Mfr Nara- T4t1- Dos- Jordan Bob- 1-14-04- 00649

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Memorandum

for the Record

Event: Interview of Ambassador Bob Jordan Type of Event: Witness Interview Date: ]/14/04 Date memo prepared: 1/15/04 Special Access Issues: None Prepared by: Serena Wille and Niki Grandrimo Team Number: 4, 1 (respectively) Location: 9- I 1 Commission Classification: SFjCRE~I';CSIIIICSJNF Participants: Jordan, Wille, Grandrimo, and Dan Byman (Team 3, for first hour of interview)

On January 14, 2004, we interviewed Ambassador Jordan for approximately 1 hour and 40 minutes at the K Street office. This memorandum provides a summary of what we consider the most important points covered in the interview, but is not a verbatim account. he memorandum is organized by subject and does not necessarily follow the order of the' interview. All information in this memorandum was provided by Jordan during the interview unless explicitly stated or indicated otherwise. Jordan received a B.A. in political science from Duke University in 1967. He spent four years in the Navy working with the Naval Security Group. He then received his M.A. in government (with an international relations focus) from the University of Maryland. [Ed. Note: lordan received a 1.0. from the University of Oklahoma.] He spent 30 years as a lawyer, most of which were with Baker Botts LLP in Dallas, Texas. In October 200], Jordan began as the US ambassador to Saudi Arabia. He spent two years in this position and, in October 2003, returned to work in the private sector in the U.S. Before arriving in Saudi Arabia in October 200 I, Jordan met with the President . and discussed the US-Saudi relationship. I 9/11 Classified

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also received extensive was the general threat of terrorism. In his country-specific preparation, there was little detail about terrorist threats or AQ. There was no suggestion that the Saudi government sponsored or facilitated terrorism. [It did not appear that the MEPP was raised in the briefings as that was the specific question we presented to lordan to which he did not respond.]

~--------------------------------------~ briefings from the CIA and academics; one of the topics

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Post 9/11, there were issues that divided the royal family and these strained the US-Saudi relationship. First, there were those in the family who were conciliatory upon the 9/11 attacks (like the Crown Prince); those who thou ht the 9111 attacks were the result of a Jewish plo nd those who believed the Saudi hijackers were eviants an cnrruna s rat er t an representatives of a fundamental

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shift in societ The Saudi business community was equally divide e roya arm y was a so Ivided over whether the US Arab-Israeli policy was a cause of the attacks. The USG was able to change this view to some extent by briefing Saudi government officials about the hijackers. In private the Saudi officials stopped making these claims, although some individuals continued with this rhetoric in public. As an aside, Jordan noted that the Saudis vieYved everything through the prism of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Jordan said tha~ ~learly understood the involvement of the Saudis in the 9/11 attacks and was not In denIal, like some of his relatives. He quickly moved into gear and was very helpful to the US. 9/11 Classified Information Immediately after 9111 the US-Saudi relationship became.strained for other reasons as well. There was a great deal of negative US press after 'th~ attacks and the Saudis could not understand why President Bush did not defend them.vJordan said he thought the President was more supportive of the US-Saudi relationship 'th~n given credit for. The mood in Congress was also anti-Saudi, which made Jordan's workmore difficult. There was a constant stream of negative vibrations, including the Rand report, comments by Richard Perle, etc. Jordan says there were also leaks from Treasury-and Defense. The CFR feport came out in 2002 and was quite negative. The relationshi ,hit an all time low in s riil 2002 when Israel entered Jenin and Nablus The Saudis thought the negativity was driven by Israeli sympathizers in the USG. Later there were other leaks from Treasury that were counterproductive and self-serving. Jordan credited these to OF AC andl I·although ..he..~~~~,~~~ thatl Icould use colorful language too. ...._-........... 9/11 Personal Pri vacy By contrast, Jordan received report ~~~~--P-~~~~~~P-~--~ they were receiving "unprecedented cooperation improvement was in the level of information-sharing. 9/11 Classified

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..... ~..,.....,.. ..........__ ~~~at one point to t e au IS t at t ey a to e more proactive 10 t err tnvestigattons. The lack of Saudi initiative was especially frustrating for the first 6-8 months after 9111. Jordan said it was not until the May 12 bombings that the Saudis became more proactive.

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Jordan did not believe the Saudis were trying to hinder USG law enforcement efforts. The Saudi culture dictated that they should only share final reports (rather than interim information or draft reports) with the USO. Jordan said the usa tried to break this culture, and he thinks the were successful in recent instances. There were also ca acit issues. 9/11 Classified

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For the US to influence Saudi government behavior, Jordan said there are several levers. First, US and Saudi interests need to converge and the US must capitalize on this convergence. It took the May 12 bombings for the Saudis to be emotionally committed to stopping Al Qaida. Previously, there was only an intellectual commitment. The Saudis are also very image conscious and were hurt by the negative US press after 9/11. Jordan told the Saudis that the best way to improve their image was to cooperate fully with the US on counterterrorism, engage in open dialogue with dissidents, grant rights to women, etc. The Saudis want to be part of the respected Arab community and to be seen as the moderates they believe they are. They have started to engage in outreach by sending Saudi businessmen to the US heartland. A final means of leverage is admission to the WTO. The Saudis are anxious to be admitted and Jordan says he worked hard to get the Administration to support their bid, which it did eventually. He also pushed the Saudis to reform their economy to meet WTO standards; the WTO could provide the Saudis cover to make necessary changes. On the US-Saudi relationship today Jordan referred us to two cables he sent at the end of his tenure in which he assessed the relationship in a systematic way. Jordan said his cables pointed optfJhat the had no policy on the US-Saudi relationship. Senior officials would travel.to the re ion and make re uests of the Saudis but no one addressed the relationshi ..; itself.

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When asked about Aufhauser's statement that Saudi Arabia is the "epicenter" cl terrorist finance, Jordan said that is like saying Miami is the epicenter of the drug trade. He said that terrorist financing activities may be going on but it does not mean that the Saudis are condoning them or turning a blind eye. However, he admitted that there is culpability. Clearly a number of wealthy people contribute to extremist organizations, some of which undoubtedly have terrorist ties. The greater source of funds, according to Jordan, is NGOs, which are funded by Saudi individuals and the Saudi government, These have recklessly poor controls, with a vast majority of the funds being donated in cash without any accounting. The transfers to branch offices and then to the: final reci ients occur com letel below he rada ere

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Early in 2002 OFAC made an effort to develop ackages of ey.{dence and ations" a ainst entities and individuals e Saudi government would repeatedly say, give us the evidence and we will take action. Jordan saidthat the requisite evidence was not made available, which made it diffic~rtt to enlist Saud] cooperation. Jordan was told the USG had the necessary evidence -,:Jordanagreed that the Saudis could have been more proactive and could have gathered.information .>: • -:

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themselves. In fact, Jordan believes the Saudis were doing more in this regard then they let us know. It was a tit-for-tat situation: we didn't share intelligence, so they didn't share intelligence. Then there were leaks from Treasury [Ed. note: about the lack of Saudi cooperation and Saudi government complicity], which mystified the Saudis who •

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IS Interagency Issue improved over time but made the Saudis wonder how competent we were. It gave them an excuse to resist complying with our requests.

Jordan did not give much credence to the claim that many senior princes were involved in terrorist financin2.1

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The Riyadh bombings had a positive impact the Saudi government's counterterrorist efforts in general. Terrorist financing, however, is a "harder nut to crack." The Saudi government removed the collection boxes from the mosques, which was viewed as a cataclysmic event in Saudi Arabia. Jordan said that it also cut off funding to foreign operations of Saudi charities and was focusing on a more domestic agenda. In Jordan's view, progress was already being made and the Riyadh bombing accelerated the process. In facq 'suggested the joint terrorist financing working group and the USG was initially dilatory in responding. Now that it is up and running Jordan believes it is going well. In response to one draft USG comment from fall 2002 stating that Saudi cooperation on terrorist financing was "sporadic and inconsistent," he said he was not aware of any USG conclusion to this effect. Jordan made it clear that he faulted the Saudis for their execution rather than their efforts. He is not trying to defend Saudi Arabia; they certainly could have done more and could still be doing more. However, other allies such as Germany have been equally reticent in their cooperation .

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When asked why al Qaida was composed primarily of Saudis, Jordan said that the previous generation .of Saudis was flushed with oil wealth. As a result, the' education system focused prinlaply .o~ philosophy and religion, not basic academics. Thus, the entire education structureproduced people with no skill for obtaining gainful employment. When the Saudi oil-based economy began to fail, these undereducated people's lofty expectations began to crumble and they were left with a sense of disillusionment. [U] Jordan stated that the goal of young Saudi men is to attain a wife, job, car, and a house, and the latter three are necessary to obtain the first. With the segregation of the sexes, the lack of an outlet for personal crises, and the breakdown of the family structure, the young men tum to the mosques for solace. There, they are "bombarded" with a dogma of intolerance, hatred, and anti-Semitism, and notions that depraved Westerners are defiling their pure Kingdom. This hatred gets projected onto others because they are taught that their problems. are not their fault. Jordan stated that culturally, the Saudi psyche does not have the same notion of "individual's capacity to overcome" as some . other cultures. As a result, these young men are prey for radical Imams or teachers who teach that this life is only a way station to eternity. They believe that they are tools of Allah and ready to leave this world at his will. [U]

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While he was at post, Jordan asked that a study of the curriculum taught in Saudi schools be conducted. He discovered that school books were full of anti-Semitism, antiWestern, and radicaJ material. For example, a math problem would read, "There are five mujahidin. Three go to jihad. How many are left?" Jordan pressed the Saudi

Government for curriculum reform, which the Saudis now claim to have done. Likewise,

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the Saudis claim that they have caused reform within mosques, forcing extremist Imams to moderate their sermons. Jordan said that he routinely asked for translations of the sermons presented in major mosques. He said that in one instance, the sermon itself preached tolerance but closed with "destroy the Jews and infidels." Jordan demanded that the Saudi Government do more. [U] When asked whether the Saudi Government views itself as a target of al Qaida, Jordan said that since the May) 2, 2003 bombings in Riyadh, the Saudi Government believes that it is more threatened by al Qaida than the US. This is also evidenced by the assassination attempts on Saudi Government officials and the November 9,2003 bombing in Riyadh of a Muslim residential compound. As a result, Crown Prince Abdullah has made it clear that anyone who aids, comforts, or rationalizes the acts of terrorists will be dealt with harshly. [U]

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Jordan believes that the increase in the number of attacks in Saudi Arabia is a direct result of increased enforcement by the Saudi Government. In addition, he believes that al Qaida is goinp ~fter soft targets and targets of opportunity because it is unable to conduct a cataclysnficattack. He commented that the al Qaida lieutenants in Saudi Arabia are a "new generation" that believe they can bring down the Saudi Government. [U) " .'

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