Mfr Nara- Na- Cia- Nolte Bill- 7-1-03- 00787

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Conversation with Bill Nolte July 1,2003 •



On achieving dramatic, revolutionary change in the Intelligence Community: o

Examine the actions and impact of General McPeak's reorganization of the USAF in 1991 ???? in which he created the Air Combat Command following the US Navy model of putting all combatant elements under a single operating element. In creating Air Combat Command, Gen. McPeak disestablished long standing USAF commands with their own culture, history, etc. This included the Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command; the Air Defense Command and other USAF elements, greatly upsetting veterans of these organizations and their political connections. WHY DID MCPEAK DO THAT AND WHAT LESSONS ARE THERE IN THIS REORGANIZATION FOR THE INTELLIGENCE CO~TY?

o

Look at CDC as a model for the 21 st century Intelligence Community

On the need for model:

a national

intelligence think tank/planning center on the NDU

In conversations with Andy Marshall of DOD and Andy Krepenevich, DOD consultant, regarding how the IC could undertake long range planning and thinking about the role of intelligence in the 21 st century, both independently said there is no entity in the IC to undertake strategic planning and to generate ideas about intelligence topics. •

On the role ofNIO's: Study Bill Colby's decision to terminate the National Board of Estimates and create National Intelligence Officers. He wanted someone to give the broadest possible view on a given topic or region. WE don't have that now in our NIO's. Additionally, NIO's should have more operational experience and not come from academia to best leverage the collection and analytical elements of the IC.



On Open Source Intelligence: o

The IC really doesn't know what open source can tell us. He recommends examining and interviewing operations such as Oxford Analytica and Stratfor.com to determine if private sector can and should be used more extensively in OSINT collection and analysis.



o

Sherman Kent is alleged to have said: 85% of what is known comes from open sources.

o

FBIS plays a marginal role in OSINT. Do we still need it?

On the distinction between intelligence and information: o



The IC is fixated on dealing with secret information. Nolte prefers thinking about the national security issues of the 21 st century requiring a focus on information and not intelligence. What is the difference?

On the utility of examining the role of lawyers in the activities of the IC before and after 9-11 : o

Nolte describes the role of lawyers in the NSA context as "censoring itself" For example, NSA lawyers are proud to say that only one FISA request has been turned down by the FISA Court. Nolte views this as an example of self-censoring, i.e. NSA should be aggressive in submitting FISA requests and let the FISA Court decide whether they are appropriate or not. There should be many more rejections by the FISA Court.

o

Lawyers as censors. Nolte recalls a conversation with NSA/OGC in which the response to a request to draft new legal language to give NSA greater authority was: "we don't ask for new law."

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