Mfr Nara- T5- Bics- Bics Briefing- 7-24-03- 00201

Commission Sensitive MEMORANDUM

FOR THE RECORD

Event: Briefing, Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Border and Transportation Directorate, DHS. Responsive in part to DHS Briefing Requests No.3 (BCIS anti-fraud detection units) and 5 (adjudication of adjustment/change of status applications) Date: Thursday, July 24, 2003 Special Access Issues: [none] Prepared

by: Janice Kephart-Roberts

Team Number: 5 (Border Security) Location: Legacy INS Headquarters, 425 Eye St., Washington, D.C. Participants

- Non-Commission:

Participants

- Commission:

Documents provided:

Bill Yates, Director of Operations, BCIS, DHS (former chief INS crime squad and director of LESC) Karen Fitzgerald, Special Ass't to Director of Operations, BCIS, DHS Dan Brown, DHS point of contact for Commission

Team 5 Janice Kephart-Roberts Betty Swope

none

NOTES: Note: In italics are questions prepared by JKRprior to the briefing. Mr. Yates' answers to the questions follow. Topics as set out in briefing request: • Types of adjustment of status available. • Types of adjustments associated with known terrorists or affiliates of terrorists, with focus on those known to be associated with terrorists, including religious worker (nonimmigrant and immigrant), marriage, and green card holders. • Processes in place to adjudicate adjustment of status applications. • Ability of these processes to detector be subject to fraud. • Anti-fraud unit investigations and the inter-agency relationships in place to pursue investigations. • Use of information derived from anti-fraud investigations in lookouts. Types of change/adjustment of status: Difference b/w change and adjustment of status.

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"change of status" refers to status shift of a nonimmigrant to a different nonimmigrant status. (example: B 1 tourist to F1 student). o If come in as a B 1 visitor, for example, and have an employer who wants to hire alien, can stay in US while employer files an H-1B petition. o Per-9f11: If come in as a B 1 visitor, for example, and decide want to apply to a US school, B 1 could use an 1-539 change of status form along with proof of legal current status to stay in US and begin attending a certified school before the 1-20 issued and student fully approved. o Post 9/11: If come in as a B 1 visitor, and decide want to apply to US school, must leave US and apply abroad using visa post and SEVIS, etc., and return in hand to PoE with an 1-20 form. "adjustment of status" refers to a status shift of a nonimmigrant to immigrant. (example: B 1 tourist to application for legal permanent resident) there are numerous adjustment/change of status laws that aren't summarized anywhere in certain nonimmigrant classes, can't change status

Types of adjustments associated with known terrorists or affiliates of terrorists: Any reports or threat assessments? "We weren't looking for terrorists pre 9/11." Post 9/11, looked at areas of risk. No formal report, but some regulatory changes. Now all adjudications require background checks, which has brought the adjudication process "to its knees". Much more difficult for known persons to be eligible for an extension of stay. "We have 800 people doing nothing but 'background' or 'national security' cases. Backlogs not of concern now; IBIS checks required for every case." Closest INS came to doing anti-fraud work pre-9f11 that could be associated with terrorists was through the National Security Unit, who worked with DoS and FBI. An anti-fraud NSU with liaison with enforcement and intel was never formally under INS. All INS fraud work was focused in the service centers (which were indeed "remote"). Even in agency annual performance plan, there wasn't a focus on fraud. INS could never answer basic questions for Congress, such as "what percentage of 1-1 cases are fraudulent"? INS never could get a handle on the scope of the problem. •

religous worker (immigrant and nonimmigrant): (Source within INS tells JKR these three statuses ~ religious, marriage, and green card holder- are the most subject to fraud, and easily used by terrorists.) This is the worst form of fraud, where there are substantial issues of misrepresentation. Hard to verify prior job history and backgrounds, with religious institutions often not wanting to succumb to immigration questions about legitimacy of clergy or workers. Very hard to get a sense of the percentage of fraud here. However, there is ongoing criminal

3 investigative interest from DoJ in these cases, via ICE. These cases are adjudicated at remote service centers and religious workers, immigrant or non, are not interviewed. Looking here for documentation on a bona fide religious . institution. FBI flags institutions of interest. BCIS anti fraud unit and ICE run all applications against the flagged institutions. Have had cases like that, but don't know numbers. Don't know of any specific cases that involve terrorists. Any cases of interest are referred to ICE. •

marriage: LPRs through marriages:- if obtain residence through marriage, given LPR status for two years conditionally, and then bedcheck done, and graded C "legitimate, process final LPR status through INS service center", graded B "maybe fraud, maybe interview", graded A "likely fraud, must interview".

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green card holder: (ran out of time)

Processes in place to adjudicate adjustment of status applications: Applications adjudicated in field offices, 33 district, 50 satellite. Naturalizations, adjustment of status, removal of conditions all adjusted via field offices. There are five remote service centers, responsible for employment applications, both immigrant and nonimmigrant; extension of stay; arrival/departure cards; and preliminary review of naturalization cases prior to transfer of case to field office. Service Centers do NOT conduct interviews. Service Centers have had significant problems sharing information and tracking cases. Without paper, were unable to alert on potentially fraudulent cases. Systems in different centers didn't talk to each other. Now expanding ability to share information electronically since all cases going through IBIS. IBIS (border inspection system) permits data mining, and already flagged a number of cases. For past 8 years, could data mine and identify cases within a certain fraud scheme, but couldn't alert inspectors at PoEs of schemes. Now can. In malfeasance cases, inspectors now required to run full name and all names with full background resolution from IBIS. At filing and adjudications, IBIS also run now. IBIS does not have an Arabic language algorithm. Pre- 9/11: In fraud investigations, would take 10 fingerprints of suspect seeking an adjustment and conduct a criminal check. Background info would go to CIA, FBI, and DoS posts. Did not do an IBIS or IDENT check; would only to IBIS if the case was referred to anti-fraud or investigative units. "We weren't looking for terrorists pre 9/11." In 8/01, slowly started increasing IBIS checks. INS couldn't use NCIC b/c got kicked out of the system in late 1970s b/c couldn't adhere to NCIC standards. INS work on the 19 hijackers: In looking at 19, all were run and found in IBIS, but no reports. Found 251 variations of names and dates of birth of 19. Ran language algorithm and 3.2 million records in search of 19. Could not certify w/in first 24 hours of 9/11 to the Attorney General that records found were of the 19.

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Ability of tit ese processes to detect or be subject tofraud. Immigration document-related corruption. DoJ OIG in October 2001 testified infront of Senate Judiciary Cmte. OIG found "deficient INS business practices" in re to (1) not safeguarding the tools to create official documents, such as paper, stamps, and ink; (2) easy access to INS computers to change entries, or issuance of INS card or benefit; and (3) bribery. What done to curtail fraud and bribery? Stamps for alien registration approval and adjustment to legal permanent resident status are easily counterfeited, as is ink used in passports as temporary evidence of alien registration. Working with the Forensic Document Lab to develop new stamps, paper and ink, and employer authorization, re-entry permits (using DoS machinery) and developing a passport book not as easily counterfeited. These efforts were in the works pre-9/l1. GAO report Jan. 2002. (1) Inability to coordinate immigration and benefit fraud investigations and inability to share information, track and manage investigations agency wide. a. Have you set forth and implemented a national strategy to coordinate fraud investigations? Don Crocetti is heading up brand new BCIS National Fraud Unit. Just now standing it up. What really need in this unit is intel and investigative officers; seeking 200 new positions for 2005, but BCIS technically not supposed to do intel, so as to not to get outright denial from BTS, Yates is renaming positions to fulfill mission within bounds set out by BTS. Motto is: "the right benefit to the right person in the right amount of time, and no benefit to the wrong person". b. Has this work been coordinated with ICE? Fraud assessment started pre 9111, but stopped due to 9/11, and didn't start up again until 2003. Right now, BCIS and ICE are conducting a study to assess the depth of its fraud problem. A random sampling often different fraud types are being reviewed by BCIS staff, who run a variety of checks of files and identifying areas where believe misrepresentation exists. No matter what the BCIS staff finds, the files then are assessed by BICE investigators to determine if, in fact, any fraud exists. The point is to determine what percentage of fraud exists in certain form types: • 539 change of status applications • extension of stay forms • 129, change of 1M status • petitions for temporary workers • petitions for permanent workers

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relative (family) visa petitions

(2) Working-level guidance. investigations?

What guidance for opening immigration benefitfraud

No. If find a scheme will notify anti-fraud component. Many standards, but with fraud, filing may be complete; but nonetheless fraudulent in content. Foran adjudicator to sniff out fraud takes training and experience. Now, if need more information, will seek it. If question arises as to potential criminality, refers case to BICE. (3) What guidance for information in an application that would trigger an interview? IF BICE 'National Security Unit receives information that an individual a terrorist, BICE goes directly to BCIS to cease and desist adjudication. (4) GAO Report discusses pressure to adjudicate cases quickly, and thus reluctantly asking for assistance from the investigations staff on adjudications suspected of fraud. Please respond. Now pressure is on to "make the right decision, not just give a stamp of approval".

Training in document fraud. •

What training is there? Who receives it? How is it updated?

FLETC and FDL both provide the training. (FLETC's anti-fraud training is designed by FDL.) Problematic especially for asylum officers. "We at BCIS don't have a packaged course. We train on an ad hoc basis through our intelligence office." FDL is willing to train the trainer and recommend to Yates to hire document examiners who can be trained by FDL. •

How does the Forensic Document Lab now being housed in ICE affect BCIS work in document fraud?

Now that FDL also has legacy Customs workto do and is bifurcated from BCIS because it now resides in ICE, fraud priorities are necessarily reprioritized, and non terrorist related fraud will be more difficult to deal with.