Maquiling Vs. Comelec.docx

NATURE PETITIONERS RESPONDENTS

MAQUILING VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 195649 / April 16, 2013 / SERENO, C.J. / Qualifications / EFHDy PETITION for certiorari Casan Macode Maquiling Commission on Elections, Rommel Arnado y Cagoco, Linog G. Balua

SUMMARY. Arnado was a natural born Filipino who subsequently gained US citizenship through naturalization, losing his PH citizenship in the process. However, in order to be qualified to run for the position of Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, he gained back his PH citizenship through repatriation, taking 2 oaths of allegiance to the country and renouncing his US citizenship. He won the election, prompting his opponents to file a case of disqualification against him, arguing that he was still a foreigner as evidenced by his continuous use of his US passport even after his Oath of Allegiance to the PH. The SC ruled that Arnado was indeed disqualified. The use of a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality. Arnado did not lose his Filipino citizenship, but regained his US citizenship and became a dual citizen. Under sec. 40(d) of the LGC, those with dual citizenships are expressly disqualified from running for local gov’t positions. The effect of this is that Maquiling, the losing candidate with the highest number of votes, should be declared Mayor. As ruled in Jalosjos v. COMELEC, when there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the next qualified candidate with the most votes wins the election. In cases like this, the winner is not considered a second-placer, but the “firstplacer” amongst the qualified candidates. DOCTRINE. The use of a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality. Under sec. 40(d) of the LGC, those with dual citizenships are expressly disqualified from running for local gov’t positions. DISSENT, BRION, J.: Arnado’s use of a foreign passport was just an isolated act and it cannot be considered as an express renunciation of his PH citizenship. FACTS.  Background – Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. He subsequently lost his PH citizenship when he underwent naturalization as a US citizen. He then regained his PH citizenship under RA 9225 by taking two Oaths of Allegiance to the RP (one on July 10, 2008 and one on April 3, 2009). These oaths were accepted, and an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. He also executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his US citizenship. >>> All this made him qualified to file his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the 2010 local elections.  Case for DQ – Another candidate for mayor, Balua, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC. He contended that Arnado was not a resident of Kauswagan, and that he was still a foreigner based on the following: (a) certification by the Bureau of Immigration indicating that his nationality was “USA-American”; and (b) Arnado’s travel record indicating that he had been using his US Passport even after his Oath to the PH.  COMELEC ordered Arnado to file his answer >> Arnado failed to file ansser >> Balua filed motion to declare him in default  COMELEC did not act on the motions in time, so the elections pushed through before petition was decided.  Result of Elections – Arnado won and was proclaimed Mayor.  Continuation of DQ case – Arnado only filed his answer after winning. He submitted the following documents to show he was qualified: (a) Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance; (b) a Join-Affidavit of City Engineer and other neighbors of Arnado, attesting that he was a long-time resident of Kauswagan; (c) certification from Punong Barangay of Kauswagan stating he was a bona-fide resident; (d) certification from Municipal Local Gov’t that Arnado’s father was also a resident, and even served as Mayor; (e) Voter Certification showing that Arnado had been a registered voter in Kauswagan since April 3, 2009  COMELEC First Division – Ruled against Arnado. It treated the case as one for disqualification, not as one of cancellation of CoC. First ruled that Arnado was not a US resident because Balua was not able to present sufficient evidence. However, in terms of citizenship, the COMELEC ruled that Arnado was not Filipino because of his act of consistently using his US passport (used it six times) after renouncing his US citizenship. Thus, they annulled his proclamation as Mayor and ruled that the winner of Vice-Mayor should succeed in his place pursuant to Sec. 44 of the LGC.  Intervention by petitioner Maquiling – Petitioner was another candidate for Mayor and garnered the second highest number of votes. He intervened and argued that while COMELEC was correct in DQing Arnado, they were wrong in ruling that Vice-Mayor should succeed as Mayor under Sec. 44 LGC. He argues that he should be proclaimed winner for being the qualified candidate who garnered the most votes.

 COMELEC En Banc – Reversed the First Division’s ruling and stated that Arnado was qualified. Ruled that the use of a US passport does not operate to revert back his status as a US/dual citizen since no law provides such.  The principle of continuity of citizenship, which provides that once a person becomes a citizen, it is assumed that he desired to continue to be one until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. In this case, Arnado should be presumed to have remained Filipino despite his use of the US passport absent any clear and unequivocal proof of expatriation.  Furthermore, Arnado’s claim that he had no choice but to use his US passport because he had not been given notice of the issuance of his PH passport yet was a valid excuse. He was only able to claim his PH passport 3 months after its issuance, and he used it ever since. ISSUES & RATIO. 1. WON the intervention of a rival candidate in a DQ case is proper when there has been no proclamation of a winner yet. – YES.  In this case, Maquiling intervened at the stage when Arnado filed an MR of the COMELEC First Division ruling before the COMELEC En Banc. The COMELEC decided to treat the case as one for Disqualification, so the applicable law is Sec. 6 of RA 6646 (Electoral Reform Law of 1987), which allows interventions during DQ proceedings even after the election, as long as there has been no final judgment on the eligibility of the candidate yet.  The fact that the COMELEC En Banc had already ruled that Maquiling had not shown the requisites for the exemption to the “second-placer rule” and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case is of no moment, and does not deprive him the right to elevate the matter to the SC.  Arnado argues that the case has attained finality because the original petitioner and respondents did not appeal the En Banc decision >>> SC = no finality precisely because Maquiling elevated it to SC. It is only after SC has ruled upon issues that DQ case originally filed by Balua will attain finality. 2. WON Arnado was qualified to run for local office. – NO. His use of a US passport after renouncing US citizenship amounts to an undoing of such renunciation.  The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s citizenship. It does not divest PH citizenship regained by repatriation, but recants the Oath of Renunciation of foreign citizenship, which is required to run for elective position.  Renunciation of foreign citizenship: Initially, Arnado complied with the twin requirements of Oath of Allegiance + Renunciation under RA9225 Sec. 5(2) to be eligible to run for an elective position. By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a PH citizen.  However, this legal presumption of citizenship is not permanent, and may be open to attack when, after such renunciation, the person performs positive acts showing his continued possession of foreign citizenship.  APPLIED: The important thing to determine is WoN Arnado was solely a PH citizen when he filed his CoC. In this case, between the date he renounced his US citizenship and the date he filed his CoC, he used his US passport to travel six times. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the USA.  The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.  Even if the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in CA63 1 constituting loss of PH citizenship, it nevertheless is an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required by a dual citizen to be qualified to run for a local elective position. He was therefore under the disqualification under Sec. 40 (d) of the LGC.  Dual Citizenship: COMELEC was correct in ruling that Arnado did not lose his PH citizenship. All that happened was a reversion to his status as a dual citizen, which was fatal to his eligibility.  There are two classes of dual citizens: (a) those who acquired foreign citizenship through positive act of naturalization; (b) those who are considered dual citizens by virtue of birth. >>> Those in the first class need

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Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship: (1) By naturalization in a foreign country; (2) By express renunciation of citizenship; (3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more; (4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country; (5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; (6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted: and (7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.

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to take both an Oath of Allegiance to PH and an Oath of Renunciation of foreign citizenship. Those in the second class only need to take an Oath of Allegiance because the mere act of filing for a CoC carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. >>> Arnado belongs to the first class. Basically, Arnado actually complied with the twin requirements under RA9225, but lost it subsequently. The purpose of the LGC in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office. Qualification Requirements are continuing in nature: In this case, the citizenship requirement must be possessed not just at the time of renunciation of the foreign citizenship, but continuously. Therefore, Arnado’s act of using his US passport stopped this continuity. The case of Yu v. Defensor-Santiago can be compared to this case: Yu was a Portugese dude who sought naturalization as a Filipino and later renewed his Portugal passport. In the case at hand, Arnado’s act of using his US passport was also a positive act of representation as a US citizen. COMELEC En Banc, in ruling in favor of Arnado, stated that he had a justifiable excuse because he used his PH passport as soon as he got it, which was 3 months after its issuance. >>> SC said this was erroneous. His PH Passport was issued on June. Three months from June is only September. If indeed Arnado used his PH passport continuously once he got it, he would not have used his US passport on November 2009. Also, his subsequent use of a PH passport will not cure the defect caused by the use of his US passport.

3. WON Maquiling should be proclaimed Mayor as the recipient of the 2 nd highest number of votes. – YES.  First of all, Topacio v. Paredes, the case that provided for the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner in an election must be re-examined  This case involved the 1912 elections in the town of Imus, Cavite for the position of municipal president between Abad and Topacio. Topacio received the most votes while Abad was the second-placer. Abad then contested the election on the ground that Topacio was ineligible because he was running for a second time without observing the four-year interruption rule under Act No. 2045.  Said case contained the oft-quoted phrase of “the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots.”  >>> First, the SC said that this phrase was only obiter dictum because the issue in that case was NOT WoN Abad can be proclaimed the winner as second-placer because of Topacio’s disqualification. The issue that the court actually ruled on was WoN the CFI has jurisdiction to try a DQ case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the most votes. The ruling was that since a CFI’s jurisdiction is confined “to determine which of the contestants as been duly elected”, the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he “declared that no one had been legally elected president of the municipality” where the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal president.  Second, we have to look at the context upon which the phrase was used. The phrase was located in a paragraph that was comparing (a) the situation where a candidate is not entitled to a position because of fraud in the elections itself, and (b) the situation where a candidate is ineligible because of his own qualifications. In the first situation, a winner can be proclaimed because there was a contest in the strict sense of the word. For instance, if it is found that one candidate won because fraud in vote-counting, and that it is clear that another other candidate should have won, such rightful candidate can be proclaimed the winner. On the other hand, in the second situation, there is no actual contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality.  The popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate: The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump mandatory provisions is not democracy nor republicanism, but electoral anarchy. This principle has been laid down by several cases such as Frivaldo v. COMELEC, Quizon v. COMELEC, and Velasco v. COMELEC.  Maquiling is not a second-placer, but the first-placer among the qualified candidates and should thus be proclaimed winner: As ruled in the cases of Jalosjos v. COMELEC and Aratea v. COMELEC, a void CoC cannot produce any legal effect. Thus, all the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determine the winner of an election.  However, this does not mean that the entire elections are rendered void. Votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of sovereign voice, and the votes cast in favor of the other legitimate candidates should also be respected. When there are participants who turn out to be

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ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC that when the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones. The electorate’s awareness of a candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the DQ to attach to the candidate. The very existence of disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the CoC but also the proclamation. Sec. 6 of RA 6646 2 provides that when a candidate has not been declared DQ’d by final judgment yet, but is subsequently proclaimed the winner, the COMELEC or Court shall continue with the trial and may suspend the proclamation of such candidate when evidence of guilt is strong. In this case, the only reason Arnado was able to continue with his candidacy without suspension was because he only filed his answer to the DQ case against him when the elections were already conducted.

DECISION. Petition GRANTED. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections. NOTES. DISSENT, BRION, J. Arnado’s use of US passport on November 24, 2009 was an isolated act and a matter of practicability, since he was returning to the PH, having used US passport before. (Risky daw na gumamit siya ng US passport palabas ng PH tapos pagbalik niya PH passport na siya)  Arnado’s Philippine passport was issued on June 18, 2009, but he was not immediately notified of the issuance so that and he only received his passport three months after or sometime in September 2009. Clearly, when Arnado travelled on April 14, 2009, June 25, 2009 and July 29, 2009, he had no Philippine passport that he could have used to travel to the United States to attend to the winding up of his business and other affairs in America.  A travel document issued by the proper Philippine government agency (e.g., a Philippine consulate office in the US) would not suffice because travel documents could not be used; they are issued only in critical instances, as determined by the consular officer, and allow the bearer only a direct, one-way trip to the Philippines.  Although Arnado received his Philippine passport by the time he returned to the Philippines on November 24, 2009, he could not use this without risk of complications with the US immigration authorities for using a travel document different from what he used in his entry into the US on July 29, 2009. Plain practicality then demanded that the travel document that he used to enter the US on July 29, 2009 be the same travel document he should use in leaving the country on November 24, 2009.  Given these circumstances, Arnado’s use of his US passport in travelling back to the Philippines on November 24, 2009 was an isolated act that could not, by itself, be an express renunciation of the Philippine citizenship he adopted as his sole citizenship under RA 9225. What the law requires in an express renunciation, not mere inference from conduct  I loathe to rule that Arnado’s use of his US passport amounts to an express renunciation of his Filipino citizenship, when its use was an isolated act that he sufficiently explained and fully justified.  I emphasize that the law requires express renunciation in order to lose Philippine citizenship. The term means a renunciation that is made distinctly and explicitly and is not left to inference or implication; it is a renunciation manifested by direct and appropriate language, as distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct.

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Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

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Other than the use of his US passport in two trips to and from the United States, the record does not bear out any indication, supported by evidence, of Arnado’s intention to reacquire US citizenship. To my mind, in the absence of clear and affirmative acts of reacquiring US citizenship either by naturalization or by express acts (such as the reestablishment of permanent residency in the United States), Arnado’s use of his US passport cannot but be considered an isolated act that did not undo his renunciation of his US citizenship. What he might in fact have done was to violate American law on the use of passports, but this is a matter irrelevant to the present case. Thus, Arnado remains to be a “pure” Filipino citizen and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed or inferred from his isolated act of using his US passport for travel purposes.

The People of Kauswagan have spoken and any doubt should be resolved in favor of their verdict. *Digester’s note: Hindi sakto yung argument’s ni J. Brion sa ponencia. Ang sabi ng ponencia DQ si Arnado dahil dual citizen siya (fact of using foreign passport means he represented himself as US citizen also.) Argument ni J. Brion ay he did not lose his Filipino Citizenship, w/c is totoo naman in the case of dual citizenship.