Jeff.docx

RULE 128 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODEGELIO TURCO, JR., aka "TOTONG", accused-appellant. G.R. No. 137757, August 14, 2000

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka “Totong”) was charged with the rape of his neighbor 13-year-old Escelea Tabada. Escelea was about to sleep when she heard a familiar voice calling her from outside her house. She recognized appellant Turco immediately as she had known him for 4 years and he is her second cousin. Unaware of the danger that was about to befall her, Escelea opened the door. Turco, with the use of towel, covered Escelea’s face, placed his right hand on the latter’s neck and bid her to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig pen which was about 12 meters away from the victim’s house, appellant lost no time in laying the victim on the grass, laid on top of the victim and took off her short pants and panty and succeeded in pursuing his evil design-by forcibly inserting his penis inside Escelea’s private part despite Escelea’s resistance. Appellant then threatened her that he will kill her if she reports the incident to anybody. For almost 10 days, she just kept the incident to herself until she was able to muster enough courage to tell her brother-in-law, Orlando Pioquinto, who in turn informed Alejandro, the victim’s father, about the rape of his daughter. Alejandro did not waste time and immediately asked Escelea to see a doctor for medical examination and eventually file a complaint after the issuance of the medical certificate. Turco, meanwhile, alleged that he and Escelea were sweethearts. The trial court found Turco guilty of the charge. In his appeal, Turco argues, among others, that no actual proof was presented that the rape of the complainant actually happened considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to explain the same.

ISSUE: Whether the medical certificate issued by medico-legal officer cannot be admitted as evidence since he was not presented.

HELD: No. In People vs. Bernaldez, the court a quo erred in giving weight to the medical certificate issued by the examining physician despite the failure of the latter to testify. While the certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official records constitute exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since it involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. We place emphasis on the distinction between admissibility by evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or the law or the rules or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence us determined by it’s by its relevance and competence, admissibility is, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down with the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception. In addition, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very little probative value due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate stating that there was hymen rupture, secondary to penile insertion as well as “foulsmelling discharges. The diagnosis was ruptured hymen secondary to rape. In fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the victim herself which, standing alone even without medical examination, is sufficient to convict. It is well-settled that a medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape it is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victim’s testimony alone is credible and sufficient to convict.

RULE 129 CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GERARDO GARCIA — CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA, MODESTA PARAYNO — NARCISO PARAYNO, JUAN ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA — SIMEON DILIMAN, AQUILINO BARRIOS — LEONORA RUIZ, LAUREANO DIZO, BERNABE AYUDA — LEOGARDA DE LOS SANTOS, ISABELO OBAOB — ANDREA RIPARIP, JOSE BARRIENTOS, URBANO RAMOS,1 ELENA RAMOS, ESTEFANIA NEPACINA, MODESTA SANCHEZ, MARCIAL LAZARO, MARCIANA ALANO, HONORIO BERIÑO — SEDORA ORAYLE, GLORIA VELASCO, WILARICO RICAMATA, BENEDICTO DIAZ, ANA DEQUIZ — (MRS.) ALUNAN, LORENZO CARANDANG, JUAN PECAYO, FELICIDAD MIRANDA — EMIGDIO EGIPTO, defendants-appellants. G.R. No. L-26053, February 21, 1967

FACTS: Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area, bordering Kansas, Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to the present. In November, 1947, the presence of defendants having previously been discovered were given by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits each labeled "lease contract” to occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. Defendants Isabelo Obaob and Gerardo Garcia (in the name of Marta A. Villanueva) received their permits from Mayor Manuel de la Fuente on January 29 and March 18, respectively, both of 1948. The rest of the 23 defendants exhibited none. For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals. Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School, which was close, though not contiguous, to the property had a pressing need to expand. The City Engineer gave the defendands 30 days each to vacate the premises and to remove the constructions therein. This was followed by the City Treasurer’s demand on each defendant for the payment of the amount due by reason of the occupancy. The defendants refused, alleging that they have acquired the legal status of tenants by reason of the written permits issued them.

ISSUE: Whether the defendants would benefit from the inadmissibility of the certificate as evidence. HELD: No. The courts in Manila are required to take judicial notice of ordinances by the City of Manila. The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That document recites that the amount of P100,000.00, had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-1963 Manila City Budget, for the construction of an additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. It is indeed correct to say that the court below, at the hearing, ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, in the decision under review, the trial judge obviously revised his views. He there declared that there was need for defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the very document, Exhibit E, aforesaid. It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its power, to make it formable to law and justice. Such was done here. Defendants' remedy was to bring to the attention of the court its contradictory stance. Not having done so, this Court will not reopen the case solely for this purpose. Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not profit defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken-because he was duty bound to take-judicial notice of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila. And, Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100, 000.00 was set aside for the "construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. Furthermore, defendants' position is vulnerable to assault from a third direction. Defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that they have permits from the mayor is at best flimsy. The permits to occupy are revocable on thirty days’ notice. They have been asked to leave; they refused to heed. It is in this factual background that we say that the city's need for the premises is unimportant. The city's right to throw defendants out of the area cannot be gainsaid. The city's dominical right to possession is paramount. If error there was in the finding that the city needs the land, such error is harmless and will not justify reversal of the judgment below.

RULE 130

BEST EVIDENCE RULE HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON, PETITIONERS, vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ AND VALENTINA CLAVE, REPRESENTED BY REV. MAXIMO ALVAREZ, JR.,RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 170604, September 2, 2013

FACTS: Plaintiffs are the heirs of Maximo Alvarez Sr. while the defendants are the heirs of Margarita Prodon. The plaintiffs filed a complaint for quieting of title with respect to a particular land in which they alleged that their parents had been in possession of the land and the registered owner thereof and they could not locate the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797, but the original copy of TCT No. 84797 on file with the Register of Deeds of Manila was intact. However, the original copy contained an entry stating that the property had been sold to defendant Prodon subject to the right of repurchase; and that the entry had been maliciously done by Prodon because the deed of sale with right to repurchase covering the property did not exist. Prodon on the other hand contended that she had become absolute owner of the property by reason of the failure of Maximo Alvarez to repurchase such. The RTC opined that although the deed itself could not be presented as evidence in court as the custodian of the records of the property attested that the copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase could not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds of Manila, its contents could nevertheless be proved by secondary evidence.

The RTC concluded that the original copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase had been lost, and that earnest efforts had been exerted to produce it before the court. It ruled in favor of Prodon. On appeal to CA, the CA concluded differently, in that it held that Prodon had not established the existence, execution, and loss of the original document as the pre-requisites

for the presentation of secondary evidence. Its application of the Best Evidence Rule naturally led the CA to rule that secondary evidence should not have been admitted. ISSUE: Whether or not the Best Evidence Rule applies in an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase.

HELD: No. The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written document are the subject of the inquiry. In an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and the defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence other than the original document. The CA and the RTC both misapplied the Best Evidence Rule to this case. The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the original. This action does not involve the terms or contents of the deed of sale with right to repurchase. The principal issue was whether or not the deed of sale with right to repurchase, duly executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really existed. The Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase were not the issue. The lower court should have simply addressed and determined whether or not the "existence" and "execution" of the deed as the facts in issue had been proved by preponderance of evidence. The presentation of evidence other than the original document, like the testimonies of Prodon and Jose Camilon, the Notarial Register of Notary Eliseo Razon, and the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, would have sufficed even without first proving the loss or unavailability of the original of the deed. The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still required Prodon to establish and explain the loss of the original of the deed of sale with right to repurchase to establish the genuineness and due execution of the deed. This was because the deed, although a collateral document, was the foundation of her defense in this action for quieting of title. Her inability to produce the original logically gave rise to the need for her to prove its existence and due execution

by other means that could only be secondary under the rules on evidence. Towards that end, however, it was not required to subject the proof of the loss of the original to the same strict standard to which it would be subjected had the loss or unavailability been a precondition for presenting secondary evidence to prove the terms of a writing. A review of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce proof sufficient to show the loss or explain the unavailability of the original as to justify the presentation of secondary evidence. Camilon, one of her witnesses, testified that he had given the original to her lawyer, Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao, but that he (Camilon) could not anymore retrieve the original because Atty. Lacanilao had been recuperating from his heart ailment. Such evidence without showing the inability to locate the original from among Atty. Lacanilao’s belongings by himself or by any of his assistants or representatives was inadequate. Moreover, a duplicate original could have been secured from Notary Public Razon, but no effort was shown to have been exerted in that direction. In contrast, the records contained ample indicia of the improbability of the existence of the deed. Camilon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had twice gone to his residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan, the first on September 5, 1975, to negotiate the sale of the property in question, and the second on September 9, 1975, to execute the deed of sale with right to repurchase.

SECONDARY EVIDENCE COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO LAGMAN, Respondent. G.R. No. 165487, July 13, 2011

FACTS: Nelson Santos (Santos) applied for a license with the National Food Authority (NFA) to engage in the business of storing not more than 30,000 sacks of palay in his warehouse at Barangay Malacampa, Camiling, Tarlac. Under Act No. 3893 or the General Bonded Warehouse Act, as amended, the approval for said license was conditioned upon posting of a cash bond, a bond secured by real estate, or a bond signed by a duly authorized bonding company, the amount of which shall be fixed by the NFA Administrator at not less than thirty-three and one third percent (33 1/3%) of the market value of the maximum quantity of rice to be received. Country Bankers Insurance Corporation issued Warehouse Bond through its agent, Antonio Lagman. Santos was the bond principal, Lagman was the surety and the Republic of the Philippines, through the NFA was the obligee. In consideration of these issuances, corresponding Indemnity Agreements were executed by Santos, as bond principal, together with Ban Lee Lim Santos (Ban Lee Lim), Rhosemelita Reguine (Reguine) and Lagman, as co-signors. The latter bound themselves jointly and severally liable to Country Bankers for any damages, prejudice, losses, costs, payments, advances and expenses of whatever kind and nature, including attorney’s fees and legal costs, which it may sustain as a consequence of the said bondSantos then secured a loan using his warehouse receipts as collateral. When the loan matured, Santos defaulted in his payment. The sacks of palay covered by the warehouse receipts were no longer found in the bonded warehouse. By virtue of the surety bonds, Country Bankers was compelled to pay Consequently, Country Bankers filed a complaint for a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In his Answer, Lagman alleged that the 1989 Bonds were valid only for 1 year from the date of their issuance, as evidenced by receipts; that the bonds were never renewed and revived by payment of premiums; that on November 5, 1990, Country Bankers issued Warehouse Bond No. 03515 (1990 Bond) which was also valid for one year and that no Indemnity Agreement was executed for the purpose; and that the 1990 Bond supersedes, cancels, and renders no force and effect the 1989 Bonds. The trial court rendered judgment declaring Reguine and Lagman jointly and severally liable to pay Country Bankers.

Lagman filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. He insisted that the lifetime of the 1989 Bonds, as well as the corresponding Indemnity Agreements was only 12 months. According to Lagman, the 1990 Bond was not pleaded in the complaint because it was not covered by an Indemnity Agreement and it superseded the two prior bonds. The appellate court held that the 1990 Bond superseded the 1989 Bonds. The appellate court rejected the argument of Country Bankers that the 1989 bonds were continuing, finding, as reason therefor, that the receipts issued for the bonds indicate that they were effective for only one-year. Country Bankers questions the existence of a third bond, the 1990 Bond, which allegedly cancelled the 1989 Bonds on the following grounds: First, Lagman failed to produce the original of the 1990 Bond and no basis has been laid for the presentation of secondary evidence; Second, the issuance of the 1990 Bond was not approved and processed by Country Bankers; Third, the NFA as bond obligee was not in possession of the 1990 Bond. Country Bankers stresses that the cancellation of the 1989 Bonds requires the participation of the bond obligee. Ergo, the bonds remain subsisting until cancelled by the bond obligee. Country Bankers further assert that Lagman also failed to prove that the NFA accepted the 1990 Bond in replacement of the 1989 Bonds.

ISSUE: Whether or not mere photocopy of the 1990 Bond is admissible in evidence.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court rule as inadmissible such copy. Under the best evidence rule, the original document must be produced whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry. The rule is encapsulated in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as follow: Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a documents, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable. Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states: SEC.5 When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. In the case at bar, Lagman mentioned during the direct examination that there are actually four (4) duplicate originals of the 1990 Bond: the first is kept by the NFA, the second is with the Loan Officer of the NFA in Tarlac, the third is with Country Bankers and the fourth was in his possession. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for the non-production of the original instrument. When more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without accounting for the other originals. Despite knowledge of the existence and whereabouts of these duplicate originals, Lagman merely presented a photocopy. He admitted that he kept a copy of the 1990 Bond but he could no longer produce it because he had already severed his ties with Country Bankers. However, he did not explain why severance of ties is by itself reason enough for the non-availability of his copy of the bond considering that, as it appears from the 1989 Bonds, Lagman himself is a bondsman. Neither did Lagman explain why he failed to secure the original from any of the three other custodians he mentioned in his testimony. While he apparently was able to find the original with the NFA Loan Officer, he was merely contented with producing its photocopy. Clearly, Lagman failed to exert diligent efforts to produce the original.

PAROLE EVIDENCE SPOUSES GUILLERMO AGBADA and MAXIMA AGBADA, petitioners, vs. INTER-URBAN DEVELOPERS, INC., and REGIONAL TRIAL COURTBR. 105, QUEZON CITY, respondents. G.R. No. 144029. September 19, 2002

FACTS: Petitioner-spouses Guillermo Agbada and Maxima Agbada borrowed money from respondent Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. To secure the loan, the parties concurrently executed a deed of real estate mortgage over a parcel of land and the improvements owned by the spouses. The spouses failed to pay the loan within the six-month period despite several out-of-court demands made by respondent Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105, a complaint for foreclosure of real estate mortgage On 2 March 1994, without assistance of counsel, the spouses filed their unverified answer admitting that they had borrowed the amount of P1, 500,000.00 from respondent and had executed the real estate mortgage to secure the loan but denying that it was payable within six (6) months and at three percent (3%) interest per month. With the assistance of counsel, petitioner-spouses Agbada moved to amend their answer to allege that the mortgage contract was not reflective of the true intention of the parties since in reality the loan was interest-free and would mature only after five (5) years from execution thereof and that consequently they were denying under oath the due execution and authenticity of the mortgage document, although the proposed answer was still not verified by them. Interestingly, the amended answer departed from the allegation in the original answer that the loan would earn interest at the legal rate. The trial court denied the amendment of the answer holding that the change would substantially alter the gist of the defense. The trial court promulgated its Summary Judgment in favor of respondent Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. It held that Simeon Ong Tiam, compadre of petitioner-spouses and then president of Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. could not have obligated his principal by contemporaneous agreement amending the maturity of the loan from six (6) months tofive (5) years and the interest rate from three percent (3%) per month to the default or statutory rate, much less interest-free,

since the undertaking was contrary to the express provisions of the duly executed loan and mortgage contract. Petitioner-spouses did not appeal the Summary Judgment nor did they pay the judgment debt. Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. moved for a decree of foreclosure which the spouses did not oppose nor did they attend the hearing on the motion. The mortgaged real estate was sold at public auction to respondent Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. as highest bidder for P4, 637,092.74 which was supposed to be in full satisfaction of the judgment debt. Upon motion of Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. and despite petitioner-spouses' opposition thereto on the ground that the purchase price of the mortgaged property was below its appraised value according to an appraisal report, the trial court confirmed the sale in favor of Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. The trial court ruled that it could not have given weight to the appraisal report since this report was not authenticated nor was the appraiser presented as witness during the hearing of the motion to allow Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. an opportunity to cross-examine on the appraised value of the property. Petitioner-spouses Guillermo Agbada and Maxima Agbada filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment with prayer for preliminary injunction.The petition sought the annulment of the Summary Judgment for alleged violation of their right to due process arising from the absence of a full-blown trial on a genuine issue of fact that the loan and mortgage would mature only on the fifth year following its execution on February 21, 1991. The petition did not question compliance with legal requirements of the foreclosure proceedings or any part thereof. Petitioner-spouses argue that they were deprived of due process when their defense, i.e., that the real estate mortgage carries a default interest rate and matures only on the fifth year following its execution on February 21, 1991. On the other hand, respondent Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. claims that petitioner-spouses did not deny under oath the authenticity and due execution of the real estate mortgage document, hence, were barred from setting up the defense that the interest rate and maturity provisions of the loan and mortgage contract were different from those stipulated in the written agreement. Respondent further argues that the alleged promise made by Simeon Ong Tiam even if true cannot be enforced against Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. since there is nothing to show that he was authorized to enter into the alleged contemporaneous agreement. Finally, respondent asserts that there were other remedies available to petitioners which they failed to exhaust by their own negligence, thus rendering the petition for annulment of judgment clearly unavailing and that they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court by seeking affirmative relief from the effects of the assailed Summary Judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not contemporaneous agreement by the parties is an exception to the parole evidence rule

HELD: No. In the instant case, while petitioner-spouses appear to tender a material issue of fact, i.e., demandability and interest rate of the loan, summary judgment would nonetheless be proper where it is shown that issues tendered are sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith, or patently unsubstantial. To forestall summary judgment, it is essential for the non-moving party to confirm the existence of genuine issues where he has substantial, plausible and fairly arguable defense, i.e., issues of fact calling for the presentation of evidence upon which a reasonable findings of fact could return a verdict for the non-moving party although mere scintilla of evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment will be insufficient to preclude entry thereof. The proper inquiry would therefore be whether the affirmative defense offered by petitioner-spouses constitutes genuine issue of fact requiring a full-blown trial. We rule that the affirmative defense sets up a sham issue which justifies summary judgment. For one, petitioner-spouses have not explained how their affirmative defense, since it attempts to vary a written agreement, could be proved by admissible evidence. It would be useless to avail of a complete trial where the issue proposed by petitioner-spouses could not be resolved in any manner other than by referring to the explicit terms of the loan and mortgage agreement. To be sure, where the parties have reduced their agreement in writing, it is presumed that they have made the writing the only repository and memorial of the truth and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived and abandoned.Specifically, under Sec. 9, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Evidence, the trial court is barred from admitting evidence which proves or tends to prove the alleged concurrent agreement with Simeon Ong Tiam which alters or varies the terms of the deed between the parties. Sec. 9 Evidence of written agreements. - When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: (a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) The validity of the written agreement; or (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement x x x x

While it is true that contracting parties may establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy, the parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of an agreement reduced into writing by testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties. As applied herein, the alleged terms of the contemporaneous agreement between petitioner-spouses and Simeon Ong Tiam cannot be proved for they are not embodied in the mortgage deed but exist only in their faint recollection. Only the terms of the loan and mortgage agreement providing for six (6) months maturity from date of execution thereof and the interest rate of three percent (3%) per month are worth considering and implementing. The instant case is not unprecedented. In Tarnate v. Court of Appeals involving a case of foreclosure of real estate mortgage that was resolved by means of summary judgment where neither the existence of the loans and the mortgage deeds nor the fact of default on the due

repayments was disputed, we rejected as genuine issue the contention of petitioners therein that they were misled by respondent bank to believe that the loans were long-term accommodations since the loan documents admittedly executed by the parties clearly contradicted petitioners asseverations and the parties must have realized that when the terms of the agreement were unequivocally reduced in writing, they could hardly be controverted by oral evidence to the contrary. Similarly, in Heirs of Amparo del Rosario v. Santos, where we rejected the alteration of the conditions imposed in the deed of sale, this Court ruled that appellants therein could not be allowed to introduce evidence of conditions allegedly agreed upon by them other than those stipulated in the deed of sale because when they reduced their agreement in writing, it is presumed that they have made the writing the only repository and memorial of truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived and abandoned. Petitioner-spouses cannot invoke any of the exceptions to the parol evidence rule, more particularly, the alleged failure of the writing to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. The exception obtains only where the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument, thus necessitating the reception of relevant extrinsic evidence of the contractual provision in dispute to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument. However, in the case at bar, the loan and mortgage deed is clear and without ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in specifying the maturity of the loan exactly after six (6) months from date of execution thereof at interest rate of three percent (3%) per month, and certainly these unmistakable terms forbid petitioner-spouses from introducing evidence aliunde of the alleged contemporaneous agreement in violation of the parol evidence rule.