AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND TRUSTS DIGESTS (2013 – 2014) G.R. No. 75875 December 15, 1989 WOLRGANG AURBACH, JOHN GRIFFIN, DAVID P. WHITTINGHAM and CHARLES CHAMSAY, petitioners, vs. SANITARY WARES MANUFACTURING CORPORATOIN, ERNESTO V. LAGDAMEO, ERNESTO R. LAGDAMEO, JR., ENRIQUE R. LAGDAMEO, GEORGE F. LEE, RAUL A. BONCAN, BALDWIN YOUNG and AVELINO V. CRUZ, respondents. G.R. No. 75951 December 15, 1989 SANITARY WARES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, ERNESTO R. LAGDAMEO, ENRIQUE B. LAGDAMEO, GEORGE FL .EE RAUL A. BONCAN, BALDWIN YOUNG and AVELINO V. CRUX, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, WOLFGANG AURBACH, JOHN GRIFFIN, DAVID P. WHITTINGHAM, CHARLES CHAMSAY and LUCIANO SALAZAR, respondents. G.R. Nos. 75975-‐76 December 15, 1989 LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. SANITARY WARES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, ERNESTO V. LAGDAMEO, ERNESTO R. LAGDAMEO, JR., ENRIQUE R. LAGDAMEO, GEORGE F. LEE, RAUL A. BONCAN, BALDWIN YOUNG, AVELINO V. CRUZ and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. CASE: Sanitary Wares Manufacturing Corporation was established by an agreement between American Standard Inc. (ASI) and a group of Philippine Investors. Section 3(a) of their Agreement provides for cumulative voting of the directors. Section 5(a) provides that ASI will designate 3 directors, and the Philippine Investors will designate 6 directors. In light of their minority status, the ASI asked for provisions to protect them as a minority group. Later, the ASI shares increased from 30% to 40%.
ATTY. JOAQUIN OBIETA
At the annual stockholders meeting in 1983, disagreement arose after two directors nominated for the Philippine Investors were struck out since 6 were already voted for. ASI then claimed that since they had 40% of shares, their cumulative voting power allowed to them vote for a 4th director, and thus supported Chamsay who was one of the 2 names struck out. This was denied by Chairman Young who then adjourned the meeting. ASI, along with Luciano Salazar and other Philippine Investors (whose total shares were equivalent to 53-‐54%) voted for 5 directors (4 by ASI and Salazar) in a meeting held by the elevator lobby. This consists of three petitions consolidated and tried together. Both the Lagdameo group (those who were voted DURING the stockholders meeting) and Salazar’s group (those who were voted at the elevator lobby meeting). The Supreme Court ruled that the Lagdameo group were duly elected board of directors, and said that since the Agreement clearly states the manner of voting for directors, ASI cannot claim to have the power to designate 4 directors when they were only allowed 3. The ASI cannot claim that cumulative voting should be applied due to their corporate character, because Saniwares is clearly a joint venture and not an ordinary corporation. As such, the cumulative voting rule of Section 3(a) is applicable only within the group (e.g. amongst the Philippine Investors choosing their 6 members), and not amongst both groups. To rule otherwise would be to allow the ASI to circumvent their minority status, which the parties had agreed on. BACKGROUND: ! 1961 ! Saniwares, a domestic corporation was incorporated to manufacture and market sanitary wares. One of the incorporators, Mr. Baldwin Young, went abroad in search of foreign partners to help in expansion. ! August 15, 1962 ! American Standard Inc. (ASI) entered an agreement with Saniwares and some Filipino investors whereby ASI and the Filipino investors agreed to participate in the ownership of Sanitary Wares Manufacturing Corporation which would engage primarily in the business of manufacturing in the
RACHELLE ANNE GUTIERREZ
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND TRUSTS DIGESTS (2013 – 2014) Philippines and selling here and abroad vitreous china and sanitary wares. o Section 3(a) (Article of Incorporation) of their Agreement provides for cumulative voting for directors. o Section 5(a) (Management) provides that the Board of Directors will be composed of 3 members designated by ASI and 6 members designated by other stockholders. ! At the request of ASI, the agreement contained provisions designated to protect it as a minority group, such as: o Veto power over a number of corporate acts o Right to designate certain officers such as a member of the Executive Committee whose vote was required for important corporate transactions. ! Later the 30% shares of ASI was increased to 40%. “Deterioration of the initially harmonious relations” begins… • March 8, 1983 ! the annual stockholder’s meeting was held and presided by Chairman Baldwin Young. o ASI group nominated: Wolfgang Aurbach, John Griffin and David P. Whittingham o Philippine investors group nominated: Ernesto Lagdameo, Sr., Raul Boncan, Ernesto Lagdameo, Jr., Enrique Lagdameo, George F. Lee, and Baldwin Young. • THEN Eduardo Ceniza nominated Luciano E. Salazar, who in turn nominated Charles Chamsay. These two were struck down by Baldwin Young on the basis of Section 5(a) of the Agreement, resulting in protests and heated arguments. • Chairman Young then instructed the Corporate Secretary to cast all the votes present and represented by proxy equally for the 6 nominees of the Philippine Investors and the 3 nominees of ASI • ASI representative, Mr. Jaqua, protested and said that all the ASI shares were being cumulatively voted for the 3 ASI nominees AND Charles Chamsay. Luciano E. Salazar and other proxy holders said that all their votes (according to their shares) were being voted cumulatively in favor of Luciano E. Salazar • Nevertheless, Chairman Young stuck to his first instruction.
ATTY. JOAQUIN OBIETA
After the meeting was adjourned under protest, The ASI group, Luciano E. Salazar and other stockholders allegedly representing 53-‐54% of Saniware shared continued the meeting at the elevator lobby where (on the basis of the cumulative votes case in the earlier meeting) ASI voted its four nominees; Wolfgang Aurbach, John Griffin, David Whittingham and Charles Chamsay. Luciano E. Salazar voted for himself, thus the said five directors were certified as elected directors by the Acting Secretary, Andres Gatmaitan, with the explanation that there was a tie among the other 6 nominees for the 4 remaining positions of directors and that the body decided not to break the tie. Petition in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) • Two petitions were filed in the SEC by two groups claiming to be legitimate directors of the corporation: o Preliminary Injunction ! Saniwares, Emesto V. Lagdameo, Baldwin Young, Raul A. Bonean Ernesto R. Lagdameo, Jr., Enrique Lagdameo and George F. Lee against Luciano Salazar and Charles Chamsay o Quo warranto and application for receivership ! Wolfgang Aurbach, John Griffin, David Whittingham, Luciano E. Salazar and Charles Chamsay against the group of Young and Lagdameo and Avelino F. Cruz • The two petitions were consolidated and tried jointly by a hearing officer who upheld the election of the Lagdameo group. • SEC en banc affirmed. Intermediate Appellate Court • Two separate appeals were filed. • The Court ordered the case remanded to SEC with the directive that a new stockholders' meeting of Saniwares be ordered convoked as soon as possible, under the supervision of the Commission. Court of Appeals • Lagdameo Group filed for a motion of reconsideration, • Court of Appeas upheld the election of the respondents (Lagdameo group). •
RACHELLE ANNE GUTIERREZ
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND TRUSTS DIGESTS (2013 – 2014) •
Petitioners now question this decision adding that: o The CA prohibits the stockholders from exercising their full voting rights as represented by the number of shares in Saniwares, thus depriving petitioners and the corporation they represent of their property rights without due process of law. o The CA imposes conditions and reads provisions into the agreement of the parties which were not there, which action it cannot legally do.
ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED: 1. Whether or not the Lagdameo group was duly elected as directors of Saniwares for the year 1983 during the March 8, 1983 annual stockholders meeting. a. Whether or not the nature of the business was a joint venture or a corporation b. Whether or not the ASI Group may vote their additional 10% equity during elections of Saniwares. RESOLUTIONS AND ARGUMENTS ISSUE 1 ! Whether or not the Lagdameo group was duly elected as directors of Saniwares for the year 1983 during the March 8, 1983 annual stockholders meeting. ! YES. The Court uphold their election as board of directors of Saniwards for 1983. Major Point 1: Whether or not the nature of the business was a joint venture or a corporation ! Saniwares is a joint venture as proven by the presence of two distinct stockholder groups, and as evidenced by contracts of the parties. • The rule is that whether the parties to a particular contract have thereby established among themselves a joint venture or some other relation depends upon their actual intention which is determined in accordance with the rules governing the interpretation and construction of contracts.
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ATTY. JOAQUIN OBIETA
Personal Note: In this case, they held the acts of the parties are indicators of their intentions. o The provisions of the Agreement does not preclude the existence of two distinct groups of stockholders: ASI as the minority and the Philippine Investors as the majority. o As the SEC Hearing Officer held: Joint venture corporations often contain provisions which do one or more of the following: (1) require greater than majority vote for shareholder and director action; (2) give certain shareholders or groups of shareholders power to select a specified number of directors; (3) give to the shareholders control over the selection and retention of employees; and (4) set up a procedure for the settlement of disputes by arbitration. In an action at law, where there is evidence tending to prove that the parties joined their efforts in furtherance of an enterprise for their joint profit, the question whether they intended by their agreement to create a joint adventure, or to assume some other relation is a question of fact for the jury. o An examination of important provisions of the Agreement as well as the testimonial evidence presented by the Lagdameo and Young Group shows that the parties agreed to establish a joint venture and not a corporation. The history of the organization of Saniwares and the unusual arrangements which govern its policy making body are all consistent with a joint venture and not with an ordinary corporation. (See third bullet in “Background) o Moreover, ASI in its communications referred to the enterprise as a joint venture. o Side Note: Baldwin Young testified that Section 16(c)1 of the Agreement that "Nothing herein contained shall be
1
Section 16(c) – Miscellaneous Provisions x x x
RACHELLE ANNE GUTIERREZ
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND TRUSTS DIGESTS (2013 – 2014) construed to constitute any of the parties hereto partners or joint venturers in respect of any transaction hereunder" was merely to obviate the possibility of the enterprise being treated as partnership for tax purposes and liabilities to third parties. Major Point 2: Whether or not the ASI Group may vote their additional 10% equity during elections of Saniwares. ! NO. The extent of ASI’s participation in the management of the corporation is spelled out in the Agreement. They cannot be allowed to interfere under the guise of cumulative voting, for to allow the ASI Group to vote their additional equity to help elect even a Filipino director (who would then be beholden to them) would obliterate their minority status, which had been agreed upon by the parties. • Having entered into a well-‐defined contractual relationship, it is imperative that the parties should honor and adhere to their respective rights and obligations thereunder. • On the one hand, the clearly established minority position of ASI and the contractual allocation of board seats Cannot be disregarded. On the other hand, the rights of the stockholders to cumulative voting should also be protected. • In order to unite the two in this case, if the Filipino stockholders cannot agree who their six nominees will be, a vote would have to be taken among the Filipino stockholders only. During this voting, each Filipino stockholder can cumulate his votes. ASI, however, should not be allowed to interfere in the voting within the Filipino group. Otherwise, ASI would be able to designate more than the three directors it is allowed to designate under the Agreement, and may even be able to get a majority of the board seats, a result which is clearly contrary to the contractual intent of the parties.
ATTY. JOAQUIN OBIETA
FINAL VERDICT: The foreign group, ASI, was limited to designate three directors. This is the allowable participation of the ASI Group. Hence, in future dealings, this limitation of six to three board seats should always be maintained as long as the joint venture agreement exists considering that in limiting 3 board seats in the 9-‐man board of directors there are provisions already agreed upon and embodied in the parties' Agreement to protect the interests arising from the minority status of the foreign investors. NO SEPARATE OPINIONS
c) nothing herein contained shall be construed to constitute any of the parties hereto partners or joint venturers in respect of any transaction hereunder.
RACHELLE ANNE GUTIERREZ