Mosques, Collective Identity And Gender Differences Among Arab American Muslims

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MOSQUES, COLLECTIVE IDENTITY AND GENDER DIFFERENCES AMONG ARAB AMERICAN MUSLIMS AMANEY JAMAL !"

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heories on gender and political engagement and participation have found that women in general are less politically engaged than men (Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). Scholars have attributed higher levels of male participation to the availability of political resources as educational levels, income and employment opportunities (Dalton 1988; Scholzman, Burns, and Verba 1984; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Few studies have examined the ways in which women of ethnic minorities or, specifically, immigrant women are affected by this gender dynamic (Lien 1998). Immigrant women face a host of obstacles that pose serious difficulties for mainstream political participation in the United States. Learning about politics in a new environment is a process of cognitive reach and behavioral competence, which involves confronting and hurdling numerous barriers: acquiring language, interacting with and in American culture, and reconciling both homeland and American identities in their daily lives. Some immigrants find themselves in networks or communities where they are able to reproduce many aspects of their lives in the homeland. Others find themselves in environments completely detached from co-ethnics. Needing to adjust to a new form of life, immigrants face challenges compounded by the reception with which immigrants are greeted in their new homes. Fear of others with different backgrounds, wariness of those who speak a different language, and unease about the impact immigrants have on the availability of jobs all mediate the way immigrants understand themselves as members of

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a political society. For immigrants, then, the cognitive and behavioral pathways to ideal citizenship involve specific challenges that those who benefit from birth in the US do not face and that may present themselves differently to men and women. In this plethora of literature on gender and political participation, we know little about the factors that either promote or stifle female immigrant patterns of political participation and engagement. More specifically, very little is known about the factors that encourage or depress patterns of Muslim Arab immigrant political participation in the US. When are Muslim Arab women more likely to exercise their political voices? And which factors mediate their decisions to actively engage the political process around them? In this paper, I argue that the differences in political engagement among Arab Muslim men and women are not solely constructed by factors specific to gender per se; rather, they are mediated by specific patterns of civic engagement and involvement in the US. More specifically, because the Arab Muslim women in my sample of Arab immigrants from the Detroit metro area are more likely than men to be involved in mosques and ethnic organizations, their levels of group consciousness are higher than their male counterparts’. Women see their location in the US as one linked to broader communal Arab and Muslim interests, while men tend to situate themselves vis-à-vis their personal economic success. Further, because these Arab Muslim women see their interests linked to larger communal priorities, they are more willing than their male counterparts to exercise their political voices when they perceive the community is targeted. RELI G I O US I N STITUTI O N S A N D P O LITI C A L P A RTI C IPATI O N The academic community has long been interested in the role played by religious institutions in fostering American civic and political engagement (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Calhoun-Brown 1996; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001; Wuthnow 1999; Peterson 1992; Greenberg 2000; Smidt 1999). Dating back to the early 1800s, Tocqueville was fascinated by the direct relationship between church participation and the increased voluntaristic virtues of American citizens. Through church participation, he believed, citizens forge meaningful ties that prevail across pre-existing social cleavages and enhance the potential for meaningful civic involvement. More recent scholarship has focused on the extent to which religious sites bolster the civic skills deemed

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necessary for democratic forms of participation. Democratic theory, both as practice and discourse, necessitates the involvement of an engaged citizenry (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). An engaged and concerned person approaches the ideal citizen. Religious institutions are communities, groups of people who meet regularly, who share beliefs and values that are articulated when they meet, and who create a common interpretive context for their separate experiences. Thus, in addition to forging ties between individuals and building their social skills, religious institutions also create a communal identity. This identity can have an important political significance even if the institution itself does not sponsor political activities. It can create solidarity that allows individuals to take others’ concerns as their own. It can influence ideas about the public good. It can transform events of private significance into causes with public consequences. Burns, Schlozman, and Verba find that among the general American population, religious institutions foster political activity for men and women. They find, however, that religious participation bolsters political activity for men more than women. Gender and race consciousness do not necessarily increase political activity but channel participation among women, African Americans, and Latinos on issues related to civil rights and minority issues. Building on this analysis, patterns of groups consciousness among Arab American Muslim women suggest that ethnic-specific institutions help promote group consciousness in ways that enhance political engagement. M USLI M W O M E N A N D M O S Q UE P A RTI C IPATI O N In 2003, Amina Wadud applauded the gains Muslim women were achieving at the grassroots levels in the US. “An exciting area of development in Muslim women’s identity formation is the growth of Muslim women’s grassroots organizations and networks.” For Muslim Americans both male and female, mosques have become sites in which external contextual influences and issues like discrimination and stereotyping dominate religious sermons and programmatic initiatives. The mosque, as a place of membership, signals more than an instrumental attachment to a community—there is an intrinsic spiritual dynamic which in of itself produces a sense of community (Jamal in press; Abraham 2000; Bagby, Perl, and Froehle 2001; Bagby 2004). Estimated at between six and seven million, the Muslim American population is one of the fastest-growing religious minorities in the country. To-

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day, American mosques number close to 1,200—a 62% increase since the 1980s. Within a four-year period, New York city itself witnessed a two-fold increase in the number of mosques (Dodds 2002).1 More than 20% of US mosques have Islamic schools associated with them, and mosque attendance has increased 75% in the past five years, with approximately 1,625 Muslims linked to each mosque (Bagby, Perl, and Froehle 2001). The Muslim American community is composed of both first-generation immigrants—primarily from the Middle East and South East Asia—as well as second-, third-, and fourth-generation Americans.2 US mosques gather Muslims from all sects and generations, creating spaces for community and worship. Approximately 90% of contemporary US mosques assemble congregations with mixed ethnic backgrounds, including African Americans, Arab Americans, and Asians. These mosques foster a sense of pan-ethnic Muslim identity. Although there remains friction between various ethnic groups in specific mosque locales, American mosques cultivate a new brand of communal Islam. Although female mosque attendance is lower than female church attendance, the mosque nevertheless serves as an important site for women’s civic participation. Muslim women of all backgrounds gather at mosques for religious classes (h· alaqas), Friday prayers, charitable work, Islamic schools for their children, and a variety of other activities. While participation in mosques in many parts of the Arab world is relegated to the domain of Muslim men, in the US, women play a more pronounced role in the mosque (Leonard 1993; Hermansen 1991). In fact, a comparison of survey data from the Middle East and Detroit, Michigan reveals that women are much more involved in mosques in the Detroit metro area than their counterparts in the Arab world. Whereas 10% of all women in Jordan and 20% of all women in Morocco report attending a mosque at least once a week, 37% of Arab Muslim women in the Detroit metro area report this level of activity.3 In the first part of this paper, I argue that the development of political engagement for immigrants is mediated by structures such as religious institutions and ethnic advocacy groups, which help to develop the communal identities that give immigrants a voice and the ability to act. In the second part of this paper, through a comparison of Muslim Arab male and female responses, I highlight the ways in which ethnic institutions bolster levels of political engagement for women. Because the women in my sample are more likely to be in ethnic advocacy groups and involved in religious institutions, they are also more politically engaged than the men in the sample.

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I examine one important aspect of political engagement in this paper: the process by which immigrants learn to voice their concerns and speak up when mistreated. This process is important for both women and men. This paper examines the relationship between this dimension of political engagement—the right to complain about a civic abuse—and Muslim ArabAmerican mosque participation. Most studies on religious institutions and American civic life focus on the role of churches, especially African American churches; however, very few studies have examined the role of mosques. Unlike churches, mosques face external contextual influences that structure political engagement differently. Primarily, Muslim Americans associated with mosque communities consistently state that they feel unjustly portrayed and targeted by American popular media and cinema. SETTI N G A N D M ETH O D S This chapter is based on in-depth, qualitative interviews conducted with 53 Arab immigrants, half male and half female, from the Detroit metropolitan area, home to the highest concentration of Arab Americans and the most visible Arab community in the United States.4 All participants immigrated to the United States as teenagers or adults and have been in the US for at least five years and at most fifty. They occupy a variety of economic circumstances (from women on welfare to storekeepers to small businessmen to wealthy suburban families) and live in a variety of neighborhoods (from majority-Arab streets in Dearborn to upscale suburbs). Of the participants, 25% are Christian (either Orthodox or Catholic) and the other 75% are Muslim (either Sunni, Shifia, or Druze). They claim seven nationalities of origin (Palestinian, Syrian, Lebanese, Iraqi, Jordanian, Algerian, and Egyptian) and ten sending areas, including all of the above as well as Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Canada. Sixty-seven percent are citizens; all but two of the rest have permanent residence. Respondents were recruited through a variety of means: personal networks in mosques and churches, a radio advertisement, and referrals from various acquaintances. Further, staff and clients were approached in the waiting room of a social service agency catering primarily to Arab Americans, and the researchers introduced themselves to customers in restaurants and Arabowned stores. The resulting sample is not statistically representative of the Arab community in the Detroit metro Area; however, a deliberate attempt was

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made to maximize the diversity of respondents, with the intention of learning about the immigrant experience both within and outside of ethnic enclaves and ethnic-primary social circles. To understand whether mosque participation structures political engagement differently for men and women, I excluded all Christian respondents from this sample and grouped Muslims (n=38) into two groups: those who attended the mosque on a frequent basis (n=18) and those who did not (n=20). I found that the Muslim Arabs in the sample who did not attend a mosque accepted stereotyping as the price of becoming American, turning their anger on their ethnic community rather than on those who disparaged it. By contrast, Muslim Arabs who were members of and participated in a mosque took a different approach, challenging stereotypes and harassment as both unjust and un-American. For them, their communal identity as Muslims and Arabs completed, and did not compete with, their identification as Americans. For women, however, the “mosqued/unmosqued”5 differentiation mattered less than for the men in the sample. I will discuss this finding below and attribute it to the unmosqued women’s involvement in ethnic advocacy groups, which paralleled the mosque’s effects in creating a sense of community. The data through which I approach immigrant forms of political engagement—defined narrowly in this paper as their willingness to use state institutions for the exercise of political voice and in order to change the behavior of state institutions—rests primarily on one set of hypothetical questions. To understand whether they felt empowered to complain about government misconduct, I asked them what advice they would give an Arab friend who was harassed by police while being issued a speeding ticket.6 I grouped their responses to concerns about police harassment into two categories. Some said, without hesitation, that they would encourage their friend to file a complaint against the police officer. A second group, however, felt that the speeder probably deserved the ticket and were dubious about his right to complain. 7 Of the 38 Muslims interviewed, I found that those likely to use their voices in response to the specter of police harassment were also more likely to be mosqued (see Table 1). They felt comfortable with the voice they had attained and familiar with the available pathways to participation. They were also confident that they had rights warranting protection. Those who did not see the officer’s actions as discriminatory, by contrast, did not necessarily lack a sense of knowledge or a desire to act. But they feared that complaining

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Table 1: Mosqued and Non-Mosqued Immigrant Responses to Police Harassment

Police Harassment: Complain Police Harassment: Speeder Deserved It

Mosqued 60% n=9/15

Non-Mosqued 44% n=8/18

40% n=6/15

56% n=11/18

would exacerbate stereotypes rather than dispel them. Thus, they had a strategic belief in the benefits of non-engagement. This sentiment is captured well in Nancy Rosenblum’s words: [W]e are reluctant to object because we don’t want to cause a scene. Why? . . . because we lack faith that others share our indignation. We imagine that in admonishing a bank teller who treats a customer unfairly we will be met with indifference or hostility from those who have been kept waiting in line. We do not expect encouragement and agreement. And this latent mistrust is self-perpetuating. (1999: 81)

What accounts for this variation between mosqued and non-mosqued respondents? And how do these responses vary when we subdivide the sample along gender lines? M O S Q UE M E D I ATI O N O F P O LITI C A L E N G A G E M E N T Muslim Americans on their “path to Americanization” express deep concern about the growing stereotypes associated with “being Muslim.” Stereotypes in both the mainstream media and the Hollywood industry paint the community as closely linked to terrorism, somewhat barbaric, and with inhumane world views characterized by little regard for human life. Most Muslims say that neither Hollywood (77%) nor the media (68%) fairly portray Muslims and Islam.8 In 1997, Yvonne Haddad, a leading scholar on Muslim Americans, discussed the results of a poll taken in the 1980s: [W]e asked people whether they believed America discriminated against Muslims. Of a sample of 365 people, 100 percent said yes. Then, when we asked whether any had personally experienced discrimination, none had.

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So it is in the air. The press contributes to the paranoia, and we cannot ignore it . . . [T]hey [Muslims] get up in the morning and read press reports about terrorists and they panic. There is this fear that at any moment, you’ll have a mob marching, trying to bomb a mosque. It has happened.

In the days, weeks, and months following September 11, attacks on people of Muslim background increased. Muslim Americans have become accustomed to hearing frequent reports of attacks on Muslims and mosques, even in some cases witnessing the endless FBI interviews of community members. Hate crimes—crimes committed for no other reason than “guilt by reason of ethnicity”—have become a reality to which Muslim Americans are gradually adjusting (Haddad 2002). Since Islam is still a greatly misunderstood religion in the US, Islamic images generated by the American media and entertainment machines continue to dominate conventional structures of cultural knowledge. This conventional wisdom has colored even political debate in highly ambivalent terms. US politicians seem to acknowledge that Muslim Americans are a growing source of political power in the US, and some extend their efforts to acquire Muslim votes. Congressman Bonior, for instance, a democratic representative from Michigan, reported that “[i]t was once the kiss of death to be involved with that [Muslim] community. Now a large number of people seek their support” (Afridi 2001). Yet, other politicians have been less willing to accept the political support of the Muslim community. During the hotly contested New York senate elections, Rick Lazzio accused Hillary Clinton of accepting “blood money” when a member of the Muslim Public Affairs Council donated $50,000 toward her campaign. Leaving Muslim leaders exasperated and speechless, she returned the money to the generous donor. Although the US offers Muslim Americans unique forms of political expression and religious observance, the political climate surrounding this community remains overshadowed by the propagation of stereotypes and misperceptions. Community mobilization resources have been increasingly employed to alter the public view of the American public toward American Muslims. In addition to serving as sites for political incorporation and mobilization, mosques are increasingly becoming sites where Muslims attempt to bridge the gaps between Americans and Muslim Americans that stereotypes have created. Open houses and interfaith dialogues have been initiated at various mosques across the countries as Muslims try to reach out to members of other religious denominations. When faced with local or national is-

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sues that concern the Muslim community, like the American Muslim community call to support the Eid Stamp, mosque members initiate phone drives and petitions. Today, the American Muslim mosque is not only a house of worship or merely a community center; in many ways, it has also become a locus of advocacy work to address misconceptions and anti-Muslim discrimination. Mosque participants are therefore situated in a unique and multi-functional locale that serves their inspirational, communal, social, and educational needs; this locale similarly links them to sympathizers in other religious denominations, puts them in contact with local governing institutions, and keeps them informed about new and important political developments. The mosque also serves another key role in that it creates a space for Muslims to speak about their experiences with discrimination and stereotypes. Mosque participants develop ties to mosque colleagues who similarly perceive that Muslims, as a communal unit, suffer from an outside world that unfairly judges them. In many ways, they function as ethnic advocacy groups. Mosques in the US serve as collectivizing forums that highlight Muslim common struggles in mainstream American society. These “common fate” attitudes and attachments unite Muslim Americans in mosque communities, whereby the injustice that occurs to one Muslim becomes an injustice that has befallen the entire Muslim community (Bobo and Gillian 1990; Miller et al. 1981).9 In addition to common-fate perceptions among the mosqued Muslim community, visible signs of religious difference potentially exacerbate the sense that this community is under a social microscope. Most Muslim women who attend the mosque are identifiable by and differentiated from the general public due to the Islamic head scarf they wear—the h· ij a¯b. Muslim mosqued women in the sample often talked about needing to prove they knew how to speak English, that they were not stupid, and that they could comprehend certain conversations. These feelings associated with being different—almost singled out by appearance—are more likely to be addressed at mosque locations. Husbands too hear their wives’ stories and often feel sympathetic to their experiences. Muslim males, less identifiable as “other” to the public, may also feel that they can be singled out for reasons similarly related to their religious identity. Mosqued Muslims are more likely to feel the effects of discrimination in the workplace; for instance, they may need to perform the five daily prayers in their employment settings. Observing specific Islamic guidelines—such as not drinking alcohol—may impact work-related functions, and defending other Muslims when inaccurate and hostile conversations occur in the work-

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place can further prejudice co-workers. These patterns of Muslim religious observance may generate feelings that view the non-Muslim community as intolerant or that perpetuate discriminatory conceptions of difference. In many ways, the Muslim head scarf and Islamic rituals is yet another layer that adds to perceptions of discrimination among the mosqued Muslim American community. Mosque participants, as a concentrated group of observant Muslims, feel the pangs of stereotypes more sharply than non-mosqued Muslims because their basic religious identities visibly differentiate them from mainstream society. Mosques further forge common-fate tendencies among Muslims. By examining the context of mosque participation in the US, this paper seeks to conceptualize the relationship between religious involvement and levels of political engagement among Muslim mosque attendees. It seeks to show that membership in a mosque does translate into a greater awareness that stereotypes are harmful and the willingness to act upon that knowledge. That mosque populations are more cognizant about the effects of stereotypes and discrimination offers us a unique opportunity to study the impact of external contextual influences—in this case, perceived patterns of stereotypes— on levels of political engagement among Muslim Americans. An initial hypothesis for the findings in Table 1 might be that Muslims who frequent the mosque are more politically efficacious or knowledgeable about their rights. Mosqued individuals were more likely than non-mosqued individuals to complain about police harassment, whereas non-mosqued Muslims were more likely to blame the speeder for speeding. Non-mosqued individuals might appear less willing to link discrimination to harassment. They may be misinformed about their rights, or they may be operating from a source of fear that does not want to confront the police about questionable acts. On both counts, however, this is not true. First, I find that mosque participants more readily believe that the police officer deliberately abused his powers by being biased. Compared to nonmosqued Muslims, mosque participants in the sample were more likely to believe that stereotypes of the community were indeed harmful (44% to 15%). Further, among the sample of Muslim Arab Americans, not a single non-mosqued individual reported that he or she had personally experienced discrimination. Of the mosqued sample, however, 40% did report an uneasy experience in which they felt their religion (including symbols of that religion, like the hijab) or ethnicity was the primary source of the mistreatment. These constituents are more likely to witness discriminatory practices fueled

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by unjust stereotypes, and they are more likely to address the problem seeking to raise non-Muslim awareness through education. This Muslim woman spoke about the types of discrimination that exist in the US, clearly pointing out that she felt women who wear the hijab would probably have a hard time looking for a job: There is a kind of discrimination . . . hidden discrimination. . . . [How is it hidden?] Like, if you want to apply to job as a Muslim woman adhering to your religion, it won’t be as easy to find job as [if] you looked like every other person. So if you are different, it’s not that simple.

This same woman also reported her willingness to complain about police harassment: But I took him [the police officer] to court and I encourage people to do the same because you shouldn’t let people to get away with such behavior. This is a wrong thing to let go. You have to let people see that that hurts. Because some people are ignorant of other people’s feelings. They think it’s OK to step all over you, maybe you don’t have feelings, maybe you are not like them. When you let them hear your voice, they know more about you.

This woman feels that she was unduly harassed because of her hijab. Her willingness to go to court ensures that she was not mistreated because of her religious identification. She believes that through proper education, prejudice and bias can be addressed. Other Muslim mosqued women in the sample told of uneasy experiences with the police. They explained that the police were rude and unnecessarily ticketed them. Said this woman: And he stopped me. And he asked me [if I knew] why he stopped me? And I said such and such. And he said, did you know that this is not right to do it? I said, yeah, but she [another driver] was very slow and I did not want to keep the traffic behind me. He was very very rude and mean . . . Sometimes the policeman, you know, they give you an attitude.

She and her husband see the officer’s terse demeanor as one dictated by his prejudicial lens. Her husband adds: I have to speak up for my rights. Even if I lose, I have to fight for my rights, to make me comfortable . . . If she is not wearing that thing [hijab] they would have probably let her go.

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One male mosqued individual, who also feels that the community is subjected to unfair stereotypes, readily encouraged the speeder to complain; he urged the speeder to “write a letter to the chief of police, to the mayor of the city, or to the city council. Absolutely,” he continued, “don’t take this.” Similarly, this male mosqued Muslim added: Go to the court, take him to the court. That exactly happened to one of the guys, who the police stopped him, and he said, you were speeding— no. He actually had an accident, and that accident was not his fault, so the police told him, “You sound like you are a stranger. Why did you come here, to this country?” I said, “What did you say to him?” He said, “Nothing.” I said, “If I were you, I would just take his badge number and take his name and take him to the court. Because it’s not his—because this country, basically, is based on foreigners. And even if that was not the case, as far as you are legal in this country, as far as you doing your job, as far as you are—it’s not his concern!” So I would just take him to court.

These findings illustrate that Muslim Arab Americans who share similar experiences—in this case, the collective mosque experience and the religious symbols associated with it—are more likely to understand phenomena like police harassment as being informed by prejudicial motives; they are less likely to dismiss it altogether, as the non-mosqued members of the sample do. This highlights the different ways that these two distinct groups of Muslim Arab Americans think about and engage the political institutions surrounding them. Mosqued individuals are more likely to see the police’s action as based on prejudice; they seek out appropriate channels in an effort to alter pre-existing misconceptions about the community and make sure police officers are held accountable for their discriminatory practices. Non-mosqued individuals, however, refuse to see such police action as prejudicial. In an attempt to exonerate state representatives of wrongdoing, these individuals in fact attribute blame on the speeder, without much qualification. Non-mosqued males placed blame on the community, pointing out that in Dearborn, Michigan there are a lot of Arabs who drive recklessly. He says: Well, there is something here. The new generation, let’s say, teenagers, 18, 20, 21, the younger people in Dearborn here . . . drive crazy, the Arabs, I mean, really, really, I never heard somebody been treated by the police bad.

Another non-mosqued individual distinguished between “ticketing” and “harassment”; he notes that American police “do not harass. They just give you a little paper with your ticket, and that’s it. They don’t do these things [harass] here.”

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Both responses illustrate that these non-mosqued individuals are not unwilling to see the actions of the police as wrong; rather, they refuse to cite discrimination as a motive for the officer’s behavior. And when possible, they turn their lenses to the community to look for patterns of behavior to blame. Absent the collectivizing experience of the mosque, these individuals don’t identify with the similar common-fate perceptions about discrimination and stereotyping that their mosque counterparts share. (Tate 1994; Stokes 2003; Miller et al. 1991; Calhoun-Brown 1996). C O M M O N -F ATE V ERSES I N D I V I D U A L I N TERESTS In addition to mosque participation, other factors influence individual assessments of the degree of discriminatory practices and the appropriate responses to such actions. All of the Muslim Arab immigrants in the sample spoke of the opportunities available to them in the US. The vast majority contrasted these newly found opportunities with the lack thereof in the Middle East. When I asked respondents to speak about discrimination in the US, I found that interviewees consistently acknowledged that there was discrimination and a plethora of negative stereotypes about the community; the impact of this prejudicial environment on their personal achievements, however, had been minimal. Hence, those individuals not involved in mosques that espouse common-fate tendencies were more likely not to attribute police actions to prejudice. Individuals in mosques (or similar ethnic advocacy groups) were more likely to see discriminatory acts as such and state that they were willing to complain. As mosque participants—as religious members of a community who are potentially singled out—their assessments of discrimination included not only themselves and their personal levels of attainment but also the larger Muslim community. Those who were not involved in the mosque were less willing to blame the police officer, less willing to complain, and more willing to place blame on the driver. In the category of individuals who stated that the speeder deserved the harassment, I find two subcategories. All of these individuals praised the US for being kind to them and for allowing them to meet their potential in terms of economic rewards and benefits. This group is composed of professionals, store owners, and businessmen. Having done well in the US, they are careful to guard their successes. They fall into two categories. One group of individuals does not acknowledge that discrimination truly exists in the US; they hold that their economic advancement has not been blocked by discriminatory barriers. The US is linked to their good fortune and prosperity; to acknowl-

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edge discrimination and to realize that members of the American law enforcement system might have to do something with it is to upset this link between “America” and “personal prosperity.” Introducing discrimination into the discourse of the American Dream might undermine that dream altogether and leave them suffering economic repercussions. One non-mosqued Muslim individual clearly articulated this relationship: I mean, United States, it’s a great country, and God bless America. I have no doubt about it. For feeding the kids, the poor, and treat them free and give the elderly the right to live with little, I mean, they provide them with money and medicare, and that’s a blessing. Nobody could deny that unless they are stupid, or mean, or doesn’t understand what they say. You know what I mean?

This non-mosqued male wanted to emphasize the point that the US is an inherently good place to be. It is kind to its citizens; it provides opportunity for all ages and sectors. Those who see the US as a place that discriminates and offers opportunities to some and not others, in his opinion, are wrong. This pattern of responses was shared by similar non-mosqued individuals who felt indebted to the US for its kindness and wealth of opportunity. Often comparing their experiences to their home countries, they are less likely to hold negative attitudes about the US. In response to the survey question about police harassment, this non-mosqued male cites “disbelief ”: First of all, I would not believe him. I think the police here are very respectful. Because it happened to me a few times, the police stopped me and they were of utmost respect and kindness.

Later in the interview, he explains how indebted he is to the American system for offering him opportunities that he was unable to attain in his home country. “[I]n Syria,” he argues, “I should [have been] able to ask my own president” for assistance. Of course, structuring this analysis is the notion that civil servants in Syria do not equally represent citizen interests. Unlike this group, other non-mosqued Muslim Arabs do recognize that stereotypes exist; however, they are very cautious in about complaining about the police or the US more generally. Their fear stems from two primary sources. On the one hand, they fear that the community may suffer economic repercussions if they are seen to be ungrateful or overly critical of the system that has given them new lives. On the other hand, they also worry that labeling police harassment as discriminatory may feed into pre-existing, harmful stereotypes about the community. Because Muslims and Arabs ac-

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knowledge that they are unfairly characterized in public discourse, there is fear among this group that members of the Arab community will try to get away with breaking the law and resort to crying discrimination when they are held accountable. This, they argue, will feed into and exacerbate preexisting negative stereotypes about the community. Examine the statement by this non-mosqued male who says that the Arab driver deserved the harassment: And I also ask that the Arab community to fight anybody within the community who does harm to the community. He who does something that is not legal should be punished by the community before the US punishes him. Because when one person does something wrong it reflects on all Arabs. Unfortunately, the media here will say “Arabs,” when it is not all Arabs who did wrong. They don’t say one person did something wrong because s/he is wrong. They describe us as all the Arabs did wrong. Where only 5% probably do something wrong and 95% do things right.

In a similar vein, another mosqued male who felt the speeder deserved it argues that police harassment should not be seen as a larger pattern in society: You know you don’t blame the American society for that. You have a drunk come in sometimes and calls you names just because they are fighting Saddam Hussein or whatever. You don’t have nothing to do with that and they don’t have nothing to do with that, but sometimes on an individual basis, sometimes they don’t like you, the way you are. Whoever you are! But I wouldn’t look at that as an obstacle to success or anything, you know. If the people [Arabs] make that an obstacle in their way, then they have the problem, not the others.

The respondent above was one of five males among mosque participants who said that the speeder deserves the harassment or that the incident was not motivated by prejudice on part of the police. Although he acknowledges that stereotypes might be an impeding force to Arab and Muslim advancement, he notes that he has also enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle in the US. These non-mosqued individuals who speak of negative stereotypes against the community while praising the level of opportunity available must reconcile two competing world views in their responses. On the one hand, they want to help out the community but want to make sure that only “real” cases of discrimination are brought forth; and that those members of the community who are claiming discrimination are indeed quite justified. And on the other hand, they also want to ensure that the US continues to offer opportunities

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for upward mobility. This individual, who is willing to place blame on the speeder, similarly invokes knowledgability about the law enforcement system as a criteria for lodging complaints: You just have to know about the system, and you could have a lot of advantages here . . . For many things, the newcomers, you have to tell them, if you’re going to speed, this is what’s going to happen, and what’s going to happen is you get a ticket. Again, this is a lesson they have to have. Don’t abuse the system. Here, they give you some more freedom, just don’t take it and go beyond it.

This non-mosqued Muslim points out an interesting distinction between himself and the “others” who may be willing to cite discrimination as the source of the policeman’s treatment. The “others,” here, are the newcomers— newcomers who may jeopardize the gains and accomplishments of the previous generations of Muslim immigrants. Although the above respondents provide different reasons for not blaming the policeman or seeing his actions as harassment, the rationale behind each of their answers is similar. They wish to guarantee and maintain the level of opportunities they have in American society and feel compelled to demonstrate the law-abiding standards underlying their citizenship and their dedication to “America.” The non-mosqued individuals who spoke of the economic rewards (in the sample, these individuals were predominately male) in America and expressed their concerns about stereotypes are unlike the group of mosqued individuals who immediately stated that they would complain about the questionable police behavior. Those who were willing to complain viewed their actions as an invocation of civic rights; they had had the right to protect themselves. Those who placed blame on the speeder were more likely to be in a category that attempted to balance two sets of concerns: their individual economic mobility in American society and common-fate perceptions linked to the effects of stereotypes. These Muslim immigrants must reconcile two world views—one based on a sense of opportunity and fortune in the United States and one based on an acknowledgment that Muslims and Arabs are unfair targets of distorted images—in order to determine both the impact of discriminatory practices and their own willingness to engage the political institutions about them. In this frame of mind, these individuals are more likely to think in terms of their civic duties towards the system—how best to serve the system that has offered them opportunities and guarantee that the system is not unfairly

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Table 2: Responses to Police Harassment Divided by Gender Female Mosqued Non-Mosqued

Police Harassment: Complain Police Harassment: Speeder Deserved It

Male Mosqued Non-Mosqued

83% N=5/6

78% N=7/9

44% N=4/9

11% N=1/9

27% N=1/6

22% N=2/9

56% N=5/9

89% N=8/9

subjected to attacks by other co-ethnics on the grounds of discriminatory practices by state officials. These concerns, as embodied in particular responses to the question about police harassment, reflect a negotiated mental settlement characterized by an evaluation of benefits both personal and communal. They believe that their willingness not to link the policeman’s behavior to discrimination, as well as their unwillingness to engage the state on these grounds, is in fact in the interests of not only the larger Muslim community, but also their own economic stability. TH E I M PA C T O F G E N D ER Dividing the sample by gender highlights these points more clearly (see Table 2). In this sample, women are more likely to see the acts of the police as motivated by prejudice; therefore, they are more likely to complain. The non-mosqued Arab women share many experiences with their mosqued counterparts. All of the non-mosqued women who reported they would complain are also involved in Arab American ethnic advocacy groups, which perform similar functions as the mosque in creating a communal identity aware of prejudicial stereotypes. The women in the sample who downplay the police officer’s actions share features with non-mosqued males. They are more likely not to be attached to major ethnic advocacy groups. When I subdivide the data along gender lines, the most striking finding is the impact exerted by gender on evaluations of the speeder. Men were more likely to say the speeder deserved it than women (64% to 25%). On the one hand, the category of non-mosqued Muslim Arab men contained the largest

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percentage of individuals who would exonerate the policeman. On the other, mosqued men were more likely to complain about police harassment. In these interviews, they—like the mosqued women—were also more likely to speak about personal incidents of discrimination and more likely to exhibit the common-fate overtones of unfair treatment associated with mosque participation. Mosqued men, as well as women, are therefore less likely to dismiss the behavior of the policeman than non-mosqued men. The non-mosqued males in the sample offer a rich story about the processes involved in assessing discrimination and engaging local authority as a remedy. These non-mosqued individuals are in fact very engaged with the American political system. Fifty percent are politically active, reporting that they have voted, petitioned, and/or participated in public demonstrations. They are successful professionals, students, and business owners interacting significantly with mainstream America. Their disapprobation of the speeder instead of the police is predicated on a lack of common-fate experiences that directly link stereotypes to individual and personal experiences of discrimination. Examining the police-speeder exchange with a lens turned inward, they do not see stereotypes against Arabs and Muslims as hindering their personal efforts to succeed. Because they reported that they do not have personal experience with discrimination, they are also not able to tie stereotypes to barriers that inhibit community advancement. They have been able to move through society relatively unscathed by the effects of discrimination, and they also are concerned that accusations of discrimination may sound false, immature, or unjustifiable, doing nothing more than offending the country that has been kind to them. Accusations of discrimination may even create “real” discrimination or impair the progress that they have been able to make in this society. The differences in the sample may appear to be highlighted solely by gender, but in fact what is being revealed is the economic substrata that structures the Arab Muslim relationship between common-fate perceptions (or lack thereof) and plausible discriminatory patterns (Table 3). This economic division directly influences the content and form of political engagement espoused by this group of Muslim Arabs. Non-mosqued males in the sample, most of whom are professionally employed or owners of their own businesses, are less likely to be involved in Arab advocacy groups—groups that may generate common-fate perceptions about the impact of negative stereotyping. Only three of the nine non-mosqued males are involved in an Arab advocacy group. Mosqued males similarly employed are almost equally divided in

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Table 3: Responses of Non-Mosqued Muslims by Involvement in Arab or Muslim Advocacy Groups Female Belongs to ethnic advocacy group

Police Harassment: Complain Police Harassment: Speeder Deserved It

Male Does not belong to ethnic advocacy group

Belongs to ethnic advocacy group

Does not belong to ethnic advocacy group

86% N=6/7

50% N=1/2

33% N=1/3

0% N=0/6

14% N=1/7

50% N=1/2

67% N=2/3

100% N=6/6

how they respond to the police. Those who say the speeder deserves it balance their appreciation for economic opportunities in the US with perceptions about the impact of discrimination. They fear that increased confrontation with the state might make matters worse for Arab Americans. However, mosqued males who say they would complain see discrimination as a potentially destructive force. They, like the female mosqued individuals in the sample or the unmosqued but politically active women, feel obligated to express their concerns to the appropriate authorities. In this sample, female non-mosqued members share many similar features with their female mosqued counterparts. Seven of the nine nonmosqued women are members of Arab ethnic advocacy groups, which help to address the feelings about stereotyping, discrimination, and common-fate perceptions that are analogous to those of mosqued women. As students or employees of Arab-owned businesses, they are less likely to be professionally employed in mainstream companies. The non-mosqued women who say the speeder deserves it, on the other hand, are not involved in advocacy work and do value the levels of opportunity in the US. Therefore, they do not exhibit the common-fate tendencies that other organized members of the sample do. The one member in this category who both says that the speeder is to blame and participates in an Arab advocacy group demonstrates a similar rationale to mosqued males who blame the speeder; she fears that the community might bring upon itself increased levels of stereotyping:

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And he has to acknowledge that he was speeding. Because what I don’t like also is people crying discrimination when they are at fault! But it’s happening! . . . We are 100% American citizens from an Arab background. And we have to fight discrimination against Arabs, stereotyping of Arabs, showing the Arab as an ugly, frightening terrorist. This is what we need to fight, because every human being deserves respect.

Although she acknowledges that discrimination and stereotypes exist, she— a successful real estate agent—is also concerned about the possible ramifications of rashly crying discrimination or confronting state institutions with these types of concerns. PER C EPTI O N S A B O UT G O V ER N M E N T Interestingly, both mosqued and non-mosqued individuals view the state as impartial, although both groups have different structural differences and experiences that influence their opinions of state officials. Those who perceived wrongdoing on the part of the police officer consistently stated that they would resort to government institutions to make their cases heard. Not one respondent doubted the state’s ability to uphold the law fairly and equally. The police officer’s discriminatory practices are interpreted as the actions, not of a biased or prejudicial political institution, but rather of a misinformed individual. Although some believed that their complaint would reap few results—because it was their word against that of the police officer’s—they still chose to have their day in court. Their faith in the legal process to allow them a voice is deeply respected. In other words, they can tell their story—narrate their plight in front of others—so that others will become more educated. They also forge stronger bonds with others in the community through the very act of storytelling. Due to their faith in the legal system, they adamantly state that they would complain about officers who abuse their power. Good citizens, that is, protect their civic rights and channel critique through putatively benign state institutions in order to alter misperceptions leading to unjustified targeting. As long as state institutions respond to their concerns, they feel protected. In a similar vein, those non-mosqued respondents who say that the speeder deserves it also have an apparently untarnished image of benevolent government that serves the interests of its citizens. So convinced are they by the impartial practices of political institutions that they cannot even ascribe wrongdoing to a government representative. Applauding the opportunities

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available to them in the US and experiencing neither personal discrimination nor the common-fate sentiments associated with religious institutions, these non-mosqued Muslims defend the state unequivocally. The political environment that has allowed them to move freely and prosper is inherently a good government. In many ways, these individuals see themselves as servants of the state, simultaneously protecting their own individual interests and those of the government. By curtailing “accusations” against the state, accusations that may potentially stain its distinguished reputation, these individuals uphold their world view of civic duties and citizenship vis-à-vis the state. By contrast, those individuals who are unwilling to blame the police because they fear increased levels of negative stereotypes against the community are more likely to be mosqued members (or members of advocacy groups), but they are so convinced that they have been misrepresented that they want to carefully diagnose cases of discrimination before they label them as such. Carefully navigating the system, they balance economic interests with the levels of harmful, public stereotypes. This group of individuals may believe that the government will listen to their complaints, but they fear augmented levels of stereotyping against the community. Recognizing that some complaints might be beneficial to the community while others may not, their levels of engagement are directly structured by a careful selection of the cases worth taking to the government. These individual negotiations, exhausting as they may be, clearly illustrate the ambiguity and caution built into Muslim Arab relationships to state institutions. That this group of highly cognizant, involved individuals chooses to protect its community by not approaching government demonstrates that the external contextual influences—in this case, the impact of stereotypes—hinders the willingness of individuals to engage their governing institutions. C O N C LUSI O N This data provides us with an intriguing account of the influence of stereotypes and discrimination on political engagement. Individuals will only respond to actions when they believe the benefits of complaining outweigh the plausible repercussions. For women involved in mosques and ethnic associations, complaining for the sake of the community’s welfare supersedes other concerns. Due to their participation in religious and other civic organizations, mosqued individuals foster ties premised on common-fate world views and thus more readily process and respond to harassing acts as a means

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of protecting both their civil rights and their community at large. Arab American Muslim women in this sample are more likely to be involved in Arab ethnic advocacy groups, and as such these women exhibit similar tendencies as their mosqued counterparts. They are more likely to identify acts of the police as discriminatory and take action. Ethnic institutions play multifaceted roles in the daily lives of Arab Muslim women. Not only does participation in ethnic-specific institutions, such as mosques, allow women the opportunity to practice their faith, preserve key elements of their identities, and situate themselves in larger communal discourses, but it also increases their levels of political efficacy and willingness to exercise voice over silence. For Arab Muslim women, therefore, ethnic institutions serve as vehicles of cultural and identity preservation while simultaneously increasing levels of female political capital in ways that bode well for mainstream political participation. Arab and Muslim women, it has been argued, place the interests of their communities above and beyond their own personal interests. This paper, however, demonstrates that female promotion of communal interests need not come at the expense of individual welfare. Through participation in ethnic community associations, these Arab Muslim females have adopted discourses of individual rights and responsibilities while simultaneously assuming their roles as communal guardians. N O TES I would like to thank Sondra Hale, Frances Hasso, Ann Lin, Ellen Lust-Okar, John Mollenkoph, Andrew Shryock, and Sherifa Zuhur and the reviewers of the Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies for very useful and constructive comments. 1. In 1980, the five boroughs contained only eight or nine mosques, a number that expanded, according to Marc Ferris, to about thirty-seven in 1991. By 1994, there were over seventy mosques; the number of mosques in New York city had doubled in three years. 2. The African American community makes up 30% of the Muslim American population in the US. 3. Findings based on the 4th Wave World Values Survey and the Detroit Arab American Study. 4. Interviews were conducted by Amaney Jamal and Ann Chih Lin through the support of the Institute for Research on Women and Gender and the Rackham Graduate School (1997–2002) at the University of Michigan. In order to protect our interviewees’ privacy, all names are pseudonyms, and some identifying details have been changed. Jamal and Lin conducted all of the interviews, using Arabic or English as the respondent preferred. Interviews were conducted privately, in person, at locations the respondents chose. Interviews lasted between one and two hours and followed a structured, open-ended questionnaire.

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5. Please note that this is a classification I use for the purposes of this paper. 6. Question: Police harassment: “Imagine that an Arab friend told you that he had been stopped by the police for speeding, and he was speeding. But when they were giving him the ticket, they harassed him, they were rude and insulting. Your friend is really upset and he asks you for advice. What would you advise him to do?” 7. Five additional respondents said that they would not respond to harassment at all, because it was best to stay away from the police. We don’t analyze this category of responses in this paper, because we believe that perceptions of the police as a body that should not be engaged are highly influenced by homeland experiences in comparison to experiences in the United States. However, we do not believe that this omission from the study biases the results of our findings. Of the five respondents that we do not discuss here, three are mosqued individuals and two are non-mosqued. Because their distribution is almost equal between both categories we are confident that our classification (mosqued and non-mosqued) is not what explains these responses. 8. MAPS poll, 2001. 9. Studies on African American patterns of political behavior focus on the concept of common fate as a determining factor in shaping black attitudes in the US RE F ERE N C ES 2002 Mistreating Muslim Americans. Islamic Horizons May/June http://www.isna.net/ Horizons/article.asp?issueid=18&artid=1&catid=9&fromall=1 Abraham, Nabeel 2000 Arab Detroit’s “American” Mosque. In Arab Detroit: From Margin to Mainstream. Andrew Shryock and Nabeel Abraham, eds. Pp. 279–312. Detroit: Wayne State University. Afridi, Sam 2001 The Carnegie Challenge 2001, Muslims in America: Identity, Diversity and the Challenge of Understanding Islam. Carnegie Research Newsletter: http:// www.carnegie.org/pdf/muslims.pdf. Bagby, Ihsan 2004 A Portrait of Detroit Mosques: Muslim Views on Policy, Politics and Religion. Michigan: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding. Bagby, Ihsan, Raul Perl, and Bryan Froehle 2001 The Mosque in America: A National Portrait, a Report from the Mosque Study Project. Washington, DC: Council on American-Islamic Relations. Bobo, Lawrence and Franklin Gilliam 1990 Race, Sociopolitical Participation and Black Empowerment. American Political Science Review. Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba 2001 The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality and Political Participation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Calhoun-Brown, Allison 1996 African American Churches and Political Mobilization: The Psychological Impact of Organizational Resources. The Journal of Politics 58(4):935–953.

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