Mfr Nara- T3- Dod- Newberry Robert- 6-21-04- 00781

MEMORANDUM

FOR THE RECORD

Event: Interview of Robert Newberry Type of Event: Interview Date: June 21, 2004 Prepared by: Bonnie D. Jenkins Classification: Unclassified Team Number: 3 (Counterterrorism Policy) Location: The Pentagon Participants - Non-Commission: Robert Newberry, Harvey Dalton Participants - Commission: Bonnie D. Jenkins

Background: Robert Newberry arrived at the Pentagon the summer of 1987. He was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Air Force and worked at the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the office of the Director of Operations. He spent three years in that position and in his last year he was assigned to work in countemarcotics in the Office of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC). In 1993, he retired from the U.S. Air Force. In 1994, he became the Principal Director for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC. In the summer 2000, he became the Principal Deputy for SOILIC and in the summer 2001, he developed an organization titled "Territorial Security'," which he worked at for one year. During these tenures he worked on counterterrorism issues. He then became the Principal Deputy for counter narcotics. Newberry is now at the newly established office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense where he is again working on countemarcotics issues. CSG and the Deputies Committee Before 9-11 Prior to 9-11, Newberry attended a number of Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) meetings that were related to his portfolio. This included countemarcotics (CN), counterterrorism (CT), and consequence management. In his view, Richard Clarke did a good job as Coordinator. He often irked people because of his dynamic style of operating. Clarke was very proactive and demanding. He was also very interagency oriented. He rubbed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) the wrong way more than the civilians in the Pentagon, and the JCS did not like the NSC telling them what to do. Newberry said the CSG was a good process for the interagency to address issues. The Deputies Committee (DC) played a role in the development of counterterrorism policy. Newberry did not attend DC meetings. However, he noted that the deputies could make decisions on preparations for such things as the millennium celebration. Newberry was not involved in issues regarding strikes and contingency plans. Operational issues were not addressed by SO/LIC. 1 Territorial security consists of anti-terrorism, consequence management (foreign and domestic) and homeland security as it began to development within the Department.

There were a number of table top exercises on potential biological, and chemical terrorist attacks. These focused on rendering safe a weapon the FBI could not. This capability was ongoing when he arrived at SO/LIC. The Department was involved in other domestic counterterrorist activities. It was engaged in preparations for the millennium and the 1996 Olympics. The Department took part in a training program for first responders in 120 U.S. cities. The Department took part in worldwide counterterrorism conferences and initiated counterterrorism reports to Congress. DoD also took part in agricultural terrorism hearings. The focus of DoD was on antiterrorism and force protection after Khobar Towers, the USS Cole, and attacks on the African embassies. The focus was how to better protect the military so it would not be such an easy target. The concern about consequence management was just beginning and there were scenarios developed for potential WMD attacks. This was really pushed after the attacks on 9-11. The concern for personal protection was also an issue and was also really pushed after 9-11. All of these efforts cost money, which was not available before 9-11. Prior to 9/11, a debate revolved around whether there was a terrorist threat at home. The question was how to improve capabilities across the board and increase security. The issue was how to protect soft targets, and that was difficult. The Department was very defense and reaction oriented. The CT part of DoD was weaker. U.S. targets were believed to be outside the homeland. The focus was on how to find the terrorists. The Department did begin reviewing ways to go after targets in Afghanistan with unmanned vehicles. That led to the idea of the use of Predators. Tom Kuster memorandum Newberry says he did not see the Tom Kuster memorandum of September 1998 stating that the Department should take a more aggressive stance against terrorism.' However, he does know the U.S. was not ready to go into Afghanistan. The defensive posture (force protection) was paramount to counterterrorism. Special Forces Operations Newberry noted that Special Operations Forces (SOFs) should have been engaged in the fight against al Qaeda and UBL before 9-11. The military was hesitant about using SOFs, but this was not because of risk aversion. What was sought was confidence that missions would be successful. Some were frustrated with DoD because DoD was seen as not aggressive in going after al Qaeda and Bin Ladin. However, when the military does a mission, there is a large footprint. They want to succeed. Using the SOFs in another country is a high risk. If the mission fails, the military must be ready to answer for it. After 9-11, there is more of a willingness to take such risks.

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Tom Kuster is the former Deputy Director of the Counterterrorism Division of SO/LIC.

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USSCole Newberry is not sure a military response to the USS Cole would have made a difference in preventing the 9/11 attacks. A strike would have had to kill the al Qaeda leadership or do significant harm to al Qaeda; however, it was very difficult locating al Qaeda leadership. Tomahawk Missiles Missiles were not the best way to go after al Qaeda and Bin Ladin. The missiles are good systems and are accurate, as long as there is a target. The key is to have actionable intelligence. The al Qaeda leaders were not stupid. They did not stay in one place for a long time. August 1998 was a signal from the U.S. "we are mad and we do not like what you are doing," Newberry said. However, it did not stop anything. Transition Newberry did not take part in transition briefings and did not prepare papers for those who did attend the briefings. Newberry conducted a countemarcotices briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld and Steve Cambone, the current Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, after the transition. Newberry said the new Pentagon civilian appointees had a different style than the previous administration. During Secretary Cohen's tenure, Cohen wanted to know what was going on and to be kept up with the latest events. Newberry would prepare papers for Cohen with updates. Newberry prepared similar papers for the Rumsfeld, however, they were shot back. He was told by Cambone not to forward information memorandum. Cambone wanted to know what action should be taken, or else, "you look like you are covering your ass." If there was no action that was going to be requested, Newberry was told not to send anything. When Cohen was in office, John Hamre, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, had a special assistant dedicated to domestic consequence management. This individual worked with SOlLIe personnel. However, the special assistant position went away when the administration changed. In the new administration, all domestic consequence management issues were placed in SO/LIC. Newberry was asked why it took so long for the new administration to appoint a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for SOLIC. Newberry said SO/LIC is an odd organization that was forced upon the Pentagon by Congress. Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Under Secretary for Policy Douglas Feith were at the Pentagon when SOlLIe was created and they were not enthusiastic about the establishment of the new office. Newberry is not sure the new administration wanted to keep SOlLIe when it arrived in 2001. After the first year, they waited to decide what to do with SO/LIC. Newberry said there are many lessons that can be learned from the area of countemarcotics. There is more information sharing that while not great, is still better than it is in counterterrorism. There have been joint task forces with federal law enforcement that is rather close. There is a lot that can be done in countemarcotics becaus.e there is an ability to move money around if it is necessary. The countemarcotics

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area is easier and smaller to manage. The budget is smaller ($1 - $1.1 billion). There is a synergy of effort that does not exist in counterterrorism. There is also no synergy between countemarcotics and counterterrorism efforts. There are stovepipes between the two. There may be a nexus between the two that would allow benefits to be reaped if efforts were joined. Intelligence collection between the two is the same. If there could be some sharing, there could be links established. It is also difficult to get some of the commands, particularly Central Command, to focus equally on countemarcotics. However, there are links between the two in the Central Command's area of responsibility, particularly in Afghanistan.

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