Ltd Edited.docx

TODAY JANUARY 3, 2017 NOS. 21-22;45;91-93 21.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. IAC

Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 195 SCRA 38 , March 11, 1991 Case Title : DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ISIDRO ESPARTINEZ, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. Ejercito, J. Syllabi Class : Land Registration|Public Lands Syllabi: 1. Land Registration; Tax declaration or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership.The other proofs of an alleged registerable title presented by Espartinez are likewise not of any help to him. Tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership (Ferrer-Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50420, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 393). The survey plan, Exhibit “M”, which allegedly evidences the fact that the land actually contains an area of around 103 hectares instead of the 80 hectares reflected in Exhibit “L”, is not even admissible in evidence because it has not been approved by the Director of Lands (Director of Lands v. Heirs of Juana Carolino, G.R. No. 61598, December 12, 1985, 140 SCRA 396.) 2. Land Registration; Public Lands; Anyone who applies for confirmation of imperfect title has the burden of proof to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.Anyone who applies for confirmation of imperfect title under this provision has, under the ruling in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry (L-30035, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 69) the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Although the application of said ruling should be on a case to case basis with the end in view of enhancing the very reasons behind the enactment of land registration laws (Director of Lands vs. Funtilar, G.R. No. 68533, May 23, 1986, 142 SCRA 57, 69), considering the foregoing discussion and the glaring fact that the area sought to be registered is around 23 hectares larger than that indicated in Exhibit “L” from which Espartinez claim of ownership sprung, the ruling in the Heirs of Amunategui case must be

given strict application. Espartinez having failed to present any proof that the land in question has been classified as and forms part of the disposable public domain, whatever possession he might have had, and however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58867, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 689 citing Adorable v. Director of Lands, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1184; Director of Lands v. Abanzadao, L-21814, July 15, 1975, 65 SCRA 5, and Republic v. Court of Appeals, L-39473, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 648) and his failure to adduce clear and convincing evidence of his claim over the land has given rise to the presumption that Lot 6783 is still part of the public domain (Director of Lands v. Heirs of Juana Carolino, supra). 3. Land Registration; Public Lands; Confirmation of Imperfect Title. The subject property had already acquired a private character in view of the length of time applicant’s predecessors-in-interest, added to his own, had possessed the land in question.In the last analysis, the subject property had already acquired a private character in view of the length of time Applicant’s predecessors-in-interest, added to his own, had possessed the land in question. And as has been held, a judicial confirmation proceeding should, at most, be limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the character and length of time required by law as it is not so much one to confer title as it is to recognize a title already vested. It is the dictum of the law itself, that the possessor “x x x shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x x .” No proof is admissible to overcome that conclusive presumption. x x x In sum, legal and equity considerations demand that Applicant’s possession, of the character and length of time required by statute, in this case, now over a century, be conclusively deemed to have earned for him the right to confirmation of his imperfect title. Division: SECOND DIVISION Docket Number: G.R. No. 70825 Counsel: Antonio A. Azana Ponente: PARAS, MELENCIO-HERRERA Dispositive Portion:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the land subject of the application for registration and confirmation of imperfect title is hereby DECLARED as part of the public domain. Citation Ref: 75 Phil. 890 | 79 Phil. 461 | 107 Phil. 401 | 142 SCRA 57 | 142 SCRA 57 | 65 SCRA 5 | 131 SCRA 140 |170 SCRA 546 | 158 SCRA 568 | 150 SCRA 393 | 146 SCRA 509 | 144 SCRA 705 | 142 SCRA 57 | 128 SCRA 545 | 140 SCRA 396 | 126 SCRA 69 | 68 SCRA 177 | 89 SCRA 648 | 129 SCRA 689 | G.R. No. 70825. March 11, 1991. DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ISIDRO ESPARTINEZ, respondents. *

Land Registration; Tax declaration or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership.—The other proofs of an alleged registerable title presented by Espartinez are likewise not of any help to him. Tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership (Ferrer-Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50420, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 393). The survey plan, Exhibit “M”, which allegedly evidences the fact that the land actually contains an area of around 103 hectares instead of the 80 hectares reflected in Exhibit “L”, is not even admissible in evidence because it has not been approved by the Director of Lands (Director of Lands v. Heirs of Juana Carolino, G.R. No. 61598, December 12, 1985, 140 SCRA 396.) Same; Public Lands; Anyone who applies for confirmation of imperfect title has the burden of proof to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.—Anyone who applies for confirmation of imperfect title under this provision has, under the ruling in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry (L-30035, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 69) the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Although the application of said ruling should be on a case to case basis with the end in view of enhancing the very reasons behind the enactment of land registration laws (Director of Lands vs. Funtilar, G.R. No. 68533, May 23, 1986, 142 SCRA 57, 69), considering the foregoing discussion and the glaring fact that the area sought to be registered is around 23 hectares larger than that indicated in Exhibit “L” from which Espartinez claim of ownership sprung, the ruling in the Heirs of Amunategui case must be given strict application. Espartinez having failed to present any proof that the land in question has been classified as and forms part of the disposable public domain, whatever possession he might have had, and however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58867, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 689 citing Adorable v. Director of Lands, 107 Phil. 401 [1960];

Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1184; Director of Lands v. Abanzadao, L-21814, July 15, 1975, 65 SCRA 5, and Republic v. Court of Appeals, L-39473, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 648) and his failure to adduce clear and convincing evidence of his claim over the land has given rise to the presumption that Lot 6783 is still part of the public domain (Director of Lands v. Heirs of Juana Carolino, supra).

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Dissenting: Land Registration; Public Lands; Confirmation of Imperfect Title. The subject property had already acquired a private character in view of the length of time applicant’s predecessors-in-interest, added to his own, had possessed the land in question.—In the last analysis, the subject property had already acquired a private character in view of the length of time Applicant’s predecessors-in-interest, added to his own, had possessed the land in question. And as has been held, a judicial confirmation proceeding should, at most, be limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the character and length of time required by law as it is not so much one to confer title as it is to recognize a title already vested. It is the dictum of the law itself, that the possessor “x x x shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x x .” No proof is admissible to overcome that conclusive presumption. x x x In sum, legal and equity considerations demand that Applicant’s possession, of the character and length of time required by statute, in this case, now over a century, be conclusively deemed to have earned for him the right to confirmation of his imperfect title.

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. Ejercito, J. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66710 affirming in all respects the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch IV, dated January 30, 1978, ordering the registration, in the name of Isidro Espartinez of Lot 6783, Cad 239, Ligao Cadastre, located in Agul, formerly of Ligao, Albay, now Pioduran, Albay. The application for the registration of said lot, which allegedly contained an area of 1,036,172 square meters, was filed by Espartinez on May 17, 1972. He alleged therein that he acquired lot by purchase from Sotera Llacer. He invoked Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, should the Land Registration Act be not applicable. The jurisdictional requirements of publication of notice of initial hearing (Exhibits “A” and “C”) and posting of such notices in conspicuous places in the parcel of land involved and in the municipal building (Exhibit “B”) having been **

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complied with, and considering that only the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry represented by the fiscal had appeared, the lower court issued an order of general default with the exception of said government agencies. Thereafter, one Perpetua Llarena appeared and, together with the fiscal, she was required to file an opposition to the application. Inasmuch as both the fiscal and Llarena failed to file their respective oppositions within the period set by the court, on December 12, 1972, it commissioned the clerk of court to receive evidence. On the same day, however, the Solicitor General entered his appearance for the government and at the same time, filed an opposition to the application for registration. He alleged therein that neither Espartinez nor his predecessors-in-interest had sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the land the same not having been acquired by means of any of the various types of title issued by the Spanish government or any other recognized mode of acquisition of title over realty under pertinent laws; that neither Espartinez nor his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land for at least thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application; that Espartinez may not avail of the provisions of Section 48 of the Public Land Act for failure to fulfill the requisites prescribed therein; and that the parcel of land involved is part of the public domain and therefore, not subject to private appropriation. Thereafter, seventeen (17) oppositors, claiming to be farmer-settlers on the land, filed a motion to lift the order of general default and opposition to the application for registration. Espartinez filed a motion to dismiss the opposition contending that the private oppositors were, with one exception, mere homestead applicants who were barred by prior judgments in Civil Case No. 2976, which was dismissed for failure to prosecute, and in CAR Case No. 523 wherein the Court of Agrarian Relations declared Sotera Llacer as the owner of Lot 6783 and the oppositors as her tenants. On January 30, 1978, the lower court rendered the aforementioned decision based on the following findings of facts: On March 28, 1885, a parcel of land in Ligao (now Pioduran) Albay, was adjudicated to Faustino Llacer. This is evidenced by the following entry on page 424 of the Gaceta de Manila: “INTENDENCIA GENERAL DE HACIENDAS DE FILIPINAS “Indice de las resoluciones definitivas adoptadas por esa Intendencia general desde el 16 al 28 del Febrero proximo pasado, que se publica en la Gaceta, con arreglo a lo mandado en Decreto de 28 de Octubre de 1869 . . . “Feb. 24.—Adjudicando a D. Faustino Llacer la extension de 80 hectareas y 16 centiareas de terreno situado en el pueblo de Ligao, Provincia de Albay, en la cantidad de pfs. 10053. Manila de 28 de Marzo de 1885 . . . Luna.” (Exhibit “L”)

The same parcel of land was in turn, adjudicated after the death of Faustino Llacer, to then minor Sotera Llacer through an order of the Court of First Instance of Albay dated November 11, 1913 in Civil Case No. 422 entitled “Abintestato de los Finados Faustino Llacer y Maria Prollamante” (Exhibit “K”). Hence, the land which was earlier declared for taxation purposes in the name of “Los Herederos de los finados Faustino Llacer y Maria Prollamante” (Exhibits “P”, “Q” and “R”), was so declared by Sotera Llacer in her own name (Exhibits “I”, “S” and “T”). In CAR Case No. 523, Sotera Llacer and her husband, Bonifacio Viscaya were also declared by the Court of Agrarian Relations in Legazpi City as landholders of Lot 6783 (Exhibit “J”). On November 26, 1969, Sotera Llacer sold to Isidro Espartinez Lot 6783 which is described in the deed of absolute sale as containing an area of 1,036,172 square meters in consideration of the amount of P8,500.00 (Exhibit “E”). So as to reflect the agreement that Espartinez would assume the responsibility and expenses in ejecting the occupants of the land pursuant to the decision in CAR Case No. 523, Espartinez and Sotera Llacer executed an amended deed of sale on June 11, 1970 (Exhibit “F”). Thereafter, Espartinez declared the property for taxation purposes (Exhibit “G”) and paid the corresponding real property taxes thereon (Exhibit “H”). Espartinez secured a survey plan of the land (Exhibit “M”) and a technical description thereof (Exhibit “N”) indicating that the actual area of the land is 103 hectares, 61 ares and 72 centares. He planted it to sugar cane and coconuts and used a portion as grazing area for his cattle and carabaos. Based on these facts, the lower court concluded that the preponderance of evidence weighs heavily in favor of Espartinez. The oppositor public officials appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the lower court’s decision in all respects. The appellate court considered Exhibit “L” as a possessory information title. Citing Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, the appellate court held that Espartinez’ possession and occupancy of the land may be tacked to that of his predecessors-in-interest who had possessed and occupied it from as far back as March 28, 1885 when it was adjudicated in favor of Faustino Llacer, or a period of around 87 years when the application for registration was filed. The Director of Land and Forestry Development, through the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari contending that the Intermediate Appellate Court committed errors of law in: (a) granting the application of confirming the title of Espartinez notwithstanding the fact that he had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he has a registerable title to the property subject of the application, and (b) agreeing with the lower court’s decision which directed the registration of subject parcel of land even in the absence of proof that the same is alienable and disposable

and despite private respondent’s failure to adduce in evidence certain required documents. A crucial point to resolve is whether the appellate court correctly considered Exhibit “L” as a possessory information title. Worth noting is the fact that said document is, as the said court itself describes it, “a copy of a certification issued by the Chief of the division of Archives of the Bureau of Public Libraries of an excerpt of an entry appearing on page 424 of the Gaceta de Manila of the year 1885 regarding some resolution(s) issued and published pursuant to a certain decree dated October 28, 1869.” (Rollo, p. 29). The “excerpt of an entry” is the Spanish text quoted above. From said description alone, it is clear that Exhibit “L” is neither a document, deed or title evidencing ownership over Lot 6783. The entry does not even contain an accurate description of the lot setting forth its metes and bounds on which its identification may be based. Moreover, while the entry states that Faustino Llacer had been adjudicated an 80-hectare parcel of land, it does not state by what reason such adjudication was made. Granting that there was indeed an “adjudication” or grant of the land to Llacer, still the same cannot be considered as a possessory information title which has been converted into a registration of ownership in the absence of proof that Llacer had complied with the requirements set forth in Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law (Director of Lands v. Reyes, L-27594, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177, 191-192). Exhibit “L” not being either a titulo de informacion posesoria or a title by composicion con el estado, it did not establish the right of ownership of Espartinez’ predecessors-in-interest (Heirs of Inocencio Santiago v. Castro, G.R. No. 62014-16, April 2, 1984, 128 SCRA 545). The other proofs of an alleged registerable title presented by Espartinez are likewise not of any help to him. Tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership (Ferrer-Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50420, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 393). The survey plan, Exhibit “M”, which allegedly evidences the fact that the land actually contains an area of around 103 hectares instead of the 80 hectares reflected in Exhibit “L”, is not even admissible in evidence because it has not been approved by the Director of Lands (Director of Lands v. Heirs of Juana Carolino, G.R. No. 61598, December 12, 1985, 140 SCRA 396). In the same vein, while the presentation of the tracing cloth plan required by Sections 1858 and 1864 of the Revised Administrative Code may now be dispensed with where there is a survey plan the correctness of which had not been overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence (Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56613, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 568, 571; Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70594, October 10, 1986, 144 SCRA 705), in this case, the tracing cloth plan assumes a great importance in view of the discrepancy between the area of the land under

Exhibit “L” and that being claimed by Espartinez. Unfortunately, there seems to be no tracing plan at all, notwithstanding the allegation in the application that the same was attached thereto (Record on Appeal, p. 3). There is no proof that it had been detached and kept by the Land Registration Commission (See: Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61462, July 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 140), and, inspite of herein petitioners’ repeated contention of the absence of the tracing cloth plan, Espartinez has failed to traverse such contention. Neither may the decision in the intestate proceedings for the estate of Faustino Llacer and Maria Prollamante be invoked by Espartinez. As earlier stated, Llacer had, in the very beginning, no transmissible rights over the property. The other cases, Civil Case No. 2976 and CAR Case No. 523, were not land registration cases and therefore, ownership of the property was not definitively passed upon. Espartinez’ reliance on Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is also misplaced. That law is premised on the prior classification of the land involved as a disposable agricultural land. The law states: “SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of title therefor, under the land Registration Act, to wit: xxx xxx xxx “(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against the Government since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.”

Anyone who applies for confirmation of imperfect title under this provision has, under the ruling in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry (L-30035, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 69) the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Although the application of said ruling should be on a case to case basis with the end in view of enhancing the very reasons behind the enactment of land registration laws (Director of Lands vs. Funtilar,G.R. No. 68533, May 23, 1986, 142 SCRA 57, 69), considering the foregoing discussion and the glaring fact that the area sought to be registered is around 23 hectares larger than that indicated in Exhibit “L” from which Espartinez’ claim of ownership sprung, the ruling in theHeirs of Amunategui case must be given strict application. Espartinez having failed to present any proof that the land in question has been classified as and forms part of the disposable public domain, whatever

possession he might have had, and however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 58867, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 689 citingAdorable v. Director of Lands, 107 Phil. 401 [1960];Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 46

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

23 SCRA 1184; Director of Lands v. Abanzadao, L-21814, July 15, 1975, 65 SCRA 5, and Republic v. Court of Appeals, L-39473, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 648) and his failure to adduce clear and convincing evidence of his claim over the land has given rise to the presumption that Lot 6783 is still part of the public domain (Director of Lands v. Heirs of Juana Carolino, supra). PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the land subject of the application for registration and confirmation of imperfect title is hereby DECLARED as part of the public domain. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla andSarmiento, JJ., concur. Regalado, J., Pro hac vice. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Dissenting: The crucial issue in this case is private respondent Isidro Espartinez’s entitlement to confirmation/registration of title to Lot No. 6783 of the cadastral survey of Ligao, with an area of 103.6172 hectares, more or less, under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act (Comm. Act No. 141). Both the former Court of First Instance of Albay and Intermediate Appellate Court held in the affirmative. The majority now reverses their rulings. I am constrained to dissent. Isidro Espartinez (hereinafter, the Applicant) should be held entitled to have his imperfect title confirmed in his favor, upon the following considerations: 1. Section 48(b) of Comm. Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942 and Rep. Act No. 3872 provides: “Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claim and the issuance of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and

shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.” (Emphasis supplied).

The majority opinion holds that said law is inapplicable on the ground that Applicant failed to present any proof that the land in question has been classified as and forms part of the disposable public domain. The ratiocination, however, loses sight of the fact that such a condition was made a statutory requirement only on 25 January 1977 by Pres. Decree No. 1073, or approximately five (5) years after Applicant filed his application on 17 May 1972. Said provision reads: “SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.”

Under Comm. Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942 and Rep. Act No. 3872, the law prevailing at the time, however, the following were the only conditions necessary before confirmation of imperfect title could issue: 1. 1.The possessor is a Filipino citizen (Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890 [1946]); 2. 2.He has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain; 3. 3.Such possession must be under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. That Applicant is a Filipino citizen is not disputed. That the land, subject of this litigation, is “agricultural land of the public domain” is presumed. That presumption has not been overcome by petitioner officials who never presented proof that the land was of a different classification. Only recently, we have had occasion to hold that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippines are agricultural lands and the Courts have the right to presume that the lands are agricultural lands. The case of Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, cited in the majority opinion (p. 10), does hold that the burden of proof in confirmation of imperfect title cases is upon applicant that he meets the requirements of the law, Comm. Act No. 141 as amended, and must overcome the presumption that land is part of the public domain. The land in that case, however, was classified as forest land and as such did not form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. The rules on confirmation of imperfect title, therefore, could not apply. Moreover, in that case, the Director of Forestry had filed an opposition to the application for registration of title. Not so in this case, where 1

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neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forestry has filed any opposition below. Besides, Applicant has presented evidence showing that the land has been utilized for agricultural purposes since he has planted it to coconuts, sugar cane and palay and a portion is used as pasture land. Proof to the contrary, or that the subject land is within an unclassified region, is wanting in the records. Being neither timber nor mineral land, the subject property must necessarily be classified as agricultural. 2. Applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title. Tacking the number of years of possession of his predecessors-in-interest to his own, Applicant should be deemed to have possessed the land for eighty seven (87) years, reckoned from 1885 to the filing of the application in 1972, definitely more than sufficient to apply in his favor the conclusive presumption that he had performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant. In fact, open, continuous and exclusive possession of alienable public land for at least thirty (30) years, in accordance with the Public Land Act, ipso jure converts the land to private property and entitles the possessor thereof to confirmation of title in his name. It may be that the entry on page 424 of the Gaceta de Manila on 28 March 1885 (Exh. “L”) adjudicating the property to Faustino Llacer is not in itself a title evidencing ownership. It may be that the judgment in Civil Case No. 422, dated 11 November 1913, declaring Sotera Llacer to have inherited said parcel in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Faustino Llacer (Exh. “K”), as well as the other cases, Civil Case No. 2976 and CAR Case No. 523 (Exh. “J”), all in Sotera Llacer’s favor, were not land registration cases where ownership of the property was definitively passed upon. It may be that tax declarations or tax payments on property are neither conclusive evidence of ownership. But certainly, when they are coupled with open, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of an owner, they constitute evidence of great weight in support of an applicant’s claim of acquisition or ownership. 3. Another major argument of the majority for the denial of the application is the fact that the tracing cloth plan, which could explain the discrepancy between the area of the subject property, as stated in Exhibit “L,” and that claimed by Applicant, was not presented. It will be recalled that the area indicated in Exhibit “L” is “la extension de 80 hectareas y 16 centareas de terreno,” while the survey plan of the land (Exh. “M”) and the technical description thereof (Exh. “N”) indicate that the actual area is one hundred three (103) hectares, sixty-one (61) ares and seventy-two (72) centares. Considering, however, that the main purpose of the technical requirement is to identify with certainty the land applied for, and that Exhibits “M” and “N” were arrived at only after a cadastral survey had been undertaken between 4

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November, 1926 and November, 1931, they should be admissible as correctly delineating the metes and bounds of the subject property. After all, the Technical Description (Exh. “N”) was certified correct, on 7 January 1971, for the Director of Lands by Amando A. Salvador, Chief, Surveys Division, and by Diosdado C. Dizon, Officer-in-Charge, Technical Standard Section of the Bureau of Lands. The Survey Plan (Exh. “M”) in turn, was prepared on 27 October 1971, checked by Alberto H. Lingayo, Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission, and certified to by Dionicio Noblejas, Geodetic Engineer of the same office, as correct and platted in accordance with the original field notes and computations of the Bureau of Lands, with the data of said field notes obtained from actual measurements. Significantly, when said Exhibits “M” and “N” were presented and offered in evidence, petitioners did not enter any objection regarding their admissibility or veracity. In the last analysis, the subject property had already acquired a private character in view of the length of time Applicant’s predecessors-in-interest, added to his own, had possessed the land in question. And, as has been held, a judicial confirmation proceeding should, at most, be limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the character and length of time required by law as it is not so much one to confer title as it is to recognize a title already vested. It is the dictum of the law itself that the possessor “x x x shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x x x.” No proof is admissible to overcome that conclusive presumption. In sum, legal and equity considerations demand that Applicant’s possession, of the character and length of time required by statute, in this case, now over a century, be conclusively deemed to have earned for him the right to confirmation of his imperfect title. Hence, this vote to affirm the judgments of both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court. Decision reversed and set aside. Note.—The applicant shoulders the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. (Director of Lands vs. Funtilar, 142 SCRA 57.) 7

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22.

HEIRS OF INOSENCIA SANTIAGO VS. CASTRO

G.R. Nos. L-62014-16 April 2, 1984

HEIRS OF INOCENCIO SANTIAGO, represented by JOSE CUNANAN, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE P. CASTRO, Judge, CFI, Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City; HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Judge, CFI, Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City; THE GENERAL MANAGER, NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY; THE CITY ENGINEER, QUEZON CITY; GERARDO G. MAGAT, City Sheriff of Quezon City; TAN CHENG LENG; BERNABE ANG, JOSE ALBERT ARANETA and RAMON ALBERT ARANETA, respondents. Amado T. Garrovillas for petitioners. Estela Perlas for respondents Albert Araneta. Antonio Luis S. Miro and Epifanio P. Racaña for respondent Manager NHA. Edgardo de Leon for respondent Bernabe Ang. Teodulo B. Ronquillo for respondent Tan Cheng Leng. Jose Torcuator and Eugenio V. Jurilla for respondents City Engineer and Gerardo Magat.

RELOVA, J.:

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Petition for certiorari (1) to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge Jose P. Castro of the then Court of First Instance of RizaL Branch IX in Quezon City, in Civil Case No.Q32452, entitled: "Francisco Edades, et al. vs. Tan Leng, et al.," directing "the demolition of the illegally constructed houses, shanties and other structures of the plaintiffs as contained in the order of this court dated July 2, 1982, in accordance with existing laws and procedures on the matter"; (2) to set aside the order of respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVI in Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-35920, entitled: "Heirs of Inocencio Santiago, represented by Jose Cu vs. The General Manager, National Housing Authority, et al.", dismissing the petition for a writ of prohibition, quieting of title with preliminary injunction and denying the application for a writ of preliminary injunction as the same has "become moot and academic"; and, (3) to annul and set aside the demolition notices issued in September 1982 by the City Engineer of Quezon City. Petitioners claim that the aforementioned orders of respondent Judges were issued with grave abuse of discretion and beyond their jurisdiction. On October 19, 1982, upon Urgent Motion, filed by petitioners, through counsel, the Court issued a restraining order "enjoining the respondents or their agents and representatives from demolishing the petitioners' houses pending resolution of the prayer for a writ of pre injunction, effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court." (p. 46, Rollo) The established background facts insofar as pertinent to this petition, follow: On July 3, 1972, Mabuhay Real Estate Investment and Financing Corporation, owned by Bernabe Ang, filed Civil Cases Nos. Q-16689, Q-16691 and Q-16693 (CFI, Rizal) against Elisa Gonzales, Igmidio Tolentino and Emmanuel Gonzales, respectively. The complaints commonly alleged that the plaintiff is the registered owner of the parcels of land in question,

having purchased them from J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and for which corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title were duly issued in its name; that the above-named defendants were unlawfully occupying the said parcels of land to the extent that it could not use the same. Defendants Eliza Gonzales, Igmidio Tolentino and Emmanuel Gonzales resisted the complaints, claiming that they are the rightful owners of their respective lots based on the Spanish title or grant to their predecessor-in-interest, Inocencio Santiago, which was registered under Act No. 496, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 892 (LRC No. Q-341 in Quezon City and LRC No. 80, LRC Record No. 49124 in Manila). On November 19,1974, the lower court rendered its decision on the three cases, the trial of which, by agreement of the parties was consolidated. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

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... It follows that the defendants' claim must fall since the basis of their claim was the invalidity of OCT No. 735. By invoking the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the above cases which was reiterated by the same tribunal in the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Hon. Judge Felix V. Makasiar, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff against the defendants as follows: 1. The defendant Elisa Gonzales, her heirs and all parties claiming any right or title under her are hereby ordered to vacate the premises and turn over possession of the same to the plaintiff; to pay the sum of P60.00 a month by way of rental from July 1960 until she actually vacates the premises; and to pay the sum of P500.00 for attorney's fees and costs of the suit; 2. Defendant Igmidio Tolentino, his heirs and all parties claiming rights or title under him are ordered to vacate the premises and turn over possession of the same to the plaintiff, to pay the sum of P240.00 a month by way of rent from June 1960 until he actually vacates the premises; to pay the sum of P600.00 for attorney's fees and costs of suit; 3. Defendant Emmanuel Gonzales, his heirs and all parties claiming rights or title under him to vacate the premises and turn over possession of the same to the plaintiff-, to pay the sum of P300.00 a month by way of rental from April 1966 until he actually vacates the premises; to pay the sum of P500.00 for attorney's fees, and costs of suit. (pp. 142-143, Rollo) The foregoing judgment became final and executory when the defendants did not appeal. However, when they refused to leave the premises, plaintiff filed a motion for execution which court granted. The matter was brought to the then the trial Court of Appeals which rendered a decision on December 29, 1980 in CA-G.R. Nos. 08367-69-SP, entitled: "Jose Cunanan, et al. vs. Hon. Ricardo P. Tensuan", pertinent portion of which states: têñ.£îhqw â£

With respect to petitioners Elisa Gonzales, Igmidio Tolentino and Emmanuel Gonzales, it is plain that they have failed to make out a case for the issuance of the extra-ordinary writs prayed for, The derision in Civil Cases Nos. Q16689, Q-16691 and "Q-16693, ordering them to vacate the premises in question, has long become final and executory for failure on their part to appeal therefrom. As such, its execution is a matter of right. Contrary to their assertion, we are unable to find supervening facts and circumstances which would render execution of judgment impossible or which justify the

postponement of implementation of the writs of execution (Magdangal vs. Hawaiian-Philippine Co., 65 SCRA 101). Not only were they classified by the National Housing Authority as disqualified' for purposes of government assistance by way of relocation and resettlement, but they were also declared, in effect, not to be owners of the land they are occupying when the Supreme Court in the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Hon. Makasiar, et al(G.R. No. L-12674) upheld the validity of the Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the root of the title of Mabuhay Real Estate Investment and Financing Corporation, plaintiff in said ejectment cases. Neither could the above-named petitioners validly avail in this Court the remedy of relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court under their alternative prayer. Suffice it to say that, if at all, it should have been sought from the Court of First Instance of Rizal by means of a verified petition specifically grounded on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, (Sec. 2) within sixty days after they have learned of the decision and not more than six months after the judgment or order was entered (Sec. 3). With respect to the other petitioners, namely, Jose Cunanan Paulina Cunanan, Domingo Cunanan, Antonio Soriano, Emilia Cunanan, Constantine Tolentino, Felix Tolentino and Papa Ignacio, the present petition is not proper for want of jurisdiction by this Court. It appears that they were being evicted by the respondent City Engineer of Quezon City by virtue of a clearance from the National Housing Authority under Letters of Instruction No. 19 and 19-A after due investigation wherein they were required to appear and present their side. Their remedy, if any lies elsewhere. In fact, except for Jose Cunanan and Domingo Cunanan, the other petitioners had already filed a similar case with this Court, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 07610-SP, but tills was dismissed outright in a resolution promulgated on March 20, 1978, it reads: têñ.£îhqw â£

Herein petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and prohibition to enjoin respondent City Engineer from executing his Orders of demolition of the houses of the petitioners allegedly "constructed within a government or private lot in violation of LOI 19". This petition should be dismissed outright on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction to issue the writs prayed for. The petitioners had prematurely instituted this action before Us. they should had brought first this action in the City Court which has original jurisdiction on ejectment cases and which may grant the Preliminary injunction prayed for (I Moran, Rules of Court, 69; Padilla vs. De Jesus, 95 Phil. 688). As it is, there is no judgment or order of the lower court which is subject for review, either by appeal or writ of error, by this Court. This Court has original jurisdiction to issue writ of mandamus, prohibitions, injunction, certiorari and an other auxillary writs only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction (R.A. 296, Sec. 30). WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby summarily dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

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WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed and the restraining order heretofore issued by this Court immediately lifted. Costs against the petitioners. (pp. 145-146, Rollo) Herein petitioners submit that instead of demolishing only the house of Elisa Gonzales and Emmanuel Gonzales, who were defendants in Civil Cases Nos. Q-16689; Q-16691 and Q16693, "the Sheriff demolished 24 houses including that of the two defendants, that is, the 22 houses demolished belong to persons not Parties to the case and therefore cannot be reached by any judgment or order in the said case, or in any other case. . . . The thing most intriguing and beyond the understanding of the 22 families whose house were demolished without due process of law in these cases (Q-16689; Q-16691 and Q-16693) is that they have presented to the Court evidence that the area from where they were unduly ejected is part of the titled land of their forebear, Inocencio Santiago. They presented the Spanish title; the approved plan, the tax declaration all in the name of Inocencio Santiago and their registration of the whole area covered by the Spanish title yet the court did not give an iota of consideration on these documented facts but gave credit to the unsupported claims of the City Engineer that they (petitioners) are squatters. ... After the illegal demolition, the respondents were not satisfied but moved for redemolition, of the houses which the 22 petitioners (in the three cases) hurriedly salvaged and formed into barong-barong if only to shelter their family members, mostly babies, children (and) ailing adults." (pp. 16-17, Rollo) On the other hand, Tan Cheng Leng sued the families who are occupying his property located in Palanca Street, Brixton HW, Barangay Dona Imelda, Quezon City before the Barangay Court of Barangay Doña Imelda, Quezon City. After a conference, 11-squatter families promised to voluntarily vacate the premises; the others refused. Thus, Tan Cheng Leng sought the assistance of the National Housing Authority to relocate the families who refused to vacate his property. In response, the Manager of the National Housing Authority issued a clearance for the demolition of the houses and structures of the petitioners but the same was not implemented because the area is covered by the Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) of Quezon City. On May 20, 1981, without having received a Notice of Demolition, petitioners filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX in Quezon City, a petition for a writ of prohibition and preliminary injunction, entitled: "Francisco Edades, et al. vs. Tan Cheng Leng, et al.," docketed therein as Civil Case No. Q-32452. However, in an order, dated June 13, 1981, the petition was dismissed on the ground that it states no cause of action and that petitioners had not exhausted all available administrative remedies. On July 2, 1982, respondent Judge Jose P. Castro, the Presiding Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX in Quezon City, issued an order allowing the implementation of the demolition of the houses of petitioners in the subject property. Upon motion of respondent Tan Cheng Leng, respondent Judge Castro issued the questioned Order of September 23, 1982, directing the authorities concerned, particularly the National Housing Authority and the Quezon City Engineer's Office, to cause the demolition of the illegally constructed houses, shanties and other structures of petitioners. Similarly, spouses Ramon Albert and Maria Puno seek the assistance of the Mayor of Quezon City for the ejectment of herein petitioners on their land. After several representations and requests of the said spouses, the City Mayor recommended to the National Housing Authority the issuance of a clearance to demolish and/or relocate the

families occupying the same. Acting upon the recommendation of the City Mayor, respondent National Housing Authority issued a clearance authorizing the Mayor to dismantle and/or remove all illegal structures on subject property pursuant to LOI 19 and its implementing directives from the Office of the President. Prior to its implementation, a conference was held between the parties therein, wherein 22 of the 28 families executed a KASUNDUAN, dated August 1, 1982, to vacate the premises voluntarily. However, on August 6, 1982, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition and Quieting of Title with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI in Quezon City, entitled: "Heirs of Inocencio Santiago, represented by Jose Cunanan vs. The National Housing Authority, et al.", which was docketed therein as Civil Case No. Q-35920, alleging that public respondents acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction by ordering the demolition of their structures. However, no copy of the order of demolition was attached. Thus, on August 27, 1982, respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano of Branch XVI, dismissed the petition for not being sufficient in form and substance. Hence, this petition filed on October 7, 1982. We cannot sustain the petition. 1. The properties in question are registered and titled in the respective names of private respondents, namely: (a) Tan Cheng Leng, under TCT Nos. 196095 and 90307; (b) Ramon Araneta Albert and Maria Lourdes Puno, under TCT No. 268627; and (3) the Mabuhay Real Estate Investment and Financing Corporation under TCT No. 25859, which originated from OCT No. 735 in the name of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., all in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. This Court, in the case of Benin vs. Tuason, 57 SCRA 531, 595, held that the "the document, Annex A of the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., was neither a titulo de informacion posesoria nor a title by composicion con el estado, and it did not establish the right of ownership of their predecessor-in-interest, Inocencio Santiago, Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs had based their claim of ownership on that document (Annex A). This Court held in that previous case that the document was unavailing against Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and against Original Certificate of Title No. 735. " Thus, herein petitioners, claiming as heirs of Inocencio Santiago, cannot derogate the validity and conclusiveness of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and of the certificates of title that are derived from said original certificate of title; and, if the late Inocencio Santiago did not become the owner of the disputed property by virtue of the document, Annex A, then herein petitioners, as his alleged heirs, have not acquired said ownership either, much less the right of possession. 2. The petition has become moot and academic inasmuch as the houses and shanties of petitioners which were constructed in the property of the Mabuhay Real Estate Investment & Financing Corporation had already been demolished on October 8 and 9, 1982, as shown in the Accomplishment Report of the City Engineer of Quezon City (P.213, Rollo). 3. In Civil Case No. Q-32452, respondent Judge Jose P. Castro, on June 13, 1981, issued an Order dismissing the petition for prohibition filed by Francisco Edades, et al. versus Tan Cheng Leng, et al. for the reason that-têñ.£îhqw â£

... on February 2, 1981, the General Manager of the NHA issued a clearance to dismantle and remove from the Tan property (the property involved in this petition) all structures illlegally introduced by the persons enumerated

therein. Said clearance shall be implemented within three (3) months from receipt. The motion to dismiss alleges that the petition states no cause of action and that the petitioner has not exhausted all available administrative remedies. Indeed, there is no cause of action, while there was clearance to dismantle, the implementing arm has not made any effort to enforce the demolition, and the best evidence is that the local government did not notify the petitioners to vacate and as a matter of fact, the local government allowed the expiration of the clearance without utilizing it. As to the second ground, granting that the local government is ready to implement the clearance, the remedy of the petitioners is to avail of administrative remedies before resorting to the Courts. In the instant case, the petitioners came immediately to the Court which should not be the case. (p. 406, Rollo) 4. In Civil Case No. Q-35920, entitled: "Heirs of Inocencio Santiago, represented by Jose Cunanan vs. The General Manager, National Housing Authority, et al.", respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano, on August 27, 1982, issued the other questioned Order, as follows: têñ.£îhqw â£

The petition for a writ of prohibition and quieting of title, nw by petitioners thru counsel not being sufficient in form and substance, is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the application for writ of preliminary injunction, dated August 12, 1982, having become moot and academic, is hereby DENIED. (p. 409, Rollo) The order dismissing the petition for prohibition, in Civil Case No. Q-32452 is dated June 13, 1981, and the order denying the petition in Civil Case No. Q-35920 is dated August 27, 1982. Instant petition was filed on October 7, 1982. As pointed out by respondent National Housing Authority, in its Memorandum dated September 27, 1983, the aforesaid orders have become final and executory. Herein petitioners did not refute this contention. têñ.£îhqw â£

The petitioner is seeking to avail of the remedy of certiorari as a substitute for appeal The questioned order of dismissed is appealable and the proper remedy should have been to appeal the same. No circumstance had been shown to explain why such procedure was not observed, nor to justify a deviation from the same as to make available a petition for certiorari in lieu of taking an appropriate appeal. (Velasco Vda. de Caldito vs. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573) Plaintiffs cannot resort to the special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus because these remedies are not available when, as in this case, there was a remedy by appeal and the period for appeal had already expired. (G.L. Enterprises, Inc. vs. Seneris, 111 SCRA 735) WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, instant petition is DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order issued on October 19, 1982 is hereby DISSOLVED.

SO ORDERED.

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Makasiar, Actg. C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur. Aquino, J., concur in the result. Fernando, C.J., and Teehankee, J., is on leave. De la Fuente, J., took no part.

45. DAVID VS. MALAY David vs. Malay, 318 SCRA 711 , November 19, 1999 Case Title : ERNESTO DAVID, RICARDO DAVID, NELIA DAVID, EMILIA DAVID, LOLITA DAVID, BASILIO LEMQUE, NICANOR LEMQUE, FELIX LEMQUE, NORMA LEMQUE, WILFREDO LEMQUE, RODOLFO LEMQUE, ROGELIO LEMQUE, VICTORIA LEMQUE, ESTATE OF MARIA ESPIRITU and ANDRES ADONA, MILAGROS DE UBAGOUMALI, FELISA GUBALLA DE UBAGO, VANESSA DE UBAGO-UMALI, ANTONIO DE UBAGO, JR., JOSEPH GUBALLA DE UBAGO, MARIETTA DE UBAGO-TAN, and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ZAMBALES, petitioners, vs. CRISTITO MALAY and NORA MALAY, DIONISIO MALAY, FRANCISCA T. CAPACILLO, PEPITO ALCANTARA, NICOLAS SORIANO and JUAN MORA, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Syllabi Class : Actions|Courts|Land Registration Act|Words and Phrases|Innocent Purchaser for Value Syllabi: 1. Actions; Courts; Land Registration Act; Under the Land Registration Act (now PD 1529), title to the property covered by a Torrens certificate becomes indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of registration.A certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent covering a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141 is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding. Under the Land Registration Act, title to the property covered by a Torrens certificate becomes indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of registration. Such decree of registration is incontrovertible and becomes binding on all persons whether or not they were notified of, or participated in, the

in rem registration process. There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law or the Land Registration Act (Act 496), now Presidential Decree 1529, fixing a similar one-year period within which a public land patent can be considered open to review on the ground of actual fraud, such as that provided for in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, and now Section 32 of Presidential Decree 1529, and clothing a public land patent certificate of title with indefeasibility. Nevertheless, this Court has repeatedly applied Section 32 of Presidential Decree 1529 to a patent issued in accordance with the law by the Director of Lands, approved by the Secretary of Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines. The date of the issuance of the patent corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary cases. Just as the decree finally awards the land applied for registration to the party entitled to it, so also, the patent issued by the Director of Lands equally and finally grants and conveys the land applied for to the applicant. 2. Actions; Courts; Land Registration Act; The nature of an action is determined by the body of the pleading or complaint itself than by its title or heading.The caption of the case before the court a quo while denominated as being one for “Annulment of Sale with Damages” is in reality an action for reconveyance since the ultimate relief sought by private respondents would be for the property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 398 to be reconveyed to the estate of Andres Adona. In this jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that the nature of an action is determined, more importantly, by the body of the pleading or complaint itself than by its title or heading. The Court of Appeals did not err in treating the action brought by private respondents as one for reconveyance or as one that seeks the transfer of the property, wrongfully registered by another to its rightful and legal owner. It would seem that Andres Adona did perfect his homestead application prior to his death, the right to the issuance of the patent on which vests after complying with all the requirements of the law. 3. Actions; Courts; Land Registration Act; A person in actual possession of a piece of land under a claim of ownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right and that his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim.There is no doubt about the fact that an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust ordinarily prescribes in ten years. This rule assumes, however, that there is an actual need to initiate that action, for when the right of the true and real owner is recognized, expressly

or implicitly such as when he remains undisturbed in his possession, the statute of limitation would yet be irrelevant. An action for reconveyance, if nonetheless brought, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, or its equivalent, an action that is imprescriptible. In Faja vs. Court of Appeals, the Court has held that a person in actual possession of a piece of land under claim of ownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, and that his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title. 4. Actions; Courts; Land Registration Act; Words and Phrases; Innocent Purchaser for Value; An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.This Court sees no cogent reasons to disturb the finding of the Court of Appeals that the de Ubagos may not be considered buyers in good faith. Said the Appellate Court: “x x x An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could convey title to the property. A purchaser can not close his eyes to facts which should put a reason- able man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith. (Sandoval vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 283, 296 [1996]) Division: THIRD DIVISION Docket Number: G.R. No. 132644 Counsel: Agerico M. Ungson, Virgilio C. Manguera & Associates Ponente: VITUG Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioners.

Citation Ref: 295 SCRA 359 | 295 SCRA 359 | 295 SCRA 359 | 295 SCRA 359 | 295 SCRA 359 | 295 SCRA 359 | 180 SCRA 401 | 180 SCRA 401 | 61 SCRA 284 | 96 SCRA 178 | 112 SCRA 542 | 21 SCRA 1192 | 13 SCRA 80 | 260 SCRA 283 | 85 SCRA 526 | 227 SCRA 330 | 231 SCRA 498 | 194 SCRA 743 | 158 SCRA 635 |159 SCRA 178 | 96 SCRA 178 | 233 SCRA 335 | 154 SCRA 396 | 291 SCRA 584 | 295 SCRA 359 | 69 SCRA 216 | 75 SCRA 441 | 204 SCRA 524 | 204 SCRA 684 | 267 SCRA 339 | G.R. No. 132644. November 19, 1999. ERNESTO DAVID, RICARDO DAVID, NELIA DAVID, EMILIA DAVID, LOLITA DAVID, BASILIO LEMQUE, NICANOR LEMQUE, FELIX LEMQUE, NORMA LEMQUE, WILFREDO LEMQUE, RODOLFO LEMQUE, ROGELIO LEMQUE, VICTORIA LEMQUE, ESTATE OF MARIA ESPIRITU and ANDRES ADONA, MILAGROS DE UBAGOUMALI, FELISA GUBALLA DE UBAGO, VANESSA DE UBAGO-UMALI, ANTONIO DE UBAGO, JR., JOSEPH GUBALLA DE UBAGO, MARIETTA DE UBAGO-TAN, and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ZAMBALES, petitioners, vs. CRISTITO MALAY and NORA MALAY, DIONISIO MALAY, FRANCISCA T. CAPACILLO, PEPITO ALCANTARA, NICOLAS SORIANO and JUAN MORA, respondents. *

Actions; Courts; Land Registration Act; Under the Land Registration Act (now PD 1529), title to the property covered by a Torrens certificate becomes indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of registration.—A certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent covering a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141 is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding. Under the Land Registration Act, title to the property covered by a Torrens certificate becomes indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of registration. Such decree of registration is incontrovertible and becomes binding on all persons whether or not they were notified of, or participated in, the in rem registration process. There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law or the Land Registration Act (Act 496), now Presidential Decree 1529, fixing a similar one-year period within which a public land patent can be considered open to review on the ground of actual fraud, such as that provided for in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, and now Section 32 of Presidential Decree 1529, and clothing a public land patent certificate of title with indefeasibility. Nevertheless, this Court has repeatedly applied Section 32 of Presidential Decree 1529 to a patent issued in accordance with the law by the Director of Lands, approved by the Secretary of Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines. The date of the issuance of the patent corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary cases. Just as the decree finally awards the land applied for registration to the party entitled to it, so also, the patent issued by the

Director of Lands equally and finally grants and conveys the land applied for to the applicant. Same; Same; Same; The nature of an action is determined by the body of the pleading or complaint itself than by its title or heading.—The caption of the case before the court a quo while denominated as being one for “Annulment of Sale with Damages” is in reality an action for reconveyance since the ultimate relief sought by private respondents would be for the property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 398 to be reconveyed to the estate of Andres Adona. In this jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that the nature of an action is determined, more importantly, by the body of the pleading or complaint itself than by its title or heading. The Court of Appeals did not err in treating the action brought by private respondents as one for reconveyance or as one that seeks the transfer of the property, wrongfully registered by another to its rightful and legal owner. It would seem that Andres Adona did perfect his homestead application prior to his death, the right to the issuance of the patent on which vests after complying with all the requirements of the law. Same; Same; Same; A person in actual possession of a piece of land under a claim of ownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right and that his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim.—There is no doubt about the fact that an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust ordinarily prescribes in ten years. This rule assumes, however, that there is an actual need to initiate that action, for when the right of the true and real owner is recognized, expressly or implicitly such as when he remains undisturbed in his possession, the statute of limitation would yet be irrelevant. An action for reconveyance, if nonetheless brought, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, or its equivalent, an action that is imprescriptible. In Faja vs. Court of Appeals, the Court has held that a person in actual possession of a piece of land under claim of ownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, and that his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title. Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Innocent Purchaser for Value; An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.—This Court sees no cogent reasons to disturb the finding of the Court of Appeals that the de Ubagos may not be considered buyers in good faith. Said the Appellate Court: “x x x An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he

receives the thing was the owner and could convey title to the property. A purchaser can not close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith. (Sandoval vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 283, 296 [1996])

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Agerico M. Ungson for petitioners. Virgilio C. Manguera & Associates for private respondents. VITUG, J.: The instant case is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals reversing that of the Regional Trial Court on an action for reconveyance of property. The issues submitted by the parties may not really be all that novel. The spouses Andres Adona and Leoncia Abad, husband and wife for a good number of years, were blessed with five children among them being Carmen Adona. Carmen married Filomeno Malay; three children were begotten by the marriage, namely, Cristito, Nora and Dionisio (among the herein private respondents). Following the death of Leoncia Abad in 1923, Andres Adona cohabited with Maria Espiritu, herself a widow, apparently without the benefit of marriage. Andres and Maria sired two children, Esperanza, represented herein by her heirs all surnamed David, and Vicente Adona. Maria Espiritu likewise had a child by her previous marriage, Fulgencio Lemque, now herein represented also by his own heirs. During his lifetime, Andres Adona applied for a homestead patent over a parcel of agricultural land located at Dirita, Iba Zambales, containing an area of 22.5776 hectares. After Andres Adona had died, Maria Espiritu, predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners, succeeded in obtaining Original Certificate of Title No. 398 over the land in her name. After Maria Espiritu had died in 1945, the children, as well as descendants of Andres Adona by his marriage with Leoncia Abad, continued to be in peaceful and quiet possession of the subject land. Sometime in 1989 petitioners executed a deed of “Extra-judicial Settlement with Sale” over the subject property in favor of Mrs. Venancia Ungson. Private respondents protested the sale claiming that they were the true owners of the land. Ultimately, in any event, the sale in favor of Mrs. Ungson was rescinded in view of the latter’s failure to pay in full the consideration agreed upon. Subsequently, petitioners executed another deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale. In this new instrument, dated 15 December 1990, petitioners divided the land equally among themselves and sold their respective shares to their co-petitioners herein, Antonio de Ubago, Jr., Milagros de Ubago-Umali, Felisa Guballa de Ubago, Vanessa de Ubago-Umali and Marietta de Ubago-

Tan and Joseph Guballa de Ubago. On 27 November 1992, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-42320 was issued in favor of the de Ubagos. Less than a month later, or on 07 December 1992, private respondents filed a complaint docketed Civil Case No. RTC-905-1 for “Annulment of Sale with Restraining Order, Injunction and Damages” against petitioners before Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court of Zambales. In their complaint, private respondents averred that the disputed land sold by the heirs of Maria Espiritu to the de Ubagos was the subject of a homestead application by their great grandfather, Andres Adona, but that Original Certificate of Title No. 398 was instead fraudulently issued to Maria Espiritu, on 04 December 1933, upon her false representation that she was the widow of Andres Adona. In its decision of 25 July 1995 after a hearing on the merits of the case, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and on the ground of prescription. It opined that the action being one for annulment of sale anchored on a fraudulent titling of the subject property, the cause of action constituted a collateral attack on the Torrens Certificate of Title. The court aquo added that even if the action were to be treated as being one for reconveyance, the suit would still have to fail since an action for reconveyance could only be brought within ten (10) years counted from the date of issuance of the certificate of title (in 1933). On appeal, the Court of Appeals in its judgment of 11 February 1998 set aside the order of dismissal of the case decreed by the trial court and directed the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-42320 in the name of the de Ubagos and the reconveyance of the property to the estate of Andres Adona. Petitioners were additionally ordered to pay damages and attorney’s fees to private respondents. The appellate court, more particularly, ruled: 1

“The evidence on record shows that OCT No. 398 issued in favor of Maria Espiritu was obtained by her fraudulent concealment of the existence of Adona’s first marriage to Leoncia Abad, as shown by the affidavit she executed on September 21, 1928 and filed with the Director of Lands. “Consequently, Maria Espiritu’s fraudulent concealment of material facts created an implied or constructive trust in favor of the plaintiffs, the excluded co-heirs and actual possessors of the subject land. Article 1456 of the Civil Code reads: “ ‘If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.’ “Although it is true that after the lapse of one year, a decree of registration is no longer open to review or attack, although its issuance was tainted with fraud; however, the aggrieved party is not without a remedy at law. Notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens Title already issued in favor of Maria Espiritu, she and her successors-in-interest, although the registered owner under the Torrens system, may still be compelled under the law to reconvey the subject property to the real owners. The Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one who had

committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith (Amerol vs. Bagumbaran, 154 SCRA 396, 404 [1987]). “In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful and legal owner or to one with a better right. (Amerol, supra) “However, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is not absolute. It is subject to extinctive prescription (Amerol, supra; Caro vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 401, 405-407 [1989]; Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 112 SCRA 542, 550 [1982]; Ramos vs. Ramos, 61 SCRA 284, 299-300 [1974]) “An action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property. (Amerol, supra; Caro, supra; Casipit vs. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 684, 694 [1991]) This rule applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. If a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance does not prescribe. The reason for this is one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain the nature of the adverse claim of third party and its effect on his title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. (Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. 108547, February 3, 1997) “Hence, the undisturbed possession by plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest gave them the continuing right to resort to judicial intervention once their claim to ownership was challenged. It was therefore the defendant Heirs’ act of executing the ‘Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale’ which constituted the express act of repudiation of the constructive trust which gave rise to plaintiff’s cause of action.” 2

Aggrieved, petitioners have come to this Court and seek to dispute the judgment of the Court of Appeals ordering the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. 398 issued on 16 November 1933. It is the contention of petitioners that to allow private respondents to question Original Certificate of Title No. 398 fifty-nine years after its issuance would undermine the Torrens system and sanctity of the certificate of title. Private respondents, upon the other hand, ask this Court to sustain the decision of the Court of Appeals on the thesis that the property in question indubitably belongs to the estate of Andres Adona whose incontestable right to it is derived from the perfected homestead application two years prior to his death as so admitted by Maria Espiritu herself in her affidavit submitted to the Director of Lands. The Court rules for the affirmance of the challenged decision. A certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent covering a disposable public land within the contemplation

of the Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141 is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding. Under the Land Registration Act, title to the property covered by a Torrens certificate becomes indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of registration. Such decree of registration is incontrovertible and becomes binding on all persons whether or not they were notified of, or participated in, the in rem registration process. There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law or the Land Registration Act (Act 496), now Presidential Decree 1529, fixing a similar one-year period within which a public land patent can be considered open to review on the ground of actual fraud, such as that provided for in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, and now Section 32 of Presidential Decree 1529, and clothing a public land patent certificate of title with indefeasibility. Nevertheless, this Court has repeatedly applied Section 32 of Presidential Decree 1529 to a patent issued in accordance with the law by the Director of Lands, approved by the Secretary of Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines. The date of the issuance of the patent corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary cases. Just as the decree finally awards the land applied for registration to the party entitled to it, so also, the patent issued by the Director of Lands equally and finally grants and conveys the land applied for to the applicant. Original Certificate of Title No. 398 was issued in the name of Maria Espiritu on 04 December 1933 and would have become indefeasible a year thereafter had not its issuance been attended with fraud. The attendance of fraud created an implied trust in favor of private respondents and gave them the right of action to seek the remedy of reconveyance of the property wrongfully obtained. InJavier vs. Court of Appeals this Court ruled: 3

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“x x x The basic rule is that after the lapse of one (1) year, a decree of registration is no longer open to review or attack although its issuance is attended with actual fraud. This does not mean however that the aggrieved party is without a remedy at law. If the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for reconveyance is still available. The decree becomes incontrovertible and can no longer be reviewed after one (1) year from the date of the decree so that the only remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name as to bring an ordinary action in court for reconveyance, which is an action in personam and is always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third party for value. If the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy is an action for damages.” 8

The caption of the case before the court aquo while denominated as being one for “Annulment of Sale with Damages” is in reality an action for reconveyance since the ultimate relief sought by private respondents would be for the property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 398 to be reconveyed to the estate of Andres Adona. In this jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that

the nature of an action is determined, more importantly, by the body of the pleading or complaint itself than by its title or heading. The Court of Appeals did not err in treating the action brought by private respondents as one for reconveyance or as one that seeks the transfer of the property, wrongfully registered by another to its rightful and legal owner. It would seem that Andres Adona did perfect his homestead application prior to his death, the right to the issuance of the patent on which vests after complying with all the requirements of the law. The next crucial issue focuses on the ruling of the Court of Appeals to the effect that if a person who claims to be the owner of the property is in actual possession thereof, the right to seek reconveyance does not prescribe. There is no doubt about the fact that an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust ordinarily prescribes in ten years. This rule assumes, however, that there is an actual need to initiate that action, for when the right of the true and real owner is recognized, expressly or implicitly such as when he remains undisturbed in his possession, the statute of limitation would yet be irrelevant. An action for reconveyance, if nonetheless brought, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, or its equivalent, an action that is imprescriptible. InFaja vs. Court of Appeals, the Court has held that a person in actual possession of a piece of land under claim of ownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, and that his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title. In the words of the Court— 9

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“x x x There is settled jurisprudence that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. No better situation can be conceived at the moment for Us to apply this rule on equity than that of herein petitioners whose mother, Felipa Faja, was in possession of the litigated property for no less than 30 years and was suddenly confronted with a claim that the land she had been occupying and cultivating all these years, was titled in the name of a third person. We hold that in such a situation the right to quiet title to the property, to seek its reconveyance and annul any certificate of title covering it, accrued only from the time the one in possession was made aware of a claim adverse to his own and it is only then that the statutory period of prescription commences to run against such possessor.” 15

The same dictum is reiterated in Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Court of Appeals; thus— 16

“With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a number of times before that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property (Vda. de Portugal vs. IAC, 159 SCRA 178). But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.” 17

Finally, this Court sees no cogent reasons to disturb the finding of the Court of Appeals that the de Ubagos may not be considered buyers in good faith. Said the Appellate Court: “x x x An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could convey title to the property. A purchaser can not close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith. (Sandoval vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 283, 296 [1996]) “It is well settled that one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond the same, but only has to rely on the title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. (Sandoval, supra, at p. 295) “The aforestated principle admits of an unchallenged exception: that a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has some knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith and hence does not merit the protection of the law. (Sandoval, supra.) (Italics supplied) “Applying the aforequoted jurisprudence, the defendant buyers can not be considered as innocent purchasers for value. A perusal of defendant buyers’ TCT No. 42320 reveals that it contains an entry by the Register of Deeds which provides that their ownership over the land is subject to prospective claims by any possible heirs and creditors who might have been deprived of their lawful participation in the estate. The said entry reads as follows:

“ ‘Entry No. 102385—Section 4—The property described in this certificate of title is subject to the provisions of Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court for the period of two years in favor of in any other possible heir or heirs and creditors who might have been deprived of his or their lawful participations in the said estate. ‘Date of instrument—December 15, 1990. ‘Date of Inscription—November 27, 1992 at 2:00 p.m. (Exh. ‘E’; Rollo, p. 137) “Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court reads, in part, as follows: “ ‘Sec. 4. Liability of distributees and estate.—If it shall appear at any time within (2) years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation x x x “The record shows that the ‘Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale’ was executed on December 15, 1990 Plaintiffs’ complaint for Reconveyance was filed on December 7, 1992. Hence, the two-year period has not yet elapsed. “It likewise appears that the subject land was the object of a sale between the defendant Heirs and one Mrs. Venancia Ungson which was subsequently aborted due to the intervention of defendant Vicente Adona and plaintiff Cristito Malay. (Exhs. ‘K’, ‘K-1’ and ‘L’) However, defendant Heirs nevertheless executed another sale in favor of defendant buyers who are admittedly relatives of Mrs. Venancia Ungson. (TSN, January 23, 1995, p. 14) Plaintiff Cristito Malay’s intervention in the previous sale should have put defendant buyers on their guard. “Moreover, it is unbelievable that the defendant buyers would not have noticed the plaintiffs who were in possession of the land when the defendant buyers inspected the same. Had they made further investigations, they would have discovered that plaintiffs were in possession of the land under a claim of ownership. “The rule is settled that a buyer of real property which is in the possession of persons other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith. The buyer who has failed to know or discover that the land sold to him is in the adverse possession of another buyer in bad faith. (Embrado vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 335, 347 [1994]).” 18

Altogether, the Court sees no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. 91.

MANILA BLDG VS. PENALOSA

In re Building & Loan Association and Peñalosa., 13 Phil. 575 , July 13, 1909

Case Title : THE MANILA BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION and GREGORIO PEÑALOSA, petitioners and appellants.Case Nature : APPEAL from an order of the Court of Land Registration. Del Rosario, J. Syllabi Class : REGISTRATION OF LAND Syllabi: 1. REGISTRATION OF LAND; REGISTRATION OF BUILDING BELONGING TO ONE OWNER ON GROUND BELONGING TO ANOTHER.Under the existing law governing the ownership of real estate in the Philippines, a building can not be registered in the registry of property separately and independently from the, land on which it is erected. The words "land or buildings or an interest therein" as contained in Act No. 496, in lieu of the single word "land," is not a sufficient ground for interpreting the law as authorizing the registration of buildings erected on land belonging to another separately and independently from the land, or that the intent of the law was to allude to buildings belonging to an owner other than the owner of the land. Parts of a law should be interpreted and construed with reference to each other, thus completing the meaning and purpose of the legislator; consequently, the words in question were used in section 2 of the Act in the same sense which appears more explicitly and practically in the forms given in section 21; hence, the natural and logical interpretation of such words in the Land Registration Act of the Philippine Islands is that the same authorizes the owner of the land to register together with the land such buildings, improvements, or interest as he may have therein, but in nowise authorizes the owner of the land and the owner of the buildings to apply for registration separately and independently, nor can the land of the one and the building of the other erected thereon have legal existence in the registry as entities independent of one another. 2. REGISTRATION OF LAND; MORTGAGE LAW.Buildings erected on land belonging to another can not be registered separately and independently from the land, even though the title to the buildings may be mortgageable. Docket Number: No. 4773 Counsel: Gibbs & Gale Ponente: ARELLANO Dispositive Portion: For the reasons above set forth the order appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs

[No. 4773. July 13, 1909.] THE MANILA BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION and GREGORIO PEÑALOSA, petitioners and appellants. 1. 1.REGISTRATION OF LAND; REGISTRATION OF BUILDING BELONGING TO ONE OWNER ON GROUND BELONGING TO ANOTHER.—Under the existing law governing the ownership of real estate in the Philippines, a building can not be registered in the registry of property separately and independently from the, land on which it is erected. The words "land or buildings or an interest therein" as contained in Act No. 496, in lieu of the single word "land," is not a sufficient ground for interpreting the law as authorizing the registration of buildings erected on land belonging to another separately and independently from the land, or that the intent of the law was to allude to buildings belonging to an owner other than the owner of the land. Parts of a law should be interpreted and construed with reference to each other, thus completing the meaning and purpose of the legislator; consequently, the words in question were used in section 2 of the Act in the same sense which appears more explicitly and practically in the forms given in section 21; hence, the natural and logical interpretation of such words in the Land Registration Act of the Philippine Islands is that the same authorizes the owner of the land to register together with the land such buildings, improvements, or interest as he may have therein, but in nowise authorizes the owner of the land and the owner of the buildings to apply for registration separately and independently, nor can the land of the one and the building of the other erected thereon have legal existence in the registry as entities independent of one another. 1. 2.ID.; ID.; MORTGAGE LAW.—Buildings erected on land belonging to another can not be registered separately and independently from the land, even though the title to the buildings may be mortgageable.

APPEAL from an order of the Court of Land Registration. Del Rosario, J. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Gibbs & Gale, for appellants. ARELLANO, C. J.: On the 14th of January, 1908, the Manila Building and Loan Association applied to the Court of Land Registration for the registration of a building of strong materials erected on ground belonging to another. On the 3d of March, 1908, the application was denied by said court for the following reason:

"Inasmuch as the petitioners are not the owners of the ground on which is erected the building of strong materials that they are seeking to register separately therefrom, their application can not be entertained by the court. However, if the owner of the land, Benito Legarda, should cause the same to be registered, the lease to which it is subject for the period of time agreed upon may be made to appear as an incumbrance, and the existence of the building erected on the leased portion of the ground may be set forth in the proper place in the certificate." On the 7th day of said month and year, the petitioners excepted to the above decision and moved for the amendment of the same. After hearing the motion on the 6th of April, 1908, the Court of Land Registration entered the following decree: "If the sense of section 2 of Act No. 496 were such as is interpreted by the petitioners, an anomalous situation would arise whereby a building might become registered without the registration of the land upon which it is erected. And in view of the facility with which a building may disappear either by its removal to another place, or by reason of a fire or other causes, the result would be that the title issued by the court would be lacking the stability assured by the law. Not even under the Spanish Mortgage Law can a building erected on ground belonging to another be registered, unless the owner of the former had registered the right of lease of the latter. The decision above referred to is sustained." On the 9th day of said month and year, the petitioner amended his request so as to include therein the following facts: that the land belonged to Benito Legarda; that it was leased to Gregorio Peñalosa, and by the latter sublet with the express consent of the owner to the Manila Building and Loan Association; that, by a decree of the Court of Land Registration issued on August 9, 1907, in case No. 2724, the land was registered in the name of Benito Legarda, subject to the incumbrance of the lease contract in favor of the Manila Building and Loan Association, which incumbrance was entered and indorsed on the title deed issued in favor of Benito Legarda in conformity with the said decree, and that in consequence thereof, the right of lease of the said Manila Building and Loan Association became registered. On the 14th of April, 1908, the last decision of the Court of Land Registration was rendered as follows: "In view of the fact that the building is an accessory, and that, as sworn to in the amended petition at the end of paragraph 1 thereof, the lease of the land on which the building is erected has been entered in the title deed issued to the owner, Benito Legarda, the note that the registrar shall enter in the proper place at the back of the certificate, to the effect that the building erected on the leased portion of the land is the property of the lessee, is sufficient. The findings contained in the judgment of March 3, and in that rendered on the 6th instant are hereby sustained."

The petitioner excepted in due course and form to the foregoing judgment and submitted to this court his bill of exceptions, wherein two causes of error are alleged: 1. 1.That the trial court erred in determining that a building of strong materials, situated on land leased from and owned by a person other than the applicant, such land being duly registered subject to applicant's lease, could not be registered under the provisions of the Land Registration Act. 2. 2.In dismissing the application. In order to support the first assignment of error, the applicant maintains that section 2 of Act No. 496, the Land Registration Act, deals with the entry or registration of land, buildings, interests; according to the applicant the law unites these three words by the conjunction or, as meaning that any one of the three things may be registered independently of the others; and, although in a following clause is mentioned "the land, and the buildings andimprovements," the use of the article the in order to distinguish and separate "land" from "buildings and improvements" confirms said interpretation; that section 19 deals with the application f or the registration of title without restricting itself to land; that in Act No. 627, dealing with military reservations, mention is made of "lands or buildings, or any interest therein;" that, while it is true that the word "buildings" has been suppressed in Act No. 806, nevertheless, in Act No, 1138, respecting naval reservations "lands of private ownership, buildings, and interests therein," are again mentioned; that the author of the Land Registration Act was well aware that the word "land" comprises everything contained thereon, and probably used it for the sake of brevity so as not to repeat the phrase "land or buildings or an interest therein;" that, if the Mortgage Law admits the registration of buildings erected on land belonging to another, independently of the land (art. 107, par. 1), Act No. 496, which has the same object and was intended to amplify rather than to restrict the said law, should be understood in the same sense; that Act No. 496 should be interpreted in its literal sense; that said law is a literal copy of the law of Massachussetts on the subject, the language of section 1 of the latter being identical with section 2 of our law, with the very significant exception that while, in the law of Massachussetts, the term "title to land" is employed, our law uses the more extensive term "title to land or buildings or an interest therein;" that it might be considered that "the owner of the land has a contingent right at the expiration of the lease, but by reason of the conjunctive provisions of articles 1573 and 487 of the Civil Code, the owner has no contingent interest or other right to the voluntary improvements of the lessee." The use that the law makes of the phrase "land or buildings or an interest therein," instead of the single word "land," is no reason for construing the law

as authorizing the registration of buildings erected on land belonging to another, separately and independently from the registra579

tion of the land. From the fact that, besides "land," "buildings" was added, it must not be inferred that it was the intent of the law to allude to buildings belonging to an owner other than the owner of the land. The natural and more logical inference is that since the buildings are an accessory to the land, in first employing the word "land" and subsequently the other word "buildings," it was intended to express what was principal and what was accessory, all pertaining to the same owner; this is shown by section 21, the latter part of which contains a form of application reading as follows: "And I (or we) declare: (1) That I am (or we are) the owner (or owners) in fee simple of a certain parcel of land with the buildings (if any; if not, strike out the words 'with the buildings'), * * * (2) That said land at the last assessment for taxation was assessed at dollars; and the buildings (if any) at dollars." Section 127 contains several forms of "deeds, conveyances, mortgages, leases, releases, and discharges affecting lands, whether registered or unregistered." Form No. 2, "deed of land registered under this Act," includes the following statement: " .......................do hereby sell and convey to said...................................... and his heirs and assigns that parcel of land, together with all the buildings and improvements thereon, etc." Forms Nos. 3 and 4, "deeds of land not registered, without or with covenants of warranty," read: "........................ do hereby sell and convey to the said ................ his heirs and assigns, that parcel of land, together with all the buildings and improvements thereon, etc." And the same formula, "parcel of land with all the buildings and improvements thereon" is found in the form of deed for the mortgage and lease of land. It may thus be seen that the language of the forms clearly expresses what was the intent of the law in the identical language of section 2 thereof; the natural and logical interpretation of such language of the Land Registration Act of the Philippine Islands being that it authorizes the owner of the land to register together with the land, all the buildings, improvements, or interests that he has therein, but that under no circumstances can registration be applied for separately and independently by the owner of the land and by the owner of the buildings; that is to say, that the land of one person and the building of another erected thereon can have no separate legal existence in the registry as property independent in themselves. Such a theory can not be set up, nor can this court sustain such a doctrine.

It is not true that "under the system of registration of property established by the Mortgage Law, buildings erected on land belonging to another may be registered separately from the land. (See par. 1, art. 107, Mortgage Law.)" (Brief. 8.) "ART. 107. The following are mortgageable, but with such restrictions as are hereinafter expressed: "1. A building erected on ground belonging to another, which, if mortgaged by the person who constructed it, shall be without prejudice to the right of the owner of the ground, this incumbrance being only secured by the interest which the person who constructed the building has therein." The article above quoted does not state that the buildings erected on ground belonging to another person may be registered independently of the land; it only says that they may be mortgaged. Because they are mortgageable it is not to be inferred that they can be registered separately from the land of another person whereon they are erected. And even though there has been no question formally presented nor argument advanced as to the registration of a mortgage on a building erected on land owned by another person, title to which land has not been previously registered, it is not considered out of place to state herein the doctrine of certain commentators on the af oresaid Mortgage Law as f ollows: "Remarks in connection with the mortgage of a building constructed on a parcel of land belonging to another person.—The right to erect a building on a parcel of land is inherent in the title thereto; and inasmuch as it subsistsper se, whereas the building can not subsist without the land, the latter is considered as principal, and that which is constructed thereon as accessory. "According to article 359 of the Civil Code, all works on a piece of property are presumed to be made by the owner and at his expense unless the contrary is proven. "Even in case it were proven, he is entitled to appropriate the works upon indemnification, if there was good faith on the part of the person who carried out. the work, or to compel the latter to pay him the value of the land. (Art. 361, Civil Code.) "He who builds in bad faith shall lose his right to indemnity. (Art. 362.) "With such precepts, which have in no manner modified the old law, we are positive that No. 1 of article 107 refers only and exclusively to a building constructed after a contract made with the owner of the land wherein the title of the person at whose expense it was built is recognized; said contract must be registered, as otherwise it could not be recorded. "Inasmuch as on the registration of the contract its conditions shall be stated, and the extent of the right of he who built shall become known, there will be no difficulty in applying the said No. 1 of article 107." (Galindo y Escosura, 3 Legislación Hipotecaria, 162.) Lastly, as a reason for the appeal, it is alleged that he who builds on land belonging to another need not f ear any contingent right on the part of the

owner of the land at the expiration of the lease, because the provisions of articles 1573 and 487 of the Civil Code do not grant to the owner of the land "any contingent interest" or other right to the voluntary improvements of the lessee. Article 1573 only says that "a lessee shall have, with regard to the useful and voluntary improvements, the same rights which are granted a usufructuary," and article 487 provides that "the usufructuary may make on the property which is the object of the usufruct any improvements, useful or for recreation, which he may deem proper, provided he does not change its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove said improvements, should it be possible to do so without injury to the property." At the expiration of the lease the owner of the land has the right, not merely a contingent one but a definite right under the law, to cause the building erected on his estate to be taken down without incurring any obligation whatever, enforcing against the lessee the obligation imposed by article 1561, to return the estate in the same condition in which he received it (unless an agreement was executed prior to the construction of the building.) If the object leased were a house, it is evident that the lessee might effect such improvements for use, recreation or comfort as would not change its form or substance as he deemed fit; he could build a bower or luxurious pavilion more expensive than the house itself, to which, at the expiration of the lease, the owner of the house would have no right whatever, unless the lessee could not remove the same without injury to the house to which it was attached as an improvement, excepting of course the right to cause the same to be demolished so that the house might be returned to him in the same condition that the lessee received it; but not because the lessee could make such improvement, and because the owner of the house did not have any right thereto, could the said bower or pavilion be registered independently of the house, when, without the house to which it was accessory, it could have no juridical status nor any real existence as a piece of propertyindependent from the other property, to wit, the house to which it was attached. "There can be no doubt, with respect to either the usufructuary or the lessee, that they are dealing with something that belongs to another; that the juridical relation maintained by them has a natural term, and that, therefore, when the time comes, they will have no right to allege such absolute and unlimited title to such improvements, as if the same had been made on their own property." (Manresa, 10 Civil Code, 595.) In one word, they have no independent possession of the thing that the improvement represents. The importance of superficies, compared to freehold, is in many countries great and constantly increasing, and enormous sums of money are raised and collected for the purpose of speculating in the first of these rights; but a

leasehold is by no means a superficies, and the Philippine Civil Code supplies various forms of contract which provide security for capital so employed or for concerns engaged in the investment of funds. For the reasons above set forth the order appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs. Torres, Mapa, and Carson, JJ., concur. Order affirmed. 92.

CRUZ VS. DE LEON

Arnedo Cruz vs. De Leon., 21 Phil. 199 , January 15, 1912 Case Title : GREGORIA ARNEDO CRUZ ET AL., petitioners and appellees, vs. DOMINGO DE LEON ET AL., opponents and appellants.Case Nature : APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Land Registration. Benitez, J. Syllabi Class : REGISTRATION OF LAND|REALTY|ABANDONMENT OF LAND Syllabi: 1. REGISTRATION OF LAND; DUTY OF APPLICANT TO PROVE TITLE AND IDENTIFY THE LAND.When application has been made for the registration of two parcels of land, the plan and technical description of which include several lots which various opponents allege to have been in possession of as owners for more than ten years, in order that the latter may be deemed to be mere detainers of the said lots it is necessary that the record show that the said opponents occupy the property under precarious title, by the consent or mere tolerance of the owners, the manner in which they succeeded in entering upon the land, and that the land so occupied forms a part of the property sought to be registered. 2. REGISTRATION OF LAND; SURVEY AND PLAN.Even though it be conclusively proven that the parties applying for registration are the legitimate owners and proprietors of the land, if there is no satisfactory proof that the lots detained by the opponents are comprised therein, for the purposes of registration there still remains to be decided, by survey and plan, the question of the area and boundaries of each of the said two parcels of land. 3. REALTY; ABANDONMENT OF LAND; PRESCRIPTION.The owners or proprietors of real properties, provided with the most legitimate and perfect titles, may be deprived and dispossessed thereof by usurpers who, by the lapse of the time specified by law,

acquire the same by prescription to their benefit and to the prejudice of the legitimate owners. (Arts. 1930 and 1959, Civil Code.) 4. REALTY; RIGHT OF POSSESSOR TO BE PROTECTED.Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession, and, should he be disturbed therein, he must be protected or restored in his possession by the methods prescribed in the law of procedure. (Art. 446, Civil Code.) Docket Number: No. 6546 Counsel: Velarde & Santos, Perfecto Gabriel Ponente: TORRES Dispositive Portion: For the reasons aforesaid, and with the modification specified, the judgment appealed from is affirmed; but before completing the inscription and registration of the said parcels of land in the name of the applicants, with the exclusion of the portions of land owned by the opponents, a correct survey, which must be duly approved, shall be made of the said properties, and a plan shall be drawn, f or the purpose of the issuance of the proper title in accordance with the law. No special finding is made as to the costs. So ordered. [No. 6546. January 15, 1912.] GREGORIA ARNEDO CRUZ ET AL., petitioners appellees, vs. DOMINGO DE LEON ET AL., opponents and appellants.

and

1. 1.REGISTRATION OF LAND; DUTY OF APPLICANT TO PROVE TITLE AND IDENTIFY THE LAND.—When application has been made for the registration of two parcels of land, the plan and technical description of which include several lots which various opponents allege to have been in possession of as owners for more than ten years, in order that the latter may be deemed to be mere detainers of the said lots it is necessary that the record show that the said opponents occupy the property under precarious title, by the consent or mere tolerance of the owners, the manner in which they succeeded in entering upon the land, and that the land so occupied forms a part of the property sought to be registered. 1. 2.ID.; ID.; SURVEY AND PLAN.—Even though it be conclusively proven that the parties applying for registration are the legitimate owners and proprietors of the land, if there is no satisfactory proof that the lots detained by the opponents are comprised therein, for the purposes of registration there

still remains to be decided, by survey and plan, the question of the area and boundaries of each of the said two parcels of land. 1. 3.REALTY; ABANDONMENT OF LAND; PRESCRIPTION.—The owners or proprietors of real properties, provided with the most legitimate and perfect titles, may be deprived and dispossessed thereof by usurpers who, by the lapse of the time specified by law, acquire the same by prescription to their benefit and to the prejudice of the legitimate owners. (Arts. 1930 and 1959, Civil Code.) 1. 4.ID.; RIGHT OF POSSESSOR TO BE PROTECTED.—Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession, and, should he be disturbed therein, he must be protected or restored in his possession by the methods prescribed in the law of procedure. (Art. 446, Civil Code.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Land Registration. Benitez, J. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Velarde & Santos, for appellants. Perfecto Gabriel, for appellees. TORRES, J.: This is an appeal raised by the opponents, from the judgment rendered by the Honorable Judge Higinio Benitez. On the 12th of August, 1907, Gregoria Arnedo Cruz, in her own behalf and in the name and representation of her sisters, Maria Concepcion, Manuela and Juana, all surnamed Arnedo Cruz, made written application to the Court of Land Registration for the registration of two parcels of land, situated in the barrio of San Miguel, pueblo of Calumpit, Province of Bulacan, of which they claimed to be the absolute owners, and described as follows: Parcel A, bounded on the north by land of Ramon de los Reyes; on the east by that of Victoria A. Cruz; on the south by a road from the barrio of San Miguel; and on the west by the land of Eugenia de Jesus. It has an area of. 222,871.23 square meters. Parcel B, bounded on the north by the road from the barrio of San Miguel; on the east by the land of Victoria A. Cruz; on the south by the Rio Grande de Calumpit; and on the west by the land of Eugenia de Jesus. It has an area of 14,130.67 square meters. The estate described, composed of two parcels of land, was appraised, for the purposes of the last assessment, together with the buildings thereon constructed. The petitioners alleged that there was no encumbrance on the property, nor any person entitled to any right or share therein, according to their best knowledge and belief; that they acquired this land by inheritance from their deceased parents, Jose Arnedo Cruz and Maria Santos Espiritu; and that, in

the unlikely event of its being impossible to grant their application in accordance with the Land Registration Act, they would rely upon the benefits of chapter 6 of Act No. 926, inasmuch as they had been in possession of the said lands for more than fifty years, during which period they were used for the cultivation of rice, being surrounded by pilapiles, or earthen dikes. Upon a hearing of the case, on February 20, 1908, the court, by an order of the same date and after the issuance of a decree of general default, decreed the adjudication and registration of the two aforedescribed properties in the names of the sisters Gregoria Arnedo Cruz, Manuela Arnedo Cruz, Maria Concepción Arnedo Cruz and Juana Arnedo Cruz. By a written petition of the date of December 15, 1908, Toribio de Leon, Agustin Catanghal, Fulgencio Clarin, Clara de Leon, Antonio Mundo, Julian de Leon, Joaquin de Leon, Domingo de Leon, Bernardo Reyes, Ambrosio Carlos, Pedro de Leon, Florentina Ramos', Monica Laderas, Juana Martinez, Francisco de Torres, and Mariano Valladar, stated to the court that they were the owners and possessors of certain building lots which formed a part of the two parcels of land concerned in this case, and that, notwithstanding the fact that the applicants knew that the said lots were held by the petitioners as owners thereof, they nevertheless included the same as their property and in their application for registration maliciously made no mention of the petitioners as the occupants of such portions of the said parcels of land, in this manner fraudulently obtaining the judgment in their favor by the Land Court on February 20, 1908; and that, because of such fraudulent procedure the petitioners had no opportunity to appear before the court at the hearing of the case to defend their rights in the portions of land which they respectively occupied. They therefore petitioned that the previous judgment of February 20 be reconsidered and reversed, after due procedure, in so far as their respective lots were concerned. After a hearing on this motion the court, with the acquiescence of the applicants, ordered, on January 7, 1909, that the case should be reheard. In consequence thereof, brief s were filed by the opponents and Domingo de Leon alleged: that for about eight years past he had been in possession as owner of a building lot, containing banana plants, situate in the barrio of Frances, Calumpit, Bulacan, bounded on the north by the barrio road, on the east by the property of the heirs of Antonia de Leon, on the south by the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, and on the west by the property of Toribio de Leon, containing 2,522 square meters; and that this lot was acquired by inheritance from his deceased parents, Cayetano and Fernanda Catanghal, who had possessed it as owners for a period of about forty years. Bernardo Reyes alleged that he was in possession as owner, and had so possessed for some twenty-eight years, a building lot, containing banana plants, situate in the barrio of Frances, bounded on the north by the barrio

road, on -the east by the property of Toribio de Leon, on the south by the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, and on the west by the property of Isidro N. Baltazar, which lot has an area of 2,590 square meters and was acquired by him by purchase from the spouses Rafael Laderas and Aleja Mata who during their lifetime had held it as owners for more than twenty years. Raymunda, Bernarda and Jose, all surnamed del Rosario, alleged that they were coöwners of a lot situate in the barrio of Frances, bounded on the north by the property of Maria Santos, on the east by that of Pedro del Rosario, on the south by that of Florentina Reyes, and on the west by that of Pedro del Rosario, containing an area of twobalitas, which lot was acquired by them through inheritance from their deceased parents, Pedro and Felipa Reyes, who had held it as owners for more than sixteen years. Florentina Ramos alleged: that for about two years she had been in possession as owner of a lot situate in the said barrio, bounded on the north by the property of Gregoria Arnedo Cruz, on the east by that of Agustin Catanghal, on the south by the barrio road, and on the west by the property of Francisco Torres, and measuring 1,033 square meters, which lot he inherited from his deceased parents, Juan and Josefa Mundo, who themselves had inherited it from Mariano Ramos and had held it as owners for more than sixty years. Patricio and Felisa Lumabas and Juana, Fernanda and Andres Catanghal, the three latter being minors attended by a curator ad litem, alleged that they were the coöwners of two lots, one in the barrio of Frances and bounded on the north by the barrio road, on the east by the property of Julian de Leon, on the south by the Rio Grande, and on the west by the property of Mariano Valladar, containing 19 ares and 76 centares, and the other in the same barrio, bounded on the north by the property of Gregoria Arnedo Cruz, on the east by that of Victoria A. Cruz, on the south by the barrio road, and on .the west by the property of Toribio de Leon, with an area of 8 ares and 40 centares; and that they inherited these lots from their deceased mother, Maria Galang, who herself had acquired them by purchase from the spouses Miguel Mundo and Esperanza Bernabe, through a private instrument of May 1, 1886. Agustin Catanghal alleged that he was in possession as owner, and had been for more than twenty years, of a lot containing banana plants, situate in the said barrio and bounded on the north by the property of Gregoria Arnedo Cruz, on the east by that of Maria Catanghal, on the south by the barrio road, and on the west by the property of Florentina Ramos, with an area of 7 ares and 92 centares which was acquired by him through inheritance from his parents, Lucas and Adriana Hilario, who during their lifetime had held it as owners for more than thirty years. Joaquin de Leon alleged that he was in possession as owner, and had been for more than three years, of a lot in the barrio of Frances, bounded on the north by the barrio road, on the east by the property of Cayetana Monserate,

on the south by the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, and on the west by the property of Julian de Leon, having an area of 5 ares and 31 centares, which lot he acquired by purchase from Gabriela Francisco, Mauricio and Magdalena Yambao and Isidra Torres, who themselves inherited it from their deceased parents, Feliciano and Segunda Arcillas; and that the two latter had possessed it f or more than thirty years. Ambrosio Carlos alleged that he was in possession, and had been for more than five years, of a piece of land situate in the said barrio, bounded on the north by the' property of Gregoria Arnedo Cruz, on the east by that of Calixto Ramos, on the south by the barrio road, and on the west by the property of Gregoria Arnedo Cruz, and that it contains 756 square meters and was acquired by him through inheritance from his deceased mother, Antonia Ramos, who had obtained it from Marciano Ramos, and these two had possessed it during their lifetime for more than forty years. Andres de Leon alleged that he was in possession, and had been for more than twenty years past, of a lot in the same barrio bounded on the north by the barrio road, on the east by the property of Clara de Leon, on the south by the Rio Grande, and on the west by the property of the heirs of Antonio de Leon, which lot has an area of 396 square meters and was inherited by him from his parents, Florentino and Juana Payabyab, who during their lifetime had possessed it for more than forty years. Ignacio and Urbana Ramos, attended by a curator ad litem, on account of their being minors, alleged that they were the owners and possessors of a lot in the same barrio, bounded on the north by the property of Gregoria Arnedo Cruz, on the east by that of Florentina Ramos, on the south by the barrio road, and on the west by the property of Ambrosio Carlos, having an area of 636 square meters, which was acquired by them through inheritance from their father, Calixto Ramos, by the latter from his mother, Luisa Ramos, who herself had inherited it from her father, Mariano, all of whom had possessed it during their lifetime for more than fifty years. Mónica Laderas stated that she was in possession as owner, and had been for some twenty years past, of a lot in the barrio of Frances, bounded on the north by the barrio road, on the east by the property of Bernardo Reyes, on the south by the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, and on the west by the property of Pedro del Rosario, with an area of 1,625 square meters, which was inherited by him from his deceased parents, Rafael and Aleja Mata, who during their lifetime had possessed it for more than thirty years. Toribio de Leon alleged that he was in possession as owner, and had been for more than twenty years past, of two building lots situate, one, in the barrio of Frances, bounded on the north by the property of Gregoria Arnedo Cruz, on the east by that of Juan Alfonso, on the south by the barrio road, and on the west by the property of Victor Carlos, with an area of 799.80 square meters; and the other, in the same barrio, bounded on the north by the barrio road, on

the east by the property of Domingo de Leon, on the south by the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, and on the west by the property of Bernardo Reyes, having an area of 1,197.65 square meters, which lots were acquired by him through inheritance from his parents who during their lifetime had possessed them as owners for more than thirty years. Gabina, Inocencia, Liceria, Pio and Vicenta, all surnamed Clarin, attended by a curator, alleged that they were, and had been for more than six years, in joint possession of a building lot in the said barrio, bounded on the north by the barrio road, on the east by the property of Andres de Leon, on the south by the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, and on the west by the property of Domingo de Leon, with an area of 396 square meters, which was acquired by them through inheritance from their deceased mother, Antonia de Leon, and by the latter from her parents who had possessed it for more than forty years. Pedro de Leon claimed to be in possession, and to have been since 1907, of a lot bounded on the north by the Frances barrio road, on the east by another belonging to him, on the south by the Rio Grande, and on the west by the property of Joaquin de Leon, which lot measures 375 square meters and was acquired by him through purchase from Luis Mañocab who himself inherited it from his parents who during their lifetime had possessed it as owners for more than forty years. Francisco de Torres set forth that he was the owner of a lot in the said barrio, bounded on the north by the property of Gregoria Arnedo Cruz, on the east by that of Florentina Ramos, on the south by the barrio road, and on the west by the property of the heirs of Calixto Ramos, which lot had an area of 626.40 square meters and was acquired by him by purchase from Domingo de Leon, who had obtained it from Bruno Salamante and the latter from Iñigo Ramos, and that Ramos inherited it from his parents, Vicente and Felipa Carlos, who had possessed it as owners during a period of about forty years. Eugenia Catanghal alleged that she was in possession as owner, and had been for more than twenty years past, of a lot in the barrio of Frances, bounded on the north by the property of Gregoria Arnedo Cruz, on the east by that of Toribio de Leon, on the south by the barrio road, and on the west by the property of Agustin Catanghal, which lot, 1,332 square meters in area, was acquired by her through inheritance from her parents, Lucas and Adriana Hilario, who, during their lifetime, had possessed it as owners for more than thirty years. Mariano Valladar declared that she was the owner of a lot in the said barrio, bounded on the north by the barrio road, on the east by the property of Agustin Catanghal, on the south by the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, and on the west by the property of Clara de Leon, which lot, 945 square meters in area, was purchased by him, through a public instrument of February 6. 1907, from Domingo de Leon who, by a private instrument of February 1, 1905, had bought it from the spouses Feliciano and Teresa Mercado.

Julian de Leon alleged that he was in possession as owner, and had been for more than eighteen years, of a lot in the same barrio, bounded on the north by the barrio road, on the east by the property of Joaquin de Leon, on the south by the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, and on the west by the property of Agustin Catanghal, which lot, 11 ares and 56 centares in area, was acquired by him more than 20 years before, by gift from Estefania Torres who during her lifetime had possessed it as owner for more than thirty years. Clara de Leon alleged that she was in possession as owner, and had been for more than twenty years, of a building lot in the said barrio, bounded on the north by the barrio road, on the east by the property of Mariano Valladar, on the south by the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, and on the west by the property of Andres de Leon, which lot, containing an area of 792 square meters, was acquired by her through inheritance from her parents, Florentino and Juana Payabyab, who during their lifetime had possessed it as owners for more than thirty years. All the aforementioned opponents alleged that their respective lots were within the perimeter of the parcels of land registered in the name of the applicants by the decree of February 20, 1908, and therefore asked for the annulment of the same, in so far as it affected their abovedescribed respective lots, and that the costs be assessed against the applicants. A rehearing in this case having been had, with the production of evidence adduced by the parties, the court, on August 16, 1910, upon the facts established, found against the oppositions presented and ordered the registration of the two parcels of land, described in the application and plans accompanying the record of the case, in the names of the sisters Gregoria Arnedo Cruz, Manuela Arnedo Cruz, Maria Concepcion Arnedo Cruz and Juana Arnedo Cruz. From this order counsel for the opponents excepted and by written motion asked for a rehearing on the ground that the evidence did not justify the judgment and that the latter was contrary to law. This motion was denied by order of September 2, 1910, from which order exception was taken by counsel for the opponents who announced their intention to appeal, by bill of exceptions, which, when filed, was certified and forwarded with the record of the case to the clerk of this court. The issue herein involved is one of the registration, in the Court of Land Registration, of two parcels of land claimed to belong to the applicants Gregoria, Manuela, Maria Concepcion, and Juana, all surnamed Arnedo Cruz, which two rural properties are described in the plan presented by the appellants as Exhibit A. It is unquestionable that the said four sisters are the owners and are in possession of the two said parcels of land, used for the cultivation of rice and sugar cane and situate in the barrio of San Miguel, of the pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan.

The question to be decided, in view of the oppositions presented by about thirty individuals who possess various lots apparently comprised within the application and plan of the said two parcels of land, is whether it is or is not proper to register the aforementioned two parcels of land with the inclusion of the lots that are the subject of those oppositions. The opponents have furnished proof that they, as well also as their predecessors in interest, have been in possession, as owners, of their respective lots, all of them for much more than ten years, and the applicants, on the unestablished allegation that the opponents are mere usurpers of certain portions of the properties in dispute, have not proved that the said opponents occupy these portions of land by virtue of any permission, nor by the mere tolerance of the owners of the two parcels before mentioned, nor have they shown how and in what manner the opponents succeeded in entering thereon. Although the documentary and other evidence produced by the applicants has shown conclusively that they are the legitimate owners and possessors of the two aforementioned parcels of land, yet they have not duly established the fact that they are the owners of the portions now in the possession of the opponents, and whether these lots are comprised within the perimeter and boundaries of the two said parcels of land designated on the plan under the letters A and B. The question presented of first importance is one of metes and bounds, or of area. Santiago V. Cruz, an agent of Teodoro Tiongson, who was formerly a lessee of the said two parcels of land during three years prior to 1882, testified that, as such agent, he had not collected any land rent for the lots, occupied by many houses, which were within the land that formed the barrio called Frances; that the lands leased by Tiongson from the applicants' mother were used for the cultivation of rice and sugar cane; that, at the expiration of Tiongson's lease, the latter were taken over by Victoria Arnedo; and that several tenants on shares lived in their houses built on the leased lands. Victoria Arnedo Cruz testified that she had leased the said two parcels of land, used for the cultivation of rice and sugar cane; that in the barrio of Frances there were houses, about fifteen or twenty in number, built on the lots which adjoined the lands of Gregoria Arnedo Cruz, some of which lots are situate on the bank of the river; that in the contract of lease executed by the witness and the applicants' mother, the said lots are not included, for the land leased by the former only extended to the fences of the said lots, and this she also had been told by Teodoro Tiongson, the preceding lessee, who himself had been so informed by the owner of the lands, the applicants' mother; that witness did not know whether the latter, during her lifetime, collected rent for the said lots, for witness, as lessee, did not collect such rent for them; that she did not believe that these lots were comprised within the lands leased by her, and, finally, that some of them, occupied by residents of that barrio, formed a

part of the land owned by her, adjacent to the lands of the applicants, while others were a part of the lands of the latter. From the f oregoing testimony it is concluded that, in the successive leases of the said two parcels of land, there were not included lots which appear to have been occupied by various residents of the locality, apparently the opponents, and, inasmuch as the latter were long prior to 1882 in material possession of the lots which they occupied, without having made any acknowledgment of the applicants' alleged ownership, nor of that of their predecessor in interest; and, further, since there is no evidence to show how and in what manner the opponents and their predecessors in interest began to occupy the lots in question and that they entered upon the same through the tolerance of their alleged owners, and also that the said lots f ormed a part of the two parcels of land sought to be registered, it would be improper to hold that the disputed lots should be included in the registration. As for all other aspects of the case, let it be borne in mind that by abandonment, negligence or carelessness, owners provided with the most perfect titles may be deprived and dispossessed of their properties by usurpers who, by the lapse of the time specified by law, acquire the same by prescription, (Arts. 1930 and 1959, Civil Code.) Civil possession, according to article 430 of the same code, is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right, together with the intention of acquiring ownership of the thing or right. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein, he must be protected or possession must be restored to him by the means established in the laws of procedure. (Art. 446, Civil Code.) The record in this case does not show, by decisive and conclusive proof, that the lots of the opponents are comprised within the lands of the applicants, and that the opponents are and have been in possession of the lots in question, unduly or precariously, by tolerance of their legitimate owners, for a less time than that required by statute for prescription, and without any good right. Therefore the registration of the two parcels of land, the subject matter of the application, is deemed proper, with the exclusion of the lots or portions of land owned by the opponents. For the reasons aforesaid, and with the modification specified, the judgment appealed from is affirmed; but before completing the inscription and registration of the said parcels of land in the name of the applicants, with the exclusion of the portions of land owned by the opponents, a correct survey, which must be duly approved, shall be made of the said properties, and a plan shall be drawn, f or the purpose of the issuance of the proper title in accordance with the law. No special finding is made as to the costs. So ordered. 93. .

ESTIVA VS. ALVERO

CEFERINO ESTIVA Y ANISTA, petitioner and appellant, vs. MARTIN ALVERO, JOSEFA ILAGAN and ALBERTO C. RAMOS, objectors and appellees., 37 Phil. 497 , January 28, 1918 Case Title : CEFERINO ESTIVA Y ANISTA, petitioner and appellant, vs. MARTIN ALVERO, JOSEFA ILAGAN and ALBERTO C. RAMOS, objectors and appellees.Case Nature : APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. Concepcion, J. Docket Number: No. 11887

Counsel: Roberto Moreno, Pedro Guevara, Pedro de Leon Ponente: AVANCEÑA Dispositive Portion: For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned by the appellant to the judgment of the court below have been refuted, we affirm the judgment appealed from in so far as it sets aside the judgment of November 19, 1914, as amended by the order of April 10, 1915, and in so far as it decrees the registration of the parcel D mentioned in the application, in the name of Ceferino Estiva, with the statement that this property is sold under right of repurchase to Martin Alvero and Josefa Ilagan. The costs of this appeal are taxed against the appellant. So ordered. [No. 11887. January 28, 1918.] CEFERINO ESTIVA Y ANISTA, petitioner and appellant,vs. MARTIN ALVERO, JOSEFA ILAGAN and ALBERTO C. RAMOS, objectors and appellees. 1. 1.REGISTRATION OF LAND SOLD WITH RIGHT OF REPURCHASE.—The vendor under covenant of right of repurchase may apply for the registration of his right over the property sold, but, for this purpose he must previously obtain the written consent of the purchasers, and if they refuse to give it, he must set forth in his application the sale with right of repurchase, in order that the same may likewise be recorded in the decree of registration. 1. 2.FRAUDULENT REGISTRATION.—A decree of registration is obtained fraudulently by the vendor with right of repurchase who, without complying with any of the requirements above-stated, applies for and obtains a decree of registration of the property sold.

1. 3.FRAUD.—It is fraud knowingly to omit and conceal an act or a fact which the law requires to be performed or set forth, whenever by such omission and concealment a benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person. 1. 4.PURPOSE OF REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS.—Registration proceedings have for their sole object the registration applied for, and it is improper to make therein any declaration of other rights not connected with said registration. 1. 5.PREFERENCE BETWEEN PURCHASERS OF THE SAME LAND.—When a property has been sold to different persons on different dates, and none of the deeds of sale has been registered, the ownership of the property thus sold belongs to the purchaser who first took possession of the same in good faith.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. Concepcion, J. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Roberto Moreno and Pedro Guevara for appellant. Pedro de Leon for appellees. AVANCEÑA, J.: On November 5, 1913, Ceferino Estiva y Anista applied to the Court of Land Registration for the registration of several parcels of land described in the application, under the letters A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H. On April 14, 1914, he and his wife Petra Fontanilla sold for P3,900, with right of repurchase within a term of six months, to the spouses Alberto C. Ramos and Benita Garin two of the parcels included in the application and designated by the letters C and D. On September 12, 1914, said Ramos and his wife filed an opposition to Estiva's application, in regard to the two parcels of land therein described under letters C and D, alleging that they had purchased them under right of repurchase. In view of this adverse claim Ceferino Estiva, on November 2, 1914, amended his original application by setting forth therein that said two parcels of land were encumbered in favor of Alberto C. Ramos and his wife Benita Garin, as having been purchased by this married couple, under right of repurchase. On November 19, 1914, the Court of Land Registration rendered a decision, decreeing the registration, among other parcels of land, of the one described under the letter D in the application, in the name of Ceferino Estiva, and on April 10, 1915, this decision was amended by setting forth therein that the parcels designated under the letters C and D in the application were sold to Alberto C. Ramos and his wife Benita Garin, under right of repurchase within a term of six months and for the sum of P3,900; and, finally, on the 15th

of the same month of the same year, the decree of registration of this land was issued in accordance with the decision and order aforementioned. On July 1, 1915, Martin Alvero and Josefa Ilagan filed a motion with the land court, asking for a reconsideration of the decree of registration in so far as it referred to the parcel D, and alleging that said parcel had been obtained by fraud, to the prejudice of the said Martin Alvero and Josefa Ilagan. This motion was grounded on the averment that on April 12, 1911, Martin Alvero and Josefa Ilagan purchased this parcel of land from Ceferino Estiva for P1,000, under right of repurchase. Alberto C. Ramos and Benita Garin filed an opposition to this motion. The court held that in fact this parcel was sold by the petitioner Ceferino Estiva, under right of repurchase, to Martin Alvero and his wife Josefa Ilagan, in April, 1911, and therefore, in a decision under date of December 11, 1915, declared that the decree of registration obtained by Ceferino Estiva y Anista of this parcel D, wherein it is stated it was sold under right of repurchase to Alberto C. Ramos and his wife Benita Garin, was fraudulently obtained, and set aside this decision and ordered the registration of this parcel in the name of Ceferino Estiva, with the memorandum that it was sold to Martin Alvero and Josefa Ilagan. The petitioner, Ceferino Estiva y Anista, appealed from that decision of the land court, and in this instance assigns the following errors as having committed by the Court of Land Registration: "First. In holding that the petitioner fraudulently obtained the decree of registration of the parcels of land claimed. "Second. In holding that the instrument Exhibit A of the claimants is a contract of the purchase and sale of said land. "Third. In not specifically holding that the petitioner has a right to redeem the said land at any time on paying the claimants the sum of P1,000." The contract entered into between Ceferino Estiva and the spouses Martin Alvero and Josefa Ilagan, on April 12, 1911, in regard to the parcel D described in the application, contains the following clauses: that Ceferino Estiva sells, cedes, and conveys with right of repurchase to the spouses Alvero and Ilagan the parcel of land described in the contract (which is the same one that is described in the application as Parcel D); that a condition of this sale is that Ceferino Estiva could not make use of his right of redemption until the lapse of one year from the date of the execution of the contract; that, after the lapse of this period of one year, Ceferino Estiva could choose between either repurchasing the land, or allowing the spouses Alvero and Ilagan to continue the possession and enjoyment of the improvements thereon until such time as Ceferino Estiva might make use of his right to repurchase the property for the said sum of P1,000. This contract., according to its terms, is clearly one of sale with right of repurchase. The length of the period of redemption was left at the will of the vendor; but, pursuant to paragraph 2 of article 1508 of the Civil Code, this

period must not exceed ten years. By virtue of the terms of said contract, Martin Alvero and his wife Josefa Ilagan took possession of the property sold and held it in usufruct. Ceferino Estiva made no use of his right of redemption. According to the facts aforestated, when, on November 5, 1913, Ceferino Estiva applied for the registration in the registry of the parcel D he had already, since April 12, 1911, sold this parcel to the spouses Martin Alvero and Josefa Ilagan. Although the law (Act No. 496, section 19, as amended by Act No. 1108, section 6) authorized Ceferino Estiva to apply for the registration of his property right over the parcel D, in his own name, notwithstanding his already having sold the land under right of repurchase, it was, nevertheless necessary that he should first have obtained the written consent of the purchasers Martin Alvero and Josefa Ilagan, and, in case of their refusal to give him such consent, he should have set forth this sale in his application in order that it might have so appeared in the decree of registration. The petitioner, however, did not obtain nor try to obtain that consent, neither did he set forth in his application nor inform the land court that this parcel D, the registration of which he applied for, had been sold under right of repurchase to Martin Alvero and Josefa Ilagan. So that the land court decreed the registration of this parcel in the name of the petitioner, and did not state that Martin Alvero and Josefa Ilagan had a right in this land, by which omission they were prejudiced. The omission and concealment, knowingly, of an act or of a fact which the law requires to be performed or recorded, is fraud, when such omission or concealment secures a benefit to the prejudice of a third person, as occurs in the instant case. The petitioner alleges in his defense that the contract entered into between himself and the spouses Martin Alvero and Josefa Ilagan was not one of purchase and sale with right of repurchase, but merely one of loan with mortgage. This contention is absolutely unfounded. The terms of the contract, herein-above cited in extract, are clear and unequivocal and unquestionably indicate that the intention of the contracting parties was to execute a contract of purchase and sale with right of repurchase. Moreover, the price of the sale, P1,000, appears to be just, considering that the property was sold for P3,900 to the spouses Ramos and Garin, together with the parcel C, which latter is more than three times as large in area as the former. In his defense the petitioner also testified, in respect to this contract, that two years after it was executed, Alvero asked him whether he wished to redeem the land, and that the petitioner replied that he had no money wherewith to do so, but would try to get it in order to effect the redemption; that Alvero then proposed to him that he leave Alvero in possession of the land f or two years more, and at the end of this period Alvero would consider the debt as paid. This statement, as being unlikely, can neither be accepted, Alvero, by reason of the contract, was entitled to the possession of the property, and in fact held it, and it was not necessary for him to offer to the petitioner to cancel thedebt in exchange for

continuing two years longer in the possession of the land, when, at all events, he was possessing it and was entitled' to its possession by virtue of the contract. But, even supposing all this alleged by the petitioner to be true, still would it be imperative to conclude that he obtained the decree of registration of this land by fraud. If, two years after the execution of the contract, he and the spouses Martin Alvero and Josefa Ilagan covenanted that these latter should continue for two years more in possession of the land, and that, at the end of this period, the debt would be cancelled, then the debt could be considered as cancelled only after the lapse of four years from the date of the execution of the instrument, or on April 12, 1915, and during these four years what is called a mortgage on the property would continue in force. Then, in accordance with section 19 of Act No. 496, Ceferino Estiva, only on November 5, 1913, could apply for the registration of this parcel of land, previously obtaining for the purpose the written consent of the mortgage creditors or, if such consent had been denied him, he should have set forth in his application that the property was mortgaged, so that this encumbrance might 'likewise have been recorded in the decree to be issued subsequently. None of these requirements were complied with by the petitioner. The aforestated facts fully justify the conclusion of the trial court that the petitioner, through fraudulent means, obtained the decree of registration of the parcel D, pursuant to the decision of November 19, 1914, later amended by the order of April 10, 1915. The said parcel of land D, mentioned in the application, having been sold first to Martin Alvero and his wife Josefa Ilagan, and later to Alberto C. Ramos and his wife Benita Garin, it must be determined, in accordance with article 1473 of the Civil Code, which of these two married couples is entitled to pref ference. As neither of the two deeds was recorded, but as Martin Alvero and Josefa Ilagan took possession of the property in good faith immediately after it was sold, its ownership belongs to them. Therefore, the judgment appealed from the lower court, decreeing the registration of the parcel D in the application, in the name of Ceferino Estiva, with the statement that the property is sold under right of repurchase to Martin Alvero and his wife Josefa Ilagan, is in accordance with the law. The petitioner asks, besides, for a specific finding, in any case, that he is entitled to repurchase the property. We do not deem it proper to make such a finding in these proceedings instituted solely for the registration of the property in question, and not for the declaration of other rights. Even without the finding requested the petitioner is perfectly free to make use of any right he may have, derived f from the contract executed by and between himself and the spouses Martin Alvero and Josefa Ilagan. For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned by the appellant to the judgment of the court below have been refuted, we affirm the judgment appealed from in so far as it sets aside the judgment of November 19, 1914,

as amended by the order of April 10, 1915, and in so far as it decrees the registration of the parcel D mentioned in the application, in the name of Ceferino Estiva, with the statement that this property is sold under right of repurchase to Martin Alvero and Josefa Ilagan. The costs of this appeal are taxed against the appellant. So ordered.