division) 26

2. True, a title issued on the basis of a free patent is as indefeasible as one judicially secured. However, this indefeasibility cannot be a bar to an investigation by the State as to how such title has been acquired, if the purpose of the investigation is to determine whether or not fraud has been committed in securing the title. One who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to public land should not be allowed to benefit from it. Elementary is the rule that prescription does not run against the State and its subdivisions.When the government is the real party in interest, and it is proceeding mainly to assert its own right to recover its own property, there can as a rule be no defense grounded on laches or prescription. Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the State in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State is not barred by prescription. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the Regional Executive Director, Region III, Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF AGUSTIN L. ANGELES, HEIRS OF CARMEN DE LEON Vda. DE ANGELES, LUZ GANCAYCO ALVAREZ and the REGISTER OF DEEDS of BALANGA, BATAAN, respondents., G.R. No. 141296, 2002 October 7, 3rd Division) 3. True, once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title issued, the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property. Further, the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible a year after the issuance of the latter. However, this indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. Well-settled is the doctrine that the registration of a patent under the Torrens System does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the registrant’s already existing one. Verily, registration under the Torrens System is not a mode of acquiring ownership. Therefore, under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the State -- even after the lapse of one year -- may still bring an action for the reversion to the public domain of land that has been fraudulently granted to private individuals. Further, this indefeasibility cannot be a bar to an investigation by the State as to how the title has been acquired, if the purpose of the investigation is to determine whether fraud has in fact been committed in securing the title. In the case before us, the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by the Alejagas, whose forebear obtained the title by means of fraud. Public policy demands that those who have done so should not be allowed to benefit from their misdeed.Thus, prescription and laches will not bar actions filed by the State to recover its own property acquired through fraud by private individuals. This is settled law. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA SR., represented by ROQUETA ALEJAGA, FELIPE ALEJAGA JR., MARIA DULLA ALEJAGA, FELIPE ALEJAGA III, ROQUETA ALEJAGA, JENNIFER ALEJAGA, EVERETTE CAPUNDAN, AND LYNETTE ALEJAGA; THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY, respondents., G.R. No. 146030, 2002 December 3, 3rd Division)

27

4. Laches is different from the statute of limitations. Prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, whereas laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on the same change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fixed time; laches is not." [G.R. No. L-28446. December 13, 1982.] FRANCISCA H. RAFOLS, FLORACION RAFOLS, AMPARO RAFOLS, CESAR CIMAFRANCIA, CRISOSTOMO RAFOLS and RICARDO RAFOLS, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. MARCELO A. BARBA, defendantappellee. LAWYER in the public office For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice. (ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA, ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR. ROGER PEREZ, DR. IMELDA DARAUG, DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA CORONACION, and JOSE RABALO, complainants, vs. ATTY. FELINA DASIG, respondent., A.C. No. 4984, 2003 April 1, En Banc) LEX PROSPICIT, NON RESPICIT Lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1961]). LOSS OF EARNING FORMULA Loss of earning capacity using the formula provided in People v. Garcia, et al. as follows: Age of Victim

=

46 years old

Life Expectancy =

2/3 (80 - age of victim at the time of his death)

=

22.67

Gross Annual Income = Living Expenses

= =

P48,000 50% of Gross Annual Income P24,000

Loss of Earning = Life Expectancy x (Gross Annual Capacity Income Living Expenses) 28

= =

22.67 x P24,000 P544,080

(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JESUS TORIO, appellant., G.R. No. 122109, 2003 June 25, 1st Division) MALA IN SE 1. The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts. ([2001V1239] [2/2] JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. [Part 2/2], G.R. No. 148560, 2001 November 19, En Banc) 2. The term mala prohibita refers generally to acts made criminal by special laws. There is a distinction between crimes which are mala in se, or wrongful from their nature and those that are mala prohibita, or wrong merely because prohibited by statute. (L.B. Reyes-Revised Penal Code, Book 1 2001 15th Revised Ed.) (STEVE TAN and MARCIANO TAN, petitioners, vs. FABIAN MENDEZ, JR., respondent., G.R. No. 138669, 2002 June 6, 2nd Division) MALA PROHIBITA 1. Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered the petitioner’s premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets. Conformably, the articles allegedly seized in the house of petitioner cannot be used as evidence against him because access therein was gained by the police officer using a void search and seizure warrant. It is as if they entered petitioner’s house without a warrant, making their entry therein illegal, and the items seized, inadmissible. Moreover, it does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A warrant is still necessary, because possession of any firearm becomes unlawful only if the required permit or license therefor is not first obtained. (BERNARD R. NALA, petitioner, vs. JUDGE JESUS M. BARROSO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, 10th Judicial Region, Malaybalay City, respondent., G.R. No. 153087, 2003 August 7, 1st Division) 29

MINORITY of a victim of tender age “This does not mean, however, that the presentation of the certificate of birth is at all times necessary to prove minority. The minority of a victim of tender age who may be below the age of 10 is quite manifest and the court can take judicial notice thereof. The crucial years pertain to the ages of 15 to 17 where minority may seem to be indubitable due to one’s physical appearance. In this situation, the prosecution has the burden of proving with certainty the fact that the victim was under 18 years of age when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty under the above cited provision. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, versus MARIO ODEN, Appellant., G.R. No. 155511-22, 2004 April 14, En Banc) NOTARIZED, not Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate reflected the intention of both Laurencia and petitioner Mauricia to physically divide the property. Both of them had acquired the shares of their brothers and therefore it was only the two of them that needed to settle the estate. The fact that the document was not notarized is no hindrance to its effectivity as regards the two of them. The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document. In this regard, Tolentino subscribes to that opinion when he states as follows: "x x x. We believe, however, that the public instrument is not essential to the validity of the partition. This is not one of those contracts in which form is of the essence. The public instrument is necessary only for the registration of the contract, but not for its validity. The validity of an oral contract among the heirs, terminating the co-ownership, has been recognized by the Supreme Court in a decision x x x (where) that tribunal said: `An agreement among the heirs that a certain lot should be sold and its proceeds paid to one of them is a valid oral contract, and the same has the force of law between the parties from and after the original assent thereto, and no one of them may withdraw or oppose its execution without the consent of all.’ ([1998V596] MAURICIA ALEJANDRINO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, RTC-9, CEBU CITY, and LICERIO P. NIQUE, respondents., G.R. No. 114151, 1998 September 17, 3rd Division) OWNERSHIP 1. Article 493 of the Civil Code states: Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership. 30

Consequently, the sale of the subject property made by Emilia in favor of Santos and Bernardo is limited to the portion which may be allotted to her upon the termination of her co-ownership over the subject property with her children. (BENJAMIN CORONEL AND EMILIA MEKING VDA. DE CORONEL, petitioners, vs. FLORENTINO CONSTANTINO, AUREA BUENSUCESO, AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents., G.R. No. 121069, 2003 February 7, 2nd Division) 2. The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.( REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, versus CARMENCITA M. ALCONABA; LUISITO B. MELENDEZ; CONCEPCION M. LAZARO; MAURICIO B. MELENDEZ, JR.; and MYRNA M. GALVEZ, represented by CONCEPCION M. LAZARO, Respondents., G.R. No. 155012, 2004 April 14, 1st Division) 3. ". . . Plaintiff's ownership over the Tanay property passed unto Dra. Cruz upon the constructive delivery thereof by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. D). On the other hand, the ownership of Dra. Cruz over the subject jewelries (sic) transferred to the plaintiff upon her actual personal delivery to him at the lobby of the Prudential Bank. It is expressly provided by law that the thing sold shall be understood as delivered, when it is placed in the control and possession of the vendee (Art. 1497, Civil Code; Kuenzle & Straff vs. Watson & Co. 13 Phil. 26). The ownership and/or title over the jewelries (sic) was transmitted immediately before 6:00 p.m. of October 24, 1984. Plaintiff signified his approval by nodding his head. Delivery or tradition, is one of the modes of acquiring ownership.([1998V156] GREGORIO FULE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NINEVETCH CRUZ and JUAN BELARMINO, respondents., G.R. No. 112212, 1998 March 02, 3rd Division) OWNERSHIP, resolving defense of Section 16, Rule 70 (Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer) of the Rules of Court, as amended, similarly provides: Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership.-When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. Thus, in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved 31

without deciding the issue of ownership, the inferior courts have the undoubted competence provisionally to resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession. (LAGRIMAS A. BOY, Petitioner, versus COURT OF APPEALS, ISAGANI P. RAMOS and ERLINDA GASINGAN RAMOS, Respondents., G.R. No. 125088, 2004 April 14, 1st Division) PARTITION 1. Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each a sole estate in specific property and giving to each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other. Not being co-owners of the disputed lot, petitioners cannot demand its partition. (ELEUTERIO, ANATALIA, JOSELITO, ROGELIO, EVANGELINE, NOEL, GUILLERMO, LORENZO, DOMINGO, AMADO, and VICTORIA, all surnamed LOPEZ, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and spouses MARCELINO and CRISTINA S. LOPEZ, FELISA LOPEZ and RAMON CORTEZ, ZOILO LOPEZ, LEONARDO LOPEZ and LEONILA LOPEZ and spouses ROGELIO M. AMURAO and NOAMI T. AMURAO, respondents., G.R. No. 127827, 2003 March 5, 3rd Division) PARTY, real in interest A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. (ELISEO FAJARDO, JR. and MARISSA FAJARDO, petitioners, vs. FREEDOM TO BUILD, INC., respondent., G.R. No. 134692, 2000 December 8, 3rd Division) PAYING, taxes over the land 1. The records also reveal that the subject property was declared for taxation purposes by the respondents only for the year 1994. They paid the taxes thereon only for the years 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1996, and 1997. Being of recent dates, we cannot trust the assertion of the respondents that they immediately took possession of the property in the concept of an owner after the death of their parents. While belated declaration of a property for taxation purposes does not necessarily negate the fact of possession, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are, nevertheless, good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession.(REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, versus CARMENCITA M. ALCONABA; LUISITO B. MELENDEZ; CONCEPCION M. LAZARO; MAURICIO B. MELENDEZ, JR.; and MYRNA M. GALVEZ, represented by CONCEPCION M. LAZARO, Respondents., G.R. No. 155012, 2004 April 14, 1st Division) 32

2. No evidence on record shows that Spouses Mauricio and Luz Melendez cultivated, had control over, or used the whole or even a greater portion of the tract of land for agricultural purposes. Moreover, only one tenant worked on the land, and there is no evidence as to how big was the portion occupied by the tenant. Moreover, there is no competent proof that the Melendez Spouses declared the land in their name for taxation purposes or paid its taxes. While tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute, at the least, proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes not only manifests one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property, but also announces an adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties with an intention to contribute needed revenues to the government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.( REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, versus CARMENCITA M. ALCONABA; LUISITO B. MELENDEZ; CONCEPCION M. LAZARO; MAURICIO B. MELENDEZ, JR.; and MYRNA M. GALVEZ, represented by CONCEPCION M. LAZARO, Respondents., G.R. No. 155012, 2004 April 14, 1st Division) PIERCING THE VEIL, Doctrine of 1. Petitioner argues nevertheless that jurisdiction over the subsidiary is justified by piercing the veil of corporate fiction. Piercing the veil of corporate fiction is warranted, however, only in cases when the separate legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, such that in the case of two corporations, the law will regard the corporations as merged into one. The rationale behind piercing a corporation’s identity is to remove the barrier between the corporation from the persons comprising it to thwart the fraudulent and illegal schemes of those who use the corporate personality as a shield for undertaking certain proscribed activities. In applying the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction, the following requisites must be established: (1) control, not merely majority or complete stock control; (2) such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest acts in contravention of plaintiff’s legal rights; and (3) the aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of. (MEL V. VELARDE, petitioner, vs. LOPEZ, INC., respondent., G.R. No. 153886, 2004 January 14, 3rd Division) 2. It is a fundamental principle in corporation law that a corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its stockholders and from other corporations to which it is connected. However, when the concept of separate legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons, or in case of two corporations, merge them into one. The separate juridical personality of a corporation may also be disregarded when such corporation is a mere alter ego or business conduit of another person. In the case at bar, it was shown that FISI was a mere adjunct of FTC. FISI, by virtue of a contract for security 33

services, provided FTC with security guards to safeguard its premises. However, records show that FISI and FTC have the same owners and business address, and FISI provided security services only to FTC and other companies belonging to the Lucio Tan group of companies. The purported sale of the shares of the former stockholders to a new set of stockholders who changed the name of the corporation to Magnum Integrated Services, Inc. appears to be part of a scheme to terminate the services of FISI's security guards posted at the premises of FTC and bust their newly-organized union which was then beginning to become active in demanding the company's compliance with Labor Standards laws. Under these circumstances, the Court cannot allow FTC to use its separate corporate personality to shield itself from liability for illegal acts committed against its employees. (SIMEON DE LEON, EFREN ABAD, JAIME ABAD, JESSIE ABAY-ABAY, ROLANDO ABIOLA, ALICIO ABISO, CELEDONIO ABSALON, JEREMIAS ADO, VICENTE ADO, VICENTE AGGABAO, EFRAIN AGUIRRE, ALEXANDER ALATA, ERNESTO ALCALDE, LORENZO ALCOY, ALMARIO ALICIO, CESAR AMADOR, JOSE AMANTE, ESTELITO AMBROSIO, VICENTE ANAPI, ARNEL ANCHETA, ROGELIO ANCHETA, WILFREDO ANONUEVO, DOMINGO ANTIGRO, MARGARITO ANTIGRO, ROGELIO ANZANO, ANTONIO APOSTOL, ORLANDO AQUINO, JUAN ARCALAS, BONIFACIO ARIOLA, EDGAR ARIOLA, BONIFACIO ARMASA, FERNANDO BACCAY, MARIO BACUD, RUPERTO BACUDAN, NILO BALAG, ARGEL BALTAZAR, DEMETRIO BARAYOGA, FELIX BARNEDO, FLORENTINO BARTE, SARRI BASIRUL, MARCELO BATANES, RECTO BAYONA, VICTORIO BERMUNDO, ISMAEL BERNAL, LERIO BERSABE, FIDEL BOSE, MARIANO BOTACION, DANILO BRAZIL, REYNALDO BRUNIO, MARIO BUENAVENTURA, ARSENIO BULATAO, FRANCISCO BULATAO, CARLOS CAJARA, ROSENDO CAMACHO, RUBEN CAMACHO, NESTOR CAPILOS, DOMINGO CASTRO, MAXIMIANO DE CASTO, EDINO CASTUERA, ZALDY CERDON, ANTONIO DERUJANO, VICTOR CIPRIANO, JUANITO CORPUZ, ALFREDO CRUZ, FERNANDO DELA CRUZ, MARIO CUSTOPAY, ROSAURO CUSTODIO, FRANKLIN CUSTODIO, ALFREDO DAPROZA, RENATO DAVAG, NOEL DEMINGOY, GENE DIESTRO, ESTEBAN DIONSON, RAMON DIZA, JEREMIAS DOROMAL, MANUEL EDATO, FERNANDO EDORA, CONRADO ENRIQUEZ, NICOMEDEZ ENRIQUEZ, ROLITO ESPIEL, LAURO ESPANOL, NONITO ESPLANA, ELPIDIO ESPANOL, DIOLITO ESTOPEREZ, ODILON EUSTE, HENRY FACTOR, VIRGILIO FAVORITO, ARISTOTLE FERNANDEZ, RODOFLO FORMALEJO, JUNE FULAY, RUIS FUTOL, JESUS GABA, RODRIGO GABAT, ROSALIA GABAT, CLEMENTE GASPAR, RODRIGO GAVIOLA, ELLEN GODELOSON, SALVADOR GUELA, EDUARDO GUZMAN, BALTAZAR DE GUZMAN, ZOSIMO DE GUZMAN, REYANLDO HAGUIRING, CARLOS GINDAP, BERNARDINO GIPIT, WILFREDO HERNANDEZ, IMMANUEL IBRING, PEPITO IMPERIO, MAGTANGGOL INSORIO, RODELYN JACUNTO, MARIO JARAPAN, MAXIMO JIMENEZ, ALEJANDRO JUDLOMAN, JUAN LAOAGAN, DANTE LARIOSA, ELINO LASAGA, JOSEPH LEGASPINA, ZOSIMO LEPALAM, BENJAMIN LIBAN, EFREN LIGUE, CLETO LINGA, ROMEO LLAGAS, LUCIO LLARENA, ALFREDO LOPEZ, FELIX LOPEZ, SANTOS LOPEZ, RUBEN LORENZO, NILO LUGANA, CANCIO MAATUBANG, ANTONIO MACASIO, ROBERTO MACATUNGGAL, VIRGILIO MACALINAO, RAMON MACOY, JOSE MAGALONA, ALEJO MANAGUELOD, DOMINGO MANALO, EMILIANO MANALO, SULPICIO MANTALABA, EDITO MANUEL, ROMULO MANUEL, FELINO MARANA, CARLITO MARGAJA, ROMARES MARIANO, CERMELO 34

MARTINEZ, MODESTO MASULIT, ALMA MATUSALEM, FLAVIANO MEDEL, DOLCIANO MEDINA, DOLOROSA MEDINA, NORLINDO MEJARITO, PEDRITO MENDOZA, GUARDITO MERANO, ALBERTO DE MESA, CHARLIE MINANO, JOSE MONTEROSO, ROSENDO MORALES, CESAR NARDA, DOMINADOR NAGAL, EDEMIO NARISMA, DINISIO NAVASCA, REGINO NEPICON, JR., JESSIE CRIS NILO, JERWYN ORARIO, EUGENIO ORBEGOZO, IRENEO ORGANISTA, CATALINO OJENDRAS, WILLIAM OLIVARES, JUANITO ORIO, WILLIAM ORTIZO, ROQUE PAL-PALLATOC, ROGELIO PAEL, LORENZO PAMINTUAN, VIRGILIO PANTALEON, ANTONIO PAPA, EMMANUEL PASCUAL, FRANCISCO PECUNDO, RUFINO PELICER, LEONARDO PEPITO, PABLITO PERALTA, EDILBERTO PEREZ, LOLITO PEREZ, PELAGIO PEREZ, JR., FERNANDO PINEDA, CARMEN PIO, ALEJANDRO QUIAMCO, VIRGILIO QUILALANG, JEREMEAS QUINES, ZENAIDA RAQUINE, DOMINGO RANOLA, SABINO RANULO, EDDIE RAZONABE, ALBERTO REBAULA, BENIGNO REGIS, PERFECTO REBOYO, VITALIANO REYES, ZOSIMO REYES, EDWIN ROBERTS, ROBERT ROJO, GODOFREDO ROLIO, ANATALIA ROSANTO, DOMINADOR ROSANTO, RAMON ROSANTO, SR., RODRIGO ROSANTO, JULIO RUBIO, DANTE RUZOL, VENUS RUZOL, ROMULO SABINO, CIPRIANO SACUILLES, SR., PRIMO SALAZAR, GASPAR SAMUYA, ANTONIO SANCHEZ, CLAUDIO SANCHEZ, YOLANDA SAN LUIS, ROBERTO SANTOS, BENITO SEGUDIENTE, EDGAR SIBAL, GREGORIO SIBAL, VALENTINO SIBAL, SONNY SINGH, ROMEO SOMERA, EDGAR TABAQUE, BENITO TACATA, MATILDE TACATA, ANDRESITO TALAM, ANTOLIN TALISIC, PABLO TAMAYO, JULIE TAMIEZA, ROGELIO TAYO, CELSO TE, ENRIQUE TRIPULCA, ARMANDO TUIBEO, NICANOR TUMAMAO, EDUARDO TUMBALE, RAMON TURIRIT, LONGENIO UMACAM, TOLENTINO UNDAUNDO, DIOLITO VALENCIA, ERNESTO VARGAS, BILLY VASQUEZ, TOMAS VELINA, MARCOS DE VERA, IRENEO VILELA, NICANDRO VILLAFRANCA, DANNY VILLANUEVA, LOLITA VITALICO, ALIPIO YGOT, AGOSTO YROMA, FELIX ZAMBALES, and GUILLERMO ZIPANGAN, petioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), and FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION and/or MAGNUM INTEGRATED SERVICES, INC. (formerly FORTUNE INTEGRATED SERVICES, INC.), respondents., G.R. No. 112661, 2001 May 30, 1st Division) PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE 1. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The 35

object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. (BERNARD R. NALA, petitioner, vs. JUDGE JESUS M. BARROSO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, 10th Judicial Region, Malaybalay City, respondent., G.R. No. 153087, 2003 August 7, 1st Division) POWER of our government, categories As aforediscussed, the Constitution divided the powers of our government into three categories, legislative, executive, and judicial. Although not "hermetically sealed" from one another, the powers of the three branches are functionally identifiable. In this respect, legislative power is generally exercised in the enactment of the law; executive power, in its execution; and judicial power, in its interpretation. In the absence of specific provision in the Constitution, it is fundamental under the principle of separation of powers that one branch cannot exercise or share the power of the other. In addition, our Constitution created other offices aside from the executive, the legislative and the judiciary and defined their powers and prerogatives.(ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, respondents., G.R. No. 157013, 2003 July 10, En Banc) PREJUDUCIAL QUESTION

A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION 1. It is elementary that "a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof." (JEJOMAR C. BINAY, for and in behalf of his minor daughter, JOANNA* MARIE BIANCA S. BINAY, Petitioner, versus THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, GENIVI V. FACTAO and VICENTE G. TIROL, * * Also spelled as Joanne in other parts of the rollo.

36

G.R. No. 170643 September 8, 2006) PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD 1. Basic is the rule that the cause of action is determined from the allegations of a complaint, not from its caption. Since the allegations in the herein Complaint constitute a suit for reconveyance, not an action to invalidate certificates of title grounded on fraud, the prescriptive period is ten years, not one year from the entry of the decree of registration. (Spouses HORACIO and FELISA BENITO, petitioners, vs. AGAPITA SAQUITANRUIZ, respondent., G.R. No. 149906, 2002 December 26, 3rd Division) 2. Elementary is the rule that prescription and laches will not bar actions filed by the State to recover its own property acquired through fraud by private individuals. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the Regional Executive Director, Region III, Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF AGUSTIN L. ANGELES, HEIRS OF CARMEN DE LEON Vda. DE ANGELES, LUZ GANCAYCO ALVAREZ and the REGISTER OF DEEDS of BALANGA, BATAAN, respondents., G.R. No. 141296, 2002 October 7, 3rd Division) 3. Section 410(c) of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991), which state: "Section 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement. xxxxxxxxx (c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses. While the dispute is under mediation, conciliation or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and causes of action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the Punong Barangay. The prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary: Provided, however, That such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the punong barangay." (ABRAHAM L. MENDOVA, complainant, vs. CRISANTO B. AFABLE, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Julian-Sulat, Eastern Samar, respondent., A.M. NO. MTJ-02-1402, 2002 December 4, 3rd Division) 4. Article 1146 of the New Civil Code provides: “Art. 1146.

The following actions must be instituted within four years:

(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff; (2) Upon a quasi-delict.” Our ruling in Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc.[6] is pertinent, thus:

37

“One’s employment or profession is a ‘property right’ and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. Clearly then, when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of one’s dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an action predicated ‘upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff,’ as contemplated under Article 1146 of the New Civil Code, which must be brought within 4 years.”(TEXON MANUFACTURING AND BETTY CHUA, Petitioners, versus GRACE MILLENA AND MARILYN MILLENA, Respondents., G.R. No. 141380, 2004 April 14, 3rd Division) 5. Their unexplained inaction for more than 11 years rendered their demand for reconveyance stale. Vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jura subverniunt. The law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights. This legal precept finds perfect application in the case at bar. Accordingly, we find that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in disregarding the ten-year prescriptive period for the reconveyance of registered real property and in giving due course to said action despite the lapse of more than 11 years from the issuance of title thereto, which was clearly barred by prescription. (HEIRS OF POMPOSA SALUDARES represented by ISABEL DATOR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE DATOR and CARMEN CALIMUTAN, respondents., G.R. No. 128254, 2004 January 16, 3rd Division) 6. The one-year prescriptive period, however, does not apply when the person seeking annulment of title or reconveyance is in possession of the lot. This is because the action partakes of a suit to quiet title which is imprescriptible. In David v. Malay, we held that a person in actual possession of a piece of land under claim of ownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, and his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title. In the case at bar, inasmuch as respondents are in possession of the disputed portions of Lot 2344, their action to annul Original Certificate of Title No. P-10878, being in the nature of an action to quiet title, is therefore not barred by prescription. Section 48 of P.D. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and can not be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding. An action is an attack on a title when the object of the action is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment or proceeding pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. (heirs of simplicio santiago, represented by ANGELITA S. CASTRO, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF MARIANO E. SANTIAGO, respondents., G.R. No. 151440, 2003 June 17, 1st Division)

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7. CIVIL LAW; PRESCRIPTION; ACTIONS FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS. — Under Articles 1144 and 1155 of the Civil Code, actions for specific performance of a written contract of sale prescribe in ten years. Hence, as to appellants' allegation that the appellee's claim is barred by prescription, the ruling of the trial court that only seven years and six months of the ten-year prescriptive period had elapsed and that the action had not yet prescribed, is in accordance with law. 8. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; PRESCRIPTION; 10-YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD TO BE RECKONED FROM THE DATE THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUED, NOT FROM THE DATE OF THE WRITTEN INSTRUMENT. — Prescription of actions run with the mere lapse of time (Art. 1139, Civil Code). But it is elementary that the computation of the period of prescription of any cause of action, which is the same as saying prescription of the action, should start from the date the cause of action accrues or from the day the right of the plaintiff is violated. In the language of Article 1144 of the Civil Code "the action must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (I) upon a "written contract.'' [G.R. No. L-55315. September 21, 1982.]WILLIAM COLE and HENRY COLE, petitioners, vs. POTENCIANA CASUGA VDA. DE GREGORIO, JOSEFINA G. HUFANO assisted by her husband, ALFREDO HUFANO and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. 9. Prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]). Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Futhermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). 10. Accordingly, prescription, although not invoked in the trial, may, as in this case, be invoked on appeal.[8] Hence, the failure to raise this defense in the motion to quash the information does not give rise to the waiver of the petitioner-accused to raise the same anytime thereafter including during appeal. Nonetheless, we hold that the crime charged has not prescribed. The petitioner is correct in stating that whether or not the offense charged has already prescribed when the information was filed would depend on the penalty imposable therefor, which in this case is "prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000.00 pesos." Under the Revised Penal Code, said penalty is a correctional penalty in the same way that the fine imposed is categorized as correctional. Both the penalty and fine being correctional, the offense shall prescribe in ten years. The issue that the petitioner has missed, however, is the reckoning point of the prescriptive period. The petitioner is of the impression that the ten-year prescriptive period necessarily started at the time the crime was committed. This is inaccurate. Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription shall "commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, x x x." In People v. 39

Reyes, this Court has declared that registration in public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains. (ANICETO RECEBIDO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent., G.R. No. 141931, 2000 December 4, 1st Division)

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PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY 1. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to prove the regularity of all proceedings leading to the sale. He cannot rely on the presumption of regularity accorded to ordinary administrative proceedings. The presumption of regularity does not apply to administrative proceedings resulting in the deprivation of a citizen or a taxpayer of his property. (LEON REQUIRON, petitioner, vs. PATRICIA, ERNESTO AND ROSALINA, all surnamed SINABAN; CONRADO, GERTRUDES, ELARIA, FEDELINA, FLORDELIZA and EMETERIO, all surnamed JAVELLO; ALFREDO, MIGUEL, OFEMIA, AMBROCIO, NATIVIDAD and CONCHITA, all surnamed NICOLAS, plaintiffs-respondents. / LEONCIA JAVELLO VDA. DE ASUELO, CECILIA, TEODOLFO, VILMA, JIMMY and TERESITA, all surnamed ASUELO, defendants-respondents., G.R. No. 138280, 2003 March 10, 3rd Division) 2. We are not unaware of the observation that in drug-related cases, the defense of frame-up coupled with "huli-dap" operation is often raised. But for his defense to prosper, the evidence in that regard must be clear and convincing. Absent proof of any intent on the part of the police officers to falsely impute commission of a crime against appellants, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the principle that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect, deserve to prevail over the bare denials and self-serving claims of appellants that they had been framed up. ([2001V887] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO CHUA Y PANGAN and YEE MIU SZE DICK @ "DICK," accusedappellants., G.R. No. 133789, 2001 August 23, En Banc) 3. We turn to the third issue raised by petitioners that the auction sale by Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo of the motor vehicle with plate no. SBH-165 was tainted with serious irregularities. We need not emphasize that the sheriff enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of the functions of his office. This presumption prevails in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary and cannot be overcome by bare and self-serving allegations. The petitioners failed to convince us that the auction sale conducted by the sheriff indeed suffered from fatal flaws. No evidence was adduced to prove that the sheriff had been remiss in the performance of his duties during the public auction sale. Indeed it would be injudicious for us to assume, as petitioners want us to do, that the sheriff failed to follow the established procedures governing public auctions. (CITY OF CALOOCAN and NORMA M. ABRACIA, petitioners, vs. HON. MAURO T. ALLARDE, Presiding Judge of Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan City, ALBERTO A. CASTILLO, Deputy Sheriff of Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan City, and DELFINA HERNANDEZ SANTIAGO and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB), respondents., G.R. No. 107271, 2003 September 10, 3rd Division) PROCEDURAL RULES At all events, this Court has repeatedly exhorted that procedural rules cannot be used to defeat the ends of justice, and courts can aptly look at substance rather than form towards that end. (ELISEO FAJARDO, JR. and MARISSA FAJARDO, petitioners, vs. FREEDOM TO BUILD, INC., respondent., G.R. No. 134692, 2000 December 8, 3rd Division) 41

PROMULGATION OF JUDGEMENT 1. Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[7] clearly provides that: SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgments. – x x x If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. underscoring supplied) There is no question that petitioner escaped after her arraignment. Subsequently, the trial was ordered to continue but after the accused failed to appear, the RTC terminated the trial and, thereafter, promulgated the Joint Judgment of conviction. During that time petitioner was at large. She remains at large even while her counsel continues to file various pleadings on her behalf before the RTC, the Court of Appeals and this Court. Under the Rules of Court, petitioner is barred from availing of the remedies allowed by the rules against the judgment of the RTC, one of which is the right to file an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The reason for this rule is because once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. (FLORITA TEOPE, Petitioner, versus THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents., G.R. No. 149687, 2004 April 14, 1st Division) RAPE 1. Appellant’s bare denial that he did not rape complainant is a negative and selfserving assertion which merits no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. Here, appellant’s denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of complainant and the other prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-motive to fabricate the charge of rape against appellant. It would have been contrary to human experience for complainant to concoct a sordid tale of rape, exposing herself to the humiliation of a public trial on such a sensitive issue as her chastity, and in such a small community where the residents knew each other. The Court need not belabor the fact that the offended party in a rape case is a victim many times over in a culture that puts a premium on purity or virginity. Rape stigmatizes the 42

victim more than the perpetrator. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, versus ALVIN CAPARAS, Appellant., G.R. No. 134633, 2004 April 14, 3rd Division) 2. We have steadfastly adhered to the rule that, when a woman testifies that she has been raped and her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. As already mentioned, complainant’s testimony was forthright and without fabrication, hence, credible and convincing. Moreover, direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt since circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can supplant its absence. All the requisites to establish guilt by circumstantial evidence are present in this case, namely: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved and, (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the following unbroken chain of events points to no other conclusion than that appellant indeed raped complainant: 1. on the night of the incident, appellant had a drinking spree in his house with his co-workers, including complainant’s husband; 2. after almost three hours of drinking, the group dispersed except complainant’s husband who was too drunk to go home; 3. appellant told his live-in partner that he was going to the outdoor toilet to answer the call of nature; 4. instead of going back home right away, he went to complainant’s house on the pretext of asking her to fetch her drunk husband from his house; 5. on their way to his house, appellant forced complainant down on the grass, muttering “pagbigyan mo ako” and “hwag kang sisigaw at papatayin kita” while choking her; 6. complainant struggled to free herself and repeatedly hit appellant with her umbrella and flashlight; 7. appellant strangled and hit complainant twice on the stomach, rendering her unconscious; 8. complainant woke up half-naked, feeling weak and dizzy, with bruises all over her body;

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9. with all the strength she could muster, she called out for help and crawled towards a nearby house in her ravaged state; 10. neighbors came to her rescue, brought her inside Dominga Vergara’s house and clothed her; 11. when asked twice what happened to her, she categorically and without hesitation answered that appellant raped her; 12. that very same night, she was brought to the municipal hall by her father and husband where she executed an affidavit-complaint charging appellant with rape; 13. when she urinated at least four times that night, she felt pain in her vagina; 14. the next day, she willingly submitted herself to a medical examination at the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City where she was found to be in a non-virgin state but negative for spermatozoa. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, versus ALVIN CAPARAS, Appellant., G.R. No. 134633, 2004 April 14, 3rd Division) 3. The unflinching testimony of the child victim notwithstanding, appellant would insist that her statement that "he (appellant) put his penis into my vagina" was inadequate to warrant conviction for the crime of rape. The trial court correctly brushed aside this argument. Granting that there was no complete penetration of the vagina, even just the briefest contact of the pudendum by the phallus, however, would be enough to consummate the crime of rape. In People vs. Balgos, the six-year old victim testified that the penis of the appellant did not penetrate her vagina but only touched its "hole." The Court considered that testimony as being sufficient and a "tell-tale sign" of the victim's "honesty and candor in relating her unsavory experience." Considering her age, Juliene's failure to give the gory details on the sexual debasement would be understandable and typical of an innocent child whose virtue had unexpectedly been violated and her chastity abused. Ample margin of inaccuracies should be accorded to a child witness who obviously had been gripped with tension on the witness stand. Most significantly, no plausible reason was given by the defense why Juliene would fabricate the charges. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SATURNINO ILUIS y JANDOC, accused-appellant., G.R. No. 145995, 2003 March 20, En Banc) 4. Under the Law on Rape at the time of the commission of the offenses, the following elements must be present to warrant conviction: (a) The offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; (b) The act was accomplished under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation, or (2) When the woman was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (3) When the woman was under twelve years of age or was demented. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that certain guidelines must be observed in deciding rape cases: (a) Accusing a man of rape is easy, but disproving the accusation is difficult even if the accused be innocent; (b) Since rape usually involves only two (2) persons, the 44

testimony of the complainant must be examined with extreme caution; and, (c) The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit and should not draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CIRILO MACABATA, appellant., G.R. Nos. 150493-95, 2003 October 23, En Banc) REGALIAN DOCTRINE "Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State (Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 340). Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration. The applicant must show that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. This petitioners failed to do. ([2000V78] JAMES R. BRACEWELL, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents., G.R. No. 107427, 2000 January 25, 1st Division) RES JUDICATA 1. In order to determine the identity of the causes of action in Civil Case Nos. 15298 and 15937, and consequently, the application of the doctrine of res judicata, it is essential to consider the identity of facts essential to their maintenance, or whether the same evidence would sustain both causes of action. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same and covered by the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the two actions rest upon different states of fact, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the maintenance of the other. (RUFINA C. CAYANA, JOSEFINA C. RABINA, MERCEDES C. DE GUZMAN, and SUSANA C. SAMBALE, Petitioners, versus COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. PASTOR & ROSITA CAYABYAB, SPS. MARCELIANO & ROSALIA CAYABYAB, SPS. RAFAEL & ROSEMARIE CAYABYAB and INSURANCE CORP. OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents., G.R. No. 125607, 2004 March 18, 2nd Division)

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2. Because the judgment in Civil Case No. CEB-7028 is already final and executory, the existence of res judicata is determinative of whether or not petitioner is guilty of forum shopping. For the principle of res judicata to apply, the following must be present: (1) a decision on the merits; (2) by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the decision is final; and (4) the two actions involve identical parties, subject matter and causes of action.18 [Bernardo v. NLRC, 325 Phil. 371, 384-385 (1996)] The fourth element is not present in this case. The parties are not identical because petitioner was not impleaded in Civil Case No. CEB-7028. While the subject matter may be the same property of the Alejandrino spouses, the causes of action are different. Civil Case No. CEB-7028 is an action for quieting of title and damages while Civil Case No. CEB-11673 is for redemption and recovery of properties. ([1998V596] MAURICIA ALEJANDRINO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, RTC-9, CEBU CITY, and LICERIO P. NIQUE, respondents., G.R. No. 114151, 1998 September 17, 3rd Division) RETRENCHMENT 1. Not every loss incurred or expected to be incurred by employers can justify retrenchment. They must prove, among others, that the losses are substantial and that the retrenchment is reasonably necessary to avert those losses. The Court has laid down the following standards that a company must meet to justify retrenchment and to guard against abuse: “x x x Firstly, the losses expected should be substantial and not merely de minimis in extent. If the loss purportedly sought to be forestalled by retrenchment is clearly shown to be insubstantial and inconsequential in character, the bonafide nature of the retrenchment would appear to be seriously in question. Secondly, the substantial loss apprehended must be reasonably imminent, as such imminence can be perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer. There should, in other words, be a certain degree of urgency for the retrenchment, which is after all a drastic recourse with serious consequences for the livelihood of the employees retired or otherwise laid-off. Because of the consequential nature of retrenchment, it must, thirdly, be reasonably necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses. The employer should have taken other measures prior or parallel to retrenchment to forestall losses, i.e., cut other costs other than labor costs. An employer who, for instance, lays off substantial numbers of workers while continuing to dispense fat executive bonuses and perquisites or so-called ‘golden parachutes,’ can scarcely claim to be retrenching in good faith to avoid losses. To impart operational meaning to the constitutional policy of providing ‘full protection’ to labor, the employer’s prerogative to bring down labor costs by retrenching must be exercised essentially as a measure of last resort, after less drastic means – e.g., reduction of both management and rank-and-file bonuses and salaries, going on reduced time, improving manufacturing efficiencies, trimming of marketing and advertising costs, etc. – have been tried and found wanting. “Lastly, but certainly not the least important, alleged losses if already realized, and the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled, must be proved by sufficient and convincing evidence. The reason for requiring this quantum of proof is readily apparent: 46

any less exacting standard of proof would render too easy the abuse of this ground for termination of services of employees. x x x.” Retrenchment is only “a measure of last resort when other less drastic means have been tried and found to be inadequate.” (EMCO PLYWOOD CORPORATION and JIMMY LIM, Petitioners, versus PERFERIO ABELGAS, ARTURO ABELLANA, FLORENCIO ABEQUIBEL, FELIZARDO AGUELO, NECERATO ALCALA, PEDRO ALIVIO JR., RODOLFO ALDAYA, ABELARDO AMANTE, NELSON ANGAC, ALEJO ANTOLIJAO, JOHN ALEX ARABEJO, REYNALDO ARBOLONIO, RODRIGO ARSILUM, RONALDO BABAYLAN, LEOPOLDO BAGA, AGRIPINO BARON, FELIPE BAHIAN, JOEL BADILLA, NARCISO BANTILLAN, FELIPE BANDIBAS, ERNESTO BEDRA, ROGELIO BONGATO, ADOLFO BUCAL, DOMINADOR BUSTILLO, PLUTARCO CABREROS, FELIPE CAMBARIHAN, PABLO CASANIA, PERFECTO CASTANES, FERDINAND CASTILLO, ISIDRO CERRO, MARCEDINO CELOCIA, LEODEGARIO CLARO, ALFREDO CLAVANO, EDILBRETO CUABO, EDILBERTO CURILAN, ANGELA DATIG, EDDIE DE LA CRUZ, DOMINO DELA CRUZ, SEGUNDO DELIGERO, RAYMUNDO DESAMPARADO, GAUDISIO DEVEYRA, HENRY ENERIO, ANTONIO ENCISO, ANSELMO FELIAS JR., JULIAN GANZAN, ALLAN HONCULADA, BIENVENIDO IBALANG, FREDERICK JANOPOL, SAMUEL JUMAMOY, ISABELO LOREN, PROCORIO LOLOR, RESTITUTO LOMOCSO, PEDRO LOZADA, PEDRO LOZAGA, PASTOR MAGARO, ALLAN MANAGA, SIMPLICIO MANDAS, SATURNINO MANISAN, DIOSDADO MATA, EMMANUEL MATUTOD, MAXIMO MEDALLE, MARCELINO MINOZA, NORBERTO MORDEN, ARNOLD MORDEN, WILLIAM MORADA, RAYMUNDO MORAGAS, RODRIGO MOSQUIDA, BENITO NEMENO JR., RICO OGCANG, EMELIANO ONDAP, FRANCISCO PANDAWATAN, ALFREDO PAIGAN, VENANCIO PAJO, ELY QUINONES, ALEJANDRO QUIPET, BENIGNO REPOLIDO, PABLO SUMIDO, JOSE SUMALINOG, SAMUEL TABLA, OSCAR TABANAO, MARIO TELIN, MANOLITO TIMTIM, FELIX TINDUGAN, DANILO VELUESTO, ALEJANDRO VILVESTRE, TEOFILO ZAPANTA, RODULFO ALCALA, PERCY ALIPIN, ANGELO AMADA, PAQUITO ANCAJAS, EDGARD ARBISO, PERFECTO ARABACA, JUDITH BALMORIA, JOHANNES BONGATO, NARCISO BULLECER JR., BERNADITA BURDEOS, WENCESLAO BUSA, RODRIGO CABAL, DONALD CADILINA, JOSE CAINGHOG, RODOLFO CATUBIG, GADIOSO CASTRODES, VIRGINIA CERRO, FORTUNATO CELETONA, JUAN CELLO, MARCIANO CORTEZ, ROLANDO CUMBA, ALMAR DAPAR, MARISA DELA CRUZ, SIMEON DELIGERO, DIOSDADO DOMINISE, FLORENTINO DUNCANO, CLAUDIO DUMO, MARIDEL EFREN, ROMUALDO ESTRETO, JAIME FLORES, ESMERALDO GALOPE, PROCESSO HERNANDO, ALFREDO JAVIER, CRISPINO JUGARAP, DANIEL LABRICA, ERNESTO LABADAN, AURELIO LINOGAO, BENALDO LOPEZ, AMADOR LUMONGSOD, FRESCO LUNOY, FLORENCIO MAGLASANG, EUTIQUEO MAJAIT, ALBINO MANLA, FELIPE MANTILLA, CASIANO MELICOR, ANECITA MENDOZA, NEMERIANO NACA, ZACARIAS NALAM, SIXTO NAPAL JR., ALMAQUIO OBEDENCIO, GODOFREDO OLAIZ, VIRGILIA OSORIO, ELEUTRIO PAGADOR, ARDEN PASILANG, DIONESIO PASILANG, ADELAIDO PAQUIPOT, FERNANDO PATINDOL, VIRGILIO PENDICA, FRANKLIN PILOTON, GIL PILOTON, CHARLITA PLAZA, EUFRACIA PLAZA, TORIBEO PUSA, FRANCISCO RAMIRA, BELEN ROJAS, ALFONSO SABANDAL, CARMEN SABELLANO, ROGELIO SIMPRON, CENIA 47

SUMILE, ESPEREDION TABIQUE, ARECIO TAGHOY, SILVANA TAPALES, JEMCIE TIMTIM, ELENO TORILLO, THOMAS TERRECAMPO, FE VALENZUELA, FLORENCIO ABEQUIBEL, EFREN LUMINARIO, JULITO ONDAP, Respondents., G.R. No. 148532, 2004 April 14, 1st Division) SELF-DEFENSE, distinguished to accident Accident and self-defense are two incompatible defenses. Accident presupposes lack of intention, while self-defense assumes voluntariness, but induced only by necessity. (ADONIS ARADILLOS and ALBINO GALABO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, respondents., G.R. No. 135619, 2004 January 15, 2nd Division) STRENGTH OF HIS OWN EVIDENCE

ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probatio nulla sit. If he claims a right granted by law, he

must prove it by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent.LEONARDO ACABAL and RAMON NICOLAS, Petitioners, versus VILLANER ACABAL, EDUARDO ACABAL, SOLOMON ACABAL, GRACE ACABAL, MELBA ACABAL, EVELYN ACABAL, ARMIN ACABAL, RAMIL ACABAL, and BYRON ACABAL, Respondents., G. R. No. 148376, 2005 Mar 31, 3rd Division) SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS In determining whether a rule of procedure affects substantive rights, the test is laid down in Fabian vs. Desierto, which provides that: [I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. (LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ARLENE DE LEON and BERNARDO DE LEON, respondents. 2003 March 20 En Banc G.R. No. 143275) SURNAME IS FIXED BY LAW, use of For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as 48

the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name. The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA,HONORATO B. CATINDIG, Petitioner,, G.R. No. 148311, 2005 Mar 31, 3rd Division) TAX DECLARATION While tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute, at the least, proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes not only manifests one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property, but also announces an adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties with an intention to contribute needed revenues to the government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, versus CARMENCITA M. ALCONABA; LUISITO B. MELENDEZ; CONCEPCION M. LAZARO; MAURICIO B. MELENDEZ, JR.; and MYRNA M. GALVEZ, represented by CONCEPCION M. LAZARO, Respondents.2004 April 14, 1st Division G.R. No. 155012) TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) Is an order to maintain the subject of the controversy in status quo until hearing of an application for Preliminary Injunction can be held. DURATION OF TRO 1. Issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) – 20 days 2. Issued by Court of Appeals (CA) – 20 days 3. Issued by the Supreme Court (SC) – no time limit TRIAL IN ABSENTIA, REQUISITES OF 1. Accused has already been arraigned 2. Has been duly notified of the trial 3. Failure to appear in unjustifiable TREACHERY

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1. That treachery attended the killing of Leonil Jimenez, qualifying the crime to murder, as alleged in the information and found by the trial court, deserves our concurrence also. Records show that Leonil was only 12 years old at the time he was killed. We have stated that the killing of minor children who, because of their tender age, could not be expected to put up a defense, is considered attended with treachery even if the manner of attack is not shown. In People v. Ganohon we deemed as attended with treachery the killing of a 12-year-old child. Similarly, in People v. Abuyen, we ruled that the killing of a 13-year-old child is, in itself, treacherous. In both cases, we qualified the killings as murder. In this particular case, treachery indubitably qualified the killing of Leonil Jimenez, a 12-year-old child, as murder. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SERGIO JOROLAN y FAJARDO, accused-appellant., G.R. Nos. 142683-84, 2003 June 23, En Banc) 2. The essence of treachery is the unexpected and sudden attack on the victim which renders the latter unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. In the case at bar, the nature of the entrance wounds and the testimonies of eyewitnesses sufficiently establish that, first, at the time of attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, as he was shot from behind while on top of a motorcycle; and second, appellant consciously adopted the particular means of attack, as he was at the crime scene prior to the attack, armed and waiting for the victim to pass by. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JESUS TORIO, appellant., G.R. No. 122109, 2003 June 25, 1st Division) UNION REGISTRATION, Cancellation of The grounds for cancellation of union registration are provided for under Article 239 of the Labor Code, as follows: Art. 239. Grounds for cancellation of union registration. The following shall constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration: (a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of members who took part in the ratification; (b) Failure to submit the documents mentioned in the preceding paragraph within thirty (30) days from adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto; (c) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, the list of voters, or failure to subject these documents together with the list of the newly elected/appointed officers and their postal addresses within thirty (30) days from election; (d) Failure to submit the annual financial report to the Bureau within thirty (30) days after the losing of every fiscal year and misrepresentation, false entries or fraud in the preparation of the financial report itself; 50

(e) Acting as a labor contractor or engaging in the "cabo" system, or otherwise engaging in any activity prohibited by law; (f) Entering into collective bargaining agreements which provide terms and conditions of employment below minimum standards established by law; (g) Asking for or accepting attorney’s fees or negotiation fees from employers; (h) Other than for mandatory activities under this Code, checking off special assessments or any other fees without duly signed individual written authorizations of the members; (i) Failure to submit list of individual members to the Bureau once a year or whenever required by the Bureau; and (j) Failure to comply with the requirements under Articles 237 and 238, while the procedure for cancellation of registration is provided for in Rule VIII, Book V of the Implementing Rules. (TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS INTERNATIONAL GOLF CLUB INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS EMPLOYEES UNIONPGTWO, respondent., G.R. No. 142000, 2003 January 22, 3rd Division) UNLAWFUL DETAINER 1. Section 11, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides a period of 30 days for the court to render judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. This period shall be counted from the receipt of the affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same. Section 11, Rule 70 echoes Section 10 of the Rule on Summary Procedure which governs unlawful detainer cases, among others. The latter provision similarly mandates the resolution of such cases within 30 days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same. Clearly, the reckoning point from which the mandatory period for rendition of judgment should be computed is the receipt of the last affidavits and position papers of the parties, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, as provided by the Rules, not from the issuance of the order by the judge deeming the case submitted for resolution. The reckoning point is fixed by law, not by the judge. A judge cannot by himself choose to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by the law. (DR. CONRADO T. MONTEMAYOR, Complainant, versus JUDGE JUAN O. BERMEJO, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 3, Manila, Respondent., A.M. No. MTJ-04-1535, 2004 March 12, 2nd Division) UNLICENSED FIREARMS 1. There is merit in appellant’s contention that he should not be convicted of the separate crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. Republic Act No. 8294, which took effect on July 7, 1997, amended Presidential Decree No. 1866 and now 51

considers the use of unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance in murder and homicide and not as a special offense. Furthermore, Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, now require that qualifying as well as aggravating circumstances be expressly alleged in the complaint or information, otherwise the same will not be considered by the court even if proven during trial. Considering that the information in Criminal Case No. L-5188 did not allege that appellant shot the victim with an unlicensed firearm, the same cannot be appreciated in imposing the proper penalty. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JESUS TORIO, appellant., G.R. No. 122109, 2003 June 25, 1st Division) 2. Republic Act No. 8294, which took effect on 06 July 1997, would allow the use of an unlicensed firearm to be taken as an aggravating circumstance "if homicide or murder was committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm." The use of unlicensed firearms was proved by the testimony of prosecution witness SPO4 Elmer Dedicatoria, Sr., from the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame, Quezon City. SPO4 Dedicatoria testified and presented before the court a certification that appellant was only licensed to carry a pistol, Armscor, caliber .45 with Serial No. 7662248 covered by computerized license issued on 08 May 1998 with expiration date on December 2000. It was clear from the testimony of Emmanuel and Gem Sapigao, however, that appellant Elpidio Mamerto shot at Lauro Sapigao not with a pistol but with an unlicensed armalite. (THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. AMADOR SAPIGAO (At Large); JOSE SAPIGAO (At Large); SAMUEL SAPIGAO (At Large); ELPIDIO MAMERTO; ARTURO MAMERTO, SR. (At Large); ROBERT OBILLO (At Large); VERSON MAMERTO (At Large); FRANCIS SAPIGAO (At Large); and REYNALDO SAPIGAO alias "CALLONG" (At Large), appellants., G.R. No. 144975, 2003 June 18, En Banc) VERIFICATION of Pleading The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the non-compliance of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served. (FELIPE G. UY, petitioner, vs. THE LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent., G.R. No. 136100, 2000 July 24, 1st Division) VOID CONTRACT 1. ART. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning: (1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy; 52

(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious; (3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction; (4) Those whose object is outside the commerce of men; (5) Those which contemplate an impossible service; (6) Those where the intention of the parties relative to the principal object of the contract cannot be ascertained; (7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law. (GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner, vs. THE PROVINCE OF TARLAC, respondent., G.R. No. 157860, 2003 December 1, 1st Division)

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