Krebs, Harry D - The Religious Thought Of Nishitani Keiji -thesis.pdf

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78-12,214 KREBS, Harry D., 1942·

THE RELIGIOUS THOUGHT OF NISHITANI KEIJI.

Temple University, Ph.D., 1978

Re11g1on, philosophy THE RELIGIOUS THOUGHT OF NISHITANI KEIJI

University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Mlchl,an 48106

(C)

Harry D. Krebs

1977

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Harry D. Krebs January 1978

Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

...... ,

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TEMPLE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE BOARD PREFACE . . .

i

INTRODUCTION.

1

I. Tick of DluM4cloft:

THE RELIGIOUS THOUGHT OF NISHITANI KEIJI

THE CONTEXT OF THE INQUIRY: MODERNIZATION, SCIENCE AND MYTH. Modernization. Science. • . . Myth • . • . • •

II .

HARRY D. KREBS

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III.

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23

39

62

THE PARAl1ETERS OF THE INQUIRY: NISHITANI'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF RELIGION • • • . . • . • . Dharma. . . . . . . . . . • • ·

AlichOI':

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Date IUbmittcd to the Graduate

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v. Aca:ptcd by the Graduate Board of Temple degm: of Doctor of Phil0110phy.

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71

71

Religion as the "Middle Path," the "way of negativity". Fields of Reality •. Great Doubt. Sin and Evil • • . Atheism. • . • • • Conclusions . . • •

84 89 101 106 111 115

NISHITANI'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE PERSONAL AND THE IMPERSONAL.

120

Modernity and Science as Impersonal. The Personal in Buddhism and Christianity • . • • • • • Eckhart: r.od as Impersonal • • • • • Man as Personal. • • • • • • . • • •

IV.

23

120 131 136 145

NIHILISM: THE NATURE OF SUBSTANCE IN METAPHYSICS . . • • • • • . •

150

Nihilum as Toward Life or Toward Death Nihi1um as Death-sive-Life • • • . • • . Nihi1um and Substance. . • • • • . • • .

150 168 178

SUNYATA: THE NATURE OF EMPTINESS AND NOTHINGNESS . . . . • .

183

Field and Subject • • • The Field of Emptiness . Emptiness as Self • • •

183 195 203

VI.

SAMSARA:

IN TIME •

... ....

211

History and Definition • Keto . . . . • . . . . Body and Mind. • •

...

VII.

. . .. . .

KARMA: THE NATURE OF LIFE AND DEATH IN HISTORY • , , • , . • • • Western Theories of History •• , , • , Time as Circular • . • • • • . • • The "task-character" and "infinite aperture" of History • . • • • The "infinite impulse" of Modern Man . • Aspects of Time. • . . • . • • • Religious Practice: Compassion,

VIII.

CONCLUSIONS ••

BIBLIOGP~HY,

PREFACE

THE NATURE OF LIFE AND DEATH

••••

.... ....

211 221 227

This dissertation is an attempt to do a critical exposition of the work of Nishitani Keiji relating to the subject of religion.

235 235

We make a fine but vital distinction be-

tween analyzing the thought of Nishitani and less generally,

248

but more to our point, analyzing his specific treatment of

258

religion in terms of its place in the Comparative Study of

267 273

Religions.

2 79

290

313

Historically, our intention is to see the place

of Nishitani's religious thought as a significant part of the development of man's inquiry into the nature of religion and his own situation that is not bound to a particular cultural or civilizational context.

Structurally, the em-

phasis is placed on elucidating and evaluating Nishitani's attempt to assess on his own grounds certain problems in the history of western religious thought and modern scientific thought, and his construction of a view of reality which represents his own synthesis of earlier Buddhist thought-especially that of Madhyamika and Zen.

This is not, then,

so much a philosophy of religion as a critical evaluation of Nishitani's understanding of religion from a comparativist's point of view; it is not our intention to criticize, either, Nishitani as a historian of philosophy, i.e., to correct his interpretation of such as Nietzsche, Kant, Eckhart, etc. whose work he considers in answering the question he poses:

i

who has suffered longest and contributed most is the person

"What is Religion?"

to whom it is dedicated: my wife Jane.

We begin by putting forward the context for this inquiry: describing the arena into which Nishitani's work is thrust and articulating some of our own methodological assumptions.

We show how his analysis of the confrontation

between science and religion sheds light on the human condition and how the human condition, particularly that of modern man, in turn provides the context for realizing the resolution to the problem of what is religion.

We then put

forward the context within which Nishitani's own work must be seen by examining some of the prominent considerations which are presupposed in his own study.

We proceed to give

a critical overview of Nishitani's understanding of religion followed by chapters on the key categories in which he considers different aspects of religion--these amounting to perspectives from which he views the subject of religion. We conclude by assessing the contribution of Nishitani in his own terms and those of western thought. The flaws in this work must remain our own but the writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to the two men who have most profoundly shaped his thinking: Dr. Richard J. DeMartino and Dr. Nishitani Keiji himself.

Dr. DeMartino,

particularly, has waited a long time for this work to come to fruition.

Dr. Nishitani has been particularly helpful in

providing many of the materials as well as the model of argumentation on which this study is based.

ii

The person, though,

II

iii

2

prompted by Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche (especially the latter's too facile comparison of European nihilism with Bud-

INTRODUCTION

dhist emptiness), led him into the study of ethics andreNishitani Keiji was born in 1900 and graduated from the Faculty of Literature of Kyoto Imperial University in 1924.

He was appointed assistant professor of the Univer-

sity in 1935, full Professor of Philosophy there in 1943, retired in 1964 and is currently Professor Emeritus of Religious Philosophy at Otani University. w~s

His first great work

The Philosophy of Fundamental Subjectivity published in

1940.

Other works which followed were: World View and State

View (1941), Studies in Aristotle (1948), God and Absolute Nothingness (1948), Nihilism (1949), Religion and the Social Problems of Modern Times (1951), and, perhaps his most important publication, What is Religion? (1956). strongest influence on Nishitani's under Nishida Kitaro.

Perhaps the

work has been his work

Other major influences were his at-

ligion which nihilism largely rejects.

His work deals

regularly with the problem of evil and after making contributions to the study of mysticism (a short history and an answer to Rudolf Otto's Die West-Hstliche Mystik are included in his God and Absolute Nothingness) he has recently been most concerned with the relationship of eastern and western cultural influences and the relationship between the sciences, religion and philosophy.

His work under Heidegger

in Freiburg before World War II is manifest in this work especially. In a review of lVha t is Religion?, 1 Abe Masao, calling What is Religion? an "epoch-making book," suggests that it tries--and succeeds--in doing for the second half of the twentieth century what Friedrich Schleiermacher's Uber die

traction to Nietzsche, Dostoyevsky, Emerson, Carlyle, the

Religion did at the end of the eighteenth century: "showing

Judea-Christian scriptures, St. Francis of Assisi, Natsurne

the roots of religion itself and making clear the irreduc-

Soseki (1867-1916), and the two famous Zen masters (1~5~768)

and Takuan (1573-1645).

Hakuin

From the left-wing He-

gelian, Max Stirner (1806-1856), he adopted the concept of "creative nothingness" which we will refer to methodologi-

ethics and metaphysics.

Nishitani saw within himself the connection between nihilism which so occupied his thoughts and the way to enHis work on nihilism,

Since both books, however, are a

thoroughgoing confrontation with their respective contemporary religious situations, their standpoints are bound to differ greatly.

cally as the "way of negativity."

lightenment called the "Great Doubt."

ible value and truth of religion, as distinguished from

SCHLEIE~CHER

was living in a Western Christ-

Tetsugaku KenkyO (Kyoto University, 1962), No. 483, 83104. Quotes here are taken from Jan van Bragt's "Notulae on Emptiness and Dialogue: Reading Professor Nishitani' s 't.Jhat is Religion?"' Japanese Religions, IV, No. 4 (Winter, 1966) pp. 50-78.

4

3

ian tradition and confronted the rationalistic tendencies

ness ." 4

of the Enlightenffient.

the solution to the problem of man striving to comP to grips

NISHITANI lives in a real 'world'-

situation, where East and West meet.

His work is a radical

Nishitani hoped to find an original formulation of

with Reality.

He says, in the Preface to his What is Reli-

confrontation wi:h the present scientific men t ality, athe-

gion?, "In so far as I am questioning all religion, I do not

ism , and Nihilism, and at the same time with Christianity, Buddhism and HEIDEGGER." 2 He makes no attempt at an objec-

base my reasoning on any article of faith or doctrine of any

tive, scientific study of religious phenomena but concen-

the discussion, I treat them as provisionally 5 mert (put into brackets).

trates on a subjective examination based on the reality of the self in the present age and focused on the root ground

particular religion.

Therefore, even when I draw them into

Nishitani, living in a highly westernized is painfully aware of the problem at hand.

einge:~lam­

mode~

As he

Japan,

h~mself

or fundament out of which religion and the "religions" emerge. 3 In this way he hopes to arrive at what religion

says, "Westernization has destroyed almost all our

"ought" to be for modern man; striving to find the "place"

including the traditional spirituality, the religions, and

of religion by opening up the way within the sal£.

philosophies of our ancestors; and what may be a su :)stitute

The goal

~: raditions,

is to reach Reality, Real Reality, via Religion in its "place,"

for the traditional spirituality has not as yet been imported,

the "place of Emptiness."

Consequently we have an empty place in the foundation of our

Nishitani is really only concerned to establish points

life, at the depth of our spiritual being . . • . Such things

of contact with other viewpoints and cultures and his own

as philosophy and religion by their very nature cannot be

description of the standpoint of Emptiness refiects, as Abe

readily transplanted in the same way as techniques and poli-

suggests, "the severe and deep personal experience of the

tical systems, for example, can.

author who, for a long time, was immersed in the awareness of

losophy is transplanted, there is no other way but zor it to

'nihil', but broke through it into the standpoint of Empti-

spring up from the inner source in the mind of the

2

Ibid., pp. Sl-52.

3 on the one hand, man's psyche is considered as reacting privately, emotionally--even arbitrarily--in a "subjective" manner over against the scientific, "real" objectivity. On the other hand man as subject is considered as the originator and carrier of cultural reality, i.e., as historically creative subject. Here subjectivity is opposed to cultural reality as a given.

When a religion or phi-

~eople.

. • . The path can be opened only by each one alone, and attained only by one's own effort. " 6 4 Ibid., p. 61, note 20. Srbid. , p. 61. 6"The Religious Situation in Present-Day Japan," Contemporary Religions in Japan, I, No. 1 (l~rch 1960), p:-Il.

5

One of the major motivating forces behind much of the

6

This is not to argue for the futility of such studies;

work done in the field of religious studies in the West in

on the contrary we have been much advanced in our under-

the last one hmtdred or so years since the pioneering work

standing of man and the human community in the larger world

of Friedrich Max Muller has b~en the desire to establish the

environment.

study of religion as an autonomous discipline, as an "obj ec-

attached to diverging from the mainstream of inquiry has not

tive" science in its own right.

much advanced the normative question.

To this end scholars have

invested their entire lives in formulating definitions, analyzing the proper relation between religion and other sci-

But such investigations and the stigma often

Few scholars have

actually argued that the normative inquiry was useless or irnpossible 9 but merely that it is a discrete enterprise, the

ences such as sociology, anthropology, psychology, etc., and, more importantly, trying to remove the normative 7 elements

vestigations by adding confusing elements, i.e., the subjec-

from this study--at the very least to draw clear lines of

tive dimension of man.

demarcation between the various methodological perspectives

such thing as a totally "objective" or "scientific" study

of these sciences and in turn within them.

of anything.

That this is

intrusion of which can only do injury to more

objectiv~

in-

Nishitani believes that there is no

At best we can only try to keep close track of

the case is made especially clear when we read the work of

various levels or dimensions of any inquiry, fully conscious

Asian scholars who have read deeply in the western tradi-

that these are not "pure" inquiries any more than there are

tions and in turn formulated categories which rest upon an

"pure" phenomena apart from their relation to the observer.

analysis of them.

It is clear that,whether talking about C. P. Tiele who felt

Kishimoto Hideo is representative of

such scholars and has even prompted the coining of the word

he could tabulate a hierarchy of religious truth or Max

"religiology" to designate the most "objective" and scientific aspect of the study of religion. 8

Muller whose "science of religion" included "comparative

7

"Normative understanding is that level of understanding or knowledge which asks the question of truth . • . . Normative understanding asks: 'Is such a view about Ultimate Reality true? Is it worthy of allegiance?'" Robert D. Baird, Categorr Formation and the History of Religions (The Hague: Mouton Co., 1971), pp. 106-7. 8 He suggests that the two subjective aspects of the study of religion are the theological and philosophical and that the two objective aspects are the historical and scientific. Theology is based on the ~tandpoint of faith, philosophy of religion constitutes the study of religion based

theology," the science of religion did not substitute objectivity for a more subjective interpretation but merely on reason (the meaning of religion for rational thought), the historical study of religion treats objects as unique phenomena, and religiology (the scientific) regards objects as manifestations of typical, universal phenomena. Kishimoto Hideo, "Religiology," NI.IIllen, XIV, No. 1 (June 1966), 81-86, and "An Operational Definition of Religion," Numen, VIII, No. 3 (December 1961), 236-240. 9 It may well be that their inattention to the matter indicates something of their priorities and apprehensions.

7

exchanged one subjective position for another.

"Although

8

shed on the nature of religion could further our understand-

Joachim Wach held that the science of religion was not nor-

ing of the variegated and complex nature of man.

mative, and placed the question of truth in suspension, the

is more or less subjective and perhaps normative in that we

phenomenological goal of verstehen (understanding) was not

assume that all investigations of man in general or in par-

merely an act of the mind, but involved the total being of 10 a scholar, hence militating against pure objectivity."

ticular require some evaluation in order for them to have meaning for us.

Historians are surely interested in early, classical or mod-

own version of the normative question posed by Nishitani as:

ern understandings of God, Reality and the Ground of Being

"What is Religion?"

but these are not entities devoid of connection with man and

The second

That is, they finally help us address our

With respect to our own definition of religion we find

his various activities, the study of which is more properly

ourselves faced with an almost endless variety of alterna-

the focus of historians.

~ive~

The same can be said of philosophers

and perhaps even of theologians.

Those who aim at describing

posed by scholars over the centuries.

We do not pro-

pose to critique these many definitions and have answered the

and fathoming the structures of the apprehension of God,

prior question whether or not to bother defining religion

Sunyata, and the Ground of Being are asking a different type

at all by adopting a working definition, variations of which

of question from those who are asking, "What is the nature

have served representatives of both western and Asian schol-

of God, Sunyata, and the Ground of Being?"

ars well, though certainly not without criticism, and may

The point, of course, is that while different types of

be useful in the context of a study of Nishitani's thought.

questions may each have their own validity, the intention of

By religion we mean to indicate man's self-awareness in re-

the investigators must be clearly differentiated.

lation to what he considers ultimately valuable and meaning-

The bulk

of this dissertation is a descriptive analysis of one man's

ful.11

normative inquiry.

11 Ultimate does not refer hPr.e to anything with absolute metaphysical stacus. Thet·.:: may be such objects of reference in an absolutely real sense but we are not concerned to affirm or deny this. In a descriptive or structural sense we only hope to indicate whatever it is to which all else is subordinate for the person under consideration at the moment. The point is that we are making certain methodological delimitations rather than any theological assertions, and these methodological delimitations do not rule out or conflict with any definition which focuses on the object of the inquiry rather than the subject. Cf. Baird, chpts. l and 2. Our working definition owes less to Paul

In our efforts we are concerned to assess

the utility and adequacy of Nishitani's more normative and ontological definition.

He wants to know what is religion;

we want to know whether his conclusions have wider implications at two levels.

The first is more or less objective

and historical in that any light Nishitani might be able to 10 Baird, p. 107.

In this context, the various religious traditions

10

9

r-r "religions" such as Christianity, Buddhism, etc. are

them.

related, but ever-changing, structures of human experience

descripti,re enterprise, his primary intention is normative

and expression within continuous, and unchanging, symbolic

and it remains to be seen if his assumptions are supported

forms or paradigms of man's relation to the ultimate con-

and his arguments warrant his conclusions.

ditions of his existence.

Nishitani is arguing that religion is a word we may use to

We are not trying necessarily to

For Nishi tani, then, although he too engages in the

At the very least

avoid any of the connotations attached elsewhere to the word

label a class of phenomena--things and events--in the exter-

religion but are merely trying to bring some degree of focus

nal world; normatively he is arguing for much more.

to the term which may be meaningful in the context of this

shoul d not be surprised to find him describing the normative

study.

sys tems of other thinkers and traditions--western and east-

Further, it should be clear that religion defined

We

in this way suggests that it is appropriate to focus on the

ern-- and then, in Buddhist fashion, arguing that religion

study of man.

is not that.

This is not, again, exclusive but suggests

that particularly in the context of the comparative study

Since the "hidden agenda" behind any attempt such as

of religion it may be more helpful to introduce such matters

this to provide a description and analysis of another norma-

as the Holy or the Transcendent at a later point in our in-

tive statement is the normative content informing the ob-

quiry and then with reference to man.

server's pP.rspective, we propose to make more explicit this

This avoic·, at the

outset at least, conflicts with such religious traditions

starting point and acknowledge that it is considerably in-

as implicitly or explicitly deny such a dimension of real-

formed by the work of Nishitani--both in his writings and

ity.

teaching.

I~

ulso helps avoid the tendency to investigate the

nature of religion on the basis of unstated,

~

priori assump-

Religion as man's experience of what he finds ultimately

tions which, as normative assertions, require as much sup-

valuable and meaningful provides an opening to reality for

port as the conclusions which may be argued as following upon

him, in as ultimate a sense as may be metaphysically the

Tillich' s famous discussion of religion as "ultimate concern" than to Robert Bellah's formulation of religion as "man's attitudes and actions with respect to his ultimate concern" which we do find helpful, enp. in the study of Japanese religion--a useful consideration in this dissertation. Cf. Robert Bellah, Toku awa Reli ion: The Values of Pre-Industrial Ja an (Boston: Beacon Press, l 7 , p. . In this way one avoi s focusing upon various "isms" rather than the study of man, or merely upon materials which have traditionally been included in the study of the "religions."

case, but, and this is more meaningful to him, it is as serious an exercise in his control of his experience as he is capable of at any given moment.

It may have practical, so-

cial implications and, indeed, even be validated by communal consensus; but it must also provide for him a mode of release from these entanglernencs, i.e. , provide an awareness

12 11

ness and the things of which we are aware. of a reality that is more than the social and perhaps even than the existential.

An inquiry into the nature of religion

or any description of religion must take seriously the assercions and affirmations of adherents of other religious traditions or accept the risk that it may have seriously impaired the inquirer's own experience, i.e., rendered it less than ultimate for him.

The magnitude of this task throws up

before man the other factors involved in his religiosity, viz., the anxiety, frustration and meaninglessness of his experience--not always felt in any ultimate sense but nonetheless always felt.

Nature and society provide us

with certain contexts or settings in which we live our lives. We cannot avoid feelings of contingency and uncertainty about ordinary matters, however important, such as what we will eat and wear; and about more fundamental matters such as whether we will live another moment.

of the problems posed for us by these dualities is seen by us as more or less urgent.

Individuals rely in varying de-

grees upon themselves or others for resolutions.

Religious

traditions have historically been more or less concerned to provide, interpret and/or preserve resolutions for persons who may not have found their own

r~~olution,

even have become conscious of the problem. 12

indeed, may not Certainly one

must not confuse the need to inform others with the need felt by some to make clearer for themselves their own understanding of the nature of religion by writing or speaking. More formally the comparative study of religions is a

There are what seem to be certain universal characteristics of human existence.

The resolution

We are often more or less power-

less in the face of forces we do not fully understand and conditions which exist in society.

Our experience of life

onlluarily takes on a dialectical character in which we see

useful exercise in comprehending the history and structure of man's existential anxiety in terms of his own understanding of his relation to himself, to his fellowmen, to his world, and to whatever he attaches ultimate significance in solving the problem of life and death.

In the normative

enterprise it provides a wider range of experiences to draw on in resolving that problem for oneself.

Methodologically

the historical, structural and evaluative considerations are informative perspectives on the problem.

It is, of course,

the latter consideration, the evaluative, that is the most

things and events in terms of dualities: ultimate concerns (life and death) and preliminary concerns (material wellbeing); ordinary and extraordinary experiences; the sacred and the secular; right and wrong; good and evil; even epistemologically we see this dualism in the form of experiencer and thing experienced; knower and thing known, aware-

12 This accounts for the need felt within Christianity and Islam to inform (and occasionally to coerce) others who have not heard the resolution to their problems, and, among those traditions less concerned, the lack of need felt by adherents of Zen. Different schools within Buddhism thus reacted quite differently to the so-called silence of the Buddha on "questions which tend not to edification."

14

13

controversial and the most frequently avoided.

Clearly

of human awareness, are thus kept in balance and dialogue. 13

evaluation is necessary in historical and structural con-

Just as man's fundamental problems are seen in dualities,

siderations to select the most relevant data and to choose

so man's self-awareness is cast in relief against the things

between innate and imposed categories.

and events of the world in which he stands.

Evaluation at the

The crucial

normative level makes discerning, cautious judgments about

thing is that man is not merely aware of some thing or event

meaning and truth and value in an attempt to resolve, not

but stands in some fundamental relation to that objective

merely such problems as

ere relation

of Buddhism to Christianity,

thing or event in relation to which he is the subjective cor-

but the problem oi, .i.n Nishitani' s phrase, "What is Relig-

relate.

ion?" which is the problem of life and death.

on his particular version of the religious quest for self-

The commonest errors generally arise out of a misplaced

In making this problem uniquely his own man takes

awareness in its ultimate form for him.

In Mahayana Bud-

emphasis on one or the other of the methodoloeical tools to

dhism this takes the form of the extinction of avidya by

the exclusion of the others.

mahaprajna and mahakaruna.

Thus excessive emphasis on the

This is the resolution of crises

historical-descriptive method, as sometimes occurs in the

or breaking points variously described by Nishitani as the

hands of sociologists, ethnologists and anthropologists,

"turn-abouts" or "about faces" from condemnation, pessimism,

leads to inadequate attention being paid to the dynamic,

dis-ease, and anxiety to possibility, hope, at-ease, and

life-or-death nature of human activity.

tranquillity.

Undue emphasis on

The method of the self-reflective thinker is

structural matters by phenomenologists or morphologists

to realize or make explicit what is ordinarily hidden; this

often leads to the interpretation or translation of the con-

in the form of actualizing his understanding of his problem in

cerns of religion into the language of economics, psychology,

an absolutely serious way.

etc., i.e., to a "reduction,"

This kind of reduction is a

This is the fundamental philosophical act of

~riticism,

form of desacralization much feared by many historians of

radical criticism.

religion.

physical inquiry is not necessary, perhaps not even helpful.

Continual attention to normative evaluations

brings constantly to bear the pressure of man's attitude or orientation to things in the world, the fundamental tendency of consciousness to take a stand in relation to what it encounters.

Consciousness and experience, the two aspects

From Buddhism we can learn that meta-

13 There are, to be sure, many ways of defining selfawareness which may be more specific but the aspects of consciousness and experience seem to us to include the referents of the term "self-awareness" as utilized in our definition of religion. The components of consciousness and experience might further be broken down into the doxic, the emotive, the volitional and the evaluative. Further, one may speak of various modes of awareness such as perception, memory, anticipation, judgment, symbolization, etc.

16

15

John G. Arapura has suggested that Buddhism is an existentialism of tranquillity in which ".

. anxiety gives way

to, and is resolved, in tranquillity which alone is thenceforth endowed with ontological dignity." 14 Its four-fold negative dialectic stands outside what it considers spurious metaphysical problems of being in favor of a genuine existential ontology.

Though it is doubtful that this is a fair

assessment of such schools of Buddhism as T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen and certainly is not true of Nishitani's thought ic does represent a distinctive form of the fundamental philo:ophical act of criticism to be assessed along with other epistemic

cl~ims.

It also serves to remind us that the reso-

lution of man's fundamental problems may ing £or first

caus.::s,

u~t

require look-

indeed, it may more producti,rely be

It is probably safe to say that the majority of the western intellectual tradition since Plato has seen epistemic claims as finally concerned with the nature of Being. Along with these considerations which continue to require our attention we must take seriously that another aspect of epistemic claims is their communicative value.

Perhaps the

illustrativ~

of this

side of epistemology--providing spiritual guidelines without making elaborate or systematic claims about the nature of truth.

degrees of seriousness) of an existential and epistemic sort.

This is the experience and consciousness which are

aspect;s of the "whole bodily experience" out of which selfawar eness emerges.

The negative dialectic, as the method

or "way into and beyond," and the epistemological experience are mutually interpenetrating.

They are a more or less

serious (urgent or critical) action-intuition.

The emergent

self-awareness, if concerned with what man considers ultimately valuable or meaningful, is more than a mere awareness of objects.

It is the mutual interpenetration of subject

and object.

A problem (uncomfortable, unfami.liar, ill-at-ease)

calls our attention to, or is cast in relief against, the unproblematic (comfortable, familiar, at-ease).

The resolu-

tion of the problem is a form of the epistemic search; it

seen as auto-creative or self-derived.

vast Prajnaparamita literature is most

reflec tive thinker is precipitated by a crisis (of varying

The criticism (more or less radical) of the self-

is ultimately critical as an attempt to pacify the "heartmind."

It entails ceasing to take for granted the seemingly

unproblematic, questioning the formerly unquestioned.

It

further involves a context to which it is correlative with varying levels of perception and difficulty, the descriptive explication of the "ordinary," the common, and the "taken for granted."

Finally, if pursued with seriousness it yields

a resolution proportional to that seriousness.

Buddhism as

a tradition may be seen in this light as providing a topes or "place" or possibility for this inquiry. 15 15 "Place" and topob are translations of the word basho. Nishitani and other mem ers of the Kyoto School use thrs--term consistently, having taken it from the Nishidatetsugaku,

18 17 modern equivalent of the search for the numinous in the West It is crucial what kind of affairs are attended to or t reated with seriousness.

For example, Nishitani (and

practically everyone else for that matter) speaks of the radical collapse of norms and values in today's modern world.

It is the case that such a collapse is defined by

a particular historical situation and context but not for

all time; for this reason any epistemic claims in connection with this affair need to be seen, not in terms of their absolute claim to truth, but in terms of their communicative--one might even say therapeutic--value.

In this man-

ner, one treats orher claims with full seriousness but without the dangers of the exclusive nature of some truth claims.

Fundamentally, man's problem is always based in

certain beliefs: minimally in the "fact" of the world and himself in that world.

The former is an almost primordial

commitment ; it is a form of "animal faith" or cust"m and habit.

The latter is conceived with varying degrees of

but it has long since been realized in Buddhism.

It has

reintroduced the possibility of focusing once again on the study of man in the West whereas it never left that focus in much of eastern thought.

Carried to extremes, the search for the nurinous constituted the de-humanization of man. 17 This is not to argue for or against the numinous as reality but to assert the methodological superiority of focusing ones epistemic search on the study of man.

Ones search for

absolutes constitutes a form of tanha (grasping, thirst, desire).

A genuine search is a radical criticism where every-

thing and nothing is holy, where the resolve is to stop at nothing, to take nothing for granted, to acknowledge that there may be no straightforward exposition of how and why. For the Buddhist and Nishitani this is the negative dialectic.

This dialectic, however, cannot even stick to its

own principle.

It cannot be maintained as a structure that

will stay basic no matter how it is modified.

In criticizing

importance as existing within the world as taken for granted. One of the major enlightenments of western intellectual history has been a kind of astonishment that whatever is is a function of our subjective beliefs. 16 This may be the

saw this most clearly but instead of embracing it as fundamental saw it as a reason for despair and skepticism. The former attitude he shares with Buddhism but not the latter. As far as can be determined Hume rejected his insight ontologically but not in terms of the actions of ordinary life, the things done by custom and habit. 17 Attempts to preserve the transcendent by claiming as transcendent the experience of the self as a subject knowing itself by turning critically inward perpetuates the basic problematic, i.e., the dualism between the knower and the known. It produces a sophisticated, but patho-logical transcendental ego.

ed.

20

19

a metaphysics or an ontology we do not aim at another meta-

. • . Folly is truth in the form which men are struck with

physics or a variant ontology--not even at one of being

as amid untruth they will not let truth go. ,lS

nonmetaphysical or nonontological.

speak on this false base or die on this base and in this

This would be hypostatiz-

We must

ing the concept of nonconceptuality and acting counter to

sense, too, language is also necessary.

the meaning of the dialectic.

lies both in excessive trust in the past and unwillingness

For Nishitani no "total" phi-

to risk the future.

losl'lphy is desirable--this would be attachment. In this context, language or talk, written or spoken or acted, may be seen to have different aspects.

Language

Irresponsibility

Modernity appears to be the only real

security there is because it is precisely this openness to change in full awareness of the attendant risks.

It is

(and systems or "philosophies" constructed by means of it)

always the willingness to forsake old content and, in times

is, on the one hand, always false.

of metaphysical revolutions, even the forms which have given

often taken for granted. sary.

It is incomplete and

On the other hand it is also neces-

It constitutes the record of man's own understanding

of his place in and commitment to the world.

Language is

temporary meaning to that content.

It is understandable in

this context that the usual Buddhist attitude toward scriptures has been that they are preliminarily useful but not

bound to the past; it is false precisely because it is so

ultimately so; that words must ultimately fall short of

bound.

grasping Reality.

It is dead, static.

It is, however, also necessary.

This is not so different from r.hristian-

We cannot speak in the future, there is no present and the

ity with respect to words but quite fundamentally different

past becomes the context or provides the parameters for our

with respect to scriptures.

existence.

that it again precludes exclusivist claims while facilitating communicative ones. 19

It is thus necessary, even though false.

We are

guided by a dead language that is both false and necessary

The value in this is, of course,

In these and Buddhist terms we may say that Nishitani

because we cannot see or know into the future; we can only act with a certain bravado, a courage, into the unknown as

offers us an existential ontology, both false and necessary,

though we were guided by the "Truth."

through which he tells us of his own normative

in this that is not also false.

There is no certainty

As Theodor Adorno has sug-

gested, "A thought that does not capitulate to the wretchedly ontical will founder

u~on

its criteria; truth will turn into

untruth, philosophy into folly.

And yet philosophy cannot

abdicate if stupidity is not to triumph in realized unreason.

18 ton

trans~ntologi-

Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. AshYork: The Seabury Press, 19 73) , p. 405.

(Ne~•

19 we are aware in all this, of course, that we may be proposing a small-scale metaphysic of correlation. Our own remarks must also be subject to the dual nature of epistemic claims and the nature of language.

21

cal or trans-metaphysical conclusions.

The importance of

22

ence" or self-awareness involves the whole heart-mind moving

the undertaking and the dangers with which it is fraught may

f rom avidya with i~s dukkha/pathos to the realization that

perhaps be best stated in his own words:

" fire does not burn fire."

With the encounter of East and West proceeding in all fields of human activities at a surprisingly rapid tempo, the mutual understanding is, needless to say, one of the most important tasks facing mankind today. Among the many difficulties lying hidden along the way of this task, the greatest appears when, trying to penetrate in some degree the inner thought, feelings and purposes of our copartners, we find words and concepts, the inevitable vehicles of this communication, rising up time and again to bar the way. In that region near the innermost core of the mind, in the region of things spiritual, the above-mentioned difficulty becomes almost insurmountable. It is especially so in the case of encounter between worldreligions, such as Buddhism and Christianity, where the differences between the religious faiths, residing in the innermost mental core of both sides, are concerned. In each of them, their own faith or insight has long been formulated into creed and authoritatively laid down as dogma predominating over all that men think, feel or will, so that people become firmly convinced of their own opinions and come to have great confidence in themselves. Often their conviction and self-confidence are armored by sharp analysis and subtle dialectics which are developed in dogmatics. In short, the religious faith or insight is translated into words and concepts and these give birth to dogma and dogmatics, which, in turn, serve to confirm that faith or insight. Here is a process in which faith is brought closer and closer to itself, thereby bP.coming more firm and more self-confirmed, and thus more enclosed within itself. Such is the process that occurs in most cases within the innermost mind in religious thinking, and therein arises the extreme difficulty of mutual understanding between minds of different religious faiths.20 Lived experience leads him to temporary structures which in turn must be radically critiqued.

The "whole bodily experi-

2 °Keij i Nishi tani, "Preliminary Remark," to "Two Addresses by Martin Heidegger," Eastern Buddhist (New Series), Vol. I , No. 2, Sept., 1966, pp . 59-77.

It involves the subjective grasp

of human life as rooted in the world; anicca is seen as the context or topos; anatrnan reveals the self to be both false and necessary in the inquiry, it represents the intrusion of sunyata or Absolute Nothingness and obliges us to take t he problem seriously without resting finally in the starti ng point of subjectivity.

24

nation. CHAPTER I

These factors are the questions concerning modernity

and tradition, the conf:ict of science and religion, and the r ole of myth as it informs the study of religion.

THE CONTEXT OF THE INQUIRY:

The study of religion, and especially the comparative MODERNIZATION, SCIENCE AND MYTH s tudy of religion, is inextricably bound up in the problem I.

Modernization

of modernization.

In order to facilitate understanding Nishitani's de-

The process is unique in certain 1nspects

given the different traditions which have shaped it in dif-

tailed inquiry into "What is Religion 'l " it will be useful

f erent societies and civilizations but it shares certain com-

to address ourselves to an exposition of three pivotal

mon, universal features.

factors which inform Nishitani's writings generally and pro-

li st, Nishitani cites two fundamental points:

vide something of the context for his inquiry.

Nishitani

Without attempting an exhaustive

these two aspects for this must be done when searching for

One point is the fact that the fundamental driving force behind the process of modernization is the development of science and scientific technique. I think we can say that science and scientific technique have permeated every phase of man's personal and social life and that this is the most important factor effecting the severance from tradition. The second point cannot be fully considered apart from the first, but I tentatively separate it (from the first) for purposes of analysis. It is the concept of man which has been formed through che historical process of modern times--that is, the great change in the way a human beint; vie~;s himself. 2

a radically new interpretation of a universal idea, a uni-

The ground out of which most

generally distinguishes between two uses of the term "concept."

"On the one hand, 'concept' simply indicates a uni-

versal 'something'; on the other hand, 'concept' refers to an idea, interpretation, or expression of that univeral 'something. ,,l

Ordinarily we do not distinguish between

versal "something."

Nishitani is not concerned to argue

scientis~s.

from Demo-

cr itus, through Roger Bacon, the alchemists, Darwin, Einstein

that concepts such as faith, revelation, transc·mdence,

and Bohr, operate is religious in the broadest sense.

nihilism, etc. have of themselves become problematical.

f ar as that standpoint was identified with Christianity it

Rather these remain the indispensible moments of the great

has gradually faded out of the picture in terms of its moti-

"religions" of the world.

vational importance,

These concepts do, however, "1long

with man's attitudes toward them, require radical re-exami1

Keiji Nishitani, "A Buddhist Philosophn Looks at the Future of Christianity," The Japan Christian Yearbook, 1968, p. 108.

Inso-

Indeed, the entire process of history

2

Keiji ~ishitani, "On Modernization and Tradition in J apan," Modernization and Tradition in Japan, Special Publication SerLes, No. 1, InternatLonal InstLtute for Japan Studies, 1969, p. 69. By "concept of man" Nishitani refers both to the theoretical viewpoint and to man in practical l ife going about the "business of living."

26

25

.. J

is closely tied to this shedding of any explicit religious

if man violates the order, he is no longer man, .•

point of view.

Nishi tani uses the term hitodenashi, a human being, yet not

The change in the concept of man has also had a profound effect on human thinking on mat:t:ers

rangiu~

man freedom to political and economic problems.

a true human being.

Whether in the ontological order

Erom hu-

(Plato's world of Ideas) or in the order of creation in

Nishitani

Chris tianity , man's being was thought to be in some way

notes the increasing frequency throughout history of the

rooted within the divine order.

notion of "fundamental human rights" ; rights with which all

"order of being" loses its essentially true humanity when,

human beings are endcwed by virtue of their being human.

in the Platonic sense, he loses ponsession of the logos; or

The changing concept of man is closely linked with the con-

in the Christian sense, he sins.

nection between (and their gradually emerging sundering

cos mic order of all being, or from God's order of creation,

from) these fundamental rights and their being endowed by God.

he then is not what man should be--he falls into self-con-

If we distinguish between modern times generally (post-

tra diction."4

The highest humanity or

"If man deviates from the

To violate the "order of being" is to be no

Descartes?) and the present (post-Industrial Revolution) we

longer man, but hitodenashi.

could, according to Nishitani, characterize the various

technological advance made possible by Darwin negated, or

problems of our time as invariably related in some more or

was thought to negate.

less direct way to technology.

been affirmed but was held in check by reason; Darwin and

For instance, Darwin's evolu-

It is this order that the

Man's animalistic nature had long

tionary thccries were a technological advance and inflicted

sub sequent technologists reversed the perspective and

a deep wound in the flesh of western thought, especially its

seemed to be arguing that the intellect or reason was some-

explicitly religious thought.

how dependent upon man's animal nature.

All subsequent thought had to

take into account the scientific "fact" that man is merely

Technology is one of the grounds underlying all dimen~o1hich

(albeit uniquely) an extension of a long line of animals.

sions of man's being; it is a perspective from

This came on the scene as a fundamental denial of the basic

thing is seen as a source of energy or power in the physical

understanding of man which underlay much of Greek and Judea-

sense and relates to both the theoretical and practical

Christian thought.

asp ects of man's life.

"In both Greek philosophy and Christian-

ity, man's being is viewed on a ground which is in some sense 'holy'--where holy means something which, in essence, man is not a llowed to violate, and 'in essence' means that

3

rbid. ' p. 73. 4 Ibid.

every-

Matter, seen as the source of energy,

28

27

looks or appears differently to different people.

Nishitani

suggests that there may be a "religious" way of perceiving water.

In this perception man must view the use of water

from the point of view of concern for his

0~·!!'1

bejn:;.

el ectric power.

It is in this sense that "nature" and"Buddha"

This "destined

to be" is, of course, karmic determinism.

Religious experi-

ence and existence is none other than the realization, wheth"In

short, both the being of man and the being of water are destined to be 'naturally' through nature, and in this order of nature they are inseparable from each other." 6 It is characteristic in the East that the tea master, the poet, and the religious man all perceive water in this context, i.e.,

this point:

"The way of

D. T. Suzuki quotes Takuan on

cha-!:!£-~·

therefore, is to appre-

ciate the spirit of a naturally harmonious blending of Heaven and Earth, to see the pervading presence of the five elements

(~-hsing)

by one's fireside, where the mountains,

rivers, rocks, and trees are found as they are in Nature, to draw the refreshing water from the well of Nature, to taste 5 Ibid., p. 76. 6

rbid.

of equivalent physical unit.

Even in the social sciences

man is seen as nothing more than "energy flowing within the social framework."

sense of holy it is no different from man.

encounter the being of water.

In this same vein, animals are viewed as

sources of protein and men as manpower hours or some sort

order in which all being (especially man's being) is destined to be." 5 When water is the embodiment of nature in this

by water or by man, of this "fated" order of being.

grand this enjoyment of the harmonious blending of Heaven 7 an d Earth 1"

water in physical terms as, for example, a source of hydro-

are equally full of the "holy" in Buddhism. "Holy" is "the

er

How

Technology, as opposed to religion, consists in seeing

This

means considering water as directly a part of man's "order of being."

with one's own mouth the flavor supplied by Nature.

At the basis of technology lies the "de-

naturalization" of nature and the "de-humanization" of humanity.

Nishitani views the problem of technology as att empting to grasp being only in abstraction. 8 As such it

i s fundamentally destructive of the spiritual ground on which r eligion, philosophy and art are formed.

"It must be empha-

si zed that such an investigation is utterly impossible to 7"Zen and the Art of Tea, Part I," Zen and Ja,anese Culture (New York: Random House, Inc., 1965), p. 2 8. 8 In our own time matters have been reduced even beyond this. "Since the sciences' irrevocable farewell to ideali stic philosophy, the successful sciences are no longer seeking to legitimize themselves otherwise than by a statement of their method. Their self-exegesis . . . accepts itself as given and thereby sanctions also its currently existing form, its division of labor, altho~gh in the long run the insufficiency of that fo~ cannot be concealed. The intellectual sciences in particular, due to their borrowed ideal of positivity, lapse into the irrelevance and nonconceptuality of countless special investigations. The cuts between special disciplines such as sociology, economics, and history make the cognitive interest vanish in pedantically drawn,inflatedly defended trenches." Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. by E. B. Ashton (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), p. 73.

30

29

accomplish from without, from some place distant to the en-

hot in the precise point where it was hot.

counter.

burning, the fire did not burn, was not fire; and in the self

Neither is it possible to accomplish it by means

In the act of

of biological, sociological, anthropological, ethical, or

t hat feels pain, St. Francis did not feel pain, was not him-

other such methods.

s elf.

All such explanations want to solve the

whole problem at a place that has not attained the deepest ground. " 9 The religious perspective, then, demands that we not

Just as fire does not burn fire, St. Francis was in

his home-ground as a "self that is not self," he was "emptied of self."

The fire was "beautiful" on its home-ground.

t his way fi::e and the "I" are fundamentally united as one

limit the I-thou relation to human beings but extend it to

within the same order of being.

all phenomena and in so doing combat technological abstrac-

of human existence essentially considered as "seeing and

tions.

being" in Buddhism, and beyond analytic knowledge.

Nishitani cites the case of St. Francis of Assisi

who called fire "brother."

He did so when treated by means

of a red hot iron for a disease of the eyes.

His friends

shrank from the scene of pain but St. Francis felt no pain

In

Here we "see" in the sense

It is

a ll these things--"the religious," "holy," "fire is," or "water is"--that are being erased and negated by technology. In defense of technology and science, Nishitani admits

and said, "Fire, my brother, you are the most beautiful

t hat it is the generative force behind civilization and man's

among God's creatures . . . I have always loved you

enlightenment and has greatly promoted happiness and well-

Treat me gently today."

10

To his brethren he said: "0

cowards, and of little faith, why did you fly?

In truth I

being.

This is only true, however, when it is properly seen

on the ground of human existence.

Today this seems not to

say unto you, that I have felt neither any pain nor the heat

be the case.

of the fire. ,ll

qualitatively different from any man has ever known.

Of course the fire was hot and St. Francis

Technology seems capable of raising problems Tech-

did feel physical pain (we might say technological pain) but

nology need not mean, and has not always meant, imbalance

in the religious terms Nishitani is speaking of, it was not

between itself and human existence.

chine age, however, seems to be a self-sustaining rush toward

9

Keiji Nishitani, "On The I-Thou Relation in Zen Buddhism," trans. Norman Waddell, The Eastern Buddhist, new Series, II, Nc. 2 (1969 p. 72. 10

Quoted by Nishitani in "On Modernization and Tradition in Japan," p. 78. 11K ... "' . h. . eLJL ~Ls LtanL,

Technology in the ma-

• • t EmptLness an d H.Lstory, II manuscrLp trans. of Chapter Six of ShUk~o to wa Nanika ("tVhat is Religion?"), SObunsha, 1961, p. 11 . - II

the abstraction of real existence.

Even what Hishitani calls

"individual subjective self-consciousness" seems frequently in danger of being swept aside in the rush toward technologized society.

Man is perceived to have "substance" only where "man

is man" in the sense equivalent to what is meant when we say

32

31

"fire does not burn fire . "

This perspective seems to cease

l1odernization poses a problem for tradition differently

to be meaningful when substance is seen only as energy, i.e.,

in different cultures.

when reality is abstracted.

the seeming fact that these countries could not or at least

The subject as acting can only

Almost unique to Asian countries is

be maintained when the self is considered to have substance.

did not themselves give birth to science or technology in

This subjectivity does not remain when all phenomena, in-

the sense that Nishitani defines these terms.

cluding the self, are taken as reducible to energy or matter

create what the West knows so well as "subjective self-con-

or infinitely manipulable and controllable.

~ihen the self

sciousness."

They could not

The comparative study of religion or of civili-

is seen as manipulating or manipulable it becomes a meaning-

zations obliges us to ask "Why?"

less abstraction--"manipulable mcnipulating."

vi ew, was, of course, to imagine that Asian religions or civili-

Even this

The traditional point of

would be appropriate if man was forced herein to see the

za tions "lacked" something which the West (usually conceived

essence of science as suspended over the abyss of nothing-

as Christianity) had.

ness and led thereby to a Great Death.

with providing the base for science as characterized by ra-

In fact, this has led

Certainly we usually credit the Greeks

to the de-humanization of man; to a condition where all things

ti onal thought and subsequently permeating all so-called

become "thous," utterly non-resistant to an evaporating "I".

"higher" western religions and civilizations.

Here "'I' becomes simply the power which controls the world

may credit the Judea-Christian-Islamic complex of traditions

of power" and even man's subjectivity slips away. 13

fo r developing the notion of a subjective self-consciousness

It is in such circumstances, of course, where individual persons--each conscious of himself as an absolute I or ego-find their freedom running up against the freedom of others, i.e., relativized.

Efficacious co-existence r~quires the

Likewise we

out of its doctrine of man's personal relationship with a dei ty.

Both of these are typically "lacking" in the major Asian traditions. 15 Host frequently, the answer given to the encroachment of technology (when it is even recognized as

postulating of norms, the mutual recognition of law or even

encroachment) takes the form of a call back to the pristine

of some universal.

past of the particular tradition speaking.

This condition is "the boundless 'Suf-

fering' that the Buddha said forms the way of the World. ,l 4

have seriously considered what this means exactly.

As Nishi-

tani says, "I think we have failed to fully come to grips

13

Keiji Nishitani, "The Problem of Myth," Religious Studies in Japan, ~okyo: The Maruzen Company, LTD., 1959),

p. ll3.

14

Few, however,

Idem., "On the I- Thou Relation in Zen Buddhism,"

p. 78. - -

with a very basic problem involved in really bringing the 15 With the exception, perhaps, of the Indian astika tradition.

34

33

classical Greek spirit into new life in modern times and in reviving Christian faith in a new form. " 16 From Nishitani's point of view, both the problem and the proposed solutions have the same roots.

They are so inextri-

parallel to such an effort to be found in the western tradition would be, according to Nishitani, the efforts of Nietzsche and Heidegger.

Both advocate a return but not in

the chronological or historical sense--rather in the sense

cably intertwined that untying one tradition seems to entail

of toward something more fundamental.

more and more resistance from the other.

be to the origins of philosophy; in Nishitani's case (and

Modern science

This "return" would

and man-centeredness are born directly out of the Greek and

perhaps in Nietzsche's case via the influence of Schopen-

Christian traditions.

hauer) this means via another heterodox culture: Buddhism.

the other.

Neither can be interpreted apart from

Nishitani proposes that an encounter with a for-

This is precisely what Nishitani attempts in his analyses

eign culture or religion may be helpful in sorting out the

of modernization, myth, history, time, and most importantly,

problem and its solution.

of religion.

This comparative approach is in-

In the western tradition this would mean going

creasingly being applauded, even demanded, in the study of

back to Greece.

religion in the West by such notable scholars as Wilfred

who were full-fledged philosophers--this is the procedure

Cantwell Smith who has suggested "that in principle there is

foll owed by many modern philosophers.

illumination, and potential profit, in considering any human

try ing to retrace the pre-Socratics to their origins.

problem thus from an unwonted angle, and in a wider context;

this does not involve the foreign heterogeneous culture which

pondering how a matter has appeared to men in other civili-

Nis hitani proposes is probably necessary.

zations, and comparing that with how it appears to us.

mum we must return to the grounds of philosophy and religion

A

comparativist approach to almost any issue can prove not only refreshing but instructive: our civilization is no longer faring so gratifyingly that we can blandly ignore criteria that transcend it. " 17 The closest methodological

This does not mean back to Plato or Aristotle

It means minimally Even

At the very mini-

-- and thus of our selves--with "a wider amplitude than any of the attempts made up to and including the modern age." 18 We must open up a new horizon from which to reconsider the problem of technology, philosophy and religion.

For Nishitani

this horizon will be the Buddhist sunyata (emptiness/nothing"On Modernization and Tradition in

ness). The activity of technology, then, is abstracting.

Tra-

18 Keiji Nishitani, "On Modernization and Tradition in Japan," p. 86.

36

35

ditional thought has viewed everything in terms of substance

Nishitani is also dissatisfied with Suber's categories, be-

but technology views things in terms of function.

lieving that there is a problem hidden right in the depths

Man who

has lose the subjective sense of "I" responding co "thous"

of the personal !-Thou relation.

is a purely ftmc tional man.

as well as the Thou are absolutes in their respective sub-

Hhen this view is taken, the

"The first is that the I

subject of anything, whether water or man or whatever, is

jectivities.

seen in the functioning of that thing rather than in its be-

through their relation upon one another are, on the other

ing.

han d, absolutely relative. ,.ZO

This is a Marxian view of man as a laborer; a view

where, because everything is seen as function rather than

The second is that the I and the Thou directly

In this context these three relations (Ich-Du, Ich-Es,

substance, there is a "work" quality or aspect in everything.

Es -Es) may be thought to be exhaustive of the possibilities

The way a thing functions is the way a thing "works."

but here Nishit:ani asserts that an eastern perspective may

In

be useful in viewing the rna tter.

ity to work, ftmction, energize rather than their capacity

when man takes or perceives water as just being water and

to be.

sees in it the

Here man cannot see himself as subject and he is

alienated.

Furthermore, objects of this work are also re-

ing it.

In the

~·!estern

this view, all things and all people are seen in their capac-

tradition

substance of water, he is already objectify-

Han as human being (subject) sees water as another

fo rm of being (object).

In early Japanese history, the "name"

are no longer things with being (subjects in their own right)

had great significance.

It symbolized the bearer himself in

but have only the nature of function.

a very real way, i.e., it was a manifestation of him and was

duced by technology to abstract subjects of work.

Objects

Using Buber's cate-

gories, Nishitani reminds us that the cognitive position al-

one with him.

ready reduces the I-Thou relation to an I-It (subject-object)

to reveal herself to him, signifying that she had already

relation and technology pushes the borderline farther back

given herself to him.

to where this subject-object relation is abstracted into an

pressions "Amida's Name" and "In Jesus Christ's Name" which

It-It relation.

signify that Buddha and God are proclaiming, revealing them-

This is a mere relation between things,

two physical things.

"Moreover, this is not even a substan-

selves.

For a woman to reveal her name to a man was

This is also the meaning of the ex-

Naming has presently ceased to mean so much; modem

tial 'thing' (Es); rather, it takes on the character of an

science has reduced naming to an abstraction which no longer

abstract subject as a mere functional 'thing that acts. "• 19

reveals any essence.

l9Ibid.' p. 89.

This is the situation described by Nishi-

2 °Keiji Nishitani, "On the !-Thou Relation in Zen Buddhism," p. 73.

37

38

tani when he suggests that, "It could well be that the pride

'what-it-is-of-itself' in the eastern sense of 'nature' is

of the so-called scientific age is an expression of folly 21 still unaware of its deep blindness. " Nishitani as an east-

not a 'substantial' being.

ern man does not perceive water as an object nor does he "grasp" water.

Nature is said to be onozukara-Shikari--

"being so of itself."

"Nature ('jinen'), being so of itself,

being what it is of itself--these mean that something like water, for instance, realizes itself in a given place as water, the being of which is of-itself. water. 1122 it is.

This water is of-itself as

This means that no outs ide force makes it be what

Water is water of its own accord.

The Chinese

ii

of

Neither is it a "subject" in the

" personal" sense or the "impersonal" (abstract) sense. From this view of 'natural,' on the one hand, individual things are taken in their complete existence, where they are as themselves at a given time and place --in their complete individuality. This is different from the view which takes (being) as the substance, or 'ego' as the subject in a thing. When we perceive substance or subject in this latter way, then we inevitably divide the ..... istence of an individual thing from its essence. We grasp the being of a thing t>vofold. As opposed to this on the eastern view of 'nature,' the being of a thing is simply onefold-einfach in German, and hitoe in Japanese. Each individual is 'onefoldly'-rcs-own self.23 Nishitani goes on to suggest, on the other hand and at

jiko ( _ _ -self) and the shi of shizen ( _ _ -nature) have the

the same time, in the western view of substance and subject,

meaning both of "of-itself" (onozukara) and "for-itself"

everything has its own private makeup.

(mizukara).

not B which in turn can only be B.

deni.

Both of these notions in one is called hitori-

In this sense water presents itself of its own accord.

A can only be A and

The western "laws" of

nature are conceived as an effort to put these scattered

It does not bear the character of "will" (either as free

things together.

will or volitional subject), it does not bear the character-

logos.

Rationality is seen in this view to have a coercive

istic of "subject of work" (abstracted as a function), it

power.

But in the eastern view, while A = A and B = B, at

does not imply ego or "self," and it is not forced by another

the same time there is a mutual interpenetration.

power

o=

will.

It does not then refer to what we might call

The same is true of the laws of reason or

refers to this as jitafuni (self and others are not

"natural necessity"which implies a sort of coercion or force.

are not fixed, they are

Scientific "laws" would be such a coercion or force in west-

rocal).

ern scientific thought necessitating that water "function"

less) and mujishoku (selfless nothingness).

according to unalterable norms or rules.

Som~thing that is

~umuge

Nishitani two);

they

(interpenetrating and recip-

In Buddhist terms they (A and B) are mujisho (selfIn the science

of logic, even in the ordinary "coin of the realm" this is a contradiction but in "natural being" it is merely two sides

21Ibid. • p. 79. 22Ibid., p. 89.

23Ibid. , P · 91.

40

39

of the coin; it is being without a "framework of being." Buddhism expresses this in rupa (matter = void--void

= matter;

= sunyata -- sunyata = rupa

pomo rphisms and thus having effectively created a new world view directly beneath that dominating the view that dominates the traditional religions, especially the major west-

Jap., shikisokuzeku--

ern theocentric religions.

kusokuseshiki).

We can say that a new field,

that of the impossibility of being, has opened up beneath the traditional view of a field of man's being-in-the-world

II. Science

as possibility. What had, to traditional philosophers and theologians,

Our being is revealed by modern science to

be a brief, fleeting instant hovering over the abyss of death

seemed like a "natural" progression frora the "life" of organic

and nothingness.

beings in the natural world to the "soul" and "spirit" of man

being and being itself is not the only reduction.

and on to the "divine" or "God" (the teleological world-

re duced are the myriad forms of consciousness, all sorts of

view) was dealt a fatal blow by modern science when it ex-

human physical and mental activity.

cluded teleology frora the natural world.

skandhas of our existence--our corporeality, feeling, per-

The mythological

This reduction of all forms of sentient Similarly

These are the five

consciousness--~·lhich

harmony between the internal and external worlds fell to

ception, volition and our

the externalization of its laws into a cosmic universality.

through which modern science attempts to cut in its progres-

There is no life or soul or spirit in a world reducible to

sive exteriorization.

matter.

Modern science not only did not stop here but

~vent

forra the veil

Man, as being-in-the-world, finds his "mind" and "spirit" nullified. 25 As a result, man appears as

on to point out to man that his life was even more tenuous

"home-less" and the grounds for God are destroyed.

than he had thought; that even such physical matters as the

science thus exteriorized not only the natural world but the

range of temperatures within which he could sustain life was

entire world of substance and form including life and mind.

maintained on earth in barely stable balance.

Its "necessary consequence was the annihilation

this signals that " .•

For Nishitani

in this understanding, the universe

Modern

of all sorts

of 'eidos' (or 'substantial form'), that is, not only of

in its usual state comes to be, for living beings, a world of death." 24 Nishitani cites l1ax Planck as depicting a modern

the substantiality of visible things, but also of the essence of life, soul and the spirit. " 26 Modern science did not,

science which has given us a view of nature devoid of anthro-

25 For Nietzsche this marked the advent of European nihilism. 26 Keiji Nishitani , "Science and Zen," pp. 81-82.

24Keij i Nishi tani, "Science and Zen," trans. R. Det1artino, The Eastern Buddhist, New Series, I. No. 1 (Sept. 1965), p. 79.

42

41

however, trace out the full implications of its

0~1

position.

!1odern science and modern scientists have not generally been self-aware of the consequences of undermining the "pre-established harmony" between the external and internal aspects of life and the world.

"The result is that, on the

one hand, scientists destroy the teleological image of the world with its characteristic of being the environment for life and instead present as the true feature of the world material processes without life and spirit and devoid of telos and meaning; on the other hand, as human beings engaged

res ts in maya, "illusion," and avidya, "ignorance" at the very root of human intellect and is brought on by selfattachment. To subdue these two, various theories and ideologies are contrived, and manifold 'laws'--civil, moral and divine laws for example--are established. But such laws are incapable of cutting the powerful root of self-attachment, and self-attachment appears under the cover of the laws. One falls into pride in one's country, moral pride, pride in one's gods or buddhas. The same holds true for the different ideologies as well . . . . Law is not bad. What is bad is man's way of fixing himself upon some universal as 'being,' his mode of becoming attached to law--in heteronomous, autonomous or 'theonomous' form.28

in scientific research these scientists are living a personal

This has led to a "progress"-oriented glorification of the

existence within a world which constitutes an environment for life." 27 The essential structure of scientific thousht

gradual enlightenment of mankind,

a risen concurrently with Nietzschean atheistic nihilism.

entails certitut:e in two ways: the nature of scientific knowl-

Where scientism led to a naive optimism, Nietzsche's grasp

edge rests on the certainty inherent in mathematical reason-

of the same situation, grounded also on the demise of non-

ing and the result is certainty in the scientist himself as

material, anthropomorphized concepts such as life, spirit,

personal conviction.

It is not, however, a part of the sci-

mind, led him in the opposite direction to a much less naive

entific enterprise to

quesc~on

pessimism.

the assumptions or base upon

This point of view has

He was not, of course, consumed by a pessimistic

which rests the possibility of such certainty-conviction.

and fatalistic nihilism; rather he turned toward an "active

Certainty, as Hegel pointed out, is not necessarily

nihilism" which

t~~th.

Look

a.ll

fo:rn~er

traditional metaphysical

The philosophical position of "scientism" makes its error in

worldviews as confining and exulted in the liberation from

assuming the synonymity of certainty and truth,

these constraints.

This makes

No longer need man, he thought, be worried

the scientific enterprise seem more sophisticated and it re-

about the "idea" of God which was destroyed by modern science.

quires the adoption of scientific rationality as the standard

Instead of confusing the "idea" of God with the very dif-

for a system of value.

28 Keiji Nishitani, "On the I-Thou Relation in Zen Buddhism," p. 84.

27 Ibid., pp. 81-32.

The profound blindness of science

44

43

ferent question of God (as scientism does) Nietzsche affirmed

to consider the consequences of the collapse of the teleo-

life as grasped from the bottom of pessimism, as having moved

logical world view.

through the aperture which lies beneath all being, i.e.,

of teleology like an angel with a sword, or rather like a demon with a sword. " 29 Theologians can no longer try to

nothingness. The rise of modern science and the increase in techno-

"Science has descended upon the world

reorganize the whole system anew into a teleological hier-

logical sophistication have paralleled the decline in tra-

archy under the absolute nature of God and scientists cannot

ditional religious sentiment.

view the \'lorld as reducible to matter and yet live their lives

Religions have been and are

obliged to reexamine the bases and worldviews which ground

as if they were living outside of the material, mechanical

their metaphysics.

world which they observe.

The teleological vie\v can only be seen

In Zen terms there has been a

from the point of modern science to be much too "human," a

"destruction of the house and demolition of the hearth," a

"home" in which man works out his destiny without any clear

break-up of the "nest and cave of the spirit."

perception of his impending doom because of his naive confi-

"fatal" question which reduces man to a question mark.

dence in a sustaining deity or its equivalent.

essence of science can thus be seen to be a problem which

Traditional

This is the The

religions, of course, have resisted in various ways the threat

lies beyond the domain of science.

posed by the modern scientific view of the universe with its

iously confronted the problem posed by his own discipline

callous indifference.

would be accepting the purposelessness of his own investiga-

The resolution of this problem, the

confrontation between scientific and religious views of the world, has been a major part of the task of modern philosophy from Descartes on.

But Descartes' investigation of the physi-

tions. Paradoxically these investigations have thus far most often been carried on by seemingly quite unscientific thinkers

cal sciences is constructed upon the metaphysical base of

such as Nietzsche.

teleological confidence in the existence of God.

Nietzsche

A vicious

The scientist who ser-

declait~

In a passage from A Genealogy of Morals against those who hold to scientism:

and insoluble dualism between mind and body was the direct

"These trumpeters of reality are bad musicians, their voices

consequence of his investigations.

obviously do not come from the depths, the abyss of the sci-

Even Kant's thing-in-it-

~

self left philosophy with the noumenal-phenomenal dualism.

entific conscience does

Again and again, assumptions based upon certainty were taken

the scientific conscience is an abyss--the word 'science' in

to be truth. From Nishitani's point of view, Nietzsche is clearly correct--God is dead--and the task at hand should be

29

speak through them--for today

Keij i Nishi tani, "Science and Zen," p. 85.

46

45

the mouths of such trumpeters is simply an indecency, an abuse, and a piece of impudence." 30 He was not attacking

spirit has been deprived of its hearth.

the scientific enterprise but rather the shallowness of

orientation, pervasive as it is in highly industrialized

those who refuse to pursue this enterprise to its uncompro-

societies, is based on human rationality and the principle

mising end where the question of the essence of science it-

of life, while neglecting to deal with the irrational elements in human existence, especially death. " 32

self can be asked.

suggested, "Modern European culture with its scientific

"This means, in other words, to take

science upon oneself as a fire with which to purge and temper the traditional religions and philosophies, that is, as a new s carting point for the inquiry into the essence of man. " 31 From the viewpoint of science, for example, death is a normal material process.

On our planet, nature makes an en-

vironment for "life" and is the place wherein the "soul" and "spirit" work out history.

Outside this small place the

scientist sees bottomless death, an environment that will not sustain life or form the base for history.

life on this planet which is simply the death of living

But it is the philosophi-

cal or religious conscience which must take up proceedings in an entirely different way, as an existential problem.

3 °Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1969), pp. 146, 147. Keiji Nishitani, "Science and Zen," p. 87.

mankind, a field of absolute negation.

Buddhism spoke of

this in mythological terms when it described the Kalpa Fire as a fact and a

fat~

directly underneath our very feet.

Nishi-

tani cites the Zen koan: A monk asked Tai-sui: 'The all-consuming Kalpa Fire now rages; the thousand great worlds all perish. I wonder, does 'rhis One perish or not?' 'It perishes!'

The monk said: 'If so, does it go off following the other?' (The word 'other' used by the monk here means the universe in the cosmic fire.) 'It goes off following the

Even the inwardness, the inner dimension of transcendence of the "This One" is consumed and must perish with the "other,"

At

this existential level, man's "horne" has been destroyed, his

31

viewing the universe as a field of existential death for all

Tai-sui answered: other.' 33

For the scientist all these phenomena are part of

one continuous material process.

Facing the lifeless materiality of the universe means

Tai-sui answered:

The same sci-

entist (and ourselves as well) sees an "underground" side of

beings.

As Masao Abe has

the universe in the Kalpa Fire.

The demythologization of this

koan lies in its being taken as an indisputable actuality by both the questioner and the questioned, whether these two 32 "B ddh" . . .f.~cance ~n . contemporary ~st N"~rvana: 1ts s1gn~ u thought and life," Living Faiths and Ultimate Goals, ed. S. J. Samartha (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1974), p. 19. 33From the Blue Cliff Collection, quoted by Nishitani in "Science and Zen," pp. 88-89.

47

48

parties be the monk and 1'ai-sui or a layman anc.l a scientist.

lives of the questioners.

The universe as bottomless death is the universe in the Kalpa

de-mythulogized and turned into the religiosity of the Great

Fire.

Death of the questioner as well as of the world itself."

Nishitani points to the atomic bomb and the condition

"The myth of eschatology was thus

of Hiroshima immediately after the fall of the bomb as evi-

"And this was made possible through the process in which the

dence of that hidden scientific actuality openly manifesting

s cientific actuality of the cosmos, or the cosmos in its

itself as an actuality in the human realm.

addressed on the religious dimension wherein the essence of

aspect of abyssal death, was transmuted into the reality of t he religious existence of the Great Death. " 36 The essence

science becomes a question to itself and scientific actual-

of science must be questioned in an inseparable correlation

ity is taken as existential actuality.

with the essence of man.

The koan must be

For the monk and for

On the religious dimension, de-

us the question must be put forth while standing on the di-

mythologization of the mythical and existentializa tion of

mension where the universe has become a field for the "aban-

t he scientific are one process.

cloning of oneself and the throwing away of one's own life."

ary view of the essential nature of man, Buddhism offered a

The Zen master T' ou- tzu described the kalpa fire as "An unspeakably awesome cold! " 34 The deadly nature of such cold

more basic and permanent principle of social transformation

breaks down the teleological view of the natural world (when taken at the common-sense level) and also the whole world of

very beginning, Buddhism was a religion that indicated the path to transcend the 'w;:>rld. '" 37 The community of Budd-

the soul, reason, and spirit based upon it (when pursuing the

hists, the sangha, was based on the negation of all sorts of

rational consequences of such a break-down).

"worldly" differentiations, social as well as psychological.

"It means a

breaking-through of everything 'inner' on all levels-- . . . ,

By opening up a revolution-

t han could ever be offered by a mere ideology.

"From its

If Nishitani speaks of the "killing sword" he means

it means the spiritual 'destruction of the house and demolition of the hearth. '" 35 The life-inhibiting universe of

sui' s declaration is "a piece of ice glistening in the midst

modern science is thus exposed as the field of the Great

of a (kalpa) fire (which burns up all things~" 38

Death in actual existence and the answers of the Zen masters

master's answer is an expression of the universe and thus of

are offered as places for that Great Death in the actual 34

also the "sword which gives life."

T6

37

Quoted by Nishitani in 'Science and Zen," p. 90.

35 Ibid., p. 91.

The "This One" in Tai-

The Zen

Ibid., p. 91.

Keiji Nishitani, "The Awakening of Self in Buddhism," trans. Shojun Bando, The Eastern Buddhist, New Series, I. No.2 (Sept. 1966), p. 3. 38 Keiji Nishitani, "Science and Zen," p. 92, parenthetical additions mine.

50

49

life-environment which fears these ordinary scientific

himself and it offers the Aletheia (truth) in Heidegger's

actualities just as earlier man feared the fires of hell,

sense of unhidden and presenting itself to the monk; the

the darkness of the underworld or the kalpa fires.

monk is taken in and offered his salvation on the field where he exists as himself in his own Aletheia (truth).

At

precisely the point where everything is negated, there is indicated the path to life.

"Something 'iliU!lortal' or rather,

in Buddhistic terminology, something which is 'unborn as well as imperishable'--something which lies beyond the duality of life and death, which is increate and immortal--stands there self-exposed." 39 Everything that subsists has its subsistence in being purged by the kalpa fire, i.e., by being brought to the abyss of nothing where the path to life is found.

Here

man sees that there is nothing at the base of his egoistic self and comes face to face with his "unborn self" or "original face."

Nishitani's clear point is that in order to

realize (actualize and comprehend) this original face, man must move in his own existence through the Great Death, the radical confrontation with the nihilum which lies beneath this material world.

For Tai-sui and for Nishitani the

mythical kalpa fire and scientific actuality are both "Truthin-itself" as aspects of the reality of religious existence. The kalpa fire is really an aspect of ordinary existence. It is this in the same way that extraordinarily hot or cold temperatures (which will not sustain life) are part of the ordinary worlds as known by science. 39Ibid.

History unfolds in a

Even

the idea of the end of the world comes to be seen as a scien tific actuality rather than a myth.

The end of the world,

however, with the implication of the end of all teleological vi ews and the end of history, implies something abyssal, a bottomless death.

When this end of the world is grasped by

existential man as actually underlying his present existence, this abyssal, bottomless death becomes a present actuality. When such an acceptance takes place, the temperature of co smic matter and all other natural phenomena can be taken as something abyssal in spite of its being finite, and as be ing necessarily finite however far out on its quantitative sp ectrum it exists.

The reduction of these phenomena to

quantitative or even mathematical relations can thus be accepted as they are into the dimension of bottomlessness. By this we recognize that both natural and abstract forms can be accepted as truth in any particular discipline, e.g., chemistry, biology, etc. but also that they are more deeply truth-full and factual when transposed into the qualitatively infinite dimension of bottomlessness. It can be said to be the place where concrete facts of nature emerge presenting themselves as they actually are and of more 'truth' than when they are ordinarily experienced as true facts, and the place where scientific truths emerge presenting themselves as they actually are and of more 'fact' than when they are ordinarily thought

52

51

me chanistically to material processes and further to mathe-

of as truths concerning facts. 40 Here the Leibnizian distinction between factual and eternal truth obtains on the same level where all facts and truths are ultimately pragma and ultimately logos at the same time. This occurs, however, only through a religious existence which accepts the universe as the place for the abandonment of oneself and the throwing away of ones life.

The true be-

ing of a thing occurs only on the dimension of bottomlessness/ nothingness.

This dimension is "the field where all phe-

nomena are of even more fact and of even more truth--the field of the Sole Self-exposed One in the midst of all phenomena." 41 Nishitani suggests it is an undeniable fact of existence that there are phenomena that we label consciousness, life, spirit, etc.

Even science cannot deny the world in which

living beings live and adapt to their environment or that phenomena such as we have labelled feelings,emotion, will and thinking have evolved. This is the so-called "abiding aspect of all phenomena." 42 This is the ~oJorld where even reductionists "reduce."

These phenomena are the base mater-

ials which were then organized into a now discredited teleological worldview.

The world of concrete things, where

"mountains are mountains and rivers are rivers" can be reduced

matical formulas.

But the eidos or forms can never be de-

duced from these formulas. direction.

The process works only in one

We may conclude that all "forms" can be con-

si dered to be an idea or representation in our consciousness further reducible to activities of the brain cells but these th~:

cells also belong to

world of "forms" in their own turn.

Man's intellect, like everything else in its aspect of eidos, can be reduced from a whole into its component parts but t hat intellect is incapable of constructing its eidos out of mere component parts.

Things in their eidos are a qualita-

tive unity and are unanalyzable.

It is not just that a mind

or intellect is "more than" the sum of its component parts, it is a qualitative unity while its component parts (taken now as parts of a larger whole and not in their own eidos aspect) are seen quantiatively.

The world is, when viewed

in terms of its eidos character, thoroughly of an cidos character.

This eidos or form character can only be truly re-

vealed on the dimension of nothingness whereas its (the world's) quantitative and reducible character is seen in the scientific world, the world of conscious intellection, rationality.

II

it is the field of emptiness (sunyata)

or absolute Non-being--or what may perhaps be called the 40

Ibid., p. 95. 41 Ibid. , p. 96. 42 Keiji Nishitani, "On the !-Thou Relation in Zen Buddhism," p. 84.

None in contrast to, and beyond the One--which enables the manifold phenomena to attain their true Being and realize their real Truth." 43 This None is not something cognizable 43

Keiji Nishitani, "Science and Zen," p. 98.

54

53

which we might reach via the way of object-cognition in

mutual interp enetration of all things wherein they are cancelled,

everyday experience and scientific inquiry.

elevated and preserved; a world where "iron trees come into

Self-conscious-

ness, because it is condition bound by the noesis-noema dichot-

blossom in the spring beyond the kalpas."

amy, cannot see or grasp itself except by seeing or grasping

essence of religious existence; as the Sole Self-exposed One

something; and the None is not something.

it is the Truth (Aletheia) itself.

This is the point

This field is the

This is, of course, only

of representation where the self sees itself as an idea pro-

one aspect of religious existence, the positive aspect in

jected upon its consciousness.

which all things give testimony of their ultimate factuality

The field of our environment

and of the objective world are normally taken to be extensions

and truth through the Sole Self-exposed One as Truth itself.

outside of us and the objects perceived and experienced

This is also the positive aspect of the Self.

therein to be the world itself.

aspect, the negative aspect, is the equally ultimate and true

But when expereinced from

The other

the field of emptiness, these objects are more truly perceived

"Sole Self-exposed One in the midst of all things"; this is

and experienceu; they present themselves as they actually are

its hidden aspect in which it has the character of appearance.

in their true factuality.

When we become aware of somet:hing in an extra-ordinary man-

This is their like-reality .

"The

world presenting itself on such a field of bottomlessness

ner or in its hidden aspect we mean "that something in this

lies beyond both the mechanistically viewed world and the

world (e.g. a mountain) is not just received as such, as in

teleologically viewed world.

daily expereince, but is distinguished from among other

and both of them.

It is at once neither of them

In this world, neither is any living be-

things as if it originated in a deeper essence.

It is not

ing whatever, with or without a soul or spirit, 'reduced' to

a supernatural being from a supernatural world, but a cer-

a material mechanism nor is any material thing whatever re-

tain thing found in the natural world presenting itself as

garded as 1iving,' endowed with a 'soul.'

if on a supernatural plane.

This world is

Yet it is actually a natural

neither the merely 'scientific' world nor the merely 'mythi-

presence in reality but revealing its true and authentic na-

cal' world, neither the world of mere 'matter' nor the world

ture.

of mere 'life'; in other words, neither the world merely in

it is not an eternal being from an eternal world, but some-

its aspect of death nor the world merely in its aspect of

thing in the middle of the movement of time presenting itself as though on a timeless plane." 45 This is the Self

l ~"f e. .. 44

This is the circuminsessional interpenetration or

44Ibid, , p. 99 ·

It shows 'inactivity' as if 'time' had stopped, but

45 Keiji Nishitani, "The Concept of Kami," Offprint from Proceedings of the Second International conference for Shinto Studies, no date.

56

55

as the field in which all things "appear" as the maya-like veil of representation and illusion. and phenomena hide?

What is it that things

What is the ultimate "reality" or

"truth" which they as appearances cover? the True Self.

It is of course

This True Self has these dual aspects of both

appearing and hiding itself at one and the same time. The Sole Self-Exposed One is none other than what appears in and as all things (or phenomena), thereby hiding Itself as Itself; so that it makes, by hiding Itself as Itself, all things (or phenomena) Its own 'appearances' with their character of unreality and untruth, and at the same time gives to the same appearances, in and as which It appears, the character of truth and reality which ail things (or phenomena) have as 'gacts.' These two aspects are essentially inseparable, they constitute one and the same essence of the religious existence.46 It is its capacity for hiding the "forms" that makes the modern scientific enterprise an affeccaLiun of the latter, negative direction.

;_ .L.&.I.

~~~

""~·-

~~-o~~~~M

sented as appearances of "matter" or physical processes which science must reduce to their smallest quantifiable component parts (ignorant afits inability to see that the qualitative Science, in

this standpoint, is still confined to viewing itself from within itself, i.e., from the subjective to the objective, and is thus directly analogous to the representational perspective of many philosophers, such as Descartes, who idealized or represented the self as incapable of doubting itself, and, also like Descartes, failed to doubt existentially as 46 Keiji Nishitani, "Science and Zen," p. 101.

put it:

As a modern western commentator has

"The crux of the matter is not one's attitude toward

science and technology, . . • Instead, it is our conception of reason, , . . When the pride of the scientific revolutionary ts diluted by time, the result is sadness and, finally, anxi ety and nausea.

These are the last emotions of a deca4 dent enlightenment, " 7 The point is not chat the efforts of

sci ence or such philosophers as Descartes are ill-conceived but that they are merely conceived; neither goes far enough. Eac h sees the things, the phenomena (whether as ideas or matter ) but does not see the Self "in the midst of all things." Though Nishitani does not, we might go on to point out that there are many other analogies to these two efforts. eAawpla,

~he

.:.J- -t-- . . '' "'.t..uc-,::n.&.uw

•t ...

_t.. _______

_ :

.. \.. ....

~o-uQJ..Cl'-'-C4

V•

wu.\:..

--.:--1

-~ .. t-'u}~.t..\-a..J..

For

---'

QU\.l

--- ....

.,.

IIICU L..d.J.

----- ---··

All phenomena are repre-

eidos of each part is itself not reducible) .

well as rationally.

achievements of some of the more famous yogins and even practitioners of the Asian martial arts are of this sort. In the midst of these things and phenomena (and rarely sought after) stands the Sole Self-Exposed One.

We might say that

the words and activities of the charlatan are the work of Hara or the devil because they overemphasize the "hidden" aspect of religious existence and rarely, if at all, show the "appearing" or "revealing" aspect,

This is often true of

various doctrines of traditional religions which, in a new age, require de-mythologizing. Nishitani relates a tale which makes such a point:

47 stanley Rosen, Nihilism: A Philosolhical Essay (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), p. 1 0.

57

Once there came to China an Indian monk who was famous because of his ability to discriminate various sounds and voices. A king invited Hslian-sha, a great Zen master of the 9th century, to subject the Indian monk to a test. The master struck an iron kettle with a copper tong and asked the monk: 't.fuat sound is this?' The monk answered: 'A sound of copper and iron.' Hearing this, the master said to the king: 'Oh, my king, don't be deceived by strangers. '48 It is not that there is no truth in the monk's answer.

There

58

The s ame is true of positions which speak of the sacred and the profane and regard the "wholly other" (ganz andere) as th e center of religious experience.

This homo-centric per-

spe ctive is, of course, best represented in "mythical" religions in which the anthropocentric orientation appears in its archetypal genuineness.

Most traditional religions and cer-

is a similar kind of truth in the second law of thermo-

tainly the Judea-Christian-Islamic complex retain their con-

dynamics or in Einstein's theory of relativity.

ne ctions to this mythic structure, however de-mythologized.

It is simply

that such an answer focuses upon the thing rather than the

They are never, and usually do not choose to be, liberated

Self standing in the midst of things.

f rom such an orientation.

This perspective is

reflected in Hsuan-sha's remark to the king.

This is True

Suchness (Tathata) as it is called in Buddhism. Traditional religions, like science, have generally for-

The radical difference between modern science and traditional religions is that the former knows no limitation imposed by any teleological perspective.

The universe as

mulated their doctrines and oriented their practices toward

viewed by modern science is not man-centered because it can-

men; even "God" or "the gods" have functioned largely with

not be understood simply as an environment for man.

the demands of man as their

laws of the universe apply to all species, even other inr.el-

fo~us.

It is easy to see why,

The

then, when man tries to understand himself as homo religiosus,

ligent life if there were any on other planets.

he has, as Freud observed, made God in his own image and con-

simple to see why modern science must view early teleologi-

sequently been both the starting point and the telos of his

cal views as simple-minded products of the imagination and

inquiry.

see the expansion of its own data-bank as a movement from

In this view, the world is viewed in the same per-

It is quite

spective as the gift of God (or the gods) to man as his en-

fantasy to enlightenment.

vironment to be used toward his own ends.

physics have, since the rise of modern science, largely had

Even the radically

Traditional religions and meta-

thea-centric perspective which laments the homo-centric em-

to occupy their time finding a way to reconcile their doc-

phasis of other views is ultimately man-oriented since its

trine of man (and God, when retained) with an ever shifting,

God is always exclusively concerned with man and his history.

constantly new image of the universe which is now seen, not

48

as infinitely manipulable by man, but, as constantly threatenKeiji Nishitani, "Science and Zen," p. 102. ing the very existence of man.

"The fact that man has be-

59

come again a question mark means, after all, that traditional religions have become radically problematical. " 49 At the same time there are difficulties within science

60

mechanisms of nature, society and human consciousness?"SO The sciences can only try to answer such a question by trying to reduce it or inquire into its mechanisms.

In Nishi-

in that it has been unable to get at the essence of man in

tani's view, what is needed is an investigation which shares

spite of brilliant progress in other matters.

both aspects of religious existence.

It has demon-

The mechanically viewed

strated more than adequately that it is itself inadequate

universe should be accepted existentially as the field of

for such an investigation into the nature of the Self.

the Great Death of man where he "abandons himself and throws

We

need not limit our criticism of science here to the natural

away his own life."

sciences; the social sciences, especially insofar as they

be taken as such in the field of bottomlessness-nothingness

have increasingly tended to be reductionistic, have at best

where every fact of the universe emerges as true fact.

been able to clarify certain mechanisms of society, history

is require d "is a standpoint which is beyond the teleologi-

and the consciousness.

cal as well as the mechanistic view of the world or, in

An existential quest or investiga-

At the same time, this universe should

What

tion of man by man himself is necessary and, ironically, this

other words, beyond the two world-images, one the qualita-

has been hampered by the very "scientific" investigation in

tive and consisting of concrete eidos-varieties, and the

the natural and social sciences which hoped to shed some

other the quantitativeand yielding to an indefinite analy-

light on the problem.

sis."51

This is because of the confusion which

arises in mistaking the things for the Self which stands in

woman dance." Nishitani is suggesting that just as the universal laws

its midst and also because of the tremendous upheaval of tradition wrought by the natural and social sciences.

Here we could see "a wooden man sing and a stone

The

of nature and the universe hold true of all possible forms

science which regards man as mere mechanism leads men in

of intelligent life, this same cosmic universality must apply

general to the same mistaken conclusion.

to the contents of the teachings of religions.

Man thus comes to

lose both his essential and substantial form as "man."

"There

Such species

of living beings endowed with intelligence, should they

remains, however, one basic question: what on earth is this

actually exist, might have entirely different forms of ex-

man himself who is endowed with, among other abilities, the

istence, different eidos-varie:ti.es.

very capacity of inquiring in so scientific a way into the

vironment, society and history of such species (and Nishi-

49rbiu., p. 10s.

50

rbid., p. 106.

Sllbid., p. 107.

Given the different en-

61

62

tani suggests, as Buddhism suggests in speaking of sentient beings, that the range of the species here on earth is

III. Myth

wider than normally treated by traditional teleological world-

The study of myth unlike the study of science usually

views) any standpoint which has access to the essence of man

carries with it the connotation of the study of something out

must go beyond the teleological perspective which has refer-

of the distant past.

ence to man only.

and not a necessary one.

As Masao Abe suggests, "This dynamic in-

Certainly this is only a common notion In point of fact it is necessary

terrelationship occurs in the common realization of egoless-

to examine the position of myth just as carefully as the

ness and Emptiness.

position of science if one wishes to clarify the relation-

This realization provides the Buddhist

foundation for man in true community.

Furthermore, this

ship between science and religion or to get at the meaning

realization applies not only to man's relationship to man, but all things in nature, from dogs to mountains." 52 In

and significance of religion.

Nishitani' s view, Buddhism, especially Zen, while needing

cluding worldview, practical, private and social life were

to be amended in various ways, has pointed to such a future

addressed from and understooci on a religious perspective.

direction toward a cosmic universality, and, thus, to a solu-

our own time, and concurrently with its rise, science has come

cion to the problem of science and religion.

to occupy this integrating perspective.

The impact of

Buddhism has, of course, declined in the modern world.

To

In medieval times all aspects of human existence in-

In

The struggle between

religion and science has been occurring from untraceable anti-

Nishitani this is largely because "it has penetrated too

quity but has moved to the fore in recent centuries, eventu-

pervasively into our daily life; it has changed into a sort

ally replacing religion and then even philosophy as the con-

of social custom and has fallen into a state of stagnation.

troll ing force in many fields of human life.

. . . Buddhism is not a so-called 'social movement'; it rather

that Nishitani does not resent this shift as inevitably bad

transforms man's inner mind radically, and develops man's

but notes its significance in paralleling the increasing

most basic being into a flowering that it has never reached

shift toward rationality and the consequent attack against

before.

irrational factors contained in one way or other in the mind

In short, it has become a moving force in society by opening up a way to transform man himself. " 53

p. 1.

52 Hasao Abe, ibid. , p. 20. 53 Keiji Nishitani, "The Awakening of Self in Buddhism,"

and life of human beings.

We should say

Typically in such encounters,

rel igion was regarded as irrational, mere myth "understood as superstition based on fantasy or illusion, or as the pr i mitive way of thinking before the appearance of rational

63

thinking ... 54

64

new forms, the power that continues to

Nishitani observes two tendencies which have emerged

in the deepest roots of our life.

work in the present

This is what was meant by

from the consideration of rationalism (and science) as anti-

Plato's doctrine of anamnesis in one of its implications.

religious and the emerging dominance of scientific rational-

For Plato, cognition was the soul returning to its home-

ism as the appropriate means of inquiring into the nature of

groun d to avoid the illusions and suffering brought about

life in this world.

by sensory experience.

The first tendency is that toward the

total mechanization of human life.

m1at Nishitani means by

tVhat Nishitani means by recollection

is different in that he is dealing with historical existence

this is, first, that the world is understood mechanically,

rather than cognition.

and secondly, that human social relations and even the way

foun tainhead or

of thinking, or the human mind and spirit, are gradually

cultural life, i.e., to return to the mythical world as the

mechani=ed.

beginning of every culture, the origin from

Virtually all modern writers are aware of and

have written on this phenomenon.

Perhaps the great problem

He is arguing for a return to the

hom~-ground

of the present historical and

culture came, as from the mother's womb.

1~hich

every

This is not a

of our time is the gradual fragmentation of our lives which

simple return to the past, a re-enactment of the past brought

is the result of the weakening of the view of life as organic

about as a result of a "nostalgia for paradise." 56

by mechanistic reduction.

place in the present, at itsvery depths.

The introspective way of reflect-

It takes

This second tendency

ing inwardly and of deepening the awareness of the ultimate

represents a fundamental aspiration to overcome the mechanized

depths of one's being is being gradually forgotten.

world in a thorough-going way.

The second tendency, actually a persistence in spite of

task.

It is not, of course, a simple

The problem is that it is an undeniable fact that sci-

the first tendency , "is a tendency to recollect the perspective

ence has broken down for all time many of the beliefs which

which is in opposition to science, namely, the perspective

were necessary to the sustenance of much of mythology.

of myth, in which a view based on life or organically ani-

scientific way of thinking broke down the very foundations

mated nature appears in its most pristine form ... ss

This is

not a movement to the past but an attecpt to see , perhaps in 5 ~eiji Nishitani, "The Problem of Myth," Religious Studies in Japan (Tokyo: The Maruzen Company, LTD., 1959),

p.

51.

55 Ibid.

56

The

This "archaic therapy" differs in large part because it is conceived as a means by which man is rendered contemporary with Creation or some primal creative power. Buddhism argues for the extinction of this nostalgia or attachment to some supposed time of an initial plentitude of being. For a more complete discussion of this phenomenon see: Mircea Eliade, Hyths, Dreams and Nbs teries, trans. Philip Mairet (New York : Harper & Row, Pu lishers, 1967), especially chapter III.

66

65

of myth in such a way that much of the development of traditional western religion has taken on the character of a more or less orderly retreat in the face of an ever-encroaching scientific rationalism.

It is not simply a uni-direc-

tional movement, however, since as Nishitani observes, there is a more or less religious sense of despair that has resisted the onslaught of science and rendered its progress a rather hollow victory.

The mythical and scientific are mutu-

ally breaking one another down.

Nishitani describes them

as "fatally stabbing each other at the heart of their respective positions • .,S]

We might even view the history of

modern thought as a pendulum swinging between these two positions.

When science dominates there emerges a position which

emphasizes something unanalyzable by the scientifc method such as emotion, life, experience or inspiration.

The pendu-

lum even seems to swing within the disciplines representative of the two poses; there are mathematical and "psycho"logical sciences and there are rationalist and "mytho"logical religions.

\fuat is crucial is that none of these

It was in this context that nihilism arose as a problem Its base is, according to Nishitani,

the conflict between myth and science.

It is also an attempt to reckon

with the destructive "insatiable cognitive drive" oi the scientific and rational way of understanding.

Nietzsche

himse lf suggests that out of this problem nihilism arose.

58

The conscience of science to which he refers is the conscience of the scientist as an "existential" human being; in this being is felt the abyss.

To the extent that such a

scientist carries out his work in a mechanical world by a mec hanized methodology he does not grasp the essence of science as an abyss.

It is only when he has taken science as

a part of his own existence that he becomes a question to himself.

When he accepts the standpoint of science as his own

'personal' problem and tries to carry it out conscientiously, he experiences great distress.

Such a scientist cannot help

but destroy, within himself, the grounds for human nature, morality, even the ground for God. This does not mean that scientists are generally pessimistic; quite to the contrary they are usually quite confi dent that reason will prevail over irrationality.

They

ar e intellectually but not existentially involved in their

alone can sustain human life.

of culture and thought.

torical life and culture.

He considers Nie-

tzsche's The Birth of Tragedy to be an effort to grasp something mythical as the most fundamental element of our his57 Keiji Nishitani, "The Problem of Myth," p. 53.

work and its implications.

This means that they do not take

t heir ground on Nietzsche's conscience (which ought to be the ground of their science) nor see themselves suspended over any abyss.

Instead they profess a sort of intellectual

atheism; God is dead for such scientists for material rea58 see the third essay, section 23 of his The Genealogy Of Morals.

67

sons, not for existential reasons.

68

and direct union of these three factors; a kind of mobile

We might say that religion is "ahead" of science if only

and dynamic relationship in which distinctions are barely

in the sense that because it is most existentially threatened

discernible.

with extinction it is more keenly aware that its position in

ing in images.

relation to science is one of mutually destroying the foundations of each other.

Because of this recognition we might

This is the position of imagination or think-

Of course myth is usually thought of in terms of the fanta stic as though it were conjured up like a day-dream in

say, as Nishitani seems to feel, that religion is in a bet-

the consciousness.

ter place to see and realize its potential for the future by

accurate picture of the ioagination.

penetrating to the base of history where religion and science

imaginar:ion should be thought of as conforming to the "forms"

are destroying each other, and where nihilism originates.

(eidos) of things.

Clearly nihilism is one of the most basic problems of con-

phenomena and even the imagined "forms" of spirits, deities,

temporary religion.

ange ls , etc.

This is not a mere frivolous intellect-

ual nihilism; Nishitani likens it to a "submarine earthquake." The more superficial

d~spair

and fragmentation we ordinarily

This is not the real function nor an The function of the

This covers natural, historical, social

"Every being, as it exists, is always found

having its own eidos.

A man is, having the 'form' of the

man; and a pine tree is, having the 'form' of the pine tree.

feel are extensions of the real problem just as tidal waves

What is called 'form' here covers not only a visible form

are the extension of more serious shocks at the depths of the

but also an invisible eidos, namely, the substance of a thing.

sea.

No matter how highly the various social and scientific

. In the case of myth, a 'thing' is there, which in its

theories and solutions are refined they will hide the more

be i ng, cannot be distinguished from other various 'things,'

serious problem.

or as what, ontologically speaking, mutually flows into and among other things, so to speak. " 59 This is equally true of

Nishi tani sees the problem between science and religion as properly focused throughout history on the relations

s elves and deities.

among three things: God (or his philosophical equivalent),

f antasy nor a "faculty" in the consciousness of an individual.

the world (taken as all phenomena), and the soul (or more

It is a thinking which mutually interpenetrates all "things."

properly, the self as subjective being).

At this level, the "individual" as self-conscious or in its

Certainly these

constitute the three pillars of traditional religions and metaphysics in the West.

In this context, myth is usually

taken as arising out of a view which assumes the complete

Imagination is neither "subjective"

subjectivity does not yet appear.

For Nishitani imagination

59 Keiji Nishitani, "The Problem of Hyth," p. 58.

70

69

is nothing but a fundamental way of "existence" of man in

and has only an abstract universal relation to the world.

the world of "things."

These three--materialism, technology, and abstract reason

This is in obvious disagreement with

in their interrelationships--break down the mythic position

thinking of imagination from the epistemological point of view as a mere faculty of human consciousness. 60 Myth and

which maintains a living relation between God, man and the

imagination are more essentially a sort of existential way

world. Phi losophy has tried to find a base upon which these dis-

of living. The history of western thought has often been considered as a progressive breaking down of mythos by logos. 61 Demo-

parate views can be rectified and reunified.

critus was one of the first (along with Thales and Heraclitus)

Greek society as a result of Democritean views of the world.

co see the world from within, and from the perspective of,

His phi losophy of the "ideas" was his attempt co deal with

the world itself.

this problem as Nishitani sees it.

Here already the world comes to be seen

Plato's dia-

logues are partly directed against the ills which befell

We might well observe

mechanically and atomistically, cutting off the relation be-

that the philosophical enterprise seems to have broken down

tween God and man.

or in many cases to have sold out to the scientific enter-

As the precursor of modern science we

have here a world understood as dead and material.

This is

prise.

At any rate, it eventuated in Nietzsche's views on

the first consequence of the position of logos dominating

nihilis m and his attempt to deal with this consequence of sci-

mythos.

entific rationalism.

Consequent upon this materialism arises the second

These are the problems which Nishitani

characteristic wherein the life and faculties of human be-

wishes to treat in terms of the Buddhist analysis of sunyata

ings take on a technical quality in which the living relation-

(nothingness).

ship between God and the world is cut off.

In this view man

rules and conquers nature by his own power through his "technique," i.e., he is more technically oriented.

Finally the

scientific way of understanding breaks down the living relation between the world and the self.

Man becomes egocentric

60 Nishitani cites Ernst Cassirer as a proponent of such

a view.

72

proponent. CHAPTER II

In some respects the Buddhist theory of karma

rests, as does its Indian antecedent doctrine, on the observation of the large number of human beings at any given point

THE PARAMETERS OF THE INQUIRY: of time who do not realize or believe that the religious NISHIT&~I'S

UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF RELIGION quest i s of any significance to them. I.

Dharma

The theory argues

that t hough such persons do not at that moment understand

At heart, the central problem of all religions is the

the nature of suffering or even that they suffer, they will

The Buddha said, "A brother who is concentrated knows a thing as it really is." 1 The remark in-

eventually understand this condition.

valves all three of the Jewels or Treasures of Buddhism.

condi tion and the facticity of the force behind the theory

Said by the Buddha, it becomes therefore part of his Dharma-

is irrelevant.

body; said of a brother it thus involves the Sangha.

profane is another way of recognizing this varying degree of

problem of Reality.

As a

problem of the sangha it involves the relationship between religious men, of man to man.

The Three Treasures are, of

Karma functions as

the normative assertion that all men should recognize this

The distinction between the sacred and the

awareness among men. Of the Three Treasures, Nishitani deals primarily with

course, essentially one in their indication of the nature of

Dharma in coming to grips with Reality.

Reality: "Three Treasures make one body, one Truth, one Re-

poin ts suggested by Nishitani for grasping the complexity

ality."

of t he Dharma are the ontological and the epistemological.

~·

Man is, according to Nishitani Keiji, homo religiTo argue that all men are h0mo religiosus is a value-

laden assertion.

It is really to argue that all men should

Two of the view-

Dharma has, on the one hand, the side of being.

This is to

say that existing things can lead to True Being.

Considera-

be homo religiosus, a normative statement about which there

tions of this nature belong in the ontological realm of

may be certainty in the mind of the person making such an

thought and philosophy.

assertion but about which there can be no objective proof.

side of doctrine of knowledge of True Beings.

When a wise man (however we may define wisdom) makes such an

considered as Teachings.

assertion we may be convinced--but not so much by the claim

thei r truth to their grounding in True Being, in Reality.

to truth of the assertion as by the rhetorical force of the

This type of consideration belongs to the epistemological

Kenneth Ch'en, Buddhism: The Light of Asia (Woodbury, N.Y .: Barron's Educational Series, Inc . , 1968), p. 41.

realm of cognition.

On the other hand, Dharma has the Here Truth is

The teachings of the Buddha owe

By all considerations, Truth in being

and Truth in knowledge are One Truth, identical.

Nishitani

74

73

sums it up as a problem of metaphysics, much on the order of

ual man presupposes as man.

Aristotle's First or Fundamental Philosophy.

ceived a s the "field" on which all men are viewed as actual.

"True Knowledge i s the Truth which can be grasped by True Being." 2 Searching for an adequate western equivalent for dharma

Being, or actuality, is con-

Here we ask questions about and consider the conscience (social, political, etc.) and those problems which make exis-

l eaves us largely confused though logos seems to come close.

tence possible here.

Wilfred Cantwell Smith suggests the close relationship between

ity. II

This is not "transcendental possibil-

"What is man in his essence?" is an inquiry on the level

dharma and "God" by arguing that dharma is a pre-existent Truth to which Buddha awoke, i.e., by emphasizing its salvific

of transcendental possibility, of Being-itself.

force as moral law.

level of dharma, of logos.

"He became a Buddha by discovering what

This is the

Existentialism attempts to view

if we were to speak in Greek terms we could only call the preexistent logos. " 3 As the 'brder prevailing in things" it sig-

man in his transcendental possibility according to Nishitani

nifies to Nishitani a kind of cosmic order while at the same

cept of Dread and Heidegger's notion of death as ultimate

time meaning "knowledge," "reason."

possib ility.

Objectively it means law,

order, concept, the contents of knowledge.

Subjectively it

means speech or words, drawing on the infinitive legein, "to

and he is fond of citing the work of Kierkegaard on the con-

The existentialist has once again spoken with

understanding of ekstasis, in the sense of "to stand out of," to transcend the duality of subject/object.

speak," "to pronounce."

Nishitani cites a phrase in the Prajnaparamitahridaya-

man's Being, viewed in its ultimate dimensions; not of man

as one of the most important in Mahayana Buddhism. The phrase is rupam sunyata, "form (that:) is emptiness." 5 The

as being, ! posteriori, as already existing.

distinction is one between "to be" (reality) and "to appear"

At its base dharma is a problem of Being-itself; of

The problem of

man in his essence is a priori; it concerns his "transcendental possibility." 4 The! priori is that which every act2 Keiji Nishitani, "Topics in Buddhist Thought," an unpublished lecture delivered at Temple University, Philadelphia on Septemb<>r 1.9, 1969, hereinafter referred to as "Topics." 3 wilfred Cantwell Smith, "Religious Atheism? Early Buddhist and Recent American," Milla ~-Milla 6 (Dec. 1966), 10-ll. 4 Keij i Nishi tani , "Topics." This use of the word "transcendental" will later be explained more specifically

~

(as when manifesting itself, revealing itself).

Within these

distinctions appears the problem of Truth and Illusion. one side Reality makes being really actual.

On

The quest for

Reality should be in some way brought out (through appearance) as the "yonder-side" or "this-side." It is also used as synonymo us with "trans-metaphysical." It refers to the "place" of sunyata or prajna and is often expressed in paradox as in "sams ara-sive-nirvana." This possibility, trans-metaphysicali ty, iSinOt the object of some assertion but is the presuppos ed ground of all assertions. 5 Ke i ji Nishitani, "Topics," Oct. 10, 1969.

76

75

as it is, as such. ance.

We must know how it is even in appear-

There is , then, a duality between Reality-manifest-

ing-itself and Reality-as-it-is-manifested,

The solution

the true state of all things, i.e., the Middle Path."

7

Re-

ality, Truth, Purity; these are names for man's transcendental possibility, his suchness, when seen from different

of the duality or the problem comes only when "to appear" is

perspectives.

If the problem is stated ontologically we

one and the same with "to be."

seek Reality.

If it is stated epistemologically we seek to

On what "place," what "di-

mension" is this possible?--the Void.

Emptiness has been

opened as this dimension.

know the Truth. Purity .

The problem of Reality can be stated many ways.

Budd-

Ethically or existentially we strive for

The problem of man is not consumed by Real Reality

or actuality.

There remains the Really Real Reality as well

hisr.: considers it in relation to tathata or "suchness" tJhich means, basically, "to know a thing au it really is." 6 The

of man .

term did not mean the same thing to every sect and school of

self, yet one's belief is rooted in the relation between

Buddhism but it figured in the concerns of all of them.

Real ity and self.

Takakusu summarizes its role in Buddhist thought in this

reali zation of man was brought about on the basis of none

way: "To see the true nature or the true state of

other than the Buddhist standpoint of non-ego.

al.l.

things

as our attitude tmvard Reality, i.e., the "belief" or "faith" God, or Reality, cannot be sought without giving up

What is distinctive is the "fact that the

The event is

is not to find one in many or one before many, not is it to

fundamentally different from its western counterpart which

distinguish unity from diversity or the static from the dy-

occurred at the dawn of the modern era and in which man's

namic.

reali zation of himself took place in the form of the realization of ego." 8 Reality manifests itself in the spiritual

The true

condition.

~

is the

~

without any special

It is, in fact, 'the true reality t>lithout a re-

ality,' i.e., without any specific character or nature.' . This amounts to saying that we see inaction in action

even ts of men.

In the domain of "things in their everyday

sense," then, the problem of man is dealt with by natural

and action in inaction, immotion in motion and motion in

science along with the social and political sciences.

imrnotion, calm in wave and wave in calm.

the domain of Being-itself and Reality the problem of man is

We thus arrive at

6"What is Religion?" trans. Janice IJ. Rowe, revised Nishitani Keiji, Philosophical Studies of Jaean, II, Tokyo, 1960 p. 41. Chapter one of Shtikyo to wa Namka ("What is Religi on? ")I Sobunsha, 1961. Tathata or suchness is a term of Chinese origin. Nishitani uses this term extensively, considering it to be one of the keywords of Japanese religiosity. It translates the word nyojitsu or the expression ari ££ ~·

In

7JunjirO Takakusu, The Essentials v • u~~-·~w~ . . . --~w~,.. .., ed. Wing-tsit Chan and Charles A. Moore C 1 1 ~n· Appliance Co., Ltd., 1956), pp. 46-47. 8Keiji ~ishitani, "The Awakening of Self in Buddhism," p. 6.

78

77

a religious or philosophical one.

Emptiness is trans-meta-

sophical reflection disappears in the immediacy of everyday

physically and trans-ontologically beyond even this domain--

experience .

and at the same time tvithin all these domains.

William James, Henri Bergson and John Dewey, Nishitani speaks

"Now when

Drawing upon the insights of Nishida Kitaro,

man casts off his small self and piously enters Reality,

of cons ciousness in its immediacy.

Great Wisdom (prajna) opens up as the native place of all

suggests, this is even more evident though it is not merely

things, as the place where they emerge and realize them-

conceptual.

selves as they are--the place of Reality itself.

with these men and with the mystics (which also occupy the

This open-

In Buddhism, Nishitani

Buddhism does, however, share characteristics

ing up is, directly, none other than man realizing Reality

standpoint of immediate experience).

in its suchness.

that perhaps the religious character of experience is pre-

The light of this 'Sun of Wisdom' as it

is, is also the insight in tvhich man sees his 'primary and original face. "' 9 One of the methods of Nishitani is to bring the discussion continually back to man's starting place.

Having sug-

Nishitani even suggests

cisely this immediacy culminating in mystical union; not merely objective reflection upon experience.

As Ashvaghosa

said in the Diamond Needle Tract, "Therefore, it is to be known that one is called a Brahmin, not according to his

gested that the Void is the "dimension" of the solution of

lineage, conduct, practice, blood, but according to his vir-

the problem of man, he takes experience as the most immedi-

tue." 11

ate field, the starting point of all things.

ance, endeavor, contemplation (dhyana), wisdom (prajna), and

"Experience

Anyone who

has

the characteristics of persever-

is identical in itself" and so provides a locus, a mode of

comp assion, i.e.,

being, the true mode of being.

the differentiation of "self" and "others."

He means, by experience,

is virtuous,

is no longer attached to We

are reminded,

everyday life with its objective and subjective aspects; the

tho ugh, to recall the important thing with regard to Budd-

world of things and events.

hism and these men; namely, the trans-conceptual difference

Right here in everyday experi-

ence is the alpha and omega of religious life. 10

Philo-

9 Keiji Nishitani, "On the I-Thou Relation in Zen Buddhism," pp. 85-86. 10 In any experience is included its "place," its topes. Place is "defined space"--to define space is to locate a place experience is. One cannot experience without space/ time. The one who experiences (sees, hears) joins subject and object (perhaps as a function of self) ; the connection is essential and within experience. Experience must include

denot ed by Sunyata.

Sunyata cannot really be treated as a

concept because concepts are functions of thought and sunboth subject anJ object. Being/time, space/time--these are inseparable dualisms and bound up in sunyata which is the "deepest experience of them in no subject/object sense." "Topics," Oct. 24, 1969. 11Keij i Nishitani, "The Awakening of Self in Buddhism," quote d, p. 5.

80

79

yata is not the object of thought.

It is

\o~ithout

form and

therefore called "Formless'"; it is without name and there' . . 1s . 1n . de f'1na bl e. 12 . h out de f 1n1teness; 1t f ore w1t This point is of supreme importance and constitutes for ~ishitani

the chief difference between western and eastern

viewpoints.

Pre-Heideggerian western philosophy has rarely

that Socrates is a man, not a plant, which opens up the essential, the inner structure of Being-itself.

This judg-

ment seeks the Truth of Being, and is found in everyday existence which is the variegated conjunction of particular and universal modes of being.

It is a part of the phi-

losophical/scientific question, "What is man?", to which the

found it necessary to seek understanding beyond the simply

answer can be given that he is an ontological species, an

declarative subject/predicate assertion.

animal , rational, a

Some universal

livi~g

being with logos (speech, intel-

concept or mode of being is predicated about a singular or

ligence).

particular mode of being.

tural and philosophical scientia, is not Emptiness.

Such formulations are usually

cast in the following equation: S = P.

For example, Socrates

~s

a man (predicate, uni-

(subject, particular mode of being) versal concept or mode of being).

There are an infinite

This basically scientific realm, the social, na-

quali tatively transcends all beings OJtterly.

Sunyata

Nothingness is

the tr anscendence of Being-itself, qualitatively.

It is

not quantitative, not a matter of higher or lower, not con-

number of variations of such assertions but the components

cerned with continuity or degree of.

remain as concepts.

svabhava ("own-being" or "self-being" as Nishitani prefers 13 to call it), which is an object existing in itself.

things which

This is the philosophical grasping of

~ishitani

disclaims as without the possibility

of offering any solution.

It is, to be sure, a necessary

part of our evaluative structure.

One can make metaphysical

pronouncements, but it is ontological analysis, the judgment

12 Douglas D. Daye suggests that emptiness is a reflexive concept, derivative and logically dependent on the two concepts of dependent or relational origination (pratityasamutpada) and own-being (svabhava); it is a descriptive device which has no ontological import. To reify this term is to make a category mistake since it denotes or designates nothing. It delimits or sets the parameters of what we can know, i.e., it has a restricted epistemic role. "Emptiness is a nonreferring word about referring words; it has merely nine letters!' cf. "MaJor Schools of the t1ahayana: Madhyamika," in Buddhism: A Hodern Perspective, Charles S. Prebish, ed. (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975), p. 92.

It is beyond even the

Furthermore, existence and "self-being" are temporal categories and so time occupies a very important place in the thought of Nishitani. 14 Past and future are less significant for him than the present. of the term, "instant."

He is especially fond

The "instant" is a kind of eternal

time, the eternal present.

T. S. Eliot speaks of the inter-

13 See footnote 12. 14we will deal more completely in 01apter VI of this thesis with Nishitani's understanding of time. Here we will con tent ourselves with a brief exposition to show the place of this concept in Nishitani's understanding of the nature of Religion.

section of Time and the Timeless.

81

82

This intersection means

surance policy, every activity or transaction involves the

the present in its essential meaning--the instant, here, now.

Only at this locus can we speak of being.

The present

visualization of future needs in the light of past experi16 ence. " The problem of being/ time is as old as philosophy

is the "place" of being, where being establishes icself.

itself in the West.

"The past is not, the future is not--only the present is the

of the Confessions all wrestle with the issue as did Meister

place of being, ,lS accorJing to Nishitani.

Eckhart and the medieval mystics after them.

The horizontal

Plato, Parmenides and the St. Augustine

!1ore recently

plane of Time and the vertical plane of Eternity intersect

Ki erkegaard revived it in his discussion of the concept of

at the instant which is Timeless.

Dread.

Nishitani speaks of "time-

Nietzsche and Heidegger, too, have been eloquent

less time" and "timely timelessness," groping for an adequate

spokesmen on the subject.

expression.

unique but to focus so exclusively upon this may be uniquely

"The past is no more--the future is not yet," says Nishitani. 17 Time expresses itself in everyday experience;

Buddhist.

here sunyata is expressed in the transience of temporality.

The recognition of this phenomena is not netol or

As part of general theories of time it has been

addressed by many commentators, for example, S. G. F. Brandon,

l~ egativity

who observes: "At any given moment, if we analyze our con-

emptiness, is where the negative (unreality) is made mean-

sciousness, we realize that the 'here-now' of present experi-

i ngful or given justification as a factor in Reality.

ence is conditioned by memory of past experience and by the

Enlightenment of the Buddha signified his victory over tran-

anticipation of future experience.

s iency (life/death; birth/death).

Indeed, it is impossible

is an essential factor of Reality.

Sunyata, or

The

Anicca, or impermanence,

to be aware of what is purely 'here-now'; for the present is

i s one of the great principles of Buddhism usually considered

a razor-edge line, between past and future, which is ever

along with anatta (non-self) and dukkha (suffering or ill) as pivotal points in any discussion of Buddhist doctrine. 18

moving, so chat what is 'now' has become 'past,' as we contemplate it, and in the very act we have moved into the

16 Ibid.

future."

17

And further, that "Upon this Time-sense the whole

complex structure of our cultural and technological civilization has been built--whether it be planning for next year's harvest, getting a rocket to the moon, or taking out an in15 Keiji Nishitani, "Topics," Nov. 14, 1969.

rbid., Nov. 7, 1969. 18 rt must be noted that this theory of impermanence, which constitutes one of the three characteristics of existence, is not to be confused with the later doctrine of moments (ksanavacla) which emerged from the Abhidharmic logical analysis of the process of change. David Kalupahana argues that the early theory was an empiricist one which merely insisted upon the temporally finite nature of immediate experi-

84

83

Life and death are transience itself, impermanence itself. The impermanence of all actual beings consists in the fact of a beginning and end to all being, i.e., temporality.

The

essential structure of beings in this world can therefore be viewed as a mixture of being and non-being. is cyclical in nature.

The mixture

Non-being leads to being (birth)

which in turn leads to non-being (death) in a samsaric activity ending only with enlightenment. (transient) comes into being. of

Mahayana

In birth a new being

Nishitani, in the tradition

Buddhism, says that Anicca is Nirvana, Sam-

sara is Nirvana (impermanence is enlightenment, life and death is enlightenment). lies in the is.

The problem, and it is monumental,

This is is the result of absolute negation.

To say that impermanence is Nirvana and life and death is Nirvana is to use a theoretical formulation, a form of judgment, an objective expression of truth, a form. culty is one of content, i.e., the is.

~e

The diffi-

very formulation

is a contradiction, a sort of "illogical madness."

Nirvana

means enlightenment (the great knowledge, all-knowing standpoint), emptiness, no-self.

To go the way of absolute nega-

tion to its end and consummation we take on the negative aspect of Reality itself.

We do not seek to escape or avoid

meeting the negative aspect of Reality, i.e., essential Un-

reality, face-to-face.

This is unavoidable, authentic, in-

evi table to the solution of the problem of Reality--which is our self, our being. The "way of negativity" is to go into ourselves and ask ourselves, question ourselves; not just scientifically/ obj ectively but concerning the root fact that we exist, that we live.

It is penetrating our being, a way which is open

in ourselves.

The way is within and must be opened by us

just by going on the way.

This way is the true program of

knowledge, it is religious practice.

It is a sort of exis-

tential quest, inseparable from practice (not just the casual practice of dhyana or yoga, but the absolute investment of t he suffering self). 19 This practice has negative and posit ive aspects.

The way of negation is really inseparable

from the way of affirmation, wherein it is consummated.

It

is just going the way that is open within us, by ourselves, to attain True Reality.

It is not a "given" outside us but

within us; not an easy-going, avoidable way but the consummation of negativity.

The problem of both ways (positivity/

negativity) is the problem of ourselves. II. Religion as the "Middle Path," the "way of negativity" The very question, "what is religion?" presents us with a paradox arising out of this "Middle Path."

The poser of

the question obviously does not yet grasp the seriousness of 19 Keiji Nishitani, "Topics," November 7, 1969.

86

85

the question, does not feel compelled by its necessity while at the same time, it is the nature of religion that it is necessary just for such a person.

Unique to the matter of

religion is the fact that "the relation of religion to us is a contradictory relation in which the person for whom religion is not a necessity is, by that very fact, just the person for whom religion is a necessity. ,ZO

Religion is not

just something for living well as are the arts and learning nor is it essential for physical survival as is food.

Re-

ligion poses the problem of life and death in such a way as to be vital to life itself.

Of natural, social or cultural

matters one can ask as to their utility.

Indeed, the func-

tional approach to religion is an extremely popular one in the works of many western observers of religion. 21 This is perhaps because much of our life is lived at the level of the natural or cultural.

The necessity of religion derives

from its compelling us to return to the source of life, to break through our ordinary mode of living. 22 Nishitani makes explicit two points in this connection: religion always concerns each individual as his own personal concern and can-

not be understood from the outside as an objective observer of the acting subject; and also, the lower-level question of what is the utility of religion must be broken through by the question, "For what purpose do we ourselves exist?" This avoids the problem of asking what is religion without undertaking the religious quest.

Everything but religion

can be examined in its relation to us or mankind generally. It is precisely where these relations break down and become meaningless that the religious question comes to bear.

"\fuen

we thus come to doubt the meaning of our existence, and when we ourselves become a question to ourselves, the religious quest springs up from within us." 23 \fuen life itself is questioned by death, emptiness (nihilum), sin, etc., we are brought face to face with the religious question.

This does

no t mean that we are literally dying before the question can confront us.

It may be brought sharply into focus by many

existential crises or breaking-points.

\fuenever our hither-

tofo re comfortable existence is undercut or threatened we may, as it were, see our life flash before our eyes and call our very selves into question.

It is here that we see most

cle arly that the natural or cultural matters of life are not 20

Idem, "What is Religion?", p. 21.

21 F

. · · . o f t h.LS poLnt or an LnterestLng ana l ysLS of

ultimately satisfying; that what we may previously have . v~ew see

Hans H. Penner, "The Poverty of Frmctionalism," History of Religions, Vol. II, No. 1 (August 1971), pp. 91-97. 22

As we stated in the last chapter, this is not to be confused with any "nostalgia for paradise" of which other writers such as Mircea Eliade have so eloquently written.

taken to be our religious comfort, whether it be practices, ideologies, or social security, is in fact a counterfeit comfort, an idolatry.

As Nishitani puts it so eloquently,

23 Keiji Nishitani, "\fuat is Religion?", p. 23.

88

87

II

. death is not something which we may meet in the dis-

tant future.

We come into the world bearing death with us.

Our life encounters death in its each step, and is incessantly inserting one foot into the domain of death.

Ever

This is the significance, for Nishitani, of the question, "What is religion?" Nishitani also makes the distinction between describing and criticizing other views of the

natur~

of religion, and

on the verge of an abyss, it may come in an instant to nothing." 24 Our existence is, as Buddhism affirms, anicca,

his own efforts to consider the problem from a different per-

( transient, impermanent).

is to say it is neither past nor future, but rather pulsates

ness of Reality, or, more strictly, the real awareness of Reali ty." 27 It is in man's own awareness of Reality that Re-

over the void of nothingness.

ality itself comes into its own realization.

It consists in the instant which

Our self-awareness is ob-

spective, "--in a word, from the perspective of the aware-

It is not some

structed by our continual relation to other things and

entity out there, transcendent to and apart from man.

events: learning, the arts and other cultural and social mat-

realization denotes both the meaning of actualizing and under-

ters.

standing.

These things both constitute the problem and hinder

our seeing them as problematic.

"Then the sense of nothing-

This

As Nishitani says, "the term 'realization' de-

note s real experience, not theoretical knowledge, as in the

ness . . . causes one, as is said in Zen, to 'reflect one's

case of a philosophical cognition: a 'bodily' understanding,

light upon what is underfoot.'"

so to speak,

"Again, as expressed in

,.28

This use of the term "body" refers

to the whole man with his spirit, soul and body.

This whole

Zen, this is 'to step back and come to oneself.' It is the about-face of our life." 25 Thus the proper study of man is

bodily experience, this awareness of Reality is our real be-

not simply ego-centered or man-centered as often appears to

ing itself and the true reality of our existence.

be claimed in many humanistic or existentialist philosophies,

search for knowledge, then, is not the religious quest.

but is the standpoint of asking for what purpose we our-

the contrary, the religious quest is "that which,--in con-

selves exist.

trast to thinking, intellectual or philosophical, which re-

It is this to which Adorno is referring in

The On

his critique of Exis tentialisrn when he notes: "The dichotomy

mains in abstraction--really seeks the true reality, and to

of subject and object is not to be voided by a reduction to

try from this approach to answer the question, 'what is re-

the human person, not even to the absolutely isolated person." 26 T4 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 25 Ibid., p. 24. 26 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B.

Ashton (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), p. 51. 27 This perspective is none other than the normative perspective to which we referred in the Introduction. Keiji Nishi tani, "What is Religion?" p. 25. 28 Ibid.

90

89

ligion,' by tracing that path through which the quest for what is truly real is really pursued," 29

Buddhist insight that it saw something wrong with the way life is understood in the ordinary sense.

In the context

of time an.d impermanence, man has tended to treat this probIII.

Fields of Reality

lem by considering a whole life to be the sum of these parts.

Nishitani speaks of fields of Reality or stages in the consideration of Reality and the corresponding problems for man in each. 30 There is also a subjective and objective, internal and external perspective or dimension of the first two fields.

The first field is that of sense perception and

ordinary experience.

From the objective perspective of this

ordinar:r field of experience, reality is thought of as things and events external to us.

Here Reality consists in the

This is where Buddhism perceived the problem and provided its doctrine of dukkha or suffering.

"Duhkha or universal

suffering includes physical and mental sufferings, but at bottom it refers to the inability to understand the frag32 Only in a crisis mentation process in our ordinary lives. " do we become aware that these are merely preliminary aspects of Re:11i ty. On its subjective (ethical) side, truth for the self is

whole visible universe--plants, tools, mountains; or even

exhibited in truthfulness, trustworthiness, in Conscience.

other people, societies, nations, human activities and events.

A con scientious man will be true to himself as a realization

On its objective side (science) truth for the self is practi-

or ac tualization of truth--i.e., truth is expressed in sub-

cal, usable, reliable in ordinary existence.

jectivity.

The subjective

Both sides are merely aspects and exist in a kind

perspective, also from the ordinary point of view, considers

of mutual negation; there is no other relation between them.

Reality as internal experiences such as desire, feelings,

Here things are dealt with as "matters of fact" leading to

thought, etc.

certainty of knowledge.

As Inada suggests: "The so-called 'internal'

At this first stage, the being that

activities, though private to each of us, are the grounds, the source of meaning." 31 Obviously, combinations of these

one who experiences").

perspectives are possible but they are linked by the fact

in every experience to be taken in its immediacy.

that they are individuals' points of view.

stage of experience there is included duality and identity.

It is a peculiarly

29 Ibid., p. 26. 30 Ibid. and "Topics," November 21, 1969. 31 Kenneth Inada, "A Buddhist Response to Fragmentation of Meaning in Modern Culture," Young East, New Series (Spring 1975), Vol. I, No. 2, p. 5.

experiences does so in the mode of self-being (as in "the Self-identity is a fundamental factor In this

The matter of Conscience requires further elucidation. It is an intangible kind of subjective moral knowledge, a 32Ibid.

91

92

"good-certainty," "good-mind" (so important in Chinese Con-

where thought (even as a kind of science), philosophy, meta-

fucian teaching) , "good-knowledge."

physics, the "sciences" are one.

In German it is the

Gewissheit or "certainty in religious matters."

Only from

The reason of mathematics

an d logic operates here as a sort of broad base for kno\
the standpoint of conscience can we establish confidence.

edge in everyday existence and experience.

Often there appears a contradiction, or an apparent one, be-

de scriptively not too distinct, however, and we begin to

tween scientific certainty and sureness of moral conscience.

creep into the second stage which is that of

The self-being is led to despair and nihilism (not, however,

being of man with consciousness and intellect.

in its most radical form at this level).

The private con-

The stages are

th~

mode of

In the stage of consciousness, the problem is one of

sciousness or conscience is perhaps the apex of self-being.

certainty.

At the stase of experience, science was purely

The "good-mind" is the fountain or fundament of all virtues

objective; concerned with the purification of everyday ex-

as "one's own self-being."

It is not good in relation to

perience, with knowledge of the objective world.

bad but fundamentally good.

It is where one's own-being

At the

l evel of consciousness the sciences take on a narrower mean-

stands only in relation to itself as moral self-conscious-

i ng as suggested by the increasing feeling of certainty de-

ness, self-knowledge, self-being.

r ived from logic, mathematics, etc.

As it is with Confucian

Any doubt entertained

teaching, conscience is the "knowing which is not waiting

by consciousness is by nature more radical at this level.

for any-thing to know."

Hoving to the level or stage of certainty of consciousness

like Heaven or God.

It has the potential to open itself

Where the Chinese speak with the phrase

i n its subjective aspect

m~ans

moving from mere truthfulness

to "stand facing heaven," Nishitani adopts the phrase, "I

towards men and trustworthiness, to certainty of man in re-

stand alone before God, in my conscience."

lation to himself, to his inner self.

The good-mind

is a sort of ontological self-being, immediate self-knowledge, the "unity of heaven and man." 33 From the point of view of epistemology, we have been

It means certainty of

man in relation to other men as Buber suggests in his discussion of Ich-Uu. self.

The conscientious man is truthful in him-

At this level, then, there is certitude such that

speaking of truth in "matters of fact" which concern Reality

doubt must be radical; similar to the "Great Doubt" of Zen

and we may equate this knowledge with wissenschaft or

though not qualitatively equal to it.

episteme.

there is only the act of doubting; even the Self, God, World

At this level there is a fundamental knowledge

33 Keiji Nishitani, "Topics," Dec. 5, 1969.

are included in this doubt.)

(In the "Great Doubt"

Such doubt does not come easily

due to the self re-enforcing nature of rationality.

Cer-

94

93

tainty is the conceptual response to the fragmentary and

simplicity is deceptive and confusing.

impermanent nature of the world of sense perception, i.e., experience. 34 The level of certainty is much more philosophi-

that what a particular person views as real in his profession, e.g., physics, is seen at odds with what he views in

cally abstract, much more scientifically theoretical than

his personal life, e.g., in his religion.

at the level of experience, even though based upon experi-

ize such positions loosely as "talk" and concede that they

ence.

are necessary in conducting the everyday affairs of life but

It has come to prevail over the first field, that of

Often it is the case

We might character-

ordinary experience, by being raised by the sciences as dis-

we must also see them as "talk" in the sense that they are

ciplines.

are false, i.e., they are simplistic reductions of reality

This is due, of course, to overconfidence in our

rational faculties.

Everything must be brought within a

in to everyday language. It is at the interface between the second and the final

certain set of logical rules and this includes even sense perception.

Reason, deceiving itself, has made objectivity

its cardinal rule.

For the natural sciences atoms or energy

or scientific laws are considered as real.

Social scientists

fi elds of Reality that Religion and Metaphysics come into pl ay.

Their concerns or problems are those of the third

fi eld but their language and formulations are bound to the

may treat economic or other principles or laws as real.

s econd field.

These four perspectives of the first two fields of Re. . 1'~s t~c. . 35 Th.~s a 1 1.. ty s h are t he cotmllon error o f b e~ng s~mp

c eptual, trans-relational; the latter are merely ontologi-

34 In an essay on fragmentation, Kenneth Inada suggests that, "We have, over the years, bound ourselves with layers upon layers of conceptual elements that are retained for their static, persistent and permanent characteristics. These elements have engendered our uncritical perspectives on life simply because we place such high premium on fixed ideas, a fixation of thought, whose value refers more to material things than to the non-material . . . though even that statement stands to be corrected or modified in light of contemporary science." Kenneth Inada, "A Buddhist Response to Fragmentation of Meaning in Modern Culture," p. 5. 35 In fact, the history of education may in large part be characterized as the progressive narrowing down of the various aspects of these perspectives into fields, departments, areas, etc. Often these are formalized into disciplines which try desperately not to tread on the toes of those in other disciplines.

The former are trans-ontological, trans-con-

cal, conceptual and relational.

The word transcendent is

used to indicate this diletmlla.

The first two fields have

nothing of the transcendent in them (except when "viewed" i n the perspective of the Great Awakening).

The transcen-

dent indicates the third field and attempts to move bayond t he problem of relation which is critical for the prior two s tages. 36 Transcendence is a problem conceptually in metaphysics i n such questions as the existence of God, the nature of t he Prime Mover, etc.

Religiously it includes some form of

36 Keij i Nishitani, "Topics," Nov. 21 and Dec. 12, 1969.

95

96

metaphysics and is concerned with God and God's relation to

day life, there is the reality of death and nothingness

man.

(nihilum).

Transcendence itself is concerned with the character

of the problem of the Absolute; not of certainty but on the plane of the transcendent--beyond the level of certainty/ uncertainty.

The aspects of subject and object are no longer

any help but part of the hindrance of conceptual apparatus. It is insufficient to speak of the subjective in terms of morality and moral certainty; or as that in which objective truth becomes certain as in Descartes' cogito.

It is also

Nihilum means the absolute negativity as regards the being of the other various things and phenomena; death means the absolute negativity as regards life itself. And just as it can be said that life a~d the existence of things are real, it can be said that death and nihilum, too, are real. When there is a finite being--and all things are finite--nihilum necessarily obtains; and where there is life, there is necessarily death. And before nihilum and death, all existence and life lose their certaLnty and weight as reality and come, instead, to seem unreal.38 From the ordinary point of view, the nothingness or nihil that

also insufficient to speak of the objective as absoLutely

i s absolute negativity lacks the kind of reality assigned to

certain; this certainty does not touch the problem of 11 \-:he-

everyday things and events.

ther?" of actuality and validity.

conceptual, a stage of samadhi, in Buddhism whereas the

fi nally come to nothing we can conclude that everything which has . being is real although not all reality has being. 39 It is

doubt in Descartes' thought is only a method--his certainty

i n this sense that the so-called mystical unity or order of

The Great Doubt is trans-

of being, knowing, etc. appear in ergo

~·

Here Absolute

But if we consider that all things

the universe which so many have felt or intuited does not ex-

Knowledge is no longer objective knowledge in some metaphysi-

haust reality or totally grasp it.

cal sense, it is religious, even moral, in the sense of

t hat Nishitani acknowledges these experiences of the divine

"Truly" livi:1g as the absolutely subjective Subject.

The

i nterdependence of things in the universe but he doubts that

seventeenth century Zen master Shido Bunan puts it:

"Be-

come a dead man, remaining alive; become thoroughly dead; then do what you like, according to your own mind; all your works then are good." 37 In spite of being based in the human experience of the first two fields and four perspectives, it is Nishitani's conviction that apart from these various standpoints of every37

Quoted by Nishitani, "Preliminary Remark," p. 57.

t his is the

~

It will, indeed, be clear

reality of things and events because it does

38 Keiji Nishitani, "~.fuat is Religion?" p. 27. 39 The idea of "being" has been characterized as the Archirnedean point of western thought. Its entire civilization has turned on this point. Cf. Yoshinori Takeuchi, " Buddhism and Existentialism: The Dialogue between Oriental and Occidental Thought," Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich, ed. Walter Leibrecht (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), pp. 291-318. This same author goes on to warn that the eastern and Buddhist notion of "nothingness" is used differently from the way it is understood in the West. This difference will become apparent as we proc eed.

98

97

not attend to the problem of absolute nothingness . Our everyday or external perspective of the things and events of the world is, of course, the field of consciousness, the topes of consciousness.

experience the realization of real Reality.

This contradic-

tion is responsible for perpetuating the various conceptual opposi tions such as materialism and idealism.

The field of consciousness is

Ni shitani suggests that Descartes, the father of mod-

the "self-centered" field from which the self as subject views

ern philosophy, is the best exemplar of this condition with

the external world or internal self as object.

his dis tinction between res cogitans and res extensa.

Here even the

This

self becomes fundamentally separated into subject and object.

marks the beginning of the formal acceptance of a mechanistic

Self-consciousness is, then, illusory, i.e., unreal, since it

worldview.

is merely the self as subject presuming to view the internal

vances this made possible in our mastery of nature through

aspects of itself as objects.

the scientific techniques it eventually facilitated.

There is of course such a self

Nishitani is not, of course, lamenting the ad-

lie

in the ordinary view of reality but from Nishitani's point of

does, however, lament that it did not also provide the occa-

view it must necessarily be a self which is estranged from

sion for seeing the radical nature of the problem posed by

things--shut up within itself.

such a dualistic worldview.

"In this, the self always puts

The ego came to be an undoubted

itself before itself and regards itself as a 'thing' called

reali ty by an ultimately uncritical self-assertion and the

'self,' separated from other things . . . . There intervenes

things in the natural world and even the objectified things

the representation, in which the self presents itself in the

of the "internal" self came to be the object of inquiry.

form of 'things.'

this respect pre-scientific man was perhaps closer to the

This self is not really at home with it-

self . • . . To sum up, things and the self, feelings and

In

truth of things. If nature and society pose such conditions and limita-

desires, all are real, but it cannot be said that they are present in their true reality in the field of consciousness,

tion s as uncertainty and contingency one may be well-advised

where they are always present only in the form of representation and are, nevertheless, usually taken as real. " 40 It is

to seek comfort in the security of an ego.

in tellect, etc. are thought of as intrinsic abilities and

in this limited sense of reality that we may say that we are

activities of the ego there may be thought to be a security

really conscious of our emotion, desires, etc.

available to man that he had previously either lost or had

This field of

the internal and external must be broken through before we 4 °Keiji Nishitani, "What is Religion?" p. 30.

not

kno~Yn.

If life, will,

Intellectual history after Freud is profound

testimony to the compelling power of Descartes' argument. 41 41 As Michael Polanyi has observed : "The method of doubt

100

99

But Nishitani questions the argument by asking whether Des-

of objective matter as seems to be intended by modern bio-

cartes may not really have only posed the dilemma for man in

lo gical and physical sciences.

a different or more striking form.

ceivable that noesis could ever be explained by

What really has happened

For Nishitani it is incon~

be-

in Descartes is that a tremendous stride forward was taken

cause knowing always contains a sort of transcendence over

toward understanding the nature of self-consciousness but

what is known.

no movement at all toward resolving the crises posed by no-

plained in terms of a "god" above who is now dead as Nishi-

thingness and death,

tani agrees Nietzsche clearly demonstrated.

Although continuing efforts persist in

On the other hand, neither is it to be ex-

Rather, we must

the effort to explain man in terms of matter or in terms of

go back further along the axis of subjectivity and pene-

his consciousness (or pre-, sub-, or un-conscious dimensions

trate in to the fundament of 'I think' itself.

of consciousness), one does not satisfy what Nishitani calls

"I think" from the position of "I think" may yield the most

man's religious aspirations by attempts to get behind or

di rectly evident truth but it is only one philosophical

under the field of consciousness and self-consciousness.

position; it is the self-centered revelation of the ego it-

Designating that as subject which can never be made an ob-

s elf.

ject or can never be derived from any other object does not

endlessly reflecting itself.

make it so.

The subject is, "on the contrary, the point of departure for considering all other objects, " 42 The cogito

conceived of in this way, that self-consciousness is end-

is a self-evident fact only at the level of consciousness

t hought from the standpoint of 'I think' itself, means that

whose self-evidence remains to be exposed from a yet more

t he ego is the mode of being of the self shut up within its elf. We may also say the self attaching to itself, ,,4 3 The

fundamental level.

The establishment of the fact "I think"

Thinking of

In this sense the ego consists of self-consciousness "But the fact that the ego is

l essly reflected in self-consciousness, and 'I think' is

is not, then, to be explained by pre-conscious life, i.e.,

various problems which rise up in the self such as radical

by a scientific "reduction" in the manner of Freud or in terms

evil and original sin, loneliness and. the loss of self in society, the possibility of cognition, the demand for the

is a logical corollary of objectivism. It trusts that the uprooting of all voluntary components of belief will leave behind unassailed a residue of knowledge that is completely determined by the objective evidence," Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 269. 42 Keiji tlishitani, "What is Religion?" p. 33.

salvation and deliverance of the soul, are evidence that the very mode of being of the ego turns at last into a problem for the ego itself. 43 rbid., p. 34.

The level of the "I think" must, then,

102

101

be broken through to a more fundamental level, a more basic self-awareness.

Here religion may be viewed as "an existen-

sciou~ne ss

as the field of the engagement between the ex-

istence of self and other things and events.

The "great"

refer s to a level or field of self-awareness in which being

tial exposure of the problematical which is contained in the usual mode of self-being. " 44 Religion may be called the

no l onger hides the nothingness which, at the level of con-

marga or path of the "I think" realizing and clarifying the

scio usness, has been covered.

"I am. II

nothingness (where, in truth, there is no plane to stand

"To stand subjectively on

on) is for the self to become more fundamentally itsel£." IV.

Great Doubt

47

This does not mean that we "are" no more but that nothing-

At this point Nishitani devotes some space to comparing Descartes' methodical doubt to the Great Doubt of Zen in one of his more extended treatments of Zen.

Zen he takes

here to be the place of the most fundamental and radical treatments of doubt in the world of religion. 45 Zen speaks

nes s appears at the foundation of the prior level of consciousness where there is separation of "external" and "internal."

"Such a realization of nothingness is not simply

a conscious, 'subjective' phenomenon; it is rather the real

of "the self-presence of the great doubt" and means by

mani festation of what is actually concealed at the foundati on of the self and everything in the world." 48 This is

"great" the seriousness, the fundamental nature of the doubt

not the existentialists' "annihilation of being" but a

to

~1hich

it refers.

Birth and death are a "great matter"

in this fundamental sense.

"Great" also refers to the ser-

iousness of our own "consciousness of our manner of existence and our own behavior vis a vis this 'great matter. '" 46 We realize death and nothingness as real, constitutive entities at the base of our existence. 44 Ibid.

We have described con-

"transformation into nothingness ."

We "are," but at a

fun damentally more subjective level where the self and other ar e essentially turned into a question mark.

of existence on the "yonder" or "this" side of psychological analysis.

The "great" doubt is not merely a doubting

of self-consciousness but "appears as a reality from the one foundation of oneself and the world.

I

This is a mode

When it appears,

p. 35.

45 For an extended treatment of Zen in this light by a Zen Buddnist to whom Nishitani has acknowledged his own indebtedness see Hisamatsu Shin'ichi, "Zen: Its Meaning for Modern Civilization," The Eastern Buddhist, New Series, Vol. I, No. l (September . l965), pp. 22-47, and his "The Characteristics of Oriental Nothingness," Philosophical Studies of Japan, Vol. II (1950), pp. 65-97. 46 Keiji Nishitani, "What is Religion?" p. 35.

it appears as an inevitablility, and we, with our consciousness and our arbitrary will, cannot know what to do with it. Through this manifestation of the 'Doubt' in our self, our 47Ibid. • p. 36. 4Bibid.

104

103

self really becomes the Doubt itself.

It becomes itself

Zen's basic expression, 'Not relying on words,' this is not to be taken simply literally.

'Not relying on words' does

the realization of the great Doubt, which is in itself a reality. " 49 It is a "whole bodily experience" of the Doubt,

not mean the complete negation (as ordinarily understood)

doubt as sarnadhi or concentration.

of words.

Such a doubt is ser-

ious as we have spoken of seriousness to the extent that it is realized existentially.

The fundamental difference

Rather, it is to be taken to mean 'prior to

words' in the sense of not depending on words, not being bound or caught by words." 51 It must be obvious that Nishi-

between this religious problematic and the exercise of phi-

tani considers Descartes to be engaged at the philosophi-

losophy is that the philosophical doubt usually turns back

cal level.

to the theoretical for an explanation of the doubt, i.e., the solution to the problem. 50 It is this enterprise which

cal counterparts to the existential condition of Great

Buddha refused to embarkupon and these questions in the

self .

face of which he remained silent.

logi cal condition or state.

It is this to which Hisa-

There are no doubt philosophical and psychologi-

Do ubt but they must not be mistaken for the Great Doubt itThe "single-mindedness" of samadhi is not a psychoTo illustrate the difference

matsu is referring in his discussion of an expression at-

between the doubting process of Descartes and the experi-

tributed to Bodhidharma:

enc e

Not relying on words or letters, An independent Self-transmitting apart from any teaching; Directly pointing to man's Mind, Awakening his (Original-) Nature, thereby actualizing his Buddhahood. Hisamatsu suggests that: "As regards the first part of 49 Ibid., p. 37. 50 If we recall that relieion and philosophy (metaphysics) operate in the interface between the second and final fields of Reality, anu that distinctions and formulations are somewhat blurred in this interface, we \dll be properly aware of the tentative nature of such an assertion as this. Takeuchi is expressing such a point of distinction when he says: "For instance, Heidegger's 'ontological difference between Sein and Seiendes' is of a philosophical nature, and on the-otKer hand, Kierkegaard's 'absolute distinction between absolute telos and relative telos' (cf. Concluding Unscientific Postscript [Princeton, 1941], pp. 347££.) is of a religious nature; notwithstanding, both are the expression of authentic existential passion (pathos).

described in so much of the Zen literature, Nishitani

quo tes at some length from Takusui' s "Sermons": The method to be practised is as follows: you must doubt concerning the subject in you which hears all voices. All voices are heard just now because there certainly is in you a subject that hears. Although you hear voices with ears, the holes of the ears are not the subject that hears. If they were, dead men also would hear voices . . . • You must doubt deeply again and again, asking yourself what could be the subject of hearing. Don't mind the various illusive thoughts and ideas that may occur to you. Only doubt more and more deeply, with all the gathered might of your entire self, without aiming at or expecting anything beforehand, without even intending to be enlightened, but also without intending not to intend to be enlightened; and being within your breast like a child • • • . But, however you go on doubting, you will find it impossible to know the subject that hears. Then you must still more deeply explore just 51 Hisamatsu Shin' ichi, "Zen: Its Meaning for Modern Civilization," p. 23.

106

105

V. there, where it is not to be known. Doubt deeply in a state of single-mindedness, looking neither before nor after, right nor left, becoming wholly like a dead man and becoming unaware even of your own person being there. When this method is practised more and more deeply, you will come to a state of being totally absent-minded and vacant. Even then, you must raise up the great doubt, "what is the subject that hears?" and must doubt further, being all the time wholly like a dead man. And after that, when you are aware no more of your being wholly like a dead man, are no more conscious of your procedure of "great doubting" and become, yourself, through and through a great doubt-mass, there will come all of a sudden a moment when you come out into a transcendence called the Great Enlightenment, as if you woke up from a great dream, of as if you, being completely dead, suddenly revived.52 E~

doubt which is truly real has these characteristics,

whether or not they issue from a great deal of religious practice.

In this manner of doubting we realize (under-

stand and actualize) nothingness and death.

The Great

Doubt emerges, opens up on the field of nothingness and as such is also called the Great Death.

This turn-about or

about-face is to the Great Enlightenment or Great Awakening. It is an attainment but also a "falling off" of our previous mode of existence.

It comes to present itself as

Reality from the foundation of the self-together-with-allthings.

This Reality is the true reality of the self and

of all things; that is, it is precisely their being present as they are--each in suchness.

The Reality which emerges

is none other than our "original face," our true and origi-

Sin and Evil

Ne xt Nishitani moves on to two other problems for man: sin and evil.

He wants to show that, whereas they have

tradit ionally been considered fundamental problems for man, in fact they are fundamental problems in an entirely diffe rent sen£e, a deeper sense.

He cites Kant's notion

of "radical evil" as illustrative of sin and evil presenting themselves on this deeper level in their true reality on a field transcending the field of the conscious self. This radical evil is not something "we" as subjects have committed, i.e., some objective act. sociated with exp erience.

~

It is not to be as-

posteriori events of the world of temporal

It is supra-temporal; it does not precede

temporal events in some causal fashion.

It is the funda-

ment beneath time itself, the Kierkegaardic.n "atom of eternity in time."

It 1ies in what tnshi tani likes to call the Eternal Present. 53 "It is something real that presents

itself in its own 'suchness' at the ground of our own being itself.

'We' cannot, therefore, grasp it; or, it can-

not be grasped on the field where we speak of 'we' committing some evil.

In this sense, it is 'incomprehensible'

for 'us,' for the ego; and that it is incomprehensible is that it presents itself really, and in its 'suchness. "• 54 Kant's "intelligibele Tat" refers to this bodily experience or realization.

Buddhist karma and avidya also have their

nal Self; it is what Buddhism refers to as mahaprajna or Great Wisdom. 52

Keiji Nishitani, "What is Religion?" pp. 39-40.

53 Keiji Nishitani, "Topics," Nov. 14, 1969. 54 rdem., "What is Religion?" p. 42.

108

lUI

origin in this supratemporal fundament. 55

Nishitani poses the obvious questions: If Barth is right,

Only in religion is this subjective dimension realized;

why does man seek God at all or recognize him when he

in the social sciences this evil and sin take the form of

speaks?

an objective crime or social disorder and become problems

ni zed the extent of his sinfulness.

treated as objective events.

ri ght to look for a "point of contact" but wrong in selecti ng reason as this point. 57 "The place of 'contact' must,

This is, of course, the error

of environmental theories of human behavior.

Such a view,

If Brunner is right, man has not yet fully recogBrunner was probably

as scientific as it may appear to be, can only hinder men

I think, be sought somehow in the complete corruption it-

from seeing the true roots of evil.

considered at this superficial level where crime and other

s elf; and it is probably to be found in the very awareness of the fact of complete corruption." 58 This is the

evils are treated as committed by individual egos, as ob-

f ield of nothingness, the field of our spiritual death, the

jective actions.

awareness of avidya.

Even ethics is generally

The difference here between ethics andre-

ligion can be seen as paralleling the difference between philosophy and religion on the matter of doubt. 56 Nishitani himself is critical of certain theories which

This field is not some place that can

be corrupted or remain uncorrupted.

One cannot therefore

adequately speak of the original nature of man as being sinful.

The deepest awareness at the boundary of man's being

are considered generally to be religious points of view but

i s simply nothingness--neither good nor evil.

which he considers to fall shore of ultimately religious

this awareness of our finitude not only gives an occasion

views.

for transcending it, in the sense that it directs our mind

Karl Barth believed that the image of God in man

"Therefore,

was completely corrupted; Emil Brunner believed the same

t o the experience of our own potentiality, that is, cultural

but that reason was the anKn~pfungspunkt for God's grace.

and spiritual creativity, but further it also drives us to

55 The bodhisattva is, of course, one who is enlightened to this fundamental condition of man and therefore of all men and who, by his own enlightenment, enables other men to become enlightened. 56 As one contemporary writer has put it: "The path of religion leads through morality, but when one approaches the goal, one enters into an entirely different element. The saint who has attained the calm of Nirvana is said to be beyond good and evil." and "The ideal Sl.tuation should be perfectly pure, so it is said to transcend secular notions of good and evil." · Hajime Nakamura, Parallel Developments: A Com}arative History of Ideas (Tokyo: Kodansha Lta:, 1975), p. 86.

transcescend from this transcendence and fall into the abyss of non-being . .,sg This is not mt!rely the form of man as op57 Nishitani is not, of course, attempting to discredit the significance of many of the particulars of such theories; but rather to point to their limits with respect to the problem being considered here. 58 Keiji Nishitani, "What is Religion?" p. 44. 59 Yoshinori Takeuchi, "Buddhism and Existentialism," p. 297.

109

posed to the contents of man.

It is the formless Form,

the formal aspect of the totality of form and contents. Faith is described in Nishitani's view as the reception of God's love really and~ it is.

It is not an intentional

act toward something from within the self.

"Just as sin

110

sword that kills man" and "a sword that gives him life." I t negates the ego-centered self and thus gives life to man's fundamental self-awareness.

One pure act of faith

in this sense is sufficient; it is not merely a temporal (and therefore temporary) affirmation of the consciousness

comes to be realized within the self as a reality emerging

of the self but an actual realization of the original Self.

from the foundation of all human existence--or of all living

This is what is meant by the instant of the pure act of re-

things (sattva)--together with the self itself, the belief

signing oneself to Buddha.

that means a tum-about from this sin, that is, salvation,

drawn to its furthest consequence, even the simple act of

must become a great reality in the same way.

faith is removed from the purview of the will of man and

We can find

"~en

this way of thinking is

the concept of faith in this sense in Christianity as well

relegated to the compassionate being.

as in Buddhism.

Japan it is believed that the value of Nembucsu (repeating

In the former, faith is considered as a

grace we receive through God's love, and the latter speaks

For instance, in

the 'Namu Amidabutsu'

formula) is the virtue of true com. . not t h e mer~tor~ous acto f man. " 61 Th us,

of 'two sores of profound faith,' of v1hich one, the faith

pass~on,

of man who seeks salvation, consists in the above-mentioned

"when we bow our heads and worship the Buddha, we are in

real awareness of man's own sinfulness, and the other, the

the realm of this world, and when we have raised our heads, enter the realm of Amida." 62

faith of 'dharma,' means that faith in salvation is a grace emanating from the Buddha Amida's saving 'Power of the Original Vow' (that is, His saving Will). " 60

This

.

an d

0

~t

~s •

Nishitani has now asserted three things, without suggesting what Reality really is.

First, nothingness is re-

faith occurs when the self truly becomffi the self itself.

alized as real where things and mental processes are un-

This fundamental awareness is the place where the self in

real, i.e., where the field of consciousness has been

its uniqueness, its unsubstitutableness finds no proxy in

passed through.

any other person or even in the ego.

abouts or about-faces from doubt and sin and evil viewed

This realization al-

ways occurs at once as the absolute negation and affirmation of the solitary self; it is, in the words of Zen, "a 6 °Keiji Nishitani,

"~fuat

is Religion?" pp. 45, 46.

61

Second, enlightenment and faith are turn-

Nakamura, p. 390. 62 zendo, "Hanshosan," quoted by Nishitani, "What is Religion?" p. 48.

112

111

as the intrusion of nothingness appearing in our self-

cal ly attend to this assertion with regard to Feuerbach but

awareness on the "yonder" and "this" side of self-conscious

it i s easy to see that he considers his characterization of

ego.

an ego-conscious subjectivity to be applicable to these

Finally, that doubt and enlightenment, sin and faith

become really ours only when we truly become the realiza-

op timistic humanisms and moves directly to forms of atheism

tion of them in their suchness.

whi ch he considers subtler and seemingly more persuasive.

In this connection Nishi-

Sartre, referring to The Brothers Karamazov, tells us

tani raised the question of God and Tathagata Buddha and proceeds now to a preliminary, but necessary, discussion of

that, "Dostoevsky once wrote, 'If God did not exist, every-

modern atheism.

thing would be permitted'; and that, for existentialism, is VI.

the starting point.

Atheism

Religious traditions which are in some sense theistic

Everything is indeed permitted if God

does not exist, and man is in consequence forlorn, for he

or at least incorporate some reference to deities are the

cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside

normally encountered religious traditions.

himself.

This is not to

He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse ."63

argue that they all conceive or consider those deities in

If, as Sartre insists, existence precedes essence, man can

the same manner or, for that matter, even in the same num-

never explain his actions by reference to a given and specif-

ber, but students of religion have always had to deal with

i c human nature.

the question of God or gods.

i tself.

Recognizing that atheism has

There is no determinism, man is freedom

One may properly conclude that it is a matter of

in many instances been raised to the rank of a substitute

s ome distress that man finds out that God does not exist.

for religions with deities, Nishitani is obliged to take it

I t means that man must fashion his own essence having merely

into special account.

turned up on the scene.

Where humanism often tends merely to

ignore the question of God, atheism takes special pains to

makes of himself.

repudiate theism.

tialism.

It does so by trying to point out an al-

ternate basis for human existence or end of human life.

As

early as Feuerbach's philosophical anthropology we encounter optimistic humanisms which hold that though God has become a useless, out-of-date hypothesis, man himself can be the basis for a better system of values providing the norms for society,

mo~ality,

culture, etc.

Nishitani does not specifi-

"Man is nothing else but what he

Such is the first principle of existen.. 64 It is also what is called subjectivity,

63 Jean Paul Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism," Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1956), pp. 294-95. 64 Idem., Existentialism and Human Emotions (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1957), p. 15.

114

113

The foundation of human existence is nothingness or the

for t to restore man to his own dignity we must finally con-

fact that nothing is found at the foundation of our being

clude that he has only more securely tied man to the prob-

itself and that we come, pre-reflectively, to an awareness

lem of seeing himself as an object.

of our subjectivity.

pendence are only social and historical but not real.

The difference here, as Nishitani

sees it, between Sartre and Descartes is that between atheism and theism.

Sartre's ego is a subjectivity which

can count on nothing within or without; Descartes' ego is a subjectivity which postulates on its own cognizance an object, i.e., God.

Hodern science, then, merely substitutes

its own confidence in an objective world for God.

Sartre's

The freedom and inde-

There is only one situation in which complete freedom can be attained without falling into anarchism. It must be one in which freedom and equality--essentially contradictory--can co-exist in a paradoxical way. Indeed this can only happen where the place of Void becomes the place of freedom; and the place of void is attained when equality, which tends to negate freedom, is traversed into the consequent end of absolute negation or nothingness. True freedom can only be consummated when 66 its absolute negation is its absolute affirmation.

existentialism claims to be a humanism on the ground that

"Nothing" becomes a "thing," a springboard for the self whose

"a man who chooses and creates himself at the same time creates an image of man such as he believes he ought to be." 65

e xistence consists of "projet."

Whereas in Christianity, man is created in the "image of

s elf-conscious ego with its subjective "nothingness" opened

God," in Sartre man creates the "image of man."

up at its base.

It is not

This is what Zen refers to

a s "living in the Demon's Cavern," i.e., in the cave of the

It is the "perversely-grasped Sunyata

surprising that Nishitani is not satisfied with Sartre's

(Emptiness)" which is rebuked by Buddhism.

analysis of the human condition and problematic.

subjectivity is deepened but it appears, nonetheless, as a

Just as

No doubt the

was the case in Descartes, here too the status of the ego

representation (idea), an object of consciousness or of at-

consists in the "I think" being thought from the standpoint

tachment.

of the "I think."

and existentialism shows the connection between the absolute

In this case the self is merely shut up

For Sartre there is no reality except in actions

within itself; "clinging to oneself" and "being bound by

character of free involvement and the relative nature of

one's own hands with one's own rope" are descriptive of this

the culture which results.

condition.

position stems from the subjective topos on which these ac-

The field of self-consciousness is not broken

through here.

However noble we might consider Sartre's ef-

65 Keiji Nishitani, "What is Religion?" p. 50; cf. Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, p. 17.

Nishitani's discomfort with this

tions and man's self-realization take place.

Such statements

of Sartre' s as "Each of us performs an absolute act in 66 Keiji Nishitani, "On the I-Thou Relation in Zen Buddhism," p. 76.

116

115

breathing, eating, sleeping, or behaving in any way what-

in res ponse to this situation, standpoints wherein man runs

ever" sound very much like Zen statements except for the

up against himself inside himself or in the form of some ob-

place of their origin, the place to which they refer.

jectivized other.

The

nothingness of Sartre has a self hiding behind it. VII.

In view of this Nishitani asks the Hegel-

ian question: "Do not these two mutually exclusive positions

Conclusions

--namely, man's freedom pushed to its ontological conclusion

We have alluded to the emergence of modern man and mod-

in any subjective nothingness and in subjectivized atheism

ern science from this subjective understanding of man.

on the one hand, and the religious freedom manifested in the

Nishitani feels that Christianity contains what is funda-

Christian tradition on the other hand,--require to attain

mentally the same problem.

by some means a new and higher synthesis which is to be at-

It has always recognized ego-

tistic existence in sin and disobedience as constituting the basic mode of

exist~nce

of humanity.

Man's freedom has been

tained only through self-negation and the mutual negation of the se two positions?

Modern atheism should not be regarded

claimed, paradoxically, to consist in subordinating his own

by Christianity merely as something to be eliminated.

will to that of God--to God's absolute power.

is Christianity able to eliminate it.

This doctrine,

of course, conflicts directly with the emerging ego as facilitated by Descartes and others.

Man has increasingly

Nor

It should rather re-

cei ve modern atheism as a mediation to the possibility of its own new development." 68

come to consider his own subjective independence as limited

The existence of modern man poses a problem to Christian-

by such authority and to desire liberation from what has

ity which has gone essentially unanswered, according to

now come to be seen as bondage--the bondage of other.

Nish itani, and forced man to look elsewhere for his answers.

"Prin-

ciples in the domains of the sciences, arts, politics, ethics,

It is the absolutely transcendent yet personal character of

and all other such areas have become independent from their

God which is the root of the dilemma.

religious groundings, and the universal 'secularization' of

ity,

human life has been more and more developed.

therefore man) have nothing at their foundation they are ab-

The alienation

~~l ~~ings

According to Christian-

are created out of nothing; since they (and

of the actualities of human life from religion thus consti-

solutely distinct from their creator.

tutes the fundamental problem in the his tory of modern man. " 6 7

the ontological relationship between God and the created

~11 the atheisms, humanisms and modern sciences are merely,

things to be a perpetual problem in Christianity.

67

Keiji Nishitani, "What is Religion?" p. 55.

68 rbid., pp. 55-56.

This doctrine causes

Since all

ll8

117

things "are" in some sense, what is the nature of this ex-

suggest that God's transcendence is met in a personal rela-

istence and this relationship to God?

tionship with God, through the consciousness of sin.

and God's being?

between man's being

Plato suggested the notion of "participa-

The

fo rmer is considered pantheism and the latter, more personal

tion" and Aristotle that of "analogia ~" but the prob-

theism is considered the more orthodox view.

lem has never been considered satisfactorily solved.

idea of God's omnipresence is contained the possibility of

Nishi-

"But in the

tani's point is that this must remain an existential ques-

encountering God everywhere in the world.

tion in the existence of each religious man.

so -called pantheism.. For this does no:: mean that Universe

Proclaiming

This is not the

that we are created by God means proclaiming that we are not

is God, or that God is the immanent Life of the world itself,

God.

but it means that an absolutely transcendent God is, as such, absolutely immanent." 71 To be created out of nothing means

Instead we are shut off from the ground of our being

by the nihilum at the foundation of the world.

At the same

time, we encounter the power of this God in the very existence

that the "nothing" is more immanent in the thing created than

of all created things in their actuality.

t he "being" of the thing created.

"It means that

This being grounded on

in our very inability to encounter God, no matter where we

nothing is immanence as absolute negativity.

turn in the world, we encounter Him, no matter where we 69 turn. " This is God in his absolute negativity. God's

mean, as Nishitani shows in chapter two, that the field of

omnipresence when met on the existential standpoint presses

i n terms of a personal relationship between God and man.

close upon our own existence and will not allow advance or

The relationship may be described as personally impersonal

retreat.

Nishitani holds that few Christians

~ave

seen or felt

This does nut

transcendence and the field of existence cannot be described

or impersonally personal in a new way so that Nishitani of-

God's transcendence in this light; notable exceptions being

fers eventually a new way for reconsidering the relationship

the situations of ~1oses and the prophets, or Paul, St. Francis of Assisi, and Luther. 70

between God and man so that, as he says, "In Christianity,

In contrast to this encounter with absolute transcendence in the existence of all created things, it is customary to 69

Ibid., p. 57.

70This reflects something of Nishitani's selective and typological understanding of Christianity and his lack of a comprehensive grasp of its history. We will have more to say of this as we proceed and in our conclusions.

too, it may become possible to proclaim, 'Once cr,e Great Death, then the Universe becomes

nE~v.

"' and "God's reality

must be taken up in the mode of its being as is revealed on the level where there is neither 'internal' nor 'external', and the existence of a man who meets with it must also be 71 Keiji Nishitani, "~oJhat is Religion?" p. 60.

119 considered on the same level, not as just 'internally' personal existence." 72

CHAPTER III

Without having answered directly his question "What is

NISHITAIH' S UNDERSTANDING OF

Religion?" Nishitani has, in the first chapter of his book

THE PERSONAL AND THE IMPERSONAL

laid out the parameters of his inquiry and given the reader a microcosmic view of his whole work.

He has introduced the

problem of the self limited by its self-consciousness and

I.

Hodernity and Science as Impersonal

We have dealt with Nishitani's understanding of

scien~e

set this problem in the context of the relation between

and myth as it relates to modernization in our first chapter

science and religion.

but it is difficult to understand his discussion of the Per-

It is in the larger context of the

relation between these two that he proceeds through his analysis

of certain fundamental notions in his attempt finally

to answer the original question. notions be continually

It is crucial that these

understood in this context since

sonal and the Impersonal without linking it in some preliminary fashion to these topics. 1 Science, since medieval times in the West (and this is als o the heritage shared by the East), has broken away from

religion is not the dead artifact of tradition but a prob-

the teleological, subjective intentions of previous thought

lem of everyday life and this means in the presence of mod-

and has espoused objectivity, even pure objectivity, as its

ern secular science.

wat chword.

Religion must not be imagined to be

Whereas, previously, thought was concerned always

some thing or event which can be abstracted out of or re-

with the relation between man and nature as inextricably in-

duced from some "archaic" or purely mythological past; it is to be experienced on some field deeper than that of self-

ter twined, and thus paralleled the Chinese preoccupation with the relation between man and nature, 2 it came more and more

consciousness.

to be preoccupied with the analysis of nature itself toward

72

Ibid., p. 60.

1 we have been guided somewhat in our willingness to recapitulate by Nishitani's own procedures which involve the constant reintroduction and reintegration of previously discussed notions freshly viewed from a new perspective. One might properly speak of the aesthetic element as figuring heavily in such a presentation or draw the analogy of someone viewing a three-dimensional object such as a sculpture fr om various directions, thus yielding new insights. 2 Especially in such as early schools of Taoism, YinYang and the Five Elements schools of classical thought.

122

121

the end of its being increasingly utilized by man but, nonethe less, viewed as "out there," essentially apart from man;

component pares. Nis hitani is not, of course, suggesting that science

somehow to be assimilated into man's self-understanding but

has no role to play in the modern world; to the contrary it

not essentially a part of man's whole bodily-experience.

is quite properly concerned with the analysis and explana-

The

Buddhist notion of svabhava, or own-being (Nishitani's self-

tion of the impersonal world.

being), long a subject of debate among Buddhist philosophers

with the purification of experience.

but generally conceived to be the opposite of anatman, was

ample, in its objective role, i.e., its scientific role,

long considered by Indian philosophers to be the representa-

must do its "behavioural" thing, must be concerned with

tion in existence of Reality.

quant ification and laboratory analysis.

Svabhava was viewed by Budd-

It is continually concerned Psychology, for ex-

This is the con-

hists, and subsequently is understood by Nishitani, as the

trap untal counterpoint to its psychoanalytic and psycho-

socially useful but ultimately unreal representation of Re-

the rapeutic side.

ality.3

more or less impersonal ventures the psychologist reminds

Not only is it unreal but finally it must always

Nishitani suggests only that in these

impede ones search for, or obscure ones view of Reality by

himself continually that he is himself a person and is deal-

posing as it.

ing in turn with persons.

The search for objectivity becomes increas-

ingly impersonal and mechanistic; an end in and of itself. The subjective, personal dimension of science is therefore lost.

Nishitani does not, of course, advocate emphasizing

"Science is not separate from

those who engage in it.

Horeover, the pursuit of science is only one aspect of human knowledge." 4 The psychologist-scientist is continually, or should

the opposite extreme and the consequent risk of obscuring

be, confronted with doubt concerning the meaning of his own

Reality by wallowing in subjectivity or self-conscious activ-

existence.

ity.

as doubt concerning the meaning of existence of all things.

Neither of these extremes is finally useful in the

This is extended into his scientific vocation

quest for ultimate Reality but science in modern times has

Thi s means taking personally all considerations he might

most often fallen into a kind of pseudo-objectivity, de-

otherwise hold at arm's length, i.e., objectify and deper-

ceiving itself into believing it has grasped Reality or moved

sonalized in the name of the scientific objectivity modern-

closer co grasping Reality by sorting out one more of its

4 Keiji Nishitani, "The Personal and the Impersonal in Religion," trans. Rev. Jan Van Bragt and Yamamoto Seisaku, The Eastern Buddhist, New Series, III. Nos. 1 (June 1970) 1-18; 2 (Oct. 1970), 80-88. Chapter Two of Shllkyo to wa Nanika ("What is Religion?") , Sobunsha, 1961.

component parts or by breaking down Reality into its smallest That is to say, it pertains only to the first two fields of Reality we described in the last chapter.

123 ity seems to call for.

The dimension in which such doubts

124

ning of the split between science and religion.

Nishitani

arise far transcends the dimension on which the scientific

reminds us of Kant's attack, following the great Lisbon

inquiry begins.

earthquake of 1755, upon the blasphemous notion "that would

The scientific inquiry and the quest for ob-

jectivity begin in and are a part of the problem itself.

vi ew such a natural phenomenon as divine punishment, or

Man's inability to find enduring order in a world where the past emerges directly out of the future without any duration

wo uld notice 'a purpose of divine solicitude' therein, which he called a 'mistaken, human teleology. "' 6 The upshot of

to the present but only the instant (Nishitani's Eternal

al l this is the increasingly mechanistic view of a cold,

Present), blinds man to the presence of Reality in the in-

dead, impersonal world.

stant and leads him to seize upon the illusion of objectivity,

s eems to thwart our attempts to realize our humanity within

i.e., Science.

We live within this world but it

i t ; indeed, it coldly, cruelly and calculatedly removes us

The arena for this inquiry is, of course, nature with

f rom existence with what often seems to be totally impersonal

its seemingly less personal (read anthropormorphic) character-

mechanisms.

istics.

t hat science and scientists do not take this fact seriously.

Following Descartes' breakdown of previously more

It has been, however, very persuasively argued

holistic worldviews and the increasingly acceptable division

They continue in the Ptolemaic and Biblical tradition to

of Reality into dualistic categories such as subject-object,

assign man a central position in the universe.

personal-impersonal, the view man has of the world takes on

learned the lesson of Copernicus--to abandon all sentimental

quite a different character.

egoism and see man objectively in the true perspective (the

Whereas previously cosmic order

Had they

meant the unification of the order of the natural world and

scientific perspective) of time and space--they would spend

the order of the human world seen operating according to the

no more than a moment considering the history of human be-

laws of nature under the providence of God (Nishitani cites

ings in the panorama of the history of the universe.

Augustine, Plato, Pythagoras, the Upanishads, Kepler and

natively, if we decided to examine the universe objectively

Newton as exemplars of this view), with the establishment of

in the sense of paying equal attention to portions of equal

natural science and the scientific world view "the concep-

mass, this would result in a life-long pre-occupation with

tion of the natural world changed from a teleological to a

interstellar dust, relieved only at brief intervals by a sur-

mechanistic view, bringing with it a fundamental change in the relation between man and nature." 5 This marks the begin-

vey of incandescent masses of hydrogen-- not in a thousand

"Alter-

million lifetimes would the turn come to give man even a

Srbid., p. 3. 6Ibid.

125

second's notice."7 Our seeming scientific objectivity only serves to exacerbate, not to heal,

t~e

despair which is the

126

"personal."

The new world view portrays the world as a

place in which man cannot exist comfortably and from which

natural consequence of holding this depersonalized natural

he cannot escape.

world view.

cial context in which modern science can thrive and find

Nishitani observes that from within that despair arises our awareness of nihilum.

The question arises, "How

This world view has in turn created a so-

its elf "self-" sustained.

"In the modern world religion is

a remnant--a recollection of what was once thought to be

and in what dimension does the resolution of this despair,

'the natural order,' the order involved in community life.

this awareness of nihilum, occur?"

It is . . . a matter of the creation of a social context in

Surely the old teleo-

logical view of nature is inadequate but is the new notion

whi ch empirical-rational thinking is demanded because the

of an indifferent natural order completely incompatible with

soc ial order itself is no longer invested with sacred mean-

the concept of God?

ings and mysteries, but is regulated by technology.

As Nietzsche observed, most religions

were preoccupied with human concerns.

Nishitani wants to

Technology is the encapsulation of a form of rationality." 9 It

question the assumption that the foundation on which salva-

r efuses to take him seriously or personally and quantifies

tion is possible remains within the realm of "human" con-

him in biological and material categories.

cerns.

ture become the focus, the axis, and the death aspect of man

"The problem is this: when the relation between an

The laws of na-

insentient world and man and the relation between such a

is bluntly pointed out and cast before his despairing eyes.

world and God are made the foundation of religion, what does the relation of God and man--that is, religion--become?" 8

Reality has, before modern science, been viewed largely in

In the teleological view, the God-man relation had been the axis.

Han was seen as the highest representative of

its life aspect. it is two-fold.

True Reality has a life and a death aspect; Whereas "soul," "personality," and "spirit"

have always been considered in their life aspect, "matter"

things in the world; this was (is) true of all the great west-

projects before us the death aspect.

ern monotheistic traditions.

gether; Reality can be viewed in each but is not reducible

The relationship between God

and man seems to have a primarily human focus, i.e., it is 7Polanyi, p. 3. Obviously we pay only lip service to "objectivity." It is this vastness and coldness of the objective universe that we discussed previously in Nishitani's references to the "kalpa fires." 8Keiji Nishitani, "Personal/Impersonal. .. " p. 4.

They must be seen to-

to any of them. "Reality is that which appears as life and as death." 10 This will be explored further in a later section; 9sryan R. Wilson, "Aspects of Secularization in the lvest," Japanese Journal of Religious Studies (Dec. 1976), Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 266. lOKeiji Nishitani, "Personal/Impersonal. .. " p. 7.

128

127

what is important is that the order of nature and history

dence of his own self-being.

had previously been viewed in its life aspect and as a re-

dependent in the realization of the void at the base of his

sult calamities, both natural and man-made, had been viewed

existence.

as extensions of God's personality in the form of wrath,

rationalism, materialism and progress.

punishment, etc., i.e. as primarily human concerns.

Here man becomes free and in-

This atheism has three components: scientific

Scientific rationalism represents the emergence of the

1bis

notion of "personality" will be clarified with reference to

power of human reason to explore, elucidate, and control

Nishitani's discussion of man's awareness of his own sub-

the materialistic world without any metaphysical reason

jectivity.

grounded in the divine will of a creator God.

Having described how the laws of nature in the modern

On the con-

trary it represents a frontal assault on such a view and

scientific concept of nature come to be seen as completely

purports to be the ordering mechanism which would discover

indifferent to man and his concerns, and how a \vorld so ruled

the matrices and interstices in a logically and mechanically

seems to undermine traditional unders tan <.lings of the personal

organized natural world.

relationship between God and man, Nishitani concludes that

these same patterns and limits upon the human psyche seen

the world can only seem completely incompatible with the

as a logical extension of the natural world it once set out

idea of "personality."

to explore but now has become the model for exploration it-

This is of enormous concern to the

Increasingly, it attempts to impose

man with such a world-view who experiences the despair aris-

self.

ing out of a materialistic scientific frame of inquiry pre-

seen as an extreme representation of an impersonal, scienti-

occupied with the death aspect of Reality.

fic, materialistic inquiry come back upon itself to produce

establish in his

0~1

How can man re-

awareness tne now lost security of a

more intimate, more personal understanding of Reality? Surely one could take the tack of supposing such an understanding to be unnecessary, even undesirable.

This ap-

Thus, in its extreme forms, social engineering can be

despair in the inquirer. In the atheistic view, human reason came to be viewed on a field wherein it was almighty, a surrogate deity, a substitute for the metaphysical reason which was itself sub-

proach finds its consummation in the subjectivization of

ordinate to a divine Order.

atheism.

trol is a result of the implication within the materialistic

Nihilum, in Nietzsche's terms signifying the death

That reason is in complete con-

of God, emerges from beneath the ground of the material,

world view that the world is absolutely passive and subject

mechanical world and is realized by modern or "post-modern"

to human control.

man as an abyss in which he reaches the "ecstatic" transcen-

to matter, man comes via his reason to see himself as com-

Since all things are ultimately reducible

130

129 pletely active and completely free. 11

As human reason en-

stituted the abyss which lies at the foundation of the world

gages, analyzes, and organizes each material object that

and oneself.

comes within its purview, it takes on the character of a

as its earlier form could be and the idea of inevitable

machine, inexorably moving forward and gives credence to the

pro gress cannot be held.

idea of an inevitable progress.

the field of nihilum, a reversal of the earlier forms of

The optimism of modern

Such an atheism cannot be naively optimistic

Han stands out in ecstasy upon

atheism and what rescues , or seems to rescue, it from the

transcendence which moved in the direction of God.

despair of a purely mechanistic world view, can be seen as

tuted for this optimism, this faith in progress, is the

a modern form of maya, a veil of illusion created by so-called

mos t "abys smal" despair.

objective reason obscuring Reality.

This ~ emerges out

of the unification of man's increasing awareness of his subjectivity (and seeming freedom therein) and the materialistic world view.

This is, of course, a shallow, early form of

Substi-

This is the dukkha, the suffering,

the ill-at-ease-ness of Buddhism--the third and final mark of existence. Nishitani is critical of Sartre because of his insistence up on confining

existence to the frame of humanism, substi-

atheism not yet awakened to the nihilum concealed at the

tut ing man for God.

bottom of such a world.

th ings and events in the world; it means, therefore, a radi-

Thus, "for presentday man, only

Nietzsche saw that atheism concerns all

when he comes to an awareness of nihilurn within himself as

cal tum-about in the way of looking at the world, of living;

the subjective ground of his existence beyond even reason,

"a fundamental reorientation in their existence and evalua-

and only when he treads on that nihilum, is it truly possible

tion. "l3

for him, so he thinks, to speak of subj ecti vi ty. " 12

saw man resolving his existence must be transcended, broken

Such a

Even the field of consciousness upon which Sartre

man as subject can by no means be reduced to an objective

through.

existence.

existential attitude has a fundamentally religious signifi-

According to Nishitani, this subjectivity is

For Nietzsche, as for Kierkegaard before him, the

analogous to Yahweh's calling himself "I am that I am" or,

cance.

we might adc.i, the characterizing of Brahman as tat ~ asi.

nothingness takes on a transcendental character as the place

Further, the nihilum brought to consciousness by this break-

of the "ekstasis" of self-existence; man absolutely con-

through is analogous to the nihilum referred to in the Chris-

fronts his being essentially dependent on God.

tian notion of creatio ex nihilo.

ter, man has his existence established "either . • . on the

11 12

rbid ..

0.

9

rbid. , p. 10 ·

For the "creator" is sub-

13

For the former, atheism is truly subjectivized and

rbid. , P · 11.

For the lat-

132

131

foundation of God's salvation, or, without that salvation, in the despair of the so-called "sickness unto death, " 14 thereby falling into unauthentic existence.

In Nishitani's view,

fested in God the Father and the Son has its analogue in the Sunyata or Emptiness of Buddhist thought. 17 He begins by quoting the passages from

Matthe~~

(5:43-

Kierkegaard falls short of Nietzsche precisely because he has

48) to show that in the western tradition there is an "indif-

not "passed through the purgative fires of the mechanistic

ference of love" which parallels and counters the "indiffer-

world view in order to enter into a confrontation with the

ence of nature" we have previously discussed.

new way of human being which lies hidden in the establishment of the natural sciences, •. .. 15

is the problem; in the former is its resolution.

II.

The Personal in Buddhism and Christianity

Nishitani wants to show that doing away with the personal element, as seems to have happened in the indifference of science, does not do away with the ground or root-source of that personal element but merely obscures it.

He holds that

the work of love has a personal characteristic and derives in the Christian tradition from a belief in God's perfection (and love as perfection).

The personal comes into being as

the imitation or embodiment of this more fundamental perfection.16

It may well be that Nishitani's view of Christianity

i s selective but there is little doubt that he does no disservice to it as he sees certain parallels with his own Buddhist tradition.

This "in-

difference of love" is described in the verses: Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, and do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you. ( 5:43 E) The injunction follows: Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect. (5:48) This "indifference of love," unlike the "indifference of nature" which reduces everything to the most abstract common denominator, "is an indifference which embraces all things in their most concrete form--for example, good men and evil men, embracing the differences just as they are." 18 This is the imitation of God who: "

. maketh his sun to rise on

the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and

He tries to show that the Christian notion

of kenosis or ekkenosis (the emptying out of self) as mani14 Ibid., p. 12. l5Ibid., pp. 12 , 13. 16 Ibid. p. 16. I

In the latter

17 r

· appropr~ate · h N. I . . ' sun d ert ~s to remem b er tat .~sl~tan~ standing of Buddhism is an essentially Mahayanistic one. Furthermore his discussion of sunyata becomes increasingly Madhyamikan and even Zen centered. The former is surely the most philosophical of the schools discussing sun~ata and the latter reveals his indebtedness to Nishida and H~samatsu. 18 Keiji Nishitani, "Personal/Impersonal. .. " p. 14.

134

133

on the unjust" (5 :45).

In Buddhism this is called "non-

differentiating love beyond enemy and friend."

Christianity

then, just as it has been the matrix of both modern science and modern atheism, is their antagonist in the attempt to provide a resolution to the problems they pose.

In Nishi-

tani's mind the question must be whether the resolution is ultimate and applicable to all men or whether we must look elsewhere to find a deeper resolution to the problem; indeed, it may be that the problem has not even been fully enough stated within Christianity especially if one takes the position that the problem fully stated and understood is, at one and the same time, the resolution. For this reason he goes on to show the analogous statement of the problem in its Buddhist formulation. 19 We might say that Emptiness is the conceptual and functional equivalent of the Christian God.

Just as this God has the tri-

adic aspects of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, so Emptiness as the Eternal Buddha has the aspects of dharma-kaya (the "body of Buddha as law"), sambhoga-kaya (the "body of bliss"), and nirmana -kaya (the "body of transformation," i.e. , the his torical Buddha).

All these manifestations, even the fact that

there are considered to be such manifestations, are evidence 19

rt must already be obvious why it is important to note the somewhat limited and selective parameters of Nishitani's grasp of Christianity. It is not part of our intention to claim that other spokesmen within Christianity have not articulated the problem more completely, that resolutions are not to be found within the Christian tradition, nor even that the problem and its resolution are coterminous.

of the mahakaruna or "Great Compassion" which is one of the most fundamental characteristics of Mahayana Buddhism. 20 To go back to the notion of ekkenosis , Nishitani suggests that ekkenosis is already included in God's original perfection, i.e. , it is a part of his original nature, and is a work which has been fulfilled in the case of the Son in his taking on the form of a man, even more of a servant.

The maha-

karuna is likewise grounded in Emptiness and is a work which has been fulfilled in the case of the nirmana-kaya or historical Buddha.

Because the Buddha and all historical existence

is viewed as being fundamentally anatrnan or muga (non-ego or sel flessness) Nishitani sees these two traditions, up to thi s point, as mirror-images--Christianity as Being emptying itself and Buddhism as Emptiness taking on Being.

Other

mirror-images describing this juxtaposition would be: being manifest and being hidden, form and formless, self-determination and self-negation, Thus-Gone and Thus-Come. 21 Nishitani recognizes that there are many dimensions of love; he speaks of the distinction between

~

and

~·

The former is the differentiating love which causes us to 20 This mahakaruna along with rnahaprajna ("Great Wisdom") are the two great philosophical pivots of Mahayana and are to be equally emphasized. It is the mahakaruna that is the hallmark of, indeed gives rise to, the Bodhisattva which figures so prominently in the Mahayana Buddhism of China and Japan but is so notably absent in the Buddhism of South and Southeast Asia. 21 Thus-Come refers to the Buddha as sambho6a-kaya ("body of bliss"), i.e., in its self-manifestat~on as the compassionate Tathagata (Thus-Come).

136

135 III.

love friends and hate enemies and is ego-centric; the latter

Eckhart: God as Impersonal

Nis hitani takes up a consideration of the negative

is undifferentiating and exhibits selflessness, self-nega-

theology of Johannes Meister Eckhart (c. 1260-1328) as rep-

tion.

resent ative of the highest moment of the various attempts

This latter is an act in imitation of God's perfection

and is the deepening of the notion of "personal" into "a kind

within Christianity to treat God in his impersonal aspect. 23

of trans-personality or impersonality--not an impersonality

He att empts to show that somehow Eckhart has gone farther

which is in simple contradistinction to personality, but . . a personal impersonality. " 22 This impersonality is the ground

even than Nietzsche in articulating the religious quest. Niet zsche, modern science and modern atheism are all taken

from which personality derives as a notion which was attacked

as having shifted the direction of the inquiry by making it

and destroyed by modern science and modern atheism.

impo ssible to continue to cling to a personal God.

Cer-

Eckhart

tainly the Christian tradition itself has generally focused

took a more productive tack by deepening his consideration

upon the personal aspect of God's perfection and has spoken

of the problem.

of God's "choosing" a people, of his "commanding" with abso-

to the awakening of the modern scientific consciousness but

lute will and power, of "loving" the righteous, and of "pun-

Nis hitani will eventually show that the direction taken by

ishing" the wicked and sinful.

Eckhart is a more productive one even though it too must

Instances of the attempt,

within Christianity, to attend to the "impersonal" aspect are usually referred to as "negative th~ology" and are few. Nishitani doubts that Christian dogmatics has successfully treated this aspect but feels that if it were to do so it would be via this approach.

fi nally fall short of a satisfactory resolution. Nishitani cites three unique contributions of Eckhart's thought: First, the 'essence' of God is thought to be found only where the personal 'God' which stands in confronta-

Certainly it must do so if it

is to combat the "indifference of nature" which has become such a problem for religion and science. Negative theology has made its attempt primarily regarding the problems of man's freedom and independence and the awakening of his subjectivity, thus opening up the aspect of the trans-personal in God. 22

To be sure, Eckhart was historically prior

Keiji Nishitani, "Personal/Impersonal ... ", p. 17.

23I t ~s . wort h not~ng . . . 1 •• I h . r-ot: . r: h 1.<: !1n1nr·"' : >'lZ'Jtcl .<: n servat~on that Eckhart seems to be an extraordinary Christian. "Eckhart's Chris tianity is unique and has many points which make us hesitate to classify him as belonging to the type we generally associate with rationalized modernism or with conservative traditi onalism. He stands on his own experiences which emerged from a rich, deep, religious personality. He attempts to reconcile them with the historical type of Christianity modeled after legends and mythology. He tries to give an 'esoteric' or_inner meaning to them, and by so doing he enters fields wh~ ch were not touched by most of his historical predecess~rs." Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, Mysticism: Christian and Budd~ (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), pp. 11-12.

138

137

tion to created bein~s is transcended. Second, the 'essence' of God or Godhead' is discovered as absolute nothingness, which presents itself to us moreover as the place of our absolute death-sive-life. Third, in the 'Godhead' alone is it possible for man to be truly himself, and only in the openness of absolute nothingness is the consummation of man's freedom and independence (man's subjectivity) to be found. "24 Eckhart distinguishes be tween God and "Godhead" (Gottheit). 25 God refers to the personal dimension of Godhead which is the essence of God.

In Eckhart's psychology,

can unite with it, "he, too, being pure and without idea or likeness." 26 Among the ideas we have are those such as that God is good, wise, merciful, etc., i.e., God as personal. Thes e Eckhart acknowledges cannot be the essence of God becaus e ideas, though they may be divinely blessed, are symbols.

In anticipation of Tillich, Eckhart says in Sermon l,

"No idea represents or signifies itself.

It always points

to something else, of which it is the symbol. " 27

The Godhead

man's essence is the soul; it is pure unity and does not act.

its elf is the eternal abyss, the absolute nothingness, out

Its agents act: the imagination imagines, the understanding

of which comes divine being.

thinks.

in Nishitani's sense of death-sive-life presents us with a

The soul itself cannot be distinguished from the

Godhead.

Ideas, volitions, etc. all come from outside the

contradiction.

Absolute nothingness, taken

Presented on the ground of their own nature

soul, via the senses, and the soul gets at things by means

they are absolutely distinct, as "eternal" or "absolute" life

of ideas which are entities created by the soul's agents

and death.

(intelligence, memory, etc,).

sol utely inseparable.

These ideas, since they come

While this is logically clear, they are also abThey are not two separate things but

to the soul from outside, via the senses, cannot tell the

make up one entity.

soul anything about itself.

since no "thing" or "being" can be made up of contradictory

It is because of this freedom

and innocence of all instrumentalities and ideas that God 24

There is no objective self-identity

opposites; this would be mere fantasy.

The oneness of which

Nishi tani is speaking here is non-objectifiable. Keiji Nishitani, "Personal/Impersonal . . . " pp. 73, 74.

25 suzuki describes this distinction after having noted appropriately that Eckhart does not always hold to his intentions to distinguish carefully between these two terms. "Though he often fails to make a clear dis tine tion be tween the two and would use 'God' where really 'Godhead' is meant, his at temp.t to make a dis tine tion is noteworthy. With him God is still a something as long as there is any trace of movement or work or of doing something. When we come to the Godhead, we for the first time find that it is the unmoved, a no thing where there is no path (~padh) to reach. It is absolute nothingness; therefore it LS t e ground of being from when ce all beings come." Suzuki, p. 19.

Objecti-

fied it would be part of the domain of conceptual thought, a part of the duality of subject-object.

The understanding

of life and death as essentially inseparable can only take place existentially through immediate experience in our existence, at one and the same level as the religious quest. 26 Meister Eckhart: A Modern Translation, trans. Raymond B. Blakney (New York: Harper & Brothers, Harper Torchbooks, 1957), p. 97. 27

Ibid., p. 98.

140

139

This kind of essential inseparability of conceptually con-

the soul's ego-centered mode of being, is broken. " 30

tradictory ideas is expressed by Nishitani in such phrases

is the first step or movement.

as "life-sive-death" and "affirmation-~-negation." "Ab-

the soul, the second movement is the soul's penetration into

solute nothingness means here the place where every mode of

God as born in the soul.

being is transcended, not only the various modes of creatu-

God revealing itself within the soul.

ral being, but even the modes of Divine being, such as the

then , is the soul returning more and more deeply to itself

Creator or Divine Love . .. ZB

and becoming more truly itself.

God the Creator is known only by "creatures," God as

This

God having penetrated into

This is the same as the depth of The third movement,

The consummation is the

so ul reaching absolute nothingness, which is the essence of

Love is known only by "lovers," i.e., each personal aspect

Go d.

is known only via personalities, selves, egos,

The essence

As Nishitani describes it: "it is the self-identity of the

(this is already a limitation) of God, the Godhead, is only

so ul which is self-identical with the self-identity of Go d. " 31 In one of his more famous statements Eckhart pro-

"known" by the essence of the soul; it transcends every aspect of Being and therefore all personal aspects.

It is im-

personal, but in a new and much deeper sense. There are three movements in this transcending.

clai:ns that: "The eye \-lith which I see God is the eye with which God sees me." 32 The unity and freedom of which Eckhart speaks 33 is,

The

self or person is tied to corporeality, space and time.

This is the bottomless ground of the soul as selfless.

To

of course, man's subjectivity but it is not the subjectivity

experience the "birth of God" within we must turn away from

of the ego.

these quantifiable things in order to be "broken into by God." As Eckhart puts it in Sermon 21: "As God penetrates

absolute death of the ego; the subjectivity which arises from pure Oneness with God. 34 Nishitani sees that in Eck-

me I penetrate God in return.

hart's unio mystica, . the final stage of perfection in mysti-

God leads the human spirit

i nto the desert, into his own unity, in which he is pure One and self-creating . . . . Here the spirit achieves unity and freedom."29 This birth of God in the soul is "already a procedure in which the 'selfness' or 'self-will' of the soul, 28 Keiji Nishitani, "Personal/Impersonal. .. " p. 71. 29

Blakney, p. 193.

It is the subjectivity which arises from the

3°Keij i Nishi tani, "Personal/Impersonal. .. " p. 72. 31 Ibid. 32 Blakney, Sermon 23, p. 206. 33 see footnote 29 above. 34 The "pure" refers here to the non-objectifiable oneness indicated in Nishitani's use of the phrase death-sivelife. --

142

141

cal experience, i.e., unification with God ~),

(~

unitum

tani notes, however, that there are some striking differ-

there is still a subject-object distinction lurking

ences.

It is not the atheism of Nietzsche nor is it the

in the background in the form of God's Being as the object

thei sm of Kierkegaard.

to be united with.

beyond both atheism and theism.

It does not mean to return to ones true

He is standing at the "other shore" For Christianity, generally,

self but rather to lose ones self in God, in the Absolute

Go d stands beyond the nihilum of creatio

One.

atheism, nihilurn takes the place of God whose person has

As over against modern science and its search for a

~

nihilo ; for

thoroughgoing objectivity, in Eckhart it is the thorough-

been negated and is realized in the

going pursuit of subjectivity that makes necessary the dis-

ity .

tinction between God and the Godhead or absolute nothing-

ab ode of God; the abyss of atheism occurs within man's sub-

ness which is its ground.

j ectivity.

This absolute nothingness and the uncreated "I am" are

gro~~d

of man's subjectiv-

The abyss of Christianity occurs just short of the

Eckhart's abyss of nothingness is, in Nishitani's

opinion, even more thoroughgoing than either.

The nihilum

not, however, imagined by Eckhart to be some place far from

is more thoroughgoing than that of atheism and the subjectiv-

ordinary reality.

ity or man's subjective self-awareness is more radically re. · d . 36 N.1s h.1tan~. exp 1a1ns a 1 ~ze t h.~s:

sideration.

He vigorously warns against any such con-

Absolute nothingness is lived in the midst of

practical, everyday life and is always open within ordinary existence.

This uncreated "I am" is not to be found some-

where apart from the creaturely man.

Here we have uncreated-

ness-sive-createdness; eternality and temporality as a living whole.

Eckhart himself presents us with similarly non-ob-

jectifiable statements: "I flee from God for the sake of "I beg of God that He may cause me to be rid of God. " 35

God."

Eckhart has clearly articulated the concerns of modern

The subjectivity of the uncreated 'I am' appears only through the complete negation (Abgeschiedenheit or detachment) of the subjectivity of selfness • . . . it is just in 'I am' at its ultimate oneness that absolute affirmation can be found. While in Eckhart, man's true self-awareness is what establishes itself only as absolute 'negation-sive-affirmation,' absolute 'death-sive-life,' i~gures in the context of contemporary existentialism without passing through an absolute negation. Here, too, the nihilum appears at the ground of man's existential being, making it the place of ecstatic selfawareness. But the self-transcending character of existential being alone is not yet the absolute negation of being as being, that is, the absolute nothingness.37

existentialism in his account of the encounter be tween God and man's subjectivity (his freedom and independence). 35

Nishi-

Keiji Nishitani, "Personal/Impersonal .. • " p. 75. Nishitani's translation from Sermon 28; cf. Blakney, p. 231.

36 "Realized" is to be understood here in both its meanings: as understood or grasped and as actualized. 37 Keiji Nishitani , ''Personal/Impersonal. .. " p. 76.

144

143

Sartre's existence, while established on nothingness, is still

existentialism subjectified nihilum as the place of the

viewed as consciousness; the self-affirmation of subjectivity.

self-transcendence of existence, contemporary theology places

Nietzsche's absolute affirmation, his Ja-sagen, while trans-

nihilum on the side of the Divine Will, with only an apparent

cending the conscious ego, still stands upon life or the

freedom and self-sustainment; the nihilum of creatio ex

"will to power."

nihilo is only relative nothingness.

Neither seems to attain Eckhart's position

Real subjective exist-

wherein absolute nothingness transcends "God", rather than

ence is established only in ekstasis; that of God and that

undermining his credibility as person; and life is the life

of man.

of "life-sive-death" rather than the life issuing out of the

even within Mahayana Buddhism in the distinction between self-

nothingness of nihilism.

help (jiriki) and other-help (tariki).

The problem in all this is partly that Eckhart can

It might well be argued that this distinction exists

The former position

is more that of Zen and Nishitani whereas the latter is more

hardly be taken as representative of mainstream, orthodox

the teaching of Pure Land Buddhism and Eckhart.

Christianity; in his own time it was regarded as heresy, albeit influential heresy. 38 Nishitani cites Emil Brunner as

ekstasis, his abgeschiedenheit, are the standpoint of sub-

among those contemporary theologians who attempt to defend

Where Nishitani's emphasis is on the emptiness of all things

the personal nature of God against the critique, explicit

and is metaphysical, Eckhart insists on the psychological

in modern science and modern atheism, and implicit in the

significance of nothingness so that God can take hold of the

via negativa of such thinkers as Eckhart, that such a God is

individual.

dead.

unitary One; the undifferentiated One.

As Nishitani says, "Hhen it is said that God wills the

Eckhart's

jective existence and constitute a spiritual psychology.

The subject is never denied but seen as the Eckhart's context is

existence of free, self-sustaining creatures as that which

the parish; his words take the form of sermons for the

really stands against God himself, where can the setting up

spiritual benefit of his parishioners.

of this free existence occur?" 39

nized this distinction is clear from his distinction between God and Godhead; that he does not consistently maintain his

38

rt is not without consequence that two of the major comparative studies of religion have looked to Meister Eckhart as a point of contact in East-West studies. Clearly the via negativa cannot be overlooked in any comparative studies-of the future and its place and influence in the western tradition needs careful reassessment. Cf. Rudolf Otto, !1ysticism East and West: A Com arative Analysis of the Nature of Mystic~ New or : er~ ~an oo s, an • . uz ~. ys ~c­ ism: Christian and Buddhist, The Eastern and Western Way (New York: The Mac~llan Company), 1957. 39

That Eckhart recog-

Keiji Nishitani, "Personal/Impersonal. .. " p. 76.

awareness is equally clear. 40

Nishitani wants to maintain

that even ekstasis as the standpoint of subjective existence 40 s uz uk.~ g1 asses over t h.~s d.~st~nct~on. . .

Cf . Myst~c~sm: .. Christian and Buddhist, The Eastern and Western Way, pp.

19-29.

146

145

is insufficient.

"There remains the more inclusive, more

a mode of comprehending ego or person. " 42 The fact is, however, that a bias is obvious here.

chorough position referred to before, that of absolute negation-sive-affirmation.

Ekstasis consists in the direction

The

in creasingly deeper self-consciousness of man reinforces his

from self to the 'ground' of self, from God to the ground of

se lf-centeredness and his self-reflectiveness and leads him

God; that is, from being to nothingness. Negation-sive-af-

t o continue to grasp his mode of being as self-evidently

firrnation consists in the direction from nothingness to being. " 41 Virtually all western thought has considered the prob-

s elf-centered.

lem of ekstasis from the direction of being toward nothingness.

modern science and modem atheism and existentialism has

The uniqueness of negation-sive-affirmation is its indication

merely borne increasing evidence of the seemingly obvious.

of a reversal of standpoint allowing a consideration of the

Nishitani suggests that this is not liberating but is rather

problem of personal and impersonal from a new perspective.

confining; man's self-being is caught in his self-conscious-

is to be found in the personal dimension.

ness. IV.

Man as Personal

of man as a personal being has, as it emerged in modern philosophical and religious thought, occupied a place of enormous Just as since Descartes'

~

cogito we may say

that the modern period can be viewed as the self-centered investigation of the self, so to a large extent "person" has been viewed from the same perspective.

The question raised

by eishitani is whether this is the only or even the best way of thinking.

Certainly it is natural that this point of

view should have come about by virlue of the fact that the very nature of ego or person tion.

The onslaught of

Man is blinded to his narcissism by his narcissim.

I n Nishitani's understanding, the "personal" emerges from,

Along with the idea of God as a personal being, the idea

importance.

Historically, man has concluded that reality

nec~ssitates

inward self-reflec-

i s a phenomenon or appearance that appears from, that which contains in its form no confinement.

phenomenon standing apart from, in contrast to, the ding~-sich

which might show itself in some other form different

from its own in the manner of the Greek notion of persona or mask.

There is nothing at all behind person, that is to

say, behind person is absolute nothingness.

41 Keiji Nishitani, "Personal/Impersonal. •• " p. 79£.

While this ab-

solute nothingness appears as something wholly other to the person and negates the person, it is not itself some conceptual "thing"--the actor behind the mask--behind the person. "Nothingness is not a thing which is nothingness." 43

"So long as the necessity for a more fundamental re-

flection does not arise, people automatically entertain such

This is not a Kantian

42Ibid. , p. 80. 43 Ibid., p. 81.

147 This would be to set up a duality behind which would then rest its resolution as something wholly other.

Generally

148

coming into being "as the 'Middle' of 'Temporary-provisory being ' and the 'Void'. " 44 It is vital that we not wrench

in western thinking, nothingness has functioned in this way;

the mask from absolute nothingness or vice versa.

it is conceived as the functional opposite of being and is

apart from absolute nothingness is mere self-centered per-

only a nothingness in thought.

sona lity; absolute nothingness apart from the mask is mere

Nothingness in Nishitani's

The mask

sense is, as we have indicated, something that can only be

idea.

lived as a part of bodily experience.

spiri t, a manifestation of the supra- or non-spiritual.

This is the nothing-

The living activity of the personality is, like its This

ness brought to light in the existential tum-about or "about-

no longer constitutes the subjectivity of modern western

face" of which Nishitani is so fond of speaking.

thought, it is the negation of the subjectivity usually as-

the Great Death and Great Awakening of Zen.

This is

But this involves

cribed to the personality of self-centered interpretation.

the self extricating itself from itself, negating itself in

It is the release from the confinement imposed by the self

order to free itself.

considering itself; it is the key to the prison of ego-

This occurs on the hither shore of th e

self, beyond the personal self. This does not mean that the self ceases to be a personal being.

The bodily experience is the self-attestation of a

living nothingness.

cen tricity.

a quotation from Gasan Joseki (1275-1365) who wrote an inscription over his portrait: 45

Absolute "negation-sive-affirmation,"

The conscious mind of this shadowy man, At all occasions is to me most familiar-From long ago mysteriously wondrous, It is neither I nor other.

as we have said before is the true realization of personal existence in the self. form."

This is the person as "formless

thing real behind it; it is itself the "really real Reality."

Thinking, feeling, willing, sensations and actions--the

The person may in this sense be the mask itself, a

"face" worn by absolute nothingness but not indicating some-

This personal being is the form of presentation of

absolute nothingness.

This is Nishitani's version of the

Buddhist notion of pratityasamutpada, or dependent co-origination of all phenomenal beings; as developed by Kegon it is "the unhindered mutual interpenetration between all phenomena."

(~isnitani himself speaks of Tendai' s notion of man

Nishitani illustrates this point from Zen with

whole self--are referred to here as a "shadowy man," "temperary provisional" in t.:hlo! Tendai sense, that is, entirely unreal.

It is the tum-about which occurs from within this per-

sonal self that opens up man's absolute Selfhood as a nonobjectifiable nothingness.

Each of these activities--bodily,

mental, and spiritual--now "appears as a shadowy act of a 44 45

Ibid. , p. 83. Quoted by Nishitani, ibid., p. 84.

149 phantom player on the now opened stage of nothingness." 46 CHAPTER IV

This is the stage on the "hither shore" referred to earlier. It is both the external world where we ordinarily see our-

NIHILISM: THE NATURE OF SUBSTANCE

self and the innermost depth of the personal self transcending itself.

This is why it is "most familiar" in Gas an

Jos eki's words.

It is both within temporality

and ecstati-

cally outside Time at each instant (the Here-now of Eckhart and the Eternal Present of Nishitani).

\men one relates

this self to other selves we ordinarily take these, at the level of ordinary existence, as two absolute existences. But on the plane of absolute nothingness they are, though absolute two as persons, absolute non-dual in their impersonality.47

Thus "The conscious mind of this shadowy man

. . . is neither I nor other."

It is in this way that the

Bodhisattva takes upon himself, indeed is himself, the suffering of all others.

He actually suffers in his Great Com-

passion for all living beings.

It is neither pretended,

metaphorical nor symbolic suffering.

As long as living be-

ings suffer, the suffering of the Bodhisattva can be no less real.

IN METAPHYSICS

His suffering is, however, empty, it is suffering

jus t as it is: suffering-sive-health.

I.

Nihilum as Toward Life or Toward Death

As we noted earlier, Nishitani has long been preoccupied with the problem of nihilism at the level of deep personal expe rience.

It will be useful if we look more closely at

this problem and at Nishitani's discussion of it in order to see how it shapes his understanding of the relation between science and religion.

of nihilism defines it as a situation which obtains when "everything is permitted."

Obviously, if everything is per-

mitted, nothing makes any difference or is worth Value must then be assigned arbitrarily and

~

anything.

nihilo and

can be reassigned upon any whim at any time with equal justification.

No argument for or against anything is of any

more value than silence.

Since silence has proven to be

largely unsatisfactory to modern man, speech has been his defense against nihilism and his mode of addressing the problem of nihilism.

46 Ibid., p. 85 . 47 It is this which makes a notion such as Buber' s "IThou," while entirely suitable as an ethical base for the conriuct of man's affairs in everyday existence, equally unsuitable as a metaphysical base due to its emphasis on the primacy of persons and their interrelations.

The common Nietzschean understanding

Nishitani is no different and to this ex-

tent he will have to use the act of speaking (or writing) to make his understanding of nihilism (and finally of Emptiness and absolute nothingness) intelligible.

The spirit of He-

gel's remark is appropriate here: "Science on its side requires the individual self-consciousness to have risen into

152

151

this high ether (where science itself flourishes)

subjectivism or subjectivity about which Nishitani speaks

Conversely the individual has the right to demand that

so eloquently, describing it as leading to despair and de-

science shall hold up the ladder to help him to get at least

personalization.

as far as this position, shall show him that he has in him-

the pride of Descartes which has gradually been negated by

self this ground to stand on, ,l

anxiety and despair,

Nietzsche did not imagine that nihilism was the inevitable result of atheism's victory over theism.

He merely

Modern science and technology begins in

Though phenomenally successful in its

own way, modern science has been unable to show us its essential point.

Nishitani as well as the "non-scientific"

understood that, historically, the theistic view had been

dimension of even the most "scientific" man is forced to

the predominant one and that, when dealt such a harsh blow,

reckon with the morass of theoretical and practical pre-

there were no living, viable alternatives to take up the

suppositions that underlies the rational method, the logi-

vacuum created.

cal construction of reality.

Nihilism quite naturally seemed, for this

reason, to be causally related to atheism.

Albert Camus'

The Rebel also makes and explores this observation.

The

As history has clearly demon-

strated, these techniques are not self-certifying. that they work is Wffiaterial to despairing man.

The fact

Man seems

net effect of the demise of theism and the impinging threat

to be acquiring power but he is losing his freedom.

of nihilism has been that the conception of "reason" has been

not uncommon for western man to suggest, therefore, that

detached from the conception of "good,"

man needs a rational interpretation of reason; Nishitani,

It is assumed that

It is

one may speak reasonably about empirically verifiable mat-

follo~ing

ters of fact and logical patterns of inference but not about

son is not the sole (perhaps not even the most important) key

what is good.

to unlocking reality.

Neither can reason be reasonably considered

as what is good.

Reason is said to objectify and in its com-

Buddhism in this regard, wants to suggest that rea-

The modern age begins with the definition of knowledge

mon alignment with mathematics it is said to alienate man

as power and might well be said to end with Nietzsche's con-

from his authentic and creative existence.

ception of the will to power.

Descartes has be-

Pascal's life of grace is no

come the symbol of the process of man's attempt to compre-

longer a viable alternative to the life of reason or the

hend the world by relying upon his reason and mathematics

mathematical ratio of Descartes.

alone.

cal knew, a more secure alternative than the pride of the

In fact, though, this same project resulted in the

1 G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenolo~y of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchboo s, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1967), Preface, p. 87.

The joy of grace was, Pas-

philosopher; he did not seem to know that the pride of the philosophers was capable of destroying even the joy of grace.

153

Though one cannot dispute these developments as part

154

l ine.

The current tendency of science seems to be that it

of history, surely one can refuse to accent them as the domi-

r efuses to look at the borderline, to accept it, that is,

nant truth of history.

t o take up the question of its own limits; except, perhaps,

Nishitani does but we will later

show that he has a somewhat circumscribed view of the de-

f or the sort of scientific humanism which seems to be both

velopment of western philosophy and particularly Christian

a science and a philosophy at one and the same time.

thought.

ence has a strong sense of its own absoluteness which is to

Nonetheless it is to Nishitani's view that we must

now turn.

Sci-

say that it has continued to retain the Cartesian sense of

Nishitani regards the world-view or ontology of science and of the scientific way of thinking in general as

knowledge as a sort of mathematical ratio. The basis of the scientific position is, of course, that

being at complete odds with that of most traditional relig-

it holds to the pure objectivity of the laws of nature. These

ions.

are both the

That this is the purview of philosophy rather than of

p~esupposition

and the content of scientific

religion is only partly true; when religion comes into be-

knowledge.

ing in historical actuality it always has such a metaphysic

of nature except by scientific means.

or world-view at its base, even if it is not self-conscious

the circle of the self exploring the self can be seen in this

of that fact.

scientific investigation of science.

Such a world-view or "philosophy" is the "in-

One does not question the validity of these laws The viciousness of

The power which is

peculiar to science lies in the fact that even its hypotheses

dispensable condition by virtue of which religion can actually come into existence." 2 The view that science andre-

are seemingly objectified by their being composed of so-called

ligion have no conflict so long as each does business with-

objective facts of which they are an arrangement.

in its own domain is fundamentally mistaken and does not re-

tion which must immediately be raised is whether, given the

solve the problem of their relation.

absoluteness of the truth of scientific knowledge, all other

The borderline which

The ques-

separates them (the world-view which they share) belongs to

areas of inquiry--religion, philosophy, art, etc.--and their

both of them.

contents must be merely subjective or imaginary.

In fact, the history of metaphysics and phi-

losophy is the history of the investigation of this border2 Keiji Nishitani, "Nihilism and Slinyata," trans. mamoto Seisaku, The Eastern Buddhist, New Series, IV, 2 (Oct. 1971), 30-49; V. No. 1 (May 1972), 55-69; and 2 (Oct. 1972), 95-106. Chapter Three of Shukyo to wa ("What is Religion?"), Sobunsha, 1961, p. 30.

they must be if we do not wish to embroil ourselves in the awkward contradiction of two absolute truths.

YaNo. V, No. Nanika

Clearly

the mathematical ratio asserts itself.

Here again

Nishitani proposes

that there may be a different way of viewing things; places or horizons from which the absolute may appear as relative

156

155

and the relative may appear as absolute.

This is a question

There are also many levels at which we accept the laws of

which is addressed to those many who hold to a form of sci-

nature with regard to these "beings."

entific humanism or rationalist nihilism which, in its ex-

the dog and the human being live the laws of nature; these

creme form, believes that all psychic or mental phenomena

laws of nature appear in all living beings as lived.

may be reduced to biochemical processes and thereby to mathe-

laws of nature are also, in a more fundamental sense, bodily

matically computable energy distributions.

realized or actualized in this living out of the laws of

The question is

In their behaviors

one of on what horizon or at what level is such a law or

nature.

truth to be encountered and accepted.

the dynamic intersection of, on the one hand, a particular

Nishitani first addresses "beings" such as a piece of

This is the so-called "instinct."

These

This instinct is

relation between individual and environment and, on the other,

bread, a dog, a human being from a physico-chemical point of

the form of the individual in his specific mode of being.

view.

In other words, living beings in their living and acting

Deprived of their particular concreteness, these "be-

ings" can be reduced to a homogen
bring into being or reveal the laws of nature in embodying

and particles.

and bodily understanding them.

Above this realm,

r.h~

psychological, the

Only in this instinctive

"spiritual" and the "personal" are often supposed to exist.

actualization do these laws of nature have any reality as law.

These too are often considered reducible, that is when they

At yet another level than the instinctive, we see in

are not merely considered fanciful inventions to explain

man what Nishitani calls "technique."

what had not yet been scientifically understood.

of the relation between a definite purpose aimed at and

Nishitani

"In his comprehension

argues, though, that it is undeniable that such "beings" as

definite means required for its actualization is involved a

a piece of bread, a dog, and a human being each has its

knowledge of the laws of nature.

proper mode of being with its proper eidos or form, and that these "beings" make a particular connection--they have a

stinct, technique involves some sort of intellectual comprehension of these laws." 4 Viewed from the other direction,

particular environment.

knowledge advances only through man acting technically.

"The respective properties, manners

In contrast with mere in-

of movement, and bodily structures inherent in the human be-

difference from instinct lies in the actualization of the

ing and the dog cannot be comprehended apart from the special characteristic of the environment each of them possesses." 3

laws into actions consequent to thought.

3 Ibid., p. 33.

reflection or knowledge is technique. 4 Ibid., p. 34.

The

This thought or

It is on this field

158

157

(wherein knowledge advances parallel to action) that the

present age, which tend to rationalize and mechanize human

dominance of laws is accepted.

life, external as well as internal, individual as well as

Modern science is nothing 5 other than the mechanization of this technique. That is,

social, rob us of the power of a rational grasp of ourselves

it is the increasing abstraction of technique as mere knowl-

and make us an easy prey of instinctive desires, lust for

edge of the laws of nature.

power, or other irrational motives.

This is the mechanization and

From behind our ration-

depersonalization of observation and experiment which gives

alized life something fundamentally irrational is apt to

impetus to the advance of scientific knowledge.

emerge--even frantically sometimes.

Here is

1

Rationalization 1 weakens

where post-Cartesian man thought he would find his security--

our power of self-reflection, that is, the faculty of rea-

in this reciprocal development of knowledge and technique.

son, and evokes all sorts of irrationality in its lower form." 6

The highly purposive character of this movement is the di-

This law of nature Nishitani calls the law of being and

mension wherein the laws of nature come to appear in their character as immutable law.

Hechanical technique and ma-

portrays as having a purposive or teleological character.

chines are the product of the embodiment in man of the laws

This is seen in the rational unfolding of the levels of be-

of nature.

ing from material, through living, to knowing; matter, life,

We encounter the laws of nature on all these

fields: on the material where we are considered a "being"

and intellect seen here as characteristics of different

like the dog or the animal man; and the technical where we

levels of "beings."

are the knowing human being making use of instruments and

are put in motion as purely mechanical.

machines.

folding of the characteristics of the different levels of

We have, of course, glorified this emerging

In the extreme, man 1 s purposive actions Along with this un-

consciousness of these various levels as a highly rational-

"beings" there seems to be a proportionate and increasing

ized "progress."

power of the "being" over the laws of nature, i.e., more free-

Even so it is clear that we are in con-

stant danger of undermining our own progress.

dom, albeit potential and frequently lost in the mechaniza-

We may at

least take it as a social good that we have risen above the

tion.

merely instinctual to the rational or technical level.

rule of the laws of nature is more direct (since not resisted)

As

Paradoxically, for inanimate objects or "beings," the

Nishitani himself recognizes: "The same conditions of the

but also shallower.

5Here we are again referring to the objective perspective of the second field of reality--the field of consciousness wherein the problem is one of certainty.

6Keij i Nishitani, "The Religious Situation in PresentDay Japan," Contemporary Religions in Japan, I. No. 1 (March 1960). 7-24.

In their mode of being as "living" be-

159

160

ings, "instinctive" life both actualizes and uses the laws

As one might well have anticipated, the "progress" in

of nature to an increasing degree.

The instinct, which is

this evolving emancipation was not without its own prob-

subordination to the law, is also the use of the law and

lems.

to that degree increased freedom.

taking place, may even be said to have taken place already,

It is, of course, tech-

As

Nishit~ni

is quick to point out, a reversal is

nical man who most clearly actualizes and uses the laws of

whereby the ruling becomes itself the ruled.

nature.

tablished that the laws of nature increasingly establish

"It is only in man's actions that we are able

clearly to recognize that the subordination to laws means at once freedom from their bondage." 7 From one side, we see this radical internalization of

We have es-

their rule over "beings" as their level of beingness or selfconsciousness intensifies and that this increasing degree of beingness or self-consciousness gradually frees itself from

the laws of nature in their appearance and coming into their

the rule of these laws by turning them to its own purposes;

own reality within and via man's actions.

outdoing nature at its own game.

Machines repre-

sent a completely objectified nature; they are creations of man's intellect and represent to the highest degree his abil-

At this juncture a new situ-

ation arises. One side of this situation lies in the increasing

icy to turn nature back on itself in a rarefied form not

mechanization and depersonalization of man on the field where

discernible anywhere else in nature.

the machine came into being, where man becomes technical man.

Man's ultimate rational

creation is also the ultimate testimony to his enslavement

A new crisis emerges which we may refer to as a civilization-

to the laws of nature.

al crisis, even a world crisis, though Nishitani refers to it

From the other side, this creation of machines, far from

as a culture crisis.

It is a civilizational crisis or a

merely representing enslavement to the laws of nature, was

world crisis in the sense that this relationship between man

his civilizational salvation; it represents in its increas-

and the laws of nature obtains on a universal scale in which

ingly sophisticated forms (but also in its simplest) his free-

all cultures share some degree of the crisis, albeit in a

dom from the laws of nature in his ability to use and turn

variety of forms.

them in his own direction.

Man's purpose is seen to domi-

depth of radicalization which shows itself in the paradox of

nate the laws of nature and rule nature in a way it cannot

man's ruling of nature while being at the same time ruled by

even rule itself.

nature.

7 Keij i Nishi tani, "Nihilism and SGnya ta," p. 37.

The crisis is the even more fundamental

The limit-situation of man's human nature and of

nature's natural character increasingly turns out to lie beyond the authentic and natural connection between these two

162

161

phenomena.

On one side man's intellect, his technique, has

radically subjectivized field can man act as though nature

become increasingly abstracted into a scientific rational-

were something external to him; act almost "instinctively"

ity, and on the other side nature, in the machine, has found

but here in a different sense of instinct from the animal-

itself in a state of de-naturalization, or "purer than na-

like instinct because here there is not being but nihilum

ture itself."

at its base--a base not felt by animal "beings."

In this fashion the natural relation between

human beings and nature has reversed itself from "a relation wherein the rule of natural laws over man's action and

Nishitani

describes this condition as the "plane of life in its natu10 ral and raw state, of life's own naked vitality." There is, of course, a whole range within which in-

life that directly engendered man's rule over the laws of nature . . . to a relation in which the laws of nature once

dividuals sense this bottomlessness, see that they stand on

more come to rule man who hitherto has held sway over them." 8

nihilum.

The other siae of this situation of reversed relation

In

th~

shallowest sense Nishitani suggests it is

to be seen and experienced in the person in the contemporary

arises in the rule of natural laws over man; the first side

world who devotes himself passionately to sports and other

having been the reversal of his rule over the laws of nature.

amusements; here it merely floats, partially submerged, in

Here the limit-situation consists in the profound internal

man's life without his becoming clearly self-conscious of it

rule of natural laws over man opening up "a mode of being

at all.

in which man behaves as if he stood entirely outside the laws

dim and he is only dimly aware of his existence as dukkha;

of nature. ,.g

he is ill-at-ease but cannot articulate exactly how and why.

This is the emergence of nihilum at the bottom

of man's being.

Man is left seemingly bottomless at that

In Buddhist terms, man's karmic consciousness is

He has many rebirths to go before rising to a level of con-

point where his abstract intellect which demands scientific

sciousness where he authentically bodily experiences the

rationality corresponds with denaturalized nature, and he

nihilum at the base of his existence. At the other end of the spectrum there is a nihilism

at the same time relies on that intellect and the world of nature as well.

Paradoxically, but understandably, only here

which, "wholly antagonistic to the condi cion of the average

in nihilum does man find himself detached and free from the

person in mass society, assumes the form of existential soli-

more thoroughgoing and radical rule of the laws of nature in

tude, in which nihilum is chosen as the ground of one's own

their mechanized, internalized role.

b e~ng

8

rbid. ' p. 39.

9 Ibid.

Only on this naked,

0

w~t 0

h c 1 ear

consc~ousness

lOibid.' p. 40.

0

an d d ec~s~on. .,11

ll!bid.

0

0

Th ~s o

~s 0

a

164

163

steadfast refusal to accept the laws of nature as deter-

via the medium of Buddhism) the Japanese have, over the

minative in the form they appear to be when viewed in the

centuries, most liked to entertain questions regarding the

mechanistic form into which they are cast by the abstracting

nature of reality within the context of the relation be-

intellect of scientific rationality.

tween man and nature; theological questions very much taking

From the very ground

of the rationalized life of modern science is emerging a

the hind seat.

"naked life" quite anterior to it and inaccessible to it.

situation in which man is dragged along behind the machines

From the point of view of freedom, then, man comes to

he has created.

Contemporary Japan pointedly illustrates a

As Nishitani says, it "is also the matter

side of nature becoming totally internalized and realized in

underlying the problem of imbalance between the progress of science and the progress of man's morality." 13 This is the

man he appears eventually as though he stood outside its

problem we introduced at the beginning of this section on

laws.

nihilism of the relation between the rational and the good.

be deprived of his human nature and be mechanized.

From the

Both appear as a fundamental whole in man as a mechan-

ized living being changed into a completely ir-rational sub-

Quite naturally Nishitani points to the problem of nuclear

ject.

weapons for a poignant illustration.

Politically this di-

. cast ~n . t h e context o f 1 emma ~s

.

We may consider Sartre and Camus as aware of this con-

dition.

Polanyi has characterized these writers as morti-

comrnun~st

.

countr~es

14 ·

~n

wh.~c h

fied by self-doubt and without any real meaning in their lives.

the tendency is toward the mechanization of governmental in-

In such a condition "We can then no longer say anything in

stitutions, and more democratic countries . in which the free-

good faith, and all rational action becomes a lifeless banal-

dom of individuals is likely to deteriorate into the whims

ity; . . . Having arrived at this stage, the modern intel-

of the desire-driven subject.

lectual will include himself in his nauseated contempt for

istic world-image of modern science and the tendency in so-

the moral and cultural futility of his time.

cial structures and man's inner life toward mechanization,

Having rendered

In this context of a mechan-

the universe utterly meaningless, he himself dissolves in a

nihilism has come to be viewed as the natural consequence of

universal wasteland." 12

this movement.

The authentic relation between man

and world is thus hidden and obscured.

Here we see Nishitani

asking and positing answers for questions on a ground on which he is most comfortable.

A method to some degree in-

digenous and to some degree inherited from the Chinese (largely 12

Polanyi, p. 236.

The nihilurn has come to be viewed as what

13 Keij i Nishi tani, "Nihilism and Siinyata," p. 41. 14 r t ~s · ~nterest~n9 · · . t h.~s connect~on . to note ~n t h at Ad orno attributes Nietzsche s adoption of the term nihilism in response to newspaper accounts of terrorist acts in Russia. "With an irony to which our ears have been dulled in the meantime, he used the word to denounce the opposite of what it meant in the practice of political conspirators: to denounce Christianity as the institutionalized negation of the will to live." Adorno, p. 379.

166

165

quite naturally "ought" to be seen as the ground of existence

The failure of these attempts is, in Nishitani's mind, rea-

and its mechanical structure.

son for opening up a trans-personal field beyond the domain

Those contemporary existent-

ialists who seriously focus upon existence have thus come to

of so-called personality and spirit, "the precise and the

seize boldly this nihilum rather than succumb to mechaniza-

only field, . . • in which personality and spirit come into

cion or the purely desire-driven subjectivity which is its opposite. 15 This Nishitani calls a positive nihilism. He

their own reality and appear in their true figure as personality and spirit. " 16 This is the plane hinted at in Eck-

does not see a solution here for the same reason that an

hart's remarks about absolute nothingness as the "ground"

investigation of the self by the self is solipsistic and un-

of the personal God.

productive; nothing cannot illuminate nothing.

to (or yonder-side of) this world and at the same time rad-

Traditional religions have generally assumed the posture of drawing up lines of demarcation between religion and science because they have rightly seen the personal and spirit-

Such a plane must be both transcendent

ically this-side (even more so than we ordinarily take ourselves to be). For Nishitani it is in the Buddhist standpoint

of~­

ual dimensions as the opposites of the mechanization and de-

yata (emptiness) that such a point comes to light more

personalization which naturally proceeded out of scientific

clearly.

rationalism.

around us are realized in their true reality (suchness).

Surely, it was thought, the latter's inhuman-

Sunyata is the field where both self and all things

ity must be countered by emphasizing the meaning of man's

is only in the context of the above relations that

personality or spirit as his correct mode of being.

find the "original face" of the self, i.e., in subordina-

The

~•e

can

other so-called "humanities" which have emerged in our uni-

tion-sive-emancipation.

versity curriculum have been thought necessary for precisely

ity with death-sive-life necessitates its being taken ser-

the same reasons.

iously.

The traditional theistic position was

It

This radical paradox and its ident-

Death and rebirth is a theme taken up in many tra-

merely an exaggerated form of this reaction since it seems

ditional religions as death to finite life and rebirth in

so firmly grounded upon a "personal" God and his rela cion to

eternal life, or death to self and world and rebirth in God.

"persons."

In most instances all such discussions have taken place with

Nishitani' s view of western philosophical thought

is that it has also consisted in trying to draw lines of de-

an emphasis upon the life aspect.

marcation between a scientific and a human view of reality.

more valuable or desirable than death; we speak of soul, per-

15 Cf. note 12.

Life is considered to be

16 Keij i Nishi tani, "Nihilism and S\inya ta," p. 44. Cf. discussion of Nishitani on the "personal" and the "impersonal" in Chapter III.

167

sonality, spirit, even ghosts as "living" inanimate objects.

a~..l

superior to

Even the philosophers of religion have

glorified the life aspect and seen God as the highest, purest

168

really a leap in the direction of death any more than ordinary nihilism is such a leap. Taking this to be our dilemma, that is, that traditional

representative, i.e., as "Eternal Life" and man's salvation

religion has failed to grasp the nature of reality by moving

consists in his achieving this purest form of life.

in a life direction and that modern science has failed in

On the other hand the spectrum i1a:; its reverse direc-

taking the opposite, death direction; Nishitani proposes to

tion back through the various forms of life--soul, personal-

look in the death-sive-life direction.

ity, etc.--to inanimate things, and at this limit, toward

the dilemmas involved in traditional religions and in modern

nihilwn and meaninglessness.

science.

In Christianity, nihilum is

that out of which God creates all that is good.

It shows up

He hopes to avoid

In the former death intrudes into the life direction

(the personaliLy

J.i.1u~••sion)

as "original sin," as disobedi-

again when sin is considered to be a self-consciousness of

ence of God's will, as self-destruction, etc.

and attraction to nihilum which is the threat to eternal life.

life shows up in the death direction (the materiality di-

Salvation appears as overcoming this nihilum, or death, in

mension) as meaninglessness and subsequent dissatisfaction

its basic form.

with scientific rationalism.

When we consider the direction toward death,

In the latter

Nishitani proposes that we must

we are not, Nishitani says, losing sight of God and perceiving

see personality and materiality as a sort of double exposure

nihilum behind the beingness of finite being--this is merely

rather than speak of ascending to higher degrees of person-

a shallow form of nihilism.

ality or reducing to lower or smaller degrees of materiality.

The death direction, correctly

perceived, extends even in the direction of God's existence and becomes an abysmal, Godless nihilum where all life whatsoever reveals death at its base.

This double exposure is the viewpoint of sunyata. II.

tahilum as Death-sive-Life

This is death taken as

the ecstatic self-transcendence of self-being.

"In place of

The sunyata or emptiness of which Nishitani speaks is

the 'image of God,' the image of 'super-man' or the image of

not, he wants to argue, the same as the nihilum of nihilism.

really human, man is here set forth as an intentional objective inherent in man. " 17 This seems to be the direction of

This nihilum ultimately bears much more relation to personality than it does to sunyata.

modern science but Nishitani hopes to show that this is not

understanding of personality is established with a self-

Recall that the traditional

centered grasp of itself as nucleus. l7Ibid.' p. 47.

It represents a sort

of captivity, a self-attachment, a self-sustaining, solip-

169

sistic subjectivity.

Absolute nothingness or emptiness is

170

i s seen from the side of self-being and is found outside

the true mode of being of personality, not in any sense of

that being, on the "yonder-side" of being, as an entity other

"out there" or "yonder-side" but radically here and this-

than being.

side.

though it were hanging out over the abyss of nothingness,

Nihilism asserts that man finds his freedom and sub-

Even Heidegger speaks of our self-being as

jectivity on the ground of nihilum, a plane at the base of

This is clearly subject-object language.

self-being which provides the creative ground for a freedom

is that "the nihilum in this case is always a nihilum-for-

which does not fasten on anything; a condition felt by most as despair and psychological instability but which can be

us, that is, a nihilum encountered by us, we ourselves standing on the side of 'being. "' 19 This is a nothingness which

turned, by being taken seriously, into the only thing upon

stands outside all beingness, an entity absolutely other

which man can count.

than beingness; this is like the view which holds that nothing-

This may have a parallel in the sort

Nishitani's point

of remark that "The only Absolute is that there are no Abso-

ness is the negation of beingness and is the customary west-

lutes."

ern view.

This is nihilism existentialized.

The awkwardness here, indeed for Nishitani the impos-

But in Mahayana Buddhist thought, emptiness emerges as

sibility of such a position, is that it differs in no funda-

something quite different.

mental way from the subjectivity of more personalistic posi-

transcend all subject-object dualisms which emerge from logi-

tions, i.e., their being-centered metaphysic.

cal analysis.

Nothingness

Its fundamental intention is to

True emptiness is not something that is re-

in nihilism is not free from the bias of objectification,

alized out there on the yonder-side of being but is, rather,

"of taking nothingness as a 'thing' which is nothingness." 18

realized at one and the same time with and as self-identical

Nishitani is not thereby denying that modern nihilism is an

to being; it is "originally self-emptying," that is, it

existential standpoint; indeed it has real analogies within

empties even the standpoint that shows it as something that

the Buddhist tradition and was often mistaken by western

is emptiness.

cormnen ta tors as identical to Buddhism generally.

nothingness is tied to itself.

Nihilism

It is not self-shackling as when, in nihilism, Emptiness is the completion

does, in fact, found itself upon the real experience of the

of the direction toward negation which has transcended even

nihilum which is at the base of all existence.

the nihilum which transcended all being.

But the

nihilum appears here as the groundlessness of self-being; it lBibid. , p . 56·

But emptiness

transcends being in an even more radical way since it is in 19Ibid.

171

no way tied to being.

On the other side, one should not

172 "would not be without that universal which th~ir recourse

conceive of emptiness merely in terms of transcendence and

to the person seeks to bar as an ethical ground,

objectify it since it reveals itself only as self-identical

why the concept of the person as well as its variants--the

with being.

that they are originally one and the same thing and struc-

'I-thou' relation, for example--have assumed the oily tone of unbelieved theology. " 20 Any concept of the "right human

turally tied together.

being" is doomed to be a consecrated

The sive of being-sive-nothingness indicates

In this fashion nothingness or empti-

This is

duplicate of its own

ness is more radically this-side than even self-being or sub-

self-preservation.

jectivity as we ordinarily conceive of it.

being "ecstatic," shows how fundamentally man or his ego is

It is this limited

Even existentialism, with its mode of

self-being which is thought to be illusory and one of the

held out over an abyss and cannot be self-sustaining in any

marks of existence in Buddhism as anatman.

real sense.

Thus emptiness

Buddhism shows us that even this nihilum origi-

is neither exhausted by the illusion of subjectivity nor

nates in emptiness.

some transcendentally subsisting place called "emptiness"

is an abyss to anything that exists, so emptiness may be said to be an abyss to the abyss of nihilum. " 21 This emptiness

or "Heaven." Nihilism obviously made a great stride forward.

Freud

As Nishi tani says, ". . . just as nihil urn

is not the atheism which remains something (an "ism") in

had concerned himself in his "Introduction · to Psychoanalysis"

the sense that positivism, or materialism, or nihilism may

with establishing the necessity for a healthy ego.

be said to be.

While

Nishitani seems to be suggesting that empti-

this may be socially and therapeutically useful it goes

ness is a bringing together in some higher synthesis the

against Buddhism's and Nishitani's understanding of the il-

limited truths of these various "isms"; the negative truths

lusory nature of such an ego.

of positivism, materialism, reductionism, nihilism, and the

This is

a

"clinging to" ( tanha)

an ego-self which wishes to rid itself of being viewed ob-

positive truths of theism and the traditional religions.

jectively

does not want, however, to objectify this synthesis in the

but which in the process establishes itself as a

He

"something," i.e., an object, which is called the atman or

manner in which Eckhart may be said to have done in describing

self.

some unio mystica "with the Godhead," however formless that

Nihilism at least rendered man the service of showing

the false security which comes from this.

In

a

powerful

statement "Against Personalism" Adorno attacks contemporary ontological efforts to derive transcendence from the person as the mere exaltation of consciousness.

This consciousness

Godhead may be.

Nor, however, does he make the common mis-

take of thinking of Eckhart's thought as pantheism, since he 20 Adorno, p. 2 7 7.

21

Nishitani, "Nihilism and S!lnyata," p. 58.

173

recognized in Eckhart's "soul's ground" something which was radically on the this-side foreground of the self.

It is

174

unknown, unknowable, and separated from each other by an absolute rupture." 22 The crucial difference here is that,

in Buddhism that Nishitani sees the radical transcendence

whereas the field of nihilum (the barren and bottomless

of the "yonder-side"-"this-side" distinction; it is a relig-

abyss) opens up an essential difference between ourselves

ion of the absolutely this-side.

and that with which we are familiar, emptiness makes this

Nishitani does not wish to say, as a modern-day Feuer-

difference the place of our most intimate encounter with all

bach might, that the abyss of nothingness in nihilism or the

beings.

personal God of traditional religions are mere fantasy or

where self and other are absolutely two and absolutely ident-

representation, mere products of the imagination.

ical.

The nihil

This is not encounter in the Buberian sense; it is

Nishitani quotes the Zen master Daito Kokushi:

is a reality as real as the fact that we exist and is not

"Separated from one another by 100 million kalpas, yet not

remote from our everyday life.

familiar with :he everyday world that we fail to perceive

apart a single moment: sitting face to face all day long, yet not oppposed for an instant." 23 In this same fashion

in it the reality of nihilum.

water and waves present each other, each in its own reality,

It is only because we are so

This is true in much the same

way that we often fail to "know" someone with whom we have

and are also self-identical.

been acquainted, even intimately, for a long time.

as the absolute this-side.

We give

Our ordinary mode of being is, however, one in which

them names (this is true of all objects within our sphere of acquaintance) and think thereby that we know them.

This

This is the place of sunyata

body and mind are perceived as separate; we conceive of ourselves as rational or personal beings.

The absolutely this-

process of "naming" is the way we render such persons and ob213 jects our own. This naming is the camoflauge covering

side always appears in this case as the absolutely yonder-

nihilum.

side.

Here the everyday conceals rather than reveals.

The self as composed of body-mind, reason, and per-

It is in this sense that the knowledge accumulated by modern

sonality grasps itself in each of these aspects by these

technology conceals rather than reveals reality by making it

aspects.

so common-place that we fail to see it.

tary attachment; it is an unselfconscious attachment which

But, "In the mode

of being where form is emptiness and emptiness is form, the 'forms' (i.e., all things) are each absolutely nameless, 21

lhis seems to be the motivation behind the high emphasis placed by the Chinese on the "rectification of names."

This is the self-attachment which is not a volun-

binds us to the illusion of an objectified self.

To Nishi-

22 Keiji Nishitani, "Nihilism and Slinyata," p. 62. 23 Ibid., p. 63.

175

tani: "It seems as if when life, consciousness, personality, or reason, each as a whole, appears from the depths of the

176

the level of being. The standpoint of emptiness embraces both the movement

world so as to become individualized and immanent in each

toward Heaven and the movement from Heaven to the earth's

individual being, they betray an essential characteristic 24 of falling into a sort of narcissistic self-attachment. "

depths.

This is necessity viewed as destiny but is not a blind, ex-

The absolutely this-side character of emptiness means that

ternal destiny; it appears disguised as our own acts.

it is where the self of reason, personality, with body-mind

It

Where emptiness is emptied to become true emptiness

is the place where every thing appears in its true suchr.ess.

is this condition which obscures from us the this-side na-

dies to itself and is extricated from its self-attachment;

ture of the yonder-side.

this is the satori of Buddhism or the Abgeschiedenheit (de-

Nishitani compares Plato and

Christianity by suggesting that for Plato the Ideas appear

tachment) of Eckhart.

as the yonder-side of the sensory world; they are the "hea-

self, which is in the above sense unnameable, lives and has

vens" viewed from the "earth," this is the

its name in the everyday world.

~

perspective.

Christianity conceives the "heavens" as dominant wherein God moves toward the "earth" in an

~

perspective.

This too

It is also the place where this same

opposed to self-consciousness.

This is self-awareness as Self-awareness is reality

viewed in its suchness, not in some objectifiable sense, but

is a yonder-side perspective in which heaven stands against

as inaccessible to the ego's grasping.

earth.

being on ones home-ground, the thing as and in itself.

Metaphysics has used reason as a tool for represent-

ding-~-sich

This is a mode of Not

ing the yonder-side and the this-side as side by side on the

a Kantian

horizon of dialectical thought.

in both eastern and western philosophical thought; a unity

The abyss of nihilum differs in that it represents the

nor the "unity" so often glibly used

sought in advance as the logical outcome of reconciling a

this side, but a this-side, as we have pointed out, that re-

pre-supposed dualism.

tains something of the objectified yo.1der-side character.

is not a result; "this standpoint is neither monism or dual-

Instead of moving from earth toward Heaven as Plato does,

ism of any kind.

and instead of emphasizing Heaven moving toward earth as Christianity does, here we have a movement from earth toward its center, its depths. 24 Ibid., p. 64.

This abyss or chasm still moves at

Emptiness or the absolutely this-side

It is the absolute self-identical One which is, as it is, the absolute Two." 25 None of this is, of course, self-evident but Nishitani is not alone in such language or assertions.

It is primarily

Zen which has, over the centuries, made similar pronounce25Ibid. , p • 68 •

178

177

ments.

more really what they are.

What is the mode of being of "forms" (existing

things) and the meaning of emptiness?

The illusion characterized by

anatman consists in our taking as real what we ordinarily

How can things

"practice and confirm the self" while at the same time drop

consider as "objective" rather than seeing behind this ap-

away from the self?

pearance to its ground. This ground is where Heidegger sees

Muse Kokushi

ans~ers :

the subject becoming more authentically subjective.

Hills and rivers, the earth, plants and trees, tiles and stones, all of these are the self's own original part.

Behind

even this is the fieldof emptiness wherein there is an entirely different mode of being. Here, Nishitani says, "things

It is not that the field of that original part lies in body and mind, or that it lies outside body and mind, or that body and mind are precisely the place of the original part, or that the original part is sentient or non-sentient, or that it is the wisdom of Buddhas and saints. Out of the realm of the original part have arisen all things: from the wisdom of Buddhas and saints, to the body and mind of every sentient being, and all lands and worlds.26

The ordinary fact of life and death means, of course, that whereas

The paradox of representation on the field of conscious-

things may with difficulty escape the realm of consciousness, no-

ness is that objectivity is never objective in any absolute sense; it remains always subjectively determined.

Though we

are not merely subjective representations as idealism asserts, nor are they merely objective beings or external realities indepen d ent o f

.

consc~ousness

' . l'~sm i ns~st. . " 27 as rea 1 ~sm an d mater1a

thing escapes nihilum. Hihilum transcends consciousness and in turn is transcended by emptiness. 28 In Zen language, at the

may say that things exist outside the self or knowing sub-

level of consciousness "mountains are mountains and rivers are

ject, epistemologically they remain inside its domain.

rivers," at the level of nihilum we realize that "mountains

When

we break through this subjectivity to the nihilum at its

are not mountains and rivers are not rivers."

base, the nihilum itself is 5ubjectivized as the base of this

to this and making the two previous assertions possible is the

self-emancipation.

level of emptiness where, once again, "mountains are mountains

This deprives things of their "reality"

but does not render them merely illusory from the subject's

and rivers are rivers."

standpoint since because they are "nihilized" they come to

of "knowing of unknowing."

be more a part of a more authentic self, i.e., more authentically subjectivized.

The field of nihilum is one

~•here

things

cease to be mere objects and are beyond representation. prived of this so-called objective reality, things become 26 Muchu Mondo ("Questions and Answers in a Dream"), quoted by Nishitani, ibid., p. 69.

III.

Behind and prior

In Nishitani' s terms this is a kind

Nihilum and Substance

Nishitani hopes to make clearer this negation of the

De27

Ibid., p. 96. 28 r t ~s · a concept wh.lC h operates ~n . Re l'1g~on . and Philosophy (metaphysics) in the interface between the second and final fields of Reality as Nishitani describes them.

180

179

position of nihilism and to describe the mode of being on

retically apart and never become a question themselves;

the field of emptiness.

thus the

To do so he takes up the categories

of substance and subject.

The concept of substance in west-

noesis-~

distinction has never been resolved.

This is not surprising since substance and subject are,

ern thought has always referred to that which in any being,

after all, set up on the plane of object-subject duality and

animate or inanimate, makes it be itself, which does not

both presuppose the subject.

change as do the accidental properties of the thing.

duality but not entirely.

This

Nihilism breaks through this

It calls the subject into ques-

reference is only possible by viewing a thing as an object

tion but leaves it in a quandary by failing to see any other

represented by the subject.

plane; it merely sees the questioning of the subject on the

j ust discussed.

This involves the paradox we

field of consciousness.

Once one concludes that all things are

"appearances" the Kantian conclusion is quite a natural one, viz., that substance is an into" objects.

~

priori something which is "thought

But the division into phenomena and nournena

not go beyond that point.

It ruptures the "logical" but does It points beyond but in pointing

at something, i.e., the nihilum which lies at the base of the "pointing" subject, it reestablishes the grasping sub-

does not solve the problem of representation on the field of

ject by finding being to consist in an ecstatic transcendence.

consciousness; it merely raises the noumena to a "higher"

One might say that the problem of thought, i.e., the "mind"

level of representation, still objectified by the thinking

in mind-body is solved but the problem of action, i.e., the "body" is unresolved. 29 Buddhism recognizes this difficulty

subject.

This view of substance (the Kantian one) gives rise

ttl the view of the subject as something that rejects any

by considering mind and body to be different aspects or per-

objective comprehension whatsoever.

spectives of one bodily-experience.

This is the subject

Truly the designations

which existentialism "improves" upon by thrusting or hold-

of substance and subject must be gone beyond in any discus-

ing it ecstatically out over the abyss of nihilum.

sion of the mode of being of the self on its own home-ground.

way, both

subst~nce

In this

and subject are disclosed in their es-

sential mode of beingness and called into question as unnameable and incomprehensible. is as close as

w~stern

the "doubt" of Zen.

The self as such a subject

thought comes to the realization of

Nishitani holds that traditional ontol-

ogy has never moved to such a level of consideration.

The

questioner and the questioned have always been held thea-

29 Adorno spe;aks of this "legacy of action" which is the residuum of nihilism as "a carrying-on which seems stoical but is full of inaudible cries that things should be different. Such nihilism implies the contrary of identification with nothingness." He ?oes on to characterize as nihilists (operating on Nishitani s field of consciousness) '' • . • the ones who oppose nihilism with their more and more faded positivities, the ones who are thus conspiring with all extant malice, and eventually with the destructive principle itself. Thought honors itself by defending what is damned as nihilism." Adorno, p. 381.

182

181

The concepts of substance and subject provide the grasping

ing itself.

ego with a degree of seeming permanence in a world that is

acting mode of being or selfness.

anicca (impermanence) •

self it also reveals its selfness, in this case in this its

itself but inadequately.

They refer to the mode of being-inAll these observations occur at

the level of reason or logos.

In spite of reason's tradi-

non-ac~ing

In burning firewood fire reveals its actual, In fire not burning it-

or essential mode of being.

Only on this latter

ground does it reveal itself to be on its home-ground, its

tional place as the resolver of the dualism between knower

fireness to itself as fire.

and known, seer and seen, there remain traces of the knower

of things from a substance point of view, the rational point

knowing the known or the seer seeing the seen.

of view, is inadequate to grasp this non-acting selfness of

Things dis-

Clearly the traditional view

close their own selfness (fire reveals its form--to be anal-

fire.

yzed scientifically, etc.--or substance to be distinguished

from the point of view of reason, toward a point of view

from other things) and, also on the field of reason, we com-

which negates the substantial self-identity of things mani-

prehend this form.

festing themselves.

No matter how intently we wish to examine

This latter point of view is a radical turnabout

~

In Buddhist terminology this means that

the fireness of fire, there is always the vehicle of reason

the

between us and that possibility.

of view, i.e., that the fire-nature (substance) point of

As Nishitani puts it, "in

order to approach the fact 'THAT fire is,' reason always goes through the process of asking 'WHAT fire is.' " 30 Substance, then, is the mode of being of a thing as it

point of view must be negated by the anatman point

view must be negated by the no-fire-nature (fire not burning itself) point of view.

Indeed, the possibility of fire

burning anything lies in its true selfness which is in not burning or exhausting itself.

identity.

at the nature of emptiness by showing that rational, sub-

From ancient times, however, there have been, in

the East, such phrases as "Fire does not burn fire," "\
These

phrases point beyond the self-identity of reason's grasping to a point where the actual and essential (the THAT and WHAT) being of things exist on their home-ground.

~Tishitani

makes

a distinction becween fire burning firewood and fire not burn3°Keij i Nishi tani, "Nihilism and SOnya ta," p. 101.

In this way

~ishitani

manifests itself to us ar.d is grasped by reason as its self-

stance-oriented methods must fail.

hints

184

does not lend itself to mere rational accounting however subtle or refine (sic) that may be.

CHAPTER V

It is rather the result

of prajna, the so-called 'eye of wisdom,' the instrument SUNYATA:

which cuts open and at once reveals reality for what it is. 2

THE NATURE OF

EMPTINESS AND NOTHINGNESS I.

"Thus the ultimate reality shown by Mahayana Buddhists is the absolute voidness (sunyata) that is devoid of all quali-

Field and Subject

That the concept of sunyata (emptiness or voidness) is the gateway to an Buddhism has

~ever

understandin~

of the essence of Mahayana

been questioned, and rightly so.

ality he has chosen to consider the matter ontologically;

It

must, however, be admitted that there are perhaps as many different interpretations of sunyata as there are scholars who venture an opinion in this matter.

Kenneth Inada has

helpfully summarized and responded to these various posi-

He lists the various erroneous

cerned with reality as dharma and prajna (wisdom).

We

turn now to a more explicit treatment of Nishitani's own understanding of sunyata in the context of his investiga-

fields of Reality. Nishitani has suggested three fields of reality: the

interpretations as absolute monist, radical pluralist, nihilist, negativist, relativist, logician and dialectician. l

field of mere sense perception (such as is also found in animals), the field of the mode of being of man with con-

It is important to distinguish between the position he criticizes as dialectics (by which he means the western, ra-

sciousness and intellect, and a field transcending consciousness and intellect.

tional form of dialectical logic) and the "negative dialectics" we have suggested is the method of Nishitani.

whereas from the epistemologic perspective he has been con-

tion of the relation of religion and science on the various

tions in an introduccory essay to his own translation of the Mulamadhyamakakar.ika.

fications and about which no conceptual determination can be formed." 3 When Nishitani chooses the term sunyata for re-

The

former perpetuates the subject-object dichotomy and takes

It is to this third field that we

now propose to look more carefully, the field of emptiness or sunyata. We havealready described this field as the field

either the destructive (eristic) or constructive (teleological) form.

Nishi tani, with Inada, recognizes that "Truth

2 Inada, Nagarjuna •.• , p. 20. 3Hajime Nakamura, Ways of Thinkin~ of Eastern Peoples: India-China-Tibet-Japan (Honolulu, 1964 , p. 55.

185

186

of a wisdom which could be called a "knowing of unknowing."

sense with our senses and think with our mind, i.e., we rep-

Further, we have described this as the field of a praxis

resent it at a distance from ourselves; we objectify it. 5

which should be called "action of non-action."

That being opens itself on the field of emptiness means that

And, finally,

we have called it a field wherein knowledge and praxis are

this distance is dissolved, that the dissolving of transi-

one.

ence is itself dissolved, and restored to being.

This field is beyond the representation of material-

Everything

ity and the representation of ideas in the sense that both

returns to that individual capacity it possesses as a mani-

are conceived on the one hand "via the thing as it appears

festation of that possibility of existence.

as an 'object' in the field of opposition of subject and ob-

mountains again become mountains and rivers again become

ject

rivers.

and on the other hand

. . on the basis of the aspect

Here is where

Whereas on the field of reason (by virtue of its

of things under which things reveal themselves to us as sub-

being nihilized) self and things turn into a big question

jects ... 4

mark, in emptiness all things again appear as substance, each

This entanglement is overcome on the field of

nihilum as being essentially rootless.

No matter how complex

possessing its own individual selfhood.

Traditionally (ra-

or enormous a thing is, it shows itself to us in an analyz-

tionally) we speak of this or that thing, existing as this

able mode

or that thing.

~~hich

nothingness.

must be seen as suspended over this abyss of

Here things are dissolved and give evidence of

Some philosophers have focused on the thing

and some have focused on the existing.

This rational mode

the Buddhist observation that all is anicca (transient).

of expression is no longer suitable on the field of empti-

This nihilun and transience appear to us from the perspec-

ness.

tive of existence and are therefore tied to it as standing

what limited by this verbal form) as in "It is not this

over against it.

thing or that thing, therefore it is this thing or that

They represent nothingness in opposition

to being, i.e., a relative nothingness.

The emptiness of

sunyata is an absolute emptiness which has emptied also these represented kinds of emptiness.

When we speak of the root

of being we usually think of something far behind what we

4Keiji Nishitani, "The Standpoint of Sunyata," trans. Jan van Bragt and Yamamoto Seisaku, The Eastern Buddhist, New Series, Vol. VI, No. 1 (May 1973)L 68-91. Chapter Four (Ku no tachiba) of the author's ShUkyo to wa Nanika ("What isReTigion?"), --

The form of paradox expresses emptiness (though some-

thing." In speaking about substance in our section on nihilism we referred to such sayings by the ancients as "Fire does not burn fire," "A sword does not cut a sword," "The eye does not see the eye."

In the very fact that

5 Thus we speak of "will" or desire and attachment in connection with such representation.

187

188

fire preserves itself in the midst of its burning there

"hot" thing is on its home-ground, beyond all categories

is non-burning.

of substance, quality, quantity, etc., on the field of

We may say then that burning is non-

burning and non-burning is burning--this is the language

emptiness.

of paradox.

of being of things."

Nishitani wants to go further to say that

Nishitani calls this "the autonomous mode This is not some sort of "front-

such language may also be used of attributes, and not

side" of things, revealed to us.

only of substances.

mysterious, hidden, "back-side" of things.

"lofuen one says, for example, that

fire is hot, there is reason to say that the heat itself is not hot." 6 This not-hot is not some relatively colder

Neither is it some "'Things'

on their own home-ground have no front or backsides;

temperature but is beyond the sphere of the relativity

they are purely and simply themselves, they are exclusively in-themselves." 7 Obviously this does not simply

of being and nothingness.

mean subjectivity or refer to a self-conscious ego.

Not-hot is not on the same

field as cold but rather the field of not-cold.

Heat

The terms "in-themselves" and "autonomous" relate things

and its possibility arise out of its self-identity with

to substance and quality but such things are neither

non-heat.

substance nor subject.

Fire is sensed as hot and belongs to the on-

Nishitani quotes Basho's remark

tological category of "quality"; at the same time it is

as illustration of this different notion of existence:

measurable and belongs to the category of "quantity."

"Learn about the pine tree from the pine tree.

The fact, however, of heat--its hotness as not-hot--can-

about the bamboo from the bamboo. ,.B

not be captured by the terms quality and quantity.

some scientific scrutiny or analysis of the pine tree,

It

Learn

This does not mean

may be that the Idea of heat as expressed in Platonic

or even simply observation.

terms is beyond the heat of the senses and therefore not

mode of being a pine tree; into the dimension where they

hot.

But this is conceptually grasped and transcends

come into their own, show themselves in their suchness.

only the body of the mind-body duality and is still a

"The Japanese word for 'learn' (~) means precisely:

part of the subject-object duality of knower-known.

The

reality of not-hot pervades the world of senses and intellect but does not belong to either, or both, etc.

to make efforts to stand essentially in the same mode of being as the thing you want to learn about.

A

7

Ibid., p. 77. 8Ibid. 6Keiji Nishitani, "The Standpoint of Sunyata," tJ. 75.

It means getting into the

What

190

189

hind" things--they show up as though viewing the "center"

renders this possible is the field of emptiness." 9 This in-itself mode of being is the samadhi of Buddhist thought.

When samadhi is merely considered to be

a mental state one is speaking of its form or definition.

But samadhi-being is not this definition from

outside; it is a mode of its being settled in itself, the Taoist wu-wei.

Such a thing may be perceived as a

definite and determined thing, for example a particular individual, but it is not so much that individual as what makes possible the principle of individuation itself.

on the field where a particular fact is considered an absolute fact; where the definite is open to the absoHere the absolute fact is more truly real than

the simple, observed fact that a leaf is falling. former makes possible the latter.

The

The absolute fact

may seem to have a provisional, an unreal, character because it does not have any apparent being but all such beings are essentially provisional phenomena. Nishitani represents the in-itself mode of being by the term "middle" (Pali Jap- chu).

=

majj hima; Skrt

=

madhyama;

This middle is the home-ground of things.

The "shapes" which show up on the fields of sense and reason always appear as the "front" of things, or "be-

9 rbid. , p. 78.

relationship to us."

The "thing"-in-itself occurs for

us only when we leap from the circumference into the center which is the opening up in ourselves of the absolutely this-side which is being at one with emptiness, 10 This is our samadhi-being. This i.e., our position. position is more "middle" than the mere positing of a thing.

When we try to explain what a thing is we find

only a form comparable to the thing itself.

This is what

Nangaku Ejo meant in his answer to the Sixth Patriarch's

Poetic truths such as "A single falling leaf

betokes autumn" often involve the expression of facts

lute.

from the circumference; as "projected on the screen of a

question, "What is it that thus comes?":

"If you try to

explain something by comparing it with anything whatsoever, you fail to hit the middle. ,ll Having dealth earlier with Nishitani's understanding of the concept of substance, we turn now to his treatment of the concept of subject.

He begins his investigation by

looking back at the history of the emergency of the concept in western philosophy.

Substance he has defined as expres-

sing "something existing at the base of the various attributes; it expresses the mode of being whereby a thing exists as itself."

"Similarly, 'subject' expresses something which

exists, in a human being, at the basis of his various faculties as their unifying factor, the mode of being whereby a 10 rbid., pp. 79, 80. This is the "middle path" considereci as the ultimate ontological principle. Cf. note 31 above. 11 rbid •• p. 80.

191 human being appears as himself. 12

The qnestion is whether

192

experience and the world of phenomena are thus shaped by

this concept of subject truly expresses man in himself as

the forms of our senses and understanding and we have in such

he is on his own true home-ground.

a view of man a clear foundation for a view of modern man as

Nishitani intends to show

that rather than this being the case, the concept of subject

subject.

parallels that of substance in expressing man at the level

the known.

of his own consciousness.

ness of man's power in penetrating to the deepest levels of

Certainly it is almost univer-

This subject is both the knower and the shaper of This sort of self-awareness involves an aware-

sally the case that the concept of subject is taken to ex-

existence and of the limitations of this power in being bound

press the essence of human existence, whether taken to be a

to the phenomenal world without access to the nournenal world

positive thing as is usually the case in western thought or

of the things-in-themselves.

as illusory as in Buddhism.

resentational, he sees "things" or phenomena as objects.

As we have already emphasized

His standpoint is always rep-

in earlier sections, this is particularly the case in modern

This is precisely parallel to the investigation of substance

times.

which is also representational.

Descrates' cogito was a major impetus in this direc-

Both subject and substance

tion and Kant probed even more deeply into this standpoint

are objects outside the noumenal realm of things-in-them-

at all levels of his thought.

selves.

Kant was a turning point in

that he reversed the position which held that our cognitive experience is

shap~d

not by fitting the object of cognition

but rather that the objects of cognition fit

~

priori cate-

gories of our sense perception and understanding.

His self-

Earlier metaphysics stoutheartedly held to the conviction that there was a correspondence between the things and the experience or understanding of them.

Humean skepticism

made this point of view questionable and Kant takes up the

designated "Copernican Revolution" looked in the oppsoite

matter in his self-examination of reason.

direction from traditional metaphysics and opened a critical

longer taken as revealing the "being" of a thing as in the

standpoint "halfway between the former metaphysics, which

one-dimensional correspondence theory of things but rather

tried to grasp the thing-itself dogmatically by purely ration-

as a "form" or a priori category of pure reason which is

al thinking, and Humean skepticism, which shook this metaphysics severely--down to its very roots." 13 All objects of

somehow "thought into" the thing.

Substance is no

The thinking subject takes

the place of substance in the center of the new ontology. Nishitani's point, of course, is that they do not differ in

12 rbid., p. 81.

being representational and objectivizing.

13Ibid., p. 82.

physics, our representations fashion themselves after the

In the old meta-

193

194

object and in the new Kantian metaphysics, the objects

ourselves become one Great Doubt.

fashion themselves after our representation.

cognition are no problem here but rather the problem is the

In this sense,

Things and self and their

Kant marks a critical milepost in the emergence of human

reality of things and the self.

rights in a world that was previously thought of as the to-

s tending of i t are not possible by going back to the cogni-

tality of the objects of experience.

tive, rational direction but rather by going onward through

Kant's world was a

This reality and the under-

world that man as subject could investigate and manipulate,

the radical doubt, through the field of nihilum to the field

i . e., it was the world of modern science.

of emptiness where things and self manifest themselves and

This is the sub-

ject standpoint which ran its modern course and is still

really realize themselves.

running it for some, all the way through Hegel's absolute

itself; it has shattered reason but is still representational.

reason to Kiekegaard's radical turnabout toward the existen-

It is, furthermore, a transitional field in that it cannot

tial subject and on through Marx and Nietzsche.

be fully objectified and therefore represented as a place

From the

Nihilum is nowhere, divided in

rational subject, through the absolute reason, it finally

wherein to dwell.

laid bare the nihilum at its roots.

sitional; it is "essentially" void.

Only then did the sub-

It only is, radically and actually, tranThe standpoint of empti-

ject reveal itself to be essentially groundless, along with

ness is not transitional, not void of things; its voidness

the world of phenomena.

or negativity as affirmation.

Then, according to Nishitani, "

This is a radical about-face;

when the concept of substance, which was supposed to express

from the void of nihilum to the absolute affirmation of

the in-itself of things, and the concept of subject, which

things, from the objective, rational world of things to

was supposed to express the in-itself of the self, collide

emptiness.

at their roots with nihilum and are negated on the spot,

as they appear to us; this is not, either, the Kantian Ding-

they make a leap forward into the field where 'thing' and

~-sich

the self (which they tried to grasp) come into their own and 14 reveal their in-itself." Here things and the self are in-

known about.

definable, no longer objects of cognition or experience, sub-

is the Buddhist "reached-beyond" which is absolutely this-

ject or substance.

side.

This is not skepticism where we doubt a

certain thing but is the situation when all things and we

14

rbid., p. 86.

This is not the phenomenal world of Kant, things

or noumenal realm which must rerMin unknown or merely Emptiness is neither the former as front-side

(this-side) nor the latter as back-side (yonder-side).

It

"It is the authentic thing-itself, which in fact 15 actually exists." Such a thing-itself is represented in lSibid., p. 88.

196

195

such sayings as "A bird flies and it is like a bird; a fish

in its own center or "middle."

moves and it seems to be a fish."

tions of the thing's selfness and are pervaded by the "mid-

re ality" of suchness.

This is the "like true

Other expressions we have introduced

These images are manifesta-

dle" but are not the "middle" when viewed from the point of

to point to this home-ground are "being in the middle" and

view of the circumference.

"being in its own position" and "samadhi-being."

represents the fields of the senses and of reason in this

The thing-

To illustrate this Nishitani

itself (self of no-self)(acting as non-acting) and its knowl-

relation by describing a diagram which we render here into

edge (knowing as non-knowing) immediately turns into an ob-

a drawing :

ject of cognition when we speak of it or analyze it.

Figure 1

reason

The thing-itself originally realizes itself as it is, in its own 'middle' which can never be objectified; and its non-objective knowledge, the knowledge of no-knowledge, means that we convert and enter into the 'middle' of the thing itself. It means that we stragithen ourselves out, turning to where none of our turnings obtains in the direction of what negates all our directions.l6 The pine demands that we "learn to be a pine."

II.

The Field of Emptiness

In the course of his speaking about emptiness Nishitani has introduced a number of expressions and phrases, two of which he explores in greater depth, via a comparative study. These phrases are: "Being is only being at one with emptiHis explanation goes as follows:

ness," and "emptiness is self." In explaining the in-itself-ness of "things," Nishitani calls an "image" the mode of being of a thing which appears as an object on the fields of the senses and of reason, and refers to the thing-in-itself as the mode of being of a 16Ibid., p • 90 ·

th~ng

. • . we shall represent the fields of the senses and of reason as the circumferences of two concentric circles. The objective images, wherein a certain thing a appears on the fields of the senses and of reason~ then becomes the two points al and a2, where a single radiu2 crosses the two circumferences in fact, al and a are al(a) a 2 (a) . In that case, the thing-in-itself, (a}, is situated in the center of the circle. This in-itself mode of being, as a non-objective way of being-in-the-middle, pervades

198

197

al and a2. Looked at in that perspectivr th1y are manifestations of a-in-itself a is a (a , a ) . • We can represent all other things, b, c, etc. in the same way. The infinite yumbrr of possible p~int~ on the circumferences, al, b , c . • . or a2, b , c . . • are conceived, each as a distinct point while in the center the infinite number of points !• ~. £ . . . are situated in the same center, are concentrated into one. This symbolizes the fact that, although on the fields of the senses and of reason things are seen each as a sensory thing with its singular subsistence or, again, as the substantial form thereof, they are gathered into one in thef? non-objective mode of being as things-in-themselves.

Figure 2

Figure 3

medieval nominalism modern empiricism

medieval realism modern rationalistic ontology

We, as limited egos, realize that an infinite concentration of points in our self-consciousness is unthinkable within the bounds of sense perceptions and reason, or even from the point of view of "being" which is comprised of such ex-

In all cases, "being" is being conceived not as ! but only

periences--this is the fundamental limitations of western

in its manifestations as a 1 or a2, i.e., from the standpoint

ontology.

of the ordinary conscious self with all things being con-

Further, such an ontology never allows for a con-

sideration of a radical nothingness.

Citing medieval nomi-

ceived as separate and distinct.

The field of nihilum con-

nalism and modern empiricism as illustrations of positions

sists in the dawning of the awareness that points al and a2

which take point al as the center of their concerns, and

are suspended over or derive from, and are dra'm into the

medieval realism and modern rationalistic ontology as illus-

one and only center, or infinity as logically incomprehen-

trations of positions which take point a2 as their center,

sible, i.e., as nothingness.

Nishitani views western thought as represented by smaller

thought to talk about the "One" consisted in making an abso-

circles taking, in the former case al as the center and a 2

lute, or seeking union within either al or a2 or on some

as its circumference (Fig. 2), or, in the latter case a2 as

continuum between or beyond them.

the center and alas its circumference (Fig. 3).

represents the nihilism aspect as tangent lines drawn to

For example:

Previous attempts in western

Nishitani alternatively

every arbitrary point on the two circles (Fig. 4) showing that "every point on the circle contains a direction of dispersing infinitely far away, and is suspended out over a

17 rbid., pp. 58-59.

200

199

mind, etc., are united in being but is a circumferenceless

bottomless abyss." 18 Figure 4

(showing, for simplicity's sake, ooly the tangent to point aZ on the field of reason)

center rendered without circumference by the nihilum and the "great" or absolute doubt it brings about.

It cannot

be represented by a circle or other diagram or any system or logic at all.

Emptiness has "its circumference nowhere"

and "its center everywhere."

The former eliminates illu-

sions and the latter makes the world and ourselves possible. The field of emptiness is an infinite space or void which makes all systems of being possible and negatable. The reality of things is that they are absolutely unique, not reducible to points on the circumference of any circle of being.

The common charge that certain forms of Buddhism

are mere relativism does not hold up in that relativism is In traditional philosophy such a circle is always viewed from the circumference, i.e., from the standpoint of the circle.

The center is only the center of the circle.

Abso-

lute unity is often conceived in terms of such a circle.

In

a consideration at the level of the circumferences of circles of being. 19 In its mode of being as "middle," each and every thing is absolutely unique and at the same time is found in the realm of appearance and illusion; it is both

such a system 'llhich ignores nothingness in favor of concen-

master and subordinate.

trating on being the all-is-One idea establishes the One as

the world, absolute uniqueness can only appear as chaotic,

mere non-differentiation.

relativism; this is because it is a uniqueness which tran-

The viewpoint from the field of

From the point of view of being in

Emptiness affirms this while at the same time affirming all

scends the "reason" circumference of r:he circle of being .

the infinite differentiations represented by the tangent

As part of the world it appears in orders and varying de-

lines extending out into infinity.

grees of uniqueness and particularity.

affirmation-sive-negation.

Thus we have the absolute

The center of emptiness is not

the non-differentiation in which senses and reason, body and IBKeij i ~is hi tani, "The Standpoint of Sunyata," (concluded) trans. Rev. Jan van Bragt, The Eastern Buddhist, ~ew Series, VI, No. 2 (Oct. 1973), pp. 58-96.

This relationship of

master-subordinate is called "circuminsessional, "

20

and is

I 9Again this fails to understand the nature of the middle path. It is not merely the avoidance of extremes but an ontological principle in its own right. Cf. notes 28 and 31. 20Th·

~s

.

~s

Rev. Jan van Bragt I s trans l at~on . o f "..'~s h'~tan~•I s

202

201

possible only on the field of emptiness.

In this position,

of being, is possible."

22

When we do not refer such a world

each unique thing is subject in the sense that it lies at

to the field of emptiness we are obliged to conceive it.

the ground of all other things; it is one moment, the occa-

When we try to conceive reality (the fact that things are)

sion, that makes every other thing "be."

we find that our clarity in the matter is inversely propor-

ordinate position.

This is the sub-

This implies the negation of such a

tionate to the profundity of our effort.

In some way or

subordinate's mastery, its position, its own "being"--it

other, all things are interlinked; each "sys tern" has con-

has no ordinary substance.

ceived the links differently.

acter. 21

It has a sort of "unreal" char-

Th ~s . same t h.~ng can be

thing in turn, whether

~.

~.

. d a bout every

sa~

.

un~que

£• or any other thing.

In this

The more scientific intellect

has used the conception of natural cause and effect, necessary relations of a mathematical sort.

!1yth and poetry,

sense, all other things in their aspect as ground in turn

vehicles of the creative imagination, have recognized a more

render other things master insofar as the former are sub-

organic, living connection (in this respect is it not unlike

ordinate.

the natural scientist, e.g., the biologist).

In this sense, "being" comes to "be" only in be-

ing "em!) tied."

II

. . it is only in a field where the 'be-

Philosophers

have used both but the development of thought has moved in

ing' of all things is a being at one with emptiness that

the direction of the absolute One.

it is possible for all things to gather into One, even while

only with the realm of being and even then have failed.

each is a reality as an absolutely unique being; that the

Nishitani suggests that only the circurninsessional relation-

'being' of all things and, again, the 'world' as a system

ship on the field of emptiness truly is the level of the

term egoteki. van Bragt chooses the term circuminsessional, he says, because the relationship thus described implies a degree of reciprocity perhaps only even approached by this term used by the Church Fathers to describe the relationship between the divine Persons of the Trinity, and surely without an equivalent anywhere else in western culture. The J~panese term seems to go even beyond this limited equivalent. Ibid., p. 65, n. l. 21 rhe theoretical side of anatman is that all existences have intrinsically no eternally-fixed nature or quality of their own. This lack of fixed nature is called "muj isho" (Jap: nihsvabhava, Skt.), which means "lack of own nature or quality." The "jisho" (svabhava, Skt.), i.e., "Own nature or quality," or "own-being" or "self-being" as Nishitani prefers to call it, of "mujish6" points to an independent metaphysical entity of its own. This would be the self-conscious ego of sense and reason.

really Real.

All of these have dealt

Only through such a "force" (physis, natura,

"nature") are all things gathered and brought into relationship to one another.

To "be" in the world means being a mo-

ment supporting the being of all other things, making them be, establishing them and in turn being supported, made and established by them; not

~erely

as subjects and objects, but

emptied of such cognitive freight.

This "mutual interpene-

tration of all things" occurs only at the level of emptiness 2 2l<eij i iHshitani, "The Standpoint of Sunyata," (concluded) , p. 66.

204

203 and is absolutely essential; more so than any relation previously conceived by science, myth, or philosophy at the level of sense or reason.

The field of emptiness is a "force field"

making relation possible.

This is the "about-face" or conversion when the self seizes the nihilum into its own subjectivity and further ecstatically transcends this doubt to the standpoint of emptiness with the awareness that "emptiness is the self."

This means breaking through

the self of consciousness and self-consciousness with its attachments to things and even to the self.

This is what Nishitani

means by "Being is only being at one with emptiness."

~..rhich

We are the field where the world and time in the circuminEach of

us is such a thing, a "worldly thing" in his individual existence.

We are both possibility and manifestation.

This

is our true self-awareness but it is not self-consciousness, self-knowledge, or intuition.

All these things are

emptied, left behind on the field of emptiness.

t1y eye is

my eye both because it sees things and because it does not see itself but makes seeing possible.

The suchness of see-

ing is its essential blindness toward itself.

This means

"that the sensation or perception called seeing itself (and, in general, all consciousness as such) is originallyempty." 24 Nishitani reiterates essentially the same arguments he uses elsewhere with the form of "the

Emptiness as Self

What then is meant by "emptiness is the self?" emptiness

an earlier instant the appearance of the world and things.

sessional system of being find their possibility.

The field of emptiness, as the field of the circuminsessional relationship, is the field of the 'force' whereby all things-in-themselves gather themselves into one, the field of the possibility of the world. At the-iame time, the field of emptiness is the field of the 'force' whereby a thing gathers itself, 23 the field of possibility of existence of the 'thing.'

III.

therefore, refer to the self as preceding in some sense of

If the

we have been describing is what makes the

___" to speak of the self as awareness.

of no- ____ The self as self-

awareness does not have some (objectifiable) awareness of self-a~..rare;

world possible, then this statement of identity must make all

itself as

the above true in some way of the self.

it is not reflective, self-conscious, or intuitive.

In some sense, the

it does not know itself as knowing, This

self on its home-ground must be anterior to the self of the

self-awareness only occurs in an absolutely "forward-look-

world and things.

ing" position which is "the point where the self is truly the

This is not temporal anteriority in the

sense we usually speak of time.

Time is of the domain and

context of the world which is made possible by emptiness and therefore is the domain and context of the self.

We do not,

self-in-itself."

This is realization as both actualization

and as awareness. There are two aspects or directions in this consideration 24rbid.' p. 70.

23

rbid. , p. 68 •

205

206

of the self-in-itself in its self-awareness on its home-

self-in-itself to the body which is its manifestation in

ground.

the world, pervaded by the mode of being of the "middle."

The first aspect is the "non-objective self-in-

itself" and the second is the "non-objective self-awareness

"In other words, the selfness cons its, concretely speaking,

as its home-ground."

in the self-identity of the selfness and the subject, the

The former is its pure subjectivity,

where it is absolutely no cognizable, experiential object

body, etc."26

but pure, authentic existence.

scends the so-called subject as we traditionally conceive

The latter is the relation

On the field of emptiness our selfness tran-

which obtains in this subjective self-in-itself aware of

of or experience it.

it self in the same way that fire relates to itself when not

tions of this mode of existence in their illusion of being

being consumed in the burning of other things.

felt, known, etc., it also pervades the various modes of

The former

Though it casts off all the manifesta-

is the self-in-itself projected on the field of consciousness.

being in the world as personal, conscious, corporeal, etc.

The latter is self-awareness in the above sense of not-know-

This Nishitani calls "being self while not being self."

ing.

"At the point of intersection the subject comes into

Nishitani recalls Goethe's suggestion that all tran-

being with the structure of self-consciousness, that is,

sient things are similes of the Eternal.

containing a consciousness of itself as something persist-

like the "vain discrimination" (vikalpa) and illusory nature

ently un-objective and, nevertheless, always opposed to an

of the personal, conscious corporeal "human being."

object.

are this in spite of their scientific truth.

In other words, 'being' originates in its self-

Such similes are

They

Nishitani

reflection, in the reflective knowledge of itself as the unity of the two above directions." 25 The concrete self in

Eternal in some theistic or temporal sense but refers to

this world is made possible by and consists in the unity of

the "primal fact" or original reality which these similes

the "being self" and the "not being self."

are when seen on the field of emptiness.

We may speak of

has already shown the unproductive nature of speaking of the

This is repre-

such a concrete self as a "subject" projected into existence

sented in the Zen saying: "If you call this a staff you

on the fields of sense and reason.

cling to it, if you do not call it a staff you depart from

This is a subject which

does not look back to its creation out of nothing but an

the facts."

absolutely forward-looking self realized in its emptiness.

staff in the world of sense perception, matter, life, but

We may also speak of looking backward from emptiness and the

that the staff is not a staff in the world of these things

25 Ibid., p. 73.

26

This does not mean that the staff is not a

Ibid., p. 74.

207

in their primacy.

The "being self while not being self"

208 mind.

This is "being bottomlessly in time."

Thus pass-

is a primal fact on its home-ground, not establishable or

ing "out of time into the field of emptiness is not dif-

reachable via cause, reason, purpose, matter, sensibility, life, understanding, Ideas, or a "Will to Power" as meta-

ferent from radicalizing the mode of being in time, i.e., from living positively the vicissitudes of time. " 27 This

physical principles.

is "absolute freedom," it is like-reality in the above sense

"Not to be self while being self" means to be the home

of "A bird flies and it is like a bird."

The knowing of

of all other things, to be absolute center absolutely every-

this true reality is called, by Nishitani, "like-phantom

where and therefore never to be "self-centered" or "ego-

Wisdom" in this same sense.

centric."

saka Sutra where it is written:

It is the negation of the self in all traditional

senses, it is a center without any circumference at all. The "force" by 1-1hich all this is possible is the circuminsessional interpenetration in which we are the home-ground of all things and all things are in us as home-ground, while at the same time we are in all things which are our homeground.

We have our "birth" and our "as-semblance" in this

interpenetration.

In this way our selfness has its "being"

in time, while not being bound by temporality.

We are in

time in the sense that the "birth-death" cycle is our ordinary mode of existence.

But we do not aimlessly, despair-

ingly drift about in this "birth-death"; rather we have our home-ground there, 1-1e actively live and die "birth-death." We make time be.

We bring it to its fullness and rule it

rather than vice-versa.

Herein is dispelled some of the

mystery of such facts as the Buddha's choosing the time of his death, his moment of paranirvana, or the bodhisattva's choice to remain in the world out of mahakaruna (Great Compassion) to assist others in their pacification of heart-

He is referring to the Avatam-

The phantom-like Wisdom of the Buddha, without hindrance, completely penetrates with its light all dharmas of the three worlds, and enters into the mental activities of all sentient beings • . . . Here, it is the deliverance of the Great Light . . • It is as with the magician who knows magic well and, dwelling on the crossroads, produces all kinds of magical effect. t-lithin the fleetingly short time of a day he conjures a full day or a full night, even seven days or sevt:n ~ights, a fortnight, a month, a year, a hundred years. And always it is all there: cities and hamlets, wells, rivulets, rivers and seas, sun and moon, clouds and rain, palaces and residences. The original one day or one hour is not done away with simply because a long stretch of years has been shmm in that time; and the days, months, and years of the phantasmagory are not demolished ~imply because the original time was so very short.2l:l 27 Ibid., p. 78. 28As quoted by Nishitani, ibid., pp. 78,79. The Avatamsaka Sutra, (Hua-yhn thing) expresses the central tenets of the Hua-yen sc oo . Here all dharmas are said to have the characteristics of universality, speciality, similarity, diversity, integration, and differentiation, and also the ten states of suchness. As Nishitani would agree, all dharmas are in the state of suchness. Nishitar&s choice of this sutra is significant since Hua-yen self-consciously combined all other schools' doctrines in syncretic fashion (similarly to T'ien-t'ai) and (along wi~h T'ien-t'ai) is often considered to be the theoretical expression of the general positio~s held by the Ch'an (Zen) sect. The si-

210

209

On the field of emptiness, all times

enter into each and

nation creating its images.

This is the so-called "phantom

every instant; they are exhausted by it and grounded in

technique" of the haiku poet where knowing appears as not-

it.

knowing.

This "like-phantom Time" is the transcendence and si-

multaneity arising out of the instant.

"~ve

can, in the

In Buddhist terms this is to "Dwell with a bound-

less heart, in the phantom-like Wisdom of the Tathagata."

present, encounter Shakyamuni and Jesus, Basho and Bee-

As ;:.Jishitani points out,"The identity of 'to be' and 'to

thoven.

know' is more original than the traditional metaphysics

That religion and culture can originate and be

imagined it to be ... 3l

What once was called the "natural

handed down historically in time, shows us time's very es29 sence." The Avatamsaka Sutra also speaks similarly of place:

"being" itself of things themselves, but not seen any longer

"A magician, staying in one place, produces all kinds of

as mere subjective cognition.

magical effects on phantom places; but he does not thereby

awareness on the home-ground of knowing things.

demolish his original place"; "He does not destroy this one

at the "middle" where a self is not a self merely, because

world through the fact that those worlds are many, nor are

it is at the same time the home-ground of all other selves.

those many worlds destroyed by the fact that this world is one." 30 Time and place circuminsessionally interpenetrate

This we may call samadhi-being (settled-ness-being).

in the absolute relativity of time and space.

being; it is "at our fingertips."

Every "thing"

light of reason" can now be seen to be no different than the

The so-called "light" is selfThis occurs

One

does not seek or look for samadhi. one originally is samadhiOur self is in its "mid-

in the world involves this interpenetration with every other

dle," i.e., it is totally inexplicable.

"thing" in the absolute relativity of existence.

"middle" somewhere between extremes or the mediative activity

This same

It is not Aristotle's

field of emptiness as absolute relativity is the possibility

of reason in Hegel's thought.

of "source-points" giving rise to such activities as reason

on the field of reason.

positing (positioning) its own images or the creative imagi-

and rivers . • . are all the self's original part."

multaneity and absolute reciprocity of all things is very much like the circuminsessional interpenetration which Nishitani speaks of. Indeed, this egoteki is described by Huayen as "the mutual in terpene tra tion of all things." 29 Ibid., p. 80. 30 Quoted by Nishitani in "The Standpoint of Sunyata," p. 80.

31Ibid.

I

p. 81.

These are middles projected

It is the "middle" where "Mountains

212

Nishitani takes up first a consideration of the term samsara which is often translated as transmigration but to

CHAPTER VI

which Nishitani prefers birth-death. SAMSARA: THE NATURE OF

similar reluctance to translate samsara as transmigration.

LIFE AND DEATH IN TIME

I.

As he says, "'Samsara' generally goes in English as 'transmigration.'

History and Definition

The problem of birth-death has lone been the preoccupation of the various schools of eastern thought.

Though

less the focus, it has also been a consideration for western thought and

particul~rly

in nihilism.

Mizuno expresses a

In certain respects,

nihilism was tied historically and existentially to the fall of Europe in modern times via catastrophic wars as well as the development of nihilistic philosophic thought.

It is,

for example, in the "history of being" that both Nietzsche and Heidegger couched their thought.

This historical con-

text is not co be found in the East.

Supposing that the con-

version from the standpoint of nihilum to the standpoint of emptiness took place also in the East, Nishitani proposes that certair, questions need addressing: "What bearing does the standpoint of emptiness have on emptiness?

In what form

did historicity appear in the position of emptiness? In what form would it have to appear there?" 1 These questions of history and emptiness are raised and answered in the context of a general examination of Time. 1 Keiji Nishitani, "Emptiness and Time," a manuscript translation by Rev. Jan van Bragt of Chapter 5 of Nishitani's ShUkyo to ~ Nanika ("Hhat is Religion?"), p. 2.

But as the word somewhat suggests a soul that

transmigrates from one world to the other, it is considered not fit for the Buddhist notion of 'samsara. '" 2 Samsara is the mode of being of all sentient things, including humans, wherein they move through the birth and death cycle continuously, time after time.

The image most frequently used is

that of the wheel, rotating; the sentient being moving through the six realms into which their existence or field of being is divided.

The "six worlds" are those of: heaven,

men, asuras (demons), animals, hungry spirits, and hell. Of the Indian schools it is in Buddhism that samsara was most seriously called into

qu~stion

at the existential level.

Samsara is dukkha, or suffering and is often referred to as the ocean of woe of birth-death, unfathomable in its extent and depth. The nihilism of modern Europe, in coming to an existential self-awareness of the abyss of nihilum, realized that existence was permeated by suffering.

But Buddhism, some

twenty-five hundred years earlier had gone even further to 2Mizuno Kogen, Primitive Buddhism (Tokyo: The Karinbunko, 1969), pp. 67-75.

214

213

declare to all men that "all is suffering"; the Buddha had made it the first of his so-called Four Noble Truths.

This

was a move from existential self-awareness to an existential interpretation of being-in-the-world. place on the base of man's karmas.

This birth-death takes

What man does is con-

ditioned by limitless past lives and the accrued merits or demerits of those lives and in turn so determines the limitless future lives he may yet live.

This is the perspective

of Buddhism whereby man's present actions (the products of body-mind based upon the will) are completely voluntary but his present condition is determined by the endless causality of fate.

Fate simply means that we reap the rewards of our

own past actions and exLstence can only be understood when viewed as the natural consequence of man's own deeds; there can be no attribution of fault or blame to any other person

Nishitani likes to suggest that in this sense, man's finitude is infinite, i.e., in its essence unlimited and This is "bad infinity."

Discursive thinking is

not satisfied by such terms; they are contradictory.

In-

tuitive thinking cannot grasp the whole at a single stroke; infinity cannot be grasped.

One cannot dispose of the mat-

ter so easily ; to existential man, finitude does seem to go on infinitely.

This is the real nature of finitude as

finitude, not that it is or is not conceptually or logically possible but that it is faced in an existential self-awareness,

said earlier, to objectify himself. cut through the dilemma.

For finite man to grasp himself finitely is to con-

This obviously does not

It is like saying that when I die

death will cease to be meaningful to me rather than cutting through to the bodily experience of death in life, i.e., life-sive-death.

Here, really, is the problem of man's

indifference to the religious question.

Generally, man

grasps or understands death in such a way that it vanishes with him.

To the Buddhist view, this merely postpones the

real confrontation to another, future manifestation and can, in fact, lead to a more difficult life as a result of refusing to transcend the life-death problem by confronting it head on.

Death does not render death dead any more than

fire burns fire or birth births birth.

Death kills life but

is in turn overcome by birth so that man comes back to his problem of birth-death.

or power.

boundless.

template himself, to represent himself which is, as we have

Therefore, the conceptually valid

statement that the finite is finite, is existentially invalid.

It fails to cut to the extraordinary infinite de-

gree to which finitude is finite.

As Nishitani points out,

it was this insight which led Kierkegaard to confront the so-called absolute reason of Hegel. Such statements as "infinite finitude : have meaning as Ri (Chinese= li).

This is, however, a truth entirely dif-

ferent in character, on a different field, from logical truth. According to Nishitani, this has contemporary parallels in the "intuition of essence" of Husserl and the "existential interpretation" of Heidegger.

This level of existence is

216

215

the self-awareness that transcends the understanding and

pre-logical; it has an existential core which consists in

reason.

its existential facing-up to the problem of birth-death.

This level of transcendence renders even Hegel's

"absolut:e reason" immanent.

"In the standpoint of absolute

reason which can be called the most profound inner continu-

The intellect has no eye for such a point of view. Philosophy as a "science" materialized in Greece in an

ity that has ever been opened up in between God and man, all

attempt to "de-mythologize" various world-views, and t:rans-

things whatsoever are absorbed in the self-development of

form them into logos.

the rational law of reason, or in t:he process whereby the thinking of reason returns back to itself." 3 The disclosure

"mythos" of t:he assumptions which drive man to seek logos where previously there was only mythos.

of t:he essence of finit:ude takes place on the field of self-

have never been lost, they have only been obscured, and t:hey

detachment or the level of "trans-descendence."

have lent depth to the logos.

To clarify

One commonly fails to realize the

The roots of myth

"[Greek] philosophy can be

such a level of transcendence in a person who is character-

said to be the de-mythologization of the mythological through

ized as a "rational" man means somehow getting beyond the

logos, but can by no means be ident:ified with a simple negation of the mythological." 4 It is science, or "scientism,"

horizon of the "human."

For Nishitani, the Buddhist view

shows such a going beyond the merely anthropocentric point

which has had the result of negating or attempting to ne-

of view.

gate, t:he mythological.

The essence of birth-death seen as the endless

Science attacks and rejects the rep-

birth-death sequence and all sentient beings seen on one all-

resentations of myt:h; philosophy recognizes symbols of reason

inclusive horizon constitute the temporal and spatial aspects

in the same representations and reduces them to reason or

of t:he essence of birth-death in the being-in-the-world. The

logos.

former is comprehended in the latter, i.e., t:he endless

logical must be seen as existence which forms its contents

rounds of finitude are seen in the cont:ext of the horizon

and meaning and is its source.

of the universality of suffering.

can de-mythologization take place and provide meaning to

The scientific, logical

Neither exhaust:s myth of its essence.

The mytho-

Only at the level of existence

crit:icism of such a Buddhist perspective is, of course, that

contemporary man; this applies also to the myth of transmi-

t:ransmigration is "mythical," a pre-scientific illusion.

gration or samsara.

Such a criticism of its content is easily justified but the

dhism that it has always undertaken such a task in its own

matter is not that simple.

self-interpretation.

Myth is not merely logical or

3Keiji Nishitani, "Emptiness and Time," p. 9.

It: is perhaps a major uniqueness of Bud-

Transmigration was interpreted as the

4 Ibid., pp. 13, 14.

218

217

opening up in man's existence of nihilum ; an abyssmal

"ek-sists," or stands outside his mere manhood, and in this

nihilum which a-nihil-ates all things in this world (or the Buddhist three worlds 5 ). Conceptually such a nihilum

abys smal nihilum where he is divested of all qualifications he stands as pure, simple being-in-the-world.

can only be conceived as a meaningless notion devoid of

dhist terms, there are no longer "six worlds" and all exis-

reality; only existentially can it be encountered,

tents, heavenly, human and animal-like, stand as pure being.

Only

then can nirvana be reached as the "ycnder shore" of the

Here, in Bud-

This kind of ecstatic transcendence, however, does not

unfathomable ocean of suffering, the endless causality of

transcend being as such even though it strikes against the

karmas.

bottom of this kind of being.

Transmigration and the nihilurn which it incorporates

It is still "inner-worldly";

it is not an escape from the three worlds, i.e., the world

is the limit-situation which pushes man's existence to the

of existence.

radicalized extreme of ecstatic transcendence beyond ordi-

boundless finitude as the limit-situation of all sentient

nary existence.

beings.

t1an's limit-situation arises as a self-

It is the essential image of all existents,

This ultimate situation, this real image of being

awareness on the spatial dimension of world-ness; a per-

i s the condition of despair; a radical despair which is neve r

spective beyond the merely human, beyond qualification as a

doubted as despairing.

human ego encompassed by and limited to the time span of

the limit-situation transcending reason and understanding.

one birth and one death.

It is, of course, the Zen "Great Doubt."

At this level of transcendence

the point of view is no longer anthropocentric, no longer merely subjective.

Rather it is a piercing beneath the

level of ordinary, everyday existence to a place where man is no longer merely "human" but because of his universality and his infinite finitude, he is being-in-the-world as "allsentient-beings-like," i.e., he includes all other forms of existence.

This is truly naked being-in-the world.

Man

5Buddhist cosmology divides the universe into the mundane world and the supramundane world. The mundane world is divided into the above-mentioned three worlds where one repeats birth and death, i.e., transmigration as a result of the karma of the good and evil done in one's past lives. The supramundane world is the world of nirvana which tran-

Doubt is conceptual but despair is

The genuine transcendence which cuts through the despair of the "Great Doubt" is the Buddhist nirvana.

The essence

scends transmigration. According to Abhidharma Buddhism the three worlds are: the "world of desire" (kamadhatu, Skt.; yokukai, Jap.), the "world of form" (rupadhatu, Skt.; shikikai, Jap.), and the "world of no-form" (arupadhatu, Skt.; mushikikai, Jap.)--all places where living (sentient) beings lived. This is the sort of cosmology which Nishitani is suggesting has been reinterpreted and restated by various schools of later Buddhism. A prominent form of reinterpretation regards the three worlds as the three mental states of man. Whatever the interpretation they are all three regarded as part of existence and thus, in Nishitani's terms, must be a-nihil-ated by the abyssmal nihilum. For a fuller discussion see: Mizuno Kogen, pp. 67-75.

219

220

of being-in-the-world is "being unto death" and nirvana

a valid description of reality?

may be said to be "the going-through this being unto death and the essential turn-about therefrom. " 6 This is the about-

juna or Zen or Nishitani.

face from true finitude to true infinity, i.e., away from

from finitude to the realization of infinite finitude through

the infinite finitude (or "bad infinity") of existence to

despair to nirvana on the "yonder-side."

infinity in ek-sistence.

Not so according to Nagar-

These statements are valid clari-

fications of man's existence; they detail his progress

The Mahayana schools of thought developed a standpoint

Nirvana is rebirth to genuine

life from the boundlessness of birth-death; it is the extinc-

called non-abiding or non-dwelling nirvana which is birth-

tion of samsara.

death-sive-nirvana (samsara-sive-nirvana).

This true "infinity" as Re:1lity is beyond the grasp of

This is especial-

ly true of Nagarjuna who devotes an entire section of his

conceptualizing and reason; it is encountered only on the

Mulamadhyarnakakarika (XXV) to an analysis of nirvana.

path of ek-sistence.

shows that none of the alternatives of the tetralemma is

"For infinity to be understood means

that it becomes Reality as life and is really live. " 7 Nir-

true~

vana is this new life; the move, the about-face, from

vana as a mental fabrication:

birth-death to nirvana is the turn-about from nihilum to Emptiness.

But the Buddhist existential clarification of

being did not stop here.

Existence had to return back to

its home-ground; the self had to find its authentic self by going through the so-called existential transcendence to yet another plane of disclosure.

It is customary to con-

sider the matter closed, the answer found, in dealing with nirvana as the yonder-side.

But Nishitani has already sug-

gested that the yonder-side must be the absolute this-side. Can it simply be, then, that nirvana is true life and true infinity?

Is the about-face from birth-death to Emptiness

6Keiji Nishitani, "Emptiness and Time," p. 21.

7Ibid., p. 22.

He

H~ goes on to state the rationale for handling nirThere is nothing whatever which differentiates the existence-in-flux (stmsara) from nirvana; And there is nothing whatever which differentiates nirvana from existence-in-flux. The extreme limit (koti) of nirvana is also the extreme limit of ex~stence-in-flux; There is not the slightest bit of difference between these two.9

If understood as Ultimate Reality, self-sufficient and independent, Nirvana will misguide the one who seeks release. Only from the perspective of samvritasatya or consciousness does nirvana seem more "empty" than samsara~ 0 Dogen illustrates this in his expression: g

MMK. XXV. 4-16

9 10

rbid., vss. 19-20. Cf. Streng, p. 75ff.

"Only when we acknowledge

221 birth-death to be nirvana,--we can detach ourselves from birth-death," and "This is birth-death is at once the Life of the Buddah."ll

This is the standpoint where birth is not

birth and death is not death.

Degen's term, translated by

Nishitani as "acknowledge" denotes existence as realization in the dual senses of manifestation (actualization) and coming to itself (understanding); it is the realization of Reality in the sive of birth-death-sive-nirvana.

This re-

alization means, in Buddhist terminology, that the Buddanature (buddhata, Skt.; bussho, Jap.) or the Buddha-mind as thus-come (tathagata, Skt.; nyorai, Jap.) passes into the essence of the actual existence of sentient beings and therefore man's mind, making it turn-about, i.e., letting man's mind pass into itself.

Ryorai's mind and man's mind reflect

one another in the metaphor of mirror reflecting mirror when set face to face.

Nishitani points out this this "acknowl-

edge" or "realize" means, in Japanese, to "obtain a mind." II.

Koto

Koto signifies an affair and a word

which is considered to have a meaning or "mind." is often used in riddles.

There is no "meaning" existing somewhere which we grasp at some time.

The understanding of the "meaning" is the com-

prehension coming into being in the living communication of one living mind reflecting upon another living mind. " . • . the comprehension as Realization is primordial, that is, the Realization whereby a certain koto really takes possession of us and passes into us and hence we really pass over into the koto and our mind operates by becoming itself the koto. " 12 Usually we think of an intellect understanding a meaning which lies behind an affair or word, but the level

of the fundamental encounter with koto lies beneath this ordinary understanding. pass into each other. ,.l3

The term

To ascertain the meaning or "mind"

Here "thing and mind abstractedly Intellectualism is the awkward-

ness wherein one tries to ascertain the meaning of the koto without first asking the meaning of the "meaning" or assumption which it sets up as its criterion.

The objectified

keto is the mere image of Reality reflected upon the level of intellect.

In this context, Nishitani enters into a discussion of the Japanese term koto.

222

Thus the meaning of the koto of birth-death-

sive-nirvana is only acknowledged or realized in the existential way wherein Nyoria's mind passes into man's mind and vice versa. tve have described Nishi tani' s speech about "the true

is to comprehend its "truth" or logos or the reality of the

transcendence is transcendence unto nirvana or emptiness

koto.

rather than unto nihilum" and about "true infinity in nir-

This is to say that the reality of the koto passes

into the mind of man and that man passes into its reality. 11

shl5bo~enz5, ShOji, quoted by Nishitani in "Emptiness

and Time," p.

4.

12

Keiji Nishitani, "Emptiness and Time," p. 26. 13 Ibid.

224

223

vana" (rather than bad infinity in nihilurn).

Now he wants

as they really are, the Life of the Buddha. 14

to maintain that the "true" in these phrases is not yet truly

In turn, truly true finitude is finitude experienced bodily

"true."

at the level of samsara-sive-nirvana.

Truly true transcendence is not nirvana but non-

abiding nirvana (samsara-sive-nirvana).

When we pursue

True finitude is bot-

tomlessly in time, while embracing the boundless past and

something truly true in the true, we find a paradox or ab-

the boundless future, we bring "time" to its fullness.

surdity which is ordinarily considered incompatible with

is the existence referred to in the Buddhist expression:

truth, i.e., untrue.

"Body and mind fall

Irrationality and meaninglessness

appear where rationality and meaningfulness are pushed to their extremity.

Reality is not paradox in some objectifi-

able sense but it only appears in that form.

Life as mean-

a~'lay;

This

the fallen way is body and mind."

The mind referred to in Nishitani's phrase about the "truly essential comprehension of Reality manifesting and coming to itself is Nyorai 's mind passing into man's mind

ingless is vlhere life truly lives itself, where it tran-

and at the same time man's mind passing into Nyoria' s mind"

scends meaning and reason.

could easily be substituted for by the term "life."

The

Nirvana as the true field of nirvana only comes into

mind he refers to is not the consciousness or intellect at

existence where one is not attached to nirvana, on the about -

the level where it grasps itself or is captured by itself.

face where nirvana is not nirvana but is samsara.

It is not the differentiating mind understanding itself.

Nirvana

is the pure and simple, though paradoxical, life of samsara-

have already remarked that this sort of mind was broken

sive-nirvana because "nirvana is essentially life" means

through in the detached transcendence onto the field of

that it is death to the life of birth-death which is essen-

nihilum.

tially death.

tial self-awareness on the field of true Emptiness, where

Samsara is not truly samsara except in sam-

sara-sive-nirvana. Birth-death-sive-nirvana is true birth-death, true nirvana, true-'time' and true eternity. Life subject to the sequences of birth-death must be, just as it is, the very place wherein nirvana presents itself. What is brought to self-awareness as the essence of human reality in this birth-death world, that is, the boundless finitude of 'being' which is inclusive of all forms of existence; (in the field of the 'world') the history of the causality of karmas extending into endless future, in which one, for example, 'leaves donkey's womb only to enter into a horse's abdomen, '--these things are,

We

So it is that the mind inherent in the existen-

nirvana is samsara, is even less that differentiating mind. This mind at the level of emptiness is the Buddha-mind and may be said to transcend differentiating thought in the way alluded to in The New Testament injunction: "Take therefore no thought for the morrow; for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself" (St. Xatthew 6 :34). 14rbid .• p. 30.

True life is

225

beyond all meanings and yet the meaning of every affair and

226

~

in earnest, we perceive that the five aggregates

less-ness of 'life' is here correlative with the non-'dif-

(pancha skandhah) are all empty, and cross over all the 17 sufferings." This mind is "truly empty but mysteriously

ferentiated' -ness of 'mind.' .. lS

existent."

word is established by reference to it.

"This 'meaning'-

In terms of the true self we can say that the ego is

This is not the meaninglessness and non-differentiation of the standpoint of nihilism.

It is the like-real-

ness (tathata) of differentiation on all occasions.

It is

not the ego in the basic sense.

The authentic self is

hidden beneath the ego which is forever blind, as ego, to

the differentiation of non-differentiation wherein the

itself.

karmas, illusions and discrimination stemming from the actions

where "Once the Great Death, then the whole universe be-

of body-mouth-mind in the samsaric world which are "sufficient

comes new," and where the "world worlds."

unto the day" in the sense of "Take no thought, saying, what

self is present in every action of the ego but the ego can-

shall we eat? or, What shall we drink?--sufficient unto the

not see the "true" ego in the sense that fire does not bum

day is the evil thereof'' (St. !1atthew 6: 31-34).

fire.

Herein the

The self as ego-less (anatman) reveals itself

This authentic

Such is the "mind" and "life" as the differentiation

Buddhist "everyday is a good day" is realized, i.e. , among

of non-differentiation.

the trivial affairs and words of everyday life.

basis of merely birth-death-like life, nor must one from

This non-

Life must not be understood on the

differentiating mind is none other than the field of empti-

the side of life make such shallow assertions as that this

ness, the fundamental possibility of being of all things, wherein "form is emptiness and emptiness is form. " 16 This

life is, as it really is, the life of the Buddha.

mere conceptualizing rather than existential interpretation.

mind is not the object or subject of contemplation but is

The "mind" and "life" spoken of here is the "mind" and "life"

existentially "realized."

on the field where body and mind fall away and fallen away

The perceiving insight is not mere

This is

contemplation but is connected with salvation from suffer-

is body and mind.

ing.

psyciology and psychology because, as Degen says, "The body and mind fallen a~vay are neither form nor consciousness. " 18

Nishitani quotes the Prajnaparamita-h:daya-sutra where

it says:

"At the time when we put into practice Prajnapara-

15 rbid.

J

p. 33.

16 we might just as easily substitute any of the other four "aggregates" of which reality is said, by Buddhist ontology, to consist: perception, mental conceptions, volition, and consciousness.

17

They cannot be researched by physics,

Keiji Nishitani,"Emptiness and Time," p. 35. 18 Ibid., p. 38.

227

I I

228

our self in the context of bad infinity. III.

In Zen this authen-

Body and Mind

tic mind means the existence which opens up the field of

Nishitani wishes to clarify DOgen's use of the phrase:

transcendence and stands fast on it; it is, in practice, that the fallen

a~~.:1y

zazen.

clearer articulations of the kind of religious existence he

mind requires the abolishing of avidya (ignorance).

has been discussing and analyzing.

tani wants to say that the practice of zazen is the way to

DOgen received the

Ju-ching

.:~dmonished

"Body and mind fall away" because it represents one of the

of bodyNishi-

expression via the Chinese monk Ju-ching (1163-1268) under

abolish ignorance and illusion.

whose guidance he suddenly attained Enlightenment; this at

sion of this would be to say that simple being-in-the-

hearing Ju-ching say, "Sanzen is the fallen away of body-

world, viewed from the side of being, must be abolished by

mind."19

the practice of something akin to, or identical with, zazen.

Sanzen is the interview wherein the student con-

The "demythologized" ver-

veys his understanding of the loan, given him by the master,

It is critical to note that by "practice" is meant not merely

to the master.

some physical activity nor merely some intellectual exer-

It is in such a context that our ordinary

regard for our body-mind as the self, the center from which

cise but a holistic "bodily experience."

all things are considered, is crushed and, as in Dagen's

will not suffice.

case, the real nature of authentic self becomes manifest.

striven for the method through which to detach from the six

Nishitani goes on to cite other remarks by Degen, e.g.,

hindrances.--If you strive for zazen only, then body-mind

"Sanzen is the fallen away of body-mind and is zazen only,"

will come to fall away.

or "The fallen away of body-mind is zazen.

tice zazen only, we free ourselves from the five desires and

from the five desires, five hindrances and so on. There is no other means to this end. " 20 In this fallen away one sees

get rid of the five hindrances."

his original face, the so-called flexible mind or "seal of

When we prac-

This sitting in zazen,

Mere method alone

As Ju-ching says, "You have hitherto

It is the method whereby to detach

i.e., zazen-only, and fallen away of body-mind are identical.

mlnd" of the Buddha's and patriarchs.

Both emancipate us from the attachment to the external world

is "to stand alone in the midst of all things."

that characterizes our everyday life.

is the king-meditation (raja-samadhi) of meditations; it is

It is, therefore,

deliverance from the world of suffering and birth-death and

meditation for its own enjoyment.

This form of existence This zazen

The cross-legged sitting

is upright body, upright mind, upright body-mind of man's 19

by

~oge~: Tendo Jojo Zenshi Zoku Goroku batsu; quoted

Nish~tan~,

ibid., p. 39.

20 Dogen: Hokeiki; quoted by Nishitani, ibid., pp. 40-41.

230

229

We meet a leap year after every three years. The cock crows towards four o'clock in the morning. 22

skin-flesh-bones-marrow and is the measure of all other samadhis.

This is not some ego-centric practice away from

the daily life of the everyday world.

Degen says:

"The

zazen of the Buddhist patriachs, from its first Lnception on, gathers in desire the Law of all the Buddhas. fore, in the midst of

~·

There-

they do not forget all sentient

beings, they turn over all the merits they possess.

This

is why all Buddhas perpetually dwell in this world of greed and investigate and preach the path of zazen." 21 The following passage from the first book of the Eiheikoroku will e;ive some sense of the body-mind on the field of "kingsamadhi of samadhis":

"I, a rustic priest, had not spent

much time exercising practical discipline in various zen monasteries.

All that I had hitherto done was to have had

an interview with T'ien-t'ung,

a~

master, and co have

apprehended at that time that the eyes lie horizontally and the nose stands vertically, and, not deceived by others, to have returned to my home with empty hands.

This is why

I have no teachings of the Buddha at hand and spend time for a while by resigning myself to destiny. Every morning the sun rises in the east Every night the moon sets in the west The clouds retreat and the mountain masses appear on the scene. The rain is over and the surrounding mountains are low. What is the matter after all? 21

(After a little while, he says,)

In this everyday world, where the world "worlds," is the "orieinal face" which is not form, nor matter, is not a thing nor a Buddha.

The King-Samadhi, or samadhi for one's

own enjoyment is the existence wherein the self is absolutely the self itself.

Here there are no hows and whys, no in-

structions but the practice of truth freely and independently. This place where body and mind are fallen away is absolutely unobjectifiable in the sense that fire does not burn fire. It is not limited to space and time, this "practicing samadhi in an atom"; it is the place of samadhi-being or "position" in Nishitani's terms.

Sent to China to "find" Zen, he was

obliged, or more accurately "freed" to come "back home with empty hands."

This going to China or returning to Japan,

like that of Bodhidharma and Hui-k' o in the saying "Patriarch Bodhidharma did not come to China nor went the second Patriarch (i.e., Hui-k'o) to India,"

is not to be conceived

in the rational sense as true or false; its truth is real only in the eternal present, the moment wherein time does not pass (its temporality) ment.

but exists forever in every mo-

This is like being the absolute center everywhere in

the universe.

Again and again the Zen tradition attests to

the reality of breaking through destiny, getting rid of boundlessly expanding space, stepping over countless kalpas, all in the place of everyday life where the eyes lie horizontally

rbid .. !'.

44 -

22 rbid. , p. 45.

232

231

and the nose lies vertically.

It is not realized, however,

contradictory in his own assertions about the "laws"

without going through the purging fires of the nihilum and

(dharmas) to which he refers by speaking of ontological order

Great Doubt.

and logos.

It is crucial to Nishitani and to Zen that the language of

identity-differ~nce

not be reduced to mere exposition.

Logos ordinarily refers to the essential ration-

al law inherent in the being itself of "things" and thus as the object of reason in the history of philosophy (even in

The "kotos" of which he has spoken must be heard, understood ,

moder.1 science).

and affirmed from their home-ground where they have no logi-

not grasp the in-itself-nature of "things" through this

cal meaning.

logos; this seems at odds with his discussion of "the fallen

It is in the phenomena that there is a leap

Nishitani has generally said that we can-

th~

year every fourth year and that the cock crows at dawn that

away is body and mind" as

we see the appearance of the dharma (law) that holds sway

their like-law character, this having been said to possess

over the world of anicca, the world of every-changing be-

all things in their logos.

coming and transition.

logos of being qualitatively varies in its meaning according

Scientists have recognized these

dharmas in stricter (but thereby more abstract) ways.

All

things move according to their ontological order and under the sway of logos; they are "like-law."

This is true, how-

store-house of all things in

In fact, Nishitani says, "the

as it is seen from the standpoint of reason or from that of ek-sistence (the existence as 'the fallen away is body and 23 mind'). " In the standpoint of existence logos comes to

ever, only in the sense that emptiness is "like-law," that

acquire the meaning of keto (both an affair and a word).

it lies beneath and makes all things be just as they are.

Here the rational law of being refers to the so-called voice-

The structural character of this "like-law" we have already

less speech of those grasped by the King-Samadhi who are,

explained in connection with their circuminsessional rela-

therefore, lord everywhere.

tionship.

of sepno which is the preaching of the Buddhist Dharma,

The field of emptiness is the field in which all

things are "gathered," i.e., they are comprehended.

Existence

This voiceless speech is a form

orally or by other means, to save sentient beings; it is

as "body and mind fallen away" is the boundless aperture on-

the speech of the Bodhisattva.

to this field, the place where, in Lin-chi's words, we "be-

tion of the law (dharma) by mere rational speech, but an ek-

come lord everywhere."

static preaching of no-preaching.

Here is the dharma-position of man

and all things, where we stand alone in the midst of all things. Nishitani recognizes that there seems to be something

This is not the communica-

It

~s

in this context

that the so-called linguistic raf~ of upaya is brought to 23Ibid., p. 56·

233

bear on the problem of karma.

"The Buddhist concept of

karma implies (implicitly) that there must be some sort of

234 the "self" as "ego-less."

Man is both this impersonal "ego-

less" and personal "self." Though it may appear that

accommodation by means of a variety of religious doctrines

l~ishitani

has lost sight of

which are appropriate and suitable to the different karmic

his topic of discussion in all this, he has been building a

endowments of individuals; likewise there must be some meta-

case for suggesting that this existence as "the fallen away

concept (upaya) which expresses the conclusion that all

is body and mind" also means to be truly in "time" or even

Buddhist religious doctrines are relative to and appropriate

more as "time."

for the different levels of individual karmic capacities following the Buddhist path. " 24 At this level there is no

ways in the beeinning of time.

objective law being preached to objective "things" or men

"before" the past and "after" all future.

because the law is not different from the things.

remote futures are realized (actualized and comprehended or

Because

Living takes place in time and is yet alBeginnings lie at the base

of temporality, making time possible.

It is, therefore, All p.asts and all

the "are" and the "ought" of things is entirely one in

gathered) at this beginning of time itself.

"emptiness," logos appears here as koto, the unified hear-

this connection is life in the world as "time" and yet al-

ing-obeying character of things hearing and obeying their

ways lives in it from the beginning wherein "time" brings

own character.

itself to fullness and the world "worlds."

That things exist authentically means that

Existence in

The same can

they express themselves and thus bear witness to what makes

also be said of "practice" as we discussed in connection

them be.

with sanzen which is the practice of zazen in the place of

Nishitani is saying then that "things" preach the

law and "things" obey the commanding law.

This preaching

"the samadhi for one 1 s own enjoyment," i.e., absolute free-

the law refers, of course, to our earlier discussion of go-

dom.

One does not attach "form" to this harmonious freedom

ing back to things as they are, to becoming the thing itself

by reflective thinking and differentiation.

Nishitani cites

1

in order to comprehend it.

"If you want to know the bam-

boo, make the bamboo your own."

What we "know" by this bear-

ing witness or clarification is the existence as "body and mind fall away" which is "lord everywhere." 24

Prebish, p. 91.

This in turn is

Hakuin s opinion that if one thinks of "prajna" or "time" as particular things it is like gouging out flesh of the perfect body.

236

deed shed any light on the problem. The first approach to be examined is that of Arnold

CHAPTER VII

Toynbee. KARMA: THE NATURE OF LIFE

AJ.~D

DEATH

IN HISTORY

I.

Toynbee represents, as we might expect, a histori-

cal-descriptive approach to the study of religion.

He is

very much aware of a specifically human pattern running

Western Theories of History

To this point, then, Nishitani has been dealing with

through the life of all societies.

He suggests that relig-

ion is something that passes on from one civilization to

time in connection with samsara (birth-death)-sive-nirvana

another and can be strengthened in the historical process.

i n terms of existence as "The fallen away is body and mind."

Just as Christianity arose out of a declining Hellenistic

Can history be clarified on the basis of such an understand-

society, it may in turn survive a decaying western civiliza-

ing of time?

tion.

Having discussed "body and mind fallen away,"

Despite his special regard for Christianity, Toynbee

Nishitani reminds us that history is the place of those whose

feels that all the higher religions have the same essential

body and mind has not fallen away and who live in the world

truth.

of avidya.

The Buddhist idea of emptiness is non-histori-

Mahayana Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism, Islam and Zora-

cal or supra-historical; in fact, Buddhism barely contains

astrianism) are distinguished by underpinning their prac-

any such historical consciousness.

tices (which remain the ultimate end) with a foundation of

Nishitani suggests that

These higher religions (Hinduism, Theravada and

i t would have been natural for such a development to take

beliefs.

place wherein the problem of history might have been called

the highest spiritual presence known to man, that man must

i nto question from the point of view of samsara-nirvana and

try to place himself in harmony with that presence, to choose

the way of the bodhisattva, but historically it did not.

between various saving truths, and to face the problem of

Nishitani does not consider the discussion of this problem

suffering.

to be the most productive avenue to opening up the problem

ligious traditions is human nature, especially its self-

of history in his terms and simply moves on to a comparative

centeredness (which he considers man's original sin). 2

examination of several western views of history to see if

Though he seemed to fear the de-humanizing forces of tech-

t hey exhaust the possible standpoints in looking at the

Arnold Toynbee, Christianitb Among the Religions of the World (New York, 1957), pp. 2 -24. 2Ibid., p. 85.

problem and then whether the standpoint of emptiness can in-

They are unanimous in affirming that man is not

1

The necessary common ground of all these re-

237

238

nology he recognized it as something to be manipulated

sentient beings.

rather than be manipulated by.

versal by emphasizing the universality of the impersonal

Technology (or science)

The individual is dissolved into the uni-

has made man's problems more universal because it has annihi-

law of a circular universe rather than on the individuality

lated the protective barrier of distance.

of each person.

At the same time,

technology has made social injustice avoidable and therefore intolerable. 3 1~ishi tani

focuses upon Toynbee' s book An Historian's

Here history is deprived of meaning since

everything is reduced to the idea of the universal and all is repetition rather than anything new being introduced. In the western Judaic view, history is analogous to the

Approach to Religion written in 1956 and proceeds to summarize

rhythm in man's individual life.

his arguments.

in terms of a life plot, the will is considered as the con-

Toynbee suggests that the intellectual chasm

When history is conceived

of the future will not fall between liberalism and communism

trolling factor.

but between the western Judaic group of philosophies (Judaism,

God or of various personal powers it plays a prominent role

Christianity and Islam) and the Buddhaic group of philosophies

and history is thought to involve meaning within itself. The

(pre- and post-Buddhaic Indian philosophy and Mahayana and

problem here is that this reinforcement of the ego makes it

Theravada Buddhism).

The former have shared the view that

Whether considered as the will of a personal

difficult i£ not impossible to avoid the self-centeredness

"his tori cal time proceeds in a straight line, and is, as a

of man.

whole, controlled by a personal being.

History is conditioned and given its meaning by intellect and will. " 4 The latter

is perhaps the most

have the following characteristic features: "Firstly, the

against the will of God, but becoming one of God's chosen

motions of nature and of the cosmos are circular.

people recasts this ego into a historically self-conscious

Secondly,

Israel's consciousness of being God's chosen people re~rkable

example of this.

level this self-centeredness must be cast off as a sin over

what holds sway over the cosmos and the human world is the concept of impersonal law (dharma) ." 5 To Toynbee the Bud-

self-centeredness.

dhist way of thinking seems to have one advantage over the

at its base.

western way of thinking: it contains the possibility of

lies hidden a projection onto God of

transcending the self-centeredness which is innate in all

desire that God should have a hatred for

3Ibid., p. Slf. 4

Keiji Nishitani, "Emptiness and Time," p. 72. 5Ibid.

At one

In Nishitani's view this disguises a profounder truth "In the concept of God's chosen people, there

on other races."

~he

Jewish people's ~•d

pass judgment

"The consummate self-abandonment or whole-

hearted humility (Demut) towards God turns out to be the

240

239

base of the superiority complex of the self over against other persons." 6 In spite of an apparent religious self-

bit.

negation there is a reversal into an unconscious self-cen-

al religious celebrations and perhaps even in most politi-

teredness.

cal, agricultural and other social celebrations.

Feuerbach and Nietzsche were prominent critics

of Christianity on this same issue.

From the Buddhist point

of view, avidya is left here intact.

Since history can have

meaning as history only by involving the self-centered per

Even the contents of human life is molded by such a

rotating time.

Rituals of renewal are seen in all tradition-

rituals renew the relations between

Annual

gods and men, gods and

the land, the land and men, man and man.

In this sense

also, human life is cyclic. The origin of historical consciousness in Judaism in-

means that the realm of history is the world of being involving ignorance and hence is the world of karmas.

volves, for Nishitani, a large problematic.

If this is true, as both Toynbee and Nishitani maintain,

the historical consciousness, especially in the modern

then there is a kind of dilemma between history and relig-

world, has seen a remarkable development to the point where

ion as Nishitani understands them.

the cyclical base is forgotten altogether and man's life is

Nishitani questions Toynbee's understanding of Buddhist time as circular.

It seems valid but is a judgment

from the point of view of a western idea of history.

Cir-

After the fact,

formed almost exclusively by an historical self-consciousness.

The problematic in Christianity is similar but also

different.

Nishitani describes three factors in this prob-

cularity in time characterizes all religions which incorporate an understanding of myth. 7 It is inevitable when one

lematic: "the awareness of sin, that of freedom and that of the once-ness of time. " 8 In the concept of original sin (ac-

sees the universe or all things in the universe from the

cording to Nishitani, the essential factor in the Christian

natural point of view.

view of man) man is seen as an autonomous, independent be-

The seasons, days, months recur;

astronomical time, the time of natural phenomena, neces-

ing.

sarily returns to its starting point and makes the same or-

the Christian is made aware of the subjective role he, by

6 Ibid., p. 75. 7It is interesting to note here that the mythology of Japan differs to the extent that in the Kojiki and the Nihongi (compiled by court decree in 721 and 720 AD respectively) we have a retrospective construction of a nations mythic origins after the nation is politically cen~ralized and conceived as dating from a one-time, non-recurring descent to earth of the descendants of the Sun-goddess Amaterasu.

Having inherited the idea of freedom from Judaism,

will, makes in the determination of his

c~m

salvation.

And

finally, his historical consciousness has made time cease to seem recurrent and every moment becomes the opportunity for something new and creative to emerge. 8 Ibid., p. 82.

The birth and

242

241

(but at an indefinite time in the future) end initiated by

death (incarnation and atonement) of Jesus Christ have opened up in history the field of man's salvation. 9

God and occurring once only as an actual event (the last)

The religious standpoint of such points of view has a character of exclusive absoluteness which simply excludes the possibility of compatibility with other religions.

Re-

ligious truth in this context combines with a once-ness historically that cannot tolerate an alternative view.

This

intolerance is related fundamentally to the personal nature of the standpoint; the standpoint of the personal relationship between man and God.

Nishitani points to the histori-

cal occurrences which were manifestations of the fundamental conflict between the self-centeredness of man's sinful nature and the~ or love of one's fellowmen. 10 The second problematic in Christianity's understanding of time and history is its eschatology.

Mythological relig-

ions and also Buddhism have a rotational view wherein ages follow ages, each rising out of and ending in some sort of conflagration.

Minimally, according to Nishitani, Chistian-

ity's view is controversial since it involves an expected

in history.

The contemporary world with its technological

stance has made the factuality of this occurence dubious. One could de-mythologize the eschaton in reinterpreting it in some existential sense but it cannot be omitted due to its centrality in Christianity and existentially it cannot be made to have

mu~h

historical sense as historical fact.

Outside theology, eschatology is an unknown word; contemporary historians as scientists do not deal with it at all. On the level of historical facts immanent in history it is inconceivable that history will end by the initiation of something or some personal being outside history.

The idea

of "progress" which emerged in the eighteenth century, though it was a reaction against the faith and intolerance of Christianity and a replacement of these by reason, is still basically a similar historically conscious movement, naively moving through an ever-new unfolding.

Though con-

ceived in tolerance (against the intolerance of Christianity) its contemporary in science has proved itself to be

9 It is probable at this point that Nishitani over-estimates the necessity for regarding these events as historically factual. He himself, for example, says, "Special emphasis is here placed upon their historical facticity." Ibid. 10 E.g., the struggles and harsh measures taken against unbelievers in the Roman era, the crusades of the l1iddle Ages, the persecution of heretics, the Inquisition and the religious wars persisting up through modern times. These are found also in Islam but are notably lacking in Buddhism. One would be hard pressed to find a war initiated by or fought in the name of Buddhism.

equally intolerant of other views, still remaining a progressoriented soteriology. This is connected with the third problematic in Christianity in Nishitani's interpretation.

"Fundamentally

speaking, this rational standpoint can be reduced to man's freedom as a rational being."ll lltbid •• p. 88.

Freedom arises in man's

244

243

having been capable of disobedience to God's will and hence

power is a rotating view in that it comes back to history

his original sin, i.e., his ability to make rational

after having negated it; the "ideas of the will to power and

choices.

that of eternal return are a position of great affirmation.•~ 2

The conflict between faith and reason has never

been absent from the history of Christianity and it has

The nihilum negates history in the ordinary sense (on the

largely paralleled the conflict between intolerance and

level of its immanence) where reason gives meaning to his-

tolerance.

tory and permits a confidence in progress.

The emergence of Nietzsche's nihilism was the

The will to power

product of a radical skepticism about the tenability of

is the ek-static basis upon which history is restored only

either the eschatological orientation of a God of judgment

to find that it cannot complete its authentic historicity,

or the alternate faith in the progress made possible by

i.e., that it cannot create anything radically new in time.

reason.

It appears as the obverse face of the problematic of Chris-

More to the point, the problems of the modern prog-

ress point of view cannot be solved by a Christian eschatologi -

tianity.

cal understanding of time and history nor is the reverse

of mythic time in favor of the historicity of time.

possible.

tzsche broke down the historicity of time in favor of some

The Enlightenment and Christian views of history have

Christianity broke down the rotational character Nie-

restoration of the rotational character of mythic time.

The

in common that they both see meaning in history but are other-

former gave a once for all time historicity to the eschaton;

wise diametrically opposed to each other.

the latter guarantees the endlessness of time but denies

God's providence

is irreconcilable with anthropocentric reason.

Nihilism

the completion of anything radically new.

Is there any way

goes back behind both of them to a position wherein history

by which history will not be brought to a complete stop at

and its origins, including all natural processes are mean-

some point in time by the supra-historical and at the same

ingless.

time realize its supra-historical base?

At this base, Nietzsche turned to the idea of the

Eternal Return.

The Eternal Return of Nietzsche is not,

Certainly not, ac-

cording to Nishitani, in the western Judaic or Nietzschean

however, the rotational view of mythological religions;

point of view.

nihilism itself is conceived as an actual historical event

dilemma in moving toward a comparison of emptiness and his-

and the Eternal Return implies all the new creations of his-

tory.

tory.

tions to his investigation.

All the nihilized "meanings" of his tory are re-affirmed

as attempts of the will itself to posit value.

Nishitani will find his solution to the

First, however, he makes a few introductory observa-

The will to 12Ibid. ' p. 92.

245

246

Eschatology is not, obviously, concerned with the end

the Christian thinkers and re-expressed in modern times in

of the world in the sense that a geologist or geophysicist

a secularized form by the historicism of the nineteenth

might be (contrary to the opinion of many fundamental sects);

century.

it is not worried about the earth cooling down or being

tendency may be taken as derived from a reinforced aware-

sucked into a "black hole."

disclosure of the supra-historical level through historical

ness of the total dependence of the human being on the historical process in an age of rapid change." 13 Similar

man's awareness.

problems arise concerning the beginning of history; scarcely

Rather it is interested in the

The end of history is directly related to

the beginning of history.

History begins for Christianity

Viewed from the common man's point of view, this

any well-educated modern man with a clear sense of his own

with Adam's Fall; history is beginning to end, i.e, the

historical immanence believes that history began with Adam's

eschaton is upon us with Christ's incarnation and will be

fall.

completed with the second advent of Christ.

of view which develops into the science of history is essen-

Christianity

As Nishitani points out, "surely this immanent point

as a religion is based upon once-happening historical events.

tial to history no less than the supra-historical point of

Its answer to Nishitani's question "What is Religion?" is:

view which unfolds unto a religious understanding of history.

"the history of salvation" or "the his tory of judgment." Representing this eschaton as an historical event is, as we

It is equally essential for historical consciousness and for a view of history." 14 Of course, both the beginnings

have seen, a problematic.

and end of history present unsolved problems for Christian-

Man falls prey to his tools (tech-

nique) as a historical being and worries about the cooling

ity and are in turn incompatible with such a point of view

off of the earth (or considers the great earthquake of Lis-

as just expressed.

bon) as God's punishment.

But history has another aspect,

Nishitani finds the root of the problem in the notion

that of the modern fact-grubbing historian who makes the

of a God conceived as personal and provided with a will.

tool the sole end in itself and cannot see the moral dimen-

tory has a beginning and an end precisely in terms of God's

sion at all.

punishment (Adam's fall) and his judgment (the eschaton).

As Goichi Miyake suggests, "This is an extreme

His-

generalization of the notion of history if viewed from the

History is the manifestation of the divine will.

simple conception of history as the real or possible object

self-centered (thea-centric) conception of God as "something

of historical description.

13 Goichi Miyake, "Ontological Study of History," Philosophical Studies of Japan, III, 1961, p. 1.

generalizatio~

This tendency toward the over-

of the notion of history was once held by

This is a

14K . . . N. h. . " EmptLness . e~JL rLs LtanL, an d T.Lme, II p. 9 7 .

247

that is."

Nishitani is not being hostile to Christianity

248

Christianity as the ground of being, the will to power as

in his critical analysis but has probed deeply into tender

the ground of becoming, and the unity of Brahman-Atman to

spots in Christian theology.

which the Indians gave expression in the phrase £!£

He himself admits that:

Nobody can deny the fact that the notion of a personal God, a God of judgment (or of justice) or a God of love, by causing human beings to stand face to face with the 'sacred' as with a living subject, face to face with a God who is probably beyond compare in the sacredness of His majesty and love, has brought man's conscience and love to special depth and thus has elevated human personality to a remarkable extent. Because of this and provided that the above analysis of the inherent problematic is right, it would be all the more desirable that the solution of these problems would arise from Christianity itself in the future. I think we are in need of this solution not only for the purpose of building up a true view of history which future mankind should possess but also in order that Christianity itself may successfully confront the 'secularized' views of history in the modern world.l5 It is, however, in Nietzsche's Eternal Return that Nishitani sees the position closest to a solution and at the same

asi.

~

The will, however, like Brahman-Atman, retains some-

thing of the "what is" character.

The will to power in-

volves within itself something that is not completely turned about into the self.

Only in the latter position is time

"what truly bottomlessly arises as time and history that whose historicity is thoroughly brought to its completion. "16 II.

Time as Circular

We must turn now even more directly to Nishitani's examination of the phenomena of time and history; e3pecially whether or not Buddhist time is circular as Toynbee suggests. A rotating world view as a cyclical process has no be-

time closest in atmosphere to the Buddhist view of emptiness.

ginning and no end and viewed from that direction contains

Nevertheless, the Eternal Return of Nietzsche does not make

infinity or seems infinitesimal.

time truly be time.

continually to its beginning, which tHshitani calls a kind

Neither does his moment (Augenblick)

It does, however, return

have the bottomlessness of the genuine instant of Buddhism.

of provisional ending, and to that extent the rotation char-

It cannot, therefore, be the place which makes possible some-

acter also signifies finitude.

thing "new" which would render comprehensible some new, west-

level finitude which, because of the endless nature of its

ern cyclical viPw of history.

repetition becomes infinite finitude.

The reason?

Something else,

This is a kind of high-

It is a mindless,

in this case the "will to power" is conceived as "something

senseless, abstract limitlessness.

that is" on the supra-historical level, something not truly

this is the same as the Buddhist "without beginning in to

emptied.

endless future?"

We might see striking parallels between the God of lSibid., pp. 98-99.

16 Ibid., p. 101.

The question is whether

250

249

is anicca in the fullest sense of the word.

Buddhism does have a kalpa system of reckoning time, each time system, of kalpa, succeeded by another.

The dif-

tfuen time is

a succession of these instants it can be said to be without

ference is that each kalpa is simultaneous with preceding

beginning and end.

but continuing ones.

time but its meaning lies in its recognition of the void-

Each kalpa is "gathered" or "com-

prehended" into larger ones.

This kalpa system is like mythological

like aperture at its base rather than the usually found pri-

tiishitani likens the system

to the moon rotating around the earth which in turn rotates

mordial time to which everything is often thought to be an

around the sun, which solar system in turn rotates around some larger system, ad infinitum. 17 This is different from

Eternal Return.

endless repetition within the same, identical time-frame.

aperture, time becomes perpetually something new in every "now. " 19 In this newness there is also an ambiguity. It is

The latter, the case of the Eternal Return, is a continuous

The ambiguity of Buddhist time is that

"only as something without beginning or end in a limitless

occurrence of the return and may be represented, according to Nishitani, as a straight line. 18 In the Buddhist system

positive in the sense that here time is the field of un-

time is clearly circular because all systems are simultaneous

possible for things to have permanence; it drives us con-

but is also rectilinear in being a sequence of "nows" wherein

stantly forward to ever new moments or turn-abouts.

the systems are simultaneous.

is existence fastened upon us like an "infinite burden."

At the bottom of this time is

a void-like aperture not belonging to any system at all.

In

limited creative freedom.

But it is also what makes it im-

We cannot "have" or "possess" ourselves.

Herein

Nishitani speaks

such a system every "now," though belonging to the accumu-

of the nature of our being or time as like a debt of an im-

lation of systems, is totally new, without possibility of

posed task.

repetition, instantaneously originating and perishing.

Further, everything done turns into a liability in its not

This

17 Keiji Nishitani, "Emptiness and History," a manuscript translation by Rev. Jan van Braft of Chapter Six of Nishitani's ShUkyo to ~ Nanika ("tfuat is Religion?"), p. 2. lSTh.~s ~s · t he case even ~n . Ch r~st~an~ty . . . wh ere sue h thinkers as Eliade place a high emphasis upon the eternal return but nonetheless conceive of history as a linear movement from past to future. This system might almost be represented by some such figure as the coils of a spring or a spiral helix.

We only live by continually doing things.

remaining done.

Our life is constantly and essentially one

of "fore-throwing" (entwerfend). 'are'

(~)

"To surmnarize, that we

in 'time,' means that we are con·demend inces-

santly to 'do' (nasu) something; and, that in that constant doing, our being is established as 'becoming'

(~).

In

other words, existence in time obtains as ceaseless becoming 19 K . . . '-1 • h · . "E mpt~ness . e~J~ ~~s ~tan~, an d H.~s t cry," p. 4 .

252

251 and turning-about." 20

This burden-character of existence

aperture" is also ambiguous; it can mean simply nihilum or

is a problem because of its infinity character ; it never

it can mean the authentic emptiness.

ends.

is vastly altered according to the meaning of this aperture.

It appears as though it were imposed by something

outside.

It i5 an infinite impulse or infinite urge.

The

The meaning of time

Time is linked with all things emerging in the world and envelops their being but in such an ambiguous or enigmatic

ancients referred to this feeling as desire (tanha, Pali; ~. Jap.) and is analogous to thirsting for water. 21 Here

way that we cannot seem to know from where we came or to

the idea of karma has its locus.

where we are going.

Karma implies both the

Our actual existence in time is filled

burden aspect of being and time and the awareness of the

with anxiety.

essence of time,

horizontally and vertically in seemingly endless fashion.

On the one hand, time in its ever-newness

Our relationships in existence spread out

is ambiguous as creation, freedom and infinite possibility;

"No matter how far the scientific explanation of the 'his-

and, on the other, as infinite burden and inescapable neces-

tory' of living beings, of our globe, of the univere

sity.

resses, it is impossible to exhaust the secrets of this ,.22 In spite of this our history's beginning or end,

Not only in "newness" is there ambiguity; there is also ambiguity in "transitoriness."

In their transitoriness time

and being are constantly manifesting "an-nihil-ation" from their very

~round:

they are fleeting and evaporative, con-

actual existence is an actual fact.

p~og­

It is crucial that the

beginninglessness and endlessness of time is rooted in an infinite aperture which in turn is rooted in actual exis-

stantly on the brink of downfall in their instantaneousness.

tence.

On the other hand they are free and light in their annihilation because they are not tied to permanence and the deter-

for inside actual existence. essence of being and time. 23

minate mode of being does not become a hindrance.

they must be found, not in time, but at the ground of the

Newness implies being and time, transiency implies nothingness and time. 20

Time is thus ambiguous.

The "infinite

The beginning and end of time can and must be looked Herein is to be found the By this is meant, however, that

present which is the place where actual existence takes place (rather than in the past or future).

This is why Nishi-

tani suggests that the judgment and punishment of God must Ibid., p. 5.

21 This is referred to as "thirsting love" by Mizuno and distinguished from the compassion of the Bodhisattva. It is the direct cause of suffering as claimed in the Second Noble Truth and is the eighth link in the chain of dependent or relational · origination. Cf. MiZ'.!!l0, p. 148-'~9.

22

rbid. , p. 10 • 23 And not in some mere "historicism" which, as Stanley Rosen suggests is "the inability to distinguish between being and time." Rosen, p. 56.

253

254

be found at the ground of the present and are seen working

of human reason have both been shown by Nietzsche (accord-

in the home-ground of the present.

ing to Nishitani) to be impossible.

Likewise Nietzsche's

Nietzsche used the mutual failure of secularism and

Eternal Return is found directly beneath the "now"-"moment." In both cases, however, the problem is overcome only in a provisional sense.

In both cases the problem of time

"Platonico-Christianity" as a stepping stone in his own thought.

That God is dead means that everything is dead,

is solved by being "managed" by sot:lething-that-is, i.e.,

that all previously conceived foundations of things have

God and the will to power, respectively.

turned into nihilum.

The Christian

All things have lost their unity in

version takes its invalid assurances on the ambiguity of

any transcendent center and float in a limitless and mean-

"newness" by emphasizing being and time.

ingless time.

Nietzsche's will

The annihilation of all being, or the "being"

to power rests on the ambiguity of "transiency" by empha-

of all things, relegates existence to the world of change.

sizing the senseless repetition based upon nothingness and

Change, which cannot be grasped, renders existence

time (nothingness conceived here as nihilum).

less.

For Christian-

mc~~~ng­

This radical nihilism is, however, the turning point

ity the infinite aperture is closed at the bottom of time

into life.

by focusing upon the eschaton; for Nietzsche there is no

time is transitory; meaninglessness turns into bottomless

infinite aperture due to man's being locked up in the ro-

meaningless.

tating time of the Eternal Return.

now; freed from the impossibility of past and future and

For contemporary man,

It takes on a light, transparent quality in that

At the same time it is firmly grounded in the

Nietzsche's position has rendered the Christian view impos-

always concerned with the actual existence of the "now."

sible without actually solving the ambiguity; merely re-

Here nihilum opens up as the field of ek-static transcendence

focussing the emphasis.

of world and time.

Science and positivism may be said

to be looking to the past; the idealism of progress may be said to be looking to the future; each without success.

It becomes the infinite aperture im-

mediately beneath the present, This is what Nietzsche means when he says: "There is 24

Nietzsche has also made these views impossible by pointing

nothing except the totality--this is a big emancipation. "

out that it lost the ek-static transcending dimension of time

He simply means that there is no "thing" outside this world,

as suspended out over the abyss of nothingness.

no God, no beyond.

Thus the

The opening up of nihilum means that it

theocentric confidence in God as creator of time (man as

participates in the world at the ground of the present and

dependent) and the secularist confidence in the independence

that all things return to this field.

This infinite aperture

24 Twilight of the Idols, quoted by Nishitani, ibid., p.20.

255

256

beneath the present takes on the character of the eternal,

Return is the "lila" or play of such a will.

not the eternity of being, but the eternity of nothing, or

that is not its manifestation.

of death.

This is the clearing out or opening of the

present toward the infinite aperture.

There is nothing

This is, of course, in striking contrast to Christian-

This death of our-

ity and secularism.

Nietzsche overcomes the man who de-

selves and the parallel death of the world is not some

clares the self-sufficiency of reason (secular man).

"matter" of objective events.

has become the murderer of God but has not at the same time

"This means, .

that the

Man

whole world and the self as one reality change into

embraced the radical implications of that act of deicide.

nihilum, that 'Great Death' presents itself out of the bot-

Secular man must undergo the refining process wherein his

tom where world and self are ~·

every illusion is shattered.

It is the affair of 'being- in- the-world,' our own 'affair. "• 25

dulged in the opposite illusion, viz., that there is some

The nihilum participates in actual existence as the realization of "Great ness.

Death"; it is the field of self-aware-

Here a fundamental tum-about takes place toward

"Great Life."

transcendent "being" or beyond.

Christianity is then forced

to view this world as a world of sin, death and transitoriness, i.e., as evil, without the affirmation of

It too is not a matter of some objective af-

fair about which we might ask "Why?"

Christianity, of course, in-

It is a conversion on

the~

sense of affirmation-sive-negation, as eternal life.

in the Both

positions fail in having started from a self-centered per-

a more fundamental field than that at which we ask and answer

spective, being unable to embrace the radical consequences

questions.

of self-centercdness.

It is, however, precisely this asking and answer-

Nishitani refers to these positions

ing that traditional religions have continually tried to do.

as optical illusions, as essentially unconscious self-decep-

In so doing they looked in the direction of God or Buddha,

tions.

toward providence or the original vow of Amida-Buddha.

a renewed affirmation of the radical consequences of con-

The

Nietzsche's position represents an advance by being

Hebrew Scripture Job gives ample testimony to the a-ration-

sidering the will to be and become himself the fundamental

ality of the "reason" on the side of Gor or of Buddha. There

role of man.

is only a "that"; never a "what."

base, affirmations of this Nietzschean will to power.

opens up the field of eternity. is both the radiating power

Nietzsche's will to power As Nishitani suggests, it

and what is radiated.

The art-

less and undefiled eternally rotating world of the Eternal 25

rbid., p. 21.

Further, the illusions are themselves,

~t

their The

desire for permanence and subsequent dependence upon a deity or reason are, in spite of not being recognized as such, basically a self-affirmation, a desire to affirm the mean-

257

ing of life. reason or God,

Here the affirmation takes a detour via the Rather than viewing Nietzsche as some sort

258

does, being driven to despair when arriving at this unconscious, nevertheless felt and unavoidable, conclusion which

of threat, either position might well have seen him as some

is experienced but not "comprehended" or "gathered" as it

minor "savior" who offered them a reinterpretation, a de-

emerges along with "progress."

mythologized grasp of their positions.

the being-in-the-world of modern secularization already ap-

Both were, after

all, mere:y a variation on the theme advanced by Nishitani

pears.

as the "infinite impulse."

on the contemporary problematic.

In Christianity thi3 was vieweci

One might say that in karma,

The demythologization of karma has a direct bearing

as the attempt to usurp the throne of God, the emergence of the demonic.

In secularism this has emerged as the despair

which dEveloped concomitant with progress.

Neither position

III. The "task-character" and "infinte aperture" of History At this point in the development of his argument, Nishi-

has shown itself to be self-critically aware of the origins

tani wants to pursue more deeply the meaning of the two

of its opposition or even its experience of these phenomena.

points he has stressed in speaking about the expression "with-

This willing self, according to Nishitani, is always to be

out beginning into (endless) future,"

found in western considerations of the problems of time and

vestigated in the context of karma.

eternity, history and the supra-historical, under the aspect

"First, a time without beginning or end gives existence si-

of infinity.

multaneously the character of a burden or an imposed task

Furthermore they are considered at the point

These are also inThe two points

are:

where they transect, thus raising problems of "fate,"

and the character of creation and freedom; and again, in the

"destiny," "providence," et.:. all viewed from the side of

background of all this there can be detected something that

will.

could be called an infinite impulse. The Buddhist notion of karma is a parallel consideration

of being-in-the-world in the aspect of infinity.

Like

secularism it speaks about beginningless and endless time. The difference is that whereas secularism was unconscious of

Second, a time with-

out beginning or end can exist only if it contains in its ground the manifestation of an infinite aperture." 26 We will examine the points one at a time. Our being is endlessly thrown forward or back in end-

this "infinite impulse" aspect, Buddhism embraces the self-

less time due to the instantaneous nature of the present;

awareness of this impulse.

this is our burden.

It begins at the base of its

consideration with this assumption rather than, as secularism

26Ibid., p. 33.

We are condemned to an incessantly new

260

259

becoming and limitless change.

Our karma of word, deed,

and bad deeds, words, and thoughts and the influence of

and thought shows itself as our free activity, forever

these deeds, etc., in turn pervaded the seeds.

creating something new.

very essence of our 'being' in time has been conceived in a

Time and our existence within that

"Thus, the

time are inconceivable apart from the world of relations

dynamic, spontaneous, self-developing 'causal' framework,

and this world of relationship appears as infinitely large

. . . One can conceive 'time' as without beginning and end

horizontally and vertically.

only in an inseparable and essential relationship with such

"Consequently, our 'works'

(samskrta) of every moment as the becoming of time itself

an understanding of 'being'- in-' time ... ,ZB

originate

doing of things cannot occur except as doing "something."

vertically, out of the background of the rela-

This ceaseless

tionship without beginning into endless future, and hori-

Existence arises in mutual determination; the self doing, or

zontally also, in relation to all things existing simultaneously with us." 27 This is the aspect of infinity under

determining, itself.

which being-in-the-world must be viewed.

The mode of being of the self is de-

termining, and being determined by itself. Nishitani uses the ancient word "innen" (hetupratyaya)

Our karma is to be

like slaves laboring continually but not at the behest of

to express the inseparable union of these two aspects.

someone or something outside; rather it is the nature of

are compelled to consider the totality of mankind and all

existence within time.

things in the world as something "fatally" linked to our

This is the de-mythologized version

of what was recognized by mythological man even more than

existence and working.

by so-called rational man.

ize themselves in this "without beginning into endless

This works-like nature of existence is one, paradoxi-

We

Our various activivies always real-

future" wave of the totality of all relationships.

The "be"

cally, whereby we are required to work out way out of our

of being-in-the-world, when existing as "become" is always

dilemma and wherein every act of work is the seed of yet

..i.Iul!.m-like.

another act of work.

"be."

We freely create our own bondage; we

secure our existence in freeing ourselves from it. contradictory

Cj~amicity

This self-

can be found in early Mahayana

Buddhism in the Consciousness-only school in which the "store-

"Doing" "does" (makes) "being": "do" "becomes"

"Thus, we are aware of an infinite impulsivity at the

ground of our 'be' and 'do,' in the ground of our actual existence; and of an infinite shut-up-in-itself-ness, so to speak, or of a self-centered-ness in the 'home-ground' which

consciousness" contained the seeds (bija) which led to good 27Ibid., p. 35.

28Ibid., p. 38.

262

261

is the well-spring of that impulse. " 29

This is the source

causality of karma is seen in the perspective of a beginningless and endless aperture of time.

of endless karmic activity and is what is meant by avidya

This aperture is the focus of Nishitani's second point.

or "fundamental ignorance" (mumyo).

It appears as a nihilum outside existence and its forms.

Thus, for Nishitani, karma is the self-awareness of the essence of actual existence in time in the dynamics of

has been variously conceived as the ground out of which

"be," "do," and "become."

emerges, or in which is found the fource for the being of

In this connection the concept of

It

metempsychosis if often found (along with that of transmi-

mythical notions of reincarnation, the conceptions of kalpa

gration) and can be understood as the mythologized version

and Great Kalpa, the Eternal Return of Nietzsche, and other

of this projection of the self into endless past and future.

world views.

It can only be understood when we interpret it so as to

ever conceived, would not come into being in time v7ithout

bring the contents of that representation back to the home-

thi'3 aperture.

ground of wur existence in the present.

cally described as the free performance of an infinite com-

Such representations

As Nishitani has described it our being, how-

The "doing" of this existo:nce is paradoxi-

are born in an intent to grasp the ground of man's actual

pulsion.

existence and contain an intuition of the essence of being-

This does not, however, mean that there is some objective

in-the-world.

thing-like content to this nihilum.

In this context, then, Nishitani defines metempsychosis as "the finitude of man is existentially grasped as an in-

The doing of this karmic activity creates being.

It means that the doing

has to rely upon its ground in nihilum in order to transcend the determinedness of the innen-like relations of this world. Anicca (transitoriness) is the Buddhist term for the

finite finitude and is comprehended in the horizon of a 'world' that includes also kinds of being other than man, in

condition which provides the freedom to transcend this de-

the quintessence of a most basic being-in-the-world. ,JO

terminedness.

In

This transitoriness is only present because

much the same way, the notion of "three worlds" represents

there is nihilum at the base of actual existence.

a dropping of even the human form in the transition from the

that viewpoint, the world of karma is a world wherein each

world of desire through that of form to that of no-form; the

individual is determined by its innen-like relations within

infinite extension of limitless world-relationships.

an infinite world-order and, nevertheless, every one's

29

The

"Seen from

existence and behaviour, and also each moment of time, origIbid. , P • 0:.1.

JOibid., p. 43.

inates as something absolutely new and containing freedom

263 and creativity. " 31

The infinite "before" and "after" of

causal necessity lies in every man's present, rendering it free and creative. 32 The infinite aperture is a supra-temporal aperture or ec-static transcendence.

It is projected into "time" every

time one performs karmic activity in the present.

264 linked to karma operating in the universe but, on the other hand, we, as beings with self-consciousness and free will, have the opportunity to be liberat~d from karma through our own free act, an act which is based on the total realization within oneself of the beginningless and ~ndl~ss process of karma, i.e., karma operating in the universe beyond

The

nature of being is becoming and every activity establishes

oneself." and "Universal karma can be realized not objec-

this self.

tively but only subjectively, i.e., in and through the

The freedom-nature of this karmic activity makes

existential realization of personal and individual karma--

it possessible, the karma is always "my" karma. Though it has this freedom character., we should not

and personal karma can be truly transcended only when uni-

imagine that we are talking about true freedom or true cre-

versal karma is subjectively overcome within oneself." 33

ativity.

The ambiguity of this existence is in the constant turn-

Freedom and creativity at this level are timed

to the inner necessity compelling us to do something.

The

abouts from despair to joy and back to despair, a motion

freedom is inseparably tied to the compulsion or infinite

which arises in freeing oneself from ones debt only to cre-

impulse.

ate in turn further indebtedness.

We have already described how getting into rela-

Furthermore, the cre-

tions with something inside the infinite relationship and

ativity aspect, joyful in its activity, must in the end

therein to be conditioned and determined by the total rela-

despair over the transitory nature of the "created."

tionship is to determine oneself.

ambiguity of existence is what the Japanese call "~ ££

Our karma appears at one

This

and the same time to have a free and a fatal character.

~~~ (the pathos of t:hings); it is the point where desire

Our free "will" chooses and rejects but is, by that choosing

and joy are one with the sadness felt over the transitori-

and rejecting "attached" to the object of choosing and re-

ness of things.

jecting.

being of man, as something that is while going into relations

I1asao Abe suggests in this connection that, "we are

bound by our own karma which shares in and is inseparably 31 Ibid., p. 46. 32 Hisamatsu elaborates on the "freedom" and "creative" nature of Oriental Nothingness in his "positive delineation" of its characteristics. Cf , his, "The Characteristics of Oriental Nothingness," pp. 91-97.

". . • it signifies the point where the

with things inside time, comes to self-awareness under the aspect of infinity, whereby then the essence of all things, 33

"Buddhist Nirvana: Its Significance in Contemporary Thought and Life," S. J. Samartha, ed. , Living Faiths and Ultimate Goals: Salvation and World Religions (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1974), pp. 20-21.

265

the quintessence of being-in-the-world as such, is esthetically felt to the quick." 34 Our present activities real-

266

their

"home-gro~.md"

is attached to ones own "home-ground."

ize themselves at one with each other in their "freedom

This self-centeredness makes itself the axis mundi, the center of the world. 36 Nishitani has also referred to this

of working" and "fata" character.

as abysmal solitude because in the horizon of a very deep

in-itself-ness comes to

This infinite shut-up-

se~f-awareness

the abyss of nihilum, at one with it. centeredness is avidya.

as standing out over

communication with all others (as axis mundi) it is shut up

This infinite self-

in itself.

It cannot, in the karmic activity

of the self, go back to the self-itself; it can only go back to the home-ground of the karmic-activity.

It con-

tinually goes in that direction but can only establish itself in the world of time without beginning or end, i.e., as becoming.

"To wander endlessl1 all over time, while

looking for the home-ground of the self itself--that is the true image of our activity, of our being in 'time,' of our life." 35 This is "karma without beginning into eternal future."

This despair is what Kierkegaard called "sickness

unto death."

:be self-centeredness existing at one with

nihilum, the root of "being" at one with "nothingness," lies directly beneath human existence but the "human" form of existence is dropped here. form."

The

gro~.md

of

e..~i::

This is the thi::-d world of "no-

:-":1=e as man it11piies a point be-

yond our determination as man.

In the ground of our self-

centeredness, the "being" of all things is gathered into one, 34Keiji Nishitani, "Emptiness and History," p. 46. 35 Ibid.

I

p. 49.

Nishitani refers to this condition also as

original sin, a sin equally original as man's free activity and existence.

The appearance of this original sin is the

freedom character of karma which is attached and therefore "fatally" free. In Chapter IV ("The Standpoint of Sunyata") Nishitani treated the relationship of the circuminsessional interpenetration of all things in the field of emptiness and called "nature" the force that gathers all things and makes them relate.

In this context, "nature" in karma can be con-

ceived as the original force at work when the self makes all things relate while gathering them in this relationship. 37 36 This should not be confused with Eliade's category of the "Sacred" wherein the axis mundi is the center of, but not a part of, the "profane.-"'--37This, I think is what Satomi Takahashi means when he says that, "Nature • . • is not only the mere factor of human existence . • • although partially the former can be the moment of the latter. Nevertheless, under the stratum of historical being in a wide sense, including the history of nature, must be considered another stratum of being, like the primary matter (materia prima), which is carrying the historical on itself. It can somehow be called 'field" where the history takes place, and it remains itself unchanged and accordin*ly must be regarded as unhistorical." "Historical Actuality,' Philosophical Studies of Japan, Vol. II (1960), p. 17.

267

268

The expressions "non-ego" and "body and mind fall away" IV.

express the standpoint of emptiness in which self-centered-

The "infinite impulse" of Modern Man

The point of Nishitani's discussion of karma has, of

ness is radically negated.

There isn't even any high-level

course, a direct bearing on the world of history and man's

self-centeredness such as is found in the religious self-

life in that world.

consciousness of being among God's elect.

The activity of karma is within that

The standpoint

world and particularly poignantly fits man's modern secu-

negates absolutely all "will" which stands at the base of

larized life.

all self-centeredness, and is at the base of all western

The anthropocentric mode of being is espe-

cially descriptive of modern man's secularized life in that

conceptions of time and history.

its essential characteristic is what Nishitani has called

impulse is found in the idea of karma.

the "infinite impulsiveness" or "self-will."

emptiness radically negates all "will" standpoints.

The concept

In the East, this infinite The standpoint of It is

not simply that tlt.: · self is shown not to be the self; this

of karma clarifies that mode of being. This standpoint, that of karma, must be dropped in the

point of view was held and transcended by many thinkers.

end because it only reveals its own home-ground as karmic

Nietzsche went beyond this to the will to power as the true

activity and does not finally and completely reveal the self

self, Schopenhauer to the will to life, Asian thought to

itself.

karma as the "in-itself" of the self, western mysticism to

There is necessitated a tum-about or conversion

to the standpoint of nirvana or sunyata, and further to the

the unio mystica where the self is united with God or the

standpoint of samsara=nirvana or samsara=sunyata.

One, Indian thought to the

It is

~

tvam asi of Brahman-Atman.

Nishitani's opinion that "the standpoint of emptiness of

The standpoint of the true ncn-ego manifests itself only in

Buddhism, especially Mahayana Buddhism lies finally halfway

the radical reversal of these positions, and is found in

between the religions with a cyclical worldview wherein,

the existential self-awareness whereby the self is realized

according to Toynbee, history disappea:s (in his classifica-

(actualized and comprehended) as emergence from non-ego.

tion Buddhism would belong to this group), and the Judaeo-

Many of the same things Nishitani said of karmic life

Christian religions, wherein the sense of history is fully

he will also affirm of life in the standpoint of emptiness

present, but self-centeredness is never fully avoided; .. 38 Buddhism is different than either point of view.

though they are done from a different perspective.

38

Here

life also exists in ceaselessly doing something; here also life in its "being" takes the form of ceaseless "becoming."

Keij i Nishitani, 'Emptiness and History," p . 55.

270

269

But here the aspect of paying off and creating debts is no

exteriorly, causally determined debt.

longer.

"in accordance with Dharma and following nature'' point of

Existence is no longer a burden.

Our activity

does not arise out of ignorance (avidya), the home-ground of the infinite impulse. field of nihilum.

It is no longer karma on the

Here Dagen's phrase is again apt, viz.,

This is the Buddhist

view. Our actual existence is a focal point, realizing itself over and over again at every moment in time; a focal

that "the everyday life whereby our eyes are horizontal and

point of the total world relationship and fatally united

our nose vertical is, as such, coming back home with empty

with it.

hands and, for a time, just living on while leaving things in the hands of the gods. " 39

ment, i.e., the freedom determined by its own products in

Our life on the field of emptiness takes on a "play" character.

This is not ordinary play which is usually con-

ceived as some form of recreation, sport, etc.

It is opposed

Our doing has the freedom confined only by attach-

karmic causal necessity but free, at the same time, with the arbitrary freedom that focuses the total relationship into the center of the self.

This kind of being-determined in a

world relationship is, of course, self-determination.

On

to the "work" we have been describing above, the indebted-

the standpoint of karma, "this self-determination is essen-

ness, the burdened

tially an infinite impulse which arises from a self-centered

cha~acter

of existence.

Both work and

play in their "yonder-side" and "this-side" meanings are

foundation, and something that realizes itself under the

referred to as "play samadhi" (yugi-sanunai).

'will-ful' form o£ attachcent and domination; and being-

The samskrta

"become" (our existence, behaviour, and life) continues to

determined means being 'fatally' conditicned with causal necessity in the total relationship." 40 The free activity

be samskrta but shows a "non-doing" character, a "birds-in-

of the will is one of attachment and domination in its rela-

the-air, lilies-in-the-field" look.

tion with things; its karma is its "fatal" determination.

we discussed as the dynamic relationship of "be"-"do"-

The spontaneity of do-

ing, being, living, etc. is a freely shouldered burden and

The source of this karma is avidya, the infinite shut-up-in-

is the standpoint of samadhi and its no-mind.

The self

itself-ness of the will.

emerging out of non-self is true spontaneity.

Here the debt

awareness only at one with nihilum.

assumes the meaning of an authentic responsibility freely taken up by the self.

This is a debtless debt, not some

39 Paraphrased by Nishitani, ibid., p. 58.

Each of these things comes to self-

Avidya comes to awareness as the ground of the self that cannot rid itself of itself; a self in the constantly be40Ibid.' p • 64.

271

coming state of "be"-"do"-"become."

There are two realities

272

scends to a point beyond self-centeredness.

Here our

in avidya that come into being simultaneously: the "self

"being"-" doing"- "becoming" take on a "non-being"- "non-

is forever itself and emerges as a self-centered 'being'";

doing"-"non-becoming" character.

and, also in avidya, "nihilum manifests itself while cease41 lessly an-nihil-ating the 'being' of the self." Avidya,

nature,' it is neither substance as noumenon nor subject ,43 as will; it is 'in-itself' It is of the nature of

as the well-spring of karma, comes to self-awareness only

fire that it does not burn itself, where time is not time

in nihilum, in which it has its ground.

and hence is time.

In karma, then, our being is condemned forever to make

"Here, 'being' is 'no-own-

Our actual existence in this kind of

dynamic relationship is "anti- the tically" one with the world-

relations with something and is thus burdensome to itself;

relationship.

our doing is both the redemption of that burden and con-

have pointed to such a standpoint in which the self exists

tinually creates a new burden.

as "play."

this fact: " •

There are two aspects of

our 'be' vanishes and arises instantane-

Nishitani suggests that western thinkers

Heraclitus and Nietzsche, for example, in their

cyclical world views saw such a play character.

The life

ously in every new moment; the nihilum which continuously

of the universe permeated their actual existence in such a

an-nihil-ates our being manifests itself here," and, " ••

way that they saw life leaping forth from its depths, its

in the same point, • . • there appears something that urges

home-grounci, just as fire erupts from the depths of the

us on infinitely from within.

earth.

In that infinite impulse,

Nishitani suggests that Heraclitus' "original fire"

our actual existence is perpetually unable to escape its own

and Nietzsche's "Will to Power" arise from such an intui-

home-ground." 42

tion.

Karma, then, is the condition in which the

They saw therein

homo ludens (playing man) as the

self cannot escape itself and yEt is perpetually changing.

highest mode of being of man.

Our actual existence is continually establishing itself in

same time, original seriousness.

the emergence from nihilum to avidya.

the debtless debt, freely shouldered.

This karmic field is

This original play is, at the It is the spontaneity of Any work which is done

the point from which the true self emerges onto the field of

apart from this standpoint is disparate, "scattering one's

emptiness.

mind."

On

this field the self as relation loses its de-

pendence upon attachment and arbitrary free will and tran-

41 Ibid., pp. 65, 66. 42

Ibid.

The bodhisattva is a paradigm for authentic work-

play, having moved from "fatal" work to "vocational" work; here actual existence is taken up freely as one's vocation. 43Ibid. , p. 66.

273

274

As we have shown, this debtless debt in actual existence ap-

less time.

pears as shouldering a debt to our "neighbors," to "other

transcendence, our actual existence stands on the "begin-

things."

ning" (a "before" absolutely anterior to time as process)

This task-character of authentic existence is

Second, in the field of emptiness as absolute

other-centered (but not toward some other in an objective

and on the "end" (posterior to the "future" of any infinite

sense).

process) of time; it transcends the "three worlds"; it is

We must remember, however, that this direction-to-

eternal.

others is only one side of the circuminsessional interpenetration.

Its counterpart is that our actual existence

This aspect, however, is only realized at one with

the first aspect.

Third (and therefore) every moment of "time" is a monad of eternity. 44 Every time-point of the

gathers all things in its own "home- ground" and is "lord

past and future is contemporary with the present.

everywhere" as the "absolute center of all things."

nal present is the place wherein is reflected all pasts and

This is

The eter-

the "like-law" character we discussed in the last chapter.

futures.

This true self-centeredness is the self realizing (actual-

present moment.

izing and comprehending) itself "like-reality" itself.

the present but is also the place of all past and future mo-

This

The past and future can only come into time as the In this way the present remains radically

is Dagen's "acknowledging"; it is also the recognition that

ments.

This does not abolish the order of events, "past"

"the birth-death cycle is, as such, the life of the Buddha"

and "future," but is the place of their possibility of re-

in the "body and mind fall away; the fallen away is body and

alization.

mind" existence.

that not only all past and future occurrences, but even

In Yogacara Buddhist terminology we might say

the possibilia V.

Aspects of Time

that did not occur, are contained in the

"storehouse" or "store-consciousness" of the present.

The field of emptiness, realized as a dynamic relation-

"The

field of reality as circuminsessional interpenetration, in

ship (time, as discussed earlier, as "be"-"do"-"become") at

its capacity of field of emptiness, is a field including,

one with the infinite world-relationship, permits the con-

at the same time, an infinite indetermination or an inex-

sideration of time and our actual existence under three as-

haustible possibility.

pects.

First, it has a task-character, it is a "samskrta"

existence that becomes in the world.

It arises and vanishes

instantaneously and simultaneously in beginningless and end-

It is the place of the so-called

44 Nishitani has used the term "monad" of eternity rather than Kiekegaard's "atom" of eternity since the latter implies something fundamental, a discrete part of, but not the entirety of eternity.

275 'inexhaustible storehouse inside the no-thing.' " 45

can see that the first and second aspects are conceptual

The first aspect is, of course, our everyday way of thinking of time without beginning or end and irreversible.

276

This

opposites; the first positing an infinite linearity and each moment as new, the second positing cyclical time and

infinity is the projection within "time" of the infinite

no newness at all in the present.

aperture which opens directly beneath our activities in the

represented by the ancients in mythological terms as life

present.

within pantheistic nature, et~rnally renewing itself, and

This "doing" based on this aperture, continuously

This second aspect is

an ··r:.ihil·ates being and at the same time createo "new"

in modern times by the action of the will on the field of

being (this is being as becoming).

atheistic nihilum.

All being is thus con-

In neither is there a notion of the

tinuously new and each instantaneous "becoming" is for one

"moment" wherein eternity authenticates time as history;

time only and thus is irreversible.

both views de-historicize time.

" • . . the 'newness'

and 'once-ness' (Einmaligkeit) in the present are essential moments of the historicity of 'time.'" 46 In everyday time

ness; only when time has the simultaneity of now and eter-

and actual existence we conceptually abstract these moments

nity, the moment and all moments, can a true image of time

and acts out of their real standpoint and come to the idea

and actual existence open up.

of a "progress" or progression through time from past to

ment" of original sin opens up the beginning of history.

future; this is the view of modern secularism.

In our direction-to-others we participate in the simultaneity

This point

These two aspects must be seen in their interconnected-

For Christianity, the " mo-

of view is, of course, blind to the aperture of the infinite

of this sin.

which makes possible such a representation.

call a "perspectival" view of time.

Nihilum, which

Christianity presents us with what we might From the side of man

is how the aperture is "represented" to us, makes us aware

time is historical (this is time in its first aspect) with

of the second aspect of time and actual existence, that it

a seemingly endless past and future and all events are new

is transcendent as the horizon of eternity.

in every moment.

Here we ab-

In order to handle the despair this cre-

stract time out of its proper standpoint into a cyclical

ates for man, a new view or perspective was thought to be

view of history.

necessary which may be said to be God's perspective which

The eternal appears represenced as nihilum

to which all things return and wherein nothing is new.

We

sees the totality of time in the present moment.

As we have

discussed earlier, this problem is never really resolved. 45Ibid., p. 84. 46 Ibid. p. 85. I

Time is considered to be radically historical (man's view)

277

278

and yet history is seen to have a beginning and an end (God's

beings to save them and elevating oneself by aiming at the

view).

attainment of enlightenment.

Secularism and nihilism were, as we have seen, only

partially successful responses to this problem.

The Bud-

These are interdependent and

inseparable dimensions of actual existence.

In this con-

dhist karma concept, like secularism, considers time to be

text all practice is "religious practice," free and unhindered.

without beginning or end and irreversible, but, like nihil-

In the standpoint of

ism, posits a nihilum at its base as an infinite aperture.

historical samskrta, ever new, occurring only once here and

The standpoint of emptiness, then, is the about-face from

now; and also absolutely transcends time and world.

that standpoint of karma, wherein the moment is the syn-

actual existence, "as historical samskrta in the present,

thesis of time and eternity where all points of past and

emerges, as it were, with an historicity that has its roots

future are simultaneously "kept" in the present of our act-

in the field of emptiness, while being radically finite in

ual existence.

every here-and-now moment, is also radically eternal and, thus, truly infinite. " 48

Here all past and future things are stored

in the ground of the present and become the liability and task of actual existence as a debtless debt.

e~ptiness,

all practice is the work of

Our

Nishitani interprets Christianity as recognizing cer-

The original image of that actual e:dstence is best

tain privileged moments: the moment that God created the

represented, according to Nishitani (drawing once again up-

world, the moment that Adam committed his sin, the moments

on Buddhism), by what is called "the four great vows of

of Christ's birth and resurrection, Christ's second advent,

Boddhisattvahood":

and perhaps the moment when the self converts in faith.

"However innumerable sentient beings

are, I vow to take them across; however inexhaustible the

These moments parallel the Bodhisattva Path as grave and

passions are, I vow to extinguish them; however, limitless

solemn moments in time.

the dharmas are, I vow to study them; however infinitely lofty the Buddha Path is, I vow to achieve it. " 47 This is

point of emptiness all moments of infinite time possess

the limitless nature of actual existence.

moments.

The first vow is

the direction-to-others and the second through fourth vows are the direction-to-itself side of actual existence.

Bud-

dhism described this as descending to the level of sentient 47 cited by Nishitani, ibid., p. 90.

But for Buddhism, from the stand-

this gravity, not just certain paradigmatic or archetypal Every moment is the realization of the gravity of

the present as a monad of eternity and "thereby brings the gravity of all 'time' to true gravity. " 49 For Nishitani, herein lies an original view of history. 48Ibid. 49Ibid.

I

p. 92.

280

279

Each of the aspects of time and actual existence is re-

point as the negation of the "an end in itself" character

flected in it.

of the self.

The "illusion aspect" (radical finitude),

This is not merely the self-denial entailed

the "emptiness aspect" (radical infinitude) and the "mid-

in the will defeating the inclinations of the passions and

dle aspect" (actual existence); these three constitute one

following the categorical imperative of practical reason.

actual existence which, while entering and leaving these

Love or Compassion is more than coincidence with some moral

aspects can show its totality in each of them.

code, more than choosing one of two antagonistic actional

This is the

freedom and self-sufficiency of actual existence. VI.

directions.

self-direction, the establishment of personhood.

Religious Practice: Compassion

In his practical philosophy, Kant emphasized the Person as an end in itself, never to be treated as a means.

Per-

son is the unifying point of the true freedom of the individual and the universal law of morality.

Such self-denial as ethics implies is mere

This point is the

The aspect

of the standpoint of emptiness wherein one throws out the self is religious, it is absolute self-negation. This love is also more than the fraternal love which exists in the "realm of ends" where other persons are recog-

individual behaving subject and the purpose realized by the

nized as ends in themselves.

behavior.

tween persons is not religious "love of ones neighbor."

Nishitani maintains that this is the deepest ex-

This respect and affection be-

pression of the subjective self-awareness of modern man.

Just as Nishitani insisted in examining Kant's epistemology

Ethics is thus seen to reach its peak when the person is an

on a higher plane (the knowledge of no-knowledge) so it must

end in itself and the community of such persons is the

be on the level of behavior that there is a radical about-

"realm of ends."

As we might imagine, however, Nishitani

is not content with this standpoint; it does not exhaust the subject of ethical behavior.

He suggests that the so-

called self-sufficient subject stands on a still more fundamental field.

The basis of the existence of such a s :.Jbject

does not reside in the subject itself.

The ethical stand-

point is incapable of going further; the Kantian observation is the end of the ethical road.

From Nishitani's point

of view, what religion refers to as Love (agape) or Compassion (jihi, karuna) breaks through the merely ethical stand-

face from the standpoint where the self as a person is its own end, to the standpoint where the self is a means for all other things.

The ".:md" which the self must reach must be

discovered in other things where it enters into their own home-ground.

" • . • , the self as person, the total reality

as such of the self-itself (and this includes even the self's reason and will) has to become a 'thing' for the others. This is potisible on the field of emptiness as absolute thisside."50

so~ .. p. 98.

281

For the ethical, behaving subject just like the know-

282 is exactly the "like" of "like-reality."

This field is the

ing subject, the self as "subject" is the self-"itself" pro-

field of transcendence of existence and the foundation of

j ected onto the field of reason.

the possibility of the world and the "in-itself" existence

This practical projection

is the most intimate projection possible but it lacks the

of things.

unity of the self-other of the standpoint of emptiness in

"Therefore, the standpoint of loving one's neighbour as one-

which there is a master-subordinate relationship.

self, the standpoint of seeing oneself in the others, is the

Joshn

As a field it is essentially prior to existence.

was called "stone-bridge Joshu" because he was destined (in

self's being in the home-ground of the other~ in the 'nothing-

his words) "to carry across donkeys and horses."

ness' of the self and, at the same time, the ?thers' being

It is a

standpoint where one can "lie under the feet of donkeys, horses, and inquisitive people."

neither the freedom (mas-

in the home-ground of the self in that same 'nothingness' 51 of the sel£." Whereas in Christianity such love is re-

ter) nor necessity (subordinate) perspective adequately de-

served solely for human beings, for Buddhism and for Nishi-

scribes the standpoint of religious love and religious

tani it has to be a field of love of all living beings and

practice.

even of love of all "things."

Only in the circuminsessional interpenetration,

Man is more than merely hu-

the doing of not-doing, can we speak properly of Love and

man in the field or standpoint of subjectum or hupokeimenon.

Compassion.

This is not the "matter" of modern science but the fact of

The command to "love ones neighbor as oneself"

tim~

must not be naively and superficially understood to be one

being itself without form and at one and the same

of quantity or degree; it cuts right to the heart of the

stituting the base of all things that have a form.

quality of the standpoint of the self as such.

more than the limit of things in the direction of the death

Comparison

con-

It is

with others is irrelevant where love consists in the abso-

of things.

lute negation of self-love.

is a reduction of the "matter" of the traditional metaphysics

Traditional metaphysics distinguished a form and a sub-

We might say that the "matter" of modern science

whereas the "matter" of religious love is its absolutiza-

stratum (hupokeimenon) or matter which received the form.

tion in affirmation-sive-negation.

It is this field or substratum that makes possible the love

of things in the direction of the Great Death of the self.

of ones neighbor as oneself; it appears only when the self

·~ ere

is made nothingness.

sciousness, personality, attains the position of a 'thing,'

The world in its suchness opens up

only in the "as itself" of such religious love.

This "as"

The latter is the limit

the self, in the act itself of possessing a body, con-

51

rbid., p. 105.

283

284

In

as the life of the Buddha." and his interpretation of this

other words, without ceasing to be a human being, the self

as the realization (achievement-comprehension) of the mind

stands on the field of the mode of being that has freed itself of human nature." 52

of the Tathagata.

of 'matter'; it gets into the role of an 'instrument.'

Nishitani has spoken frequently of "doing" as taking

He relies especially heavily upon the

Buddhist doctrines of anatman, anicca, dukkha, avidya, and karma as well as samsara, nirvana and sunyata.

He has, of

on the character of "religious practice," especially in con-

course, continually interpreted these in terms of western

nection with his discussion of practicing

thought as well.

ticing the way of Buddha.

~

and prac-

He does not mean that the original

Christian thought is often paralleled

with Pure Land thought and the compassionate Christ often

face shows itself exclusively in the practice of Buddhism

seen paralleled to the Bodhisattva.

or the Buddhist "religion."

easy to understand Nishitani's use of such remarks as

This would be to fall immedi-

In this context it is

ately into the pitfall of what he considers the fundamental

Degen's "Before it crosses to the beyond, the self take ..

shortcoming of much of the Judeo-Christian tradition--its

across all the others," and Kiyozawa Manshi's "The self is

exclusivism.

nothing other than a being that trusts itself without re-

such

There are, obviously, many interpretations of

doct~ines

of karma within Buddhism itself.

Nishitani

serve to the absolutely infinite wonderful working, and with -

makes the explicit claim to take no particular religion or

out its own interference leaving all things to the Law,

philosophy as a basis for his though~53

dwells in this visible world while dropping it," or Shin-

His aim has been

and is an investigation of the original image of reality

ran's "One who lives in the faith is called equal to the

and of man.

Tathagata.

anti-philosophical standpoints, e.g., Nietzsche and secular

A mind of Great Faith is Buddha-Nature and Buddha-Nature is Tathagata." 54 Here Nishitani is affirming

scientism.

the variety of expressions of "religious practice" wherein

He includes, therefore, anti-religious and

He does admit, however, that in Buddhism, and

especially in Zen Buddhism, this original image is very,

invoking the name of Amida is religious practice of the

perhaps most, clearly set forth.

original self but is not merely the diligence of the prac-

This is evident in his reliance on ideas derived from Buddhism and Zen, e.g .• Degen's "to acknowledge birth-death 52 rbid., p. 106. 53 For example, ibid., p. 73.

titioner; it is unhindered "play."

He is affirming in all

these contexts the "task-character" of our actual existence. Both the direction-to-itself and the direction-to-others is 54

rbid., p. 74, 75,

285

here affirmed.

Dogen's remark represents the direction-to-

286

beings is the essence of Buddhism as a religion. 56

Even in

others in the same sense that Rinzai's "If you meet a Bud-

Christianity there is St. Francis of Assisi who called all

dha, kill him; if you meet a patriarch, kill him; if you

things "brother" and "sister."

meet a sage, kill him; if you meet your father and mother,

speech as Nishitani reads St. Francis, they are the way St.

slay them; if you meet your relatives, slay them.

Francis encountered these things in actual existence.

then you shall obtain liberation.

Only

This is the nobility of

These are not figures of

The Aristotelian contemplative life represents only one side of the highest standpoint of all; it represents the

dwelling in oneself, transparent and free, without dependence on persons or things," 55 represents the direction-to-

practice of an abstraction: God as "thinking of thinking."

itself.

". . . as soon as thinking tries to make explicit the latent

The field of itself and others opens up in actual

existence. ing itself.

Becoming aware of that field is the self trustThe true self becomes centered in the about

ontological factors, ontology becomes theological instead

face from nihilum to the field of emptiness, from the field

of philosophical, and theology itself tends to become a dogmatics that wants to exclude philosophy altogether." 57 This

of karma to the field of non-ego.

is an exclusivistic form of perfection and self-sufficiency.

This is the "killing" of

the self in the sense of "If you meet the Buddha, kill him."

For Nishitani, perfection "should include the field where

It is the opening up of the Right Path.

When viewed from

infinitely unfinished and imperfect things and, moreover,

this standpoint, Nishitani maintains, the "original play"

'anti-perfect' things like sin and karma are brought into

of Heraclitus and Nietzsche can hardly be maintained to have

being in all their possibility and actuality. ,SS

reached the true standpoint.

fection

It does not contain the other-

True per-

lies in the unity of Aristotelian "perfection"

centeredness whereby the self becomes emptied of itself.

and its infinite opposites.

Theirs retains the "will" standpoint.

"emptying" oneself and thus bringing all thir,gs to be. This

The oneself in "as oneself" is a self absolutely brought to

"nothingness."

The field of religious Love or Compas-

sion is more than a field for the love of ones neighbor only. That Buddhism extends religious compassion to all living

55 cited by Nishitani, ibid., p. 76.

True self-sufficiency is

56 It is this all-inclusiveness that highlights the limits of Buber' s category of "I-Thou" which is a category reserved to human beings. As Nishitani says, "With regard to a human being, the dimension out of which a 'thou' confronts an 'I' is completely erased." 57Nishitani Keiji, "Ontology and Utterance," p. 12. A paper delivered at the Fourth International Consultation on Hermeneutics, October 2, 1970, Syracuse University. 58 Nishitani Keiji, "Emptiness and History," p. 109.

287

288

is the implication of the shift from Hinayana Buddhism to

the direction of life.

Mahayana Buddhism.

of "Great Death."

A modern commentator may be understood

As we said, it takes the direction

In accordance with the Buddhist expres-

as describing both this shift and Nishitani's method (and

sion, "In Great Death heaven and earth are new for the first

its limits) in his observation that: "The negative dialec-

time," we have here a world beyond mechanism (modern sci-

tic does not lead to the understanding of the Ultimate Truth

ence) and teleology (metaphysics).

but prepares the ground for the true insight to be gained

prompt Nishitani to say, "Man's thinking seems .

through concentration.

become optimistic enough to find a positive meaning in its

Prajna transcends reason and can

Their limits are what to have

only, if imperfectly, be described as a mystical intuition

own restlessness--which is now called progress--by expelling

which sees by way of not seeing (adarsanayogena),

every kind of metaphysics, it has enhanced the physical to

From a

philosophical point of view the Madhyamika system is the

the point that even man's being comes to be located therein.

culmination of a basic tendency in Buddhism which consists

Th1Js, finally, metaphysics itself has begun • • . to find

in the emptying of ontological categories • • . • The Ulti-

in process itself the ultimate meaning as reality." 60

mate Truth cannot be described with words or concepts but

is the world of original reality in which all things are

the insight gained in concentration, enables the Yogin to

truly "like" (such).

use his dialectical reason on the plane of samvrti in order

of the Great Death, is also the field of the resurrection

to demonstrate the unsubstantiality of all dharmas, Nirvana

of the self.

included ... sg

Here the field of emptiness, the field

In the circuminsessional relationship we have the radi-

Are these standpoints of love and compassion related to a worldview?

It

Nishitani represents modern science and

traditional metaphysics as concerned with "matter" direction of death.

in the

Traditional metaphysics, however, made

calization of two perfectly contradictory standpoints being made perfectly one.

The true freedom realized here is not

simply a matter of freedom of will; this is merely the field of self-consciousness.

In-itself freedom is not the liber-

form the center of its worldview and its teleological focus

tine freedom of subjectivity.

turned in the direction of form as life, the self-preserva-

equal human rights and possessions, the self-centered mode

tion of things.

I~

the standpoint of emptiness, however,

there is neither focus upon the direction of death nor upon 59 J. W. DeJong, "Emptiness," Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 2 (1972), p. 14.

Likewise true equality is not

of being in desires and passions. 60

Nishitani Keiji, "Ont0logy and Utterance," p. 3.

289

True freedom, . . • is absolute self-rule as 'having nothing to rely on' in the field of emptiness • • • . True equality, . • . is an equality that exists, so to speak, in an exchange of absolute inequality in a reciprocity wherein the self and the other stand, at the same time, in the position of a lord and of a servant with regard to each other; it is an equality in love.6l

CONCLUSIONS

What then, finally, are we to make of Nishitani's understanding of Religion?

What, if any, are the possible impli-

cations for Buddhism, or even more pertinently, for modern man whose situation Nishitani shares and to whom he directs his remarks?

On the one hand it seems safe to say that Nishi-

tani is not merely an apologist for the Buddhist tradition since he makes no

stra~ghtforward

attempt to explicate in any

systematic way the doctrines of Buddhism.

On the other hand

it is clear that he is immensely indebted to Buddhism in that he makes use of the explication of particular doctrines or key concepts such as samsara, karma, sunyata, etc. in his probing of the question "What is Religion?"

We have not

chosen to analyze his indebtedness and relation to other, more contemporary Buddhist, particularly Japanese Buddhist, thinkers because we have wanted to examine Nishitani's work on one subject only--that of religion--in the larger context of the comparative study of religion.

He may profitably be

seen as a bridge between, on the one hand, the traditional western formulations of the nature of human existence and their failure to alleviate the suffering of modern man, and on the other, the insights gained from an examination of traditional Buddhist formulations.

He attempts to speak to

modern man wherever he may be found by pointing out the weak61 Nishitani Keiji, "Emptiness and History," p. 114.

292

291

nesses of various notions central to Christianity such as its

dhist doctrine under two rubrics.

treatment of God in personal terms and its elevation of his-

realm of cognition he asks how does one know.

tory to almost ontological status by

he focuses upon mythical, intuitive and scientific modes of

showi~g

the limits of

In the epistemological In this light

scientific thought in its failure to integrate its insights

apprehension, shows the inherent limits of each and offers

into the nature of substance with the suffering condition of

the negative dialectic of Buddhist teaching about Emptiness

the scientist, and by showing that though Nietzsche was aware

in their place.

of and pointed out the limits of the Christian and =ational

sciousness he attempts to set forth levels of Reality, fields

scientific understandings he was not able to provide a reso-

or places whereon Reality may be encountered.

lution to man's problems which was not itself caught up in

epistemological tool of the negative dialectic he shows the

the subject-object duality.

limits of sense perception and consciousness as inadequate to

One might well ask how pointing

In the ontological realm of thought and con-

Using the

out the weaknesses of other systems of thought can be any

the realization of Reality and posits the place of Emptiness

help in itself.

as the place of the Real--a place to be

Indeed Nishitani is suggesting that the des-

~ncountered

in every-

pair of western man generally has not been deep enough and

day existence.

that he suffers from a misplaced confidence.

quirer, no lonser a conscious, sensuous ego but as a True

Like Descartes

The realization of Emptiness throws the in-

he has doubted but he has substituted for his early belief

Self, back into the world of samsara.

in the reality of objective existence an uncritical and sup-

samsara that is no longer felt as a logical contradiction

posedly indubitable trust in subjectivity.

subject to conscience and certainty.

From Descartes

= nirvana.

it is, however, a

Rather it is the sam-

through Kierkegaard and the Existentialists man has continued

sara of samsara

to cling to his self-centered, his ego-centric, mode of per-

signifies Nishitani's concern for humanity generally.

ception.

this that makes the Boddhisattva the paradigm, however

Nishitiani's program, like that of traditional Bud-

It is this latter project which

emptied of essence and substance, for Nishitani's enterprise.

dhism, is to point out the inadequacy of that understanding of the self.

Let us recapitulate briefly how this takes place and

What kind of enterprise, then, is that of Nishitani?

It

indicate how Nishitani's thought contributes to the unde=gen~rally

is, in hjs examination of religion, an attempt to realize Re-

standing of mankind

ality via a consideration of the fundamental question "What

to modern Japan more specifically.

is Religion?"

It is

He does this by a careful examination of Bud-

and is, therefore, not confined

As we have suggested, Nishitani's choice of the question

293

294

~·

awareness and that oi which we are aware,

"What is Religion?" is not an indication of an attempt to

Noesis and

define or delimit a field of study or academic preoccupation.

knower and known must always be understood (comprehended)

He is posing the most fundamental of questions--a problem

in relation to one another.

vital to life itself.

is to make explicit the hidden.

Its necessity as a problem of human

Nishitani's task at this level This is the first layer of

life lies in its causing us to return to the source of life,

his criticism.

"where life is something beyond function or utility, that

ing and the nihilum and is his way of positing himself toward

is, where our usual way of life is surpassed and \vhere our

that experience.

ordinary mode of being is broken-through ... l

sciousness.

It is an in-

It is generated by his experience of suffer-

It is his activity at the level of con-

He seizes upon crises from his own experience

tensely personal question and cannot be understood from out-

and the experiences of others (e.g. Descartes, Echart, Nie-

side, i.e., it cannot be conceptually understood in terms of

tzsche, etc.) in the history of man; analyzes them in terms

an objective answer to a subjective question.

of their seriousness and makes his radical critique of their

The resolution to the problem as he poses it is immediately before us but is not a static "solution" as such.

It

proposed resolutions.

He judges them in terms not only of

their internal consistency--indeed this is secondary --but

cannot be reified in terms of archetypes or paradigms of re-

in terms of how adequately they perceive the fundamental prob-

ligious experience or revelations of religious truth.

lem of man and how adequate are their answers to this problem.

Man's

fundamental problem is a form of ego-inebriation, the con-

He is in this sense always engaged in the normative enter-

sciousness of one's own-being as permanent in a world of

prises.

change.

For Nishitani, this fundamental avidya must be ex-

Taken as a whole, Nishitani's work on religion does two

tinguished in favor of self-awareness which transcends this

things minimally.

ego-centric, conscious field.

e.g., that the nature of life is suffering, that the teleo-

Our ego-centric awareness,

It asserts certain things to be the case,

whether we describe it in terms of belief, emotions, or any

logical and scientific worldviews are inadequate, etc.

other aspect of consciousness and experience, encounters the

at the same time, communicative.

world and formulates its ordinary awareness in terms of dual-

are, in the realm of language, both false and necessary, must

ity.

be considered in light of how they point beyond the particu-

For Nishitani, in common with other philosophers, there

It is,

Its arguments, since they

must always be a fundamental or essential correlation between

lars of the argument.

the two poles of each duality at the level of consciousness.

the epistemological enterprise and even ontological claims

1Keiji Nishitani, ''vrnat is Religion?", p. 22.

For Nishitani, the True and the False,

296

295

operate at different levels depending upon the status of the inquirer.

In accord with earlier Buddhist thought, there is

Furthermore, re-

religious experience or, in the case of Nishitani, of underThis negative dialectic has

its base in the !:\-TO-level theory of truth of Nagarj una.

Con-

ventional truth (samvriti) is the level of category mistakes s~ch

as the reification of categories and symbols, and of

conceptual distortions such as the permanence of the self which produce suffering and existential illusion.

On the

other hand, the highest truth (paramartha), though it is trans-conceptual (sunya), cannot be reached without using conventional truth as a ladder,

Thus Nishitani's effort can be

seen in this light as having that communicative--perhaps even soteriological--function whereby the whole of the enterprise, while being false and limited by its conceptual apparatus, is an indicator of a truth beyond

:hc~c

limits.

In this way

emptiness (sunyata) is the key term in Nishitani's thought just as it was in Nagarjuna's.

It functions, like Nishitani's

larger enterprise, as a reflexive term, a self-describer which refers to no simply empirical reality without our experience of space and time.

Nishitani does not con-

He is only concerned to point out the falsity (along with

We have used the phrase

"negative dialectics" to distinguish a method of apprehending

standing the nature of Reality.

failed to realize their True Self.

sider the normative enterprise to be equivalent to this.

ality must be realized (in the sense of understood and actualized) at different levels.

of religion operates at the level of conventional truth. This is not the same as saying that all western men have

no substratum of being to which truth points or which is symbolized by words, myths, rituals, etc.

tani's view virtually all of western thought on the subject

It is easy to see then that in Nishi-

the necessity) of the contributions he analyzes, most notably those of Christianity and modern science.

Indeed it seems

safe to say that Nishitani would accept the likelihood of either view providing the stimulus for individuals transcending the particulars of either view (this would be their communicative function).

At the same time it is clear that he

does not think this as likely as might be made possible by Buddhism.

\vitness to this is the failure of either system

to minister to the needs of modern suffering humanity.

This

is, of course, Ni::ihitani 's own criticism and need not reflect the actual status of either Christianity or modern science, It is important, though, to note that Nishitani's criticism would apply to any system which takes Being as its metaphysical base and is not, therefore, a simply narrow-minded or parochial one. Further, it is even the case that Hishitani encourages the confrontation with the nihilum which Christianity and modern science also encounter.

He has, however, a somewhat

different notion of what constitutes modernity which is reminiscent of Vimalakirti's "taking form in response to the thing

297

298

Nishitani notes a shift in the fundamental spirit of

confronted" except that, whereas Vimalakirti considered this to be tied up inextricably with suffering, Uishitani relates

man from the religious spirit which was predominant in the

this to the situation of modern man and suggests it is the

wesc until the end of the medieval period, to the scientific

field of suffering itself.

mind of the discoverers of the modern period.

Modernity is the context within

Formerly all

which the fundamental problem is to be found and experienced

aspects of human existence were unified on the basis of the

but is not suffering itself.

religious perspective of all social, private and political

In fact, modernity is precisely

life.

the projection of the suffering self out over the abyss of nihilum into the Great Doubt.

Modernity is a

radica~

open-

The struggle began long before this time but received

its major impetus after the medieval period.

The struggle

ness to change; as the context of religion it is the willing-

appeared in the form of scientific efforts to explain and

ness to forsake old content (the reified paradigms and sym-

clarify so-called irrational elements of human life.

bols) and, as a kind of metaphysical revolution, provide a new

ion has been considered by science to be the source for error

language within which to realize the True Self.

and irrationality.

In this

sense, modernity functions too as a reflexive indicator.

It

is the domain of things and events in their everyday sense and can be understood by the enlightened as the contemporary

Relig-

Considered as mere myth, religion was

thought of as superstition

based on fantasy or illusion and

as pre-rational. From this point of view, all criticisms of religion

structure of life and death, i.e., as the samsara of nirvana

tend to appear anti-religious rather chan constructive.

samsara.

problem is inherent in the general tendency toward a

For Nishitani, then, religion involves ceasing to take

The

mechanized worldview which gradually comes to include the

for granted the seemingly unproblematic; questioning the

compartmentalizing, segmenting, reductionistic analysis of

formerly unquestioned.

every aspect of human existence.

It involves a resolution proportional

to the seriousness of the commitment.

Further, it takes place

Person-to-person relation-

ships do not lend themselves to such an analysis.

Nishitani

in a context to which it is correlative with different levels

regards as necessary an anarnesis or recollection of a view

of perception and difficulty.

based on life in an organically animated nature in its most

The contexts which Nishitani

has examined include those of Christianity, modernization,

pristine form; a return to the power of the root sources of

science and myth.

life itself.

Buddhism provides his own point of departure,

his own critical apparatus.

Nishitani proposes a return to the "fountain-

head of the present historical and cultural life, in other

300

299

words, to return to the mythical world as the genesis of

the scientist as a human being and the use of its methods by all human beings.

When the scientific rationalist "ac-

every culture, namely, as an origin from which every culture 2 came, as from the mother's womb. " This return does not

cepts the standpoint of science as his own 'personal' prob-

merely hark back to archaic time but recalls the beginnings

lem and tries to carry it out conscientiously, a great destruction and distress must necessarily happen inwardly." 4

of history in the "instant" of the intersection of eternity in the continuum of past and future, in the eternal now. The general developmental path of the world's religions, including Christianity, has also tended to be a process of gradually breaking down this position based on myth.

How-

ever, with the Cartesian dualistic and mechanistic consideration of the ego set against the natural world, the mythic understanding of the world was largely abandoned.

Conscious-

ness and its extensions were considered a more sophisticated and useful way of coming to grips with the world, or reality. The more sympathetic, psychic relationship, however, need

Man gets himself involved in destroying the ground for God, human nature and morality within himself.

course, actually accept science as a personal problem.

They

do not actually engage science "existentially" and tend to adopt a basic position similar to that of the atheist.

Con-

fident that science (and thus themselves as "scientific" persons) can go on progressing endlessly, they are never led co question their own existence until some existential drama grasps them and they find themselves powerless and unprepared for such a confrontation.

Such reflection upon their

being leads them toward nihiEsm. not be abandoned.

Few people, of

o~n

!1odern science does not

In fact, as Nishitani maintains, such take seriously the question it poses to itself.

This is not

sympathy means a "direct contact, before and more direct nihilism as mere feelin8, thought or notion; it is the shatthan consciousness; it is the field of the most immediate encounter between man and man in the impulsive and instinct-

tering of the very foundational presuppositions of the scientific method.

We have, then, a situation in which science

ive which lies hidden at the base of emotions, desires and thoughts. " 3

and myth are mutually destroyin8 one another's foundations. Still, Nishitani maintains that this pre-con-

scious level, like its more scientific successor, is finally

In reaction, Nishitani says, we have a situation where the mythical wan':.:; to recollect and the mythical and the sci-

unsatisfactory for the religious quest. Science itself becomes a problem in the existence of

entific are breaking down each other.

"Generally viewing

history down to the present, if, in a certain period, the 2Keiji Nishitani, "The Problem of Myth," p. 52. 3Idem., "What is Religion?" p. 31.

4 Idem., "The Problem of Hyth," p. 54.

301 302

scientific position gains power and a trend of total mechanization arises, then as a reaction against it appears a position which emphasizes something irrational or onanalysable by scientific understanding, for instance, life, emotion, experience or inspiration.

The latter usually

reaches something which is religious in the last analysis and is connected with something mythical in the broad sense." 5 The alternating of these emphases points to the fact that neither of them alone can support human life. The question arises whether it is correct for religions to try to challenge science by holding on to their old teleological worldview?

This worldview grasps unfailingly to an

environment based on life and the face of bottomless death rarely shows itself.

Thus it is that there is an indispen-

sable element lacking in traditional deity-centered religions in their refusal to face so obvious an element as the end of life in a really satisfying way. outlook finds himself grasping

The man of this religious

at the wispy straw of life

(ignoring the fact of death) much in the same way the scientist works his mechanical magic, oblivious to the fact that the personal aspect of his life exists apart from the mechanical, material universe he observes. Zen masters have traditionally offered bottomless nothingness, the "unspeakably awesome cold" as a reality of religious existence on a dimension higher than chat of science 5 rbid.,p. 53.

or common sense,

The universe as bottomless becomes the

arena or place for abandoning the self, the field for the occurrence of the Great Death.

The myth of eschatology is

thus demythologized and turned into the religiosity of che Great Death of the questioner.

For Zen, the sword which

brings death also brings life.

"Just where everything is

negated radically and brought to ultimate extinction--just there, an indication of the life path is given by the master,"6 This is the mahakaruna or Great Compassion side of Buddhism, itself.

This grand exposure is none other than the Truth Natural phenomena retain, of course, their char-

acter as fact within their respective disciplines; it is when confronted with bottomlessness that a phenomenon becomes more meaningful.

Here there is more "truth" and more

"fact" than is ordinarily experienced,

The point is that

such a dimension can only open up through the religious existence which accepts the universe as the place for the abandoning of self; only through the Great Death,

Here the

world is neither merely one of material things nor one of life, i.e., neither the world in its aspect of death nor in its aspect of life.

The bottomless field of such existence

should not be thought of as mere space; it is none other than the essence of the religious existence itself,

Reality and

appearance are merely "The Sole Self-Exposed One" appearing in and as all things (or phenomena) "so that it: makes, by 6 Keij i Nishi tani, "Science and Zen," p. 9 3.

304

303

hiding Itself as Itself, all things (or phenomena) Its own 'appearances' with their character of unreality and untruth

nature. 8 Nishitani does not think of Buddhism as the same as

and at the same time gives to the same appearances, in and

Religion.

as which It appears, the character of truth and reality

tions between men and God and the world.

which all things (or phenomena) have as 'facts.'

fundament deals with the background making such relation

These two

Religion at its fundament deals with the relaBuddhism at its

aspects are essentially inseparable, they constitute one

possible.

and the same essence of the religious existence.,]

lute) and man but is directed toward the "place" making re-

This

is Tathata (True Suchness) as it is called in Buddhism. Nishitani clearly points out that whereas, tradition-

The question does not stop with God (the Abso-

la.t:i.on possible.

"Place" is not brought from "somewhere"

outside man; it is taken as essentially connected with man's

ally, theocentric religions brought great insight to man re-

being and the being of the Absolute.

garding his position in the universe, it remained for the

the "place of possibility," "place of fundament."

scientific vision to make clear the ultimate poverty of its

Nishitani calls it

Buddhism is a religion to the extent that it talks of

own and the pre-scientific approach when pursued to their

the relation between man and the Buddha.

ultimate conclusions.

fundament in which Gautama becomes the Buddha; where man is

universality.

Religion must have more of a cosmic

tiishitani is not hesitant in pointing to Bud-

no more man.

Nirvana is the

The Buddha is the only awakened one, tathata- -

dhism and Zen Buddhism as sources of the type of suggestions

"the one that is in its suchness, in its authentic reality."

we have discussed above.

Buddha is the True Man; not a being bound by time and space

He readily acknowledges that

Japanese Buddhism seems to have little effect on men's lives

but the fundamental possibility of man.

today but argues that the direction provided by Buddhism is

possibility of man is man in his True Reality.

the right one.

thus trans-metaphysical, "the possibility of Buddhahood,"

It aims to transform man's inner mind radi-

The fundamental Reality is

cally and permits man's inner being to come into full flower.

"the mother of all Buddhas."

It is a religion of transcendence in that it offers man a way

failed to know or recognize Nothingness as the religious

to break through day to day existence amid suffering and at-

Self-realization of "Human-Being"-ness.

tain nirvana, the extinguishing of the Kalpa-fires.

social, psychological, material or any other distinctions

It

strives to awaken the authentic nature of man, the dharma7

Ibid., p. 101.

Other modem ideologies have

This destroys all

and moves beyond the pseudo-world of the dualism of subject/ 8Keiji Nishitani, "The Awakening of Self in Buddhism," pp. 1-ll.

305

object.

306

which the subjective self is aware.

It is, of course, crucial what kind of everyday af-

This is ~. the source

of the problem, and can never yield the resolution.

This is

fai rs, the things and events of the everyday world, are

a correlation by analysis rather than any "whole bodily ex-

a tt ended to.

perience" in which a radical doubt via the "negative dia-

Today's generally perceived collapse of norms

and values is defined by the historical situation or con-

lectic, " resolving to stop at nothing, taking nothing for

t ext of the various religions of the world but, Nishitani

granted, strips everything of being and lays bare the funda-

would maintain, not for all time, i.e., not paradigmatically.

ment of emptiness.

I t i s precisely this overconfidence in history itself that exacerbates the problem.

There is operating here a kind of

We might say that traditional religions and traditional western thought offer phenomenological descriptions of the

preliminary and deceptive enlightenment that is typical of

world based upon various ontologies.

western thought.

structures lead to or order experiences which are observed

It is that western scientific man's view

Intuited or "revealed"

of his problem is based in an explicit or implicit belief in

by man's consciousness of his own sense perceptions via his

two things.

observation of himself.

~f

First of all the world as believed in is a kind

animal faith, an instinct, a primordial commitment.

These archetypes are the false part

of paradigmatic or exemplary acts performed by gods and

Secondly, there is the undoubted belief in the self (or the

heroes of religion and science.

self as believing in the world).

ligious experience is reducible to these conscious struc-

The development of west-

The assumption is that re-

tures.

ern philosophical and scientific thought may be seen (is seen by Nishitani) as the gradual realization that whatever

In contrast we might say that Nishitani offers an on-

is, is strictly correlative to, a function of, our subjective

tology, false and necessary, based on a phenomenology.

beliefs.

Lived experience leads him to temporary structures such as

This confidence in the rational scientific mind of

modern man has often displaced, but continued to function

his levels of Reality which must in turn be radically

as, his earlier concern for the numinous.

critiqued.

In Nishitani's

The "whole bodily experience" involves the whole

eyes, whether in the religious thought of Eckhart, the athe-

heart-mind moving from avidya, with its dukkha/pathos, to the

ism of Sartre, the nihilism of Nietzsche or the science of

realization that fire does not burn fire.

modern man, this must be finally the process of the cor. ; cious

not finally told us "What is Religion?", he has provided us

correlation of subject and object, of awareness and

tha~

of

with a clearer picture of what it is not.

If Nishitani has

This too is con-

308

307

sistent with his predecessors in the world of Buddhism,

truths.

As Edward Conze has said of Madhyamika, "In this way the

persons to persist in understanding the conditioned so as

understanding of the conditioned, when carried on long

to be led automatically to the appreciation of the Uncon-

enough, automatically leads to the appreciation of the

ditioned,10

Unconditioned, ,g

ciated by the man in the forest, so Nishitani's subtleties

It only remains for us to ask certain questions of

Nishitani's work in the same spirit in which he has examined the work of others before him.

It is clearly the case that

It takes what amounts to an act of faith for these

If Madhyamikan subtleties were largely appre-

are likely to be largely appreciable to the philosopher. But, at the same time, if our fundamental problem is merely perpetuated when we cling to systems of thought at

all criticisms as well as approbations of Nishitani's work

the level of consciousness or cling to the reality of para-

finally hinge on the reader's view of the role of language,

digms at the level of mythic or sensual perception, then

We must note that there is a long-standing tradition in Bud-

Nishitani's work has the power to dissuade by negation,

dhism and Chinese thought of the kind of trans-logical,

is further noteworthy that the effort of negation and the

multi-perspectival use of language which Nishitani has ap-

results of the negation both take place in

propriated and used,

compassion.

Further, there is evidence in the

J

It

framework of

Neither belies the slightest trace of personal

phenomenological movement in the !·lest as well as among such

animosity or egocentricity--rather it reveals a depth of

thinkers as Heidegger of a longing to move, if little suc-

compassion difficult to find elsewhere in radical criticism.

cess in moving, in this direction,

Indeed it would appear that Nishitani in some sense is sug-

Perhaps the most severe questions must be raised over

gesting the substitution of this religious inquiry along

whether Nishitani's work has communicative value, whether it

philosophical lines for the meditation which was so central

does ease the suffering of modern man.

for Madhyamika and Zen,

It seems likely that

It is a

systemati~

meditation in

the criticism levelled against earlier Madhyarnikan and sub-

which emptiness is the object of rapt contemplation and where

sequent Zen proponents might well be levelled against Nishi-

precise philosophical formulations are a form of grasping and

tani as well.

10 It was in consideration of this problem and in the context of the age of mdp~9 that Japanese Buddhist thinkers such as Honen, Shinran an ~chiren were moved to find ways, in this degenerate age, for the ignorant to realize the Dharma through simple acts of faith such as the recitation of the name of Amida or the incantation of the "namu Mhoho Rhnge Kyo." This is found even in the Zen of Dagen w o emp asued za~~n or just sitting.

The teachings of Madhyamika and of Zen have

often been accused of offering little comfort to the layman or the man of common sense with access only to conventional 9

Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India: Three Phases of Buddhist Philosoph~ (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1970), p. 41.

309

attachment that deserve only contempt.

310 the heart of western philosophy and has, at the same time,

Though this form

of meditation may not be accessible to all and indeed may

made a strong case for the West's failure to come to equal

only be accessible to those of sufficient philosophical

terms with eastern thought, most particularly Buddhism.

subtlety, it is consistent with general Buddhist teaching that meditations exist on different levels.

The degree of

If the question is raised whether or not Nishitani has misunderstood the West by selecting out certain representa-

realization which the faculty of wisdom has achieved is one

tive thinkers and even further by quoting out of context,

such consideration as is the aspect of the Dharma which is

i.e., that he is an exegete or even an eisagete rather than

being meditated upon.

--"rather than what?" one is tempted to ask.

In the former consideration, Nishi-

It is his ex-

tani, like the Zen tradition before him, assumes an integrity

pressed purpose to speak to the larger question "What is

and seriousness of purpose--a depth of suffering--which makes

Religion?" rather than comprehend or explicate the subtleties

the inquiry or meditation worth undertaking.

of any particular theological position.

In the latter

To this end he feels

consideration, he has provided us with an investigation at

perfectly justified in criticizing the intentional and con-

the level of ontology and at the level of epistemology with-

ceptual weaknesses of any given thinker or theologian.

out reifying either.

example, he is not critizing the religious experience of

He subjects both being and knowing to

the ruthless scalpel of the negative dialectic.

For

Eckhart but rather is showing the inadequacy of Eckhart's ex-

In this

manner the various levels of Reality reveal in referential

position of it, pointing out the communicative deficiencies

ways nothingness as the fundamental place of possibility.

of Eckhart's explanation of his experience, his witness to

..

If we are tempted to ask if Nishitani' s categories or

an experience that may, itself, have been valid.

In this

levels of Reality are universal and applicable to homo re-

light one might say that of course Nishitani has not answered

ligiosus everywhere we can answer with a clear yes.

the question he raises himself but he has facilitated the

Onto-

logically, epistemologically and civilizationally they are

resolution of other men's problems by showing up the defects

not bound.

in various other metaphysical or ontological statements.

On

the simple principle of inclusivity they en-

compass more of man's religious experience than Being-oriented

has used language and concepts to show the inherent limits

categories or descriptions of reality which must fall short

of all language, including that of Eckhart.

of elucidating the problem of nihilism and nothingness.

Nishi-

tani has clearly shown that he is capable of penetrating to

Is such an enterprise morally destructive? level theory of truth lead to ethical anarchy?

He

Does a twoPerhaps.

312

311

Nishitani intends only to show that morality does not precede but rather follows upon the realization of the True Self. All ethical and moral systems are mere conceptualizations of a reified pure type.

In the context of the religious sangha

or community it may be advantageous for those whose faculties of wisdom is less mature to adhere to the sila or vinaya, but as the history of Buddhism testifies, these are not set in stone for all time; rather they are preliminary, disciplinary guidelines which facilitate the maturation of the faculty of wisdom and make possible the working of the faculty of compassion.

It is not Nishitani's intention to

s~ggest

ethics and

morality are inappropriate but rather that they are preliminary guidelines and ultimately empty.

They may be altered

as the human and civilizational context demands. Nishitani's work as a philosopher from a "non-western" tradition can and does shed light upon the human condition; moreover it is cast in the contemporary situation and thus does not perpetuate the (perhaps) naive view that the distant past or "progress" toward an uncertain future hold any hope for suffering man.

By showing that the structures of re-

ligious apprehension have no reality of their own, Nishitani is able to speak more directly to contemporary man.

As a

form of language these structures are necessary but they are also false.

In this context modern man is encouraged to em-

brace modernity as a social reality in the context of which he seeks to alleviate his own suffering.

Religious crea-

tivity is precisely this emptying process.

For Nishitani,

the human condition is one of ignorance (an existential and ontological thirst) wherein he clings to things and events at the level of sense perception and consciousness.

All

ontological categories are empty, they are negative and dialectical--the paradigms are empty of Reality.

One is

tempted to consider Nishitani's work as a philosopher of religion in the same relation to post-Platonic, Beingcentered western thought as Nagarjuna's work stood to the Abhidharmic tradition before him.

314

313

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Nishitani, Keiji. "The Awakening of Self in Buddhism," Trans. Shojun Banda, The Eastern Buddhist, New Series, I, 2 (September 1966). "A Buddhist Philosopher Looks at the Future of The Japan Christian Yearbook (1968). No translator given.

· .

---c'"'fi~·ristianity."

Abe, Masao. "Buddhist Nirvana: Its Significance in Contemporary Thought and Life," Living Faiths and Ultimate Goals. Ed. S, J. Samartha. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Bo'OkS (1974). Bellah, Robert. "Continuity and Change in Japanese Society," Stability and Social Chan~e. Ed. Bernard Barber and Alex Inkeles. Boston: L~ttle, Brown and Company. Buri, Fritz. "The Fate of the Concept of God in the Philosophy of Religion of Keiji Nishitani," Northeast Asia Journal of Theology, 8 (March 1972). Conze, Edward. "Buddhist Philosophy and its European Parallels," Philosophy East & West XIII (1963/64).

----...-' Shibayama Zenkei, and Tsukamoto Zenry\1. "Chinese Zen: A Dialogue," Trans. Hirano Umeyo. The Eastern Buddhist, New Series, VIII, 2 (October 1975), 66-93. .

"Eine Buddhistische Stirrane zum Thema der EntZietschrift ftir Religions und Geistesgeschichte, XIII, Nos. 3-4, 244-62 and 345-56. No translator given.

--~m~y~thologisierung."

•

"Harmony of Religion and Science." Japan Studies. and pub, International Institute for Japan Studies, No. 9, 2-8. No translator given.

Ea.

.

"Japan in the Contemporary World." Japan Studies. and pub, International Institute for Japan Studies. No. 13, 1-6. No translator given.

---~r·

---~E~d.

Daye,

. "Japan in the World." Japan Studies. Ed. and pub. ---·I-nternational Institute for Japan Studies, No. 2, 2-9. No translator given.

"Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy," Philosophy East & West XIII (1963/64).

DeJong, J. W, "Emptiness," Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 2 (1972). Hisamatsu, Shin' ichi. "The Characteristics of Oriental Nothingness," Philoso~hical Studies of Japan 2. Trans. Richard DeMartino (19 0). ---~·

"Zen: Its Meaning for Modern Civilization." Trans. Richard DeMartino and Gishin Tokiwa. The Eastern Buddhist, New Series, I, 1 (1965).

"Kami and Fundamental Experience" from The Concept KAMr:--Offprint from the Proceedings of the Second International Conference for Shinto Studies. No date. No translator given.

---~o~f

•

.

"Nihilism and Sunyata." Trans. Yamamoto Seisaku. Eastern Buddhist, New Series, IV, No. 2 (October 1971), 3o-49; V, No. 1 (May 1972), 55-69; and'!, No.2 (October 1972), 95-106. Chapter Three of Shuky5 to wa Nanika.

----T~h~e

318

317 Nishitani, Keiji, "On Modernization and Tradition in Japan." Modernization and Tradition in Japan, Special Publication Series, No. 1, International Institute for Japan Studies (1969), 69-96, No translator given. . "On the I-Thou Relation in Zen Buddhism." Tr.:~ns. cwrman Waddell. The Eastern Buddhist, New Seriel'l, II No. 2 (1969) , 71- • • "The Personal and the Impersonal in Religion," ------·t-rans. Rev, Jan van Bragt and Yamamoto Seisaku, The Eas~ern Buddhist, New Series, III, No, 1 (June 1~) 1-18; No. 2 (October 1970), 80-88, Chapter Two of ShUkyo to wa Nanika. •

"Preliminary Remark" to "Two Addresses by Martin The Eastern Buddhist, New Series, I, No.2 (September 1966), 48-59. No translator given.

------~H-eidegger."

•

"The Problem of Myth." Religious Studies in Japan. ------~E~d. by Japanese Association for Religious Studies. Tokyo: The Maruzen Company, Ltd. (1959), 50-61, No translator given, ------....,....· "Rationale of the International Institute for Japan Studies." Japan Studies, ed. and pub, International Institute for Japan Studies, No. 1, 1-8. No translator given. • "Die ReligiHse Existenz im Buddhismus," Proceedings 7 ------ o~f the IX International Congress for the History of Religions. Tokyo (1958), 577-583, No translator given. • "Die Religios-Philosophische Existenz in Bud------d.,hr-ismus." In Richard Wi.sser 's Sinn und Sein, Ttibingen (1960), 381-398. No translator g~ven.

------71"::"·

"The Religious Situation in Present-Day Japan." Contemporary Religions in Japan, I, No, 1 (March 1960) 7-24. No translator g~ven.

• "The Standpoint of Sunyata." Trans. Jan van Bragt ------~a~nd Yamamoto Seisaku. The Eastern Buddhist, New Series, VI, No. 1 (lfuy 1973), 68-91. Chapter Four of Shi:ikyo to wa Nanika. • "Science and Zen." Trans. Richard DeMartino. The --.......,E,....astern Buddhist, Uew Series, I, No. 1 (Sept.l965) 79-IO'S". •

"A Symposium: On Buddhist-Christian Encounter." ------~w~ith Kuyama Yasushi, Kitamori Kazo, et al in Japan Studies. Trans. Robert Enns and Mis Utako Adachi. Ed.and pub. International Institute for Japan Studies, No. 15 (Autumn 1969). 1-19. "What is Religion?" Trans, Janice D. Rowe,revised Philosophical Studies of Japan, II, Tokyo, 1960, 21-46. Chapter One of Shtikyo to wa Nanika.

oy Nishitani Keiji.

Penner, Hans. "The Poverty of Functionalism." Religions, Vol. II, No. 1. August 1971.

History of

Piovesana, Gino K• "Main Trends of Contemporary Japanese Philosophy." Monumenta Nipponica 11 (1955) 60-74. • "One Hundred Years of Japanese Philosophy: 1862- -.....1..,..9-r62' • " Contemporary Religions in Japan 5, 3 (1964) 199-206. Robinson, Richard H. "Some Logical Aspects of Nagarjuna's Sys tern." Philosophy East and West: A Journal of Oriental and Comparative Thought, VI, 4, January 1957. Ruiz, F. Perez. "Philosophy in Present-Day Japan." Monumenta Nipponica 24, 1-2 (1969), 137-68. Sartre, Jean Paul. "Existentialism is a Humanism." Existentialism from Dostoevs~ to Sartre. Trans. Walter Kaurmann. New York:e World Publishing Company, 1956. Shaw, J. L. "Empty Terms: The Hyaya and the Buddhists." Journal of Indian Philosophy, 2 (1974). Shimomura, Torataro. "On the Varieties of Philosophical Thinking." Philosophical Studies of Japan 4 (1963), 1-21. Trans. YUkio Irie • • "The Modernization of Japan, With Special Refer____e_n_c..,.e to Philosophy." Philosophical Studies of Japan 7 (1966) 1-28. Trans. John R. McEwan. Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. "A Human View of Truth." Truth and Dialogue in World Religions: Conflicting TrucK= Claims. Ed. John Hick. Pliiladelphia: The Westminster Press, 1974. ---....,..-· "Religious Atheism? Early Buddhist and Recent American," Milla wa-Milla 6 (December 1966). Suzuki, Daisetz Teitaro. "On Emptiness." On Indian l~hayana Buddhism. Ed. and with intra. by Edward Conze. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers (1968) • ______ • "The Philosophy and Religions of the Prajnaparamita." On Indian Mahayana Buddhism. Ed. and with intra. by Edward Conze. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers (1968). •

----~tu~r~e,

"Zen and the Art of Tea." Zen and Japanese CulPart I. New York: Random House, Inc. (1965).

320

319

Takahashi, Satomi. "Historical Actuality." Studies of Japan, 2. 1960.

Philosophical

Takeuchi, Yoshinori. ''Buddhism and Existentialism: The Dialogue between Oriental and Occidental Thought." Reli6ion and Culture: Essa~s in Honor of Paul Tillich. Ed. alter Leibrecht. New ark: Harper and Brothers, (1959). "Thinking in Buddhist Philosophy." Studies of Japan, 5 (1964), 69-94. <'.mura.

Nishitani, Keiji. "Topics in Buddhist Thought." A series of unpublished lectures delivered at Temple Tmiversity, September-December 1969. Wargo, Robert J. J. "The Logic of Basho and the Concept of Nothingness in the Philosophy of Nishida Kitaro." Ph.D. dissertation: The University of Michigan, 1972.

Ueda, Yoshifum.

Philoso~hical

Kansei

Trans.

Van Bragt, Jan. "Nishitani on Japanese Religiosity." In Jooaph J. Spae's Japanese Religiosity. Tokyo: Oriens Institute for Religious Research (1971). . "Notulae on Em~tinesa and Dialogue--Reading ----..;P::-roiessor Nishitani s 'What is Religion?"' Japanese Religions 4, 4 (1966), 50-78. Waldenfels, Hans. "Absolute Nothingness: Preliminary Considerations on a Central Notion in the Philosophy of Nishida Kitaro and the Kyoto School." Monumenta Nipponica 21, 3-4 (1966), 354-91. Wilson, Bryan R. "Aspects of Secularization in the West." Jalanese Journal of Religious Studies (December 1976), Vo , 8, No. 4. Unpublished Materials Dilworth, David A. "Nishida Kitaro: The Development of His Thought." Ph.D. dissertation: Columbia University, 1970. Nishitani, Keiji. "Emptiness and Time." Manuscript translation by Rev. Jan van Bragt and Yamamoto Seisaku of Chapter Five of ShUkyo to wa Nanika. "Emptiness and History." Manuscript translation oy Rev. Jan van Bragt and Yamamoto Seisaku of Chapter Six of Shukyo to wa Nanika. "Ontology and Utterance." Paper delivered at the International Consultation on Hermeneutics, October 2, 1970, Syracuse University. Originally in English. •

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