Ipss Political School Aug 08 - Crises Of The State

State: A state is a political association with effective sovereignty over a geographic area and representing a population. These may be nation states, sub-national states or multinational states The form of government identifies only one aspect of the state, namely, the way in which the highest political offices are filled and their relationship to each other and to society. It does not include other aspects of the state that may be very important in its everyday functioning, such as the quality of its bureaucracy. Some scholars have suggested that the term "state" is too imprecise and ought to be replaced by the more comprehensive term "political system." The "political system" refers to the ensemble of all social structures that function to produce collectively binding decisions in a society. In modern times, these would include the political regime, political parties, and various sorts of organizations. The term "political system" thus denotes a broader concept than the state The earliest forms of the state emerged whenever it became possible to centralize power in a durable way. Agriculture and writing are almost everywhere associated with this process. Agriculture allowed for the production and storing of a surplus. This in turn allowed and encouraged the emergence of a class of people who controlled and protected the agricultural stores and thus did not have to spend most of their time providing for their own subsistence. In addition, writing (or the equivalent of writing, like Inca quipus) because it made possible the centralization of vital information. The structure of the state in reality depends on the social structure of society. A generalization of the process of state formation can be viewed as an evolution from tribal society - decision making in a egalitarian fashion through consensus, to feudal society – decision making by the feudal lord which applies to his fief, to absolutism – decision making & governance by the king who has absolute power over his domain, to popularization of sovereignty by the French revolution which gave the concept of power to the people. Since, states have been run by various interest groups in society who share power with others dominant groups. The main issues are representation, transfer of power and governance which are usually written in the form of a ‘social contract‘ called the constitution. The representation of the people is restricted in different ways. A dictatorship means that there is no representation of the people, an aristocracy means few people or groups are represented in the state. Some states have an adult franchise (one person one vote) while others such as Cuba have representation according to social class e.g. farmers, laborers etc. If judged from a representation standpoint, the poor who comprise 70% of the population are not at all represented in the Pakistani parliament – the decision making body. What also matters is the representation in state bureaucracy (military & civil) especially if the government is undemocratic, dominated by bureaucracy and highly centralized. The transfer of power mechanism is important because it leads to political stability. Without a standard mechanism, a mughal king had to kill all his brothers to be safe on the throne and more recently in Pakistan, abrupt changes in control of state because of intermittent military & democratic rule has lead to political instability. Governance is extremely important as even with an authoritarian system or a semi-democratic system, some countries have done well primarily because of political stability and an efficient, effective & uncorrupt bureaucracy. Punjab for instance has 90 million people but one government which makes all the decisions. This is a highly centralized government structure compared to countries which are either small or have smaller provinces. The Pakistani state structure has not changed since the British whose purpose was to rule over people & extract revenue, rather than let people rule themselves & the for bureaucracy to help them in this regard. For IPSS Political School

The Concept of a Nation If one wants to enjoin people to struggle for the national interest, one must have some idea about what a nation is and what it is to belong to a nation. There are two extreme options. One, purely voluntaristic definition, a nation is any group of people aspiring to a common political state-like organization. If such a group of people succeeds in forming a state, the loyalties of the group members might be “civic” in nature. At the other extreme, nationalist claim a non-voluntary community (ethno) of common origin, language, tradition and culture (religion) as the basis for an ethno based nation. For the ethno-cultural nationalist it is one's ethno-cultural background which determines one's membership in the community. One cannot choose to be a member; instead, membership depends on the accident of origin and early socialization. A more liberal proposal is a “socio-cultural definition” as nation is a cultural group, possibly but not necessarily united by common descent, endowed with civic ties. Let us now turn to the issue of the origin and “authenticity” of ethno-cultural groups or ethno-nations. In social and political science one usually distinguishes two kinds of views. The first can be called “primordialist” views. According to them, actual ethno-cultural nations have either existed “since times immemorial” or at least for a long time. The second are the modernist views, placing the origin of nations in modern times. They can be further classified according to their answer to a further question: how real is the ethno-cultural nation? The modernist realist view is that nations are real but distinctly modern creations, created because of capitalism and technology. The anti-realist view nations as merely “imagined” but somehow still powerful entities meaning that although nation does not exist in reality still people imagine/feel that they are part of a nation. The extreme anti-realist view claims that nations are pure “constructions” – meaning that they are not real but actually constructed by a state or someone. Though the current term for state is Nation State, there are very few nations in the world that are homogenous (that 80%+ people fit the basis of that ethno nation) and thus it is a challenge to keep various communities to live in harmony with one another in one state. If only one community controls the state, the other think that they are persecuted. Thus it is important to differentiate between a State which is based on a Civic concept of nation versus a State which is based on an Ethno concept. The State built on a civic concept does not differentiate between its citizens on the basis of language, ethnicity, religion and culture. America is a good example of this type of state where the constitution does not differentiate among citizens. Turkey however is based on Ethno concept of the Turk nation, while Pakistan prides itself on the Ethno concept of religion – Muslims as one nation. The question thus to be asked is ‘Is nation real? If it is but the State includes citizens from different nations then does it make sense to have a State based on Ethno concept or does a State based on a Civic concept better equipped to provide quality life to its citizens?

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Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The price of strategic myopia. By Ahmad Faruqui reviewed by Chanakya Sen Always trust an economist to prick balloons of national security floated by militarists. Economic consultant Ahmad Faruqui's commentary on demilitarizing Pakistan offers an alternative vision for priming human development, the road that rulers in Islamabad never took. Published when generals are yet again preferred instruments of Western intervention in Pakistan, this book warns of dire consequences if new paths are not hewn. A Faustian bargain Faruqui's central thesis is that most of Pakistan's socio-economic problems originate from the heavy emphasis on national defense and military spending. Pakistan's unconditional support for the US's "war against terrorism" after September 11, 2001 has augmented this lopsided stress. President General Pervez Musharraf has been handed "an enduring rationale for continuing as president under Kelsen's law of necessity that has served all prior military rulers". (p xix). He is less inclined to take any major initiatives to pursue peace with India. Military expenditure continues to absorb the lion's share of the government budget and no major overhaul of Pakistan's military organization is likely. The endemic problem of military dominance in Pakistan has been perpetuated with the mutual embrace of the West and Musharraf. More harm than good has accrued when Musharraf short-sold Pakistan to the US. To prevent the "Islamic bomb" from falling into religious terrorist hands, the American 15th Marine Expeditionary unit is ready to "neutralize" Pakistan's weapons of mass destruction even at the cost of engaging Pakistani troops. The arrest of Pakistani nuclear scientists for passing know-how to al-Qaeda was done to please the US Federal Bureau of Investigation. Changes in the Pakistan army high command and the Inter-Services Intelligence were carried out to curry favor with the Central Intelligence Agency. India has succeeded in throwing flashlights on terrorist training infrastructure in Pakistani Kashmir. The victory of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan is a major setback to Pakistan due to the former's closeness to Iran and India. Pakistan's economy is deteriorating, with sliding per capita incomes lower than 1%, and foreign economic assistance evaporating after the Taliban were dislodged from Afghanistan. Musharraf's decision to ally with the US turns out to be a Faustian bargain, not a bright tactical move. It is similar to the 1999 Kargil war with India planned by Musharraf. Initially praised as "an act of military brilliance", Pakistan lost both the political and military battle for Kargil. It had to withdraw in humiliating circumstances since "the world chose to accept the Indian version of events". (p 16) History of militarism Pakistan's governance travails stem from dictators who are "specialists in violence rather than in economics". (p 19) Small cabals have acquired disproportionate organizational and collusive power under successive military regimes. The landed oligarchy, the bureaucracy and the jihadis are the main beneficiaries of Pakistan's "political economy of defense". (Ayesha Jalal) Their fortunes have been peaking through policies exacerbating inter-class and inter-regional inequalities. General Ayub Khan nurtured a class of robber barons with gigantic concentration of wealth in a handful of families. West Pakistan's per capita income was 61% higher than the East's under Ayub. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a feudal lord himself, was unable to rise above his roots. He transferred resources from public enterprises to private individuals and income distribution worsened under his so-called socialist tenure. General Zia ul-Haq mass-appointed retired and serving army officers to top public sector positions and allowed one fifth of the US$3.2 billion American aid for Afghanistan to be pocketed by the military-civil service elites. Benazir Bhutto doled out franchises to thugs and convicted murderers and triggered a new arms race with India due to her respect for the Pakistani military's "autonomy". Nawaz Sharif, Zia's protege, misused public funds for favoritism and kickbacks and followed his mentor's promotion of orthodox militancy. For IPSS Political School

Musharraf's coup in 1999 occurred when "the army's corporate interests were threatened". (p 35) He has named manifold ex-generals as diplomats and many senior-serving officers to civilian duties for which they have no core competency. He has not touched the lucrative contracts and sinecures of the defense coteries and has failed to rein in religious militias waging jihad. Misreading India Pakistan's present and past national security strategies are premised on fear of being reabsorbed into India. The Pakistan army has convinced many citizens that India never reconciled itself to the partition of 1947. To counter this perceived Indian threat militarily, "no economic sacrifice is judged to be too much". (p 42) Pakistan's claim to Kashmir is the main legitimating potion of its ruling class and the hawks in its security establishment. This obsession has misbegotten four costly wars and countless acts of subversion that proved fruitless. Pakistan's military planners have projected India as "a pushover adversary that is cowardly because the Hindu has no stomach for a fight". (p 44) They have raised very high expectations about the superiority of Pakistan's armed forces, illusions repeatedly shattered by defeats. In spite of enjoying tactical successes, Pakistan has consistently failed to achieve strategic objectives in wars with India. Often, Islamabad has "completely misunderstood Indian intentions and capabilities" and jumped the gun with hubris and folly. In 1971, General Niazi believed that India would merely conduct a minor incursion into East Pakistan (to become Bangladesh) to set up a puppet regime, though Indian responses to provocation have always been aggressive, like those of other states of similar power and size in the international system. Failures in the higher direction of war have been matched by diplomatic fiascos and leadership blunders. Pakistan expects its foreign allies to bail it out of difficult situations against India, but these hopes have rarely materialized. In the Kargil war, China, the vaunted "perpetual ally", did not support Islamabad owing to fear of Islamic extremism. Counting on China as a counterweight to India is also chimerical because "the Indians have made it plain that they will not be routed a second time and intend to return any Chinese 'lesson' in kind". (p 90) Nuclear fallacies Pakistan's advocacy of nuclear deterrence is meaningless since it has not capped its program after developing a few atomic bombs. In the year following its nuclear tests of 1998, Pakistan had to increase defense spending by 10%, nullifying the publicized benefits of a "nuclear dividend". Nothing changed in the day-to-day life of common Pakistanis, even though nuclear scientists and generals commercialized weapons of mass destruction for personal gain. Cash-strapped Pakistan is incapable of matching the Indian increases in defense budgets, but the vanity of weaponizing "even if the people eat grass" (Z A Bhutto) has not receded. Pakistan's nuclear program cost an estimated $10 billion up to 2001 and set back development indices by more than years. Post-nuclear US sanctions caused Pakistan's economy to suffer a gross domestic product fall of 2.9%. The exorbitant opportunity costs of Pakistan's nuclear white elephant have actually diminished the country's national security. Retrenchment strategies The solution to Pakistan's security deficit suggested by Faruqui is to balance its economic resources with strategic ambitions. What is needed is a "lean and mean military organization, without becoming a drain on the national treasury and undermining the non-military dimensions of security". (p 115) The comparative experience of Israel, which depends on reservists for defending territorial integrity, is a lesson. To defend Pakistan against external aggression, a force level of 300,000 troops is enough, ie half of the present strength. Demobilization can be carried out by offering golden handshakes and compensation packages for converting swords into ploughshares. Small force levels do not imply weak defense. At present, Pakistan is incurring a price tag of $110 million a year for pumping the insurgency in Indian For IPSS Political School

Kashmir and thereby earning the ire of the international community. Faruqui prescribes a more active "third party catalyst" role for the US to provide incentives for peace over Kashmir, though how a superpower interested in running off democratic India against China can be expected to be an honest broker over Kashmir is left for the reader's imagination. Faruqui's reading of post-Cold War realities and US-China equation are confusing. Economic aid, debt write-offs and conversion to zero-interest loans are also recommended to encourage defense spending cuts in Pakistan and India. Faruqui makes assumptions that Indian security is purely Pakistan-centric by adducing two-country game theory models to prove that economic diplomacy works. Bilateralizing concentric multilateral threat perceptions is too simplistic. Faruqui's proposals for reforming the Pakistani military are on firmer ground. To improve national security by lifting the people's confidence in the military, the latter should provide a transparent analysis of its fiscal expenditures. Pakistan's defense spending has been free from scrutiny or audit, thanks to the guiding philosophy of "defense for the sake of defense". Only two lines in the official budget (defense administration and defense services) represent the huge military expense bill, with no explanation of what these two items stand for. Pakistan should switch from exorbitant "offensive defense" to "defensive dominance" strategies that involve civilian participation. The military must formalize rigorous self-evaluation of combat effectiveness and be willing to accept failings. Do or die Pakistan's poor economic situation is linked intrinsically with faulty defense and foreign policies. Faruqui offers Pakistani leaders the example of Deng Xiaoping, who converted China's foreign policy of confrontation into one of economic cooperation. Pakistan's savings and investment ratios are among the lowest in the world, mainly due to defense spending and corruption, both severe drains. It spends 6% of its gross domestic product on defense, while health and education stagnate at 1% and 2%. Faruqui argues for correct, accurate and realistic threat evaluations, not exaggerated and unrealistic ones. These would also bring home the futility of massive arms importing and free resources for public welfare. Military spending in Asia as a whole has declined from the end of the Cold War and helped power investment and per capita incomes in the long run. Disarmament is feasible and practical, as examples from both developing and developed countries reveal. For Pakistan, which is on the edge of the precipice, there is no choice but to pragmatically take a leaf from Deng's famous dictum that strength is primarily economic. But for a disappointing reliance on International Monetary Fund and World Bank formulas for poverty alleviation, Faruqui's study is a fine blend of strategic revision and economic prognosis. The million-dollar question is whether Musharraf reads this honest reappraisal of what Pakistan requires to be really secure.

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The rise of religious fundamentalism in Pakistan By Professor Hamza Alavi (copyright The Friday Times) Religious fundamentalism has become a powerful and dangerous force in Pakistan, due mainly to the opportunism of successive political leadership that has pandered to it. Militant sectarian religious groups and parties, led by half-educated and bigoted mullahs, many of them armed to the teeth, are holding our civil society and the state to ransom. They threaten the very fabric of Pakistan’s society. Threats of disruption from religious parties have escalated in recent decades. They have steadily grown in strength since the time of General Ziaul Haq. They now claim that they are the true custodians of Pakistan and that it was they, the mullahs, who had fought successfully for Pakistan, to establish a theocratic state for Muslims. Facts contradict such claims. With the exception of Ghulam Ahmad Parvez’s pro-Pakistan Tulu-iIslam, group, all religious groups and parties, including the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind, the Majli-i-Ahrar and the Jamaat-i-Islami, had all bitterly opposed the Pakistan Movement and abused its leadership which was secular. The Muslim League, the Party that led the Pakistan movement, was a party of modern educated Muslim professionals and government job seekers (whom, for the sake of brevity, we may call the ‘salariat’). It had little to do with the outlook of bigoted mullahs. It was free of any millenarian ideological pretences about creating an Islamic state. It was a movement of Muslims rather than a movement of Islam. Behind it was a new class of English educated Muslim professionals and government job seekers that came into being in the 19th century. It got organised politically by the turn of the century, seeking a better deal for themselves vis-à-vis Hindus who were advancing relatively more rapidly in these fields. When the Muslim League was founded in 1906 at a meeting convened by Nawab Salimullah at Dhaka, the new party was immediately hijacked by the Aligarh group led by Nawab Viqar ul-Mulk. Aligarh was at the vanguard of the new Northern Indian Muslim salariat class, the sons of the Muslim Ashraf [nobility], who were deeply conscious of the loss of their privileges with the advent of British rule and the relatively more rapid rise of Hindu educated classes. The main base of the Muslim salariat was in UP and Bihar for, at that time, the Muslim salariat was relatively weaker in the Muslim majority provinces. The Muslim League was focused entirely on its secular demands of western educated Muslim professionals and the salariat. Attempts to place the issue of Islamic ideology on the agenda of the Muslim League were both rare and invariably unsuccessful. Arguably, the earliest of such attempts was one by Shibli Numani to Islamise the Aligarh syllabus. Shibli was explicitly committed to theocratic values and wanted to shift the emphasis of the Aligarh syllabus away from English and modern sciences, towards Islamic learning and the Arabic language. The response of the Muslim salariat class to that attempt is exemplified by the remarks of Sir Raza Ali, who was a close collaborator of Sir Syed’s immediate successors, Muhsin ul-Mulk and Viqar ul-Mulk. With them, Raza Ali was at the centre of the Aligarh establishment. In an article in the daily Statesman opposing Shibli’s move, he remarked that the idea of reviving Arabic knowledge was, of course, beguiling for Muslims. But he warned that they should not ignore the demands of our times, for the most urgent need of Indian Muslims was to be offered education that would be beneficial in the affairs of this world; education that would help their coming generations to earn their livelihood. Sir Raza Ali spelt out the principal concern of the educated Muslim middle class at the time. Their concern was not about a hypothetical return to original Islam and the creation of an ‘Islamic State’, ruled over by mullahs, that Shibli had dreamt about. Shibli had to leave Aligarh, for it was not the place where his theocratic ideas could flourish. Among the rare attempts to bring the issue of ‘Islamic Ideology’ on to the agenda of the Muslim League was one that was planned for the Delhi Session of the AIML in April 1943. One Abdul Hameed Kazi (backed by ‘Maulana’ Abdul Sattar Niazi) canvassed support for a resolution, which he intended to table. That would For IPSS Political School

commit the Muslim League to an Islamic ideology and the creation of an Islamic state. But pressure from everyone around him forced Kazi to abandon the idea. The resolution was not even moved. The Pakistan movement remained firmly committed to its secular concerns. In his keynote speech before the inaugural meeting of Pakistan’s new Constituent Assembly, on 11th August 1947, Mr. Jinnah spelt out the Pakistan Ideology,namely the secular and tolerant vision of the new state. That speech was not a sudden aberration, as some Islamic ideologists, and General Zia’s hacks, were later to allege. It was consistent with what Mr. Jinnah had been saying for decades. The Muslim League had always been committed to a secular society. Following Mr. Jinnah, his political successor, Liaquat Ali Khan, too reiterated the Muslim League’s secular values. When Liaquat moved the Objectives Resolution in the Constituent Assembly in March 1949 he declared that ‘As I have just said, the people are the real recipients of power. This naturally eliminates any danger of the establishment of a theocracy.’ Despite that clear statement by the mover of the Objectives Resolution, later religious ideologues, notably General Zia and his hacks, have claimed that the Objectives Resolution was a charter for the imposition of the ‘Sharia’ (as they would interpret it) although the word Sharia does not occur anywhere in that Resolution. Their argument is based on some conventional generalities in the Resolution, which said that ‘Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives, in the individual and collective spheres, in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunna’. That did not amount to a charter for the creation of a theocratic, ‘Islamic’ State. Liaquat’s position on the Muslim League’s traditional secularism was, however, soon to be reversed. Not so very long after the Objectives Resolution was passed, Liaquat began to change his tune for his political base was threatened by splits in the Muslim League in the Punjab, which was the power-base of Pakistan’s ruling elite. That was due to factional conflict between Daulatana and Mamdot who left the Muslim League to form a rival Party. Liaquat was now in a panic. He decided to exploit Islamic rhetoric, to hold together his crumbling Party. He began to speak of ‘Islam in Danger’. He also began to equate loyalty to the Muslim League with loyalty to the state. Those who opposed him or his party were denounced as traitors. There was, however, a second and a much more important reason why Liaquat decided to abandon his secular stance. Powerful regional movements had arisen in East Bengal, Sindh, Balochistan and the NWFP, whose people felt that they were not being given their due in a Punjabi dominated Pakistan. They demanded regional autonomy and fairer shares of resources. The Centre, which was seen as ‘Punjabi’, was in fact dominated by a cohesive bureaucracy, under Chaudhri Muhammad Ali as Secretary General to the Government. It was the centralised bureaucracy that ruled Pakistan whilst politicians, including Liaquat, went through the motions. Arguably, it was the challenge to the centre from regional movements which was the more important factor in precipitating Liaquat’s ideological volte-face.Abandoning Mr. Jinnah’s (and his own) firm stand against pandering to the mullahs, Liaquat sought to negate regional demands by issuing calls for ‘unity’ in the name of Pakistan and Islam. We were all Pakistanis and Muslims, it was now argued, and therefore we could not be Bengalis or Sindhis or Baloch. The bureaucracy, rather than Liaquat, was in effective control, and it was not prepared to make any significant concessions to the mullahs. The mullahs could be given a visible public role, but without any real share in power. For that purpose a Board of Talimaat-i-Islamia, was set up. It provided a few jobs for some senior mullahs, the Ulama. But the Board was to be no more than a façade for the newfound religious rhetoric of politicians. It was not to have any real powers. Its function was purely advisory and that too only on matters that were referred to it. When the Board did make some suggestions they were unceremoniously ignored. Nevertheless, the Ulama seemed to be content with the arrangement. They remained quiescent for nearly two decades. Recalcitrant Mullahs, such as Maulana Maududi, found themselves in jail. The mullahs were under control. For IPSS Political School

That basically peaceful scene was disturbed only temporarily in 1953, when Islamic militants launched AntiAhmadi riots in the Punjab and Martial Law was proclaimed. Although religious zealots of the Majlis-i-Ahrar and the Jamaat-i-Islami led the riots, they were in fact being used by cynical political forces, led by Punjab Chief Minister Mumtaz Daulatana. That was done in the context of US attempts to destabilise the Nazimuddin Government at the centre and to counter the Bengal group of MPs in the matter of the proposed Pakistan-US military Alliance which they opposed. That is a long and complicated story. A decade and a half later, religious rhetoric was indulged in by the illegitimate regime of General Yahya Khan, but without conceding any formal role to the mullahs. General Sher Ali, redefined ‘Pakistan Ideology’ as ‘Islamic Ideology’. The Yahya government’s primary concern was to de-legitimise the increasingly powerful Bengali nationalism. Yahya’s Bengali adviser, Prof. G. W. Choudhury, had persuaded him and his coterie of Generals, that East Bengali nationalism was limited to only a handful of intellectuals, who were in the pay of the Indians and that the vast majority of Bengalis had no sympathy with them. That tragically false picture could account for the ferocity and reckless manner in which Yahya tried to suppress the Bengali people in 1971. Would they have embarked on that policy if Yahya had even the slightest inkling of the depth of Bengali feelings? The mullahs were quiescent, however, until they were stirred into action by the foolish populist rhetoric of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who misguidedly decided to exploit religious ideology. Thereby Bhutto sowed the seeds of his own destruction, for the re-activated mullahs became the vanguard of the campaign against him. That set the scene for Gen. Zia’s coup d’etat. It was under General Zia that narrow and bigoted religiosity became state policy. The General sought the political support of the mullahs for his illegal regime, for he had no other political base. He also sought financial support from the Reagan regime in the US. Both of these objectives, he thought, could be secured through an Islamic Jihad which he proclaimed against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The CIA took over the task of organising armed religious groups in Afghanistan, in cooperation with Pakistani agencies. When the Russians left Afghanistan, however, the CIA was withdrawn precipitately from the scene, leaving it to Pakistan to deal with the mess that they had created. Foolish Pakistani policies since then, especially under Benazir Bhutto and her successor Nawaz Sharif, got Pakistan even more heavily involved with these once US sponsored ‘terrorist groups’. The present government has done little to turn away from these policies to extricate Pakistan from the mess that was inherited from Zia’s Afghan policy. When he seized power illegally, Zia badly needed some source of legitimacy for his regime. Being politically bankrupt, he decided to exploit the credulity of Pakistani Muslims by invoking Allah. He claimed to have experienced ilham (a divine revelation) in which, he declared, he was enjoined by the Almighty himself to Islamise Pakistan and to transform it into a fortress of Islam. New ‘Islamic Laws’ were promulgated that were crude and cruel distortions of Islamic teachings, such as his Hudud Ordinance which, for example, had the effect of punishing a rape victim (for fornication) while the perpetrator of the rape went scot-free because of impossible conditions of proof now needed to prove his guilt! Zia also bequeathed to his successors undemocratic Shariat Courts that are answerable to no one. They issue binding decisions on the state and on the people, in the name of the Sharia. That role, in the name of Islam, is rejected by the philosophy of Sir Syed Ahmad who pointed out that Islam did not decree the office of a Pope with powers to issue binding decrees in the name of the faith. Islam, he said, is a religion of the individual conscience. No person or institution has the right to issue binding fatawa, laying down what Islam is and what it is not. Indeed, no other Muslim country has the equivalent of our Shariat Courts. They were set up by Zia’s illegitimate regime and should be dissolved. The Shariat Courts are manned by persons who hold rigid religious views. Their most damaging decision so far For IPSS Political School

is an order that requires the abolition of interest, ‘in all its forms’, by 30th June, 2001. This threatens to bring Pakistan’s already very shaky economy to a complete halt. No enemy of Pakistan could have devised a more potent weapon to destroy the country. In arriving at their decision the judges of the Shariat Bench of the Supreme Court set aside the advice of a very large number of scholars who came before it as witnesses, who resisted this interpretation of the Sharia.Instead, the Court appears to have been misled by bogus claims of ‘Islamic Banking’. They seem to be ignorant of how a modern economy functions and do not seem to have understood at all the obvious implications of their decision in a modern day capitalist economy such as that of Pakistan. They appear to be ignorant of the difference between interest in a modern capitalist economy ( sood) and usury (riba) in pre-capitalist economies to which Quranic strictures apply. What the Shariat Courts have produced is a time bomb which, if allowed to go off, threatens to blow up Pakistan’s economy. The present Government seems to be paralysed in the face of the die-hard religious lobby which seems to be triumphant about this. It has poor advisers. As soon as the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court announced its decision, the Minister of Finance, who is an ex-banker, declared, without pausing to think, that the Court’s decision would be implemented in full. But, after months of deliberations by several high powered committees, the Government still has no idea whatever of what is to be done. It speaks with two voices. At a recent meeting, the Federal Minister for Religious Affairs declared that the Government has drafted all required laws and regulations, which are ready to be promulgated and that the Government is ready to implement the Shariat Court’s decision in full, and without qualifications. But at the same meeting, the Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan (the country’s central Bank) declared that they do not as yet know how the Shariat Court decision can be implemented. He said that the Government needs more time to work out viable solutions and that it has asked for an extension of time. The Government does not seem to understand the gravity of this issue. They should know that they cannot allow the economy to collapse. But they also appear to be too intimidated by religious fundamentalists to overturn the Shariat Court’s decree. Meanwhile, the top nine religious parties in the country have declared that they will launch a mass anti-Riba movement, on the lines of the movement that brought down Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, if the Government fails to abolish interest by the date laid down by the Shariat Bench of the Supreme Court, namely the end of June, 2001. They have declared, ominously, that the time has come for a decisive war between Islamic and secular forces in the country! A major factor in the present situation is a development since the time of Zia. That is the proliferation of deeni madaris, religious schools that have spread throughout Pakistan. They receive generous foreign funding, not least from Middle Eastern states like Saudi Arabia. The deeni madaris have little difficulty in recruiting pupils ( taliban), who are turned into fanatics, ready to die for what they are taught to believe are sacred causes. A factor that has greatly helped their recruitment is the creation of a huge number of unemployed families, people without a livelihood and without hope, as a consequence of farm mechanisation, especially in the Punjab. Every tractor displaces at least a dozen families of sharecroppers. Hundreds of thousands of them are now without a source of livelihood. In that context, the appearance of the well financed deeni madaris, who take over their children, give them free ‘tuition’, accommodation and food, cannot appear to be anything other than a great blessing. The enthusiastic young taliban are taught to recite the Quran. They are also indoctrinated, their minds filled with distorted and intolerant ideas about what Islam is and what it prescribes. The taliban are thus turned into fanatics. Most of the ‘ deeni madaris also give them military training for jihad initially ostensibly against the Soviets and now for the liberation of Kashmir. But already Pakistan itself is experiencing the inevitable heavy fallout from this. The armed groups, many of them with battle-hardened taliban, are in the vanguard of sectarian killings throughout Pakistan, which are on the increase; killings of members of rival sects, Sunnis against the Shi’a, Deobandi Sunnis against Barelvi Sunnis and so on. They have also begun to issue threats against the state itself and the society in Pakistan. Instead of a viable policy designed to disarm and liquidate such groups, successive regimes in Pakistan have pandered to them. The current military government, unlike the military regime of General Zia, has not indulged For IPSS Political School

much in religious rhetoric, except for the occasional utterances of its Federal Minister for Religious Affairs. Indeed, the Government’s liberal interior minister, General Moinuddin Haider, has given calls, from time to time, about doing something to bring the so-called deeni madaris under some sort of control, reforming their syllabi to introduce some useful, career related, educational input into their activities. For that he has become the bête noir of the religious parties, who have warned the government, firmly, against meddling in their affairs. The government, for its part, seems to be intimidated by the militant Islamic groups. In December last, for example, one Maulana Muhammad Akram, leader of the Tanzimul Ikhwan, threatened to march on Islamabad with ‘hundreds of thousands’ of his followers, to force the Government to promulgate the Sharia. The Government’s response was to placate him. It despatched the Punjab Home Secretary and the Inspector General of Police to parley with Akram. That was apparently not enough, for it then sent Dr. Mahmood Ghazi, the Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, as reinforcement. After long drawn out talks, Maulana Akram ‘graciously agreed’ to defer his plan to storm the capital. It has been suggested by the media that Maulana Akram has ‘a lot of influence among middle-ranking officers of the army’. If that is so, that must surely be extremely worrying. Could it be that which explains the Government’s apparent paralysis in the face of serious threats from fanatical religious groups? It must know that a do nothing policy will not solve anything. Left to itself, the situation can only get worse. Theories of the state, democratic or otherwise, are premised on the state’s monopoly of legitimate force. But here we have a situation where the state’s monopoly of force is undermined by the numerous armed religious groups (who often work in concert) that have agendas of their own. The Government must realise that the more they try to accommodate religious zealots, the stronger and the more intransigent they become. What the situation demands is a firm and well thought out policy to disarm such groups and bring them under control. It is surprising that Pakistan’s professional military does not yet seem to have realised the very serious threat that this situation poses to itself as well as to the State and society as a whole. In the meantime, until something is done, Pakistan will continue to stagger towards an uncertain future, with contradictory state policies. Professor Hamza Alavi is Pakistan’s leading sociologist and educationist. He read this paper at the South Asian Conference on Religious Fundamentalism held in Dhaka on June 1-2, 200

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National security at lower cost By Ayesha Siddiqua (copyright The Friday Times) While the current strategic developments around Pakistan seem to be have altered the country’s militarystrategic environment, the changing situation also makes it possible to effect major reductions in the annual defense outlays — provided the policymakers muster sufficient political will. In fact, a strategic restructuring of the defence sector could make possible a reduction of the current annual defense spending by 35-41 percent. However, this is not possible without a complete overhauling and revamping of defense planning and the defense sector in the country. Even using conservative estimates Pakistan could achieve a net saving of about Rs 55-64.5 billion without compromising national security. This money could in fact be diverted to socioeconomic development especially in the education sector. Clearly, such investment would save the country from acquiring additional debt burden in the form of loans from multilateral agencies for improving the current educational system. The other option could be for the governments (this or successive) to re-invest these captured resources in obtaining the much-needed weapons technologies to gear up for Pakistan’s role as a nuclear weapon state. But before getting into the details of how resources could be saved in the defense sector and what changes are to be made, let us briefly evaluate the strategic developments and how these are linked with Islamabad’s current defense spending and the military expenditure reduction debate. The near end of the war in Afghanistan and the American victory against the Taliban forces will most certainly impact the future role of Pakistan’s armed forces, especially the army. The restructuring of Afghanistan’s political system is bound to reduce the role of Pakistan army and some of its vital agencies that were embroiled in the conflict for the past twenty years. Since the early 1980s, a huge proportion of the intelligence agencies’ manpower and budget (as also some of army’s budget) has remained tied up with Afghanistan. This included, first, helping the Afghans fight the battle against the Soviet occupation and, later, creating a situation favorable to Pakistan’s security interests in that region. The end of the 1980s also witnessed the inflammation of the Kashmir issue. The war waged by the Kashmiri mujahideen also increased pressure on the Pakistan army. Groups fighting for the control of Afghanistan against those that were being supported by states inimical to Pakistan’s interests also created inevitable linkages with Kashmiri mujahideen. However, with the current international focus on terrorism, the possibility of pursuing the Kashmir issue through means other than diplomatic and political is likely to reduce. American impatience with Pakistan getting involved in any activity provoking cries of “terrorism” from India was quite obvious during General Pervez Musharraf’s recent visit to the US. This is indeed a time when the Pakistani military’s top brass need to re-evaluate their strategic options and decide on how to use this opportunity to contribute proactively towards socioeconomic development and growth. It is interesting to note that all the plans conceived by the present regime so far are a bid to generate revenues, not to undertake any major expenditure reduction. This is particularly true of the defense sector. Like other dimensions of the defence sector, the changing strategic milieu also provide Pakistan with an opportunity to strengthen the nuclear deterrence option that cannot be left undeveloped, besides exposing the armed forces to the much-needed concept of revolution in military affairs (RMA). RMA, which refers to revolutionary changes in defense technologies and relevant strategies, is presently non-existent in Pakistan’s military. One of the major reasons for this is the dearth of resources. The key areas where resources can be conserved relate to: (a) non-auditable programs, excluding the nuclear program, (b) defense industry, (c) weapons and spares procurement, (d) manpower planning and (e) supplies of military stores. The first item on the list is directly linked with the huge budget of various intelligence agencies that consume about nine to ten percent (Rs. 14.1-15.7 billion) of the annual defense allocation. Of course, this For IPSS Political School

would call for redefining the role of military intelligence agencies, besides altogether eliminating the domestic political role played by these organisations. Given the current situation, this budget could easily be brought down to 3-4 percent (Rs. 4.7-6.3 billion) without undermining the agencies’ intelligence-gathering capacity. Similarly, reorganization of the defence industry and restricting its activities to certain key areas could save another 10 percent (Rs. 15.75 billion). This would mean bringing down the budget from the current 28 percent (Rs. 44.1 billion). In fact, all organizations in the defence industry that are not contributing towards national security effectively could be wound up. The other alternative is to adopt the Chinese option of asking these organizations to generate their own resources and incrementally reducing their budget. This would not only reduce wastage but also make these institutions more efficient. It must be noted that poor inventory, work and human resource planning and contracting leads to huge wastages in the defense industry. The import of raw materials and piling up of raw material and other items also increase the cost of production. Interestingly, these wastages never come to light because of secrecy and other reasons. Human resource planning is another area needing immediate attention. The military, particularly the army, continues to be labor-intensive. In the past 12 to 15 months the army has added five infantry divisions and about 40, 000 personnel to counter the growing Indian military-technological capacity. But while numbers have been added, the technological capacity of the army remains qualitatively inferior. Experts say that with about 2, 320 obsolescent tanks and old M-113 armored personnel carriers, the army cannot really compete with the adversary. It is therefore debatable whether increase in manpower alone can add to the army’s punch vis-à-vis India. Clearly, a better option would be to improve technology, which is presently not possible because of the huge personnel cost the army has to bear. The service spends about 41 percent of its budget on meeting expenditure on personnel (Rs. 26.4 billion). There is need therefore to develop a leaner but (technologically) more efficient force and achieve this objective in a phased manner. According to a recent study, increasing conscription could reduce the budget by Rs. 70 billion annually (about 44 percent). Even if this budget could be reduced by 15 percent, it would still mean a substantial saving (approximately Rs. 23.6 billion). Of course, this would amount to an increased pension bill in the short term, but its financial benefits in the medium- to long-term are clear. The army can consider various models for conscription. The best in this case would be the one currently practiced in the army in the form of short-term, 4year commission. To increase the capability of the fighting force the service could increase the level of education at the time of induction and gradually build the reserve force through introducing a database. The idea is to build a system on scientific lines. The alteration of the financial allocation system by making it project-oriented rather than tying it up with the financial year will also reduce wastage in the procurement of weapons, spares and other supplies drastically. A conservative estimate is that through better management in these areas, the government could save up to a minimum of 5-7 percent (Rs. 7.9-11 billion) of the budget. The wastage is not only caused through deliberate mismanagement or kickbacks, but also because of the use of obsolete system of accountability and checks and balances. One of the areas requiring immediate attention, which is completely outdated, relates to the process of weapons and spares procurement. Traditionally, weapons have been acquired without spending sufficient time on generating the requirement. Moreover, none of the three services uses a project management approach to procurement. Even militaries like that of the United Arab Emirates uses a similar concept, thus enhancing the total cost and increasing industrial and other dividends. Another 3-5 percent (Rs. 4.7-7.9 billion) could be saved through improving management in other areas and stopping financial wastage especially resources that are leaking into the military’s business ventures or money excessively spent on various military organizations including the training institutes.

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