Memo Of 9/11 Commission Interview Of Former Jeddah Consul General Richard Baltimore

Commission MEMORANDUM

Sensitive

FOR THE RECORD

Event: Richard Baltimore interview, Ambassador to the Sultanate of Oman Type of event: Interview -- untaped Date: 12-2-03 Special Access Issues: None Prepared

by: Tom Eldridge/Janice Kephart-Roberts

Team Number: 5 Location: Room 5125, GSA Building Participants

- Non-Commission: Phone

Name AgencY/Title Richard Lewis Baltimore, IIIAmbassador

Participants

202-647-2227

Asst. Legal Counsel

Paula Barton

- Commission:

Tom Eldridge

Counsel Team 5

202-401-1686

Janice Kephart-Roberts

Counsel Team 5

202-401-1705

Documents/handouts

received by the Commission:

Other contacts referred to: None TEXT: Mr. Baltimore's Background B.A. G.W. University, 1969 JD Harvard, 1972 Joined State Department 1972 Lisbon P and Ec. 1973-1975 S.A. P and Cons 1976-1979 Spec. Asst. Sec State 1976-1979 Egypt P 1981-1983 Hung. Lang. Trng. 1983-1984 Budapest Pol. Chief 1984-1987 Near Eastern Regional Affairs 1987-1990

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(Dep. DiT. and Dir.) DCM Budapest 1990-1994, \:\ "" Snr. Pol. Advisor to Holbrooke on Bosnia ~994-199,$ __ Pres. Sm. Seminar 1995-19~,6 :: \. ' DCM San Jose 1996-1999.'/ \: \ CG Jeddah, SA 1999,,20q1 ':.

Amb, Muscat, Oman 19102 - Present Jeddah Consulate - Arrived summer 1999

be arrived :'(:arliCockburn was head of' the, consular secti6n., -"Under Cockburn were ,

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We asked Baltimore to describe the role of the CG:': He said it is a misnomer, because they do not focus on consular work. Rather, the is in charge of the consulate. The three posts in SA, Riyadh, Jeddah, and Dahran divided up the country. As CG, he had oversight over all branches of the USG in Jeddah, including the admin, public diplomacy, FAA, USGS, Political and Economic Sections, and military. There was no INS person in Jeddah. FAA was there because every Saudi pilot was certified by the FAA, something not true for any other country, including Israel. \. '

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Baltimore believed his job was to make sure people g<# the information they needed, without there existing any stovepipes at post. As far as: consular work went, his main concern was to get the consular people into a new facility. When he arrived, they were in a trailer and the situation was bad. He said at one poind Iroot went through the floor of the trailer. To accomplish this, he dealt with the government construction person in Riyadh. The new facility was completed during his tenure there. The Scene in J eddah We asked Baltimore to describe Jeddah. He said Jeddah was the "entryway to the Raj." He described Jeddah as a port city, far more cosmopolitan city than Riyadh, one not afraid of the outside world. It had millions of visitors each year from pilgrims. The main merchant families of Jeddah were of multiple ethnicities - Egyptian, Turkish, Saudi, . Yemeni - whereas in Riyadh, the main families would have mostly Saudi tribal names. Jeddah was the last kingdom - the Kingdom of Hijaz, formerly controlled by the Hashemites - conquered by the AJ Sauds in the 1920s.

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The U.S. interest in Jeddah was more commercial than in Riyadh. Also, Baltimore said that approximately 6,000 U.S. citizens came through Jeddah on the Raj .

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Fraudulent documents '. i Baltimore said that he recalled one instance when Ddiscc>:~ered the use by a TeN of fraudulent documents. ~aIled the police and the police came and took the TeN away. ~aid it was all handled "smoothly." ~Otherwise, Baltimore does not recall ever h~ut Saudis using,fraudulent documents to obtain visas from any source.

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Terrorist Threat """ ,,:

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Baltimore was never told of a terrorist threat posed to the United States from Saudis, nor did he recall being "~oldabout iihadist activities of Saudis. He did receive intelligence information each w~,ekJ Ibut he very rarely saw any finished intelligence"'product. [Note: see handwritten notes for classified material on this topic.] Although he could not recall any specific instances, he did believe any information on a parti~.ular visa applicant would have been shared with the consular section.

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For terror concerns, they ..re.... lied on Vi~",asViper

an1, Tipoff.

Visa Policy

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Baltimore said that Riyadh was the ultimate visa P?licy-setter. Baltimore concurred with our assertion \that Saudi's were generally considered to be good risks for becoming intending immigrants, and for this reason were not generally interviewed. Before 9-11, Baltimore said, it "wasn't likely" that a Saudi could be a terrorist. Moreover, the visa adjudication system was not designed to catch terrorists. Rather,it was designed to catch intending immigrants.

He was not aware of any special i~tervieW{rograms

at post.

He said there was always pressure te issue visas from commercial interests in SA and in the U.S. He said he had never seen ~ congressional letter questioning why a visa had been issued to a Saudi before 9-11, only since, He! said he never criticized the refusal

any

rates 0 f of his ~IlU~ul;U;Il~iers. memo to him fro~

He did'recall the Fow ler incident referenced in a

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Visa Express ,

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Baltimore said that h{~as at post ~hen it\;was\intr~duced, top-down, from Riyadh. He said the TARP had been used in another post .J: Mexico City - successfully by the CG in Riyadh (Furey): Ba1timore did not recall that part of the reason for it was to improve security forthe consulate and embassy ......\" \ ", :

'V~ a~ded wo:k

Baltimore di~ recall t~ai ke.~t Jeddah. Baltimore said It also added one day to

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t:p~ processing

fo~ the consular se~tion in time for the Saudis to get

visas (from same day to two days), andirlanY.\.i,:~omplainedabout this.

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Baltimore said the perception that VE led to tQe State Department divesting itself of responsibility for evaluating the merits of Saudi visa applications was incorrect. He said, however, that this perception prevailed, and forced the State Department to drop Visa Express. This decision was made in Riyadh and at the top of the Department, said B~m~. \ . Changes post 9-11 Baltimore said initially, everyone at post was shocked ~d horrified to learn that they had issued visas to some of the hijackers. They collected paperwork for the various government agencies investigating, including CA, the FBi'1 Their main question was: Did we follow proper procedures? After reviewing the applications, they "were convinced we did." They concluded that although the system may have been faulty, that the State Department employees in Jeddah implemented it as designed.

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When we pressed Baltimore on details - such as the incomplete applications - seemingly inconsistent with this conclusion, he stated, "I wasn't involved in the details."

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As a general matter, Baltimore said the State Department is "very poorly understood." He said that State employees are just as patriotic as any other American. He said consular officers were not to blame, that we were taken advantage of as a system and as a country because of our openness and trusting nature. He also said the visa law is designed by Congress, and that it is simply not fair to blame anyone branch of government for 9-11. He also said that if State is to do more interviewing post 9-11, then they should be given the resources and training to do this job. .

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