Kotler-berkowitz Mpsa 2019

Research note

Why are synagogues more politically active than other religious congregations? Comparisons and explanations from the National Congregations Study Laurence Kotler-Berkowitz, PhD Senior Director, Research and Analysis Director, Berman Jewish DataBank The Jewish Federations of North America Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference 5 May 2019 Chicago, IL

I. Introduction American Jews are well-known for their generally liberal political preferences, and the attempt to explain those preferences has been the master theme dominating the study of American Jewish politics (Fuchs 1956; Sprinrad 1990; Katznelson 1995; Liebman and Cohen 1990; Forman 2001; Liebman 1973; Medding 1977; Lipset and Raab 1995; Levey 1996; Greenberg and Wald 2001; Wald 2015, 2019; Rebhun 2016). In contrast, the study of the political participation of American Jews has lagged behind. Some scholars have examined American Jews’ disproportionately high rates of voter registration, turnout and political donations (Smith 2005; Greenberg and Wald 2001). Others have analyzed the political activity of Jewish organizations with specific mandates to engage in politics, including community relations, advocacy and lobbying organizations (Elazar 1995, Waxman 2016; Chanes 2001). However, little if any attention has been given to the political participation of synagogues, American Jews’ primary religious institutions, even as scholars have begun turning their attention to the political activity within other religious congregations (Beyerlein and Chaves 2003; Brown 2006; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2014). This research note seeks to contribute to the knowledge of American Jewish political participation by using data from the National Congregations Study (Chaves, Anderson and Eagle 2014) to compare the political activity of synagogues and congregations from other religious traditions. It first documents that synagogues are more likely than other congregations to undertake political activity. It then attempts to explain this difference in levels of political participation by positing a series of hypotheses with predictors that account for variation in the political activity of religious congregations in general, including congregational resources, 1

theology, political orientation, a proxy variable for connections to other congregations, and an underlying propensity for congregational activity. Crosstabulations show synagogues disproportionately possess these predictors compared to other congregations, and a series of bivariate regression models demonstrate how these predictors reduce, but do not fully eliminate, the increased likelihood of synagogues to participate in politics. Put differently, the predictors offer a partial explanation of why synagogues are more politically active than other congregations, but a residual gap between synagogues and other congregations remains. Several potential explanations for the residual gap are then offered. A concluding section discusses implications of the analysis for religion and politics generally and for the political bases of Jewish cohesion in the United States specifically. II. The National Congregations Study The National Congregations Study cumulative data file combines three cross-sectional surveys of US religious congregations conducted in 1998, 2006 and 2012. Each cross-section started with that year’s respective General Social Survey respondents, who, if they belonged to a religious congregation, were asked to report contact information for it. Subsequent interviews were then conducted with clergy at named congregations, yielding a representative sample of congregations. Weights on the data file allow researchers to analyze data at the congregational level (these weights adjust for differences in the probability of being in the sample due to differences in congregation size) or at the individual congregant level. This analysis operates at the congregational level, and reported findings use a congregational-level weight. Details of the sampling procedure, known as hyper-network sampling, and weights are provided in Chaves, Anderson and Eagle (2014). The cumulative file contains a total of 4,071 congregations, comprised of 1,897 evangelical Protestant churches (46.6%), 891 mainline Protestant churches (21.9%), 254 Roman Catholic churches (6.2%), 832 black Protestant churches ( 20.4%), 54 Jewish synagogues (1.3%), and 142 other non-Christian congregations (3.5%). 1 The small number of Jewish synagogues in the congregational sample reflects, of course, the small share of the American adult population that is Jewish by religion, estimated at about 1.8% (Pew Research Center 2013; another .5% of American adults identify as Jewish for ethnic, cultural or other reasons, but they are less likely to belong to synagogues than Jews by religion). Though the small number of synagogues in the sample suggests results should be interpreted with some caution, synagogues are so different from other congregations that the small sample size does not preclude robust statistical findings. 1

Religious traditions were coded by the data file producers.

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III. The political activity of congregations: comparing synagogues and other congregations The NCS data file contains nine dichotomous measures of congregational political activity, all asked in each cross-sectional survey. Eight of the nine refer to activity in the 12 months prior to the respective survey; the measure of voter guides, in contrast, had no time reference in the 1998 survey and a two-year reference in the 2006 and 2012 surveys. The nine measures are as follows: 1. People at worship services told of opportunities for political activity, including petition campaigns, lobbying, or demonstrating 2. Any groups, meetings, classes or events specifically to discuss politics 3. Any groups, meetings, classes or events specifically to organize or participate in efforts to lobby elected officials of any sort 4. Any groups, meetings, classes or events specifically to get out the vote during an election 5. Any groups, meetings, classes or events specifically to organize or participate in a demonstration or march, either in support of or opposition to some public issue or policy 6. Any groups, meetings, classes or events specifically to get people registered to vote 7. Any elected official visiting the congregation to give a talk at a meeting, event or worship service 8. Anyone running for office visiting the congregation to give a talk at a meeting, event or worship service 9. Voter guides distributed through the congregation When the dichotomous measures are summed to construct a 0-9 scale (alpha =. 70), more than half of all congregations (55.9%) reported no political activity at all, 18.7% reported 1 activity, 11.9% reported two activities, and 13.5% reported 3 or more activities, with an everdiminishing number as the scale climbs to all nine activities. To simplify this analysis, the scale was recoded into a dichotomy distinguishing those congregations that engaged in one or more of the nine political activities (44.1%) from those that did not engage in any political activity (55.9%). Table 1 presents the percentage of congregations from each religious tradition that engaged in at least one political activity. Altogether, 44% of congregations report at least one political activity, with a range from 33% for other non-Christian congregations at the low end to 87% for synagogues at the high end. Difference of means tests show statistically significant differences in political activity between synagogues and the congregations of each of the other religious 3

traditions, and a post-hoc test of homogenous subsets shows one grouping of evangelical Protestant churches, mainline Protestant churches and other non-Christian congregations, a second grouping of Roman Catholic and black Protestant churches, and a third group of synagogues by themselves (results not displayed). (Table 1 about here) IV. Predictors of political activity of congregations Why are synagogues more likely than other congregations to participate in political activity? To begin answering this question, five hypotheses that explain variation in the political participation of congregations in general are offered in this section, along with empirical indicators of the hypotheses’ predictors in the NCS cumulative data file. Religious congregations may vary in their political participation for the following reasons: 1. Congregations with more resources, both human and financial, are more likely to engage in political activity than congregations with fewer resources (Brown 2006). In this analysis, resources are measured by the number of adults regularly involved in religious activities, the number of full-time staff in congregations, and congregational income. 2. Congregations that are politically conservative or liberal are more likely to engage in politics than congregations that are politically moderate. This argument is an extension of individual-level theories and empirical findings that stronger ideological positions - on both the left and right - lead to increased political participation, as people with stronger ideologies are more motivated or incentivized to change or maintain the status quo than centrists are (van der Meer et al 2009; Putnam 2000; Pew Research Center 2014). Political orientations are measured by respondents’ placement of their congregations, politically speaking, as more on the conservative side, right in the middle, or more on the liberal side. 3. Congregations with liberal and moderate theological orientations are more likely to be politically active than those with conservative theological orientations. This is an extension of findings connecting liberal and moderate theological traditions to civic engagement broadly (Chaves 2004; Chaves, Stephens and Galaskiewicz 2004), but here theological orientations are measured distinctly from religious traditions. Specifically, theological orientations are measured by respondents’ placement of their congregations, theologically speaking, as more on the conservative side, right in the middle, or more on the liberal side.

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4. Congregations with more extensive connections to other religious traditions are more likely to participate in politics relative to congregations with fewer such connections. As with political ideology, this explanation is an extension of individual-level theories and empirical findings, in this case tying more diverse social networks to greater information flows and increased political participation (Kotler-Berkowitz 2005; Granovetter 1973). No direct measure of connections to other religious traditions was asked in all three NCS cross sections. Instead, a proxy measure identifying congregations that met in the past year to learn about another tradition is used, under the assumption that learning about another tradition likely entails some contact with a congregation or representative of that tradition. 5. Congregations that have more activity in general are more likely to be politically engaged than congregations with less activity in general. Here, political activity is the byproduct of an underlying disposition or culture of congregational activity. Following Chaves, Stephens and Galaskiewicz’s measurement strategy (2004), this underlying disposition is measured with factors scores extracted from a factor analysis of 10 variables that capture congregational program activity. 2 V. The potential advantages of synagogues in political participation Comparing synagogues to congregations from other religious traditions shows synagogues disproportionately possess the predictors hypothesized to account for congregational political participation. Starting with resources in Table 2, synagogues have comparatively more congregational income and full-time paid staff than other congregations, especially churches in the three Protestant traditions. In turn, only a quarter of synagogues have more than 200 adults regularly active in congregational religious life, but even this low share trails only Roman Catholic churches. These statistics reasonably reflect the nature of most Conservative and Reform synagogues, which tend to large membership bases that allow for high congregational income and multi-person staffs and, concomitantly, a small share of regularly active members. (Table 2 about here) Turning to other predictors, Table 3 shows synagogues are the most liberal in their political orientations and evangelical Protestant churches are the most conservative, with both having the fewest politically moderate congregations. In contrast, the other traditions have more politically moderate congregations and fewer on the conservative and liberal sides. Synagogues 2

The factor analysis included programs focused on feeding the hungry; the homeless or transient; homebuilding, repair or maintenance; physical health needs; jobs; disaster relief; clothing or blankets; education or training; senior citizens; and immigrants, migrants and refugees.

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are also the most theologically liberal, far outstripping congregations for the four Christian traditions. In addition, synagogues outpace all other congregations in discussing or learning about other religious traditions, the proxy measure for social ties to other traditions. (Table 3 about here) Lastly, Table 4 shows synagogues have the highest mean scores on three of the four factor scores measuring congregational activity, indicating a generally stronger underlying disposition for program activity than other congregations. However, synagogues’ negative mean score on factor 2 indicate this is not always the case. (Table 4 about here) Given the relative advantage that synagogues possess with respect to these characteristics, it is not surprising that the level of political participation among synagogues is the highest of the religious traditions examined here, but the connection is only implicit so far. The paper now turns to explicitly connecting congregations, their characteristics and political activity through multivariate analysis. VI. The difference in political participation between synagogues and other congregations, partially explained Conventionally, multivariate regression is used to test the relative explanatory power of various predictors net of each other. Here, though, the analytic strategy is somewhat different. A baseline logistic regression model enters religious traditions as the only predictor of congregational political activity to determine initial differences across traditions, with a particular focus on synagogues. Successive regression models then enter the other hypothesized predictors of congregational political participation, revealing how much the other predictors reduce, and thereby account for, initial differences between congregations from distinct religious traditions, again with a focus on synagogues. The process ends with a full model that includes all the hypothesized predictors of interest and additional control variables. Table 5 displays the logistic regression models. Model 1 is the baseline model with religious tradition, a categorical variable, entered as the only predictor. Evangelical Protestant congregations are the reference category. The cell entries for the congregations from other traditions are odds ratios (not the underlying regression coefficients). 3 Mainline Protestant 3

Odds are the probability of an event happening over the probability of it not happening. Odds ratios are the odds of the event happening for one category of the predictor variable relative to the odds of it happening for the

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congregations and other non-Christian congregations are no more likely to engage in political activity than evangelical Protestant congregations. The odds of black Protestant and Roman Catholic churches participating in politics are, respectively, are two and more than three times the odds of evangelical Protestant churches. Synagogues are the most likely to undertake political activity, with their odds of engaging in political activity almost 10 times that of evangelical churches. With only religious tradition in the model, Nagelkerke’s pseudo R-square stands at just .06. Model 2 adds the three resource predictors, congregational income, full-time paid staff and number of adults regularly active in the congregation’s religious life. Each has the expected effect: increases in income, staff and active members raise the odds of political activity. Turning to the religious traditions, mainline Protestant and non-Christian congregations remain no more likely to engage in political activity than evangelical churches. The odds of black Protestant congregation’s undertaking political activity increase after accounting for resources, indicating that black Protestant churches’ advantage over evangelical churches in the baseline model 1 is restricted by the relatively fewer resources black churches have compared to evangelical churches. In contrast, the odds ratio for Catholic and Jewish congregations fall slightly once resources are accounted for, suggesting a small part of the reason Catholic and Jewish congregations are more likely to engage in political activity than evangelical churches is that they have more resources to do so. Of all the congregations, synagogues remain the most likely to engage in political activity even after resources are accounted for. Nagelkerke’s pseudo R-square doubles to .13. Model 3 enters political ideology as a predictor, and it operates as hypothesized. The reference category is politically moderate congregations. Relative to them, politically conservative and especially liberal congregations are more likely to engage in political activity. There is little change in the odds ratios for the resource predictors or the religious traditions, except Jewish. The odds ratio for synagogues declines by more than a third of its size, indicating that an important reason synagogues are more likely to undertake political activity relative to evangelical Protestant churches is because synagogues are more often politically liberal (see Table 3) and liberal congregations participate in politics more than moderate and conservative congregations do. For the model as a whole, Nagelkerke’s pseudo R-square increases to .17.

reference category. Odds ratios more than one mean the odds of the event happening in the predictor category are greater than the odds in the reference category. Odds ratios under one mean the odds of the event happening in the predictor category are less than the odds in the reference category. An odds ratio of one means the predictor and reference category have the same odds of the event happening.

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Theological orientation is added to the predictors in Model 4, and again the hypothesized effect is evident. Theologically moderate and especially theologically liberal congregations are more likely to participate in politics than theologically conservative congregations. The resource predictors remain stable, but political ideology changes somewhat, with a small increase in the odds ratio for politically conservative congregations and a decrease in the odds ratio for politically liberal congregation, though both still operate as hypothesized. In taking account of theological orientation, mainline Protestant churches and non-Christian congregations are less likely than evangelical Protestant churches to undertake political activity, while Catholic and black Protestant congregations remain more likely. The odds ratio for synagogues remains the largest for the religious traditions, but it declines further in Model 4, meaning another reason synagogues are more likely than other congregations to participate in politics is because they are predominantly liberal in their theology and liberal congregations are more likely than conservative congregations to engage in politics. Nagelkerke’s pseudo R-square does not change. Model 5 enters the proxy predictor for social ties to other religious traditions, and the odds ratio shows that congregations that discussed or learned about another religious tradition are more likely to participate in politics than those that did not. Accounting for ties to other traditions results in small declines in the explanatory power of the resource predictors, liberal political ideology and liberal theological orientation, indicating that better-resourced congregations and politically and theologically liberal congregations are more likely to have social ties to other traditions. The odds ratios for mainline Protestants and non-Christian congregations are stable in Model 5, while the odds ratios for Roman Catholic and black Protestant congregations tick upwards slightly. In contrast, the odds ratio for synagogues falls slightly again, adding social ties to other religious traditions to the explanation of why synagogues participate in politics more often than other congregations. Nagelkerke’s pseudo Rsquare rises to .19. The four factor scores for congregational program activity are entered in Model 6. Only Factor 3 - on which programs for education and training, jobs, and immigrants, migrants and refugees had the highest loadings - affects political activity, increasing its likelihood. The odds ratios for the other predictors remain largely the same, though for the first time having 200 or more adults regularly active in the congregation’s religious life is no longer statistically significant at the .05 level. Looking specifically at synagogues, the odds ratio does not change, suggesting that though synagogues are more likely to have a range of program activities than other congregations, an underlying disposition for them does not explain why synagogues are more politically active as well. Nagelkerke’s pseudo R-square is .20 for model as a whole.

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Finally, Model 7 is the same as Model 6 but adds a series of socio-demographic control variables, including separate measures of the gender, age, ethnic and immigrant composition of congregations; urban, suburban or rural location; region; and, following Chaves, Stephens and Galaskiewicz (2004), whether congregations received government funding in the 12 months prior to the survey. Several of the controls related to gender, age and immigrant composition of congregational members and congregations’ suburban location have predictive power, but contrary to the findings of Chaves, Stephens and Galaskiewicz (2004), having received government funding does not. Within the resource predictors, the highest category of congregational income and both categories of active adults are no longer significant, while staff members remain so. Political and theological orientations and the proxy measure for social ties to other traditions remain largely the same and in the hypothesized directions, as does factor score 3 for congregational program activity. Among the religious traditions, mainline Protestant and non-Christian congregations remain less likely than evangelical Protestant churches to undertake political activity, while Catholic and black Protestant congregations are more likely. The odds ratio for synagogues is still the largest for the religious traditions, but it declines further, indicating that the controls - especially a higher share of older members and suburban locations - account for some of the reason why synagogues are more likely to engage in political activity. With this final model, Nagelkerke’s pseudo R-square is .22. VII. The residual gap in political participation between synagogues and other religious congregations From the baseline model to the full model with controls predicting political activity, the magnitude of the odds ratio for synagogues declines by almost two-thirds, from 9.7 to 3.6. The impact of resources, political ideology, theological orientation and social ties to other religious traditions - all factors on which synagogues have an advantage in terms of catalyzing political participation - explains much of this decline. Synagogues are more likely to participate in politics because they have more resources to do so, their congregations tend to be politically and theologically liberal, and - at least by one proxy measure - they have more social ties to other religious traditions. One of the factor scores for underlying program activity in congregations also predicts political activity, but it doesn’t account for the higher levels of synagogues’ political engagement net of the other predictors. Several of the controls - which weren’t specifically hypothesized as predictors - also account for why synagogues are more likely to engage in political activities. Even as the odds ratio for synagogues declines substantially, synagogues remain the most likely congregations to participate in politics in the full model. In other words, even in the full model,

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a residual gap in political activity remains between synagogues and other congregations. Several possibilities might account for this continuing difference. Among the predictors, different measures - either of the particular indicator or, in some cases, entered into the models as ordinal rather than categorical - might better account for some of the remaining variation in synagogue political activity. On the dependent variable side, the dichotomous dependent variable, constructed to simplify this analysis, may be masking variation in the political activities that were used to construct the original scale before it was dichotomized. Congregations from different traditions tend to specialize in different political activities (Beyerlein and Chaves 2003; Chaves and Eagle 2015; Chaves, Stephens and Galaskiewicz 2004). Examining each political activity separately and, specifically, regressing each on the predictors might reveal some full models in which the difference between synagogues and other congregations is fully accounted for. Unmeasured explanatory predictors might also more fully account for the continuing difference. As a social and religious minority, American Jews have been keenly aware of the benefits and necessity of political activity to safeguard their rights (Wald 2019) and have developed an elaborate communal infrastructure of politically-oriented organizations (Elazar 1995; Chanes 2001; Lipset and Raab 1995). If measurable at the institutional level, this politics of minority consciousness, as Forman (2001) describes it, could explain why synagogues, the institutional home of a small religious minority, are more apt to partake in politics than congregations whose members are part of much larger religious traditions. Lastly, the continuing gap between synagogues and other congregations may reflect, in part, the kinds of synagogues in the National Congregations Study. The strong majority of them are Reform and Conservative synagogues, both of which (despite the name Conservative) are religiously liberal offshoots of traditional Orthodox Judaism. In contrast, very few of the synagogues in the NCS are Orthodox. This makes sense from the perspective of how congregations were sampled for the NCS (Chaves, Anderson and Eagle 2014). There are many more American Jews who belong to Conservative and Reform synagogues than to Orthodox synagogues, and so those Conservative and Reform synagogues had a greater chance than Orthodox synagogues of entering the NCS sample. Paradoxically, however, there are actually more Orthodox synagogues in total in the U.S. than there are Conservative and Reform synagogues (Schwartz et al. 2002). This is because the numerically fewer Conservative and Reform synagogues tend to have large membership bases, while the numerically more Orthodox synagogues tend to have significantly fewer members and to be fragmented along intra-Orthodox religious lines. 10

The critical implication for this analysis is that Orthodox synagogues are less likely than Conservative and Reform synagogues to have the characteristics that propel political activity. Orthodox synagogues likely have fewer resources, ties to other religious traditions and program activity, and they tend to be politically and theologically (small “c”) conservative. The underrepresentation of Orthodox synagogues in the NCS, therefore, likely inflates the difference in political engagement between synagogues and other congregations in the achieved sample, and their greater presence would probably reduce the residual gap that remains in the full regression model. VIII. Conclusion Synagogues in the NCS achieved sample are more likely to participate in politics than other religious congregations because they have more resources to do so, their congregations tend to be politically and theologically liberal, and - at least by one proxy measure - they have more social ties to other religious traditions. One of the factor scores for underlying program activity in congregations also predicts political activity, but it doesn’t account for the higher levels of synagogues’ political engagement net of the other predictors. Several of the controls - which weren’t specifically hypothesized as predictors - also account for why synagogues are more likely to engage in political activities. Beyond accounting for why synagogues are more politically active than other congregations, the particular focus on synagogues presented here highlight and underscore a number of general propositions about the relationship between religious congregations and politics. Though not primarily constituted for political purposes, religious congregations serve as a venue for political activity. By sponsoring opportunities for political action that individuals can access, congregations provide an institutional mechanism for mobilizing individuals to political participation. As such, congregations are an important part of the civil society institutional landscape that mediates between individuals on the one hand and political and governmental actors and institutions on the other. Synagogues fulfill all of these roles, and as this analysis has shown, they do so relatively more often than other congregations do. Lastly, the findings reported here provide evidence for the transformationalist understanding of Jewish cohesion in the United States. Contemporary Jewish communal discourse has been dominated by the assimilationist view that Jewish distinctiveness in America is inevitably declining as Jews adapt to American society and culture (Cohen 2018). However, the National Congregations Study suggests otherwise, aligning instead with a transformationalist perspective that American Jews are have multiple bases of cohesion - some traditional, others emergent 11

that counteract patterns of assimilation (Goldscheider and Zuckerman 1984; Goldscheider 1989; Zuckerman 1990; Kotler-Berkowitz 2015, 2018). By documenting the high rate at which synagogues participate in politics, both in absolute terms and relative to congregations from other religious traditions, the NCS data reinforce Zuckerman’s (1990) insight that politics is an important basis of Jewish cohesion in the United States. The political activity of synagogues partially accounted for by hypotheses covering religious congregations in general - serves to maintain a distinctively Jewish presence in American politics and society. IX. References Beyerlein, Kraig and Mark Chaves. 200 3. “The Political Activities of Religious Congregations in the United States.” Journal for the Social Scientific Study of Religion 42(2): 229-246.

Brown, R. Khari. 2006. “Racial Differences in Congregation-based Political Activism.” Social Forces 84(3): 1581–1604. Chanes, Jerome. 2001. “Who Does What? Jewish Advocacy and Jewish ‘Interest’.” In Jews in American politics, ed. L. Sandy Maisel. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 99119. Chaves, Mark. 2004. Congregations in America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chaves, Mark, Shawna Anderson, and Alison Eagle. 2014. National Congregations Study. Cumulative data file and codebook. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University, Department of Sociology. Chaves, Mark and Alison Eagle. 2015. Religious Congregations in 21st Century America.” Durham, NC: National Congregations Study. Accessed at http://www.soc.duke.edu/natcong/Docs/NCSIII_report_final.pdf. Chaves, Mark, Laura Stephens and Joseph Galaskiewicz. 2004. “Does Government Funding Suppress Nonprofits’ Political Activity?” American Sociological Review 69(2): 292-316. Cohen, Steven M. 2018. “The Quality of American Jewish Life.” In Arnold Dashefsky and Ira Sheskin (eds.), The American Jewish Year Book 2018. Dordrecht, Germany: Springer International Publishing.

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Elazar, Daniel J. 1995. Community and Polity (revised edition). Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society. Forman, Ira N. 2001. The politics of minority consciousness. In Jews in American politics, ed. L. Sandy Maisel. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 141-160. Fuchs, Lawrence H. 1956. The political behavior of American Jews. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Goldscheider, Calvin. 1989. Jewish Continuity and Change: Emerging Patterns in America. Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press. Goldscheider, Calvin and Alan S. Zuckerman. 1984. The Transformation of the Jews. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Granovetter, Mark S. 1973. “The Strength of Weak Ties.” American Journal of Sociology 78(6): 1360-1380. Greenberg, Anna and Kenneth D. Wald. 2001. “Still Liberal After All These Years?” The Contemporary Political Behavior of American Jewry.” In Jews in American Politics, ed. L. Sandy Maisel. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 161-193 Katznelson, Ira. 1995. “Between separation and disappearance: Jews on the margins of American liberalism.” In Paths of emancipation: Jews, states and citizenship, eds. Pierre Birnbaum, and Ira Katznelson. Princeton: Princeton University Press , pp. 157-205. Kotler-Berkowitz, Laurence. 2005. “Friends and Politics: Linking Diverse Friendship Networks to Political Participation.” In Alan S. Zuckerman (ed.), The Social Logic of Politics. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Kotler-Berkowitz. 2015. “After Pew: Thinking about American Jewish Cohesion, Division and Assimilation.” Palo Alto: Berman Jewish Policy Archive (www.bjpa.org). Kotler-Berkowitz. 2018. “The Inevitable Tension within American Jewry.” In Arnold Dashefsky and Ira Sheskin (eds.), The American Jewish Year Book 2018. Dordrecht, Germany: Springer International Publishing. Levey, Geoffrey Braham. 1996. “Review article: The liberalism of American Jews – has it been explained?” British Journal of Political Science 26 (3): 369-401. 13

Liebman, Charles. 1973. The ambivalent American Jew. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America. Liebman, Charles, and Steven M. Cohen. 1990. Two worlds of Judaism. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lipset, Seymour Martin and Earl Raab. 1995. Jews and the new American scene. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Medding, Peter. 1977. Toward a theory of Jewish political interests and behavior. Jewish Journal of Sociology 19: 115-144. Pew Research Center. 2013. A Portrait of Jewish Americans: Findings from a Pew Research Center Survey of U.S. Jews. Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center. Pew Research Center. 2014. Political Polarization in the American Public. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center. Putnam, Robert. 200. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Rebhun, Uzi. 2016. Jews and the American Religious Landscape. New York: Columbia University Press. Schwartz, Jim, Jeffrey Scheckner and Laurence Kotler-Berkowitz. 2002. “Census of U.S. Synagogues, 2001.” American Jewish Year Book 102: 112-150. Spinrad, William. 1990. Explaining American-Jewish liberalism: Another attempt. Contemporary Jewry 11(1): 107-119. Smith, Tom W. 2005. Jewish Distinctiveness in America: A Statistical Portrait. New York: American Jewish Committee. van der Meer, Tom W.G., Jan W. van Deth, and Peer L. H. Scheepers. 2009. “The Politicized Participant Ideology and Political Action in 20 Democracies.” Comparative Political Studies 42(11): 1426-1457.

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Wald, Kenneth D. 2015. The choosing people: Interpreting the puzzling politics of American Jewry. Politics and Religion 8(1): 4-35. Wald, Kenneth D. 2019. The Foundations of American Jewish Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wald, Kenneth D. and Alison Calhoun-Brown. 2014. Religion and Politics in the United States, 7th edition. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Waxman, Dov. 2016. Trouble in the Tribe: The American Jewish Conflict over Israel. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Zuckerman, Alan S. 1990. “The Structural Sources of Cohesion and Division in the American Jewish Community.” In Michael Shapiro (ed.), Divisions between Traditionalism and Liberalism in the American Jewish Community. Lewiston, NY: The Edward Mellen Press, pp. 277-310.

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X. Tables Table 1. Political activity of congregations by religious tradition. Religious tradition

Engaged in one or more political activity (%)

Evangelical Protestant

36.5

Mainline Protestant

39.7

Black Protestant

65.0

Roman Catholic

58.8

Jewish

87.0

Other non-Christian

32.9

Total

44.1

Source: National Congregations Study cumulative data file 1998-2006-2012.

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Table 2. Congregational resources by religious tradition. Cell entries are percentages. Totals may not sum to 100 due to rounding. Congregations Evangelical Protestant

Mainline Protestant

Black Protestant

Roman Catholic

Jewish

Other nonChristian

Less than $50,000

22

26

34

13

13

32

$50,000-less than $100,000

17

15

11

8

0

2

$100,000-$200,000

15

21

9

12

6

10

$200,000 or more

16

25

6

40

56

14

Income not reported

30

13

39

27

26

42

100

100

99

100

101

100

None

34

34

48

21

26

43

One

41

43

29

18

9

19

Two or more

25

22

23

60

65

38

100

99

100

99

100

100

Congregational income

Total Full-time paid staff

Total

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Table 2 (continued). Congregational resources by religious tradition. Cell entries are percentages. Totals may not sum to 100 due to rounding. Congregations Evangelical Protestant

Mainline Protestant

Black Protestant

Roman Catholic

Jewish

Other nonChristian

Less than 100

75

67

83

26

56

80

100 to less than 200

16

19

11

15

19

13

200 or more

10

15

6

58

26

8

101

101

100

99

101

101

Total

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Table 3. Congregational political orientations, religious orientations and ties to other religious traditions, by religious tradition. Cell entries are percentages. Totals may not sum to 100 due to rounding. Congregations Evangelical Protestant

Mainline Protestant

Black Protestant

Roman Catholic

Jewish

Other nonChristian

More on the conservative side

79

46

38

46

13

22

Right in the middle

20

40

49

47

34

46

2

14

13

7

53

32

101

100

100

100

100

100

More on the conservative side

85

40

46

50

15

35

Right in the middle

14

40

44

44

24

26

2

20

11

7

61

39

101

100

101

101

100

100

No

77

71

82

80

49

75

Yes

23

29

18

20

51

25

100

100

100

100

100

100

Political orientation

More on the liberal side Total Theological orientation

More on the liberal side Total Discussed or learned about another religious tradition in past 12 months

Total

19

Table 4. Congregational activity by religious traditions. Cell entries are means of factor scores. Grand mean for each factor score is 0.

Congregations Evangelical Protestant

Mainline Protestant

Black Protestant

Roman Catholic

Jewish

Other nonChristian

Factor 1

-.07

.23

-.12

.19

.36

-.37

Factor 2

-.02

.14

-.10

.03

-.09

-.15

Factor 3

-.10

.16

.04

.04

.32

-.13

Factor 4

-.02

.07

-.02

.08

.31

-.26

Congregation activity factor scores

20

Table 5. Bivariate logistic regression models predicting congregational political activity. Cell entries are odds ratios for predictors. *** p = .000 ** .000 < p < .01 * .01 < p < .05 Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7 (= Model 6+ controlsA)

1.04

1.00

.89

.78*

.79*

.76*

.80*

Roman Catholic

3.24***

2.52***

2.55***

2.45***

2.70***

2.76***

2.52***

Black Protestant

2.02***

2.69***

2.56***

2.43***

2.53***

2.48***

2.90***

Jewish

9.72***

9.51***

5.92***

4.48**

4.18**

4.19**

3.64**

.92

1.07

.65

.52*

.54*

.56*

.51*

1.57***

1.52***

1.55***

1.49**

1.44**

1.42**

$100,000-$200,000

1.47**

1.53**

1.54**

1.50**

1.42**

1.44**

$200,000 or more

1.57**

1.63**

1.62**

1.52**

1.41*

1.35

1.03

1.10

1.12

1.15

1.14

1.11

Congregations (reference = evangelical Protestants) Mainline Protestant

Other non-Christian Congregational income (reference = less than $50,000) $50,000-less than $100,000

Income not reported

21

Table 5 (continued). Bivariate logistic regression models predicting congregational political activity. Cell entries are odds ratios for predictors. *** p = .000 ** .000 < p < .01 * .01 < p < .05 Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7 (= Model 6+ controlsA)

One

1.93***

1.91***

1.91***

1.86***

1.82***

1.82***

Two or more

2.05***

2.05***

2.05***

1.97***

1.94***

1.90***

100 to less than 200

1.34**

1.35**

1.35**

1.31*

1.29*

1.20

200 or more

1.50**

1.50**

1.51**

1.40*

1.34

1.15

1.27**

1.47**

1.48***

1.53***

1.55***

4.62***

3.58**

3.38***

3.33***

3.48***

1.30**

1.27*

1.27*

1.29*

2.02***

1.87***

1.88***

1.78**

Full-time paid staff (reference = none)

Number of adults active in congregation’s religious life (reference = less than 100)

Political orientation (reference =right in the middle) More on the conservative side More on the liberal side Theological orientation (reference = more on the conservative side) Right in the middle More on the liberal side

22

Table 5 (continued). Bivariate logistic regression models predicting congregational political activity. Cell entries are odds ratios for predictors. *** p = .000 ** .000 < p < .01 * .01 < p < .05 Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7 (= Model 6+ controlsA)

1.83***

1.79***

1.80***

Factor 1

1.06

1.07

Factor 2

1.00

1.01

Factor 3

1.21***

1.21***

Factor 4

1.01

1.01

Discussed or learned about another religious tradition in past 12 months Congregation activity factor scores

Constant

Nagelkerke (pseudo) R-square

.65***

.29***

.29***

.19***

.10***

.10***

.11***

.06

.13

.17

.17

.19

.20

.22

A

Controls in Model 7: received government funding; percent of congregation female; percent of congregation Hispanic; percent of congregation immigrants; percent of congregation over age 60; urban, suburban or rural; and region.

23