Evidence Batch 3.docx

1 AFP v Rep of PH

2 Alvarez v Ramirez Husband burned sis-in-law’s house knowing that his wife is there

3 Guerrero v St. Claire’s Realty

4 Goni v CA

5 Tongco v Vianzon 6 Fitzimmons v Atlantic Gulf 7 Razon v IAC

8 Mendezona v Viuda De Goitia 9 Garcia v Vda de Goitia

10 People v Carlos

11 Uy Chico v Union Life

12 Regala v Sandiganbayan ACCRA lawyers 13 Barton v Leyte Asphalt 14 Orient Insurance Company v E.P. Revilla 15 People v Sandiganbayan

16 US v GordonNikkar 17 US v McParlin 18 Lim v CA Schizophrenia

19 Krohn v CA Confidential Psychiatric Report; Husband as witness 20 Blue Cross Health v Olivares Stroke; Pre-existing condition 21 Chan v Chan Druggie husband; wife said privilege does not cover hospital records

RTC dismissed application for land registration for failure to prosecute because petitioners witness did not possess an authorization to testify on behalf of petitioner. There is no substantive or procedural rule which requires a witness for a party to present some form of authorization to testify as a witness for the party presenting him or her. No law or jurisprudence would support the conclusion that such omission can be considered as a failure to prosecute on the part of the party presenting such witness. All that the Rules require a witness is that the witness possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Husband burned house of sister in law where he knew his wife was staying. Wife was called to testify against him, filed a motion to disqualify pursuant to marital disqualification. SC: Marital disqualification has its own exceptions. Where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. Obviously, the offense of arson directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and his wife. It should be stressed the prior to the commission of the offense, the relationship between petitioner and wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost 6 months before the incident. Indeed the evidence and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect. Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes were presented as witness to establish that it was not Cristina Guerrero but Andres Guerrero who owned the disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero did not really sell but merely mortgaged the property. SC said that they are not parties in the present case, neither are they assignors of the parties nor “persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.” Moreover, the present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not part of the estate of Manuel Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of the dead man’s rule. Plaintiff presented Gaspar Vicente who testified facts occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva. Under ordinary circumstances, Vicente would be disqualified by reason of interest from testifying. However such protection was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined Vicente. Sec 26 Rule 123 disqualifiees only parties or assignors or parties, the officers/stockholders of a corporation are not disqualified from testifying for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person. DMS is applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person. The testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. Rather it is the administrator who is filing the case. He did not object to the oral testimony, which is deemed to be a waiver. DMS does not apply if what is being testified against the executor is a denial of something that happened before the deceased passed away. Affidavit covering Pedro’s alleged admission and recognition of the alternate farming scheme is inadmissible in violation of DMS. Such declaration which pertains to the leasehold agreement affects the kasunduan sa buwisan ng lupa which she is assignor and the subject matter of present case, cannot be admitted for such can be used against Dominga who is placed in an unfair situation by reason of her being unable to contradict such declaration as a result of her husband’s prior death. The letter was a privileged communication and not admissible. Where a privileged communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a third party, whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes admissible. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions by delivering the communication to the third person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a privileged communication between the attorney and his client. This rule applies to a compromise agreement perfected by the attorney with the authority under the instructions of his client. As a general rule, a lawyer may not invoke the attorney-client privilege and refuse to identify the identity of his client. However, such rule is qualified if revealing the client’s identity would implicate the client in the very activity for which he sought legal advice for, if disclosure would open client to civil liability or if revealing the client’s name would establish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual and as such, refuse to give the client’s identity in invoking the privilege. The privilege which protects communications between attorney and client does not extend to a copy of a letter written by the client to his attorney which comes to the hands of the adverse party. Where the authenticity of such document is admitted, the court will take no notice of the manner in which it was obtained. The court found it difficult to consider a contract for fees as privileged. However irrelevant under the circumstances, it cannot be privileged in nature. Contracts between attorneys and clients are inherently personal and considered as private matters but they are a constant subject of litigation, and contracts relating to fees are essentially not of privileged nature. For the application of the attorney-client privilege, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In other words, the privileged confidentiality applies only to a crime already committed, but does not attach to a crime which a client intends to commit in the future, for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer's advice. The testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the communications made to him by Paredes at the time he and Honrada were about to falsify the documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of the crime of falsification which he, Paredes and Honrada foisted upon the authorities. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the attorney client-privilege. A communication divulged to “stranger” or outsiders can scarcely be considered a confidential communication between attorney and client. The attorney-privilege does not extend to communications regarding an intended crime Communications by a client to his own lawyer remains privileged when the lawyer subsequently shares them with co-defendants for purposes of a common defense. The privilege protects pooling of information for any defense purpose common to the participating defendants. The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated." Her expert opinion excluded whatever information or knowledge she had about the petitioner which was acquired by reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between them. As an expert witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot then be excluded. In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report. Failure to object. Petitioner has the burden to prove that the stroke was excluded because it was due to a pre-existing condition, but failed to do so. It merely speculated that Doctor’s report would be adverse to Neomi based on her invocation of the doctor-patient privilege. This was a disputable presumption at best. The presumption does not apply if the suppression is an exercise of privilege. Here, respondent’s refusal to present or allow the presentation of Doctor’s report was justified. It was privileged communication between physician and patient. Petitioner should have made its own assessment and should not have passively waited for doctor’s report. Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene's request for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny's hospital records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure. Wife says prohibition covers testimony of physician at trial, and not hospital records. To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records — the results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient's illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him — would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient's consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patient's records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged

22 Neri v Senate Committee NBN-ZTE Deal 23 Lee v CA Chinese children; want Tiu to testify 24 Estrada v Desierto Erap Angara diary 25 People v Godoy Teacher-student; allegedly raped; compromise 26 People v Gener de Guzman Tricycle driver; rape

27 San Miguel v Kalalo Dealer of beer; Compromis 28 People v Ypparraguire Housemaid; rape 29 Bank of Commerce v Manalo Installments payment

30 The Learning Child v Ayala Alabang Deed of Restrictions

31 Narra Nickel v Redmont 32 People v Bokingo Employees killed employer

33 City of Manila v Del Rosario 34 Gevero v IAC

35 US v Pineda Pharmacist; barium chlorate; horses died  36 People v Irang Robbery to spouses; pocksmarks 37 People v Babiera Struck by bolo 38 US v Mercado 39 Gonzalez v People Arson; questions credibility of witnesses 40 Republic v Kenrick Development Unsigned pleading 41 Civil Service Commission v Belagan Sexual harraser; question’s complainant’s credibility 42 People v Noel Lee

matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter's prior consent. The confidentiality of the President’s conversations and correspondence is akin to the confidentiality of judicial deliberations which possesses the same value as the right to privacy of all citizens and more, because it is dictated by public interest and the constitutionally ordained separation of governmental powers. There is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege. Here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee. The use of Angara diary as evidence was proper. The use of Angara diary to determine the state of mind of petitioner does not violate the rule against hearsay evidence rule. The Angara diary contains statement of petitioner which reflects his state of mind and is circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. They are admissible and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay. Prosecution said that compromise settlement was admission of guilt. But SC said no implied admission can bedrawn from the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the accused did not take part in any of the negotiations. In this case, complainant's own mother, Helen Taha, testified that present during the negotiations were herself, her husband, Mia, and appellant's mother. Appellant himself was never present in any of said meetings. A meticulous assessment of Gilda's testimony demonstrates beyond doubt the truthfulness of her story, which she narrated in a categorical, straightforward and candid manner. The principal object of re-direct examination is to prevent injustice to the witness and the party who has called him by affording an opportunity to the witness to explain the testimony given on cross-examination, and to explain any apparent contradiction or inconsistency in his statements, an opportunity which is ordinarily afforded to him during cross-examination. The re-direct examination serves the purpose of completing the answer of a witness, or of adding a new matter which has been omitted, or of correcting a possible misinterpretation of testimony. The letter was not an admission of liability. At most, what respondent acknowledged was the receipt of the statement of account, not the existence of her liability to petitioner. SMC said offer of compromise was admission of guilt but SC said the Offer of Compromise dated 5 December 2000 was made prior to the filing of the criminal complaint against her on 9 March 2001 for a violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. The Offer of Compromise was clearly not made in the context of a criminal proceeding and, therefore, cannot be considered as an implied admission of guilt. An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can be received in evidence against the offeror. What is required is that after committing the crime, the accused or his representative makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved. The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance of the purchase price of lots purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly installments does not constitute evidence that XEI also agreed to give the respondents the same mode and timeline of payment of the P278,448.00. Evidence that one did a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at another time, although such evidence may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the parties. Respondents failed to allege and prove, in the trial court, that, as a matter of business usage, habit or pattern of conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay the balance of the purchase price in installments of 120 months of fixed amounts with precomputed interests, and that XEI and the respondents had intended to adopt such terms of payment relative to the sale of the two lots in question. It appears that Ayala Corporation is jointly interested with AAVA in an action to enforce the Deed of Restrictions, and is therefore covered under the following exception to the res inter alios acta rule. The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party or other person jointly interested with the party. However, the acts of ALI are not at all damaging to the position of AAVA. The act in number 1 concerns the alleged assent of ALI to the reclassification of the subject property as institutional which, as we have already ruled, does not amount to a nullification of the Deed of Restrictions. Exception to res inter alios acta rule applies (Sec 29 Rule 130) Admission by co=partner or agent and admission by privies. Relationship found between petitioners and MBMI are considered to be partnerships, then CA is justified in applying Sec 29 Rule 130 by stating that by entering into a joint venture, MBMI have a joint interest with Narra, Tesoro, and McArthur. An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his/her co-accused and is considered hearsay against them. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator. However, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received as against his/her co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself. In this case, the court did not find any sufficient evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy. Therefore, extrajudicial confession has no probative value and is inadmissible against co-conspirator. Where one derives title to real estate from another, the declaration, act or omission of the latter to the property is evidence against the former only when made while the latter holds the title. As to petitioner’s contention that Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed when he signed the document in 1968 entitled Settlement to Avoid Litigation, it is basic rule of evidence that the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. "where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property is evidence against the former." It is however stressed that the admission of the former owner of a property must have been made while he was the owner thereof in order that such admission may be binding upon the present owner. Hence, Lanceros' declaration or acts of executing the 1968 document have no binding effect on DELCOR, the ownership of the land having passed to DELCOR in 1964. As general rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is inadmissible. As one exception, however, it is permissible to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be established. There is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents. An admission made under oath before a deputy clerk of court cannot be considered involuntary merely because the person who made it alleged having done so under threat, the persons supposed to have threatened him having denied such fact. Consequently, such admission is admissible against the person making it. A statement made under circumstances which would not render it admissible as a dying declaration becomes admissible as such if approved and ratified by the declarant after he had abandoned all hope of recovery. In the present case, whether he had committed other assaults or not was a matter of no importance in the present action. The admission or rejection, therefore, of the proof to which such question related could in no way prejudice the rights of the defendants. Whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions and sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected circumstances necessary for his accurate recollection of the subject. In this case, the eyewitness positively identified Gonzales as the culprit who caused the fire. Both the trial and appellate courts found the testimony of eyewitness Canlas credible. A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify another's statement. Where it appears that a party clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of another, evidence of those statements is admissible against him. This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission. By adoptive admission, a third person's statement becomes the admission of the party embracing or espousing it. Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built its case on them. When the credibility of a witness is sought to be impeached by proof of his reputation, it is necessary that the reputation shown should be that which existed before the occurrence of the circumstances out of which the litigation arose, or at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement of the suit. This is because a person of derogatory character or reputation can still change or reform himself. With respect to the complaints filed with the Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, the acts complained of took place in 1978 to 1979. In the instant administrative case, the offense was committed in 1994. Surely, those cases and complaints are no longer reliable proofs of Magdalena's character or reputation To say that Magdalena's credibility is diminished by proofs of tarnished reputation existing almost a decade ago is unreasonable In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no connection

Son killed; accused attacks victim’s character 43 Primo Miro v Mendoza LTO officers charged with graft & corruption 44 Geraldo Ariate v People Victim died; still uttered who killed him; badjao amado 45 People v De Joya Lola robbery & homicide “Si Paki”; acquitted 46 Fuentes v CA Victim stabbed; “Zoilo”

47 Parel v Prudencio Eviction; affidavit papa 48 People v Alegado Below 12 girl raped by watchman

49 Tison v CA Niece, nephew of aunt w/o heirs

50 Mendoza v CA Casimiro, 91 yrs old; Teopista claims to be daughter of latter: SC agrees 51 Solinap v Locsin “Sr.”; birth cert Exhibit D v 8, photograph 52 Jison v CA 53 Ferrer v Inchausti claims their mother is daughter of S but died already 15 yrs prior to birth of mother 54 In Re Mallari 55 DBP v Radio Mindanao Insurance companies deny proceeds; fire; claims res gestae testimony of Torres 56 Talidano v Falcon Maritime Marine officer, illegal dismissal fax message

57 Canque v CA Contractor

58 Wallem Maritime Services v NLRC 59 Northwest v Chiong seaman not able to board plane

60 Patula v People Employee estafa

between the deceased's drug addiction and thievery with his violent death in the hands of accused-appellant. In light of the positive eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of the victim's bad character he could have been killed by any one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple speculation. Moreover, proof of the victim's bad moral character is not necessary in cases of murder committed with treachery and premeditation. No substantial evidence to show that defendants were guilty or involved in the anomalous scheme. Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness. The records show that not one of the complainants actually witnessed the transfer of money from Alingasa to Erederos and Mendoza. Nowhere in their affidavits did they specifically allege that they saw Alingasa remit the collections to Erederos. In fact, there is no specific allegation that they saw or witnessed Erederos or Mendoza receive money. At all events, even if the victim's dying declaration were admissible in evidence, it must identify the assailant with certainty; otherwise it loses its significance. It has not been established, however, that the victim would have been competent to testify had he survived the attack. There is no showing that he had the opportunity to see his assailant. Contrary, however, to the immediately-quoted ruling of the appellate court, it is the prosecution, not petitioners, which had the burden of proving that petitioners were, at the material time, the only ones in the barangay who bore such nicknames or aliases. This, the prosecution failed to discharge. The dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete. In other words, the deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The trial court simply assumed that by uttering the words "Si Paqui ", the deceased had intended to name the person who had thrust some sharp instrument through and through her neck just below her ears. But Eulalia herself did not say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her communication might have been had death not interrupted her. We are unable to regard the dying statement as a dying declaration naming the appellant as the doer of the bloody deed. In the instant case, we find that the declaration particularly against penal interest attributed to Zoilo Fuentes Jr. is not admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. Accused cries mistaken identity; says “Zoilo” admitted to their uncle that he was the one committed the crime. Patent untrustworthy! There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed. The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on necessity and trustworthiness. Declarant was not able to testify. Defense did not show serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. In said affidavit, Florentino categorically declared that while he is the occupant of the residential building, he is not the owner of the same as it is owned by respondent who is residing in Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would not have made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to himself as well as to his children's interests as his heirs. A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party herself and her maternal grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was born on September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence as claimed by the accused-appellant but rather fall under the exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family. Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being that such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent's declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. The defendant's parents, as well as the plaintiff himself, told Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that Teopista was the daughter of the defendant. It was only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this question of pedigree, and he did not cite Casimiro's father. His testimony was that he was informed by his father Hipolito, who was Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista was Casimiro's illegitimate daughter. Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule because it is the best the nature of the case admits and because greater evils are apprehended from the rejection of such proof than from its admission. At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that "documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public o􀀺cer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two Certi􀀺cates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil Registry General. MONINA Evidence may be given upon trial of monuments and inscriptions in public places as evidence of common reputation; and entries in family Bibles or other family books or charts; engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, as evidence of pedigree. The law does not require that the entries in the said booklet be made at the same time as the occurrence of those events. In view of the fact that Ramon Martinez Viademonte is now dead, the testimony of Joaquin Jose de Inchausti referring to the said deceased is admissible, for they are members of the same family, in accordance with the provisions of section 281 of Act No. 190

Res gestae. The Court is not convinced to accept the declarations as part of res gestae. While it may concede that these statements were made by the bystanders during a startling occurrence, it cannot be said however, that these utterances were made spontaneously by the bystanders and before they had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood. Both SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres received the bystanders' statements while they were making their investigations during and after the fire. It is reasonable to assume that when these statements were noted down, the bystanders already had enough time and opportunity to mill around, talk to one another and exchange information, not to mention theories and speculations, as is the usual experience in disquieting situations where hysteria is likely to take place. It cannot therefore be ascertained whether these utterances were the products of truth. That the utterances may be mere idle talk is not remote. We find that the fax messages cannot be deemed part of the res gestae. Assuming that petitioner's negligence — which allegedly caused the ship to deviate from its course — is the startling occurrence, there is no showing that the statements contained in the fax messages were made immediately after the alleged incident. In addition, no dates have been mentioned to determine if these utterances were made spontaneously or with careful deliberation. Absent any critical element of spontaneity, the fax messages cannot be admitted as part of the res gestae of the first kind. Neither will the second kind apply. Assuming arguendo that such absence was the equivocal act, it is nevertheless not accompanied by any statement more so by the fax statements adverted to as parts of the res gestae. No date or time has been mentioned to determine whether the fax messages were made simultaneously with the purported equivocal act. Moreover, Aday admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entry. She said she made the entries based on the bills given to her. But she has no knowledge of the truth or falsity of the facts stated in the bills. Thus, the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other words, where the witness has testified independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by him.

We find the manifest and passenger name record to be mere hearsay evidence. While there is no necessity to bring into court all the employees who individually made the entries, it is sufficient that the person who supervised them while they were making the entries testify that the account was prepared under his supervision and that the entries were regularly entered in the ordinary course of business. In the case at bench, while MENDOZA was the supervisor on-duty on April 1, 1989, he has no personal knowledge of the entries in the manifest since he did not supervise the preparation thereof. Guivencan on the other hand, admits that she has no personal knowledge of the amounts actually received by petitioner from customers. She based her testimony on the entries found in the receipts issued by petitioner to various customers, the ledgers held by Footluckers and the

61 Africa v Caltex Fire in gas station

62 People v San Gabriel Murder blotter inadmissible 63 Barcelon v CIR

64 Talidano 65 Malayan Insurance v Reyes

66 PNOC Shipping v CA 67 Tan v CA

68 Manliclic v Calaunan 69 Francisco v People

unsworn statements from customer, with her being the only witness who can testify on the entries. Considered hearsay. The third requisite is not present in the case. The material facts recited in the reports as to the cause and circumstances of the fire were not within the personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation. The sources of some facts were not identified while some facts were attributed an employee of Caltex, the driver of the tank truck, and respondent. The persons who made the statements not only must have personal knowledge of the facts but must have the duty to give such statements for record. THE REPORTS DO NOT CONSTITUE AN EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE. The facts stated in the reports were not given by informants pursuant to any duty to do so. The public officer who prepared the document had no sufficient and personal knowledge of the stabbing incident. Any information possessed by him was acquired from Camba which therefore could not be categorized as official information because in order to be classified as such the persons who made the statements not only must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for the record. In the case of Camba, he was not legally so obliged to give such statements. In this case, the entries made by Versola were not based on her personal knowledge as she did not attest to the fact that she personally prepared and mailed the assessment notice. Nor was it stated in the transcript of stenographic notes how and from whom she obtained the pertinent information. Moreover, she did not attest to the fact that she acquired the reports from persons under a legal duty to submit the same. Hence, Rule 130, Section 44 finds no application in the present case. Thus, the evidence offered by respondent does not qualify as an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence. Here, there is no dispute that SPO1 Dungga, the on-the-spot investigator, prepared the report, and he did so in the performance of his duty. However, what is not clear is whether SPO1 Dungga had sufficient personal knowledge of the facts contained in his report. Thus, the third requisite is lacking. Respondents failed to make a timely objection to the police report's presentation in evidence; thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to do so. As a result, the police report is still admissible inevidence. The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay evidence considering that the persons who issued them were not presented as witnesses. Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. The testimony of a witness, given in a former case between the same parties, the same matter, the adverse party having had an opportunity to cross-examine him, may be given in evidence, when said witness is: (a) deceased; (b) out of the Philippines; or (c) unable to testify [such inability proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech]. Here, the witnesses in question were available. Only they refused to testify – they do not come within the legal purview of those ‘unable to testify.’ In the situation here presented, petitioners are not bereft of remedy. They could have urged the court to have said witnesses arrested, punished for contempt – petitioners however failed to avail of said remedies, went ahead and submitted their case.