John Rapanos V. United States, Cato Legal Briefs

i QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Does the Clean Water Act prohibition on unpermitted di s c ha r g e st o“ na vi g a bl ewa t e r s ”e xt e ndt ononna vi ga bl e wetlands that do not even abut a navigable water? 2. Does extension of Clean Water Act jurisdiction to every intrastate wetland with any sort of hydrological connection to navigable waters, no matter how tenuous or r e mot et hec onne c t i on,e xc e e dCongr e s s ’ sc ons t i t ut i ona l power to regulate commerce among the states?

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Question Presented ........................................................................i Table Of Contents.........................................................................ii Table Of Authorities....................................................................iii Interest Of Amicus Curiae ............................................................ 1 Summary Of Argument ................................................................ 1 Argument...................................................................................... 3 A. Gonzales v. Raich Unde r s c or e sTha tPos i t i ve“ As s e r t i ons ofAut hor i t y ”Cl e a r l yCont a i ne dI nTheTe xtOfA Federal Statute Are A Prerequisite For Agency Action Within The Periphery Of The Federal Commerce Power................................................................................ 3 B. The“ Hy dr ol og i c a lConne c t i on”Te s tFa i l sTr a di t i ona l Commerce Clause Analysis............................................ 17 Conclusion.................................................................................. 20

iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) ....................................................... 16 Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) ......................................................... 6 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871).......................................... 5 Ex parte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629 (1884) ......................................................... 5 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) ....................................................... 16 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) ............................................ passim Rancho Viejo LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2003)...................................... 18 Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Corps of Army Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) ........................................... 3, 6, 7, 17 TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) ........................................................... 7 United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003) .......................................... 17 United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993) ............................................ 13 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) ............................................. 2, 15, 18 United States v. Morrsion, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) ................................................... 2, 18

iv United States v. Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (E.D. Mich. 2002) ......................... 2 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) ....................................................... 17 Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 1994) .......................................... 4, 6 Statutes 21 U.S.C. § 801 ............................................................ 10, 12 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) .......................................................... 1, 5 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g).............................................................. 6 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).............................................................. 5 Other Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 Envtl. L. 1 (1999) ...................................................................... 19 EPA, SSO Fact Sheet (Nov. 25, 2005) ................................. 4 Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 989 (1999) ..................................... 15, 16 Frank H. Easterbrook, St at ut e s ’Doma i ns , 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (1983) ........ 15 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 Yale L. J. 1399 (2000)............................................. 16

v Raich Pet. Br, Gonzales v. Raich (No. 03-1454).. 8, 9, 10, 11 Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 Cor ne l lJ . L.&Pub.Pol ’ y203( 2004)............................ 16 Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 823 (2005) (forthcoming) ........................................ passim Wetlands Desperado, Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 2004 ................. 2

1 INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 The Cato Institute was established in 1977 as a nonpartisan public policy research foundation dedicated to advancing the principles of individual liberty, free ma r ke t s ,a nd l i mi t e d gove r nme nt . Ca t o’ sCe nt e rf or Constitutional Studies was established in 1989 to help restore the principles of limited constitutional government, especially the idea that the U.S. Constitution establishes a government of delegated, enumerated, and thus limited powers. Toward that end, the Institute and the Center undertake a wide range of publications and programs, including, notably, publication of the Cato Supreme Court Review. The instant case raises squarely t heque s t i onoft hel i mi t soft hef e de r a lg ove r nme nt ’ s commerce power and is thus of central interest to the Cato Institute and its Center for Constitutional Studies.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The Clean Water Act expressly authorizes federal c ont r olove r“ na vi g a bl e ”wa t e r .33U. S. C.§1344 ( a ) .But the United States contends that it does more: that the Ac t ’ sr e f e r e nc et o“ na vi g a bl ewa t e r s ”a ut hor i z e sf e de r a l control of waters and land that are neither navigable nor we t .Sol onga sl a ndha sa“ hy dr ol og i c a l ”c onne c t i ont o water that is navigable, however remote the connection may be, says the government, the Clean Water Act reaches it. 1

In conformity with Supreme Court Rule 37, amicus has obtained the consent of the parties to the filing of this brief and letters of consent have been filed with the Clerk. Amicus also states that counsel for a party did not author this brief in whole or in part, and no person or entities other than the amicus, its members, and counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation and submission of this brief.

2 The risibility of this fiction is evident on the facts of this case: John Rapanos dumped sand into a man-made ditch filled with rainwater. As a result, the federal government brought criminal charges against Mr. Rapanos under the Clean Water Act based on the risk that some grains of that sand may, in an epic journey across drains, di t c he s ,a ndc r e e ks ,“ hy dr ol og i c a l l y ”we ndt he i rwa yt o the Kawkawlin River, twenty miles distant. See United States v. Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1012 (E.D. Mich. 2002). Ne ve r mi ndt ha tMr .Ra pa nos ’l a ndi snotr e motely t r a ve r s a bl ebybo a t . Ne ve r mi ndt ha tMr .Ra pa nos ’l a nd ( now de s i g na t e da sa“ we t l a nd”byt heCor ps )ha sbe e n drained of standing water since the early 1900s, when a county commission installed drains to reclaim the land for farming, rendering it as dry as a bone. See, e.g., Wetlands Desperado, Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 2004, available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id= 110005541.Whi l ei ti snot“ na vi g a bl e ”a nd i ti snot “ wa t e r , ”s a y sr e s ponde nt ,t heg ove r nme ntc a ns t i l lt r e a ti t as such as a matter of law. Re s ponde nt ’ snove la nde xpa ns i vei nt e r pr e t a t i onof t heCl e a nWa t e rAc ti sa toddswi t ht heCour t ’ smos t recent analysis of the federal commerce power in Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). In Raich, the Court presumed that federal regulations located at the periphery of the federal commerce power must be g r ounde di npos i t i ve“ a s s e r t i onsofa ut hor i t y ”( id. at 2205) clearly contained in the text of a governing federal statute. Raich’ sa na l y s i si sc ons i s t e ntwi t hake ygoal articulated by the Court in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000): promoting accountable legislative deliberation about the scope of the commerce power. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9 Lewis & Clark L.

3 Rev. 823, 834 (2005) (forthcoming), available at www.lclark.edu/org/lclr/objects/LCB94_Merrill.pdf. Raich dooms r e s ponde nt ’ s t e xt ua l l y -unmoored “ hy dr ol og i c a lc onne c t i on” t e st for agency jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. ARGUMENT RESPONDENT’ SINTERPRETATION OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT IS INCONSISTENT WITH GONZALES V. RAICH A. Gonzales v. Raich Underscores That Positive “As s e r t i onsOfAut hor i t y” Cl e ar l y Cont ai ne d In The Text Of A Federal Statute Are A Prerequisite For Agency Action Within The Periphery Of The Federal Commerce Power. Gonzales v. Raich, supra,be l i e sr e s ponde nt ’ snove l interpretation of the Clean Water Act. Raich is a case not only about the meaning of the Commerce Clause, but about where the burden of articulating a theory of the Commerce Clause in hard cases is properly assigned. In Raich, this Court assigned that burden to Congress in the first instance, underscoring that regulatory action within the periphery of the commerce power requires a clear t e xt ua lwa r r a ntc ont a i ne di na na g e nc y ’ sa ut hor i z i ng statute. 1. Re s ponde n t ’ st he or y of t he s t a t ut ei st hi s : “ Na vi g a bl ewa t e r s , ”a sus e di nt heCl e a n Wa t e rAc t , e nc ompa s swa t e rpos s e s s i nga“ hy dr ol og i c a l ”ne xus to an “ a qua t i cs y s t e m”wi t hi nt her e c og ni z e dj ur i s di c t i onoft he EPA,whe t he rornott ha twa t e ri s“ na vi ga bl e . ” Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers ( “ SWANCC” ) ,531U. S.159 (2001); Resp. Cert. Opp. 10 (quoting 42 Fed. Reg. 37,128 (1977)); Resp. Cert. Opp. 16.

4 That rule is nothing if not expansive. As Judge Easterbrook has noted, it could plausibly embrace even isolated puddles of rainwater contaminated with exhaust fumes, lacking any surface connection—man-made or otherwise—to open water. See, e.g., Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J.) (municipality filed suit suggesting that trucks parked near a Target warehouse “ dr i poi l ,whi c hc ol l e c t si nt her unof ff r om as t or m”a nd t he nc e“ i nt ot heg r ound—carrying hydrocarbons and other unwe l c omes ubs t a nc e s ”i nt ot hegr oundwa t e ra ndt hr ough t hegr oundwa t e ri nt o“ s t r e a ms ,l a ke s ,a ndoc e a ns ” ;whi l e skeptical that the statute authorized liability based on such at he or y ,J udg eEa s t e r br ooknot e dt ha t“ t hepos s i bi l i t yof hy dr ol og i c a lc onne c t i on c a nnot be de ni e d” ) . The “ hy dr ol og i c a lc onne c t i on”r ul e ,i ns hor t ,ha snol og i c a lor principled stopping point.2 2

The EPA suggests that everyday homeowner nuisances—from “ c l og g e d”or“ f r oz e n”pi p e st o“ ba s e me ntba c k ups ” —may exert “ hy dr a ul i c ”s y s t e ms t r e s sonmuni c i p a lpi p e s ,wh i c hi nt u r n may cumulatively impact water far removed from individual parcels of property. See, e.g., EPA, SSO Fact Sheet 2-4 (Nov. 25, 2005), available at www.epa.gov/npdes/sso/control/indext.htm ( “ f r e e z e / t h a w c y c l e s ”a nd“ c l o g g e da ndc ol l a p s e dl i ne sduet or o otg r owt h a nd a c c umul a t i o n ofde b r i s ,s e d i me nt ,oi la nd g r e a s e ”c a n c umul a t i v e l yr e s u l ti n“ hy dr a ul i cs t r e s s ”on“ ot h e rpa r t s ”o ft he s y s t e m,whi c h ma ye v e nt ua l l yi mpa c t“ r i v e r s ,s t r e a ms ,a nd e s t u a r i e s ” ) ;id.a t5( “ Anunt o l dnumbe rofpr i v a t eba s e me nt backups occur each year . . . [not only] caus[ing] structural da ma g et obui l di ngf r a me s ”a nd“ e l e c t r i c a la ndg a sa pp l i a nc e s , ” but“ f r e que nt l ys pi l l [ i ng ]i nt o home owne ry a r d s ” ) ;id. at 4 (suggesting that while i ti s“ h a r dt og a ug e ”t h ed e g r e eof environment impact of such localized plumbing problems on t he de g r a da t i on o f wa t e r wa y s ,t h e ya r e“ s u s p e c t e da sa c ont r i bu t i ngf a c t or ” ) .I ft he“ hy dr ol og i c a lc onne c t i o n”r u l ei s t a k e ns e r i ous l y ,a ndt h eEPA’ se v i d e nc ei scredited, there is no

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The rule also has no basis in the text of the Clean Water Act. Three textual hooks for the rule present themselves, but not one is a remotely plausible basis for r e c og ni z i ng t he “ hy dr ol og i c a lc onne c t i on” t e s t . Fi r s t , Section 404(a) of the Act authorizes federal control over “ na vi g a bl ewa t e r s . ” 33U. S. C.§1344(a); 33 U.S.C. § 1362( 7) . Thet e r m“ na vi g a bl ewa t e r s ”i snot ,howe ve r , a mbi g uous : a st hi sCour tha sl ong he l d,“ na vi ga bl e wa t e r s ”a r et hos et h a ta r e“ us e dora r es us c e pt i bl eofbe i ng used . . . as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel a r eorma ybec onduc t e d. ”The Daniel Ball, 77 U. S.( 10 Wa l l . )557,563 ( 1871) . The t e r m’ spl a i n meaning cannot support jurisdiction over water that is not so described. Nor can respondent find recourse in 33 U.S.C. § 1362( 7) ,whi c h de f i ne s“ na vi ga bl e wa t e r s ” unde rt he Cl e a nWa t e rAc ta st he“ wa t e r soft heUni t e dSt a t e s . ” As Ex parte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629 (1884), held long ago, the “ wa t e roft heUn i t e dSt a t e s ”i st ha twhi c he nc ompa s s e s “ na vi g a bl ewa t e r ”us e d“ f orc omme r c ebe t we e npor t sa nd places of differ e ntSt a t e s . ”Id. at 632. Tobes ur e ,“ wa t e r soft heUni t e dSt a t e s ”i sat e r m of art, derived from admiralty law. See id. Might it therefore encompass administrative glosses on the Act, including the hydrological connection test? No again: This Court has consistently held that terms of art, when l og i c a lba s i sf o rde ny i ngf e de r a l“ po l i c epowe r ”ov e rt hed i r t that flows from garden tools and soiled hands into the kitchen sink and bathroom shower drain. Yet, to date, even the EPA has not suggested it possesses the kind of general permit power over private homeowners claimed by counties and municipalities.

6 susceptible of multiple interpretations, must be construed according to the meaning that best accords with, and does not render superfluous, the plain text of the Act itself. See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490U. S.730,741( 1989)( whe r et het e r m“ e mpl oy e e ”i sa term of art susceptible of several interpretations under the law of agency, the Court will choose the meaning most “ c ons i s t e ntwi t ht het e xtoft heAc t . ” ) . He r e ,t ha tr ul e dicta t e st ha tt het e r m“ wa t e r soft heUni t e dSt a t e s ”mus t be assumed to qualify and narrow, not supplant and 3 e xpa nd,t het e xt ua lt e r m“ na vi g a bl e . ” The remaining possible textual basis for the “ hy dr ol og i c a lc onne c t i on”t e s ti sSe c t i on404( g )oft he Act. Section 404(g) mandates reporting requirements for state programs that issue permits for the dredging or infill of“ na vi g a bl ewa t e r s , ”butc ont a i nsamur kypa r e nt he t i c a l t ha tr e f e r st o“ na vi g a bl ewa t e r s( other than those waters which are presently used, or are susceptible to use in their natural condition or by reasonable improvement as a me a nst ot r a ns por ti nt e r s t a t eorf or e i g nc omme r c e ... ) . ” 33U. S. C.§1344( g )( e mpha s i sa dde d) .Thewor ds“ ot he r t ha n, ”r e s ponde n tha sa r g ue d,ma ys ugg e s tCong r e s s understa nds t he t e r m “ na vi g a bl e ”t oe xt e nd be y ond wa t e r sa c t ua l l y“ na vi g a bl e . ” See, e.g., SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171 (providing overview of government argument premised on Section 404(g)).

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See also Village of Oconomowoc Lake, 24 F.3d at 965 ( “ ‘ Wa t e r sof the United States’mus tbeas ub s e tof‘ wa t e r ’ ; otherwise why insert the qualifying phrase in the statute? (No one suggests that the function of this phrase is to distinguish dome s t i cwa t e r sf r om t hos eofCa n a dao rMe x i c o. ) ” )( e mpha s i s in original).

7 Even if such an inference were possible, it does not follow that Congress intended to grant respondent a ut hor i t yove ra l lwa t e r s“ hy dr ol og i c a l l yc onne c t e d”t o navigable water. The hydrological connection rule has no discernable stopping point. It would render the terms “ na vi g a bl e ”a nd“ wa t e r soft heUni t e dSt a t e s ”i ne f f e c t i ve as meaningful limits on federal regulatory jurisdiction. Put another way, the hydrological principle would support jurisdiction in nearly all cases, leaving the terms “ na vi g a bl e ”a ndwa t e r s“ oft heUni t e dSt a t e s ”wi t hl i t t l et o do. Whatever Section 404(g) may mean, it cannot be attributed a meaning that either reads the plain text out of the statute or that renders that text insignificant as a practical matter. As this Court held in TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001), a statutory construction that “ r e s ul t [ s ][ i n ]ar ul enowhe r ec ont a i ne di nt het e xt... [ t ha t ]woul ddot hebul koft ha tpr ovi s i on’ swor k,whi l ea proviso accounting for more than half of that text would l i edor ma nti na l lbutt hemos tunl i ke l ys i t ua t i ons , ”i s categorically disfavored. Id. at 31. In sum, the plain text of the Clean Water Act cannot support the claim that non-navigable water with a “ hy dr ol og i c a lc onne c t i on”t ona vi ga bl ewa t e ri swi t hi n federal regulatory jurisdiction. 2. The government has suggested its capacious reading of the Clean Water Act accords with the Comme r c eCl a us e .Re s p.Ce r t .Opp.25( “ Thepowe rt o protect navigable waters is part of the commerce power g i ve nt oCong r e s s . ” ) .Tha ta r g ume nte c hoe spa s tr ul i ng s oft hi sCour tt ha ts ugg e s tt ha t“ na vi ga bl ewa t e r s ”i nc l ude all waters within the scope of the federal commerce power. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168 n.3 (statement in Conf e r e nc eRe po r tt ha t“ t het e r m‘ na vi g a bl ewa t e r s ’be g i ve nt hebr oa de s tpos s i bl ec ons t i t ut i ona li nt e r pr e t a t i on” s i g ni f i e s“ t ha tCo ng r e s si ntended to exert . . . its c omme r c epowe rove rna vi ga t i on” ) ;see also id. at 181,

8 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Corps argues t ha tt hes t a t ut er e qui r e si t“ t opr ot e c twa t e rqua l i t yt of ul l e xt e ntoft heComme r c eCl a us e , ”a ndt ha ti snotc onfined onl yt ot he“ ve r yhe a r t l a ndofi t sc omme r c epowe r ” ) . Yet, in the wake of Gonzales v. Raich the Commerce Clause is not available to respondent as a tool for c i r c umve nt i ng t e xt ua lpr obl e mswi t ht he“ hy dr ol og i c a l c onne c t i on” t e s t : Thi s Cour t ’ s de c i s i on in Raich underscores that the plain text of statutes enacted by Congress is the sole guide for agencies acting, as the Corps and EPA do here, within the periphery of the commerce power. a. Raich’ s i mpl i c i t“ c l e a rs t a t e me nt ” r ul e —its preference for agency action grounded in the clear text of a governing statute—is evident when the legislative record before the Court in Raich is compared with the evidence upon which the majority actually relied in that case. Respondents in Raich challenged the application of schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act to wholly intrastate, medicinal use of cannabis under the Commerce Clause. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2200. Both parties in the case agreed that application of the CSA to medicinal cannabis, if it was to be uphel d,mus tr e s tonCong r e s s ’ s residual power over commerce under the Necessary and Proper Clause. As the Attorney General explained, under t heg ove r nme nt ’ st he or y ,t heNe c e s s a r ya ndPr ope rCl a us e allowed Congress to reach intrastate use of medical marijuana be c a us er e g ul a t i onofs uc hus ei s“ a ne s s e nt i a l pa r tofal a r g e rr e g u l a t i onofe c onomi ca c t i vi t y . ”See, e.g., Raich Pet. Br. 12, Gonzales v. Raich (No. 03-1454) (quoting Lopez,514U. S.a t561)( he r e i na f t e r“ Raich Pet. Br . ” ) . Accordingly, the Attorney Gene r a l ’ sbr i e f si nRaich strove toward one end: creating a legislative record that mi g hts uppor tade f e r e nt i a lj udi c i a lf i ndi ngof“ ne c e s s i t y . ”

9 See, e.g., id. at 16-20( c ompi l i ng“ l e g i s l a t i vej udg me nt s regarding whether the intrastate activity at issue subs t a nt i a l l ya f f e c t si nt e r s t a t ec omme r c e ” ) . In an effort to compile that record, the Attorney General highlighted three different categories of legislative findings: First, he quoted extensively from findings found in the legislative history of the Controlled Substances Act. See id. at 17-18 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 1, 3. 6 (the Act establishes a “ c ompr e he ns i ve ” a nd “ ‘ c l os e d’ s y s t e m of dr ug di s t r i but i on” ) ) ;id. at 18-19 (quoting S. Rep. No. 613, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 3-4) (the drug trade constitutes “ c omme r c i a la c t i vi t y ”t ha t“ t a ke spl a c ei ni nt e r s t a t ea nd f or e i g nc omme r c e ” ) ) ;see id. at 17-18 (quoting S. Rep. No. 613, supra, at 3 (Congress was concerned with preventing diversion of controlled substances from legal to illicit channels)); id. at 19 (quoting S. Rep. No. 613, supra, at 3-4 ( n ot i ng s c ope of “ nonme di c a l ”a nd “ nonpr e s c r i pt i on” c r os s -border drug smuggling)); id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 613, supra, at 2, 3 (at time of passage, marijuana offenses accounted for “ t hebul kof dr uga r r e s t s ” ) ) ;id. at 22-23 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1444, supra,pt .1,a t29( Cong r e s sde e me di t“ ne c e s s a r yt oma ke the controls . . . applicable to all controlled substances regardless of whether they or their components have ever been outsi det heSt a t ei nwhi c ht he ya r ef ound” ) ) ;id. at 23 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1444, supra, pt. 1, at 29 (controlled substances commonly flow through interstate commerce “ i mme di a t e l ypr i ort o...pos s e s s i on” ) ) . Second, the Attorney General relied on factual findings of executive branch agencies entrusted with enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act. See id. at 18-19 (quoting DEA, Drug Trafficking in the United States 1 (Sept. 2001) (the drug trade generally constitutes

10 “ c omme r c i a la c t i vi t y ”t ha t“ t a ke splace in interstate and f or e i g nc omme r c e ” ) ) ;id. at 19 (quoting Drug Availability Steering Committee, Drug Availability in the United States 103 (Dec. 2002) (documenting the current economic value of the trade in recreational marijuana)). Third, the Attorney General relied on additional statutory findings, contained within the enacted text of the Controlled Substance Act, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 801(1)-(6) ( e xpr e s s i ngCong r e s s ’ sj udg me ntt ha ta“ ma j orpor t i onof the traffic in controlled substances flows through interstate a ndf or e i g nc omme r c e ” ;a nd“ [ i ] nc i de nt soft het r a f f i c which are not an integral part of the interstate or foreign flow . . . nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect uponi nt e r s t a t ec omme r c e ” ) .See Raich Pet. Br. at 4-5, 23, 31, 39 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 801). The Attorney General argued that, together, those sources demonstrated Congress had made an intelligible, deference-worthy judgment that regulating local pos s e s s i onofma r i j ua nai s“ ne c e s s a r y ”t oe f f e c t i vef e de r a l control of interstate trafficking. Id. at 16, 20-21, 23-24, 28-29, 43. b. The Raich Cour the l dt ha tCong r e s s ’ sl e g i s l a t i ve findings deserved substantial deference. In so holding, however, the Court marginalized supporting evidence extraneous to the text and structure of the CSA. Indeed, legislative judgments contained in the legislative history—which had figured so prominently in t he At t or ne y Ge ne r a l ’ s br i e f s —were almost entirely 4 e xc l ude df r om t hema j or i t y ’ sa na l y s i s . The Court turned 4

Th eCour t ’ ss o l eus eofl e g i s l a t i v ehi s t o r yt os up por tt h e e xi s t e n c e ofa ma t e r i a l“ l e g i s l a t i v ej u dg me nt ”i sfound in footnote 21, where the Court refers to legislative history that e v i de nc e sCong r e s s ’ s“ pa r t i c ul a r ”c onc e r nwi t ht he“ ne e dt o prevent the diversion of drugs from legitimate to illicit

11 a blind eye to that history even though it (1) contained the r e c or d’ s only direct and unqualified statement of “ l e g i s l a t i vej udg me nt ”t ha tc a t e g or i c a lc ont r olof“ a l l ” i nt r a s t a t e us e of ma r i j ua na i s“ ne c e s s a r y ”t ot he suppression of marijuana in the interstate marketplace and also (2) contained the only evidence, however indirect, that Congress was aware marijuana may have medicinal, or some other social, value. See, e.g., id. at 23 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1444, supra, pt. 1, at 29 (Congress deemed i t“ necessary to make the controls of [the CSA] applicable to all controlled substances regardless of whether they or their components have ever been outside the State in whi c ht he ya r ef ound” )( e mpha s i sa dde d) ) ;Raich Pet. Reply at 9 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1444, supra, pt. 1, at 12 ( not i ngt ha t“ t here are some who would not only advocate 5 [ ma r i j ua na ’ s ]l e g a l i z a t i onbute nc our a gei t sus e ” ) ) . I ns t e a d,t he Cour tf oc us e d on t he CSA’ se xpr e s s t e xt ua lf i ndi ng s :t ha ta“ ma j orpor t i onoft het r a f f i ci n c ha nne l s . ”Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2203 n. 21 (citing United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 135 (1975) and H.R. Rep. No. 1444, pt. 2, at 22 (1970)). However, this evidence did not add to the textual evidence, but rather concerned the intensity of legislative concerns that the Court noted were independently apparent in the text and structure of the CSA. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2203-04 (noting that the structure of the CSA e v i de nc e sa d e s i r et od e v i s e“ ac l os e dr e g ul a t or ys y s t e m making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled substances except in a manner a ut ho r i z e dbyt h eCSA” )( c i t i ng21U. S. C.§§811,812 ,821-30, 841(a)(1), 844(a)). 5

By contrast, the legislative findings contained in 21 U.S.C. § 801( 6 )s t a t e d onl yt ha tc ont r olo fi n t r a s t a t e“ i n c i de n t s of t r a f f i c ” —no t“ a l l ”s i mpl e noncommercial intrastate use, unconnected with traffic—i s“ e s s e nt i a l ”t ot hei n t e g r i t yoft h e ban on interstate trafficking in controlled substances. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 801(6).

12 controlled substances flows through interstate comme r c e , ” t ha tl oc a l“ di s t r i but i on a nd pos s e s s i on” c ont r i but et o “ s we l l i ngt hei nt e r s t a t et r a f f i ci ns uc hs ubs t a nc e s , ”a nd t ha te nf or c e me nt di f f i c ul t i e s “ a t t e nd di s t i n g ui s hi ng be t we e n ma r i j ua na c ul t i va t e dl oc a l l y ”a nd ma r i j ua na grown in and transported from another state. See Raich, 125 S.Ct .a t 2203 ( not i ng t ha t Congr e s s ’ s“ ma i n obj e c t i ve s ”we r et o“ c onque rdr uga bus ea ndt oc ont r olt he legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled s ubs t a nc e s ” )( quot i ng 21 U. S. C.§§ 801( 1) -(6)); id. ( s t a t i ng t ha t“ Cong ress devised a closed regulatory s y s t e m” )( c i t i ng 2 1 U. S. C.§ 841( a ) ( 1) ) ;id. at 2208 ( not i ngt ha t“ [ f ] i ndi ng si nt hei nt r oduc t or ys e c t i onsoft he CSA explain why Congress deemed it appropriate to e nc ompa s sl oc a la c t i vi t i e swi t hi nt hes c opeoft heCSA” ) (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 801(1)-(6)); id. at 2208 (noting Cong r e s s ’ sj udg me nta boutt he“ e nf or c e me ntdi f f i c ul t i e s that attend distinguishing between marijuana cultivated l oc a l l ya nd ma r i j ua na g r own e l s e whe r e ” )( c i t i ng 21 U.S.C. § 801(5)). Raich’ ss e l e c t i ve t r e atment of the record evidence hi g hl i g ht st hede c i s i on’ si mpor tf ort hi sc a s e : Whe n federal agencies seeks deference for actions within the periphery of the federal commerce power, Raich suggests judgments evident in, and supported by, the clear text of a federal statute—not those contained in extraneous sources—deserve judicial deference.6

6

TheCour ta l s or e l i e d ,i naf oot n ot e ,ont hef a c tt h a tt h eCSA’ s textual scope has been replicated by other statutes that similarly aim to effect a comprehensive ban on interstate traffic in a proscribed article of commerce, see, e.g., Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211 n.36 (treating parallel statutory structure as evidence that the enforcement choices reflected in the CSA are rational). That evidence remains squarely focused on text—i.e., on

13 To be sure, the Court rejected the argument that l e g i s l a t i on, t o qua l i f yf or de f e r e nc e , mus t“ c ont a i n detailed findings proving that each activity regulated within a comprehensive scheme is essential to the s t a t ut or ys c he me . ” Id. at 2208 n.32. That objection, howe ve r ,doe snotg a i ns a yt hef a c tt ha tt heCSA’ st e xt monopolized the Raich ma j or i t y ’ sa na l y s i s :i tme r e l y denies that the text must identify with specificity each possible challenged application of the statute in advance. For the Raich Court, it was enough that the statute, through its text and structure, reflected a coherent theory of“ ne c e s s i t y ” —namely, that local transactions have a di r e c te c onomi c( a“ s we l l i ng ” )e f f e c tons uppl yi nt he interstate market. Id. at 2207. Any further requirement— i.e., that Congress must anticipate a challenge premised on state authorization of medicinal cannabis use—would be “ i mpr a c t i c a l . ” Id.a t2208 n. 32 ( “ [ s ] uc ha ne xa c t i ng requirement [of precise specificity] is not only unpr e c e de nt e d,i ti sa l s oi mpr a c t i c a l ” ) .See also Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. at 850 (endorsing clear statement rule, but noting that i twoul dbe“ unus ua l ,no tt os a yunwor ka bl e , ”t oma ket he t e s tt ur nonCong r e s s ’ sa bi l i t yt oi de nt i f yi na dva nc ee a c h specific factual application authorized). c. By anchoring record analysis of regulatory “ ne c e s s i t y ”ont hec l e a rt e xt ua lc hoi c e sc ont a i ne di nt he four corners of the Controlled Substance Act, Raich r e t a i nss omec ons i s t e nc ywi t ht heCour t ’ spr i orComme r c e Clause analysis in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison. In Lopez, the Fifth Circuit struck down the Gun Free School Zones Act based on the absence of pertinent legislative findings (United States v. inferences that may be drawn from the replication of enacted text and statutory structure in other, parallel statutory schemes.

14 Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367 (5th Cir. 1993)); the Supreme Court, in turn, cited the absence of legislative findings as oneoft hef a c t or st ha tdi s a bl e dade t e r mi na t i on“ t ha tt he activity . . . substantially affec t e di nt e r s t a t ec omme r c e . ” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563. See also Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. at 83637.Andt het e xto ft heVi ol e nc eAg a i ns tWome n’ sAc t , struck down in Morrison,i nc l ude d as i mi l a r l y“ ba r e assertion of power to legislate; there [was] no explication in the text of the constitutional theory that would support legislation under the Commerce Clause, nor any e nume r a t i on of f i ndi ngs i nt he t e xt . ” See Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. at 848.7 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (2000). The clear statement rule also respects the overarching liberty principles that Lopez and Morrison s oug htt os e c ur e .“ Wes t a r twi t hf i r s tpr i nc i pl e s , ”Chi e f Justice Rehnquist famously wrote in Lopez. “ [ T] he powers delegated by the . . . Constitution to the federal g ove r nme nta r ef e wa ndde f i ne d” —an enumeration that in t ur n“ [ e ] ns ur [ e s ]pr ot e c t i onofourf unda me nt a ll i be r t i e s . ” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552. Clear statement rules, like the kind practiced in Raich, offer additional protection for liberty interests that the enumeration of powers in Article I and the separation of powers more generally are designed to safeguard. As Judge (then-Professor) Frank Easterbrook notes: Those who wrote and approved the Constitution thought that most social relations should be 7

While Congress did make legislative findings when it passed the Violence Against Women Act, those findings were c ont a i ne di nt he Ac t ’ sl e g i s l a t i v e hi s t o r y . See Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. at 848.

15 governed by private agreements . . . . A rule declaring statutes inapplicable unless they plainly resolve or delegate the solution of the matter respects this position. It either preserves the private decisions or remits the questions to other statutes through which the legislature may have addressed the problem . . . . [But] [u]ntil the legislature supplies a fix or authorizes someone else to do so, . . . judges [have no reason] to rush in. Frank H. Easterbrook, St at ut e s ’Domai ns , 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 549-50 (1983). d. The clear statement rule also mitigates the risk that agencies will interpret Raich as an invitation to executive aggrandizement. The risk is palpable: If, after Raich, agencies can use legislative history, statutory purpose, or context to manufacture ambiguity nowhere apparent from the text of a statute, and if, in turn, agencies interpreting t he i rpowe runde r“ a mbi g uous ”s t a t ut e sa r eg r a nt e dbot h the full quantum of deference owed to Congress under Raich and under Chevron, the potential for agency aggrandizement is immense, indeed. See Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. at 834 (clear statement rule protects against threat that executive actors will “ l e ve r a ge ”gr a nt sofpowe r“ i nt o r e g ul a t i onst ha te xpa ndf e de r a la ut hor i t yi nne w wa y s , ” t he r e by “ uni l a t e r a l l yc ha ng i ng t he s c ope of f e de r a l a ut hor i t y ” ) . The clear statement test reduces that risk by ensuring that agency action at the outer limits of federal power (where the risk of agency aggrandizement is greatest, see, e.g., Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 989, 991-92( 1999)( “ c onc e r na bouta g e nc ya gg r a ndi z e me nti s a ti t sh i g he s t ”...“ [ w] h e r e agency self-interest is directly

16 i mpl i c a t e d” ) ) ,i sc a bi ne dbya nobj e c t i vel i mi t i ngs t a nda r d 8 grounded in the text of the statute. 3.Appl i e dt ot he“ hy dr ol og i c a lc onne c t i on”t e s t ,t he Raich “ c l e a rs t a t e me nt ”r ul edoomsr e s ponde nt ’ sbi dt o criminalize pe t i t i one r ’ sc onduc ti nt hi sc a s e .Ase ve nt he respondent must concede, neither the text nor the structure of the Clean Water Act provides any warrant for the “ hy dr ol og i c a lc on ne c t i on”t e s t .See also Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. at 849 ( not i ngt ha tt heCo ur twoul dbec or r e c tt oi nva l i da t e“ a ny . . . construction of the Clean Water Act grounded in a 8

Concern about executive aggrandizement is not new to the Cour t : i ti se c ho e di nt h e Cou r t ’ se v ol v i ng a pp r oa c ht o Chevron deference, which has suggested (1) that the “ r e a s o na bl e ne s s ”p r o ngi ns t e pt wooft h eChevron test should be applied to prohibit open-ended assertions of federal regulatory authority under an ambiguous organic statute (see, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388 (1999) (agency interpretation fails Chevron step two because agency f a i l e dt os upp l ya“ l i mi t i n gs t a nda r d,r a t i o na l l yr e l a t e dt ot he goals oft heAc t ” ) ;see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 Yale L. J. 1399 (2000)); and (2) that deference is particularly inappropriate where the interpretation implicates the a g e nc y ’ ss e l f -interest in perpetuating its own power. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S.120,159( 2000 )( “ Ac our tma ya l s oa s kwhe t he rt hel e g a l question is an important one. Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the course of the s t a t ut e ’ s da i l ya dmi ni s t r a t i on. ” ) . See also Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 Cor ne l lJ . L.& Pub.Pol ’ y203,262( 200 4)( n ot i ng, after careful analysis, that Brown & Williamson “ wo ul da pp e a rt opr ov i dea rationale for questioning any interpretation that serves to e xpa nd t he r e a c h ofa na dmi ni s t r a t i v ea g e nc y ’ sr e g ul a t o r y a ut ho r i t y ” ) .

17 substantial effect analysis, since Congress never articulated an intention to permit regulation on that t he or y ” ) .Atbe s t ,t he“ hy dr ol og i c a lc onne c t i on”t e s tf i nds support in indirect legislative history (i.e., Congressional acquiescence to executive interpretations and speculative inferences derived from unenacted legislative proposals). See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132-39 (1985); SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 18081, 183-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Because the hydrological connection rule has no basis in statutory text and would extend agency power at the periphery of the federal commerce power (Resp. Cert. Opp. at 22 (suggesting power over non-navigable waters is rooted in peripheral power over channels of commerce granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause) (quoting United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 707 (4th Cir. 2003)), it must be rejected. B. The“Hydr ol ogi c alConne c t i on”Te s tFai l s Traditional Commerce Clause Analysis While this case is resolvable on the basis of clearstatement principles, it is also capable of resolution—and should be resolved—based on an independent, nondeferential judicial analysis of the Clean Water Act under the Commerce Clause. The wetlands regulation at issue here does not purport t o di r e c t l yr e g ul a t e“ c ha nne l s ”or“ i ns t r ume nt a l i t i e sof c omme r c e , ” butr a t he rt or e g ul a t ea c t i vi t yt ha tma y indirectly affect channels or instrumentalities. As such, the regulation is justifiable solely under the third prong of commerce clause regulation identified in United States v. Lopez:a sr e g ul a t i onofa c t i vi t yt ha t“ s ubs t a nt i a l l ya f f e c t s ” interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60. Yet, as United States v. Morrison made clear, isolated local activity cannot be aggregated under the substantial effects t e s tunl e s st hea c t i vi t yi si t s e l f“ e c onomi c ”i n na t ur e .

18 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610. Raich did not dispute this holding: To the contrary, the Court expressly reiterated Morrison’ ss t a t e me ntt ha t ,unde rt he“ s ubs t a nt i a le f f e c t s ” t e s t ,“ e c onomi ca c t i vi t y ”f or ms t he pr ope rba s i sf or aggregation, see Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211. Indeed, the Raich Court upheld the Controlled Subs t a nc e s Ac tnotonl y be c a us et he CSA “ di r e c t l y r e g ul a t e se c onomi c ,c omme r c i a la c t i vi t y , ”i nc l udi ngt he “ pr oduc t i on, di s t r i but i on, a nd c ons umpt i on of c ommodi t i e s ”( id.), but because the CSA does so with the intent to affect prices and distribution within a larger market. Id. at 2207 n.29 (noting that in Wickard, Cong r e s ss oug htt o“ pr ot e c ta nd s t a bi l i z e ”t he“ whe a t ma r ke t , ”whi l eCong r e s ss oug ht ,unde rt heCont r ol l e d Substances Act, to eradicate the marijuana market); id. at 2208( “ a si n Wickard, when it enacted comprehensive legislation to regulate the interstate market in a fungible commodity, Congress was acting well within its authority t o‘ ma kea l lLa wswhi c hs ha l lbene c e s s a r ya ndpr ope r ’t o ‘ r e g ul a t eComme r c e ’ ” ) . Here, it is impossibl et odi s c e r na ny“ c omme r c i a l ”or “ e c onomi c ”ne xu si nt hes e ns ea r t i c ul a t e dbyMorrison and Raich. Lopez di r e c t soura t t e nt i ont o“ t heactivity be i ngr e g ul a t e d” —here, literally, the filling of a ditch in a cornfield with sand. See, e.g., Rancho Viejo LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J . ,di s s e nt i ngf r om de ni a lofr e h’ ge nba nc ) . Eve ni fi t might be argued that the dumping of sand is the “ di s t r i but i on”or“ c ons umpt i on”ofac ommodi t y( s i nc e sand can be bought and sold), and that the use of sand will—multiplied across thousands of cornfields, bogs, sand boxes, and drainage ditches—“ a f f e c t ”t he g oi ng price for sand bags nationally, no one can plausibly argue that the Clean Water Act is designed to regulate the price of sand trafficked on the interstate market. Compare Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207 n.29 (noting that Congress

19 sought, under the Controlled Substances Act, to eradicate t hema r i j ua na“ ma r ke t ” ) . Indeed, any such suggestion would raise serious concerns that the Clean Water Act is premised on exactly the sort of pretextual Commerce Clause justifications that both the majority and dissent in Raich suggested are impermissible. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2210 n.34 ( r e c og ni z i ngpos s i bi l i t yof“ ‘ e va s i ve ’l e g i s l a t i on”wr i t t e n “ f ort hepur pos eo ft a r g e t i ngpur e l yl oc a la c t i vi t y ”but denying the CSA was such a statue); id. at 2223 ( O’ Connor ,J . , di s s e n t i ng )( wa r ni ng of “ e va s i ve ” legislative strategies in which Congress regulates “ c ompr e he ns i ve l y , ”i nor de rt or e c e i vede f e r e nc eunde r Raich,butdoe ss o“ e xc l us i ve l yf ort hes a keofr e a c hi ng 9 i nt r a s t a t ea c t i vi t y ” ) .

9

Nor, for that matter, is the class of activity defined in the Clean Water Act inherently commercial, as the Court has required in Raich a ndot h e rc a s e s :“ Th eCor psh a sa s s e r t e dt h a t i tc ou l dr e g ul a t e‘ wa l k i ng ,bi c y c l y i ng ord r i v i ng av e hi c l e t hr oug hawe t l a nd, ’i fi ts oc hos e ,b e c a us es uc ha c t i v i ties could r e s u l ti nt h e‘ d i s c ha r g e of d r e dg e d ma t e r i a l . ’ Cl e a r l y , regulatory authority of this scope extends far beyond the r e g ul a t i onofpu r e l yc omme r c i a la c t i v i t y . ”J ona t ha nH.Adl e r , Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 Envtl. L. 1, 35 (1999).

20 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit should be overruled. Respectfully submitted, TIMOTHY LYNCH (Counsel Of Record) MARK K. MOLLER THE CATO INSTITUTE 1000 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 842-0200 Counsel for Amicus Curiae

December 2005.