Iran's Tryst With Democracy

Iran’s tryst with democracy ALI PAYA

IN the course of the 20th century Iran, uniquely among all developing countries, is the only one whose people have participated in two fully-fledged popular revolutions in order to replace the existing autocratic and despotic systems with genuine democracy. And yet, despite more than a century and a half of popular struggle, developing a fully functional home-grown democracy has remained an unrealized aspiration. The present paper, following a brief account of earlier attempts to establish democratic rule, concentrates on the saga of the development of democracy in Iran in the post-Islamic revolution (1979) era. It attempts to explicate the role and impact of the main actors in this drama, including the clergy, intellectuals, political activists, the bazaar, the armed forces and the public. The final part of the paper deals with the chal-

lenges which lie ahead for the consolidation of a healthy democracy in the country. As a country ruled by Shahs throughout her long history, Iran has always been a stage for struggle between despotic rulers and dispossessed and disenfranchised people longing for justice and freedom. Disastrous encounters between a mighty West and a weakened Persia in the first half of the 19th century, which led to the annexation of large parts of northern Persia to Tsarist Russia in the course of two rounds of bloody wars (1813, 1828) and later to a semi-occupation of the country by the British and Russian empires, paved the way among other things, for familiarizing Iranian elites with the idea of democracy. The elite in question mainly consisted of enlightened and frustrated ruling officials, intellectuals SEMINAR 576 – August 2007

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and political activists, progressive clergy and merchants and businessmen who were involved in trade with European countries. The Qajar dynasty’s despotic rule which had resulted in a severe decline in socio-economic conditions of the populace, and general degeneration of law and order in the country, helped forge a consensus among the elite that the only solution for the country’s ills was the introduction of new models of governance borrowed from western sources.

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lthough the efforts of intellectuals, activists and ruling elites in introducing modern political and philosophical ideas to Iranian society greatly impacted on increasing public awareness, being a deeply religious society, the momentum for change became unstoppable only after prominent figures among the clergy were convinced by intellectuals that there was no incompatibility between imported ideas and Islamic tenets. Seyyed Mohammad Tabatabee, a grand Ayatollah and an influential figure in the constitutional revolution (1906), in his address to the first Majlis (National Parliament) pointed out that: ‘We had not visited democratic countries ourselves. However, based upon what we had heard and those who had visited democratic countries told us that constitutional rule would bring about security and prosperity, we also developed a desire and an enthusiasm [for such a system] and established constitutional system in this country.’1 The dream of a genuine democratic system was not to last long. Arm-twisting between the Qajars and democratic forces continued for some

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1. Proceedings of the Majlis, 1907, quoted in F. Adamiyat, Fikr-e Democracy-ye Ejtema’ee dar Nahzat-e Mashrutiyat-e Iran (The Idea of Social Democracy in Iran’s Constitutional Revolution). Payam Publications, Tehran, 1975. SEMINAR 576 – August 2007

years until the last Shah of Qajar, a young inexperienced lad, was forced into exile in Europe by his powerful minister of war, a colonel in the Cossack corps, Reza Khan, who later crowned himself as the founder of a new despotic dynasty, the Pahlavi dynasty (1925-1979).2 Reza Khan’s Ataturk style of government came to an end when the allies invaded Iran in 1941 to use the country as ‘a victory bridge’ for assisting the USSR against the might of the German army. Reza Khan’s son, Mohammad Reza ascended to the throne at the age of twenty one. His indecisive rule amid political turmoil of the war was, in a sense, a blessing in disguise: a truly democratic government headed by an experienced veteran politician, Mohammad Mossadeq, assumed power in the turbulent years after the Second World War.

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owever, once again, people’s longing for democracy was frustrated: a coup orchestrated by the CIA and the British Intelligence Services in 1953 restored Mohammad Reza, who had fled the county, to the throne. Hence started a long and harsh period of autocratic rule in which a programme of forced modernization from above was imposed on the nation.3 Throughout the Pahlavi’s reign, democratic forces in the shape of intellectuals, progressive clergy, students and political activists and enlightened bazaaries, continued their efforts to promote democratic ideas and ideals. However, the combination 2. E. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1982. 3. M. Gasiorowski (ed.), Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran (Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East). Syracuse University Press, 2004. Also, S. Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. John Wiley & Sons, 2004.

of a number of factors, including weakness of the tradition of party politics, an absence of competent theories of democracy, rivalry and suspicion among opposition groups, non-availability of a unified leadership, the regime’s effectiveness in suppressing political discontent, and betrayals on the part of influential political actors frustrated the collective democratic movement. For example, during the short period of Mossadeq’s government when the wildest wishes of the prodemocracy forces had come true, the pro-Soviet Tudeh party, instead of assisting Mossadeq and his colleagues in consolidating the budding democratic rule, did its best to bring down his government by accusing him of being a stooge of the western powers. However, when the same powers staged a coup against Mossadeq and his national government, the party, despite its prior knowledge of the imminent danger and notwithstanding its vast network of members and sympathizers, did not raise a finger in support of the government.4

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he Islamic revolution of 1979 which for the first time in Iran’s history, through a genuine and relatively bloodless mass movement put an end to millennia of monarchical rule, rekindled hopes for the establishment of true democratic rule. Despite the Islamic flavour of the revolution as a dominant feature, many of the main architects of the revolution, including its undisputed leader, grand Ayatollah Khomeini, were adamant that in the post-revolutionary era, just as was the case during the course of the revolution, all will be equal and there will be no special treatment or privileged status for any particular group, especially the clergy. 4. M. Gasiorowski, op. cit., 2004.

Whatever the intentions of the main architects of the revolution, what was endorsed as the most important document of the Islamic republic, namely its constitution, violates a cardinal principle of democratic rule, i.e., equality of all citizens in the process of political decision-making. There are a number of articles in the constitution that give the Shi’i clergy a privileged status vis-à-vis the rest of the people, and as such renders the young Islamic republic structurally incompatible with fully-fledged democracy.

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part from the content of the constitution, an important point of contention among various social groups in Iran since the early days of the Islamic revolution has been the larger issue of the compatibility or otherwise of Islam and democracy. While some of the progressive clergy argue that Islam and democracy are compatible, most conservative clergy maintain that democracy is a western product and has nothing to do with Islamic teachings. A somewhat similar debate is ongoing among the intellectuals. While a majority of the religious intellectuals hold that Islam and democracy are compatible and have tried to produce workable models of ‘Islamic democracy’ which could be used in a Muslim country, left-wing and non-religious secular intellectuals are of the view that Islam and democracy cannot be reconciled.5 What makes a critical assessment of the quality of the arguments produced in these debates rather difficult is that the interlocutors do not seem to address each other by using

5. A. Paya, ‘Islamic Democracy: a Viable Concept or an Oxymoron?’ in Paya and Esposito (eds.), Iraq, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World. 2007 (forthcoming). Also, H. Bashiriyeh, Aql dar Siyasat (Reason in Politics). Negah-e Moaser Publications, Tehran, 1993.

the same terms of reference. Key terms such as ‘Islam’, ‘democracy’, ‘secularism’, ‘people’ and the like are used in different senses by the discussants. Moreover, in recent years, perhaps due to the respectability acquired by ‘democracy’ in modern political parlance, even some age-old enemies of democracy attempt to couch their opposition in ways which create an impression that they are actually in favour of such a system, albeit with their own exclusive gloss. Thus for example, Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi, an influential conservative clergy who is a father-figure for radical fundamentalists, distinguishes between three forms of democracy, two of which he rules out as either outmoded or inappropriate from an Islamic point of view, while the third one, he maintains, is already in use in Iran.

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he two forms of democracy which Ayatollah Misbah dismisses are direct democracy of the type which was in place in ancient Athens in the 5th century BC, and secular democracy which is prevalent in the West. According to Ayatollah Misbah, the third form of democracy is the one which gives the Muslims who live as an absolute majority in an Islamic country the right to choose a righteous leader to govern their state. Ayatollah Misbah argues that the leaders, in an Islamic state, are either appointed by God or by the Prophet or the infallible Imams and therefore receive their legitimacy from above. As such, it is the duty of the people to recognize the righteous leaders and offer them their allegiance and support. If they fail to do so, the wrongly chosen leader would be taghout, an unjust and illegitimate ruler. In this case, even if the political systems introduced by these illegitimate rulers are passed off as democracy, such a ‘democracy’ cannot be endorsed by Islam.6

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otwithstanding the tacit or explicit opposition of the conservative clergy and their radical followers to the notion of democracy, it has progressively turned into one of the dominant discourses in Iranian society since the end of the eight year war with Iraq in 1988. While President Rafsanjani, who was elected after the war, pursued a policy of economic reform and political restriction during his eight years in office (1988-1996), his successor, President Khatami won a landslide victory on a comprehensive reform agenda whose main theme was political openness. It was during Khatami’s two-term presidency (1997-2005) that the greatest theoretical leap forward in elucidating and elaborating the idea of democratic rule took place in Iran. Even a cursory glance at the literature produced during this period testifies to the quality of the conceptual frameworks within which the debates were conducted and the sophistication of the arguments for justifying the points made. It would be no exaggeration to claim that as a result of these intellectual efforts, not only was a great deal of analytical clarification achieved concerning the rich network of meaning which embraces the notion of ‘democracy’, but also the idea of democracy, as the best human construct so far for managing the affairs of the societies, entered the collective consciousness of a large number of Iranians. The significance of this achievement can only be appreciated if one compares the present public understanding of the notion of democracy with what was the case in the first half of the 20th century or even a few decades ago. Since the idea of democracy was first introduced to the Iranian

6. M.H. Musbah Yazidi, Nazariyeh-e Siasi-ye Islam (The Political Theory of Islam). Qom. SEMINAR 576 – August 2007

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public mostly through the works of Iranian expatriate social-democrats who were active in the Caucasus,7 for many decades ordinary people, as also the clergy (’Ulama), tacitly or implicitly identified democratic aspirations with Communism and Marxism and hence regarded them as being antireligion. In the case of the ’Ulama there were further reasons for being suspicious of democracy: apart from being an alien, western product, democracy was a form of government that great Muslim thinkers like Al-Farabi, inspired by Plato’s writings, had condemned as ‘the rule of the rabble’.8

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version to democracy was not limited only to the ’Ulama or restricted to the earlier part of the 20th century. Throughout the 20th century, during Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign and after the advent of the Islamic revolution to the present day, many of the secular intellectuals influenced by the ideas of anti-democratic writers like Heidegger, Nietzsche, Spengler and Junger, or non-secular intellectuals under the spell of mystical traditions which are by nature elitist, were (and are) not in favour of the idea of democracy.9 It is mostly to the credit of a younger generation of Muslim intellectuals and to a lesser extent a new breed of left-wing/secular intellectuals who have freed themselves from the shackles of orthodox Marxism and other outmoded political theories, that the idea of democracy has, more

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7. F. Adamiyat, Ideologi-ye Nahzat-e Mashrotiyat-e Iran (The Ideology of the Iranian Constitutional Movement). Payam Publications, Tehran, 1976. 8. A. Al-Farabi. On the Perfect State. Trans. by Richard Walzer. Kazi Publications, 1998. 9. A. Mirsepassi, Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization: Negotiating Modernity in Iran. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000. SEMINAR 576 – August 2007

or less, become somewhat like a household concept in modern-day Iran. As empirical evidence we only have to look at the number of books and papers on democracy, either in the shape of translations from prestigious foreign sources or home-products penned by indigenous writers, which have increased manyfold since the revolution in comparison to the decades prior to it.10

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he new generation of pro-democracy writers have tried, from different perspectives, to shed fresh light on the issues involved in debates about democracy. Thus for example, Mohsen Kadivar, a young Ayatollah in the camp of the reformers has argued for the compatibility of Islam and democracy by producing a mix of internalist and externalist arguments.11 This in itself is a novelty, since most of the arguments produced so far by prodemocracy clergy have tended to be only internalist. Kadivar maintains that in an Islamic democracy, people’s rights are reconciled with their duties toward God. If the majority decide to forego their religious duties, then such a society, although democratic, is no longer an Islamic democracy. For the continuity of Islamic democracy all affairs of state need either to be endorsed by religious teachings or at least not be incompatible with these teachings. Kadivar emphasizes that in an Islamic democracy all the members of society, regardless of their religion,

10. According to official statistics the number of books with the term ‘democracy’ in their titles published since the revolution is close to 200. The figure for similar publications in the pre-revolution era could hardly be put at 50. 11. Internalist arguments are those arguments that are solely based on religious sources whereas externalist arguments are those that make use of non-religious sources and authorities.

gender, colour, ethnicity and political ideas, are equal citizens in political and legal respects. All citizens, Muslim or non-Muslim, as far as the rights to govern and to intervene in public affairs are concerned, are equal and should enjoy equal opportunities.12

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li-reza Alavi Tabar, another prominent figure among the reformers, has argued for the necessity of ‘secularism’ for establishing a healthy model of ‘Islamic democracy’in Iran.13 Alavi Tabar makes a distinction between what he calls ‘secularization’ and ‘secularism’. The former, according to Alavi Tabar, is a process whose aim is to separate the two, sacred and profane, realms. The latter is a trend which manifests itself in, for example, attempts to push religion into the private sphere and cut it off from social and collective life. In the realm of politics, secularism has been used in three different senses, namely, separation of religion and state; separation of religion and government; and separation of religion and politics. The question Alavi Tabar tries to answer is the relationship between secularism as a necessary condition for democracy, and as basis for an Islamic model for democracy. Alavai Tabar maintains that in the case of the Islamic republic as a political system, religion has three important functions, i.e., providing legitimacy for the system, justifying the privileged status given to certain institutions in the Constitution, and participating in general policy-making. In his view, to create a viable model of Islamic democracy, what is needed 12. Kadivar’s paper can be viewed on his site: www.kadivar.com. See also, A. Paya, Islam and/or Democracy: Some Views from Iran. 2007 (forthcoming). 13. Alavi Tabar, ‘Secularism and Democracy: The Case of the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Aftab, No. 3, 1993).

is to graft secularism in the second sense with an interpretation of the Constitution which does not endorse religion’s second function. Alavi Tabar emphasizes that secularism, in its other senses, is not necessary for an efficient Islamic democracy; there are mechanisms in place in the existing Constitution which would allow its amendment along the above lines.

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aeed Hajjariyan, a political scientist and one of the main strategists of the reform movement has also made an important contribution to the debate concerning the establishment of democratic rule in Iran. In a recent paper, ‘The Nature of Modern State’, Hajjariyan argues that the main condition for the emergence of a modern state is rationalization of power and its accumulation and concentration in a rational fashion in proper institutions.14 Comparing political power with wealth and capital, and referring to Adam Smith who once noted that in the absence of accumulated wealth any kind of wealth distribution would be tantamount to distribution of poverty, Hajjariyan argues that in the absence of accumulated and rationalized power, any kind of power distribution, which is one of the main aims of democracy, would be tantamount to distribution of weakness and inefficiency. Having explicated the main feature of a modern state, Hajjariyan goes on to make a number of important points in relation to the political situation in Iran. His first point is that Iranian efforts to create a modern state since the Constitutional revolution (1906) have not brought about the desired objective. The outcome of more than a century of popular struggle has been, what Hajjariyan dubs, 14. S. Hajjariyan, ‘The Nature of Modern State’, Sharq Daily, 15 May 2007.

a ‘twin-tracked sovereignty’: unable to outmanoeuvre each other, democratic and anti-democratic forces have been forced to accept a precarious coexistence in which each part gains provisional ascendency at certain periods before being pushed out, temporarily giving its place to the other. In Hajjariyan’s analysis, anti-democratic forces have had the upper hand for the better part of the last one and a half centuries. These forces, on occasion, in the shape of absolutist developmental states, have tried to bring about economic prosperity and industrial development in the absence of democratic rule. However, he argues, such a goal is an illusion in the context of modern Iran. While a people who have experienced two prodemocracy revolutions and enjoy a high level of literacy and urbanization may not as yet be ready to fully support a reform agenda for proper democratic rule which demands lots of personal and collective sacrifices, they will definitely not extend support to an undemocratic system.

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ajjariyan’s insight concerning the collective tendency of a majority of Iranians vis-à-vis democracy is a view shared by many political analysts. However, there are observers who maintain that due to some powerful structural factors, the road towards proper democratic rule is much more hazardous than the above insight would have us believe. Abbas Abdi, a political activist and member of the Participatory Front, has in a number of recent exchanges with Hajjariyan stressed the fact that until Iran’s economy remains dependent on oil income, and so long as the state which exercises its monopoly on revenues from oil, considers herself self-persistent and independent of people’s tax money, the prospects for genuine democracy remain bleak.15

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thers like Abdolkarim Soroush, a Muslim intellectual who has been involved in a Lutheran-style reconstruction of Shi’i thought, argue that certain influential tenets in traditional interpretations of Shi’ism, such as the belief in the illegitimacy of all types of government which are incompatible with the rule of the infallible twelfth (hidden) Imam, act as powerful hindrances and insurmountable obstacles on the road towards democracy.16 Iranian women activist groups who are struggling to obtain equal rights for women are also of the view that until and unless women’s proper socio-political rights are granted, there is little hope for genuine democratic rule in Iran. In sharp rebuttal of the claims of those reformers who maintain that the immediate objectives of the reform movement should be ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ and not women’s rights, which can be achieved at some later stage, women activists point out that a ‘democracy’ in which half of the population is deprived of their rights cannot be regarded as a proper democracy.17 There are other observers who worry about the power, economic and political, assumed by the former or present members of the Revolutionary Corps. In their view, power accumulated in the hands of the high-ranking commanders of the Revolutionary Corps plus their radical outlook, makes a dangerous mix for the future of democracy in Iran. However, despite all these difficulties, a panoramic view of the situ-

15. A. Abdi, ‘Mahkumiyat-e Doganeh’ (Being ruled twice over), Ayeen, no. 6, February 2007. 16. A. Soroush, ‘Shi’ism and the Challenge of Democracy’, www.drsoroush.com, 2005. 17. Iranian women’s voice can best be heard in some female-exclusive publications, one of the best example of which is a weekly called Zanan (Women) produced by a leading activist, Shahla Sherkat. SEMINAR 576 – August 2007

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ation in Iran would indicate to more thoughtful observers that in Iran’s rapidly changing econiche in which many players with various vested interests and different aims and objectives are interacting and many powerful institutions are exerting their influence on the dynamics of the situation, the role of what can be termed ‘emerging phenomena’ in changing the topography of the environment should not be underestimated.

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t is true that there are powerful figures among the old guard conservative clergy and their allies in the Revolutionary Corps who are not in favour of democracy and would not accept anything less than a thorough theocracy. But one should not discard the role of younger generations of religious seminary students and ordinary members of the Revolutionary Corps who do not necessarily support the views of their superiors. In the case of seminary students it should be noted that despite systematic efforts to inculcate certain ideas in their minds, they have broadened their horizons by studying modern philosophy, literature and law, along with their more traditional texts. This new breed of clergy will soon replace the old guard by whose demise, as Thomas Khun has famously observed, the old paradigm would become untenable. As for ordinary members of the armed forces, their vote in favour of the reform movement during Khatami’s presidency, despite strict instructions to do the opposite, is good evidence for the popularity of the reform agenda, of which democratic rule is an integral part, even among this class of the population. Intellectuals, and in particular Muslim intellectuals, are an important social force for good in modern day Iran.18 By trying to produce indig-

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enous solutions for social, political, cultural and economic problems, Iranian intellectuals are doing their best to create powerful collective intentionalities among the main actors in the political arena, including decision-makers, civil society and NGOs, the bazaar, and the clergy.

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t seems, as Hajjariyan has suggested,19 such efforts could lead to a situation not dissimilar to what existed at the time of the constitutional revolution, in which the clergy feel that the new models being proposed by the intellectuals are not only compatible with the basic tenets of shari’a, but could assist in promoting better and more profound interpretations of religion which would be of great assistance to modern man in an age of ‘crisis of meaning’. Solid evidence shows that a good number of the conservative elements are gradually being won over by the intellectuals’ arguments and are trying to adjust their positions. Such ‘new movements’ which are part of the larger category of ‘emergent 18. In today’s Iran, the contribution of left-wing or secular groups of intellectuals to the discourse on democracy, and indeed many other important socio-political issues, pales in comparison to what has been produced by Muslim intellectuals. A number of cases can be cited in an attempt to explain this rather important phenomenon. In the case of left-wing intellectuals, for example, while older generations have remained hostage to their past views, the younger generation who have freed themselves from the shackles of pro-Soviet thinking prevalent in earlier periods of Iran’s left movement, are still struggling to find a genuine voice for themselves. Feeling somehow marginalized in a political system with religious overtones, these left-wing intellectuals along with other secular pro-democracy intellectuals, have mainly contributed to the discourse on democracy by emphasizing the need for abolition of all privileged status and equal treatment of all citizens as a necessary condition for a healthy democracy. (The contributions of the left-wing/secular intellectuals to the debate on democracy can be traced, among other

phenomena’, give hope to all those who wish to see a proper democratic state in Iran.

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mong other factors which seem to be facilitating the emergence of a better environment for nurturing democratic aspirations, three are worth mentioning: the general desirability of the idea of democracy in a global setting, the changing situation in the Middle East region and, last but not least, an awareness among Iranian socio-political actors that a theoretical separation and a practical division of labour between two aspects of democracy, namely democracy as a political system and democracy as a social movement, would make their efforts more focused and effective. In the final analysis, it can be claimed that given the degree of sophistication of Iran’s society and her rich experience in their long and hard struggle for achieving freedom, justice and equality, a return to an entirely undemocratic, despotic rule would be immensely costly and therefore highly improbable, whereas the road towards a thoroughly democratic rule, though bumpy, seems to be easier to travel.

sources, in the debates in a number of their periodicals including Negah-e Nou (New View) and Goftego (Dialogue). For a criticism of the left-wing intellectual by a fellowtraveller see A. Milani, ‘Ruzgar-e Separi Shodeh Roshanfekran-e Chap’ (The Bygone Age of the Left-wing Intellectuals), HamMihan, 30 May 2007, for general assessment of the way Iranian intellectuals have reacted towards modern ideas, see A. Paya and M.A. Ghaneirad, ‘The Philosopher and the Revolutionary State: How Karl Popper’s Ideas Shaped the Views of Iranian Intellectuals’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20(2), July 2006. Also, A. Paya and M.A. Ghaneirad, ‘Habermas in Iran’, Iranian Studies 40(3), 2007. 19. S. Hajjariyan, Jomhouriyat: Afsoon Zodayee az Qodrat (Republicanism: Disenchanting the Power). Tarh-e Nou Publications, Tehran, 1990.