Letter From 9/11 Commission Bob Kerrey Complaining About Deal On Pdb Access

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New School University

Bob Kerrty

66 Wost uth Srreer New York NY won 2it.22<).^6 fcua ^13.229.5937 www.newschooJ.edu

February 11,2004 The Honorable Thomas H, Kcan Chairman, 9-11 Commission President Drew University 36 Madison Avenue Madison, NJ 07940 f/ee H. Hamilton Vice-Chairman, 9-11 Commission President and Director Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars Ronald Reagan Building aiid International Trade Center One Woodrow Wilson PlaZa 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, isTW Washington, DC 20004-3027 Dear Tom zind Loe: I read with considerable concern the press accounts of the February 10 meeting of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (9-11 Commission), which, I presume, are largely the result of reading the joint statement you made. My concern centers on a simple but uncomfortable truth: I do not agree with your characterization of the agreement you reached with the White House on the question of Presidential Daily Briefs, or PDBs, I simply do not believe that this "agreement has enabled the Commission Review Team to report back to the full Commission on all PDBs of critical importance to the Commission's work." Not only do T not agree with this statement, T strongly disagree with it. Had I been a member of tha Commission when the original agreement was put together with the White House, I would have objected because my experience with document analysis is that we all read a little differently. While it is true that a careful reading will result in both you and I seeing things we regard as significant, it is also true that something will stand out to you that f miss and vico versa, The value of having all Commissioners read the PDIis is that collectively wo are much more likely to take notice of the fads we need to get the rull and complete accounting the law requires of us. New School Uinver.nl Eiltdnr UnjJ CoU«a» T|l» No* iMiool

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As a. member of the Commission,, I trusted that the Commission Review Team which did work long hours and did superb work- would be given "wide latitude" in reporting back to the full Commission, Not only were they not given "wide latitude" as the White House promised, but also they were given very restrictive instructions on what their report could contain, As a consequence, the report is confusing and incomplete, and does not give all ten of us what we need to make informed decisions. This is ail the more important because even in its intentionally confusing state, the report of PDBs brought back Lo the Commission discloses key facts that I consider to be enormously important in several ways. These facts will affect who we invite as witnesses as well as the details of the questions we will ask them, hi fact it must be clear to most Commissioners from our brief reading of the summary that we will need to recall some who have previously testified. To be clear I am not interested in just those PDBs that were delivered to President Bush. The period of time which is of greatest interest to me is from February 1998. when Osama bin Laden issued a Fatwa against the United States, through September 11,2001. For much of this period I was vice-chairman of the Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence and have an active memory of what T was told and knew at the time. For rne it is all the more reason that I feel I must be given the opportunity to read tbe PDBs myself, That is why I voted to subpoena these documents. That is why I believe the White House's unwillingness to allow our review team "wide latitude" in preparing their report has compromised my ability to get a full and complete accounting. And that is why I will continue to argue that we must be given this access In order to do our work according to the letter and spirit of the law. I respect you and your efforts to produce consensus on this Commission, If anyone can do it, it is you, Regretfully, in this case it was not and is not possible. There is one more item in your joint press release to which I object. While it is true that die team "reviewed all... (of the) ,.. PDBs responsive to the Commission's document requests," and that "this access to PDBg is unprecedented," the statement is misleading. Tl misleads because observers of our work will mistakenly conclude that the review we were given was adequate for our work. Those who voted against the subpoena presumably believe it was; those of us who voted in the affirmative do not. It also misleads because the "unprecedented" access signals a heroic effort on the part of the White House, a presumption that I do not accept. This is aa unprecedented commission investigating an unprecedented incident, liven the President uses this rationale to ask Americans to do tilings to which they are Unaccustomed. Further, by allowing Commissioners some access, they have

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already broken the veil of executive privilege., making Their legal and political case against further access quite weak. A much more accurate statement would have been that this was the best we were going to get and that we feared that litigation for access would take so long we might not be able to finish on time. Indeed these were rhe arguments 1 heard on February 10 in support of a negative vole 011 the question of using our subpoena powers to get this access. Finally, while you "are confident that the Commission lias obtained an account of all PDBs that relate to the al Qaeda threat and the events of September 11," and "are confident that we can prepare a strong and credible report," 1 hold no such confidence, I fear the opposite: that our lack of access to the PDBs will compromise our ability to prepare a strong and credible report. I hope that at the end of mis process I will be able to look back on this incident and say that you were right and I was wrong. If that happens, it won't be my first such apology. I also hope that you do not conclude That my confidence in and respect for you has been shaken. Both have survived this disagreement. Respectfully yours,

Kerrey

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