Investment Research General Market Conditions
6 October 2009
Latvia - Escalation of crisis Non-recourse loans in Latvia? THE STATEMENTS IN THIS TEXT ARE SUBJECT TO CONSIDERABLE UNCERTAINTY DUE TO THE UNCLEAR INFORMATION SITUATION. According to several news agencies the Latvian prime minister has asked his legal experts to bring forward a bill that will limit mortgage lenders’ liability to the value of the collateral – not the size of the loan. As far as we can tell, there are indications that the proposal will apply to prime residence loans only; second homes and buy-to-let properties would thus not be covered if this is correct. These make up some 50% of all mortgage loans. However, the Latvian newspaper Diena today states that the law would apply to all existing loans without closer specification, so the situation is unclear. Any legal bill will probably take a few months to draught; however, a law to the effect implied here can be made to be applied retroactively. This will for all practical reasons be a non-recourse model, where mortgage borrowers can hand in the keys to the bank, and not be liable for anything.
Todays key points The tensions between Latvia and their lenders have reached a new level. There is news out that the Latvian Prime Minister may propose draconian legal measures that will have large ramifications for foreign banks in Latvia The proposal as it stands also implies a removal of a major obstacle for the Latvians to devalue their currency
According to the article, the purpose is to stop lenders (=banks) to make claims on borrowers’ other assets, if a sale of the collateral cannot cover the loan. Furthermore, the legal experts are asked to come up with a proposal, where a bank that repossesses a house is liable to provide the family with somewhere else to live, and the new place should be accepted by the borrower => this could mean that if a bank repossesses a 150sqm home it has to offer the previous owner another home – however, this does not have to be the same size, and the borrower can reject the home, thereby prolonging the situation. According to the spokesman of the Prime Minister these steps have been taken on the back of the current situation on the financial markets and borrowers’ increasing problems to service their loans. Where does this leave the banks active in Latvia? In a very bad position. With property prices down some 70% from the peak, it must be tempting to stop paying mortgage loans for borrowers with negative equity, which applies to the majority of mortgage borrowers in Latvia today. The major advantage from the Latvian government’s point of view is that devaluation will no longer pose a big problem! The major obstacle has been the fact that loans are made out in EUR, but collateral has been in LVL, and thus a devaluation would make loans increase substantially relative to the value of the collateral (i.e. real estate). This issue would be removed since the value of loans can never exceed the value of the LVL-denominated collateral, and all mortgage loans implicitly would be in LVL. Senior Analyst Pär Magnusson +45 45 12 85 15
[email protected] Senior Analyst Per Grønborg +45 45 12 80 51
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Latvia - Escalation of crisis
Why is this proposal flashed now? Maybe it should be viewed as a bargaining chip in the light of the increased pressure from both IMF and the Swedish government on the Latvian government to deliver on the terms agreed upon with the IMF and EU funding. Conclusion: This proposal could be a part of the political bargaining with IMF/EU. Everything might be solved overnight if a compromise can be reached, but the risk premium on Latvian banking business is sky-rocketing at the moment. The ramifications of this proposal lest 50% or more of all mortgage loans are covered by the proposal could be very severe for especially Swedbank and SEB. EUR/SEK is no doubt vulnerable to this growing tension, as is the mortgage bond spreads of especially Spintab bonds.
Latvian lending book (Q209A) Swedbank: SEK 61bn – of which SEK 29.5bn to private customers SEB: SEK46bn – of which SEK11bn is household mortgages Nordea: EUR3.1bn Danske Bank: 1.4% market share in Latvia – approx. DKK3bn DnB Nor: NOK 22.5bn of which 49% is at the risk of Nord LB.
Source: Danske Markets
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Latvia - Escalation of crisis
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