Module-5-appeal-cases.pdf

MODULE 5: APPEAL Aranas v. Mercado

inventory was interlocutory and could be changed or modified at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings, held that the order of exclusion was not a final but an

FACTS: Emigdio S. Mercado died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife,

interlocutory order "in the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the San

Teresita V. Mercado, and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado,

Lorenzo Village lots."

Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma

In the case of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, the Court pointed out: All that the said court could

M. Aranas.

do as regards the said properties is determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a

Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned shares in Mervir

dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to

Realty Corporation and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation. He assigned his real

resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title

properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold real property in Badian

because the probate court cannot do so.

to Mervir Realty. On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take Thelma then filed in RTC of Cebu a petition for the appointment of Teresita as administrator of

against the assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section

the estate of Emigdio. RTC granted petition. As the administrator, Teresita submitted an

1, Rule 41, Rules of Court, which also governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that

inventory of the estate of Emigdio on December 14, 1992 for the consideration and approval

only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law "that completely disposes of

by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no

the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable" may

real properties but only personal properties”.

be the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or

Claiming that Emigdio had owned other

properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita

resolution is expressly made non-appealable.

to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma's motion through the order of January 8, 1993.

Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility that material issues may be finally determined at various stages of the special

On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8, 1993.

On

proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court (open codals in case ipa

January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the

enumerate) enumerates the specific instances in which multiple appeals may be resorted to in

inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days within which to file a formal opposition to

special proceedings and clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not

or comment on the inventory and the supporting documents Teresita had submitted. On

come under any of the instances in which multiple appeals are permitted.

February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for approval

Jose v. Javellana

of the inventory. On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on the inventory. With the parties agreeing to submit

FACTS: September 8, 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma Jose sold for 160,000 to respondent

themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties should be included in

Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale 2 parcels of land in Barangay Mallis, Bulacan.

or excluded from the inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing on that issue.

They agreed that Javellana would pay 80,000 upon execution of the deed and the remaining 80,000 upon the registration of the land under the Torrens system; and that should Margarita

RTC issued an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded

become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal Alma Jose, and her daughter

properties that should be included. RTC denied their MR. The CA partly granted the petition,

Priscilla, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the registration.

reversing the inclusion of a certain parcel of land which was already sold. Margarita died, and Juvenal predeceased Margarita, leaving Priscilla the sole surviving heir. ISSUE: WON certiorari was the proper recourse to assail the questioned orders of the RTC (naa ni issue about GAD in including certain properties in the estate which is irrelevant)

However, she did not comply with the registration of the properties to the Torrens System, and instead began to improve the land with the intent of turning it into a residential subdivision. Javellana then filed an action for specific performance against her in the RTC of Bulacan.

HELD: No. Javellana prayed for the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends that the resort to the special civil

from continuing with the improvements, and that she institutes registration proceedings and

action for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC by Teresita and her co-respondents was not

execute a final deed of sale in his favor. Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss stating that the

proper. Thelma's contention cannot be sustained.

complaint was barred by prescription, and that the complaint did not state a cause of action.

The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether the

RTC initially denied Priscilla’s motion to dismiss, however, upon MR, RTC reversed itself and

assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. In Pahila-Garrido v.

granted the motion to dismiss, opining that Javellana had no cause of action against her since

Tortogo, the Court distinguished between final and interlocutory orders as follows:

she was not a party to the contract. Javellana moved for MR, which the RTC denied.

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order

Javellana then filed a notice of appeal which the RTC gave due course to, and the records

is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its

were elevated to the CA. Priscilla countered that the order was not appealable, and not

entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving

perfected on time. (na ni forum shopping issue, but we’re done with that)

nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely

CA reversed and set aside the orders of dismissal and remanded the case to the RTC for

dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided

further proceedings. CA denied the MR stating that it decided to give the appeal due course

upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and

even if filed out of time because Javellana had no intention to delay the proceedings, as in fact,

the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment

he did not even seek an extension of time to file his appellant’s brief, and that current

rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a

jurisprudence afforded litigants the amplest opportunity to present their cases free from

judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment

constraints of technicality, such that even if an appeal was made out of time, the court had the

leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the

discretion to allow the appeal.

merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

ISSUE: 1. WON the denial of the MR of the order of dismissal was a final order and thus appealable

The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita's motion for the approval of the inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were

2. WON the appeal was made on time HELD: 1. Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
 order of dismissal was a final order and appealable.

provisional and subject to revision at any time during the course of the administration

First of all, the denial of Javellana's motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done

proceedings.

by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one. The Court has distinguished between final and

In Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, the Court, in affirming the decision of the CA

interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, thuswise:

to the effect that the order of the intestate court excluding certain real properties from the

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MODULE 5: APPEAL The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order

reconsideration interrupting the running of the period of appeal. As such, his filing of the

is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its

notice of appeal only on July 19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal on time, as Priscilla insists.

entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment

The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld, however, considering that the Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, by which an aggrieved party desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:

rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts.

judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment

It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a

leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the

more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In

merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is

the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules

interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and

And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment

compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.

rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that "appeal may be

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to

taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular

afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical

matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;" but the remedy from an

to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the

interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari. The explanation for

Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a

the differentiation of remedies given in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:

new trial or motion for reconsideration.

. . . The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the

The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has already retroactively extended the fresh period rule to "actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure." According to De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:

adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the

The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh

parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental

period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event that the

questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders

motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on

rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order

retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to

may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has

pending actions, such as the present case.

been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.

Consequently, we rule that Javellana's notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to the fresh period rule.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65,

PHILIPPINE BUSINESS BANK vs. FELIPE CHUA

provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in

FACTS: Tomas Tan, a stockholder and director/Treasurer of CST Enterprises, Inc. (CST),

excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

filed a derivative suit for the Declaration of Unenforceability of Promissory Notes and

Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal from the final order or judgment itself; and has expressly clarified that the prohibition against appealing an order denying a motion for reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order.

Mortgage, Nullity of Secretary's Certificate, Injunction, Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction against PBB, John Dennis Chua et al, and John Does before the Makati RTC. In January 2002, the respondent Chua informed Tan that CST's properties had been fraudulently used as collateral for loans allegedly taken out in CST's name, but without

2. Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA

proper authority from CST stockholders and/or the Board of Directors.

Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out of time. She points out that he

From his investigation, Tan discovered that a certain Atty. Jaime Soriano had issued a

received a copy of the June 24, 1999 order on July 9, 1999, and filed his motion for

Secretary's certificate, which stated that John Dennis Chua was authorized during a

reconsideration on July 21, 1999 (or after the lapse of 12 days); that the RTC denied his

duly constituted CST board meeting to open a bank account and obtain credit

motion for reconsideration through the order of June 21, 2000, a copy of which he received

facilities under the name of CST with PBB. This Secretary's Certificate also

on July 13, 2000; that he had only three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000,

authorized John Dennis Chua to use CST's properties as security for these loans.

within which to perfect an appeal; and that having filed his notice of appeal on July 19,

Using this Secretary's Certificate, John Dennis Chua took out loans with PBB in the total

2000, his appeal should have been dismissed for being tardy by three days beyond the

amount

expiration of the reglementary period.

collateral. Respondent Chua signed as co-maker with John Dennis Chua, who signed

Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (n) Under the rule, Javellana had only the balance of three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal due to the timely filing of his motion for

P91,100,000.00,

and

used

CST

properties

as

both as the representative of CST, as well as in his personal capacity, on six promissory notes to PBB to evidence parts of this loan. PBB's Amended Answer also included a cross-claim against respondent Chua, demanding payment of the promissory notes he signed as co-maker with John Dennis Chua. In respondent Chua's Answer to the Cross-Claim of PBB, he admitted that he signed, as co-maker, six promissory notes covering the loans obtained by John Dennis Chua with PBB. PBB subsequently filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment based on Section 1, Rule 35, claiming that since respondent Chua already admitted the execution of the promissory notes. RTC issued a partial summary judgment on PBB's cross-claim on July 27, 2005, finding respondent Chua liable as a signatory to the promissory notes amounting to P75,000,000.

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MODULE 5: APPEAL The RTC reasoned that by signing as a co-maker, he obligated himself to pay the amount indicated in the promissory notes, even if he received no consideration in return. FIRST BANCORP, INC. vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JANE THOMAS ISSUE: Whether the Partial Summary judgement is a final judgement and

LIGHTNER

whether it could be appealed. RULING: NO. PBB's motion for partial summary judgment against respondent Chua was

FACTS: Bancorp is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Alabang, Muntinlupa

based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules, which provides:

covered by TCT No. 201126. On October 10, 1997, Jane Thomas Lightner, an American citizen who resided in California, U.S.A., filed a Complaint against Bancorp with the Regional

Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. — A party seeking

Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City with the following allegations:

to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in

“4. Defendant is the registered owner of a parcel of land and house and other

answer thereto has been served, move with supporting

improvements covered by TCT No. 201126 of the Register of Deeds of the

affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in

City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the "Property."

his favor upon all or any part thereof. 5. Notwithstanding the fact that title to the Property is registered in the A summary judgment, or accelerated judgment, is a procedural technique to promptly

name of defendant, the Property in actuality belongs to the estate of Donald C.

dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings,

Lightner, Jr. and plaintiff jointly.

depositions, admissions and affidavits on record, or for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation to avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a trial. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts.

5.1. The Property was acquired with conjugal or community funds and therefore is a conjugal or community asset. 5.2. The Property was used exclusively as the primary residence of Donald C. Lightner, Jr. and his mistress Aida Villaluz until his death. Ms. Villaluz continues to reside on the Property.

This is what is referred to as a partial summary judgment. A careful reading of this

6. In an attempt to divest and defraud plaintiff out of her 50%

section reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a

undivided interest in the Property, Donald C. Lightner, Jr. caused

"final judgment," as it does not "put an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff

the title to the Property to be registered in the name of defendant

either has or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for." The Rules provide

(Bancorp)”

for a partial summary judgment as a means to simplify the trial process by allowing the court to focus the trial only on the assailed facts, considering as established those facts

She prayed That judgment be rendered declaring that defendant holds a 50% undivided

which are not in dispute.

interest in the property as trustee and in trust for the benefit of plaintiff.

After this sifting process, the court is instructed to issue an order, the partial summary

Bancorp filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on grounds that the complain states no cause

judgment, which specifies the disputed facts that have to be settled in the course of trial. In

of action since the Lighter is an American citizen which cannot own real properties in PH and

this way, the partial summary judgment is more akin to a record of pre-trial, an interlocutory

that the petition is premature since the alleged conjugal properties has not yet been liquidated.

order, rather than a final judgment. RTC issued an Order denying the motion of Bancorp, prompting it to file a motion for Unlike a final judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an

reconsideration. Lightner opposed the motion. This time, however, the RTC issued an Order on

'interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that

April 14, 1998 granting the motion of Bancorp, and ordered the complaint dismissed.

may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. Lightner filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the questioned Bearing in mind these differences, there can be no doubt that the partial summary

order is contrary to the relevant facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. For its

judgment envisioned by the Rules is an interlocutory order that was never meant to

part, Bancorp filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that CA has no jurisdiction

be treated separately from the main case.

since the instant appeal involves pure questions of law and is properly recognized in the SC.

Applicability of Guevarra

Lightner opposed the Motion to Dismiss Appeal, claiming that her appeal involved both questions of law and questions of facts. On October 19, 2000, the CA resolved to deny the

In the Guevarra case, the Court held that the summary judgment rendered by the lower

Motion to Dismiss Appeal filed by Bancorp.

court was in truth a partial summary judgment because it failed to resolve the other causes of action in the complaint, as well as the counterclaim and the third party complaint raised by the defendants. cEITCA Clearly, this partial summary judgment did not dispose of the case as the main issues raised in plaintiff Tomas Tan's complaint, i.e., the validity of the secretary's certificate which authorized John Dennis Chua to take out loans, and execute promissory notes and mortgages for and on behalf of CST, as well as the validity of the resultant promissory notes and mortgage executed for and on behalf of CST, remained unresolved.aIDc

ISSUE: Whether the case involves questions of law or questions of fact. RULING: Questions of law. The order of the trial court dismissing the complaint of respondent (plaintiff below) on the ground that it is premature and states no cause of action is final because it terminated the proceedings so that nothing more can be done in the trial court. The order ended the litigation. There are two modes of appeal from a final order of the trial court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction — (1) by writ of error under Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the

Thus, while there can be no question as to respondent Chua's liability to PBB (since he

Rules of Court if questions of fact or questions of fact and law are raised or involved; or (2)

already admitted to executing these promissory notes as a co-maker), still, the court a

appeal by certiorari under Section 2(c), Rule 41, in relation to Rule 45, where only

quo's findings on: (a) whether John Dennis Chua was properly authorized to sign these

questions of law are raised or involved.

promissory notes on behalf of CST, and (b) whether John Dennis Chua actually signed these promissory notes in his personal capacity, would certainly have the effect of determining whether respondent Chua has the right to go after CST and/or John Dennis Chua for reimbursement on any payment he makes on these promissory notes, pursuant to Article 1217 of the Civil Code. Contrary to PBB's contention, however, certiorari was not the proper recourse for respondent Chua. The propriety of the summary judgment may be corrected only on appeal

If the aggrieved party appeals by writ of error under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the CA and it turns out, from the brief of appellant, that only questions of law are raised, the appeal shall be dismissed. The nature of the issues to be raised on appeal can be gleaned from the appellant's notice of appeal filed in the trial court and in his or her brief as appellant in the appellate court. The provision relied upon by respondent, Section 15, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, reads:

or other direct review, not a petition for certiorari, since it imputes error on the lower court's judgment. It is well-settled that certiorari is not available to correct errors of procedure or

Sec. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. — Whether or

mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions of law and fact.

not the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the court below, he may include in his assignment of errors any

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MODULE 5: APPEAL question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below

declaration of Mocorro contained an annotation that such lot was subject to a mortgage in

and which is within the issues framed by the parties.

favour of the Bank of Naval.

This rule, however, does not relate to the nature of the issues that may be raised on appeal by

In 1984, the cadastral lot of the spouses Dadizons were issued a tax declaration for the first

the aggrieved party, whether issues of fact or issues of law, or the mode of appeal of the

time, and such tax declaration had the effect of decreasing the lot of the Mocorros on the

aggrieved party from a final order or resolution of the trial court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; it merely provides the nature of the issues appellant may include in his assignment of error incorporated in his Brief as appellant. It may happen that the appellant may have raised in the trial court errors of fact or law or both, and need not include all said issues in his appeal in the appellate court. The appellant has the right to choose which issues of law he or she may raise in the CA in addition to factual issues already raised.

western boundary from 224 sq. m. to 146 sq. m (a decrease of 78 sq. m.). Hence, the Spouses Mocorro filed this case in the MTC. MTC RULING: The MTC ruled in favour of the plaintiff spouses owing to the fact that the spouses had “solid evidence” in their favour. The defendant spouses on the other hand merely showed a private document from their mother, and made flimsy excuses as to why it was not

A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of alleged

notarized. Moreover, Felicidad Dadizon, being a public school teacher, ought to know that such

facts. If the query requires a reevaluation of the credibility of witnesses or the existence or

is needed to be notarized. Hence, the MTC declared the plaintiffs as owners of the 78 sq. m.

relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query

lot, and ordered to demolish the structures the defendants had made, and to cancel the Tax

is factual. On the other hand, there is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as

declaration of Dadizon, plus damages.

to what the law is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. In a case involving a

RTC: RTC affirmed the MTC’s findings in toto since “conclusions and findings of the trial cout

question of law, the resolution of the issue rests solely on what the law provides on the given

are entitled to great weight”.

set of circumstances.

Ordinarily, the determination of whether an appeal involves only

questions of law or both questions of law and fact is best left to the appellate court. All doubts

CA RULING: The Dadizons filed a notice of appeal. CA initially asked them to file appellant’s

as to the correctness of the conclusions of the appellate court will be resolved in

brief. However, the Mocorros moved to dismiss since the mode of appeal was “erroneous”.

favor of the CA unless it commits an error or commits a grave abuse of discretion.

Agreeing with the Mocorros, the CA dismissed the appeal and denied the subsequent motion

In the present case, respondent appealed the order of the trial court, which dismissed her complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action against petitioner (defendant

for reconsideration. Hence, the Dadizons come to this Court to assail the dismissals. ISSUE: WON the mode of appeal was erroneous?

therein), and for prematurity, as the conjugal partnership between her and her deceased husband had not yet been liquidated prior to its filing. With the foregoing premises, we agree with petitioner's contention that a question of whether or not a complaint states a cause of action against defendant or that the action is premature is one of law. The determination thereof is one of law and not of facts. Indeed, in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that:

RULING: Yes. This petition for review on certiorari lacks merit. They should have filed a petition for review in accordance with Rule 42, Rules of Court, which was the correct mode of appeal, considering that the RTC had rendered the decision in question in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Appeals to that Court from the Regional Trial Courts are perfected in two (2) ways, both of which are entirely distinct from an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court (See Sec 2 Rule 41). They are:

In a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, there cannot be any question of fact or "doubt or difference as to the truth or falsehood of facts,"

a) by ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ of error - where judgment was rendered in a civil or

simply because there are no findings of fact in the first place. What the

criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction; and

trial court merely does is to apply the law to the facts as alleged in the complaint, assuming such allegations to be true. It follows then that any appeal therefrom

b) by petition for review - where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of

could only raise questions of law or "doubt or controversy as to what the law is on

appellate jurisdiction.

a certain state of facts." Therefore, a decision dismissing a complaint based on failure to state a cause of action necessarily precludes a review of the same

The petition for review must be filed with the Court of Appeals within 15 days from notice of

decision on questions of fact. One is the legal and logical opposite of the other.

the judgment, AND shall point out the error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed. An ordinary appeal is

The Court further ruled that a review of a finding of lack of cause of action based on the factual

taken by merely filing a notice of appeal within 15 days from notice of the judgment, except

and material allegations of the complaint would only limit itself to whether the law was properly

in special proceedings or cases where multiple appeals are allowed in which event the period

applied given the facts alleged in the complaint. What would inevitably arise from such a review are pure questions of law, and not questions of fact. Thus, the appeal of respondent to the CA by writ of error is a wrong mode of appeal; consequently, the appeal should have been dismissed.

of appeal is 30 days and a record on appeal is necessary. In fine, if an appeal is essayed to either court by the wrong procedure, the only course of action open is to dismiss the appeal. If an appeal by notice of appeal is taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals and in the latter Court, the appellant raises naught but issues of law, the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. And finally, it may be stressed once more, it is only through petitions for review on certiorari that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may properly be invoked. Consequently, the CAs dismissal of the Dadizons appeal was proper. Sec. 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court[14] pronounces that an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed. Indeed, the policy of liberal construction mandated by the Rules of Court may be invoked

SPOUSES DADIZON VS CA TOPIC: Rule 42 - appeal from MTC to RTC to CA

only in situations in which there is some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, but not where its application subverts the essence of the proceeding. Hence, every lawyer must observe scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, with keen

MNEMONICS para dali: Dadizons – Defendants (D – D)

awareness that any error or imprecision in compliance therewith may well be fatal to his client's cause.

FACTS: The Spouses Mocorros filed a case in MTC versus the Spouses Dadizons to recover a lot, and also sought consequential damages. The right to recover the land traced back to a

BONUS – SUBSTANTIAL LAW: The land belonged to the Mocorros since the unnotarized

certain Ignacio Bernal who owned 3000 Sq. m. of land. This certain Bernal sold 224 sq. m. of

deed of sale could not bind third parties. Moreover, the findings of the lower courts are given

the lot to Elaba, Elaba sold the same to Mayor Caneja, and Mayor Caneja finally sold it to

great weight.

Mocorro. Such transfers were evidenced by tax declarations. It is to be noted that the tax

4 | Page

MODULE 5: APPEAL PCI LEASING VS ANTONIO MILAN (Read Sec 1, Rule 22)

relaxed the doctrine of immutability of final judgments on the following grounds: to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of

FACTS: PCI Leasing (PCI) filed a complaint for sum of money against Milan in the RTC since

special or compelling circumstances (SC used this ground in this case) (c) the merits of

the checks given in payment of the loans (P2million) were dishonoured, and Milan did not pay

the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by

despite demands. The summons cannot be served by the process server since on two

the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous

occasions; he was told that the defendants already transferred to an unknown location.

and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Hence, the civil case

PCI Leasing filed a Motion to Archive, subject to reinstatement, after the whereabouts of the

was REINSTATED.

defendants was determined. However, such was denied and was instead directed to take the

BONUS – CA also erred in dismissing the notice of appeal on the ground that it involved purely

necessary steps to actively prosecute the instant case. Hence, PCI Leasing filed a motion for

questions of law, without even looking at any substantive pleading.

Alias Summons. At first it was denied for containing a “defective notice of hearing”, but after filing a second motion, it was accepted. However, during the hearing for the motion, there was no appearance from both counsels of the PCI Leasing and the respondents. Hence, it was SAMUEL JULIAN, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, ROBERTO DELA CRUZ,

dismissed.

petitioner, vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE CITY SHERIFF,

PCI, then, filed a motion for reconsideration explaining that the counsel was already in the courtroom when the judge dictated the order of dismissal. The counsel even asked for apologies. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration, to “serve as a lesson to PCI to be more considerate of the time and resources of the court”. PCI leasing filed an Ex Parte Motion for reconsideration, seeking once more a reconsideration of the dismissal of the case. RTC

respondents. FACTS: Thelma Julian, mother of Samuel (Petitioner), executed a Real estate mortgage over a parcel of land in Roxas City to secure the her loan from DBP worth P99k. A SPA was inserted in the mortgage contract appointing DBP to sell the property in the event of

denied the ex parte motion. PCI filed notice of appeal with the RTC (the notice was properly

extrajudicial foreclosure. Thelma later died. Land was foreclosed with DBP being the highest

made in accordance with Sec 5 Rule 41). RTC dismissed the Notice of Appeal since it was

bidder coz of arrearages in the monthly amortizations. Title was consolidated coz no

taken out of time, hence it has become final and executory.

redemption.

RTC’S REASON:

January 17 was the date the counsel received the denial of the 1st

Later, Spouses Dela Cruz (ang wife is sibling ni Julian), offered to purchase the

motion. He filed the 2nd motion on January 26, so 9 days was already used up, and the

property, which was accepted by DBP and thereafter executed a Deed of Conditional Sale.

counting of the period stopped. The counsel received the denial of the 2nd motion on May 3

Later, they failed to pay 72 amortizations but still refused to vacate despite demand, so

and resumed the counting of the period. So supposedly, according to the RTC, he had 7 days

unlawful detainer was filed, which was granted by the trial court. Before the writ of execution

left daw to appeal, which is on May 10. However, the notice of appeal was filed on May 11.

can be carried, Julian filed a petition to cancel TCT of DBP alleging that the SPA inserted was

(Ambot sad nganu 16 days total ang computation sa RTC, basta sayup siya kay gi-suspend

cancelled due to the death of Thelma. So the foreclosure sale and TCT were void.

ang counting sa period pag-file sa 2nd motion). RTC RULING: CA RULING: Denied also the petition for certiorari since it has become final and executory

After some time, parties reached a settlement. So RTC ordered them to submit a

(OUR TOPIC), and it contained purely questions of law. PCI filed a motion for reconsideration

joint motion to dismiss the case. But two years have passed, none complied. So RTC

but was denied. Hence, it reached the Supreme Court.

dismissed the case for failure of the parties to comply for unreasonable length of time. But it was nevertheless reversed for payment of Julian of the 10% of DPB’s claim. So since na

ISSUE: WON the appeal was filed on time?

revive, parties were given 15 days, which was extended to 30, to submit their compromise agreement, but still none complied. So, gi dismiss njud sa RTC. But, Julian was able to timely

RULING: No, but the Supreme Court used a different computation as to the time table than

file an appeal to the CA but failed to pay the docket and other lawful fees.

that of the RTC. CA RULING: An ordinary appeal of a judgment by the Regional Trial Court shall be taken within fifteen days

So CA dismissed coz of non-payment despite explanation of Julian that non-

from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from, except in the meantime, a motion for

payment was due to oversight and non-cognizance of the necessity to pay coz his counsel did

new trial or reconsideration is filed, in which case, appellant is given a “fresh period” of fifteen

not inform him. CA said that the payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is

days within which to filed the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order

mandatory for the perfection of an appeal." This is so because a court acquires

dismissing the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. (reference was made to Neypes

jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action only upon the payment of the correct

vs CA)

amount of docket fees regardless of the actual date of Fling of the case in court. The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is sine qua non for the perfection of an

This “fresh period rule” shall also apply to appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the

appeal.

Regional Trial Courts, petitions for review from the RTC to the CA, appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA, and petitions for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court. It is to be noted, however, that under Section 5 Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading, and the filing thereof does not toll the period within which an appeal may be taken. In the case at bar, PCI Leasing filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated October 13, 2000, which dismissed Civil Case No. Q-00-40010. On January 4, 2001, the RTC rendered a Resolution, denying the Motion for Reconsideration. Said Resolution was received

ISSUE: WON CA was correct in strictly applying the rules on the payment of docket fees. - YES RULING: PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: He acknowledges the mandatory nature of the payment of docket and other lawful fees but asserts that the broader interest of justice and the desired objective of deciding the case on the merits call for leniency in the application of the rules.

by PCI Leasing on January 17, 2001.[65] Therefore, PCI Leasing should have filed its Notice of Appeal within 15 days from January 17, 2001 or until February 1, 2001. PCI Leasing actually filed its Notice of Appeal on May 11, 2001 or 114 days after receipt of the Resolution denying its Motion for Reconsideration.

SC SAID: Payment of full docket fees within the prescribed period for taking an appeal is mandatory. It is well-established that "[t]he right to appeal is a statutory privilege and must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law."

Contrary to the findings of the RTC, the period within which to file the Notice of Appeal should

"Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with the requirements

not be reckoned from May 3, 2001,[66] the date of receipt of the RTC Resolution dated April 6,

of the rules, and failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal."

2001, which denied the Ex Parte Motion. Rule 41(4) of ROC provides that appellant shall pay the full amount of the HOWEVER, despite the fact that it was filed out of time and hence final and executory, the

appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment shall be transmitted together

Supreme Court gave due course to the petition. In Barnes vs Padilla, the SC stated that it has

with the original record.

5 | Page

MODULE 5: APPEAL extrinsic fraud. CA dismissed on the ground that the negligence of Atty. Pascua did not Also, it is likewise provided in the rules that the failure to pay the docket and

constitute extrinsic fraud. Hence, the petition.

other lawful fees is a ground for dismissal of the appeal. It is a condition sine qua non for the appeal to be perfected and only then can a court acquire jurisdiction over the

ISSUE:

case. The requirement of an appeal fee is not a mere technicality of law or procedure and should not be undermined except for the most persuasive of reasons.

RULING:

EXCEPTION: when persuasive reasons exist that merits leniency.

Pascua, and the evidence presented in support do not warrant a reversal of the CA

Marcelina’s allegation of extrinsic fraud committed by her former counsel, Atty. decision affirming the RTC. IN THIS CASE: The justifications of oversight and lack of advice from counsel are neither convincing nor adequate to merit leniency.

It is well-settled that "(i)n order for fraud to serve as basis for annulment of a judgment, it must be extrinsic or collateral in character, otherwise there would be no end to litigations. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party which is committed

Petitioner submits that he only found out about the requirement to pay the docket

outside the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting

fees when he received the CA Resolution denying his appeal on April 22, 2005 or three days

fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.'' Thus, it

short of one year from Fling of the said appeal. This Court finds this not to be logically true to

"refers to some act or conduct of the prevailing party which has prevented the aggrieved party

human experience. It is unusual for petitioner's counsel not to advise him of the required

from having a trial or presenting his case to the court, or was used to procure judgment without

docket fees. More often than not, counsels are aware of the docket


a fair submission of the controversy." This Court has not just once ruled that the fraud must be

fees required to be paid to the courts, and will ask clients for the said amount prior to Filing

committed by the adverse party and not by one's own counsel

pleadings in court. This is so because counsels are not expected to shoulder or advance payment for their clients.

The doctrinal rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client because otherwise, "there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed

Assuming arguendo that petitioner's counsel did not
 inform him of the requirement to pay the docket fees to perfect the appeal, what we find

who could allege and show that prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or learned.

incredible is that petitioner apparently failed to communicate with his counsel after the filng of said appeal. This Court has repeatedly held that "litigants, represented by counsel, should not

EXCEPTION: the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of

expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case. "It is the

law, or where the application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty or

duty of a party-litigant to be in contact with his counsel from time to time in order to be

property or where the interests of justice so require and relief ought to be accorded to the client

informed of the progress of his case.

who suffered by reason of the lawyer's gross or palpable mistake or negligence.

Moreover, the counsel's negligence binds petitioner and, for that reason alone

IN THIS CASE:

the loss of his remedy was caused by his own negligence. Consequently, a relaxation of the

Marcelina’s allegation is a mere conclusion and does not find support in the

rule cannot be granted. The bitter consequence of such grave inadvertence is to render the

evidence submitted. To impute negligence is one thing, to prove such negligence was in

trial court's order final and executory

collusion with the Domingos is another.

Reliance on Yambao case was also misplaced because in that case, the CA

The lapses committed by Atty. Pascua were simple negligence, and not gross or

allowed the extension of the time to pay when the payment made was incorrect – so there is

palpable negligence amounting to extrinsic fraud. While Marcelina’s case was pending, he filed

actually payment, although incorrect amount, which is not the situation in this case.

the required pleadings and presented evidence in support of the former’s cause. His filing of a defective notice of appeal and motions for recon cannot be said to be sheer absence of real

DENIED.

effort on his part to defend his client’s cause amounting to gross negligence. Moreover, Marcelina was not outrightly deprved of her property as she was given ample opportunity to

MARCELINA GACUTANA-FRAILE, petitioner, vs. ANGEL T. DOMINGO, BENJAMIN T.

adduce evidence on her behalf.

DOMINGO, ATTY. JORGE PASCUA AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC BRANCH 33, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA, respondents

DENIED.

FACTS:

Estrella vs Espiridon, GR No. 134460 Marcelina (Petitioner) filed a civil case for quieting of title and damages against

Angel and Benjamin (Domingos – respondent)in the RTC of Guimba Nueva Ecija, involving 3

Facts: Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners for the recovery of possession of a

parcels of land registered in her name. Then, while the case was pending, the Domingos filed

parcel of land being occupied by petitioner alleging that they (respondents) are the absolute

a quieting of title against Marcelina involving the same lands. (ni baws ug file)

owners of such parcel of land. Respondent further alleged that it acquired the land through purchase and the house of petitioner was already there at that time of purchase and that she

Marcelina hired Atty. Pascua (respondent) as counsel. Atty. Pascua filed a motion

merely tolerated the presence of petitioner.

to dismiss the Domingos’ case on the ground not on the pendency of Marcelina’s case but on the on a decision earlier rendered by the same RTC reconstituting Marcelina’s titles over the

RTC rendered a judgement on September 3, 1997 in favor of respondent ordering petitioners

lands in question. On the joint hearings, Atty. Pascua agreed to a continuous trial and allowed

to vacate the land. During the reglementary period for filling an appeal, petitioner’s counsel

the Domingos to present their evidence first even if Marcelina filed her case ahead.

filed a motion to withdraw appearance and was substituted by another counsel. Petitioner then filed an appeal on Oct. 1, 1997 which was eventually denied by the CA on the ground that

RTC DECISION:

their notice of appeal did not specify the court to which the appeal was being taken.

In favor of the Domingos. Atty. Pascua filed notice of appeal and motion for recon only on the last day for filing. It was dismissed for lack of service to the adverse party and

With this filed a certiorari petition to the SC seeking nullification of CA’s order of denying due

no written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. It also lacked a

course their appeal alleging that the CAwas too strict in denying their notice of appeal for

notice of hearing. It also failed to specify the court to which the appeal was being taken.

failure to specify the court to which appeal is being taken, despite the fact that said notice was

Docket fees were not seasonably paid.

filed within the reglementary period to appeal. They argued that since the Notice of Appeal was filed on October 1, 1997 or just three months after the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure only took

Motion for recon of Atty. Pascua was denied. Later, he did not challenge the

effect on July 1, 1997, they should be given some leniency in complying with the new rules.

order, so titles of Marcelina were cancelled. Issue: WON the CA was correct in denying due course petitioner’s appeal. CA DECISION: Aggrieved, she hired another lawyer, Atty. Esguerra who filed a petition for

Held: No, SC relaxed the rules.

annulment of the RTC judgmenet citing the procedural lapses of Atty. Pascua as amounting to

6 | Page

MODULE 5: APPEAL We find cogent reasons for a relaxation of the application of the rules of procedure in this case.

Anent the failure to transmit the records to the Court of Appeals within the period prescribed by

At the outset, we call to mind our pronouncement in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Hon.

law, we find that respondent Casila-Derayunan was remiss in the performance of her duty

Helen Bautista Ricafort, et al. to wit:

under Section 10 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court which provides:

The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect only on 1 July 1997, while the

Sec. 10. Duty of clerk of court of the lower court upon perfection of appeal. —

questioned "Answer (with Counterclaims)" was filed only on 8 August 1997, or on

Within thirty (30) days after perfection of all the appeals in accordance with the

the 39th day following the effectivity of the 1997 Rules. Hence, private

preceding section, it shall be the duty of the clerk of court of the lower court:

respondents' counsel may not have been fully aware of the requirements and ramifications of Section 11, Rule 13.

xxx xxx xxx (d). To transmit the records to the appellate court.

xxx xxx xxx It has been several months since the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect.

She ought to know that she is required to transmit the complete records to the appellate court

In the interim, this Court has generally accommodated parties and counsel who

within thirty days after the perfection of the appeal. Based on the records, the appeal was

failed to comply with the requirement of a written explanation whenever personal

given due course and the records were ordered elevated to the Court of Appeals as early as

service or filing was not practicable, guided, in the exercise of our discretion, by

September 25, 2002 but the same was not transmitted

the primary objective of Section 11, the importance of the subject matter of the

within the 30-day period. Her explanation that she was saddled with heavy work load is not an

case, the issues involved and the prima facie merit of the challenged pleading.

excuse for her not to perform her duties but serves only to mitigate her liability.

However, as we have in the past, for the guidance of the Bench and Bar, strictest compliance with Section 11 of Rule 13 is mandated one month from promulgation

The fact that complainant's co-plaintiff Amor filed an urgent motion did not exculpate her from

of this Decision. (Emphasis supplied)

liability because eight months had already lapsed without her transmitting the records to the appellate court when said motion was filed. It has been held that the failure of the clerk of court

Further, in the higher interest of orderly administration of justice and to spare the parties from

to transmit the records of a case constitutes negligence and warrants disciplinary action. The

further delay in the final resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 46671 as well as Civil Case No. 169-

clerk of court is an

M-92, we move on to resolve the issue of whether or not petitioners' appeal should have been

essential officer of our judicial system. As an officer of the court, he performs delicate

given due course by the trial court despite the failure of petitioners to specify in their notice of

administrative functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice. Among the

appeal the appellate court to which they intended to bring their appeal.

duties of the Branch Clerk of Court is the prompt and orderly transmittal of appealed cases and the records to the appellate court.

Section 5, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provides: Sec. 5. Notice of appeal. — The notice of appeal shall indicate the parties to the

We find complainant's claim that respondent Judge violated the Rules of Court when he acted

appeal, specify the judgment or final order or part thereof appealed from, specify

on his co-plaintiff Amor's Motion to Discharge Counsel and Withdraw Notice of Appeal after the

the court to which the appeal is being taken, and state the material dates

perfection of appeal, to be untenable. Rule 41, Section 9 of the Rules of Court provides:

showing the timeliness of the appeal. (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. — A party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in

There exists no doubt that the notice of appeal must specify the court to which the appeal is

due time.

being taken. However, considering that the notice of appeal was filed by petitioners on October 1, 1997 or just three months from July 1, 1997, the date of effectivity of said

A party's appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect

Rule, we apply the same policy of leniency as earlier enunciated in the Solar Team case.

to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.

Thus, the appeal should have been given due course for a proper review of the findings of the trial court in Civil Case No. 169-M-92 by the Court of Appeals.

In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

Osorio vs Judge Dizon, AM No. RTJ-04-1838 In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject Facts: Petitioner was one of the complaints in a civil case before the RTC in sala of

matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and

respondent Judge. They filed an appeal of the decision of the RTC and filed the necessary

the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

notice of appeal on July 22, 2002. On September 25, 2002 respondent judge gave due course to the appeal and ordered the transmittal of the entire records to the Court of Appeals for

In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on

further proceedings. However, the records were not forwarded to the court of appeals.

appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal,

On May 23, 2003, complainant's co-plaintiff, Danilo Amor, filed with the trial court an Urgent

approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution

Motion to Discharge Counsel and to Withdraw Notice of Appeal, alleging that plaintiff Rosita

pending appeal in accordance with section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of

Amor had passed away and none of the heirs including himself are no longer interested to

the appeal. (Emphasis supplied).

pursue the case to file notice of appeal. Respondent Dizon however still acted on this and set a hearing thereon. Petitioner then opposed this contending that Judge Dizon should not have

Clearly, upon the perfection of appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case, but

acted on the motion since the thirty-day period had already lapsed.

prior to the transmittal of the records to the appellate court, it can still exercise residual jurisdiction such as allowing the withdrawal of appeal. At the time the Motion to Discharge

It was only on November 13, 2003 that the entire records of the case was forward to the CA.

Counsel and Withdraw Appeal was filed by complainant's co-plaintiff Amor, the records were

With this, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent alleging that there violation of the

not yet forwarded to the appellate court. Thus, respondent judge did not exceed the trial court's

Rules requiring transmittal of records within the period of thirty days from the time the appeal

jurisdiction when he acted on the motion.

was given due course such that he was prejudiced in the sense that gave an advantage to the defendant in the civil case it filed before respondent judge.

However, the fault of the respondent judge lies in the fact that he treated Amor's motion as a non-litigated motion which he granted without any hearing. While the defendants would

The OCA recommended that respondent Clerk of Court Casila-Derayunan be FINED

naturally not oppose such a motion, Amor had other co-plaintiffs, herein complainant Osorio

P1,000.00 while respondent Judge Agustin S. Dizon be warned for his inability to exercise

and his wife who could be prejudiced by the withdrawal of their appeal. Thus, the respondent

close supervision over the personnel of his court and that a commission of similar acts in the

judge should have set the motion for hearing so as to give the other plaintiffs the chance to be

future would be dealt with more severely.

heard; or, he should have required complainant and his wife to comment on said motion. As a judge, he should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and the

Issue: WON the OCA was correct in fining respondents.

procedural laws.

Held: We agree with the findings of the OCA and approve its recommendations.

Villamor V. NPC (NAPOCOR)

7 | Page

MODULE 5: APPEAL Facts: Respondent NAPOCOR instituted an action for eminent domain with prayer for the

A partys appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect

issuance of a writ of possession against petitioner, Carlos Villamor, before the RTC of Danao

to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in

City. Subject of expropriation was a portion containing 3,224 square meters of a 10,625 square

due time.

meter lot belonging to petitioner situated in Barangay Catipay, Carmen, Cebu where NAPOCOR intended to install transmission lines for its 230 KV Leyte-Cebu Interconnection

In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon

Project.

the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

Subsequently, Respondent was granted by the court a writ of possession regarding the subject

In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject

properties. After the court rendered judgment, respondent filed a motion for

matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and

reconsideration for the reduction of the price of the properties and to use as basis, the

the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

price on their tax declarations which was denied. In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on NAPOCOR thereupon filed a Notice of Appeal dated March 2, 1998 which was given due

appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the

course by Order of March 9, 1998 of the trial court which ordered the Clerk of Court to

rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal,

transmit the original records of the case to the CA

approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.

Petitioner then filed for an execution pending appeal before the trial court which was

The mere filing by one party of a notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of its

granted.

jurisdiction over a case and to resolve pending incidents, like a motion for execution pending appeal filed by the party within the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal because the court must hear and resolve such motion for it would become part of the records to be elevated

From the trial courts order granting petitioners Motion for Execution Pending Appeal,

on appeal.

NAPOCOR filed a Motion for Reconsideration, it asserting that when petitioner filed the motion, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction over the case. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied and a Notice of Garnishment was ordered by the Court against

As long as any of the parties may still file his, her, or its appeal, the court

Land Bank for the satisfaction of the writ.

does not lose jurisdiction over the case. The plaintiff or plaintiffs may not deprive the defendants or co-plaintiffs and neither may the defendant or defendants deprive the plaintiff or co-defendants of

Issue: WON The Trial Court Acted in grave abuse of discretion upon ordering the writ?

the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to move for a new trial or an execution pending appeal by immediately filing a notice of appeal. The filing of an appeal by a losing party does not automatically divest the party favored

Ruling: Section 2 (a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the provision governing execution of judgments pending appeal, provides: SEC. 2. Discretionary execution. (a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal. After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court. Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing. Passing on the provision of the Rules, this Court explains: xxx the trial court may only grant discretionary execution while it has jurisdiction

by a decision of the right to move for a more favorable decision or to ask for execution pending appeal. It is only after all the parties respective periods to appeal have lapsed that the court loses jurisdiction over the case In the present case, when NAPOCOR filed its Notice of Appeal on time, the appeal was deemed perfected with respect to it only. The appeal did not deprive petitioner of its right to file a motion for execution within the reglementary period of appeal or fifteen days from his receipt of the trial courts February 20, 1998 Resolution denying NAPOCORs Motion for Reconsideration. The records do not show that copy of the said February 20, 1998 Resolution was furnished petitioners counsel. There can thus be no notice to speak of from which the 15-day reglementary period of appeal is counted. When a notice required to be given is not furnished to the attorney of record of a party, the corresponding reglementary period for the subsequent procedural steps that he may take does not start. Even if it is assumed that petitioners counsel did receive a copy of the trial courts Resolution of February 20, 1998 on the same date as the counsel of NAPOCOR did, the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal was still filed within the reglementary period. It bears noting that a certified true copy of the Notice of Transmittal issued by Clerk of Court

over the case and is in possession of either of the original record or the record

shows that the records of the case were transmitted to the appellate court on September 30,

on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion. When not

1998, long after petitioner filed his Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. That the trial

all of the parties have perfected their appeal and the period to appeal has yet to

court had earlier given due course to NAPOCORs appeal by Order of March 9, 1998 and

expire, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to order

therein directed the transmittal of the records of the case to the appellate court is

discretionary execution. Discretionary execution is thus barred when the trial

inconsequential

court loses jurisdiction and this occurs when all of the parties have filed their respective appeals or when the period to appeal has lapsed for those who did not file their appeals and when the court is no longer in possession of the

With respect to the issuing of the writ of execution. As a general rule, such should be issued

records of the case.

when the case has reached finality. The exception to such is the execution of judgment pending final appeal. In such case, the movant must show good reason to the court why such

Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

should be granted. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to show good cause why such should be granted. Reason for such general rule is that respondent may be injured or may suffer damage

SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. A partys appeal by notice of appeal

if respondent secures reversal of such judgment.

is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.

8 | Page

MODULE 5: APPEAL Fortune Life V. CA

court, now sought to be struck down, are the very reason preventing the realization of these conditions.

Facts: In a civil case, judgment was rendered in favor of respondent (Delsan Transport) against petitioner ordering petitioner to pay a sum of money in favor of respondent. Subsequently, respondent filed a motion for execution pending appeal. It invoked as "good reason" petitioner's alleged fraud and deceit in not informing the former of the latter's change in

Thus, the trial court had no more jurisdiction to issue the disputed orders inasmuch as the case had already come under the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of respondent court. De Liano vs CA (Taas ni kay gi-disect ang each part sa brief)

corporate name. At the same time, respondent issued a bond in favor of petitioner to answer FACTS:

for damages in case the order would be reversed by the CA.

There was a case filed for the cancellation of 2 real estate mortgages (REM) in

favor of petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) executed by private respondent Benjamin The motion was opposed by petitioner. While the motion was pending, or on December 20,

Tango over his house and lot in Quezon City. Other defendants in the case were De Liano and

1985, petitioner filed its notice of appeal.

`Abrille, Jr., who are senior executives of SMC. The RTC of QC rendered a decision ordering SMC to release the REM in favor of

On January 2, 1986, the trial court issued a writ of execution pending appeal.

Tango. SMC, De Liano and Abrille appealed the aforesaid decision to the CA. In due time, The Sheriff garnished its bank deposit and levied upon its properties. Petitioner then filed a

their counsel filed an Appellants' Brief which failed to comply with Section 13, Rule 44 of the

petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The trial Court's order granting the writ of

ROC.

execution pending appeal was set aside on the ground that, inter alia, the alleged "good The appellee (respondent) was quick to notice these deficiencies, and

reason" of private respondent was sufficient to justify the issuance of said writ.

accordingly filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal. And so, appellants averred that their brief had substantially complied with the requirements. They proffered the excuse that the omissions Subsequently, Petitioner filed a case against respondent for damages against the bond which

were only the result of oversight and as such could be considered "harmless" errors.

was opposed by respondent contending that the trial court had already lost jurisdiction.

The CA dismissed the appeal hence the case at bar. ISSUE: WON the appeal was validly denied due the failure to comply with Sec. 13, Rule 44 of the ROC.

Issue: WON said court retain jurisdiction to hear the application for damages against the bond that was posted in support of private respondent's motion for execution pending appeal?

RULING: YES. The petition was validly denied. Section 13, Rule 44 of the ROC governs the format to be followed by the appellant in drafting his brief (pre tan-awa nalang sa codal kay taaas kayo)

Ruling: The general rule is, petitioner states, once the appeal from a trial court judgment has been perfected said court loses jurisdiction over the case. By way of exception, it retains jurisdiction, inter alia, to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal. Under the facts of this case, upon perfection of the appeal to respondent court, the trial court lost its jurisdiction over the

a.

The first requirement of an appellant's brief is a subject index. The index is

intended to facilitate the review of appeals by providing ready reference, functioning much like a table of contents. Unlike in other jurisdiction, there is no limit on the length of appeal briefs or appeal memoranda filed before appellate courts. (That’s why for convenience, dapat naay subject index)

case only insofar as the subject matter of the appeal is concerned but not the right of petitioner to recover damages against the bond. The cause of action in the first is the occurrence of the

b.

risk insured under the marine policy whereas in the second, it is the breach of the condition in

appellate procedure is an enumeration by appellant of the errors alleged to have been

the bond, to wit: "to answer for any damages which the defendant may suffer by reason of the

committed by the court below in the trial of the case upon which he seeks to obtain a reversal

execution." Granting arguendo that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claim for

of the judgment.

An assignment of errors follows the subject index. An assignment of errors in

damages, private respondent is estopped by laches from raising the same. It has been held that a general assignment of errors is unacceptable under the There is no controversy that the appeal of petitioner has been perfected. As a necessary

rules. Thus, a statement of the following tenor: that "the CFI of this City incurred error in

consequence thereof, the trial court was divested of jurisdiction over the case.

rendering the judgment appealed from, for it is contrary to law and the weight of the evidence,"

Section 9,

Rule 41 of the Rules of Court mentions three (3) instances when the trial court is allowed to exercise "residual" jurisdiction after the perfection of the appeal, namely: (1) to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal; (2) to approve compromises offered by the parties prior to the transmittal of the record on appeal to the appellate court; and (3) to permit the prosecution of pauper's appeals. Petitioner relies on the first instance as basis for its stand that the trial court has the authority to hear its application for damages. Its reliance thereon is misplaced. Although the application for damages is beyond the scope of the matter to be litigated by the appeal, there is no "protection and preservation" of its "rights" to speak of.

was deemed insufficient. The appellant has to specify in what aspect of the law or the facts that the trial court erred. c.

overview of the judicial antecedents of the case and providing material information regarding the nature of the controversy involved. These enable the appellate court to have a better grasp of the matter entrusted to it for its appraisal.

Respondent court was emphatic in its disquisition on this subject matter: The private respondent's application for damages being heard by the respondent court may

The rules then require that an appellant's brief must contain both a "statement of

the case" and a "statement of facts." A statement of the case gives the appellate tribunal an

The statement of facts comprises the very heart of the appellant's brief. The facts constitute the backbone of a legal argument; they are determinative of the law and

not be considered an exception to Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The provision

jurisprudence applicable to the case. The brief must state the facts admitted by the parties,

speaks of "protection and presentation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any

as well as the facts in controversy.

matter litigated by the appeal." The action for damages, in fact, and in actuality, however, is

Facts which are admitted require no further proof, whereas facts in dispute must

an act of vindication, is punitive in nature and not an act to protect and preserve, but to punish and make one party, the petitioner, to pay damages for having availed of a writ of execution

be backed by evidence. Relative thereto, the rule specifically requires that one's statement of

pending


facts should be supported by page references to the record. If a statement of fact is

appeal

unaccompanied by a page reference to the record, it may be presumed to be without support

It is, moreover, clear that the pursuit of damages against the bond posted by the petitioner in this case, is a futile undertaking for by its express language, approved by the respondent court, the bond may only be answerable in damages where two conditions concur: one, that judgment has, in fact, been rendered on appeal, and second, that the judgment appealed from has been reversed on appeal. The very proceedings before the respondent

in the record and may be stricken or disregarded altogether. d.

When the appellant has given an account of the case and of the facts, he is

required to state the issues to be considered by the appellate court. The statement of issues is not to be confused with the assignment of errors: they are not the same.

9 | Page

MODULE 5: APPEAL The statement of issues puts forth the questions of fact or law to be resolved by the appellate court. (Kahibaw na ta unsay question of fact and question of law)

Lui Enterprises' appellant's brief lacked a subject index, page references to the record, and table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited. Under Rule 50, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Lui Enterprises' appeal.

e.

Thereafter, the appellant is required to present his arguments on each

assigned error. An appellant's arguments go hand in hand with his assignment of errors, for

Except for cases provided in the Constitution, appeal is a "purely statutory right.”

the former provide the justification supporting his contentions, and in so doing resolves the

The right to appeal "must be exercised in the manner prescribed by law.” Otherwise, the

issues.

appeal shall be dismissed, and its dismissal shall not be a deprivation of due process of law. The appellant has to show that he is entitled to the reversal of the judgment

There are exceptions to this rule. One of which is SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE.

appealed, and he cannot do this unless he provides satisfactory reasons for doing so. It is therefore essential that the errors and reasons assigned should be supported by a

IN THE CASE AT BAR: Lui Enterprises did not substantially comply with the rules on the

citation of authorities. Otherwise, the court may not consider the assigned errors.

contents of the appellant's brief. It admitted that its appellant's brief lacked the required

In this regard, the rules require that authorities should be cited by the page of the report at which the case begins, as well as the page of the report where the citation is

subject index, page references to the record, and table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited.

found. (This is for convenience daw para din a mag pakli pakli ang court) f.

Lastly, the appellant is required to state, under the appropriate heading, the

reliefs prayed for. In so doing, the appellate court is left in no doubt as to the result desired by

However, it did not even correct its admitted "technical omissions” by filing an amended appellant's brief with the required contents. Thus, this case does not allow a relaxation of the rules. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Lui Enterprises' appeal.

the appellant. The subject index serves as the brief's table of contents. Instead of "[thumbing] IN THE CASE AT BAR: Naa to’y amended brief gi-file but contained similar defects as to the

through the [appellant's brief]” every time the CA Justice encounters a citation, the Justice

original brief, thus:

deciding the case only has to refer to the subject index for the argument or citation he needs.

1. The brief filed by appellants lacked an assignment of errors but included a statement of

Page references to the record guarantee that the facts stated in the appellant's

issues. 2. The "statement of facts" lacked page references to the record. 3. Authorities were

brief are supported by the record. A statement of fact without a page reference to the record

cited in an improper manner, that is, the exact page of the report where the citation was lifted

creates the presumption that it is unsupported by the record and, thus, "may be stricken

went unspecified. 4. The amended brief did not even follow the prescribed order: the

or disregarded altogether."

assignment of errors came after the statement of the case and the statement of facts. As for the table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited, this is required so that the The half-hearted attempt at submitting a supposedly amended brief only serves

CA can easily verify the authorities cited "for accuracy and aptness."

to harden our resolve to demand a strict observance of the rules. The negligence of the lawyer binds the client. DENIED.

Steel Corp v Equitable PCI Bank

Lui Enterprises vs Zuelling Pharma

FACTS: SCP is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and distribution of cold-

FACTS:

Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma Corporation entered into a 10-year

contract of lease4over a parcel of land. The land was registered to Lui.

rolled and galvanized steel sheets and coils. During its operations, SCP encountered and suffered from financial difficulties and temporary illiquidity, aggravated by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. As a result, SCP was unable to

Zuellig Pharma received a letter from the Philippine Bank of Communications

service its principal payments for its liabilities.

(PBC). Claiming to be the new owner of the leased property, the bank asked Zuellig Pharma to pay rent directly to it. Zuellig Pharma promptly informed Lui Enterprises of the PBC’s claim. Lui

Accordingly, on September 11, 2006, Equitable PCI Bank, Inc., now known as Banco de Oro-

insisted that it has the right to collect the rent, not PBC.

EPCI, Inc. (BDO-EPCIB), which accounted for 27.45% of the total liabilities of SCP, filed a creditor-initiated petition — to place the SCP under corporate rehabilitation

Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and the PBC over the rental payments, Zuellig Pharma filed a complaint. Zuellig Pharma prayed that it be allowed to consign in court the monthly rentals and that Lui Enterprises and the PBC be ordered to litigate their conflicting claims. Lui file a motion to dismiss. Zuelling Pharma filed its opposition to the

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the Rehabilitation Court issued an Order directing, among others, the stay of enforcement of all claims, whether for money or otherwise and whether such enforcement is by court action or otherwise, against SCP, its guarantors, and sureties not solidarily liable with it. The Rehabilitation Court likewise appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as the Rehabilitation Receiver for SCP.

motion to dismiss and alleged that it was filed beyond the period prescribed (15 days

In a Compliance dated March 6, 2007, Atty. Gabionza submitted his recommended

after the service of summons.) Thereafter, it moved that Lui Enterprises be declared in

rehabilitation plan. The said plan contained the salient features of the rehabilitation plans

default.

separately submitted by SCP and BDO-EPCIB, as well as his own comments. The plan was summarized by the Rehabilitation Court as follows: The RTC found that Lui Enterprises failed to file its motion to dismiss within the

reglementary period thus it denied Lui’s motion to dismiss and declared it in default. Lui Enterprises did not file any motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision declaring that Lui is barred from any claim in respect of the rental payments. Lui appealed to the CA. The CA found Lui Enterprises' appellant's brief insufficient. Thus, the CA dismissed the appeal ultimately leading to the case at bar.

Thus, after considering the comments of the other participating creditors and evaluating the proposals of SCP and the petitioner, Atty. Gabionza recommended the following terms and conditions for rehabilitation plan, to wit: 1. Fresh equity infusion of P3.5 Billion, out of which P3 Billion shall be used for debt reduction, and the balance of P500 Million as additional working capital. 2. The P3 Billion allocated for debt repayment shall first service the

ISSUE: WON the CA’s denial of Lui’s appeal was proper RULING: YES. The CA’s denial of the appeal was proper. Under Rule 50, Section 1,

secured credits and excess thereafter will be applied to clean creditors and suppliers.

paragraph (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the CA may, on its own motion or that of the

3. The remaining short term and long term debt balances after debt

appellee, dismiss an appeal should the appellant's brief lack specific requirements under Rule

reduction will be restructured over a period of 12 years inclusive of a

44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f). (Awa lang codal kay taas kaayo)

2 year grace period on principal payments. There shall be 20 equal semi-annual payments of principal to commence at the end of the grace period.

10 | P a g e

MODULE 5: APPEAL 4. Interest rates for the restructure debt shall be 8% per annum fixed for

quo, or the approved Rehabilitation Plan, be MODIFIED

the duration of the loan and shall be payable quarterly in arrears. No

accordingly, thus:

grace period on interest payments. 1. Under its Phase 1, the articles of incorporation and by laws of 5. To protect existing clean creditors, SCP may not secure additional

SCP be accordingly amended to accommodate

secured credits which will utilize the excess assets values after the

the additional equity of Php3.0 Billion.

P3.0 Billion debt reduction. SDHCac 2. Under Phase 2, the present stockholders and/or the 6. Any excess cash after the annual (normal) CAPEX and debt service

Rehabilitation Receiver shall offer for sale to

requirements shall be distributed as follows: 70% debt repayment

acceptable investors SCP's stocks, through

and 30% to be retained by the Company.

negotiated sale or bidding for an amount not less than Php3.0 Billion, which is equivalent to

7. All existing suppliers credits (subject to final validation) shall have 2

approximately 64% of SCP; and

options: 3. Under Phase 3, there shall be an immediate conversion of a. To be paid quarterly over a period of 5 years without interest, or

debt to common shares in the required amount of Php3.0 Billion, which is equivalent to

b. To continuously supply the company on the pay-re-avail (Deliver same

approximately 64% of SCP, pursuant to the terms

amount paid) basis.

and conditions of the Recommended Rehabilitation Plan.

8. All loans, supplier's credit and other SCP liabilities are subject to final verification once the recommended rehabilitation plan is approved.

Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises, are likewise prayed for. 21

The rehabilitation plan recommended by Atty. Gabionza has three (3) phases in the implementation of the proposed P3.5 Billion fresh equity infusion, thus: Phase 1 SCP's articles of incorporation and by laws shall be amended to accommodate the additional equity of P3.5 Billion. The present stockholders of SCP shall be given sixty (60) days from approval of the plan to keep their stockholdings SCP by raising/sourcing the P3.5 Billion fresh equity required.

As to CA-G.R. SP No. 101881, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that it has also been consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No. 101732 in a Resolution issued by the CA dated March 22, 2010. [1st issue re: consolidation] On July 3, 2008, the CA issued the assailed decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 101881, ordering the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings. [2nd issue: re: termination of the proceeding without appellant raising such] Hence, these separate recourses are before us.

Phase 2 In the event the present stockholders fail to raise the P3.5 Billion fresh equity needed to keep their stockholdings and save their company, Atty. Gabionza shall offer to acceptable investors, through negotiated

ISSUE: 1. WON CA erred when it failed to consolidate the four (4) appeals arising from the

sale or bidding, 67% of SCP for the P3.5 Billion fresh equity required. Phase 3

same decision of the rehabilitation court. 2. WON the CA may order the termination of the rehabilitation proceeding absent it being raised by appellant in its brief.

Should Phase 1 and 2 fail, there shall be a debt to equity conversion in the required amount of P3.5 Billion. 5 RULING: On June 21, 2007, creditors of SCP altogether holding more than 50% of SCP's total

1. Yes. Consolidation of cases is not discretionary, but mandatory.

liabilities, filed their Joint Manifestation and Motion declaring their conformity with and support to Atty. Gabionza's Recommended Rehabilitation Plan.

Consolidation of actions is expressly authorized under Sec. 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court:

On December 3, 2007, the RTC promulgated a Decision approving the Modified Rehabilitation Section 1. Consolidation. — When actions involving a common

Plan.

question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order Therefrom, several creditors went to the CA via separate Petitions for Review on Certiorari, to

a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the

wit: [Don’t focus, important to ponder is separate cases were filed arising from the same issue]

actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may

(1) SCP's petition dated January 9, 2008, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101732 and

make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend

entitled Steel Corporation of the Philippines v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc.; (2) DEG's petition dated January 6, 2008, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101880 and entitled DEG-Deutsche

to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. It is a time-honored principle that when two or more cases involve the

Investitions-und Entwicklungsgesselschaft mbH v. Steel Corporation of the Philippines; (3)

same parties and affect closely related subject matters, they must be consolidated and

BDO-EPCIB's petition dated January 8, 2008, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101881 and

jointly tried, in order to serve the best interests of the parties and to settle expeditiously

entitledEquitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. Steel Corporation of the Philippines; and (4) Investments

the issues involved. 13 In other words, consolidation is proper wherever the subject

2234 Philippines Fund I, Inc.'s (IPFI's) petition dated January 10, 2008, docketed as CA-G.R.

matter involved and relief demanded in the different suits make it expedient for the court

SP No. 101913 and entitled Investments 2234 Philippines Fund I (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. Equitable

to determine all of the issues involved and adjudicate the rights of the parties by hearing

PCI Bank, Inc.

the suits together. 14

The petitions of SCP and IPFI were eventually consolidated under CA-G.R. SP No. 101732. However, the CA denied BDO-EPCIB's motion to consolidate with CA-G.R. SP No. 101732.

The purpose of this rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets, and simplify the work of the trial court. In short, consolidation aims to attain justice with the least expense and

Notably, the prayer portion of the BDO-EPCIB petition in CA-G.R. SP No.

vexation to the parties-litigants. 15 It contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and

101881 only sought for the following reliefs: [Don’t focus, important to ponder is

is in accord with the aim of affording the parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive

appellant merely request to modify the plan, not terminate]

determination of their cases before the courts. Further, it results in the avoidance of the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the courts in two or more cases,

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court

which would otherwise require a single judgment. 16 EAcHCI

that the Decision dated 03 December 2007 of the Court a

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MODULE 5: APPEAL In the instant case, all four (4) cases involve identical parties, subject

Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is

matter, and issues. In fact, all four (4) arose from the same decision rendered by the

improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of

Rehabilitation Court. As such, it became imperative upon the CA to consolidate the

relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords

cases. Even though consolidation of actions is addressed to the sound discretion of the

the opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed

court and normally, its action in consolidating will not be disturbed in the absence of

relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that

manifest abuse of discretion, 17 in this instance, we find that the CA gravely erred in

allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery

failing to order the consolidation of the cases.

is to prevent surprise to the defendant. 24 (Emphasis supplied.)

By refusing to consolidate the cases, the CA, in effect, dispensed a

Trinidad Go v Chavez

form of piecemeal judgment that has veritably resulted in the multiplicity of suits. Such action is not regarded with favor, because consolidation should always be ordered

FACTS: On January 29, 1997, Vicente Chaves (Vicente) filed a Complaint against spouses

whenever it is possible.

Trinidad Go and Gonzalo Go (Go spouses, herein petitioners) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City for the removal of clouds on his transfer certificates of title.

2. No. CA has no power to grant such. It is not a relief that may fall in the prayer for general relief which is added to the demand of specific relief – contrary to what

Vicente alleged that Paquito Francisco Yap and Evelyn Nellie Chaves-Yap (the Yap spouses),

defendant believe.

his son-in-law and daughter respectively, obtained a loan in the amount of P23.2 million from Trinidad Go (Trinidad), using his and his wife's real properties as collaterals. The Yap spouses

Sec. 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides:

were able to do this by presenting a forged Special Power of Attorney (SPA) purporting to

SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. — No error which does

authorize the Yap spouses to obtain a loan using Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos.

not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of

T-60898 and T-60899 registered in the names of Vicente and his wife Alice Chaves (Alice) as

the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be

collaterals.

considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly

Vicente prayed that the SPA and mortgage to petitioners be invalidated, and that the Go

argued in the brief, save as the court pass upon plain errors and

spouses be directed to surrender the owner's duplicate certificates of title over the subject

clerical errors.

properties.

Essentially, the GENERAL RULE provides that an assignment of error is

Subsequently, the trial court allowed two parties to intervene in the case: a) Alice, who

essential to appellate review and only those assigned will be considered, save for the

alleged that her rights to the share of the conjugal partnership are being trampled upon and

following EXCEPTIONS: (1) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction

who, like her husband, averred that she had never authorized the Yap spouses to mortgage

over the subject matter; (2) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently

the conjugal properties 10 and; b) Mega Integrated Agro-Livestock Farms, Inc. (Mega),

plain or clerical errors within the contemplation of the law; (3) matters not assigned as

which claimed that it had purchased from Vicente in December 1996 a portion of the

errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision

property covered by TCT No. T-114415, and that it could not effect the transfer of said title

and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid

in its name because the Go spouses are in possession of the owner's copy of TCT No.

dispensing piecemeal justice; (4) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal

T-114415.

but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (5) matters

RTC rendered decision in favor of Vicente declaring the SPA and the mortgage as

not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (6)

ineffective, invalid, and unenforceable.

matters not assigned as errors on appeal but which the determination of a question properly assigned is dependent. None of these exceptions exists in this case. IEHSDA It is very plain in the language of the prayers of BDO-EPCIB that it only requested the CA to modify the existing rehabilitation plan. It never sought the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings. Thus, given the factual backdrop of the case, it was inappropriate for the CA, motu proprio, to terminate the proceedings. The appellate court should have proceeded to resolve BDO-EPCIB's appeal on its merits instead of terminating the proceedings, a result that has no ground in its pleadings in the CA.

[IMPORTANT] The Go spouses appealed to the CA Cagayan de Oro. They filed their brief and furnished Vicente (Note: only to vicente, failed to furnish the brief to Alice and Mega) with a copy thereof before the June 12, 2007 deadline. However, all the other adverse parties moved before the CA to have the appeal dismissed: cCaEDA a) Mega argued in its Motion to Dismiss that Go spouses failed to file their brief on time. It appears that Go spouses failed to furnish Mega with a copy of their brief. Their counsel, Atty. Kathryn Dela Serna, claimed inadvertence for the mistake. Nonetheless, when Go spouses received Mega's Motion to Dismiss on June 14, 2007, they personally served Mega a copy of the brief that same day;

In Abedes v. Court of Appeals, this Court emphasized the DIFFERENCE OF APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES AND IN CIVIL CASES by saying, "Issues not

b) Vicente (now substituted by his children in view of his death) on the other hand,

raised in the pleadings, as opposed to ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the

complained about the form of the appellants' brief he received, pointing to want

whole case is opened for review, are deemed waived or abandoned." 22 Essentially,

of the following requirements under Rule 44 of the Rules of Court: 1) subject

to warrant consideration on appeal, there must be discussion of the error assigned,

index, page references, and legal citations as required under Section 13; and 2)

else, the error will be deemed abandoned or waived. 23

certified true copy of the assailed RTC Decision as required in Section 13 (f)

This Court even went further in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, in which it held that it is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of the relief sought by the pleadings, to wit:

[should be (h)]. Petitioners' counsel again professed inadvertence and good faith, reasoning that the errors cannot be considered fatal, for the body/contents of the appellants' brief have substantially complied with the provisions of Rule 44. Nevertheless, she submitted the subject index/table of contents of the brief;

The Court of Appeals erred in ordering DBP to return to respondent "the P1,000,000.00" alleged down payment, a

c) More than two months after the filing of the appellant's brief, Alice still had not

matter not raised in respondent's Petition for Review before it.

received a copy of said brief. She thus joined Mega in asking the appellate court

In Jose Clavano, Inc. v. Housing and Land Use Regulatory

for the dismissal of Go spouses' appeal. 18 Upon learning that Alice was likewise

Board, this Court held: ASHICc

not provided with the appellants' brief, petitioners then furnished her with a copy

". . . It is elementary that a judgment must conform to, and be supported by, both the pleadings and the evidence, and

thereof on August 30, 2007. 19 In their Comment, 20 petitioners' counsel, Atty. Emmy Lou Lomboy (working for Atty. Dela Serna's law firm), justified the

must be in accordance with the theory of the action on

oversight by explaining that she only inherited the case from the former counsel

which the pleadings are framed and the case was tried. The

of record, and that she merely relied on the list of parties indicated on the CA

judgment must be secundum allegata et probate." (Italics in

Resolutions/Notices 21 who must be furnished with copies of the appellants'

original.)

brief. It appears, however, that Atty. Erlington Pimentel, is not included therein.

12 | P a g e

MODULE 5: APPEAL CA dismissed the appeal of the Go spouses on the following grounds: First, that

the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in

Go spouses failed to serve a copy of their appellants' brief upon the intervenors

more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.

on time, and, second, that their appellants' brief does not contain a subject index and that no copy of the assailed Decision was appended thereto, in violation of Section 44, Section 13 (a) and (h) in relation to Rule 50, Section 1 (f).

Cabuenas vs. Ardiente Facts: Respondents Felisa and her eight (8) children filed a complaint for reconveyance and partition. They alleged that the subject land was in the name of Felisa; that Felisa discovered

ISSUE:

that Tax Declaration No. 120150 (covering their land) was cancelled and a new one was WON the CA erred in dismissing the appeal by applying strictly the form required the law.

issued in the name of petitioners; that upon inquiry, the respondents learned that the transfer of the tax declaration in the name of petitioners was by virtue of a deed of sale purportedly executed by Felisa.

RULING: Yes. A deviation from their rigid enforcement may thus be allowed, as petitioners should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of their case, rather than lose their property

In the alternative, the respondents prayed that Felisa did not intend a sale but possibly a mortgage only.

on mere technicalities. RTC Ruling Our rules of procedure are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of cases and permit the prompt disposition of unmeritorious cases which clog the court

the RTC dismissed the complaint "for want of a valid cause of action." It concluded that the deed of sale was valid and, being a notarized document, its due execution was presumed.

dockets and do little more than waste the courts' time. These technical and procedural rules, however, are intended to ensure, rather than suppress, substantial justice. A

CA Ruling

deviation from their rigid enforcement may thus be allowed, as petitioners should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of their case, rather than lose their

the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. It ruled that Felisa never intended to sell the

property on mere technicalities. We held in Ong Lim Sing, Jr. v. FEB Leasing and

subject property to petitioners as she believed that the transaction was one of mortgage.

Finance Corporation that: DIETHS Aggrieved, petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties' right to due process. In numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity. We agree that the CA had the discretion to dismiss petitioners' appeal. The discretion, however, must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in hind the circumstances obtaining in each case. 30

Court assailing Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, in an action for reconveyance and/or partition of parcel of land. Dom: mao raning part na CIVPRO. Issue: WON the CA was correct in ruling that the contract entered into was intended to be a mortgage and not a sale. Ruling: CA was correct. Felicia never intended for it to be a sale.

Here, we find that the failure to serve a copy of the appellant's brief to two

A cursory reading of the Deed of Sale would reveal that it was entirely written in English, and

of the adverse parties was a mere oversight, constituting excusable neglect. 31 A

instead of the usual mode of placing a signature as a sign of assent, there appears to be a

litigant's failure to furnish his opponent with a copy of his appeal brief does not suffice to

thumbmark on top of Felisa's name. The claim of Felisa that she was "unschooled" and could

warrant dismissal of that appeal. In such an instance, all that is needed is for the court

neither read nor write was sufficiently supported by the evidence on record.

to order the litigant to furnish his opponent with a copy of his brief. 32 Anent the failure to append a copy of the assailed judgment, instead of dismissing the appeal on that

Petitioners failed to present any proof that Felisa was made to understand the tenor of the

basis, it is more in keeping with equity to simply require the appellants to immediately

document that she signed, which was in the English language. For their failure to do that, the

submit a copy of the Decision of the lower court rather than punish litigants for the

presumption of mistake under Article 1332 stands.

reckless inattention of their lawyers. ScCIaA As held in Zamora v. CA, in determining the nature of a contract, courts are not bound by the The PURPOSE OF A SUBJECT INDEX in an appellant's/appellee's brief obviates the court to thumb through a possibly lengthy brief page after page to locate whatever else needs to be found and considered, such as arguments and citations. 33 In the case at bar, notably, the appeal brief submitted to the CA consists only of 17 pages which the appellate court may easily peruse to apprise it of what the

title or name given by the parties, the decisive factor being the intention of the parties, as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by their conduct, words, actions, and deeds prior to, during, and immediately after executing the agreement. Ganuelas vs. Cawed

case is all about and of the relief sought. Thus, the belated submission of the subject index may be considered excusable. This case involves voluminous records meriting a review on the merits by the CA. Otherwise, the efforts of the petitioners to protect their collateral in their judicial battle will lead to naught once they lose their remedy of an appeal just because of procedural niceties. Adherence to legal technicalities allows individual error to be suffered in order that justice in the maximum may be preserved. Nonetheless, "we should indeed welcome," as Judge Learned Hand once wrote, "any efforts that help disentangle us from the archaisms that still impede our pursuit of truth". 35 Our ruling in Aguam v. Court of Appeals 36 also bears recalling: TAEcCS

Facts: Celestina executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property in favor of her niece Ursulina, one of herein petitioners. The pertinent provision of the deed of donation reads, quoted verbatim: “That, for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE, and of the faithful services the latter has rendered in the past to the former, the said DONOR does by these presents transfer and convey, by way of DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above, described, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present

Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just

donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect.”

determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to

However, later on, Celestina executed a document purporting to set aside the deed of

encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be

donation.

applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to

Petitioners insist that the donation was inter vivos.

excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to

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MODULE 5: APPEAL RTC: the provision in the Deed of Donation that in the event that the DONEE should

Finding no confusing similarity between the marks "MACJOY" and "MCDONALD'S," the CA, in

predecease the DONOR, the "donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and

its herein assailed Decision dated July 29, 2004, reversed and set aside the appealed IPO

effect" is an explicit indication that the deed is a donation mortis causa.

decision and order. The CA explained in its order that MacJoy and McDonalds have a different logo, use different fonts, uses different colors, and their stores have different designs.

Aggrieved, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails, on a question of law, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, in an action for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation.

Petitioner promptly filed a motion for reconsideration. However, in its similarly challenged Resolution of November 12, 2004, the CA denied the motion, as it further held: Whether a mark or label of a competitor resembles another is to

Dom: mao ra ning CIVPRO na part.

be determined by an inspection of the points of difference and resemblance as a whole, and not merely the points of

Issue: WON the petition for review shall proper

resemblance. The articles and trademarks employed and used by the [respondent] Macjoy Fastfood Corporation are so

Ruling: No, it’s donation mortis causa.

different and distinct as to preclude any probability or likelihood In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that any

of confusion or deception on the part of the public to the injury of

right, title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the

the trade or business of the [petitioner] McDonald's Corporation.

death of Celestina. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of

The "Macjoy & Device" mark is dissimilar in color, design, spelling, size, concept and appearance to the McDonald's

no other interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to

marks.

Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime. More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before the donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded

ISSUE: WON the petition should be dismissed for procedural defects, namely: the certification

and of no further force and effect shows that the donation is a postmortem disposition. As

against forum shopping was defective, the person signing it not having authority to do so; and

stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is

the petition does not present reviewable issue, challenging only factual findings of the CA

that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. Moreover,

HELD: Contrary to respondent's claim, the petitioner's Managing Counsel, Sheila Lehr, was

the deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation as mortis causa.

specifically authorized to sign on behalf of the petitioner the Verification and Certification attached to the petition. As can be gleaned from the petitioner's Board of

McDonalds v. Macjoy FACTS: On 14 March 1991, respondent MacJoy Fastfood Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in the sale of fast food products in Cebu City, filed with the then Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTT), now the Intellectual Property Office (IPO), an application, thereat identified as Application Serial No. 75274, for the registration of the trademark "MACJOY & DEVICE" for fried chicken, chicken barbeque, burgers, fries, spaghetti, palabok, tacos, sandwiches, halo-halo and steaks under classes 29 and 30 of the International Classification of Goods. Petitioner McDonald's Corporation, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, USA, filed a verified Notice of Opposition against the respondent's application claiming that the trademark "MACJOY & DEVICE" so resembles its corporate logo, otherwise known as the Golden Arches or "M" design, and its marks "McDonalds," McChicken," "MacFries," "BigMac," "McDo," "McSpaghetti," "McSnack," and "Mc," (hereinafter collectively known as the MCDONALD'S marks) such that when used on identical or related goods, the trademark applied for would confuse or deceive purchasers into believing that the goods originate from the same source or origin. Likewise, the petitioner alleged that the respondent's use and adoption in bad faith of the "MACJOY & DEVICE" mark would falsely tend to suggest a connection or affiliation with petitioner's restaurant services and food products, thus, constituting a fraud upon the general public and further cause the dilution of the distinctiveness of petitioner's registered and internationally recognized MCDONALD'S marks to its prejudice and irreparable damage. The application and the opposition thereto was docketed as Inter Partes Case No. 3861. Respondent denied the aforementioned allegations of the petitioner and averred that it has used the mark "MACJOY" for the past many years in good faith and has spent considerable sums of money for said mark's extensive promotion in tri-media, especially in Cebu City where it has been doing business long before the petitioner opened its outlet thereat sometime in 1992; and that its use of said mark would not confuse affiliation with the petitioner's restaurant services and food products because of the differences in the design and detail of the two (2) marks. In a decision dated December 28, 1998, the IPO, ratiocinating that the predominance of the letter "M," and the prefixes "Mac/Mc" in both the "MACJOY" and the "MCDONALDS" marks lead to the conclusion that there is confusing similarity between them especially since both are used on almost the same products falling under classes 29 and 30 of the International

Director's Resolution dated December 5, 2002, as embodied in the Certificate of the Assistant Secretary dated December 21, 2004, Sheila Lehr was one of those authorized and empowered "to execute and deliver for and on behalf of [the petitioner] all documents as may be required in connection with . . . the protection and maintenance of any foreign patents, trademarks, tradenames, and copyrights owned now or hereafter by [the petitioner], including, but not limited to, . . . documents required to institute opposition or cancellation proceedings against conflicting trademarks, and to do such other acts and things and to execute such other documents as may be necessary and appropriate to effect and carry out the intent of this resolution." Indeed, the afore-stated authority given to Lehr necessarily includes the authority to execute and sign the mandatorily required certification of non-forum shopping to support the instant petition for review which stemmed from the "opposition proceedings" lodged by the petitioner before the IPO. Considering that the person who executed and signed the certification against forum shopping has the authority to do so, the petition, therefore, is not procedurally defective. As regards the respondent's argument that the petition raises only questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for review, suffice it to say that the contradictory findings of the IPO and the CA constrain us to give due course to the petition, this being one of the recognized exceptions to Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. True, this Court is not the proper venue to consider factual issues as it is not a trier of facts. Nevertheless, when the factual findings of the appellate court are mistaken, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings culled by the court of origin, as here, this Court will review them. FUJI TELEVISION NETWORK, INC. vs. ARLENE S. ESPIRITU FACTS: Arlene S. Espiritu was engaged by Fuji Television Network, Inc. ("Fuji") as a news correspondent/producer "tasked to report Philippine news to Fuji through its Manila Bureau field office." Arlene's employment contract initially provided for a term of 1 year but was successively renewed on a yearly basis with salary adjustment upon every renewal. Sometime in January 2009, Arlene was diagnosed with lung cancer. She informed Fuji about her condition. In turn, the Chief of News Agency of Fuji, Yoshiki Aoki, informed Arlene "that the company will have a problem renewing her contract" since it would be difficult for her to perform her job.

She "insisted that she was still fit to work as certified by her attending

physician."

Classification of Goods, i.e., food and ingredients of food, sustained the petitioner's opposition

After several verbal and written communications, Arlene and Fuji signed a non-renewal

and rejected the respondent's application.

contract on May 5, 2009 where it was stipulated that her contract would no longer be renewed

In time, the respondent moved for a reconsideration but the IPO denied the motion in its Order of January 14, 2000. Therefrom, the respondent went to the CA via a Petition for Review with prayer for Preliminary Injunction under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, whereat its appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 57247 .

after its expiration. The contract also provided that the parties release each other from liabilities and responsibilities under the employment contract. In consideration of the non-renewal contract, Arlene "acknowledged receipt of the total amount of US$18,050.00 representing her monthly salary from March 2009 to May 2009, year-end bonus, mid-year bonus, and separation pay." However, Arlene affixed her signature on the non-renewal contract with the initials "U.P." for "under protest."

14 | P a g e

MODULE 5: APPEAL The day after Arlene signed the non-renewal contract, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal

FACTS:

with the NCR Arbitration Branch of NLRC. Arlene claimed that she was left with no other

land located in Cabanatuan City. Pascual owned Lot 4, Block 2; Angeles owned Lot 5, Block 2

Neighbors Pascual and Angeles were registered owners of adjacent parcels of

recourse but to sign the non-renewal contract.

Each of them built a house on his respective lot, believing all the while that his respective lot was properly delineated. It was not until Metrobank, as the highest bidder in the foreclosure

The National Labor Relations Commission reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision. It held that

sale of the adjacent Lot 3, Block 2, caused the relocation survey of Lot 3 that the geodetic

Arlene was a regular employee. CA affirmed the NLRC. This is a petition for review

engineer discovered that Pascual's house had encroached on Lot 3. As a consequence,

on certiorari under Rule 45.

Metrobank successfully ejected Pascual.

ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly determined that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the NLRC when it ruled that Arlene was a regular employee RULING: Arlene is a regular employee and was illegally dismissed by Fuji.

In turn, Pascual caused the relocation survey of his own Lot 4 and discovered that Angeles' house also encroached on his lot. Of the 318 square meters comprising Lot 4, Angeles occupied 252 square meters, leaving Pascual with only about 66 square meters. Pascual demanded rentals for the use of the encroached area of Lot 4 from Angeles, or the removal

Rule 45 distinguished from Rule 65 (TOPIC)

of Angeles' house. Angeles refused the demand. Accordingly, Pascual sued Angeles for recovery of possession and damages in the RTC in Cabanatuan City.

In St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission, this court clarified that judicial review of National Labor Relations Commission decisions shall be by way of a petition

In the course of the trial, Pascual presented Clarito Fajardo, the geodetic engineer who had

for certiorari under Rule 65. Citing the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, it further ruled that such

conducted the relocation survey and had made the relocation plan of Lot 4. Fajardo

petitions shall be filed before the Court of Appeals. From the Court of Appeals, an aggrieved

testified that Angeles' house was erected on Lot 4. On the other hand, Angeles presented

party may file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Juan Fernandez, the geodetic engineer who had prepared the sketch plan relied upon by Angeles to support his claim that there had been no encroachment. However, Fernandez

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original action where the issue is limited to

explained that he had performed only a "table work," that is, he did not actually go to the

grave abuse of discretion. As an original action, it cannot be considered as a continuation of

site but based the sketch plan on the descriptions and bearings appearing on the TCTs of

the proceedings of the labor tribunals.

Lot 4, Lot 5 and Lot 6; and recommended the conduct of a relocation survey.

On the other hand, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal

RTC favored Pascual. CA affirmed.

where the issue is limited to questions of law. In labor cases, a Rule 45 petition is limited to reviewing whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion and deciding other jurisdictional errors of the National Labor Relations Commission. In Odango v. National Labor Relations Commission, this court explained that a petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is "available only and restrictively in truly exceptional cases" and that its sole office "is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." A petition for certiorari does not include a review of findings of fact since the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission are accorded finality. In cases where the aggrieved party assails the National Labor Relations Commission's findings, he or she must be able to show that the Commission "acted capriciously and whimsically or in total disregard of evidence material to the controversy."

Issues: (a) the credence the CA accorded to the testimony and relocation plan of Fajardo as opposed to the survey plan prepared by Fernandez; and (b) application of builder in good faith rule Ruling: The petition lacks merit. The Court, not being a trier of facts, cannot review factual issues Sec 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that the petition for review on certiorari "shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth." In appeal by certiorari, therefore, only questions of law may be raised, because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial. The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings thereon are received with respect and are binding on the Supreme Court subject to certain exceptions. A question, to be one of law, must not

When a decision of the Court of Appeals under a Rule 65 petition is brought to this court by

involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or

way of a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be decided upon.

any of them. There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or

Justice Brion's dissenting opinion in Abbott Laboratories, Philippines v. Alcaraz discussed that in petitions for review under Rule 45, "the Court simply determines whether the legal correctness of the CA's finding that the NLRC ruling . . . had basis in fact and in law." In this kind of petition, the proper question to be raised is, "Did the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case?" These parameters shall be used in resolving the substantive issues in this petition.

difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts. Whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or should be rejected as feeble or spurious; or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue;— all these are issues of fact. Questions like these are not reviewable by the Supreme Court whose review of cases decided by the CA is confined only to questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth.

Arlene was a regular employee with a fixed-term contract Nonetheless, the Court has recognized several exceptions to the rule, but the Arlene's tasks included monitoring and getting news stories, reporting interviewing subjects in front of a video camera," "the timely submission of news and current events reports pertaining to the Philippines, and traveling to Fuji's regional office in Thailand." She also had to report for work in Fuji's office in Manila from Mondays to Fridays, 8 hours per day. She had no equipment and had to use the facilities of Fuji to accomplish her tasks. That the successive renewals of Arlene's contract indicated the necessity and desirability of

circumstances of this case indicate that none of such exceptions is attendant herein. The credence given by the RTC to the testimony and relocation plan of Fajardo was conclusive upon this Court especially by virtue of the affirmance by the CA of the RTC. Resultantly, the fact of Angeles' encroachment on Pascual's Lot 4 was proved by preponderant evidence. Angeles was a builder in good faith

her work in the usual course of Fuji's business. Because of this, Arlene had become a regular employee with the right to security of tenure.

To be next determined is whether the CA's application of Article 448 of the Civil Code was correct and proper.

The expiration of Arlene's contract does not negate the finding of illegal dismissal by Fuji. The manner by which Fuji informed Arlene that her contract would no longer be renewed is

With the unassailable finding that Angeles' house straddled the lot of Pascual, and that

tantamount to constructive dismissal. To make matters worse, Arlene was asked to sign a letter

Angeles had built his house in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code, which spells out the

of resignation prepared by Fuji. Due process must still be observed in the pre-termination of

rights and obligations of the owner of the land as well as of the builder, is unquestionably

fixed-term contracts of employment.

applicable. Consequently, the land being the principal and the building the accessory, preference is given to Pascual as the owner of the land to make the choice as between

The Court of Appeals' modification of the National Labor Relations Commission's decision was

appropriating the building or obliging Angeles as the builder to pay the value of the land.

proper because the law itself provides that illegally dismissed employees are entitled to

Contrary to the insistence of Angeles, therefore, no inconsistency exists between the

reinstatement, backwages including allowances, and all other benefits.

finding of good faith in his favor and the grant of the reliefs set forth in Article 448 of the Civil Code.

ANGELES vs. PASCUAL

15 | P a g e

MODULE 5: APPEAL 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation and conjecture. SPOUSES ANDRADA VS PILHINO SALES CORP VIVARES VS SPOUSES SUZARA FACTS: Pilhino Corp (Pilhino) is suing the spouses Andrada for recovery of money. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment against two trucks (Fuso and Hino truck) both owned

FACTS:

by Jose Andrada. However, the levies on attachment were lifted after Jose filed a counter-

themselves in brassieres, smoking and possessing hard liquor on Facebook. Such information

Julia Daluz and Vida Suzara were senior STC students who posted pictures of

bond.

reached Ms. Escudero, a computer teacher, who learned about the event. The girls were identified by fellow STC students in class. Ms. Escudero wasted no time and reported the

In due course, the RTC rendered a decision against Jose. Pilhino opted to enforce the writ of

matter to Ms. Tigol, STC’s discipline-in-charge.

execution instead of going after the counter-bond since the bond’s premium was not paid. As a result, the sheriff seized the Hino truck and auctioned it, with Pilhino was the highest bidder.

Thereafter, the STC started an investigation and found the students for violating the rules

However, the Hino truck could not be transferred to Pilhino’s name due to its having been

prescribed in the Student Handbook such as: possession of hard liquor, obscenity, wearing

already registered in the name of petitioner Moises Andrada.

clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour and engaging in immoral or lewd acts. The students reported to the office of the principal and were allegedly “verbally abused”. The

It appears that the Hino truck had been meanwhile sold by Jose Andrada, Jr. to Moises

principal also informed the parents that as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the

Andrada, which sale was unknown to Pilhino, and that Moises had mortgaged the truck to BA

commencement exercises.

Finance Corporation (BA Finance) to secure his own obligation. When Moises failed to pay, the truck was also auctioned, with BA Finance as the highest bidder. Hence, Pilhino instituted this

A week before the graduation, the mothers of the students filed a petition for injunction and

action against the Andradas and BA Finance.

damages, and prayed that the school be enjoined from precluding the students from joining the commencement exercises. Though RTC issued a TRO, STC still barred the sanctioned

Jose Andrada and his wife entered into a compromise agreement with Pilhino (sila ra ha).

students from participating. Thereafter, the petitioners filed before the RTC a petition for the

Moises and his wife on the other hand averred defences that they acquired the truck in good

issuance of habeas data since the students had a reasonable expectation of privacy (since the

faith.

RTC, owing to the compromise agreement between Jose and Pilhino, dismissed the

settings were set to “Friends Only”) and that there were “victims” in this case since the photos

case with Moises, Pilhino and BA Finance. Spouses Moises Andrada appealed to the CA to the

were showed to the STC officials. To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an

extent that RTC dismissed also its counterclaim for damages against Pilhino. The CA only

invasion of their children’s privacy.

affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, they filed this petition for certiorari arguing that they deserve damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and attorney fees under Art 2208 of the

RTC, however, rendered a decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. To the trial court,

same Code.

petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Not satisfied

ISSUE: WON the spouses are entitled to damages/fees?

with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.

RULING: NO. We cannot side with the petitioners. Their insistence, which represents their disagreement with the CA’s declaration that the second and third elements of abuse of

ISSUE: WON the writ should be issued?

rights, supra, were not established, requires the consideration and review of factual issues. Hence, this appeal cannot succeed, for an appeal by petition for review on certiorari

RULING: NO. In order for one to have an expectation of privacy, it is necessary that there is a

cannot determine factual issues. In the exercise of its power of review, the Court is not a

manifest intention to keep certain posts private. Note that the Supreme Court did not expressly

trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented

mention any discussion about “Appeals in Special Rules”, but merely discussed the

by the contending parties during the trial.

applicability of the Writ of Habeas Data in the case at bar. I will check the SCRA later for any “implied discussion”.

This restriction of the review to questions of law has been institutionalized in Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is true that the Court has, at times, allowed exceptions from the

The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,

restriction. Among the recognized exceptions are the following, to wit:

liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b)

of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved

When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) When there is

party.11

grave abuse of discretion; (d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) When the findings of facts are conflicting; (f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond

It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,

the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and

information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce

the appellee; (g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court; (h) When the

one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. In developing the writ of habeas data, the

findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i)

Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational privacy, among others. Availment of

When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are

the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand,

not disputed by the respondent; (j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed

and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly

Contrary to respondent’s contention, it is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and

considered, would justify a different conclusion.

enforced disappearances. In Sec 2 on the Rules of Habeas Data:

However, the circumstances of this case do not warrant reversing or modifying the findings of

Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data.

the CA, which are consistent with the established facts. Verily, the petitioners did not prove the

However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed

concurrence of the elements of abuse of rights.

by:

They are not also entitled to attorney’s fees since the very element of bad faith was not duly

(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children

proven. Accordingly, the petitioners’ demand for attorney’s fees under Article 2208 must fail. As

and parents; or

noted by the Court in Morales v. Court of Appeals,15 the award of attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the rule. The power of a court to award attorney’s fees under Article

16 | P a g e

MODULE 5: APPEAL (b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

ISSUE: WON the CA erroneously affirmed the RTC decision, thereby effectively depriving

(emphasis supplied)

the NPC of its constitutional right to due process. - NO Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not have been made.

Also, respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being

RULING: PETITION IS WITHOUT MERIT NPC CONTENTION: A complaint for expropriation is a Special Civil Action under Rule 67 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, not a "special proceeding" as contemplated under Rule 41, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; that there is no law or rules specifically requiring that a record on

an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the

appeal shall be filed in expropriation cases; and of the two sets of defendants in the present

person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is,

case, the Dilaos and Enriquez, the first, while they filed an answer, did not appeal the trial

nonetheless, erroneous.

court's decision, while with respect to the second, there is no showing that summons was served upon her, hence, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her and, therefore, no

To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To

appeal could arise whatsoever with respect to the complaint against her. Ergo, petitioner

"engage" means "to do or take part in something."19 It does not necessarily mean that the

concludes, no possibility of multiple appeals arose from the case.

activity must be done in pursuit of a business. SC SAYS: In Rule 41(2) of ROC (read lng kay taas ang provision),x x x no record in appeal

However, despite the erroneous arguments of STC, the writ of habeas data still does not issue in this case, owing to the fact that the students did now show any manifest intention to keep their posts and pictures private.

shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

In former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy,20 he

Court said that while a complaint for expropriation is not a special proceeding,

explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy;21

nevertheless, jurisprudence recognizes the existence of multiple appeals in a complaint

(2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of the three, what is relevant to the

for expropriation. In Municipality of Binan v Garcia, in an action of expropriation, there are 2

case at bar is the right to informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to

stages. FIRST, it is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to

control information about themselves.

exercise the power of eminent domain (Condemnation proceeding). SECOND, it is concerned with the determination by the Court of just compensation for the property

Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social network (OSN)

sought to be taken.

activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent

Therefore, in actions for eminent domain, since no less than two appeals are

access thereto or to limit its visibility. United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open

allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of condemnation is thirty days counted

the method of transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. It is to be noted that the default setting of Facebook is “Public”. The contention of the students

from notice thereof and not the ordinary period of 15 days prescribed for actions in general. As such, the complaint falls under the classification of "other cases of multiple or separate appeal where the law or these rules so require" in above-quoted Section 2(a) of Rule 41.

that they set their setting to “friends only” was self-serving and was not properly proven.

On the contention that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over respondent Enriquez, Court said that Enriquez can actually participate in the determination of the value of

NATIONAL POWER CORP VS HON SYLVA AGUIRRE PADERANGA, ET.AL (DAGHAN

her property which is expropriated pursuant to Sec 3 Rule 67 par. 3 .x x x “however, at the

RESPONDENTS PULOS TAG.IYA SA YUTA NGA GI.EXPROPRIATE)

trial of the issue of just compensation, whether or not a defendant has previously appeared or answered, he may present evidence as to the amount of the compensation

FACTS:

to be paid for his property, and he may share in the distribution of the award”. So if she To implement its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project, the NPC filed before the

does not agree with the determination of the value, THEN SHE MAY APPEAL. (reason jud is

RTC of Danao a complaint for expropriation of several parcels of land in Carmen, Cebu. The

kay wala daw mi file ug answer si Enriquez sa complaint of expropriation ni NPC. . . But wala

parcels of land include that which are owned by respondent Dilao and Enriquez. RTC granted

sya mi oppose sa expropriation, only ra sa determination sa JC, so despite that, maka

NPC’s motion for issuance of writ of possession. Then, Board of Commissioners was formed to

participate jpon sya if ang issue na is JC, which is the present case, so maka.appeal sya if

determine just compensation. With respect to Dilao and her siblings lands, the appraisal was

ever aggrieved sa value)

P516.66/sqm. NPC assailed the appraisal for failing to into account RA 6395 “An act revising the Charter of the NAPOCOR”. Sec. 3A thereof stipulates that the just compensation for right-

Multiple or separate appeals being existent in the present expropriation

of-way easement for which that portion of Dilao’s property is expropriated shall be equivalent

case, NPC should have fied a record on appeal within 30 days from receipt of the trial

to 10% of the market value.

court's decision. The trial court's dismissal of its appeal, which was affirmed by the appellate court, was thus in order.

RTC DECISION: RTC adopted the recommended appraisal. NPC filed a notice of appeal but it

Wa na nako apila ang discussion on just compensation and right of way.

was denied for failure to file and perfect it within the reglementary period, it having failed to file a record on appeal. Motion for recon was likewise denied. NPC then filed still before the RTC a petition for relief from the denial of its

DENIED. SPOUSES DAVID BERGONIA and LUZVIMINDA CASTILLO,


appeal on the ground that its failure to file a record on appeal was due to honest

petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (4th DIVISION) and


mistake and excusable neglect, it having believed that a record on appeal was not

AMADO BRAVO, JR., respondents.

required in light of the failure of the other defendant, Enriquez, to file an answer to the complaint. Nevertheless, RTC denied NPC’s petition.

FACTS:

CA DECISION:

the RTC decided in favor of the latter. They sought reconsideration but it was denied in an

Early on, petitioners filed a case against Bravo (private respondent), upon which NPC filed a petition for certiorari with CA, assailing the RTC decision. Petition

order dated April 25, 2008, received on May 6, 2008. On May 7, they filed a Notice of Appeal.

was denied holding that under Rule 41 (2) of 1997 ROC, the Fling of a record on appeal is

The law firm of Lapen(enye)a & Associates filed an entry of appearance as counsel for

required in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals, as in an

petitioners in view of the previous counsel’s withdrawal. CA required them in a Resolution

action for expropriation in which the order determining the right of the plaintiff to expropriate

dated Jan. 30, 2009 to file Appellant’s brief within 45 days from receipt. Bravo filed a motion to

and the subsequent adjudication on the issue of just compensation may be the subject of

dismiss appeal grounded on the failure of petitioners to file the brief within the 45 day period

separate appeals. Hence, the appeal.

granted in the resolution. Petitioners countered claiming that they did not receive any

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MODULE 5: APPEAL resolution from the CA requiring them to file said brief within 45 days. So, CA considered their appeal abandoned and dismissed.

The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is

On May 25, 09, CA issued another Resolution stating that the Jan. 30, 2009

merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in accordance with the law. The

order to file brief addressed to petitioners’ counsel was received by a certain Ruel de Tomas on

party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules.

Feb. 5, 2009. Subsequently, petitioners sought reconsideration of the dismissal of their appeal.

Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.

Likewise, in a Manifestation, they asserted that their counsel, has no employee in the name of Ruel de Tomas. However, they explained that Atty. Cabacungan, an associate of the law firm,

DENIED.

personally knows Ruel who sometimes visit their office and must have accidentally received the resolution. CA, nevertheless denied the reconsideration. Hence, the petition for certiorari.

Brgy. Dasmarinas vs Creative Play Corner School, GR No. 169942 Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint against respondents before the prosecutor imputing

ISSUE: WON CA correctly dismissed the petitioners’ appeal for failure to file brief. - YES

falsification of documents and use of falsified documents to respondents due to its alleged falsification and use barangay clearance and official which was in petitioners’ name.

RULING: PETITION IS WITHOUT MERIT

Respondents’ however denied the allegation and submitted their counter-affidavits to the prosecutor.

1)

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER 65 WAS IMPROPER The extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of only if there is no

appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the

The prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case finding no probable cause therein. This was then elevated by petitioner to the DOJ for the proper review but the DOJ found no error and it sustained the resolution of the prosecutor.

law. An Appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case.

From this, the petitioner went to the CA for review. But before petitioner was able to file its petition, it first sought for an extension of time of 15 days from May 13, 2005 or until May 28, if FINAL ORDER - if the order disposes of the action


or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the

2005 within which to file the same due to counsel's heavy workload. The CA granted the extension.

remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. – PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI 45 (kani nga certiorari is APPEAL to SC by a PETITION FOR REVIEW)

After this petitioner asked for a second extension but this time it was denied by the CA and henceforth its petition for review was dismissed on the ground that he was not able to file his petition on time. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration explaining the delay in that

INTERLOCUTORY - merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, hence basically provisional in its application – PETITION FOR CERTIORARI under 65 (kani nga certiorari is WHEN NO

petitioner’s counsel had a large volume of work and he was very busy and a relative of him died such that because of such reasons, he could not file the proper petition on the given time. This however was denied likewise by the CA.

OTHER REMEDY) In the SC, petitioner prayed for a liberal application of the rules while respondent argued that IN THIS CASE:

there was no compelling reason to warrant the grant of extension.

The assailed resolutions declaring the appeal of petitioners as having been abandoned and accordingly dismissed are in the nature of a final order, hence, the remedy is

Issue: WON liberal application is warranted.

a petition for review on certiorari under 45 and not petition for certiorari under 65 Held: We deny the petition. 2. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT CERTIORARI WAS PROPER, THERE IS NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION COMMITTED BY CA.

Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 4. Period of appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of

A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged

its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the

and proved to exist. The abuse of discretion must be as patent and gross as to amount to

denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in

an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at

accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1)

all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic

motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the

manner by reason of passion or hostility.

payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of

IN THIS CASE: There was no grave abuse committed coz under Sec. 1(e) Rule 50, one of the grounds for dismissal of appeal is failure of appellant to serve and file the required brief or

fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis supplied.)

memorandum within the time provided. From the above, it is clear that the CA, after it has already allowed petitioner an extension of CA’s authority to dismiss an appeal for failure to file the appellant’s brief is a

15 days within which to file a petition for review, may only grant a further extension when

matter of judicial discretion, hence it is neither mandatory nor ministerial. Circumstances

presented with the most compelling reason but same is limited only to a period of 15 days.

surrounding the case must be taken into account.

Thus, when the CA denied petitioner's Second Motion for Extension of five days, it was merely

The petitioners’ excuse for their failure was flimsy and discreditable, hence

following the above mentioned provision of the rules after it found the reason for the second

dismissal was valid. The records of the case clearly showed that through their counsel, they

extension as not compelling. And, considering that the CA has already sufficiently

received the assailed resolution. The CA was guided by the Report of the Judicial Records

explained how it was able to arrive at the conclusion that there is no compelling reason

Division of the CA and by the certification issued by the Postmaster of Quezon City.

for such second extension, we deem it unnecessary to repeat the same especially since we are in total agreement with the ratiocination of the CA.

3. THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE TO WARRANT RELAXATION OF THE RULES DOES NOT APPLY Bare invocation of the interest of substantial justice is not a magic wand that will automatically compel the Court to suspend procedural rules.

As to petitioner's invocation of liberal application of the rules, we cannot heed the same. "It is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the rules of procedure should not be strictly followed in the interest of substantial justice. However, it does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will. It bears emphasizing that procedural rules should not be

Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their

belittled or dismissed simply because their nonobservance may have resulted in prejudice to a

non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all

party's substantial rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for

rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons

the most persuasive of reasons."

when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.

Moreover, as pointed out by respondents, petitioner had not only

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MODULE 5: APPEAL once transgressed procedural rules. This Court has previously held that "[t]echnical rules

Poverty cannot be used as an excuse to justify petitioners' complacency in allowing months to pass by

may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving."

before exerting the required effort to find a replacement lawyer. Poverty is not a justification for delaying a

Petitioner's low regard of procedural rules only shows that it is undeserving of their

case. Both parties have a right to a speedy resolution of their case. Not only petitioners, but also the

relaxation.

respondents, have a right to have the case finally settled without delay.

Also, we cannot subscribe to petitioner's argument that considering that no prejudice was

Petitioners are at fault on this case and cannot rely on such reason so as to relax the rules.

caused to respondents by the belated filing of the petition as the latter were free and not

Petitioners failed to prove that the circumstances would merit an exception.

detained hence, the CA should have just disregarded such belated filing. Likewise, the filing of the petition and payment of the corresponding docket fees prior to petitioner's receipt of the

Petitioner likewise argued that technicalities should be disregard on the ground that the merits

CA's resolution denying its Second Motion for Extension does not, contrary to petitioner's

of their case are strong. The court disagrees, the partition made by petitioners’ descendants

position, render such belated filing moot. If such would be the case, the delay in the delivery of

and subsequent sale in favor of respondent was valid notwithstanding the absence of

court resolutions caused by the limitations of postal service would serve as a convenient cover

publication with respect to the extrajudicial partition.


up for a pleading or a motion's belated filing. This would be contrary to the aim of procedural rules which is to secure an effective and expeditious administration of justice.

Alfonso V. Andres Facts: Respondents filed an accion publiciana with damages against petitioners in which the RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. This prompted petitioner to file an appeal. Before the Court of Appeals, petitioners' previous counsel was notified by the CA to file appellants' brief within 45 days from receipt of the notice On November 5, 2003. The original 45-day period expired on December 21, 2003.But before then, on December 8, 2003, petitioners' former counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw Appearance. Petitioners consented to the withdrawal.

Petitioners moved for an extension to file their appellants’ brief which was subsequently granted by the court for a period of 75 days commencing from December 21, 2003 until March 5, 2004.

However, petitioners were only able to receive the resolution granting the extension on April 6, 2004. By such time, the time within which to file the appellants’ brief has already expired.

Subsequently, petitioners were able to have the services of Public Attorney’s Office which subsequently filed for an extension for time within which to file their appellants brief but was subsequently denied by the CA. Thus CA dismissed the petition on the ground of failure to file the appellants brief within the reglementary period.

Petitioners contend that their failure to file their appellants' brief within the required period was due to their indigency and poverty. They submit that there is no justification for the dismissal of their appeal specially since the PAO had just entered its appearance as new counsel for petitioners as directed by the CA, and had as yet no opportunity to prepare the brief. They contend that appeal should be allowed since the brief had anyway already been prepared and filed by the PAO before it sought reconsideration of the dismissal of the appeal and is already part of the records. They contend that the late filing of the brief should be excused under the circumstances so that the case may be decided on the merits and not merely on technicalities. Thus the present petition. Issue: WON CA was correct in dismissing the petition on the ground of failure to file the appellant’s brief within the reglementary period? Ruling: Yes. The Court of Appeals was correct. Rule 50 of the Rules of Court states: Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.-An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:

xxxx

(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;

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MODULE 5: APPEAL

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