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Question 13: Why has the United States found it difficult to terminate the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq? Introduction After more than 17 years of fighting what began as limited wars with limited political objectives in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the U.S. invasion in Iraq, the United States still finds itself deeply entrenched in a protracted war on insurgency compounded by the difficulties of nation-building in Afghanistan and Iraq. To date, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are the longest running and most complex wars ever fought since the inception of the United States, spanning three presidential administrations -- wars neither of which the Commander in Chief, the American public nor her allies can afford to lose. The United States has found it difficult to terminate the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq for several reasons. First, the United States has consistently failed to understand the cultural and ideological differences that have further complicated their political objectives. Second, the United States lacks ed war termination strategies in both conflicts, which has left the U.S. without politically legitimate options to terminate either war. Lastly, mission creep has gradually escalated the U.S.’ involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, resulting in a more complex situation than what had been anticipated. The United States’ Failure to Understand the Culture that Drives Societies in Conflict From the outset of both conflicts, United States-led coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq were based on the concept of a purely two-sided engagement—the respective government versus the insurgentsthe United States against an identified enemy. The reality in both cases turned out to be much more complex. Ethnic, political, religious, institutional, and cultural differences have created multiple sides to both conflicts. The shifting alliances between the various ethnic, religious, cultural, and kinship factions haves led to a situation in which the

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nominal national governments have very little control or influence beyond their respective capitoals. The coalition’s failure to understand these underlying factors dramatically reduced the effectiveness of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts because the coalition failed to establish political structures appropriate for each nation. ; Aas a result, its efforts to achieve one of its political objectivees to respectively establish legitimate, democratic governments were have been significantly hindered.

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Understanding the impact of these issues requires a significant amount

of effort during the initial phase of war planning. Failure to do so, as evidenced in the protracted conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, often results in outsiders (i.e., the United States) pursuing actions that magnify the underlying problems, rather than reducing them. FurtherAdditionally, even the most well-intentioned actions and/or decisions taken without a full understanding the of the complex intricate interrelationships that exist amongst the various sectarian factions often leaad to unforeseen and counterproductive consequenceses.

The US United States did a poor net assessment when planning for the things that mattered most to Afghans; Islam and land. Building programs and projects took the place of mobilizing the Afghanis to fight. The western attempts to build a government were not effective in bonding Afghanistan’s dissimilar groups which gave legitimacy to the Taliban and resulted in more conflict and no peace negotiations. 1 Dissimilar iIdeology complicatesmakes war termination even more complicated because neither side can gain a decisive advantage off the battlefield that would force the other side to negotiate some of its principles. Sunnis backed by Al-Qaeda and Shiites that lead the

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Carter Malkasian, War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier(New York,Oxford, 2013), 156

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government have deep ideological clashes and are a contributor to the US inability to terminate the conflict in Iraq. . The United States did not realize the depth of the fault lines in Iraqi society -- between Kurds and Arabs, Sunnis and Shiites, and the members of different tribes and local religious groups. These tensions were contained during four centuries of Ottoman rule, and the British, who took over from the Ottomans in 1920, put Iraq under strong Sunni control, centered on Baghdad. Now, because of the destruction of the old Iraqi society, for the first time in centuries, power is in the hands of the Iraqi Shiites. Sectarian violence was a real threat, but especially so in Iraq, which had long been under control by the Sunni Ba’athists. 2 Neither side is willing to compromise its ideologic principles in order to reach a negotiated settlement to terminate the conflicts. As Sun Tzu stated, “In a hundred battles, you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.”.2 Iraq There was no Iraqi equivalent of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan. An international conference to legitimize an appointed government, as the UN-sponsored Bonn Conference did with Afghanistan, would have been very difficult to organize in the prevailing international climate. Many Iraqis were wary of a rapid turnover becoming Ba’athism without Saddam. Others worried about Shi’ite domination. The Kurds worried about both of these scenarios and also kept one eye on Turkey.39 In a similar vein, the few hundred Iraqi National Congress exiles, led by

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Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. Ed. Samuel B. Griffith. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

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Ahmed Chalabi, were not well or widely employed and accomplished little when they were brought into theater to help put an Iraqi face on coalition efforts. For better or for worse, the United States toppled Saddam’s toxic, vile regime but has yet to be able to replace it with a stable entity.

An Irregular Complicated War Focused Complicated by on Non-State Actors The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are were the first in U.S. history to target non-state actors, causing difficulty in setting coherent and effective strategic goals to end the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Between 2001-2016, Jihad group participation s rose from 20 to 70 groups that add to the Rred Teteam’s adversaries.3 (Kadedcan lecture). These groups place the US in uncharted territory as to who to engage and not engage in order to not overextend themselves. (Genest lecture) Throughout the era of the United States’ occupation in Afghanistan, corruption has significantly undermined its political objectives in Afghanistan by destroying the legitimacy of the Afghan government by strengthening popular support for the insurgency, in turn re-routing material resources to insurgent groups. The U.S. continues to struggle with corruption at all levels of the government, some of which the U.S. finds its lines of accounting re-routed to the causes of insurgent groups. Lack of public legitimacy in government has bred insurgency, bribery, fraud, and extortion as well as empowered the local warlords and their militias.

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Professor Kadercan Lecture to Naval War College, RI: “GWOT in Iraq: When Global Becomes Local”, February 8, 2019.

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Afghanistan’s nominal national government has little influence or control outside of Kabul which has allowed the Taliban and other groups to establish local power bases (fiefdoms, if you will), which are in direct conflict with the government in Kabul. If the US coalition were to withdraw under these conditions, Afghanistan would very likely be put on death ground and become a failed state, and once again become a safe-haven for terrorist groups seeking to attack the US. In order to avoid this outcome, the US must find solutions to help the government in Kabul to develop the capacity to effectively govern the entire country. There are no quick solutions or short cuts to nation building, and the process requires tremendous national resolve and patience. The war in Iraq has seen two failed war termination efforts, in 2003 and again in 2009201141(Kadedcan lecture). Both failed efforts were due to a rise or restructure of an insurgency. General Petraeus was able to make some great success in 2007-2008, but advised the next administration to place policy and diplomacy measures in place for a goal to get to peaceful operations.5 (Tell Me How This Ends PG 350) The caliphate comeback in 2011, made worse by

Commented [DA1]: What about in 2003? What happened then?

civil war in Syria, gave birth to ISIS, yet another non-state actor in the conflict. ISIS is

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attempting to build a nation-state in what is now Iraq and Syria. U.S. Military Mission Creep in Afghanistan and Iraq As demonstrated in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States missed prime opportunities following its initial invasion in both countries to replace each government with

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Professor Kadercan Lecture to Naval War College, RI: “GWOT in Iraq: When Global Becomes Local”, February 8, 2019. 5

Robinson, Linda. Tell Me How This War Ends, New York: Public Affairs Books, 2008. p. 350.

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Formatted: Highlight Formatted: Highlight Commented [DA2]: What you have under this point – Mission Creep – is the same as your point 3 below. Are you still writing the mission creep section? Formatted: Not Highlight Formatted: Not Highlight Formatted: Not Highlight

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legitimate interim nation authorities, thereby minimizing any prospects of public perception of the conflict as U.S. occupation and instead, as U.S. liberation, which could have significantly increased stability in the region from the very beginning. Analogous with the importance in the medical field’s “golden hour” following a traumatic injury, the U.S. similarly missed its “golden opportunities” to take action6, which have consequently resulted in significant complications that still continue to inhibit U.S. war termination efforts to this day. As a result, the wars have interminably dragged on with significant mission creep. In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States went to war in Afghanistan since the loosely governed nation provided a strategic safe haven for al-Qaeda, who was reportedly responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Little did the U.S. know at the time, the original war against al-Qaeda was about to quickly morph into a war against the Taliban, where the United States found herself on a mission fighting a non-state actor who found safe haven in neighboring Pakistan, a supposed ally in the region. Meanwhile as the war continued, violent extremist organizations’ activity metastasized into a complicated, unconventional web of terrorist cells that still now, more than ever, span several continents, countries, religions, and ideologies all with the same common frustration – anger in response to the U.S. for killing Muslims in their own holy lands. What began as a seemingly limited reactionary response to replace the government of Afghanistan aimed at protecting its population under the pretenses of “peacekeeping” and “nation building” turned into a full-scale aggressive warfighting strategy that sought to inflict mass casualties on the Taliban.7 During the Obama Administration, the government of Kabul gained significant ground, but decreasing U.S. presence was not

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Barfield, Thomas. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010. Robinson, Linda. Tell Me How This War Ends, New York: Public Affairs Books, 2008.

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sustainable and Afghan governance failed yet again, leaving the Afghan Security Forces to bear the brunt of the fighting at the mercy of the Taliban. To further complicate matters in Afghanistan, the U.S. became and continues to be deeply involved in the ever-ominous war on two on fronts, in Iraq and Afghanistan. As history tends to repeat itself, the U.S.’ war on two fronts has resulted in less focused energy in either of its political objectives across both conflicts.

Iraq As former President George H.W. Bush and his National Security Advisor, Brent Snowcroft, later wrote in their reflections after the first Gulf War, “Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guidelines about not changing objectives in midstream, engaging in “mission creep,” and would have incurred incalculable human and political costs…We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad, and in effect, rule Iraq…Under those circumstances, there was no viable “exit strategy” we could see.”8 The former President’s assessment could not be more accurate. --As a result, and a combination of not understanding the cultural issues in the Middle Eeast region, and not having a clear strategic aim, the US was forced to improvise as it went along – and created new goals (and new missions) as the conflicts progressed. 43 Previous RAND research showed that insurgencies last approximately ten years, and that full success often takes another six years to achieve. Complex insurgencies last even longer, and conditions

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Bush, George and Snowcroft, Brent. A World Transformed. New York: Vintage Books, 2011.

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in insurgent warfare are highly dynamic.44 IS is one of the most complex and dynamic insurgencies the U.S. has ever faced. While these analyses are not predictive, they do suggest the kind of timelines for the IS campaign already envisioned by some U.S. military leaders: at least 10-20 years.45 Therefore, it would be more useful to envision a long-term state rather than to declare a fixed path towards an end that most likely cannot and will not be achieved.

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Iraq In order to defend what gains have been made in Iraq, the US has been drawn into conflict with ISIS and became involved in the Syrian civil war. Although ISIS has been driven out of its strongholds and considerably weakened, the US has been unable to withdraw from the conflict because of lack of resolution in this never-ending war. The caliphate comeback in 2011 and made worse by the Syria civil war has given birth to ISIS that is looking to build a nation-state

Commented [DA3]: I’m guessing here – I really don’t know except what I read…but I think that you can finish this up. Formatted: Highlight

which make conflict resolution extremely difficult because it intends to occupy Iraq and Syria which threatens to overthrow the Iraqi government and undo US presence in Iraq also allows the access to neighboring countries Afghanistan is too weak and the US were the ones that formed that to sustain and US is concerned with Who do you back to get rid of “the Armed group of the day or state of the day.” You will always have inevitable tradeoffs when on someone else’s soil. How far to go with training them as they can pop up later on and become a threat. Part of it is that it’s hard to end conflict when dealing with non-state actors that have a high value object. (Dew lecture) Counter-Argument 8

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Some may argue that the United States finds it difficult to terminate the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq due to the potential significant and negative lasting effects on domestic opinion and international legitimacy of U.S. military operations if clear victories are not achieved. If the United States were to terminate the wars immediately – the people of Afghanistan and Iraq, along with U.S. and coalition veterans and Gold Star families would be left with an unfillable void, wondering — “All that gave all, gave all for what?” Domestic and international opinion is so critical and sacred to the preservation of the legitimacy of U.S. military operations that within the span of these two conflicts -- three Commanders of Chief; seven sitting and Acting Secretaries of Defense; six Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and countless U.S. and Allied Commanders have yet to figure out how to terminate the war on legitimate and justifiable terms, as seen through the war-tainted lenses of the public and world at large. Rebuttal It is true that the United States finds it difficult to terminate the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq due to its mission in preserving the sacredness of domestic opinion and its effects on international legitimacy. However, after almost two decades of fighting these limited regional wars with limited objectives, the United States has become politically estranged not only from the global powers she went to total world war with twice in the past century against a bonafide threat, but also the very nation states she initially sought to rebuild in the aftermath of the respective Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts. Public opinion and legitimacy have certainly complicated war termination across these two cases, but as with any limited regional war and especially ones of unprecedented lengths, one can conclude that the sanctity of public opinion and legitimacy will inevitably erode as time progresses. The United States’ true underlying 9

difficulties in terminating the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are attributed to the U.S.’ lack of understanding the effects of cultural and ideological differences amongst her and her enemies and further, collectively integrating those lessons learned into overarching political strategy and military operations; her failure to establish measurable war termination goals at the outset of each conflict; and her inexplicable oversight in failing to continuously reassess and synchronize legitimate political and military objectives to avoid the inherent protraction of war due to mission creep. Conclusion The historically complex and seemingly never-ending conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq provide invaluable insight into the difficulties of war termination. As demonstrated across these two case studies, irregular warfare against a hybrid combination of regionally entangled nation states and non-state actors will only continue to develop and evolve in the foreseeable future. Circumstances of future conflicts will inevitably vary, but U.S. lawmakers and military strategists should at the very least, take the lessons learned from these cases into consideration when planning and managing the political objectives and termination of war. Instead of seeking a rigid “desired end state” which implies a timeline or fixed end condition, the United States should focus its national and military efforts on achieving an “envisioned state” – a more realistic and contemporary approach to unconventional war termination with modest, phased, achievable, and culturally sound objectives.

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