Interaction Foreign Assistance Briefing Book

Foreign Assistance Briefing Book Critical problems, recommendations, and actions for the Obama Administration and the 111th Congress

November 2008

InterAction 1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

Foreign Assistance Briefing Book

Contents Section 1: Introduction by Sam Worthington, CEO, InterAction

• InterAction Member List • InterAction Funding Recommendations for FY2010 Poverty-focused Development and Humanitarian Accounts

Section 2: CLIMATE CHANGE

• Climate Change and Sustainable Development–Policy Brief Table of Contributors Table of InterAction Climate Change Working Group

Section 3: GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS

• Global Food Crisis–Policy Brief Table of Contributors Table of InterAction Food Crisis Working Group

Section 4: AGRICULTURE

• Agricultural Development for Reducing Hunger and Rural Poverty–Policy Brief • Ending Hunger: The Role of Agriculture–Policy Paper Table of Contributors Table of InterAction Agriculture Policy Working Group

Section 5: HEALTH

• Sustainable Global Health and Development–Policy Brief Table of Contributors Table of InterAction Health in Relief and Development Working Group

Section 6: GENDER

• Gender in Development and Humanitarian Relief–Policy Brief • Value Added: Women and U.S. Foreign Assistance for the 21st Century–Policy Paper Table of Contributors Table of InterAction Gender and Aid Reform Task Force

Section 7: U.S. Government Development Assistance Funding Trends

• U.S. Government Development Assistance Funding Trends–Policy Brief Table of InterAction Public Policy Working Group

Foreign Assistance Briefing Book

Contents Continued Section 8: Supplemental Funding for Humanitarian Accounts

• Over-Reliance on Supplemental Funding for Humanitarian Accounts–Policy Brief • Why Dependence on Supplemental Funding Hurts Humanitarian Programs–Policy Paper Table of InterAction Public Policy Working Group

Section 9: Transformational Diplomacy

• Transformational Diplomacy: The “F Process”–Policy Brief • Foreign Assistance Reform: Views From the Ground–Policy Paper Table of InterAction Foreign Assistance Reform Advisory Group Table of InterAction Public Polic y Working Group

Section 10: Millennium Challenge Corporation

• Millennium Challenge Corporation–Policy Brief • Millennium Challenge Corporation–Policy Paper Table of Contributors Table of InterAction Millennium Challenge Corporation Working Group

Section 11: Millennium Development Goals

• Millennium Development Goals: A Framework for U.S. Development Assistance–Policy Brief • The United States and the Millennium Development Goals–Policy Paper Table of Contributors to Millennium Development Goals Policy Brief

Section 12: National Development Strategy



• A Call for a Comprehensive National Development Strategy–Policy Brief • Proposed Major Components and Organization of a Cabinet-level Department for Global and Human Development–Policy Paper • Why the U.S. Needs a Cabinet-level Department for Global and Human Development–Policy Paper Table of InterAction Public Policy Working Group

Section 13: U.S. Government Regulatory Constraints on NGO Space

• Regulatory Constraints on NGO Space–Policy Brief Table of InterAction USAID Management Reform Working Group Table of InterAction Humanitarian Policy and Practice Counterterrorism Working Group

Foreign Assistance Briefing Book

Contents Continued Section 14: NGO and Military Relations

• The U.S. Military’s Expanding Role in Foreign Assistance–Policy Brief • Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments–Policy Paper • Peacekeeping–Policy Brief Table of Contributors Table of InterAction Humanitarian Policy and Practice Working Group

Section 15: Humanitarian Priorities

• Humanitarian Funding Priorities–Policy Brief • Afghanistan–Policy Brief • Burma–Policy Brief • Chad–Policy Brief • Democratic Republic of Congo–Policy Brief • Ethiopia–Policy Brief • Iraq–Policy Brief • Somalia–Policy Brief • Sri Lanka–Policy Brief • Sudan–Policy Brief • Uganda–Policy Brief • West Bank/Gaza–Policy Brief • Disaster Risk Reduction–Policy Brief Table of Contributors Table of InterAction Humanitarian Policy and Practice Team

Introduction To: From: Date: Re:

The Obama Administration Transition Team, Members of Congress Samuel A. Worthington, President & CEO, InterAction November 2008 InterAction’s 2008 Transition Foreign Assistance Briefing Book

O

n behalf of InterAction’s 172 member organizations, I am pleased to present you with our Foreign Assistance Briefing Book. Our goal for this book is to present our community’s best thinking and wealth of experience on the issues we expect you will face during the first six months of President Obama’s Administration and the 111th Congress. This briefing book identifies key areas and sectors in need of immediate attention and lays out suggested actions. The book captures the lessons learned from our members’ decades of on-theground experience, which guides InterAction’s work. The briefing book is presented in three distinct sections: issues such as climate change, funding trends, and humanitarian priorities. Each issue is outlined in a succinct one-pager and several sections have additional longer, indepth background papers. InterAction is the largest coalition of U.S.-based international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) focused on the world’s poor and most vulnerable people. Our members’ activities are directly supported by over $6 billion of private funding from the American people, leveraging the over $2.8 billion our members receive from the federal government. Foreign assistance advances U.S. national interests. U.S. foreign assistance represents our humanitarian values, and shows the best face of America to the world. Public attitudes show strong support for poverty reduction, sustainable development, and humanitarian work. More than 90% of respondents to a September 2006 Public Agenda poll indicated that, “helping other countries when they are struck by natural disasters like the tsunami in Indonesia” and, “assisting countries with developing clean water supplies,” should be top priorities of U.S. foreign policy. Conversely, only 34% of survey respondents agreed with the statement, “We should only send aid to parts of the world where the U.S. has security interests.”

InterAction 1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

At the heart of America’s foreign assistance portfolio is poverty-focused development assistance, which is our country’s most important tool for reaching the world’s poor. The primary goal of such assistance is to support the efforts of people, communities and countries to permanently lift themselves out of poverty, and to save lives in humanitarian emergencies. This effort extends beyond the much-needed task of addressing the basic needs of the poor, such as creating access to food, water and sanitation, and health care. It involves protecting the most vulnerable from shocks, cycles, and trends that threaten their survival, equipping them with the capacity and tools to advocate on their own behalf, enabling them to be stakeholders in the systems and structures that govern their access to resources, and improving their ability to support themselves and their families. For instance, the number of people living in absolute poverty has fallen by 500 million over the last twenty-five years. The number of deaths of children under the age of five fell from 20 million in 1960 to 9.7 million in 2006. From 1960 to 2006, the disparity between primary and secondary education for boys and girls declined by 60 percent. While the U.S. NGO community involved in foreign relief and development has proven successes, its ability to partner effectively with the U.S. Government has declined in recent years.

Today, too few international development dollars are spread over too many federal agencies. U.S. foreign assistance is fragmented across 26 departments and agencies in our government, and aid programs are often poorly coordinated and/or working at cross-purposes. This fragmentation has been exacerbated by recent initiatives like PEPFAR and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) that were designed to work around, rather than with, existing development capabilities of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the lead U.S. development agency. For this reason, InterAction believes, as do a growing number of foreign policy and international development experts, that the U.S. needs a single national strategy for global development, bringing all U.S. development assistance programs, including MCC and PEPFAR, under a single unified framework, overseen by a Cabinet-level department focused on humanitarian relief and international development. We envision an entirely new department, with new capabilities to meet 21st century challenges, that brings the government’s best development interventions together beneath one roof. Our top three priorities for modernizing and elevating foreign assistance within our government are: •

Develop and promulgate a new national development a strategy that articulates the U.S. Government’s overarching development goal, describes how the United States will partner with beneficiaries and other donors, and prioritizes poverty reduction as a key goal.

•

Elevate development to its rightful place alongside defense and diplomacy – as articulated in the 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies – by creating a new Cabinet-level Department for Global and Human Development.

•

Rewrite and reauthorize the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) to eliminate the legislative and bureaucratic barriers to effective development. Take the opportunity presented by the reauthorization to reprioritize monitoring and evaluation, local consultation, and flexibility in programming.

Taking these steps will help us create aid programs that are attuned to the needs of beneficiaries and dynamic enough to respond to them. This can achieved by crafting a “grand bargain” between Congress and the administration that reflects a shared vision of the role and management of U.S. foreign assistance, provides the Executive branch with the authorities it needs to respond to a rapidly changing world, and ensures rightful and comprehensive legislative oversight. All of these steps should take place in consultation with civil society, beneficiaries and other stakeholders. This briefing book contains a wealth of information and policy recommendations on a range of pressing foreign assistance challenges. Included is InterAction’s FY2010 development and humanitarian budget request levels for your information. If you would like further information about these or any other topics related to U.S. foreign assistance, please contact my staff at 202-667-8227. This Foreign Assistance Briefing Book represents a robust collaboration involving over one hundred InterAction member organizations working through and with InterAction staff, and in partnership with one another. Member organizations and relevant working groups are credited in connection with particular policy papers. Nearly every interaction staff member contributed in some way, by coordinating the work of members, writing and editing, developing ideas and concepts, and reaching out to knowledgeable authorities. Leadership for this project came from three staff members: Chad Brobst, Senior Publication Manager and Graphic Designer, developed design and coordinated production; Sarah Farnsworth, Senior Program Manager for Government Relations, managed the project and coordinated the work of many members and staff; and Lindsay Coates, Vice President for Policy and Communications, provided overall leadership. Many thanks to the InterAction member organizations, their leadership and staffs, and the InterAction staff for their contributions, professionalism and dedication. We hope that our efforts will be useful to our readers.

SETTING A BOLD AGENDA FOR RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT InterAction is the largest coalition of U.S.-based international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) focused on the world’s poor and most vulnerable people. Collectively, InterAction’s more than 165 members work in every developing country. Formed in 1984 with 22 members and now based in Washington, DC with a staff of 40, InterAction’s member agencies are large and small, faith-based and secular and are headquartered across 25 states. In poor communities throughout the developing world, InterAction members meet people halfway in expanding opportunities and supporting gender equality in education, health care, agriculture, small business, and other areas. To forestall or recover from the violence that impacts millions of innocent civilians, InterAction exercises leadership in conflict prevention, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and peacebuilding initiatives in post-conflict situations. InterAction members respond to natural disasters all around the world. The U.S. public shows its support for advancing human dignity and peace in the world through contributions to InterAction members totaling around $6 billion annually. InterAction leverages the impact of this private support by advocating for the expansion of U.S. government investments and by insisting that policies and programs are responsive to the realities of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable populations. InterAction’s comparative advantage rests on the uniquely field and practitioner-based expertise of its members. InterAction works with its members to compile data on the impact of NGO programs, as a basis for promoting best practices and for evidence-based public policy formulation.

MOVING FORWARD IN 2008 InterAction’s work is guided by the following priorities:

Goal 1

Promote a bold agenda to focus U.S. development and humanitarian assistance on improving the conditions of the world’s poor and most vulnerable.



Engage with the U.S. government to advance poverty alleviation and humanitarian relief as major independent U.S. foreign assistance priorities. Advocate for the creation of a cabinet-level U.S. department that addresses development, humanitarian assistance, and other related issues.

Goal 2

Demonstrate and enhance NGO accountability and impact in development and humanitarian action. Focus on aggregating the contributions of the NGO community towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals, on broadening compliance with the Sphere Project’s Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, and on aligning with other key global frameworks that advance development efforts and enable humanitarian action.

Goal 3

InterAction brings the values and experience of the NGO community into the broader development and humanitarian assistance community through strategic alliances with key partners around particular issues and objectives. These partnerships further leverage InterAction’s political, intellectual, and financial capital. InterAction believes its future is one of strategic alliances.

Be the voice and prime representative of U.S. international NGOs in building alliances and common agendas with NGO networks around the world and with other strategic partners.

Neither InterAction nor its members bear lightly the responsibility of the trust the American people place in us. As such, members adhere to InterAction’s standards that help assure accountability in the critical areas of financial management, fundraising, governance, and program performance.

For more information, visit:

1400 16th Street, NW, Suite 210

Washington, DC 20036 USA

www.interaction.org

Tel 1.202.667.8227

Fax 1.202.667.8236

[email protected]

InterAction Member Organizations Academy for Educational Development Action Against Hunger USA ActionAid International USA Adventist Development and Relief Agency International (ADRA) African Medical & Research Foundation African Methodist Episcopal Service and Development Agency (AME-SADA) Africare Aga Khan Foundation USA Aid to Artisans Air Serv International Alliance to End Hunger American Friends Service Committee American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee American Jewish World Service American Near East Refugee Aid American Red Cross International Services American Refugee Committee AmeriCares America’s Development Foundation (ADF) Amigos de las Américas Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team Baptist World Alliance B’nai B’rith International BRAC USA Bread for the World Bread for the World Institute Brother’s Brother Foundation Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC) CARE Catholic Medical Mission Board Catholic Relief Services Center for Health and Gender Equity (CHANGE) Center for International Health and Cooperation (CIHC) Centre for Development and Population Activities (CEDPA) CHF International Christian Blind Mission (CBM) Christian Children’s Fund (CCF) Christian Reformed World Relief Committee (CRWRC) Church World Service Citizens Development Corps Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs Communications Consortium Media Center Concern America CONCERN Worldwide U.S., Inc. Congressional Hunger Center Counterpart International Direct Relief International Doctors of the World Educational Concerns for Hunger Organization (ECHO) Episcopal Relief & Development Ethiopian Community Development Council Floresta The Florida Association of Volunteer Action in the Caribbean and the Americas (FAVACA) Food For The Hungry Freedom From Hunger

Friends of Liberia Friends of the World Food Program Gifts In Kind International Giving Children Hope Global Health Council Global Links Global Resource Services GOAL USA Goodwill Industries International Habitat for Humanity International Handicap International USA Hands on Worldwide Heart to Heart International Heartland Alliance Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society Heifer International Helen Keller International Hesperian Foundation Holt International Children’s Services Humane Society International (HIS) The Hunger Project Information Management and Mine Action Programs (IMMAP) INMED Partnerships for Children InsideNGO Institute for Sustainable Communities Institute of Cultural Affairs International Aid, Inc. International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) International Crisis Group (ICG) International Housing Coalition (IHC) International Institute of Rural Reconstruction International Medical Corps International Orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC) International Reading Association International Relief & Development International Relief Teams International Rescue Committee (IRC) International Social Service — United States of America Branch, Inc International Youth Foundation Interplast Islamic Relief USA Joint Aid Management (JAM) Jesuit Refugee Services USA Korean American Sharing Movement Latter-day Saint Charities Life for Relief and Development Lutheran World Relief Management Sciences for Health (MSH) MAP International Medical Care Development Medical Teams International Mental Disability Rights International Mercy Corps Mercy USA for Aid and Development Minnesota International Health Volunteers Mobility International USA National Association of Social Workers National Peace Corps Association

National Wildlife Federation ONE Campaign Operation USA Opportunity International Oxfam America Pact Pan American Development Foundation PATH Pathfinder International PCI-Media Impact Perkins School for the Blind Physicians for Human Rights Physicians for Peace Plan USA Population Action International Population Communication Presbyterian Disaster Assistance and Hunger Program Project HOPE ProLiteracy Worldwide Quixote Center/Quest for Peace Refugees International Relief International RESULTS Salvation Army World Service Office Save the Children Seva Foundation SHARE Foundation Society for International Development (SID) Solar Cookers International Stop Hunger Now Support Group to Democracy Trickle Up Program Unitarian Universalist Service Committee United Methodist Committee on Relief United Way International USA for UNHCR U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants U.S. Committee for UNDP U.S. Fund for UNICEF VAB (Volunteers Association of Bangladesh) Winrock International Women for Women International Women’s Environment and Development Organization Women Thrive Worldwide World Cocoa Foundation World Concern World Conference of Religions for Peace World Education World Emergency Relief World Hope International World Learning World Neighbors World Rehabilitation Fund World Relief World Resources Institute (WRI) World Society for the Protection of Animals World Wildlife Fund World Vision (as of 10/01/08)

InterAction Funding Recommendations for FY2010 Poverty-focused Development and Humanitarian Accounts

I

nterAction, a coalition of 172 U.S.-based international development and humanitarian private voluntary organizations, respectfully submits the following funding recommendations for FY2010. We strongly urge the Administration to request these amounts, and urge the Administration, Budget Committees and the Appropriations Committees to request and provide allocations sufficient to allow the recommended total increase of $9.9 billion dollars (over FY2008 enacted levels) for these poverty-focused development and humanitarian accounts. Success in the global fight against poverty requires quality investments across a number of sectors: HIV/AIDS, education, nutrition, clean water, skilled health workers, good governance, functioning health systems, economic empowerment, and gender equality, to name just a few. Sustainable progress in any one of these sectors is intertwined with progress in the others, and if investments are not balanced across sectors, our ability to effect sustainable change, including in the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, will be diminished. InterAction celebrates the exponential increases in support for HIV/ AIDS and malaria programs over the last several years, but urges the Administration to request and Congress to provide adequate funding across all these sectors and accounts. We fully understand the tough budget climate. While our recommendations may seem aggressive to some, their total remains an exceedingly small portion of the overall federal budget, and the returns on the investments we recommend – in increased global stability, prosperity and good will, reduction of suffering and enactment of American values – will be many-fold. In the coming years, those returns will be needed more than ever. The time to make the investments is now.

InterAction 1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

The table on the next page provides our numerical recommendations by account, with comparison to FY2008 enacted levels (given the incomplete status of FY2009 appropriations). The pages that follow provide justifications for our recommendations, explaining the numbers and where useful breaking them down by “sub-account.” Questions and requests for further detail are welcome: please contact Ken Forsberg at InterAction at 202-552-6564, or [email protected].

 

GRAND TOTAL

TOTAL OTHER KEY ACCOUNTS

Millennium Challenge Corporation Global Health and Child Survival Programs (HIV) Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities

TOTAL CORE ACCOUNTS  

 

Global Health and Child Survival Programs (non-HIV) Development Assistance International Disaster Assistance Office of Transition Initiatives Migration and Refugee Assistance Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance International Organizations and Programs:   UNICEF UNFPA UNIFEM UNIFEM Trust Fund UNDP Center for Human Settlements

Account

23,900,345

13,027,845

 

2,200,000 8,500,000 2,327,845

10,872,000

135,000 65,000 7,000 5,000 110,000 2,500

3,347,500 3,756,300 1,128,200 65,000 2,051,000 200,000

InterAction FY2010 Recommendation

($ in thousands)

1000

+1,500

2,064,217

+263,628

    +9,886,287

14,014,058

8,559,700

5,009,095

+3,490,905

+4,468,145

 

1,486,388

 

+713,612

5,454,358

98,160

+11,840

+5,418,142

1,800

+3,200 

316,897

 

3,600

75,636

+124,364

+3,400

1,338,178

+712,822

7,000

44,636

+20,365

+58,000

649,739

+478,461

129,000

1,623,622

+2,132,678

+6,000

1,481,987

FY08 Enacted (including all emergency)

+1,865,513

Δ from FY08 Total Enacted

InterAction Fiscal Year 2010 Funding Recommendations

(Global Health and Child Survival, non-HIV)

GHCS – non-HIV

Account

$3.348 billion

FY10 Funding Level Recommendations

a bilateral family planning and reproductive health investment of $935 million which would constitute an appropriate U.S. share of the resources necessary to meet the need for contraception of the estimated 201 million women in the developing world whose contraceptive needs go unmet; a TB investment of $650 million which would provide the USAID portion of the U.S. share of what is needed in 2010 based on the Global Plan and the MDR-TB and XDR-TB Global Response Plan; a malaria investment of $800 million which is targeted to meet the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI). PMI pledged $1.2 billion to combat malaria at the end of five years; $50 million for neglected tropical diseases which would keep the U.S. on track to meet what the President has pledged toward fighting those diseases; and $12.5 million for child marriage prevention (with the same amount in Development Assistance) which would help reduce a practice associated with greater poverty, lower levels of girls’ education, higher rates of maternal and infant mortality, and greater incidence of domestic violence.

•

• • • •

New investment in global health is also vital for expanding health workforce capacity and working against gender-based violence. Overall, the recommended amount for this account would constitute a significant and much needed increased U.S. investment in a healthier world.

a maternal and child health investment of $900 million which would expand effective programs to save the lives of children under 5 and their mothers who die from preventable causes;

•

This amount for the Global Health Account (not counting HIV programs) would allow the following:

Justification

(Development Assistance)

DA

Account

$3.756 billion

FY10 Funding Level Recommendations

$750 million for agricultural development which is consistent with the authorization in the Lugar-Casey Global Food Security Act of 2008 (which will be reintroduced in the next Congress) and reverses a steady decline in funding for these programs. Some estimate the U.S. share of the global needs for programs to increase agricultural productivity at $1.2 billion; $500 million for water and sanitation which is the realistic amount required in FY 2010 to continue to implement the Senator Paul Simon Water for the Poor Act (P.L. No. 109-121), and to work partially toward the goal stated by Congress therein to “reduce by one-half from the baseline year 1990 the proportion of people who are unable to reach or afford safe drinking water and the proportion of people without access to basic sanitation by 2015.” This amount would cover the cost of bringing adequate water and basic sanitation to 5 million new people each year (or 5% of the total number of people annually needing access to reach the relevant Millennium Development Goal) in countries that have increased internal funding for the sector and that have sound water and sanitation policies; $304 million for microfinance which would make a significant contribution toward poverty reduction by enabling microfinance institutions to leverage billions of dollars in private investment capital to promote dramatic growth in outreach to the poor and very poor, an estimated 500 million of whom could benefit from enterprise credit, as well as the hundreds of millions more who do not have access to insurance or a safe place to save their money; $283 million for trade capacity-building programs which would help the agrarian-based economies of developing countries pull more people out of poverty and help ensure that more people have what they need to feed their families and communities; $275 million for biodiversity, a modest increase from $195 million in FY 2008, which would enable more work to be done on conservation for the benefit of people and nature. Scientists estimate 1/10th of the world’s biological diversity is in danger of extinction, including at least 25% of mammals, and by the end of the 21st century as much as 2/3 of the world’s species could be in danger of extinction. 3/4ths of the world’s species reside in developing nations that depend on sustainable natural resources for their livelihoods; $212 million for climate change mitigation and adaptation; $195 million for clean energy programs, both of which recognize our need to act on our steadily increasing understanding that protecting our environment and promoting human wellbeing and development go hand in hand, and that one cannot proceed without the other;

•

•

•

•

•

• •

(continued on next page)

$1 billion for basic education – the foundation for human and economic development – which would amount to 1/3 of the U.S. share of what is needed annually to ensure that all children have access to quality basic education by the internationally agreed upon target of 2015;

•

This amount for Development Assistance would allow the following:

Justification

(Office of Transition Initiatives)

OTI

(International Disaster Assistance)

IDA

(DA continued)

Account

$65 million

$1.128 billion

$3.756 billion

FY10 Funding Level Recommendations

$20 million for women’s economic opportunity (with $20 million in ESF) which is needed to enhance economic opportunities for poor women in developing countries as a key component of reducing global poverty rates; and $12.5 million for child marriage prevention (with the same amount in Global Health). The widespread practice of child marriage in many developing countries is associated with greater poverty, lower levels of girls’ education, higher rates of maternal and infant mortality, and greater incidence of domestic violence. Therefore, it must be fully addressed within U.S. development programs for girls’ education, income generation and gender-based violence, in order to for these programs to be most efficient and cost-effective.

•

•

This amount for the Office of Transition Initiatives would allow OTI to continue its work as a key civilian instrument on the ground providing fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs worldwide. OTI normally looks for matching funds from USAID regional bureaus and local USAID Missions to support portions of their work. One of the regions where their activities are most needed – Africa – is also the region where USAID regional bureaus and local USAID Missions have the least funding available to support match arrangements. A small increase would allow for more effective programs in Africa.

USAID has been forced to rely on mid-year supplemental appropriations in order to address a long list of disasters and famines, a funding practice with serious human costs. Adequate funding in the regular budget is critical in meeting the needs in ongoing and escalating emergencies, while maintaining a small contingency fund to respond to unexpected emergencies.

The International Disaster Assistance account reached a level of $649.7 million in FY08 through regular, bridge and emergency appropriations. Additional funding is required to respond to the increasing pressures of the global food crisis and the worsening situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Chad and Sudan. At least $185 million is needed to meet the needs of internally-displaced and other vulnerable Iraqis without drawing resources away from emergencies elsewhere. Contingency funds are also needed to ensure that the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is not forced to scale down ongoing programs when unexpected emergencies arise. Additional funding was also built into this calculation for response in the critical areas of emergency education and violence against women and girls.

$185 million for a new line item to address gender-based violence which would scale up current U.S. Government and other model programming to address violence against women internationally, addressing the fact that one in three women will be a victim of abuse in her lifetime;

•

Justification

(International Organizations and Programs)

IO&P

(Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance)

ERMA

(Migration and Refugee Assistance)

MRA

Account

We recommend an amount for the IO&P account that would allow the following levels of funding:

$200 million

$2.051 billion

FY10 Funding Level Recommendations

UN HABITAT (Center for Human Settlements): $2.5 million. Habitat, as the sole U.N. organization concerned with human settlements, plays an important role in focusing worldwide attention on housing and slum conditions in the developing world.

UNDP (United Nations Development Program): $110 million to support the UN’s primary development agency as it works to encourage democratic governance, plays a lead role in coordinating the international long term responses to disasters and conflict around the world, and focuses on energy, environment, and health issues as they relate to human development. UNDP strives to ensure that all of its programs support gender equality and respect for human rights.

UNIFEM Trust Fund: $5 million, to help fund the only multi-lateral grant-making mechanism that focuses support for local, national and regional efforts to combat violence against women internationally.

UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women): $7 million, to provide financial and technical assistance for innovative programs and strategies promoting women’s political participation and economic security in over 100 countries, particularly where they face the highest levels of insecurity.

UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund): $65 million to restore U.S. leadership in the key multilateral organization in the family planning and reproductive health field by providing a contribution at a level comparable to those of UNFPA’s other leading bilateral donors.

UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund): $135 million, which would help support this agency’s expanding efforts to ensure the survival and well being of children throughout the world.

The Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance account provides an important safety valve during times of emergency. The ERMA ceiling of $100 million has not been raised since the mid-1990s and given the increased costs of providing emergency assistance, we recommend an increase in the ceiling to $200 million. Additionally, the current presidential certification process is cumbersome. To ensure an agile response to immediate emergency needs, the Secretary of State should be authorized to certify ERMA drawdowns.

The recommended funding level includes $1.425 billion for overseas assistance. This reflects funding available in FY 08 for overseas assistance adjusted for inflation and $125 million to address new and unmet humanitarian needs. The recommended funding level also includes $556 million for the United States to resettle 125,000 refugees and an additional 5,000 Iraqis and their accompanying family members under the Special Immigrant Visa program. It is vitally important that the U.S. continue to revitalize its refugee admissions program to help protect highly vulnerable refugees and to provide a long-term solution to some refugees trapped for years in protracted humanitarian crises.

This amount for the Migration and Refugee Assistance account would allow the U.S. to continue its strong leadership on humanitarian assistance and help improve the international response to the basic needs of displaced persons—the majority of them women and children. The number of refugees and internally displaced persons is rising, and many lack access to essential, life-saving services—health care, safe shelter, clean water and education. Efforts to prevent and respond to violence against displaced women and girls are inadequate and underfunded. Conditions have significantly deteriorated for displaced persons in several African countries and in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Several million Iraqis are still displaced. The Colombia displacement crisis remains one of the largest in the world.

Justification

(Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities)

CIPA

(Global Health and Child Survival – HIV/AIDS)

GHCS — HIV

(Millennium Challenge Corporation)

MCC

Account

$2.3 billion

$8.5 billion

$2.2 billion

FY10 Funding Level Recommendations

By FY10 it is also expected that a number of missions will have begun to draw down, reducing the overall cost of UN peacekeeping. Among these is UNMIL (in Liberia), which will have reduced its size by 10% in 2009, and is expected to continue to downsize at roughly that rate in 2010. Also, UNMIK (in Kosovo) is already in a rapid state of drawdown and is expected to maintain just 30% of its civilian resources and a maximum of 500 UN police into 2010.

Some of the most expensive UN peacekeeping missions are those that have been given numerous complex tasks beyond their core civilian protection mandates, or that face significant logistical hurdles. The MONUC (Democratic Republic of the Congo) force, for example, is also responsible for providing massive logistical and combat support to the Congolese Army (the FARDC). UNAMID (in Darfur) has faced a number of both political and logistical roadblocks to deployment, but is expected to reach full deployment of 26,000 troops in FY10.

$250 million of this amount can be attributed to the U.S. leading a push for a new peacekeeping deployment in Somalia. This comes in spite of a warning from NGOs and peacekeeping experts that a peacekeeping mission can only be successful when there is a peace to keep, and that conditions are not currently conducive in Somalia.

$2.3 billion for the Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities account represents the U.S. share of projected peacekeeping costs for FY10. The U.S. share, agreed to by international treaty, is currently 25.9% of the total UN peacekeeping budget. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the U.S. has given its support to each and every one of the UN peacekeeping missions deployed. As such, a failure on the part of the U.S. to pay its bills represents both a failure to follow through on its international commitments, and a betrayal of those countries that have made troops and equipment available to support peacekeeping efforts.

The PEPFAR reauthorization bill authorizes $37 billion over five years, which works out to $7.4 billion a year if evenly distributed, assuming no further increases for the Global Fund aside from the $2 billion authorized. If we assume the increase is more gradual, and starts with a 15% increase over the previous year, and assume that some of the $37 billion will go towards the Global Fund, the authorized level for 2010 for AIDS is about $6.5 billion for bilateral programming, plus $2 billion for the Global Fund, for a total of $8.5 billion.

The Millennium Challenge Corporation is an innovative development program working directly with countries who have quantitatively demonstrated a commitment to ruling justly, providing economic freedom and investing in their people. The MCC has made determined progress over the last year in shifting its focus to implementation and subsequently progress is being seen on many of the Compacts. An FY10 appropriation of $2.2 billion would allow the MCC to sign 3-4 Compacts currently in the pipeline, as well as cover possible threshold agreements with countries seeking MCC eligibility and minimal administrative costs.

Justification

Climate Change

Climate Change

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Climate Change and Sustainable Development Problem Climate change poses a serious and immediate threat to poverty reduction, sustainable economic development, stability and security around the world. Developing countries face climate change impacts that make the lives of poor people more precarious including reduced water access and crop yields, severe weather-related disasters, exacerbated disease and new, destabilizing risks such as sea-level rise.

Recommendations The Administration and Congress must tackle climate change at the international level through U.S. legislation and solid re-engagement in global climate negotiations. This must include support for the most vulnerable developing countries to prepare for and build resilience to climate challenges. These steps can help achieve a global climate agreement, bolster political stability, and generate sustainable economic development.

Actions • Provide significant funding and support for the most vulnerable developing countries to prepare for and build resilience to climate change impacts (at least several billion dollars annually are necessary according to recent estimates). This assistance should come from substantial resources generated in comprehensive climate legislation and through short-term assistance of at least $250 million for the Least Developed Countries Fund which supports adaptation projects; • Help developing countries limit emissions by supporting reduced deforestation and access to clean energy technology; • Ensure solutions are pursued equitably, with appropriate safeguards for the rights and livelihoods of poor communities; • Responsibly re-engage in UN climate negotiations for a post-2012 global deal that: provides appropriate support to developing countries for adaptation to climate change; helps developing countries reduce emissions; and commits the U.S. to substantial emissions reductions; and • Ensure U.S. development assistance aligns with climate change adaptation and preparedness strategies and efforts to help developing countries shift to lowcarbon pathways.

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Developing countries will have greater resources to handle pressing climate change impacts. The U.S. will have emissions targets and developing countries will have assistance to reduce their emissions. Equitable principles and safeguards will protect the rights and livelihods of local communities.

Background Climate change poses one of the most serious challenges to poverty reduction and economic development around the world in the 21st century. Though least responsible for climate change, developing countries are facing climate change impacts including reduced water availability, decreasing natural resources and crop yields, severe weather-related disasters, exacerbated disease, and rising sea levels that are creating new, destabilizing risks. Climate change poses a serious and immediate threat to poverty reduction, sustainable economic development, stability and security around the world. As the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recently stated, developing countries have the least capacity to cope with these consequences. Addressing these consequences for developing countries depends on tackling a twin challenge, both in U.S. legislation and through international negotiations. Providing funding, capacity building, and appropriate technologies for climate adaptation and preparedness is not only needed to address serious climate impacts, but can also be vital to economic development. The financial benefits from taking preventive action have been demonstrated widely. According to an analysis by the World Bank and the U.S. Geological Survey, an investment of $40 billion to reduce disaster risk is capable of saving $280 billion. Our already strained capacity to respond to natural disasters and health crises around the world is being stretched even further by the increasing harm caused by climate change impacts. Moreover, security experts have warned that the impacts of climate change will heighten security threats by increasing impoverishment and leading to migration and refugee crises and conflicts over scarce natural resources such as water. Meanwhile, working with developing countries to be aware of, adapt to and prepare for climate impacts should be an essential part of a broader strategy of renewed global engagement. The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, released October 30, 2006, noted that even with dramatic emission reductions today, climate change will still have major impacts, particularly on developing countries, for many years and that supporting developing countries in their efforts to adapt to climate change is the only avenue to actually address the harm being experienced now. In many developing countries, rural communities are particularly vulnerable to climate impacts because of their dependence on agriculture for their livelihoods. Much of this agriculture is rain-fed, relatively labor-intense, and makes little use of yield-improving inputs and labor-saving innovations, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Where there is limited infrastructure – in the form of physical facilities for

distribution, storage and conversion, or limited access to agricultural extension services, the capacity to overcome adverse climate conditions is particularly low and food security is increasingly threatened. Urban, coastal communities (particularly slum dwellers), face heightened risks as sea levels rise, exacerbating current flooding disasters, forcing population displacements that will yield increasing urban poverty and the risk of urban unrest. Climate impacts vary widely. Taking this into account through community-based adaptation is therefore important. At the same time, attention should be paid to wider economic, social, political and institutional support frameworks.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Contributors to Climate Change Policy Brief Organization

URL

CARE Evangelical Environmental Network Mercy Corps National Wildlife Federation Oxfam America International Food Policy Research Institute World Wildlife Fund

www.care.org www.creationcare.org www.mercycorps.org www.nwf.org www.oxfamamerica.org www.ifpri.org www.worldwildlife.org

InterAction Climate Change Working Group

1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

Organization

URL

Academy for Educational Development Action Against Hunger ActionAid American Friends Service Committee American Red Cross Bread for the World CARE Catholic Relief Services Christian Children’s Fund Church World Service Center for International Environmental Law Congressional Hunger Center Conservation International Evangelical Environmental Network Floresta Friends Committee on National Legislation Friends of the Earth Global Health Council Heifer International Institute for Policy Studies Institute for Sustainable Communities International Food Policy Research Institute International Medical Corps International Orthodox Christian Charities International Relief & Development International Rescue Committee Islamic Relief USA Jubilee USA

www.aed.org www.actionagainsthunger.org www.actionaid.org www.afsc.org www.redcross.org www.bread.org www.care.org www.crs.org www.christianchildrensfund.org www.churchworldservice.org www.ciel.org www.hungercenter.org www.conservation.org www.creationcare.org www.floresta.org www.fcnl.org www.foe.org www.globalhealthcenter.org www.heifer.org www.ips-dc.org www.iscvt.org www.ifpri.org www.imcworldwide.org www.iocc.org www.ird.org www.theirc.org www.irw.org www.jubileeusa.org

InterAction Climate Change Working Group Members (cont) Organization

URL

Leon H. Sullivan Foundation Lutheran World Relief Mennonite Central Committee Mercy Corps Missionary Oblates – Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation National Council of Churches National Peace Corps Association National Religious Partnership for the Environment National Wildlife Federation Natural Resources Defense Council ONE Opportunity International Oxfam America Pact Population Action International RESULTS Save the Children Sierra Club Solar Cookers International Solar Household Energy, Inc. The Nature Conservancy Tostan U.S. Committee for UNDP Union of Concerned Scientists Unitarian Universalist Service Committee United Methodist Committee on Relief US Climate Action Network Women’s Environment and Development Organization Wildlife Conservation Society World Concern World Resources Institute World Vision World Wildlife Fund

www.thesullivanfoundation.org www.lwr.org www.mcc.org www.mercycorps.org www.omiusajpic.org www.ncccusa.org www.rpcv.org www.nrpe.org www.nwf.org www.nrdc.org www.one.org www.opportunity.org www.oxfamamerica.org www.pactworld.org www.populationaction.org www.results.org www.savethechildren.org www.sierraclub.org www.solarcookers.org www.she-inc.org www.nature.org www.tostan.org www.undp-usa.org www.ucsusa.org www.uusc.org www.umcor.org www.climatenetwork.org www.wedo.org www.wcs.org www.worldconcern.org www.wri.org www.worldvision.org www.wwf.org

Global Food Crisis

Global Food Crisis

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Global Food Crisis Problem Increases in food prices are pushing over 100 million more people into food insecurity. Lack of reliable access to food causes involuntary migration, the breakup of families, and greater vulnerability overall. Widespread hunger and malnourishment threatens global development and political stability, and harms the poorest and most vulnerable of the world’s people, especially women and children.

Recommendations While fully addressing the problem will take time and extensive collaboration, the U.S. should actively support the first Millennium Development Goal, a global initiative that aims to halve the number of individuals suffering from chronic hunger and malnutrition. The U.S. must use its leadership to strengthen partnerships among all stakeholders and urge other governments to adopt policies that create national social safety nets to help the poor better cope with shocks.

Actions • Double the U.S. annual commitment to food relief programs to at least $3.2 billion. Funding for these programs (food aid, school feeding and child/maternal health, nutrition) must be more flexible to meet the needs of the poor, and should include funding for food vouchers, cash for work, and local cash purchase of food aid; • When possible, buy locally. Increase resources for flexible cash assistance, which can be used to purchase food supplies locally and regionally. The FY09 Supplemental Appropriations Bill provided an additional $795 million to address the food crisis, with over 50% directed to cash programs including local and regional purchase; • The U.S. Government should invest $750 million in FY10 to meet urgent needs in agricultural development, focusing on assistance to small-scale farmers (especially women) through programs that provide seeds, training, equipment, and farm credit; and • Review the negative impacts of U.S. agricultural subsidies and quotas on food security and prices in low income countries; and urge developing countries to end food export barriers.

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The international community will be better prepared to deal with future shocks and price increases. Fully-funded childhood nutrition programs will prevent over 3.5 million childhood deaths annually, substantially reducing the number of children with permanent cognitive damage and lifelong illnesses. Women and children freed from food insecurity will be less likely to drop out of school or turn to unsafe income generating activities such as prostitution or child labor.

Background Food prices have been rising since the early 2000s, and most sharply since 2006. According to the International Monetary Fund, a ton of wheat that cost $105 in January 2000 cost $481 in March 2008. In one year (March 2007 to March 2008), the price of corn increased by 31%, rice by 74%, soya by 87%, and wheat by 130%. Some of the forces driving the current food price crisis include: the all time high cost of oil; natural disasters/drought; a global increase in demand for meat, milk, and grain to feed livestock; an increase in the use of grains to produce biofuels; and ongoing agricultural subsidies in developed countries. The crisis is also a consequence of the neglect of agriculture. For the last 20 years, donors and many recipient governments have made low and declining investments in agriculture. In 1980, 30% of annual World Bank lending went to agricultural projects; in 2007 it was only 12%. In developing countries, agriculture spending as a share of total public spending fell by 50% between 1980 and 2004. U.S. foreign assistance for agriculture has dropped from a high of 20% in 1980 to 6.0% in 1995 to 2.5% in 2006. Rising food prices erode the purchasing power of poor people, many of whom already spend most of their income on food, and causes a significant increase in food insecurity across the globe. Even before the recent sharp increase in food prices, over 850 million people faced hunger and food insecurity and 177 million children are chronically malnourished. Another two billion people suffer from nutrient deficiencies. Lack of access to food at affordable prices has prompted violent protests worldwide in over two dozen countries and has led to the overthrow of several governments. Further destabilization can be expected unless food needs are met. The U.S., along with almost every other nation in the world, signed a commitment to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), including MDG 1 which commits signatories to cutting world hunger in half by 2015 (from 1990 levels). Unless immediate and substantial steps are taken by the U.S. government, along with other donors and partner organizations, the goal will not be attained, and millions of people will continue to suffer the consequences of hunger and malnutrition. The current crisis in global food prices presents an opportunity for the U.S. to demonstrate leadership and to craft an integrated, coordinated approach to tackling the symptoms – and underlying causes – of chronic hunger. Emergency food assistance addresses the immediate need of populations in dire situations but it alone cannot pull us out of the crisis of chronic hunger.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Contributors to Food Crisis Policy Brief Organization

URL

CARE Save the Children U.S. Fund for Unicef World Concern Oxfam America Catholic Relief Services Episcopal Relief and Development World Vision International Medical Corps Jesuit Refugee Services USA

www.care.org www.savechildren.org www.unicefusa.org www.worldconcern.org www.oxfamamerica.org www.crs.org www.er-d.org www.worldvision.org www.imcworldwide.org www.jrsusa.org

InterAction Food Crisis Working Group

1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

Organization

URL

Action Against Hunger Action Aid Adventist Development and Relief Agency International Africare Aga Khan Foundation U.S.A. Alliance to End Hunger American Red Cross Bread for the World CARE Catholic Relief Services Christian Children’s Fund Church World Service Congressional Hunger Center Episcopal Relief and Development Food for the Hungry International Medical Corps International Relief & Development International Rescue Committee Islamic Relief USA Jesuit Refugee Services USA Joint Aid Management Lutheran World Relief Mercy Corps

www.actionagainsthunger.org www.actionaid.org www.adra.org www.africare.org www.akdn.org www.alliancetoendhunger.org www.redcross.org www.bread.org www.care.org www.crs.org www.christianchildrensfund.org www.churchworldservice.org www.hungercenter.org www.er-d.prg www.fh.org www.imcworldwide.org www.ird.org www.theirc.org www.irw.org www.jrsusa.org www.jamusa.org www.lwr.org www.mercycorps.org

InterAction Food Crisis Working Group (cont) Organization

URL

Oxfam America Pact PATH Save the Children The Hunger Project U.S. Fund for UNICEF Women Thrive World Concern World Vision

www.oxfamamerica.org www.pactworld.org www.path.org www.savethechildren.org www.thp.org www.unicefusa.org www.womenthrive.org www.worldconcern.org www.worldvision.org

Agriculture

Agriculture

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Agricultural Development for Reducing Hunger and Rural Poverty Problem Although nearly 1 billion people in developing countries face chronic hunger and poverty, investment in agricultural development by the U.S. and other donor countries is minimal and at an all-time low. Modest U.S. Government support is often uncoordinated, short-term, limited in scope and inconsistent with host country development plans and the needs of small farmers.

Recommendations Re-orient U.S. agricultural development goals within a broader strategy for international development that is aligned with the Millennium Development Goals. Recognizing the key role that small-scale farming has on reducing poverty, the U.S. should support long-term agriculture programs that focus on: increasing the productivity of small-scale farmers; generating rural livelihood opportunities; environmental sustainability; and reaching those most vulnerable to hunger and malnutrition, especially women, children, landless and other marginalized populations. Particular emphasis should be placed on the participation and skills of women, who are the majority of the farmers in the developing world.

Actions • Establish a high-level, inter-agency team, led by USAID, to coordinate with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector in formulating cohesive and integrated U.S. policies to promote international agricultural development. This whole-of-government approach should include both short and long-term strategic plans and associated budgets for agricultural development; and • The Administration and Congress should work together to increase funding for agricultural development to levels appropriate with its critical role in poverty reduction and rural development. Allocate $750 million in the FY 2010 USAID Development Assistance Account, and increase investments over subsequent budget cycles to assure stable program support for USAID and other U.S. Government (USG) agencies that provide technical assistance to developing countries.

Results

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Increased funding for sustainable international agricultural development will reduce poverty, improve food security and accelerate rural development. A cohesive, long-term U.S. strategy that leverages capabilities across the U.S. Government and includes contributions from NGOs and the private sector, aligns with each country’s development plans and coordinates with other major international donors will result in more efficient use of development resources and more effective agricultural development.

Background High food prices, malnutrition rates and poverty levels now threaten to reverse decades of development achievements in health, education and poverty reduction. The destabilizing political impacts of escalating food prices have also been felt in many developing countries. Yet, inappropriate policy responses in the areas of trade, subsidies, and bio-fuels continue to put upward pressure on prices. After years of declining investment in agriculture and poor policy choices by governments, market systems in many poor countries lack the ability to respond to the higher prices with increased production. The 2008 World Bank Development Report concludes that the road to reduced poverty, improved nutrition and economic growth in most developing countries must run through agriculture and the rural economy. A broad consensus now exists within the development community that broad-based growth in agricultural productivity – particularly in the small farm sector and associated rural enterprises – is the most effective means of rapidly reducing poverty and hunger. U.S. Government policies toward international development still do not fully reflect this relationship. Over the past two decades, the U.S. has decreased its support for agricultural development to only 2% of U.S. foreign assistance. Soaring costs for humanitarian relief and assistance demonstrate that this up front lack of support and investment often imposes higher long term costs. U.S. Government support for agricultural development has been marked by fragmented responsibilities and inconsistent or conflicting policies. Domestic agricultural subsidies place farmers in poor countries at a tremendous competitive disadvantage, while trade tariffs impose collective costs on poor countries that exceed the amount of our development assistance. Three principal departments (State, Agriculture and Treasury) play prominent roles, while other departments, agencies, and other entities have subsidiary tasks. Taken together, this pattern makes coordination within the U.S. government difficult, and with other donors and host country governments, extremely challenging. A second, but significant effect is a lack of coordination between non-governmental organizations and the U.S. Government. While private sector investment, remittances, foundation support, and private individual donations have all been rising, these vital resource flows have not been coordinated with – and so do not leverage – government development assistance. Current USG approaches to formulating development policy do not systematically incorporate the valuable but largely untapped resource of the NGO community’s 40-plus years of experience in promoting international agricultural development and boosting the production of small-scale farmers.

Environmental protection is another domain where policies promoting food production and the sustainability of resources have not been reconciled. As climate change reduces yields and water availability in many developing countries, this area will assume increasingly urgent importance for U.S. Government policy makers and program managers in agricultural development.

POLICY PAPER

November 2008

Ending Hunger: The Role of Agriculture Previously published by Bread for the World, June 2008.

S

ince 2005, prices for rice, wheat, corn, and other food grains have soared by 83 percent. Many factors are responsible for rising food prices. Higher incomes in China and India, as well as in other developing countries, have led to more diversified diets, including greater consumption of meat and dairy products, contributing to greater demand for feed grains. Meanwhile, the diversion of crops and agricultural land for the production of biofuels, particularly corn-based ethanol, has meant decreasing supplies for human and livestock consumption. When extended drought in key producer countries is added to the equation, the result is a major jump in prices as demand begins to outstrip supply. Finally, sky-high oil prices are contributing to what World Food Program’s Executive Director Josette Sheeran has called “a perfect storm hitting the world’s hungry.”1 Higher food prices may be good news for some farmers, but they add a crushing load to the most vulnerable and poorly nourished people, including young children and nursing mothers in developing countries. Poor people typically spend up to 80 percent of their disposable income on food. Food riots in countries as far-flung as Haiti, the Philippines, Indonesia, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Egypt, and Cameroon suggest troubling times ahead as fears of hunger take root.2 The international community must take measures to provide food and cash assistance to meet immediate needs and to improve agricultural policies. Increasing demand for staples has not been matched by investments in agricultural productivity, especially in developing countries where rising food prices are felt most acutely. The longer-term impact of this global hunger crisis could stall or reverse decades of progress against hunger and extreme poverty and prevent the world from reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. Bolstering the agricultural sector in poor countries is a smart investment that will yield substantial dividends, especially when it comes to hunger. Of more than 854 million people worldwide who are chronically hungry, 75 percent live in rural areas and depend on agriculture for their earnings, either directly, as farmers or hired workers, or indirectly in sectors that derive from farming.3 Realizing agriculture’s potential and creating economic opportunities in rural communities is imperative to achieving MDG #1, cutting hunger and poverty in half, by 2015.

Agriculture, Hunger, and Poverty

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“No country has been able to achieve a rapid transition out of poverty without raising productivity in its agricultural sector,” explains Peter Timmer of the Center for Global Development, and one might say the same of achieving sustainable reductions in hunger.4 Decreasing poverty in rural areas has been the main cause of the decline in extreme poverty (the proportion of people who live on less than $1 a day) in developing countries—from 28 percent in 1993 to 22 percent in 2002.5 The poorest countries have largely rural economies: agriculture accounts for roughly 30 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and employs 65 percent of the workforce.6 Frequently, the industries and sectors linked to farm production account for another 30 percent or more of GDP.7 In general, countries with rapidly increasing food production are more effective in reducing poverty.8 The World Bank’s 2007 World Development Report notes, “Cross-country estimates

Box I: Job Growth: On and Off the Farm Job creation is a major concern both in terms of economic growth and social stability. Jobs available to people with few skills contribute directly to reducing poverty. Compared to other sectors of the economy, agriculture has the potential to absorb large numbers of workers. This is especially important because there will continue to be many new jobseekers –in 2005, 30 percent of the population in the developing world (41 percent in Africa) was younger than 15.12 In Asia, most rural households earn half or more of their incomes from non-farm sources, but it is often the agricultural sector that provides the “ladder,” as Peter Timmer describes, “from underemployment at farm tasks to regular wage employment in the local economy.”13 The opening up of employment opportunities to women, in particular, leads to a range of benefits. The benefits are especially important in nutrition, since research shows that more income in the hands of women leads directly to additional spending on food. Throughout the 1990s, women constituted roughly 80 percent of the agricultural labor force in the least developed countries. This is projected to decline but remain above 70 percent into the next decade.14 The result of agricultural growth is increasing numbers of women in the economy, whether their jobs are on or off the farm.

show that GDP growth originating in agriculture is at least twice as effective in reducing poverty as GDP growth originating outside of agriculture.”9 One of the main reasons for this is that agriculture in developing countries tends to be labor intensive. Agriculture and agricultural support industries have the potential to absorb relatively large amounts of labor compared to other sectors of the economy. For example, Chile’s expansion of its agricultural GDP can be largely credited to a labor-intensive agricultural export boom over the past two decades. Each 1 percent of expansion in agricultural and agro-processing output is estimated to have reduced national poverty by between 0.6 and 1.2 percent.10 Poor people in rural areas benefited from the expansion indirectly, through their employment by larger-scale farmers and processing firms. Many of these jobs were taken by women. Similarly, a recent study in Rwanda found that agricultural growth contributed 50 percent more to poverty reduction than growth in other sectors, and that a 1 percent annual growth rate in staple food production translates into a 3 percent reduction in poverty.11 Steadily increasing agricultural productivity over the past 30 years has succeeded in keeping food prices generally low and stable. In effect, low food prices mean higher incomes for poor people, who spend the bulk of their disposable income on food. This is true even for farmers in poor countries. Increasing agricultural productivity also stimulates job growth in the manufacturing and service sectors. (See Box 1). Thus, improving agricultural productivity helps address both hunger and poverty: not only does it increase the amount

of food available, it stimulates economic growth by creating jobs, both on- and off-farm, which raise people’s incomes and enable them to purchase food. But the task of continuing to raise food production in developing countries will be complicated in the coming years by the harmful effects of global warming. These include warmer and drier conditions, shorter growing seasons, and changes in cropping patterns. Poor countries will pay the heaviest cost in the next few decades even though they had the least to do with causing climate change. But the worst predicted outcomes are by no means inevitable. There is time to avert disaster scenarios by limiting greenhouse gas emissions (particularly by developed countries, who are the biggest contributors), and by investing in research and technology to help developing countries adapt to changing weather patterns and conditions.

Lessons from a Green Revolution

In the early and mid-1960s, many experts were predicting that millions of people around the world would die of starvation. Like many African countries today, India and China, Indonesia and Thailand were mired in poverty. Countries in South and East Asia relied heavily on food imports. Overall economic growth barely kept pace with population growth, and agricultural productivity was stagnant. Then, beginning in the 1960s and continuing through the 1970s, new technologies developed by international agricultural research centers, in partnership with the Rockefeller Foundation and supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other donors, were introduced in Asia. These technologies involved using improved varieties of wheat, rice, and hybrid maize in combination with more fertilizer. Countries in the region began to experience what has come to be known as the “Green Revolution.” The Green Revolution fueled a dramatic increase in food production in India. Between 1970 and 1999, India doubled its cereal production, fueled by a threefold increase in wheat production. India is now a net rice exporter, and the wheat that it imports is an insignificant share of all the food available. Moreover, technological innovations have come largely from Indian research farms, the result of decades of investment in science and technology that began in the 1960s. So far, there has been no Green Revolution for sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, one of the major barriers to Africa’s development has been the poor performance of its agricultural sector — agricultural production has not kept up with population growth. The cause is neglect by both national governments and donors. Since 1973, the region has been a net food importer. Figure 1 shows the relationship between agricultural productivity (measured in terms of crop yields) and poverty levels for South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa between 1984 and 2002.15

The story behind this graph is one of glaring discrepancies between South Asia’s and sub-Saharan Africa’s key agricultural indicators. Sub-Saharan Africa’s rate of irrigation is one-tenth that of South Asia, and its rate of fertilizer use oneeighth that of South Asia. Africa’s cereal yields are less than half those of South Asia.16 In spite of some formidable obstacles, however, it is possible to achieve sustained agricultural growth in Africa. Twelve sub-Saharan African countries are already succeeding in their efforts: they have had agricultural growth rates higher than 3 percent (some higher than 5 percent) sustained over the past 15 years.17 Another encouraging sign is that a number of African leaders have pledged to commit 10 percent of their national budgets to agricultural investments.18 The accomplishments of the Green Revolution would not have been possible without substantial political and financial support from the countries involved. The emerging Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), bringing the Gates and Rockefeller Foundations together in partnership with national leaders and African scientists, holds real promise for stimulating the kind of research and policy reform that will lead to sustainable, pro-poor economic growth. Organizations like the National Smallholder Farmers Association of Malawi (NASFAM),19 which provides production and marketing support for more than 100,000 farmers, demonstrate what can be achieved through a combination of local partnerships and financial and technical support. At the beginning of Asia’s Green Revolution, many experts were skeptical that India would ever emerge from chronic food insecurity. Despite what they saw as nearly insurmountable obstacles, India has been able to reduce poverty from 55 percent in 1970 to 35 percent in 2000. And it did so Figure 1.

largely because of growth in agriculture and the rural economy. For African countries to achieve similar results, national governments and the international community will need to act in concert, putting in place the policies, institutions, and resources that will encourage and support smallholder agriculture and rural development.

Ploughing a Path for Sustainable Development

China, another Green Revolution success story, has had the most rapid reduction in poverty in modern history. In little more than two decades, the country’s poverty rate fell more than sixfold: from 66 percent of the population in 1981 to 10 percent by 2004. Over this period, 500 million Chinese people were lifted out of extreme poverty.20 Economists often point to China as a textbook case of export-led growth in the manufacturing sector. But in reality, rural economic growth and agricultural growth in particular had far more to do with China’s dramatic reduction in poverty between 1981 and 2004.21 In the past 15 years, Vietnam has had a tremendous growth spurt. Extreme poverty has declined from 58 percent of the population in 1993 to 16 percent in 2006.22 Vietnam’s progress is due to a combination of economic reforms and technological innovations in its agricultural sector, very much in the vein of the Green Revolution. The most significant policy changes were loosening state controls on agriculture while implementing land reforms that provided market incentives to farmers. These changes were followed by permitting more private sector activity in agricultural processing and marketing. Farmers responded by increasing production, growing two or even three successive crops on the same piece of land each year. More use of irrigation and the development of new rice varieties requiring shorter maturation periods helped them accomplish this. From 1993 to 2006, per capita food production grew at 3.8 percent per year, a rate that was equaled or surpassed by only five countries in the world. There are many other examples of how agricultural growth has fueled poverty reduction. The general point is the same: Improving agricultural productivity among poor farmers is the most effective way to ensure that economic growth will be broad-based. Equitable economic growth not only increases family incomes and disposable incomes, but expands and sustains investments in social services like

Agriculture and the Millennium Development Goals Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger: The majority of poor people reside in rural areas and rely on agriculture. Improvements in agriculture pave the way for economic growth in poorer nations. Meeting the first MDG will contribute to progress on all. Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education: By raising incomes, agricultural growth enables parents to send children to school rather than to work. Education prepares children, particularly girls, to take advantage of economic opportunities. It empowers poor men and women in all aspects of life. Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women: Women play a critical role in agriculture in much of the developing world, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Formalizing their legal and economic rights will help boost agricultural productivity. Goals 4 & 6: Reduce child mortality and improve maternal health: More children die before the age of five in rural than urban areas. About half of these deaths are due to malnutrition. Increased and diversified agricultural production is one of the most reliable, sustainable interventions to improve nutrition and reduce child malnutrition and mortality.25 Goal 5: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases: When people with HIV lack sufficient food and proper nutrition, they develop AIDS more rapidly.26 The agricultural sector in developing countries can help by generating income to purchase food and increasing the availability of nutritious food. Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability: Many agricultural practices that increase productivity may also cause damage to the environment. Overuse and misuse of agricultural chemicals can pollute surface and ground water supplies and leave dangerous residues in food. But agriculture’s large environmental footprint can be reduced. Agriculture can also help protect the environment through carbon sequestration. Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development: Domestic agricultural policies in rich countries hurt many poor countries. Rich countries subsidize their farmers to overproduce, which makes it difficult for the world’s poorest farmers to compete and therefore to earn a living.27 Agricultural protection in rich countries remains solidly in place despite agreements to bring agriculture within the purview of the World Trade Organization and negotiate fairer policies. health and education. Targeted programs to address the more intractable cases of poverty depend on sustained growth in the broader economy. President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete of Tanzania said recently, “No country can develop through investing in the social sector alone. Indeed, Tanzania’s impressive strides in the social sectors… were quickly eroded when the domestic economy could not grow fast enough to generate domestic capacity for expansion, maintenance, and sustainability.”23 As national incomes grow, more resources are available to government, enabling it to finance spending on health,

education and other social sectors. Ultimately, countries will be able to “graduate” from foreign aid. An official in the U.K. Department for International Development noted: “Countries that are growing rapidly are on-track to achieve most of their MDGs, and those that are not are failing.”24

Chronic Underinvestment in Agriculture and Rural Development

Over the last 20 years, instead of increasing resources for agriculture and rural development, most donors have been partners in a progressive decline in support.28 From 1985-2005, agriculture’s share of U.S. Official Development Assistance (ODA) declined from more than 12 percent to just 3.1 percent.29 In absolute terms, support for agriculture went from a high of about $8 billion in 1984 to $3.4 billion in 2004.30 The international donor community has also undercut prospects for African agricultural development through a combination of misguided policy advice, trade restrictions, and subsidies for its own agriculture. The “Washington consensus”31 policies imposed on developing countries during the 1970s and 1980s as a condition of financial support restricted poor governments’ expenditures and promoted onesided trade liberalization. These were policies driven by rich countries through the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and other international financial institutions. During this period, low global prices for cereals made it easy to argue that developing countries could neglect agriculture and buy needed food on international markets. Trade restrictions and subsidies have had two troubling effects. First, maintaining production levels well above those that would prevail in the absence of restrictions and subsidies — thus increasing global supplies of staple crops — drove world prices down and made it difficult for African farmers to compete even in their own markets. Second, rich countries restricted the markets available to African farmers in order to protect their own farmers. This unfair market environment gave poor countries good reasons not to invest much in agriculture. In 2003, the International Food Policy Research Institute estimated that protectionism and subsidies in industrialized nations cost developing countries about $23 billion annually in lost income.32

U.S. Assistance for Agricultural Development

Among donor countries, the United States has been particularly neglectful of agriculture in developing countries. U.S. foreign assistance has had a proliferation of special initiatives and earmarks, from both the administration and Congress, that have tended to squeeze out funding for agriculture.33 The FY2008 budget for agricultural investments in developing countries is illustrative. While there was a slight increase in overall funding for development assistance, funding that is not earmarked and could be used for agriculture

Figure 2.

has declined significantly. Lack of funding has forced steep cuts in U.S. support for international agricultural research centers, where vital work is being done in how agriculture can adapt to climate change and other topics crucial for food production. It’s important to note that when developing countries are given the opportunity to prioritize their needs, they have consistently asked for more agricultural support than donors have been giving in recent years. The U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) funds development assistance “compacts” in poor countries that are well governed and invest in their people. These compacts are based largely on the

country’s own assessment of development priorities. And in fact, more than half of the funds committed to date by the MCC are for agriculture and related rural infrastructure. The low, stable commodity prices that prevailed up until last year allowed the international community to turn its attention to education, maternal and child health, water and sanitation, and global pandemics like HIV/AIDS. These are crucial areas of work for poverty reduction. But because there are limited resources available for long-term poverty-focused development assistance, the effect has been to crowd out funding for agriculture and rural infrastructure. The growing global hunger crisis — rapidly rising food prices and the inability of poor people around the world to cope with them — is largely a consequence of this underinvestment.

Helping to Create the Conditions to Reduce Hunger and Poverty

What role can developed countries play in addressing the global hunger crisis and reducing hunger and poverty in the long term? Food aid can and does go a long way toward meeting the immediate needs of hungry people. In 2006, international donors provided food for more than 90 million people in more than 80 countries.35 But food aid is, at best, a palliative, and the increase in food prices highlights the shortcomings of relying solely on food aid to reduce global hunger. Long-term food security depends on increasing the supply of food and raising the earning potential of poor people. Broad-based growth in agriculture and the rural economy is crucial. Increasing development assistance for agricultural development is necessary to this end. More development assistance by itself won’t suffice. For donor resources to be effective, developing countries themselves have to provide supportive policies and the bulk of the extra investments. But developed countries can support agricultural development in a number of ways: working with farmers, especially smallholder farmers, to provide the resources they need to improve their yields; promoting good governance; providing technical assistance and advice on how to strengthen institutions and accountability; and supporting research and development to improve agricultural productivity in the longer term. Developed countries should also reduce trade barriers and subsidies for their own agriculture. Donor governments and financial institutions need to step back and encourage de-

veloping country governments to determine their own policies, rather than requiring them to adhere to agendas determined in Washington or other foreign capitals. They should not promote their own policies or technology interventions over others that may be better suited to local conditions. Governments and civil society in developing countries will need to work out their own options based on what will work for them. The ultimate test of aid effectiveness is how much it contributes to the goal of ending global hunger and poverty. In the case of the Green Revolution and agricultural development more broadly, the test results are in: foreign aid in combination with domestic political backing and supportive policies saved the lives of millions of people and launched many countries on the path to sustained poverty reduction and economic growth. Certainly, we know enough about the benefits of investing in agricultural productivity to make a powerful case for increased donor support. Endnotes 1 Sanders, Edmund and Tracy Wilkerson (April 1, 2008), “U.N. food Aid Costlier as Need Soars,” Los Angeles Times. 2 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (April 11, 2008), “Poorest Countries Cereal Bill Continues to Soar, Government Tries to Limit Impact,” FAO Newsroom. 3 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2002), Reducing Poverty and Hunger: The Critical Role of Financing Food. 4 Timmer, Peter (2005), Agriculture and Pro-poor Growth: An Asian Perspective; Center for Global Development. 5 World Bank (2007), Agriculture for Development: World Development Report for 2008. 6 Ibid. 7 Bathrick, David (October 1998), Fostering Global Well-Being: A New Paradigm to Revitalize Agricultural and Rural Development; International Food Policy Research Institute. 8 Timmer, Op. Cit. 9 World Bank, Op. Cit. 10 Ibid. 11 NEPAD PowerPoint presentation, Accelerating CAADP Implementation in Rwanda; PowerPoint Presentation: www.nepad.gov.rw/docs/CAADP/ Day%20Two.%2030th%20March%202007/5.%20Knowledge,%20Review%20and%20Dialogue%20Mechanisms.pdf 12 United Nations (2007), World Economic and Social Survey. 13 Timmer. 14 Alexandra Spieldoch (2007), A Row to Hoe: The Gender Impact of Trade Liberalization on Our Food System, Agricultural Markets, and Women’s Human Rights, International Gender and Trade Network. 15 World Bank. 16 World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2007), World Bank Assistance to Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa. 17 Ibid. Countries include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African

Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda. 18 The commitment has been made under CAADP (the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program), an initiative of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). 19 Data available from the NASFAM website: www.nasfam.org/ 20 Martin Ravallion (Jan. 2008), Lessons for Africa, World Bank Dev. Research Group. 21 Ibid. 22 Nhan Dan (February 16, 2008), “Vietnam leads Way in Tackling Poverty, Says WB,”: www.nhandan.com.vn/english/life/160208/life_v.htm 23 President Jakaya Kikwete, remarks at CGD symposium “Power and Roads in Africa: A Tanzanian Perspective,” December 14, 2007. 24 U.K. Development Minister Sriti Vadera speech to mark the launch of the World Bank’s “Doing Business Report,” October 12, 2008. 25 Timmer. 26 Von Braun, Joachim, M.S. Swaminathan and Mark W. Rosegrant (2004), Agriculture, Food Security, Nutrition and the Millennium Development Goals, International Food Policy Research Institute. 27 Timmer. 28 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Op. Cit. 29 OECD/DAC, Statistical Annex of the 2007 Development Co-operation Report, December 2007 30 WDR, pp 41-42. While this decline was common to bilateral as well as multilateral aid, the decline in the latter was more pronounced. 31 A package of economic policies pushed by the donor community during the 1980s and 1990s as a condition for financial support involving, inter alia, fiscal discipline, trade liberalization, privatization, competitive exchange rates, tax reform and generally reduced government regulation and role in the economy. 32 International Food Policy Research Institute (August 2003), How Much Does It Hurt? The Impact of Agricultural Trade Policies on Developing Countries. 33 Currently, only about 4 percent of the USAID budget is available for unencumbered use to promote the largely microeconomic reforms that can speed economic growth in poor countries. Another 20 percent or so is available for promoting economic growth in a particular sector or for a particular country or region. For all donors, aid directed at agriculture and economic growth (including economic support infrastructure) amounted to 19 percent of the total. (OECD DAC 2005 statistical annex) 34 OECD Creditor Reporting System (2006), OECD International Development Statistics website. 35 United Nations World Food Program (2007), 2006 Food Aid Flows.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Contributors to Agriculture Policy Brief Organization

URL

Bread for the World Winrock International International Center for Research on Women World Wildlife Fund Women Thrive Worldwide Heifer International Catholic Relief Services

www.winrock.org www.icrw.org www.wwf.org www.womenthrive.org www.heifer.org www.crs.org

www.bread.org

InterAction Agriculture Policy Working Group

1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

Organization

URL

Academy for Educational Development ACDI/VOCA Action Against Hunger Adventist Development and Relief Agency International Africare Aga Khan Foundation USA Alliance to End Hunger American Red Cross Bread for the World Carbon Measurement & Management Working Group CARE Catholic Relief Services Christian Children’s Fund Christian Reformed World Relief Committee Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs Congressional Hunger Center Church World Service Conservation International Catholic Relief Services Ecoagriculture Partners Episcopal Relief and Development Experience Corps Food for the Hungry Foods Resource Bank Friends of the World Food Program Habitat for Humanity International Heifer International International Center for Research on Women International Food Policy Research Institute

www.aed.org www.acdivoca.org www.actionagainsthunger.org/ www.adra.org www.africare.org www.akdn.org www.alliancetoendhunger.org www.redcross.org www.bread.org www.care.org www.crs.org www.christianchildrensfund.org www.crwrc.org www.cnfa.org www.hungercenter.org www.churchworldservice.org www.conservation.org www.crs.org www.ecoagriculture.org www.er-d.org www.experiencecorps.org www.fh.org www.foodsresourcebank.org www.friendsofwfp.org www.habitat.org www.heifer.org www.icrw.org www.ifpri.org

InterAction Agriculture Policy Working Group (cont) Organization

URL

International Center for Research on Women International Fund for Agricultural Development International Relief & Development International Rescue Committee Joint Aid Management Land O’Lakes International Development Latter-day Saint Charities Lutheran World Relief Mercy Corps National Wildlife Federation National Farmers Union Nature Conservancy, The Oxfam America Pact Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa Plan USA Save the Children The Hunger Project Trickle Up Urban Agriculture Network Inc. Winrock International Women Organizing for Change in Agriculture & NRM Women Thrive Worldwide World Cocoa Foundation World Hope International World Relief World Vision World Wildlife Fund

www.icrw.org www.ifad.org www.ird.org www.theirc.org www.jamusa.org www.idd.landolakes.com www.providentliving.org www.lwr.org www.mercycorps.org www.nwf.org www.nfu.org www.nature.org www.oxfamamerica.org www.pactworld.org www.africanhunger.org www.planusa.org www.savethechildren.org www.thp.org www.trickleup.org www.cityfarmer.org www.winrock.org www.wocan.org www.womenthrive.org www.worldcocoafoundation.org/ www.worldhope.org www.worldrelief.org www.worldvision.org www.worldwildlife.org

Health

Health

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Sustainable Global Health and Development Problem United States development assistance for the health sector has focused on certain diseases rather than what should be its central aim: access to sustainable comprehensive primary health care, with special attention to the health of families, mothers and children. To that end, an effective U.S. government strategy for international development must address goals of improving health conditions and strengthening equitable health systems in poor countries.

Recommendations In collaboration with local and international partners, set country-specific health performance targets to ensure that investments succeed in expanding access to quality, comprehensive health care that improves people’s overall health. Ensure that a U.S. national development strategy comprehensively addresses basic health care needs, with emphasis on strengthening local health care systems, increasing the number of skilled healthcare workers, fostering community participation and reaching the household level. To maximize effectiveness, the U.S. must harmonize its program interventions, guidelines and policies with those of host countries and other donors.

Actions • Make improving health conditions and strengthening health systems in poor countries a priority of a U.S. national development strategy; • Significantly increase overall health sector funding, and plan scale-up to increase access and coverage; • Build health workforce capacity and reduce inequalities of health care coverage and access, which primarily affect women, children and other marginalized groups, to help achieve U.S. global health goals; • Assess the impact of global disease-specific initiatives on health system strengthening. Harmonize funding at the national level with bilateral and multilateral donors, in order to fully integrate health programs and leverage funding streams; • Initiate a comprehensive review of US health development commitments to meet the Millennium Development Goals and other key international frameworks; and • In at least 15 countries, selected based on overall health need and ability to succeed, create a coordinated strategy in collaboration with governments and nongovernmental organizations to meet identified health care needs.

Results 1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

Increased funding for primary prevention and health care services, improved coordination among donors and stakeholders, and new monetary commitments for strengthening health systems and workforce will increase access to quality health services, comprehensively address health needs; improve sustainability, and reduce avoidable disease- particularly for the poorest and most vulnerable populations.

Background The U.S. has been a relatively generous donor to global efforts to address serious health challenges. This is particularly true within the past 6 years, during which U.S. funding for global health initiatives to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis has increased by billions of dollars. Despite this generosity, which has created notable health improvements for some, the general health of the global poor is severely lagging. Mortality rates, particularly amongst women and girls, still remain intolerably high, and millions of people die needlessly every day from conditions that can be easily addressed, such as diarrhea and child pneumonia. Furthermore, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) related to maternal and child health are unlikely to be met by 2015, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, undermining progress towards global human health and prosperity. Unfortunately, budgets for child survival interventions and reproductive health services have declined by 18% and 39%, respectively, over the last decade when adjusted for inflation and population growth. Strengthening healthcare – not just the fight against specific diseases. Focusing on the treatment of disease, as opposed to the expansion of primary health care with the aim of reducing morbidity and mortality, is a multi-year trend of U.S. foreign assistance and continues to dominate health program funding. For example, in the FY 2008 budget only 13% of U.S. funding for global health was allocated for non-disease specific interventions. This trend has had a profound effect on health system delivery, as the narrow push to medically treat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria has exacerbated infrastructure weaknesses that preclude universal access to health services. Furthermore, foreign aid programs must be designed sustainably by reducing dependency on external supplies and helping build local capacity to run health initiatives themselves. Moving forward, U.S. development strategy must shift to increase access to a range of health services within communities, including support for family planning and reproductive health, for both the prevention and treatment of infections and other health issues. Tackling Brain Drain. The World Health Organization estimates that 57 countries have severe health worker shortages, with the crisis most pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa. While rich countries and well-off institutions attract health care workers from developing countries, this contributes to the shortage of a skilled health labor force. This is a growing problem that results in a “brain drain” in host countries. Donor Coordination. Along with a U.S. development approach that increases access to a broader range of health care services, we support the establishment of a joint donor reporting strategy in each country to reduce the burden on scarce health service providers by standardizing their report-

ing demands. The integration of services between different providers will further maximize available resources. This will allow health workers to spend more time and energy towards providing direct health services, as well as coordinate investments that strengthen health systems to retain staff within local communities. Because existing support is inadequate for universal access, even for HIV/AIDS, we wish to see continued and enhanced support for the existing U.S. health development portfolio, as well as an expansion of support to achieve the universal access to sustainable comprehensive primary health care. We affirm that all people have a right to access basic health care and the opportunity to be protected against disabling and fatal diseases and health conditions for which a vaccine, prevention method or cure is already available. Special attention to: expanding quality health care to vulnerable and marginalized populations; channeling resources to prevent malnutrition and provide children with the energy necessary to learn life skills; and increasing access to clean water and adequate sanitation is also imperative to successfully preventing hundreds of millions of premature deaths.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Contributors to Health Policy Brief Organization

URL

Physicians for Human Rights World Vision International Rescue Committee Population Action International Academy for Educational Development U.S. Fund for UNICEF International Medical Corps International Center for Research on Women

www.physiciansforhumanrights.org

www.worldvision.org www.theirc.org www.populationaction.org www.aed.org www.unicefusa.org www.imcworldwide.org www.icrw.org

InterAction Health in Relief and Development Working Group

1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

Organization

URL

Academy for Educational Development ACDI/VOCA Action Aid Acts of Compassion Adventist Development and Relief Agency International African Medical & Research Foundation Africare Aga Khan Foundation U.S.A. Agape Foundation for Literacy and Rural Development Aidspan Air Serv International American Jewish World Service American Red Cross American Refugee Committee Basic Education Coalition Bread for the World CARE Catholic Relief Services Center for Health and Gender Equity, Inc CHF International Christian Children’s Fund Christian Reformed World Relief Committee Church World Service CIVICUS Compassion International Concern Worldwide Congressional Hunger Center

www.acdivoca.org www.actionaid.org www.questia.com www.adra.org www.amref.org www.africare.org www.akdn.org www.agapefdn.org www.aidspan.org www.airserv.org www.ajws.org www.redcross.org www.archq.org www.basiced.org www.bread.org www.care.org www.crs.org www.genderhealth.org www.chfinternational.org www.christianchildrensfund.org www.crwrc.org www.churchworldservice.org www.civicus.org www.compassion.com www.concernusa.org www.hungercenter.org

www.aed.org

InterAction Health in Relief and Development Working Group (cont) Organization

URL

Congressional Research Service Counterpart International Eastern and Southern Development Forum Doctors without Borders Family Health International Food for the Hungry Global Health Council Habitat for Humanity International Heartland Alliance Heart to Heart International Heifer International Heifer Kenya Interplast International Center for Research on Women International Crisis Group International Institute for Rural Reconstruction International Medical Corps International Relief & Development International Rescue Committee International Youth Foundation Jesuit Refugee Services USA John Snow International Latter-Day Saint Charities Liberation Alliance for Change Lutheran World Relief Management Sciences for Health MAP International Mercy Corps Mercy USA for Aid and Development National Peace Corps Association Oxfam America Pact Pan African Organization for Sustainable Development PATH Pathfinder International Physicians for Human Rights Plan USA Population Action International Population Council Project Concern International ProLiteracy Worldwide RADEM Refugees International Relief International Salvation Army Save the Children Stop Hunger Now Tampa Bay International Network

www.crs.gov www.counterpart.org www.doctorswithoutborders.org www.fhi.org www.fh.org www.globalhealth.org www.habitat.org www.heartlandalliance.org www.hearttoheart.org www.heifer.org www.heiferkenya.org www.interplast.org www.icrw.org www.crisisweb.org www.iirr.org www.imcworldwide.org www.ird.org www.theirc.org www.iyfnet.org www.jrsusa.org www.jsi.com www.providentliving.org www.freewebs.com/liberationalliance

www.lwr.org www.msh.org www.map.org www.mercycorps.org www.mercyusa.org www.rpcv.org www.oxfamamerica.org www.pactworld.org www.posdev.org www.path.org www.pathfind.org www.phrusa.org www.planusa.org www.populationaction.org www.popcouncil.org www.projectconcern.org www.proliteracy.org www.refugeesinternational.org www.ri.org www.salvationarmyusa.org www.savethechildren.org www.stophungernow.org

InterAction Health in Relief and Development Working Group (cont) Organization

URL

TechnoServe U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) U.S. Committee for UNDP U.S. Fund for UNICEF USA for UNHCR Volunteers Association for Bangladesh Winrock International Women for Women International Women Thrive Worldwide Women’s Commission World Concern World Council of Credit Unions World Education World Hope International World Learning for International Development World Relief World Vision YMCA of the USA YouthNet

www.technoserve.org www.nccbuscc.org www.refugees.org www.undp-usa.org www.unicefusa.org www.usaforunhcr.org www.vabonline.org www.winrock.org www.womenforwomen.org www.womenthrive.org www.womenscommission.org www.worldconcern.org www.woccu.org www.worlded.org www.worldhope.org www.worldlearning.org www.worldrelief.org www.worldvision.org www.ymca.net www.fhi.org

Gender

Gender

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Problem Despite overwhelming evidence linking gender integration to effective assistance, the U.S. Government currently does not consistently integrate gender into its foreign assistance policies and programs. Increasing income in the poorest households, stimulating economic growth and improving social, health and political conditions in a developing country cannot be achieved without the full engagement of women.

Recommendations The Administration should establish a high-level, central office on gender integration and have strong gender focal points for each major development assistance agency or program, and within each sub-bureau and country mission. These experts should ensure that gender analysis is systematically used in designing development strategies, programs, and projects, and monitoring and impact evaluation to ensure both women and men benefit from and contribute to development efforts and that gender equality is a strategic priority.

Actions • Make a demonstrated track record of supporting and integrating gender equality a required strategic objective in foreign assistance; • Develop a U.S. national strategy for global development that commits the U.S. to advancing the Millennium Development Goal on gender equality and women’s empowerment (MDG 3); • Create an Office of Gender Integration under the highest-ranking officer for U.S. development assistance, which would be responsible for ensuring gender is thoroughly integrated throughout the entire foreign assistance structure and in all steps of assistance including budget, planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation; and • Require each major development assistance agency or program to have a dedicated stream of funding to support gender equality strategies, to monitor expenditures, and to finance projects that include funding for local women’s organizations that focus on empowering women and girls.

Results 1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

More than 40 years of evidence demonstrate that achieving gender equality, primarily through investing in women, leads to greater reductions in poverty, faster economic growth, and significant improvements in family health, nutrition, education, and quality of life. Reforming U.S. foreign assistance provides a pivotal opportunity to incorporate gender integration as a proven tool for effective development that truly addresses the needs, resources and priorities of both women and men living in poverty around the world.

Background The promotion of gender equality is a powerful tool for effective development, contributing directly to poverty alleviation, economic growth, reduced domestic and sectarian violence, stronger community institutions, and better governance. Gender equality means equal opportunities for all people, woman and men alike, to achieve their personal potential and maximize their contributions to the development of their families, economies, and societies. Since 1973, when Congress mandated the need to address gender equality in U.S. development assistance, the United States has funded a wide range of programs working toward gender equality including basic education, anti-trafficking, and microfinance programs. The U.S. government has also launched a number of initiatives in recent years that have the potential to strengthen gender equality through foreign assistance mechanisms. However, these programs are limited by the lack of a clear strategy to consistently integrate gender into all of U.S. foreign assistance policies and programs. Promoting gender equality is not only a feasible objective with long-term and self-sustaining benefits, but one that has strong public support. Decades of research and experience demonstrate that gender integration makes development efforts more effective. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, inequality between men and women in education and employment suppressed annual per capita growth during 1960 – 1992 by 0.8 percentage points per year. A boost of 0.8 percentage points per year would have doubled economic growth over the period.1 In another study, The World Bank evaluated its programs and found that those with gender-related actions achieved their overall goals more often than similar projects without such actions. Despite the overwhelming evidence, a recent USAID assessment of the agency’s Country Strategic Plans found that more than half (57%) had only minimal gender integration. Other U.S. development programs such as the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC) take varying approaches to gender integration. This one change – systematically understanding and addressing gender differences – could make U.S. development assistance vastly more effective. Furthermore, to effectively adopt a gender strategy within U.S. development assistance, the U.S. should align its development objectives with those of the international community by integrating the goals and targets of the ICPD Programme of Action, Beijing Platform for Action and Millennium Devel1 Blackden, Mark & Chihtra Bhanu “Gender, Growth, and Poverty Reduction: Special Program of Assistance for Africa.” World Bank Technical Paper No. 428, 1998

opment Goals into U.S. development goals. For gender equality to play a central role in effective development there must be a national strategy for global development that systematically utilizes gender analysis at all levels of strategic planning and implementation, and across all sectors. Gender analysis reveals the different roles, rights, responsibilities and constraints of women and men. In most cases, such analyses highlight an increased need for investment in women and girls, recognizing the historic and ongoing discrimination that has prevented them from reaching their full potential. Gender analysis at the strategic level reveals different priorities. For example, a gendered analysis of the different barriers women and men face to moving out of poverty would reveal gender-based violence and the lack of family planning and reproductive health services as critical barriers for women. Gender analysis in agricultural projects would reveal that while women produce 80% of the food they own only 1% of the land and receive less than 7% of farm extension services. As a result, effective programming needs to reach out directly to women farmers rather than solely the male landowners. In terms of infrastructure, investments in building and maintaining secondary and tertiary roads often have greater benefit in helping women reach local markets or social services than major highways, which often have a greater benefit for men. Gender integration can only be fully implemented with strong political commitment, high-level leadership, and an institutional mandate for gender equality, supported by the enhanced capacity to conduct comprehensive gender analyses, sufficient financial resources, and greater accountability. We highly recommend that these efforts be led by an Office of Gender Integration that reports directly to the highest-ranking administrator for U.S. foreign assistance and that has a mandate backed with a dedicated stream of funding to support gender equality strategies. This high-level office would be responsible for coordinating the efforts of strong gender focal points within each bureau, mission, and technical office. In addition to providing technical expertise in the area of gender analysis and gender training, gender focal points would ensure gender is captured in the setting of foreign assistance strategic objectives and priorities and that there is accountability in reaching both women and men beneficiaries through appropriate performance indicators and the collection and analysis of sex-disaggregated data.

POLICY PAPER

November 2008

Value Added: Women and U.S. Foreign Assistance for the 21st Century By Kathleen Selvaggio, Rekha Mehra, Ritu Sharma Fox and Geeta Rao Gupta

Previously published by International Center for Research on Women and Women Thrive Worldwide, July 2008.

M

ore than 40 years have passed since the United States first created its foreign assistance framework, and the world has changed dramatically. New global threats such as HIV and AIDS, climate change and rising food and energy costs challenge our efforts to expand economic opportunities in developing countries and build a more equitable world. The changed context has led to a call for a significant overhaul of foreign assistance. The Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network (M-FAN)1 – a group of U.S. think-tanks, academics and international nongovernmental organizations – recently called on Congress and the next U.S. president to reform U.S. foreign assistance for the 21st century.2 The M-FAN consensus argues that rather than subordinate global development to larger national security goals, the prototype for many years, U.S. foreign assistance must be realigned. M-FAN calls for global development and poverty reduction to be elevated to a level equal to diplomacy and defense, with the mandate and resources to be a principal instrument of U.S. engagement in the world. The consensus asserts that fighting global poverty is itself a contribution to longterm security because it addresses many of the root causes of political instability. The International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) and Women Thrive Worldwide endorse this call for a new and expanded U.S. strategy for global development and poverty reduction, and we assert that the reform agenda will be even more effective if it takes women into account. What follows are recommendations that add value to the M-FAN proposal by enhancing economic growth and reducing poverty through the promotion of women’s empowerment and gender equality.

Common Principles: Women and Foreign Assistance Reform

1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

The Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network (M-FAN) policy consensus proposes five core principles for a new Foreign Assistance Act. ICRW and Women Thrive support these principles, which underscore the policy changes needed to achieve women’s empowerment and gender equality: • elevate global development as a national interest priority in actions as well as rhetoric; • align foreign assistance policies, operations, budgets and statutory authorities; • rebuild and rationalize organizational structures; • commit sufficient and flexible resources with accountability for results; and • partner with others to produce results. As the United States elevates global development to a primary foreign policy aim, it must elevate the goal of women’s empowerment and gender equality.4 The United States is much more likely to achieve its broader aims of poverty reduction and economic development with investments in women. The U.S. government has made solid strides in raising the profile of

Value Added: Integrating Women into the Recommendations of the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network 1. Develop a new U.S. strategy for global development that fully recognizes women’s roles in reducing poverty and expanding economic growth, commits the United States to advancing the Millennium Development Goal of women’s empowerment and gender equality, and invests in multilateral efforts to achieve this goal. 2. Plan, design and enact a new Foreign Assistance Act that ensures that U.S. development assistance benefits women equally as men, with tools and indicators to improve execution and results. 3. Implement a more consistent and coordinated policy and approach to gender integration as part of broader efforts to achieve greater coherence and coordination in U.S. foreign assistance programs. 4. Increase funding for programs that invest in women and address gender inequalities, and track and report on these expenditures to ensure that financial resources allocated to foreign assistance are effective in reducing poverty and promoting development. Note: These recommendations build directly onto the action priorities of the M-FAN consensus.3

women in development, especially through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). But greater attention is needed to achieve the development objectives of Millennium Development Goal 3: to empower women and promote gender equality. A new Foreign Assistance Act, which would provide a legal framework for updated policies and reorganized structures, presents an exciting opportunity to reduce poverty by fully integrating gender into foreign aid investments and enhancing opportunities for both women and men.

Why Women and Gender Equality? Lessons from 40 Years of Development

Any effort to expand global development and reduce poverty must focus on women and gender equality. From a human rights perspective, women are half of the population and addressing their distinct needs, given unequal power relationships, is imperative. From an economic perspective, women are the bulk of the world’s poor and investing in women pays. The international development community has more than 40 years of evidence to demonstrate the value added of investing in women. Investments in women lead to direct payoffs for reducing poverty and growing economies.5 Women in developing country economies are producers and income earners, farmers and entrepreneurs, wage workers and self-employed. In India’s economic transformation of the past 15 years, the World Bank finds that states with the highest percentage of women in the labor force grew the fastest and had the largest reductions in poverty.6

Investments in women also have broad multiplier effects like improving children’s health and education, which over the long run can significantly improve the futures of communities and countries.7, 8 An extra year of girls’ education can reduce infant mortality by 5-to-10 percent.9 The children of educated mothers are 40 percent more likely to live beyond the age of 5,10 and 50 percent more likely to be immunized.11 A mother’s social and economic status also is one of the best indicators of whether her children will escape poverty and be healthy. Bottomline: A focus on women is vital to reduce poverty and break the cycle of inter-generational poverty. Despite the evidence, women and girls still fail to be incorporated fully into and benefit from global development efforts. In developing countries, women earn on average 22 percent less than men.12 Women in Africa constitute the majority of farmers, yet they receive less than 10 percent of small farm credit and own just 1 percent of the land.13 Women face more obstacles than men in labor markets, receive lower wages for the same work, dominate in the informal economy and have less access to credit, land, education and other productive resources. If these gender inequalities persist, women, their families, their communities and their countries will pay the high cost of slower economic growth, weaker governance and overall lower standards of living:14 • GNP (gross national product) per capita is lower in countries where women are significantly less well educated than men.15 • In sub-Saharan Africa, inequality between men and women in education and employment suppressed annual per capita growth during 1960-1992 by 0.8 percentage points per year, according to the World Bank. A boost of 0.8 percent per year would have doubled economic growth over that period.16 Reforming U.S. foreign assistance provides a pivotal opportunity to integrate the lessons of the past 40 years into new priorities, strategies, structures and budgets. What follows are proven steps for how to enhance economic growth and improve development efficiency by promoting women’s empowerment and gender equality. These steps build directly into the action framework of the M-FAN consensus.17 (1) Develop a new U.S. Strategy for Global Development and Poverty Reduction that Fully Recognizes the Role of Women. As M-FAN asserts, the United States must develop a clear and focused strategy to achieve long-term development and poverty reduction, separate from but parallel to short-term national security interests and political goals.18 For too long, U.S. foreign assistance has been encumbered by multiple, competing and sometimes conflicting goals and objectives. ICRW and Women Thrive urge that a new U.S. strategy for global development should build on the eight Millennium

Development Goals (MDGs)19 endorsed by the international community in 2000, and specifically MDG 3 which promotes women’s empowerment and gender equality. Thus far the United States has kept the MDGs at arm’s length. Now is the time for the United States to espouse the MDG framework for its own bilateral assistance as well as to cooperate and more fully engage with other donors and multilateral agencies (see Box I). Moreover, for a new U.S. strategy to be effective, it must identify and overcome specific gender inequalities that are obstacles to development. For example, if a major U.S. goal is to increase food security in Africa, aid programs need to recognize African women’s primary role in food production and family nutrition, and identify ways to address the obstacles women face to increasing their agricultural productivity (e.g., lack of a legal right to own and inherit land, and lack of access to productive resources such as credit, technology, extension services, information and markets). Such efforts to reduce gender inequality would complement other programs and benefit men as well as women. Recommendation 1: Develop a new U.S. strategy for global development that fully recognizes women’s roles in reducing poverty and expanding economic growth, commits the United States to advancing the Millennium Development Goal of women’s empowerment and gender equality, and invests in multilateral efforts to achieve this goal. (2) Plan, Design and Enact a New Foreign Assistance Act that Strengthens the Commitment to Women as well as Men.

Box I: Multilateral Foreign Assistance Key to U.S. Reforms The United States is missing crucial opportunities to leverage its own funding to improve and shape the direction and performance of multilateral institutions by downplaying multilateral aid in favor of bilateral aid. The U.N. system, the World Bank and the regional development banks are important partners in international development cooperation and influential actors in development assistance worldwide. To date, they lead international efforts to empower women and reduce gender inequality. Many have adopted gender mainstreaming and equality policies with varying success and offer important lessons learned. The World Bank, for example, recently adopted a Gender Action Plan to focus attention on women’s economic activities, intensify attention to gender in its economic programs and operations, and demonstrate results. UNIFEM is the only multilateral organization that focuses solely on women’s rights and gender equality. To date, it has experienced mixed success for a variety of reasons that include diffused responsibilities and a lack of resources. A recent proposal suggests ways to strengthen UNIFEM and its role in leading efforts within the United Nations to integrate gender and achieve the goals of gender equality and women’s empowerment.20

A new Foreign Assistance Act must improve upon the Percy Amendment to strengthen and expand the focus on women’s empowerment and gender equality. The 1973 Percy Amendment guides current U.S. policy toward women’s roles in international development. The Amendment stipulates that U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs should be administered “so as to give particular attention to programs, projects and activities which tend to integrate women into the national economies of foreign countries, thus improving their status and assisting the total development effort.” It helped foster the creation of the USAID Women in Development Office and subsequent initiatives to improve the status of women in developing countries, though some were never fully implemented. Despite its mandate, the Percy Amendment has had only marginal success. A 1993 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that USAID’s implementation of the Percy Amendment had been weak. USAID was “slow in incorporating gender into its programs and activities,” according to the GAO, and had “not adequately monitored the implementation of its policies and strategies or routinely evaluated the impact of its programs and activities on women.”21 Although USAID subsequently took steps to remedy these problems, its track record remains weak. The agency lacks both the high-level leadership and some of the institutional mechanisms to systematically integrate gender analysis into program design and implementation so that programs benefit women as well as men. For example, USAID lacks an institutional mandate and internal policy to ensure that women benefit from its programs; it lacks adequate finances for such programs; and it fails to place gender experts in key positions in the agency. Recommendation 2: Plan, design and enact a new Foreign Assistance Act that ensures that U.S. development assistance benefits women equally as men, with tools and indicators to improve execution and results. (3) Implement a More Consistent and Coordinated Policy and Approach to Gender Integration. ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­The proliferation of foreign assistance agencies, programs and offices has led to disparate commitment levels and approaches to address women’s empowerment and gender inequality. In addition to USAID, for example, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) address strategies for empowering women and promoting gender equality to varying degrees. A new Foreign Assistance Act will provide the United

Box II: Different U.S. Aid Agencies Take Different Approaches for Women The three main U.S. development entities today – U.S. Agency for International Development, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) – vary significantly in their approaches toward achieving gender equality and empowering women. USAID. In 1996, after more than 20 years of little progress toward fulfilling the Percy Amendment and under pressure by the international women’s conference in Beijing, USAID adopted a Gender Plan of Action for all its activities. In 2000, however, an in-depth analysis of the plan’s implementation showed that “over 90 percent of those interviewed in USAID and the PVO/NGO community said that [the plan] has not had any measurable impact on agency operations.”22 Since then, USAID has made some progress toward integrating tools and approaches that help prioritize women and their different needs through its development programs. In 2003, the agency adopted guidance explicitly requiring attention to gender considerations in country strategies. The guidance stipulated that country strategies had to include a gender analysis, hire staff with some gender expertise, and disaggregate data by sex for monitoring and evaluation. A recent USAID review found a marked increase in the degree and quality of attention to gender in country strategies after 2003. This progress fell across nearly all development sectors and geographical regions, although the average score remained between “minimal” and “moderate.”23 Evidence is not yet available on how effective the strategies have been in generating better results for women. PEPFAR. Although the 2003 PEPFAR authorization legislation placed considerable emphasis on gender inequality and its effect on women’s HIV risk, the program was slow to integrate ways to address women’s unique barriers and risks pertaining to HIV in its procedures and programs. In late 2005, the Office of Global AIDS Coordinator established a gender technical working group which identified five priority program strategies: (1) increase gender equality on access to HIV/AIDS services; (2) address risky male norms and behavior; (3) reduce gender-based violence and sexual coercion; (4) increase women’s and girls’ access to income and productive resources; and (5) increase women’s legal protection and rights. PEPFAR also began to disaggregate by sex some of the data collected for annual reporting to Congress. It was the first U.S. aid agency to do so. Beyond these steps, however, PEPFAR lacks most other mecha-

States with a unique opportunity to streamline these three key U.S. bilateral aid entities, as well as other aid initiatives, and improve the coherence and coordination of their programs, including efforts to integrate gender and improve outcomes for women. No U.S. assistance program has fully embraced gender integration, though the MCC has made progress (see Box II). Important lessons from such efforts can inform a new foreign assistance framework. Significant changes in organizational structure and processes are needed to ensure that the goals of empowering women and promoting gender equality are a priority throughout all U.S. foreign assistance efforts. These structural changes include establishing: • Leadership and political commitment to development

nisms for integrating priorities for women into its work plan, structure or policies. The program has issued no institutional mandate on gender integration and no formal operational guidance to field programs. It has dedicated few financial resources or full-time staff to promoting the implementation of the five program strategies issued by the gender technical working group, and holds no regular gender training or other capacity building for staff and partners. Although the working group reviews annual country operational strategies and recommends ways to strengthen attention to gender issues, it conducts no systematic gender analysis of projects and provides limited technical assistance to field programs. Recently, PEPFAR initiated an effort to define new indicators to measure results. Such indicators might move the program beyond disaggregated data collection by sex and allow PEPFAR to better assess whether and how programs are working for women. MCC. Established in January 2004, the MCC already has demonstrated considerable commitment to advancing women’s status in developing countries and promoting gender equality by integrating these priorities into its policies and procedures. Noteworthy efforts include: • Consistent and strong political leadership from MCC’s chief executive officer that women are a priority in its development efforts. • Appointment of a high-level gender expert to anchor program work. • Adoption of a clear gender policy that calls for gender integration in program design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation that articulates the expectations of country governments and MCC staff. • A requirement that all staff undergo periodic mandatory trainings on gender analysis and other gender methodologies and approaches. • A requirement that recipient governments consult with women, including rural women, in country prior to drafting “compacts” or agreements with the MCC. The compacts must identify intended beneficiaries disaggregated by sex, age and income. • A requirement that all country compacts undergo gender analysis as part of larger social and environmental analysis prior to final MCC board approval. Though still in the early stages of rolling out its country programs, the MCC is conducting an internal evaluation on its gender policy implementation to assess whether its goals for women are being met and how to improve their work in this area.

for women at the highest levels of agencies or programs, including the appointment of a senior-level official responsible for the gender goals who reports directly to the agency head and has the authority to influence decisions on foreign assistance policies, priorities and budget; • Institutional mandate that signals to managers that empowering women and promoting gender equality must be integrated across all strategies, programs and projects, including the use of gender analysis; • Enhanced capacity for gender analysis and programming by placing gender experts with appropriate technical experience and skills within all relevant regional and technical bureaus or functions, and by drawing upon local technical gender experts in host countries (see Box III);

• Sufficient financial resources to support comprehensive gender analysis and appropriate follow through in project design, implementation and evaluation. This involves hiring technical gender experts in various development fields, and financing the integration of women (or men, if appropriate) in projects as well as stand-alone activities that are vital to the success of development efforts and achieving gender equality. Recommendation 3: Implement a more consistent and coordinated policy and approach to gender integration as part of broader efforts to achieve greater coherence and coordination in U.S. foreign assistance programs. (4) Increase Funding for Programs that Invest in Women and Address Gender Inequalities. To expand economic growth and reduce poverty in developing countries, increased funding and greater accountability are needed. Making investments in women and establishing gender equality as a cornerstone of U.S. foreign assistance will go a long way toward achieving development goals, and this requires ensuring adequate resources and accountability. At present, it is difficult to know how much money is spent in U.S. foreign assistance programs to promote women’s empowerment and gender equality. Recent reporting on donor countries’ expenditures to advance gender equality by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) excludes any figures for the United States 24 (see Box IV). A new foreign assistance framework must allow sufficient resources to ensure that gender integration occurs throughout a project cycle.

Box III: Gender Analysis Can Strengthen Foreign Assistance Gender analysis identifies the different roles, rights, responsibilities and constraints of women and men in different societies. Addressing these differences is essential to the successful design and implementation of development programs. For example, to keep girls in school in many developing communities, particular attention must be paid to their safety as they move between their homes and schools, and while at school. This simple, but important consideration came to light as part of an analysis of the different factors affecting the school enrollment rates of girls as compared to boys. Gender analysis does not just benefit women and girls. Addressing the distinct roles, beliefs and barriers that men face is equally important to strengthening programs. A gender perspective ensures that both women and men can participate in, support, and benefit from development efforts to relieve poverty and expand economic growth.

Box IV: Global Foreign Aid: What’s Spent on Gender Equality? Total global spending on women’s empowerment and gender equality through development assistance programs is difficult to measure, and ranges widely from 5 percent in Japan to 50 percent in Germany. The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD reports that during 2005-2006, some 16 bilateral donors spent a total of approximately $8.5 billion each year on aid focused on gender equality and women’s empowerment – almost 33 percent of the $26 billion in overall aid spent by those same donors. This figure does not include the additional $27.8 billion in bilateral aid spent by seven other countries, including the United States, that either do not report their gender-related spending to the OECD or for which the spending is too low. Most money allocated toward women’s or gender programs support investments in education, health, water and sanitation, and social services. Only a small share of the programs support investments in finance, business, agriculture or industry – areas vital to poverty reduction and economic growth. Source: “Aid in Support of Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment” OECD-DAC Secretariat, February 2008

Effective ways to track this spending also should be devised to facilitate accountability. The U.S. should track its expenditures on women and gender equality as other OECD countries do, and establish mechanisms to measure progress toward U.S. development goals. Such mechanisms include monitoring and evaluation systems that disaggregate data by sex as well as age and income, and developing and adopting indicators to measure outcomes such as improvements in women’s or men’s health, education, income or legal rights. Finally, stronger internal accountability measures must be put in place so that managers within foreign assistance programs are assessed on their progress toward reaching these goals. Congress too must play a more active role in oversight of foreign assistance agencies by monitoring agencies’ progress toward women’s empowerment and gender equality goals and objectives. Recommendation 4: Increase funding for programs that invest in women and address gender inequalities, and track and report on these expenditures to ensure that financial resources allocated to foreign assistance are effective in reducing poverty and promoting development.

Conclusion

The global scene has changed tremendously since the birth of U.S. development assistance with the Marshall Plan and its subsequent alignment with U.S. security interests

pertaining to the Cold War. Yet U.S. foreign aid mechanisms have not been systematically analyzed or overhauled to reflect the United States’ changing priorities. Further, while U.S. development assistance has been adapted to the changing global landscape over the past several decades, those changes have occurred in an ad hoc way. The time is ripe to systematically revamp U.S. development assistance mechanisms, drawing on key lessons learned with years of aid experience and taking advantage of increased public awareness of the importance of a U.S. role in addressing global poverty in the aftermath of 9/11. We are at the cusp of potentially major changes in the U.S. administration. We also have the benefit of many years of development experience, which gives us greater understanding on how to overcome poverty, including the central importance of empowering women and reducing inequality between women and men. We must ensure that gender equality goals and gender integration in development programs are integral features of the new foreign assistance framework and strategy. Endnotes 1 Also referred to as the Wye River Consensus Group. 2 See, “New Day, New Way: U.S. Foreign Assistance for the 21st Century: A Proposal from the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network,” June 2008. This consensus proposal draws upon analysis of the Center for Global Development, “Seizing the Moment for Modernizing US Foreign Assistance: Testimony for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,” April 23, 2008. See also other foreign aid reform proposals including: Lael Brainard, “U.S. Foreign Assistance: Advancing National Security, Interests, and Values,” Brookings Institution, April 23, 2008; “Smart Development: Why U.S. Foreign Aid Demands Major Reform,” Oxfam America, February 2008; and “The Rationale for and Major Structural Components of a Proposed Cabinet-level Department for Global and Human Development,” InterAction, Washington, D.C. (forthcoming). 3 Priority actions as articulated in the M-FAN consensus document, “New Day, New Way: U.S. Foreign Assistance for the 21st Century” include: (1) develop a national strategy for global development; (2) reach a “grand bargain” between the Executive branch and Congress on management authorities and plan, design and enact a new Foreign Assistance Act; (3) streamline the organizational structure and improve organizational capacity by creating a Cabinet-level Department for Global Development by rebuilding human resource capacity and by strengthening monitoring and evaluation; and (4) increase funding for and accountability of foreign assistance. 4 Gender is a social construct that defines and differentiates the roles, rights, responsibilities and obligations of women and men. The U.N. Task Force for MDG 3, of which ICRW was a member, adopted an operational framework of gender equality with three interrelated dimensions: (1) capabilities, referring to basic human abilities as measured by education, health and nutrition; (2) access to resources and opportunities, referring to equality in the opportunity to use or apply basic capabilities; and (3)

security, meaning reduced vulnerability to violence and conflict. The concept of empowerment is related to gender equality but distinct from it. The core of empowerment lies in the ability of a woman to control her own destiny. This implies that to be empowered women must have not only equal capabilities and access to resources, but also the agency to use those rights and resources to make strategic decisions. Such agency requires women to live without fear of coercion or violence. (UNDP, Taking Action: Achieving Gender Equality and Empowering Women, 2005.) 5 Agriculture remains a key economic activity in many developing regions. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, women who obtained the same levels of education, experience and farm inputs as men increased their agricultural yields by 22 percent (International Food Policy Research Institute, “Women: The Key to Food Security” June, 2000). 6 Besley, Timothy; Robin Burgess and BertaEsteve-Volart, “Operationalising Pro-Poor Growth: India Case Study,” Washington, D.C., 2005. 7 Between 1970 and 1995, for example, investments in women’s secondary education led to a 43-percent reduction in malnutrition in the developing world (Smith, Lisa C. and Lawrence Haddad. “Explaining Child Malnutrition in Developing Countries: A Cross-Country Analysis,” Washington, D.C.: IFPRI, 2000.) 8 When credit is provided directly to a woman, it can increase household consumption and children’s schooling. Loan repayment rates are higher for women than for men. (Schultz, T. Paul. “Returns to Women’s Schooling,” in Elizabeth King and M. Anne Hill, eds, Women’s Education in Developing Countries: Barriers, Benefits and Policy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003.) 9 Schultz, T.Paul. “Returns to Women’s Schooling,” in Elizabeth King and M. Anne Hill, eds, Women’s Education in Developing Countries: Barriers, Benefits and Policy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. 10 Summers, Lawrence H. “Investing in All the People: Educating Women in Developing Countries,” EDI Seminar Paper No. 45, Washington, D.C.; World Bank, 1994. 11 Gage, Anastasia, Elizabeth Sommerfelt, and Andrea Piani, “Household Structure and Childhood Immunization in Niger and Nigeria,” Demography 34 (2): 195-309, 1997. 12 “Gender: Working Towards Greater Equality,” in Gender Equality as Smart Economics: A World Bank Group Action Plan. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007. www.worldbank.org/gender 13 Ibid. 14 World Bank, Engendering Development: Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources, and Voice – Summary (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001). www.worldbank.org/gender/prr/engendersummary.pdf. As cited by Susy Cheston and Lisa Kuhn, Empowering Women Through Microfinance. UNIFEM: 2002. 15 “Gender and Sustainable Development: Maximizing the Economic, Social and Environmental Role of women,” Paris: OECD, 2008. 16 Udry, Christopher, John Hoddinott, Harold Alderman and Lawrence Haddad. 1995. “Gender differentials in farm productivity: Implications for household efficiency and agricultural policy,” Food Policy, 20:407423. 17 Priority actions as articulated in the M-FAN consensus document, “New Day, New Way: US Foreign Assistance for the 21st Century,” include: (1) develop a national strategy for global development; (2) reach a “grand

bargain” between the Executive branch and Congress on management authorities and plan, design and enact a new Foreign Assistance Act; (3) streamline the organizational structure and improve organizational capacity by creating a Cabinet-level Department for Global Development by rebuilding human resource capacity and by strengthening monitoring and evaluation; and (4) increase funding for and accountability of foreign assistance. 18 Ibid. 19 The MDGs set targets for reducing global poverty, hunger, illiteracy, illhealth and inequality. 20 A U.N. High-Level Panel recently called for U.N. organizations to promote gender equality as part of a larger package of reforms to the U.N. system. The panel’s proposal, currently before the U.N. General Assembly, recommends that UNIFEM and several other U.N. gender entities consolidate and graduate to a new, stronger U.N. agency that promotes women’s rights and gender equality. The new agency would have the authority to support operational programs, and develop and promote U.N. policies toward gender equality. The panel also calls for making the head of the new agency a U.N. Under-Secretary General—a measure that would give the agency more clout to strengthen gender integration across the U.N. system. 21 Rax, Roee “Gender Inequality Remains Key Issue in Development,” Monday Developments, Washington, D.C.: Interaction, Dec. 15, 2003. 22 Sharma, Ritu. “Women and Development Aid,” Foreign Policy in Focus. September 2001. 23 Power Point presentation by the Office of Women in Development, USAID, May 2008. Washington, D.C. 24 “Aid in Support of Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment,” Paris: OECD-DAC Secretariat, February 2008 http://www.oecd.org/ dataoecd/8/13/40346286.pdf

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Contributors to Gender Policy Brief Organization

URL

American Red Cross CARE Catholic Relief Services Centre for Development and Population Activities Center for Health and Gender Equity Christian Children’s Fund International Center for Research on Women International Medical Corps Opportunity International Population Action International Save the Children Winrock International Women Thrive Worldwide

www.redcross.org www.care.org www.crs.org www.cedpa.org www.genderhealth.org www.christianchildrensfund.org www.icrw.org www.imcworldwide.org www.opportunity.org www.populationaction.org www.savethechildren.org www.winrock.org www.womenthrive.org

InterAction Gender and Aid Reform Task Force

1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

Organization

URL

American Red Cross CARE Catholic Relief Services Centre for Development and Population Activities Center for Health and Gender Equity Christian Children’s Fund International Center for Research on Women International Medical Corps Opportunity International Population Action International Save the Children Winrock International Women Thrive Worldwide

www.redcross.org www.care.org www.crs.org www.cedpa.org www.genderhealth.org www.christianchildrensfund.org www.icrw.org www.imcworldwide.org www.opportunity.org www.populationaction.org www.savethechildren.org www.winrock.org www.womenthrive.org

U.S. Government Funding Trends

U.S. Government Development Assistance Funding Trends

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

U.S. Government Development Assistance Funding Trends Problem The U.S. underinvests in proven programs for foreign development and humanitarian assistance. U.S. assistance remains at historically low levels relative to GDP, far less than our peer countries provide (per capita) and less than the American public desires and believes is the case. Congress appropriates less than 1% of the entire U.S. government budget to foreign development and humanitarian assistance. This lack of up-front investment results in greater future spending on crisis response and military operations.

1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

Recommendations Dramatically ramp up the resources invested in poverty-focused humanitarian and development assistance along with the personnel and systems that administer and deliver such assistance.

Actions • Request a major increase in FY2010 funding for development and humanitarian accounts, including the seven development and humanitarian Core Accounts (Global Health, Development Assistance, International Disaster Assistance, Office of Transition Initiatives, Migration and Refugee Assistance, Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance, International Operations and Programs), the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the President’s Emergency Response for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and peacekeeping accounts. From an FY2008 baseline, InterAction recommends an additional $9.9 billion; • Direct the new USAID Administrator, in consultation with the National Security Advisor, to draft and present a national development strategy for the FY2010 budget request process that would streamline and present in a cohesive manner U.S. Government funding requests for all foreign development and humanitarian assistance currently provided by over 26 agencies and departments responsible for the delivery of U.S. development and humanitarian assistance; • In the congressional budget resolution and appropriations subcommittee allocations, provide overall and subcommittee discretionary spending allowances sufficient to allow a total increase of $9.9 billion for the development and humanitarian accounts; and • Modernize our foreign assistance architecture to ensure maximal efficiency and effectiveness of these increased resources.

Results A significant increase on the order proposed would start the investment needed to seed future global economic prosperity and reduce the need for costly military intervention and humanitarian action. It would begin to rebuild our store of goodwill around the world, serve our long-term national security interests, and put into action our national values.

Background Historical trend: As this Congressional Research Service graph shows, U.S. foreign assistance (in this case including some military assistance) as a percentage of GDP has declined significantly over the last several decades. Data on U.S. official development assistance (a subset of foreign aid) as a percentage of national income show a significant decline from 0.54 % in 1960 to 0.16% in 2007.1

tional security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies.” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in turn, has called for, “a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security – diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development…” The chart below shows the relative size and lack of balance among U.S. Government spending levels on these three categories in FY2008.6 Public Attitudes: Some argue that the public does not prioritize foreign assistance. This impression may stem from a fact repeatedly demonstrated in polls: the public thinks our official assistance is higher than it is, with median estimates at around 20% of the federal budget, and median levels preferred at around 10% of the budget. The actual level is less than 1% of the budget.

Comparison to peers: In a ranking of Official Development Assistance (ODA)2 as percentage of national income for 20073, the U.S. ranks 23rd, behind Greece, Italy, Japan, Portugal, and Italy, to name just a few of the 22 nations higher on the list. Including private flows – resources donated from foundations, individuals, universities, and corporations – still leaves the U.S. ranked 17th (OECD4) or 11th (Hudson Institute5) depending on data source.

Rationale: Some argue that the U.S. takes a leadership role and does more than its fair share to serve the international community. That argument misses both the practical and moral points. Increasing stability, prosperity and goodwill in developing as well as post-crisis states and regions around the world makes us safer. For example, if we had worked with the Pakistani government a decade ago to help reduce poverty, improve governance and build a more modern education system, madrassas (Islamic schools, some of which are extremist) might not have gained such influence and Pakistan might be more stable (and might be contributing less to the costly war we are fighting across the border in Afghanistan). Morally, most Americans would agree that our economic, security and cultural contributions do not, and should not, diminish our duty and desire to offer a hand up to those most in need around the world.

The “Three D’s”: The U.S. National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006 divided our national security apparatus into three components: defense, diplomacy and development. The 2006 Strategy says: “Development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our na1 Chart source: Congressional Research Service Report 98-916, p.16. Figures: % of GNI, OECD DAC statistics (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee) http://stats. oecd.org/wbos/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE1# 2 ODA is the OECD’s official definition of what “counts”as foreign assistance. 3 2007 data is preliminary as of this writing. 4 OECD DAC statistics http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Index. aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE1# 5 Hudson Institute, The Index of Global Philanthropy 2007, p. 16, Chart 5.

6 Chart source: FY2008 appropriations bills

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

InterAction Public Policy Working Group

1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

Organization

URL

Academy for Educational Development Action Against Hunger Action Aid Adventist Development and Relief Agency International Africare Aga Khan Foundation U.S.A. Air Serv International American Friends Service Committee American Jewish World Service American Red Cross American Refugee Committee AmeriCares Bread for the World CARE Catholic Medical Mission Board Catholic Relief Services Center for Health and Gender Equity, Inc Centre for Development & Population Activities (CEDPA) CHF International Child Health Foundation (CHF) Christian Children’s Fund Church World Service Concern Worldwide Congressional Hunger Center Counterpart International Ethiopian Community Development Council, Inc Florida Association for Volunteer Action in the Caribbean and the Americas (FAVACA) Food for the Hungry Friends of the World Food Program Global Health Council Habitat for Humanity International Heartland Alliance Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society Heifer International InsideNGO Institute for Sustainable Communities Interplast Int’l Catholic Migration Commission Int’l Center for Research on Women Int’l Crisis Group International Medical Corps

www.aed.org www.actionagainsthunger.org www.actionaid.org www.adra.org www.africare.org www.akdn.org www.airserv.org www.afsc.org www.ajws.org www.redcross.org www.archq.org www.americares.org www.bread.org www.care.org www.cmmb.org www.crs.org www.genderhealth.org www.cedpa.org www.chfinternational.org www.childhealthfoundation.org www.christianchildrensfund.org www.churchworldservice.org www.concernusa.org www.hungercenter.org www.counterpart.org www.ecdcinternational.org www.favaca.org/ www.fh.org www.friendsofwfp.org www.globalhealth.org www.habitat.org www.heartlandalliance.org www.hias.org www.heifer.org www.InsideNGO.org www.iscvt.org www.interplast.org www.icmc.net www.icrw.org www.crisisweb.org www.imcworldwide.org

InterAction Public Policy Working Group (cont) Organization

URL

Int’l Orthodox Christian Charities Int’l Reading Association International Relief & Development International Rescue Committee Jesuit Refugee Services USA Joint Aid Management Life for Relief and Development Lutheran World Relief Management Sciences for Health MAP International Medical Teams International Mental Disability Rights International Mercy Corps Minnesota International Health Volunteers National Peace Corps Association ONE Campaign Opportunity International Oxfam America Pact Pan American Development Foundation PATH Pathfinder International Physicians for Human Rights Plan USA Population Action International Project HOPE ProLiteracy Worldwide Refugees International Relief International RESULTS, Inc. Save the Children The Hunger Project U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) U.S. Committee for UNDP U.S. Fund for UNICEF Winrock International Women for Women International Women Thrive Worldwide World Vision World Wildlife Fund

www.iocc.org www.reading.org www.ird.org www.theirc.org www.jrsusa.org www.jamusa.org www.lifeusa.org www.lwr.org www.msh.org www.map.org www.medicalteams.org www.mdri.org www.mercycorps.org www.mihv.org www.rpcv.org www.one.org/ www.opportunity.org www.oxfamamerica.org www.pactworld.org www.padf.org www.path.org www.pathfind.org www.phrusa.org www.planusa.org www.populationaction.org www.projecthope.org www.proliteracy.org www.refugeesinternational.org www.ri.org www.results.org www.savethechildren.org www.thp.org www.refugees.org www.undp-usa.org www.unicefusa.org www.winrock.org www.womenforwomen.org www.womenthrive.org www.worldvision.org www.worldwildlife.org

Supplemental Funding

Supplemental Funding for Humanitarian Accounts

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Over-Reliance on Supplemental Funding for Humanitarian Accounts Problem The unpredictable, stop-and-start supplemental funding for humanitarian accounts leads to inefficiencies, disruptions and shutdowns of urgently needed life-saving assistance. It has become standard for administration budget requests and regular appropriations bills to under-fund humanitarian accounts, using supplemental funding to cover the shortfall later in the budget year. The costs are irreversible: lost lives, stunted children and the spread of disease.

1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

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Recommendations As a leader in humanitarian response, the United States must demonstrate its reliability and commitment to assisting those affected by conflict and natural disasters by fully funding the humanitarian accounts in the regular appropriations process. The accounts in question are International Disaster Assistance (IDA), Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA), Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA), Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) in the State, Foreign Operations appropriations bill, and the food aid accounts in the Agriculture appropriations bill. A U.S. national development strategy adopted by Congress and the Administration would provide an overarching vision and mission for U.S. humanitarian programs and bring coherence to the planning process for humanitarian budgets.

Actions • Administration: Request full funding for these accounts in the regular budget request based on historical requested levels, historical supplemental funding levels, and projected needs from the relevant agencies; • Congressional Budget Committees: Set the overall discretionary spending cap and the recommended allocations for the International Affairs Budget (Function 150) high enough to accommodate full funding for these accounts; • Appropriations Chairs: Set the State, Foreign Operations Subcommittee allocation high enough to accommodate full funding for these accounts; • State, Foreign Operations Subcommittees: Fully fund these accounts in the appropriations bills, based on projected needs (calculated as detailed in the first point above); and • Administration and Congress: Rely on supplemental funding only for truly unanticipated emergencies.

Results Predictable, robust funding will allow the U.S. to be a reliable partner in international humanitarian efforts and respond efficiently to new emergencies without diverting funds from ongoing humanitarian programs. It will enable more efficient use of scarce humanitarian dollars, improve crisis readiness and save more lives.

Background With budget ceilings increasingly tighter, the humanitarian accounts1 in appropriation bills have become vulnerable to reductions during the regular appropriations process. This practice is based on an expectation that the humanitarian accounts stand a better chance for mid-year, emergency supplemental funding than accounts that fund long-term development. The following graph of requests and appropriations for the International Disaster Assistance account clearly illustrates the trend: the taller black bars are the total amount eventually provided in each fiscal year (regular plus supplemental appropriations), while the shorter bars are the request and regular appropriations, normally provided toward the start of the fiscal year.

What needs to be emphasized is that under-funding appropriations for the humanitarian accounts in the regular appropriations bills causes program cuts, delays and disruptions that carry serious, irreversible human consequences, regardless of any eventual “makeup” funding in supplementals. Low funding in the regular bills results in: • Uncertainty. Managers of assistance programs do not know until the middle of the fiscal year (or later) if more funding will be forthcoming – budget guidance is uncertain, and management decisions are postponed. If there is a supplemental, it can take weeks or months before any money is allocated. • Disruption in the field. Uncertainty and delay at the beginning of the year can lead to drastic scale-backs and shutdown of programs. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) try to keep programs running with private funding, but triage often results and deep cuts may mean that NGOs must close offices and lay off staff. 1 International Disaster Assistance (IDA), Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA), Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA), food aid and peacekeeping accounts (PKO and CIPA).

• Lives lost. Disruption in the delivery of services has serious consequences: lost lives, malnourished children and the spread of disease. Funding may be restored but the damage incurred is irreversible. Example: FY 2006 Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA). In Fall 2005, cuts to the FY 2006 refugee aid account in the annual appropriations bill triggered cutbacks to refugee programs in Liberia, Guinea, and Kenya. In Kenya, budget cuts caused a 10% reduction in health care services provided to the large Kakuma refugee camp that sheltered refugees from nine different nations, including Sudan, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Example: FY 2006 Sudan. Greatly reduced humanitarian funding for FY 2006 caused deep cuts in programming in Darfur. The reductions meant that 100,000 people who had been receiving food in FY05 were no longer being fed. Funding cuts also affected other critical services. Water and sanitation services were cut in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, affecting over 125,000 people.

POLICY PAPER

November 2008

Why Dependence on Supplemental Funding Hurts Humanitarian Programs

T

1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

he annual appropriations cycle has become a two-step process. In addition to the regular annual appropriations bills, mid-year supplemental appropriations bills are now an expected part of the budget process, in large part because much of the Defense Department’s budget for the Iraq war has been covered through mid-year supplementals. There is therefore now an expectation of a second chance each year to fund certain programs. With budget ceilings increasingly tighter, humanitarian accounts (disaster, refugee, and food aid) in annual appropriations bills have become vulnerable to reductions during the regular appropriations process because of the expectation that these accounts stand a better chance for mid-year supplemental funding than accounts that fund long-term development. There is an assumption that a stronger case can be made that funding is urgently needed for complex humanitarian operations. The tables and charts at the end of this document illustrate the trend: the budget request and regular appropriations have routinely been less, sometimes significantly less, than what is eventually found to be necessary and is appropriated. Let there be no mistake, however, cutting appropriations for the humanitarian accounts in the regular appropriations bills causes program cuts, delays and disruptions that carry very serious, irreversible human consequences, regardless of any eventual “make-up” funding provided in supplementals. Uncertainty and delay: Managers of foreign aid accounts do not know until the middle of the fiscal year if more funding will be forthcoming – budget guidance is uncertain, and normal management decisions must be postponed. If there is a supplemental, it can take weeks and months before it passes through Congress and is delivered to the president for signature. Internal agency processes to allocate funds and make grants can take several more weeks. This uncertainty and delay at the beginning of the fiscal year can lead to drastic scale-backs and shutdowns of programs. Without U.S. Government grants, NGOs will rely on private funding to try to keep programs running – resorting to triage in order to continue life-saving operations. But deep cuts may mean that NGOs have to close offices, let staff go, and shut down services. Disruption in the delivery of these life-saving services have, by definition, serious consequences: lost lives, stunted children, and the spread of disease. Food pipelines and nutrition programs, inoculations for children, safe deliveries for mothers, medical care for the sick, efforts to provide shelter and protect the vulnerable – all of these can come to a screeching halt when humanitarian funding is cut and programs are shut-down. Funding may eventually be restored, but the damage incurred is irreversible. It is not possible to “backfill” urgently needed life-saving assistance such as food, water, primary health or emergency obstetric care. When humanitarian accounts are cut, unanticipated crises can deplete reserves. When there is no funding left for contingencies, reaction times slow and lives may be lost when disaster strikes.

Vicious cycle: Existing, ongoing humanitarian programs may be “starved” as the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is required to pull together resources to provide emergency assistance late in the fiscal year—meaning that supplemental funding will be needed once more to make up for this dangerous borrowing game. Furthermore, what frequently gets “borrowed” or diverted is funding intended to help prevent and mitigate future emergencies. The reduction in prevention and mitigation leads to many emergencies recurring again and again. Costly inefficiencies: If cuts in regular appropriations bills force office closings and release of staff, it is expensive to restart operations late in the fiscal year using supplemental funding. Key staff members may be lost because they have sought work elsewhere; cancelled leases must be renegotiated. The uncertain budget climate also makes trying to manage grants and programs, recruit new staff, and plan for the future very difficult. Diminished credibility: The stop-and-start nature of programs resulting from uncertain funding may cause recipients and other global relief organizations to question the reliability of the U.S. government and U.S.-based NGOs as partners in relieving human suffering.

Real-life Examples

FY 2006 Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA): In Fall 2005, cuts to the FY 2006 refugee aid account in the annual appropriations bill triggered the following: • In Liberia, programs to help refugees return to the country were cut back just when successful democratic elections and a new president offered a possible return to peace and normalcy. • In Guinea, education programs for displaced children were threatened. Funding for the regional certification exam was cut, leaving students who could not afford the certification fee with a lost school year. • In Kenya, budget cuts caused a 10% reduction in health care services provided to the large Kakuma refugee camp that shelters refugees from nine different nations (75 percent are southern Sudanese, 20 percent from Somalia, and the rest from Burundi, the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda). FY 2006 International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDFA): Cuts to the disaster aid account in FY 2006 meant that a significant portion of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance’s (OFDA’s) budget was diverted to respond to the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. Some humanitarian country programs were quickly downsized while OFDA waited six months for supplemental funding to replenish funds used for earthquake response. Programs in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, and Eritrea could not get off the ground, even

though all three countries were experiencing emergencies. Although some of these programs later benefited from lateyear funding infusions from the FY 2006 Supplemental bill, the delays hurt real people. FY 2006, Sudan: Greatly reduced humanitarian funding for FY 2006 caused deep cuts in programming in Darfur. These reductions meant that 100,000 people who had been receiving food in FY05 were no longer being fed. Funding cuts also affected the provision of other critical services. Water and sanitation services were cut in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, affecting over 125,000 people. Beyond the immediate impacts on the most vulnerable populations in Sudan, the scale-back of operations had other serious implications: • Heightened insecurity for NGO staff as services provided to host communities were scaled back. • Increased movement of host communities into Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps in order to access increasingly unavailable basic services. • Difficulty in ability of delivery organizations to implement quality programming due to uncertainty about future funding.

We therefore ask Congress:

• Do not cut humanitarian programs in regular appropriations bills thinking the cuts can be “made up” in a supplemental without problem or cost. Fully fund all the core development and humanitarian accounts in regular appropriations bills. • Expect humanitarian crises to occur, and appropriate sufficient funds at the start of the fiscal year to be ready for the next crisis.

Q&A

Q: If cuts have to be made during the regular appropriations process, why shouldn’t the accounts most likely to get supplemental funds get cut? A: Those accounts should not be cut because such cuts result in lost lives, stunted children, and the spread of disease, regardless of eventual supplemental appropriations. The damage from cuts to these accounts in the regular appropriations bills is not reversible mid-year! Both short-term humanitarian assistance and long-term development reconstruction programs are vitally important to fight global poverty and create a better, safer world for our future, yet together they use a mere 0.7% (7 tenths of 1%, or 0.007)1 of the appropriations budget. If cuts have to be made, they should be made elsewhere. Q: Even if recent history shows that supplemental appropriations have been needed every year, how can one 1 Total in the FY2006 Foreign Operations appropriations bill for Humanitarian and Development Assistance divided by total enacted FY2006 appropriations. $8,344,556! $1,210,920,325,000= 0.68%

be certain that disaster – tsunamis, hurricanes, earthstan earthquake, the Asian Tsunami and the recent crisis in quakes – will strike and that funding will be needed? Isn’t Lebanon force OFDA to draw significant funds and resources it better to wait and seek funding after disaster strikes? away from continuing crisis situations. The IDFA account A: While no one can foretell the future, the pattern of reneeds to be funded adequately in regular appropriations to cent major disasters is established and unlikely to go away. limit the disruptions and uncertainties caused by reliance on According to a recent report from the World Bank’s Indepensupplemental appropriations. dent Evaluation Group, “the reported number of disasters has been increasing, growing from fewer than 100 in 1975 to TABLES AND CHARTS891011 more than 400 in 2005.”2 The following tables and charts illustrate the pattern of After a crisis, the first few hours and days are when the two-part appropriations that has emerged for IDFA, MRA/ most lives can be saved – and they can only be saved if resERMA and food aid. Data for these tables and charts comes cuers move quickly. For example, the rapid and robust reprimarily from USAID budget tables and from appropriasponse to the Asian Tsunami prevented many more people tions bills. from dying from disease and hunger-related causes in the aftermath of the disaster. Appropriate resources must therefore be available to make sure that disaster response teams move within this critical window. It is also important that rapid response not happen at the expense of existing programs—“borrowing” funding may lead to the perverse outcome of lives lost in other areas of the world due to a diversion of critical resources. Q: Congress usually approves the president’s requests for the IDFA account and also provides supplemen tal funding. Why does Congress need to approve more funding for the IDFA account in the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill? Isn’t approving the president’s requested level and providing additional funding later in the fiscal year enough?34567 A: No. Such a two-stage process is unwise, because the uncertainty generated by the two-stage appropriations process costs lives and International Disaster Assistance (IDA/IDFA) creates significant inefficiencies. OFDA’s Regular Annual + recent annual operating year budgets Year Request Supps = Total Appropriated Appropriation have been around $500 million – a level $40,000,000 $421,500,000 FY02 $200,000,000 $381,500,0003 that is significantly above the president’s 4 5 yearly IDFA requests and congressional FY03 $235,500,000 $288,115,000 $143,800,000 $431,915,000 IDFA appropriations. As has been noted, 6 7 FY04 $435,500,000 $253,993,000 $290,000,000 $543,993,000 a two-step appropriations process has 8 FY05 $384,896,000 $367,040,000 $207,856,000 $574,896,000 been highly disruptive to humanitarian 9 10 FY06 $355,500,000 $361,350,000 $217,630,000 $578,980,000 programs in places like Sudan, Northern Uganda and Eastern Congo that are adFY07 $348,800,000 $361,350,000 $165,000,000 $526,350,000 dressing continuing emergencies. Unan11 FY08 $297,300,000 $319,739,000 $330,000,000 $649,739,000 ticipated emergencies such as the Paki2 Independent Evaluation Group. “Hazards ofNature, Risk to Development.” World Bank. October 18,2006. http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/naturaldisasters/ 3 $235,500,000 + $146,000,000 Emergency Response Fund (ERF) – IDA. 4 Does not include extra $50,000,000 requested for humanitarian and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan after 9/11. 5 Emergency Wartime, 4/03, PL 108-11. 6 $235,500,000 IDA + $200,000,000 famine fund. 7 $220,000,000 (Iraq/Afghanistan, 11/03, PL 108-106) + $70,000,000 (Defense approps, 8/04, PL 108-287).

8 $100,000,000 (Emergency Hurricane, 10/04, PL 108-324). + $17,856,000 (Sudan Emergency). + $90,000,000 (Tsunami & Wartime, 5/05, PL 109–13) 9 Does not include Emergency Food Assistance request of $300,000,000 previously requested elsewhere (PL Title II). 10 $56,330,000 (Avian Flu, 12/05, PL 109-148) + $161,300,000 (Wartime and Hurricane, 6/06, PL 109-234). 11 The FY08 omnibus appropriations bill (PL 110-161) included $110 million in emergency funding for the IDA account. This emergency funding was not included in the base funding level used in the FY09 Continuing Resolution.

Refugee Assistance (MRA & ERMA) Regular Annual + Appropriation

Year

Request

Supps

= Total Appropriated

FY02

$730,000,000

$820,556,00012

FY03

$720,565,000

$807,716,000

$80,000,000

FY04

$800,197,000

$785,472,000

$25,000,000

FY05

$749,789,000

$793,600,000

$120,400,000

FY06

$932,770,000

FY07

$888,000,000

FY08

$828,500,000

$820,556,000 13 14 15

$887,716,000 $810,472,000 $914,000,000

$812,790,000

16

$75,700,000

$888,490,000

$887,900,000

$130,500,000

$963,400,000

$867,814,000

$546,000,00017

$1,413,814,000

Food Aid (P.L. 480 Title II) Regular Annual + Appropriation

Year

Request

Supps

= Total Appropriated

FY02

$835,000,000

$945,000,000

$13,820,00018

$958,820,000

FY03

$1,185,000,000

$1,440,575,000

$369,000,000

$1,809,575,000

FY04

$1,185,000,000

$1,184,967,000

$0

FY05

$1,185,000,000

$1,173,041,000

$240,000,000

20

FY06

$885,000,000

$1,138,500,000

$350,000,000

21

FY07

$1,218,500,000

$1,214,711,000

$450,000,000

$1,664,711,000

FY08

$1,219,400,000

$1,219,400,000

$850,000,000

$2,069,400,000

19

$1,184,967,000

12 $705,556,000 MRA (1/02, PL 107-115) + $15,000,000 ERMA (1/02, PL 107115) + $100,000,000 Emergency Response Fund-MRA. 13 ERMA (4/03, PL 108-11). 14 Emergency Supplemental-Darfur humanitarian crisis (8/04, PL 108-287), MRA. 15 Emergency Supplemental (5/05, PL 109-13), MRA. 16 Emergency Supplemental, (6/06, PL 109-234), MRA. 17 The FY08 omnibus appropriations bill (PL 110-161) included $200 mil-

$1,413,041,000 $1,488,500,000

lion in emergency funding for the MRA account. This emergency funding was not included in the base funding level used in the FY09 Continuing Resolution. 18 FY 2002 Supplemental-Title II (8/02, PL 107-206: Title I, sec. 104(b)). 19 Wartime Supplemental Title II. Includes $69,000,000 under the Emerson Trust Fund (4/03, PL 108-11). 20 2005 Wartime & Tsunami Supplemental (5/05, PL 109-13). 21 FY 2006 Global War On Terror Supplemental Title I (6/15/06, PL 109-234).

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

InterAction Public Policy Working Group

1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

Organization

URL

Academy for Educational Development Action Against Hunger Action Aid Adventist Development and Relief Agency International Africare Aga Khan Foundation U.S.A. Air Serv International American Friends Service Committee American Jewish World Service American Red Cross American Refugee Committee AmeriCares Bread for the World CARE Catholic Medical Mission Board Catholic Relief Services Center for Health and Gender Equity, Inc Centre for Development & Population Activities (CEDPA) CHF International Child Health Foundation (CHF) Christian Children’s Fund Church World Service Concern Worldwide Congressional Hunger Center Counterpart International Ethiopian Community Development Council, Inc Florida Association for Volunteer Action in the Caribbean and the Americas (FAVACA) Food for the Hungry Friends of the World Food Program Global Health Council Habitat for Humanity International Heartland Alliance Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society Heifer International InsideNGO Institute for Sustainable Communities Interplast Int’l Catholic Migration Commission Int’l Center for Research on Women Int’l Crisis Group International Medical Corps

www.aed.org www.actionagainsthunger.org www.actionaid.org www.adra.org www.africare.org www.akdn.org www.airserv.org www.afsc.org www.ajws.org www.redcross.org www.archq.org www.americares.org www.bread.org www.care.org www.cmmb.org www.crs.org www.genderhealth.org www.cedpa.org www.chfinternational.org www.childhealthfoundation.org www.christianchildrensfund.org www.churchworldservice.org www.concernusa.org www.hungercenter.org www.counterpart.org www.ecdcinternational.org www.favaca.org/ www.fh.org www.friendsofwfp.org www.globalhealth.org www.habitat.org www.heartlandalliance.org www.hias.org www.heifer.org www.InsideNGO.org www.iscvt.org www.interplast.org www.icmc.net www.icrw.org www.crisisweb.org www.imcworldwide.org

InterAction Public Policy Working Group (cont) Organization

URL

Int’l Orthodox Christian Charities Int’l Reading Association International Relief & Development International Rescue Committee Jesuit Refugee Services USA Joint Aid Management Life for Relief and Development Lutheran World Relief Management Sciences for Health MAP International Medical Teams International Mental Disability Rights International Mercy Corps Minnesota International Health Volunteers National Peace Corps Association ONE Campaign Opportunity International Oxfam America Pact Pan American Development Foundation PATH Pathfinder International Physicians for Human Rights Plan USA Population Action International Project HOPE ProLiteracy Worldwide Refugees International Relief International RESULTS, Inc. Save the Children The Hunger Project U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) U.S. Committee for UNDP U.S. Fund for UNICEF Winrock International Women for Women International Women Thrive Worldwide World Vision World Wildlife Fund

www.iocc.org www.reading.org www.ird.org www.theirc.org www.jrsusa.org www.jamusa.org www.lifeusa.org www.lwr.org www.msh.org www.map.org www.medicalteams.org www.mdri.org www.mercycorps.org www.mihv.org www.rpcv.org www.one.org/ www.opportunity.org www.oxfamamerica.org www.pactworld.org www.padf.org www.path.org www.pathfind.org www.phrusa.org www.planusa.org www.populationaction.org www.projecthope.org www.proliteracy.org www.refugeesinternational.org www.ri.org www.results.org www.savethechildren.org www.thp.org www.refugees.org www.undp-usa.org www.unicefusa.org www.winrock.org www.womenforwomen.org www.womenthrive.org www.worldvision.org www.worldwildlife.org

Transformational Diplomacy

Transformational Diplomacy

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Transformational Diplomacy: The “F Process” Problem The 2006 Transformational Diplomacy reforms (the “F process”) undertaken by the Department of State’s Director of Foreign Assistance accelerated the alignment and coordination of the U.S. Government’s humanitarian and development assistance with the priorities of the Department of State, weakening USAID and subordinating it to the Department of State. The “F process” did not focus on the foreign assistance handled by over 20 other departments and agencies. This epitomizes the lack of strategic coherence to U.S. development policy. 1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

Recommendations Under the process of creating a national strategy for global development, undertake a broader, more fundamental set of reforms that replaces and builds on the lessons of the “F process.” Create a new, independent and elevated U.S. foreign assistance agency that brings coherence and coordination to the U.S. Government’s development and humanitarian assistance efforts and elevates development to its rightful place alongside defense and diplomacy, as articulated in the 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies. These positions are aligned with the recommendations of the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network, a bipartisan coalition of experts on U.S. foreign assistance.

Actions • Suspend any further implementation of the “F process” pending a substantive review to determine which aspects of its implementation and associated reforms should be retained or discarded; • Name a strong USAID Administrator who is given budget authority over an independent development agency including authority over funding currently under the mandate of the Director of Foreign Assistance at the Department of State; • Disband the F Bureau in the Department of State and return its staff to USAID; • Continue and expand consultation between Washington and the field, U.S.-based NGOs, and Congress to achieve a more accountable and effective foreign assistance framework and structure; • Develop a systematic plan for consulting with local communities and civil society that allows field missions (rather than Washington) to make decisions at the program level; and • Revitalize and reinvigorate USAID, significantly increasing the number of full-time USAID foreign service officers and civil service employees and enhancing its staff training capability.

Results These reforms will produce a more effective U.S. foreign assistance framework and delivery structure by elevating humanitarian and development assistance alongside defense and diplomacy, and will empower and adequately resource the technical expertise needed for effective implementation.

Background For more than ten years, InterAction has maintained that the programs, strategies and institutional structures of U.S. foreign assistance lack a coherent framework, and are therefore under-resourced, increasingly fragmented and uncoordinated. These factors have driven two interrelated trends in recent years: the dangerous weakening of the civilian capabilities of U.S. foreign policy, especially at USAID and the Department of State; and the increasing role of the Department of Defense in delivering humanitarian and development assistance. One of the chief justifications for the Bush Administration’s Transformational Diplomacy reforms (the “F process”) was to realign U.S. foreign assistance programs with U.S. foreign policies in the post 9/11 world and index these investments to measurable outcomes. To this end, the Administration has, through executive action, established a new office at the U.S. Department of State called the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance (or “F Bureau” in State department nomenclature). The Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) serves as the Senateconfirmed USAID Administrator, and holds the rank equivalent to Deputy Secretary of State though is not Congressional confirmed as a Department of State senior official. The DFA was originally charged with running both USAID and the “F process.”The staff of the F Bureau is comprised of some 60-80 USAID-funded positions that were moved from the agency’s Bureau of Policy and Program Coordination (PPC) into the State Department also by executive order, thereby leaving USAID without budget and planning capacity. The creation the F Bureau’s framework and indicators reflects a lack of fundamental focus on sustainable poverty reducing development work and substitutes inputs and outputs for meaningful measures of outcomes. The “F process” instituted a new foreign assistance framework that borrowed from the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) criteria (two major Administration initiatives outside the “F process”) to rationalize USAID’s programs to five country and six objective categories. An elaborate set of indicators and a new database to track them was developed to measure and report on progress within each category. The thinking was that this would achieve more accountable and more easily understood relief and development programs, thereby furthering U.S. foreign policy goals and increasing political support for aid in Congress. InterAction supports reforms designed to achieve greater transparency, accountability and efficiency if more effective humanitarian and development assistance is the result. InterAction also supports the premise that foreign assistance, including relief and development programs, serves the U.S. national interest in a variety of ways. However, the “F process” reforms do not place

relief and development at their center. They have further weakened an already demoralized and embattled USAID, exacerbated a trend toward the militarization of U.S foreign assistance (see separate briefing paper in this binder), and eroded the U.S. government’s capacity to deliver effective relief and development assistance at a time when these tools are needed more than ever.

POLICY PAPER

November 2008

Foreign Assistance Reform: Views From the Ground Previously published by InterAction, June 2008.

T

he current effort to reform US foreign assistance grew out of an understandable desire to better align US assistance with US interests and to improve the coordination, efficiency and transparency of that aid. The process has been the subject of a great deal of writing and discussion in Washington, but views from the ground – from the in-country USAID officials and in-country implementing partners – have received less systematic attention. This report, based on some 270 in-country interviews with field-based individuals in nine countries, is an effort to bring their important observations to Washington decision-makers considering what should be the next steps.

Transformational diplomacy to date

The current round of foreign assistance reform (F process) began in January 2006 as part of the Administration’s Transformational Diplomacy initiative. The relevant goals of this initiative are: • To strengthen the strategic alignment of US foreign assistance resources with the new Strategic Framework for United States Foreign Assistance1 (Strategic Framework); • To improve coordination and efficiency in the use of foreign assistance resources across multiple agencies and accounts, by evaluating comparative strengths and tools available; • To improve transparency in the allocation and use of foreign assistance resources; and • To improve performance and accountability for results, by aligning foreign assistance more clearly with human progress, and with a uniform scale for measuring progress [embodied in the new Strategic Framework for and its progress indicators]. Source: Tobias, Randall L., “MESSAGE FROM THE ADMINISTRATOR TO THE WORKING GROUPS”, April 12, 2007

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The F process mandate covers US foreign assistance funds traditionally controlled by USAID and some parts of the State Department, but not US foreign assistance programs controlled through other departments and the President’sEmergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) initiatives. The stated purpose of the F process has been to better align US foreign assistance with the new Strategic Framework. The document, created by the newly created Office of Foreign Assistance at the State Department (known informally as the “F Bureau”), identifies five programmatic priorities: peace and security;

www.interaction.org

1 Strategic Framework for United States Foreign Assistance, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, July 10, 2007). Available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/88433.pdf.

governing justly and democratically; investing in people; economic growth; and humanitarian assistance. Core country teams, based in Washington and representing the 35 countries that were identified for fast-track implementation of the reforms, then reallocated appropriated funds and developed decision-making processes and policy guidance for the in-country USAID missions. The F Bureau subsequently launched the system in Fiscal Year 2007 through the use of Operational Plans prepared by the missions according to a complete set of instructions relating to priority objectives (including program areas, elements and scores of indicators for each objective). Missions used this framework to set annual targets for each objective.

This research study

With funding from the Gates Foundation, InterAction – the largest association of U.S.-based NGOs involved in international relief and development – undertook an effort to collect the reflections of field-based officials and individuals whose work directly involves or is influenced by the F process. For this research, InterAction chose a cross-section of countries from among the 35 nations in the fast-track category. Researchers conducted in-depth interviews in Ghana, Honduras, Kenya, Nepal and Vietnam in both June and November 2007, while InterAction staff conducted interviews in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Tanzania and Zambia. The interviews were with members of USAID country missions, and field staff of US-based NGOs that directly receive USAID funding, local NGO partners and local NGOs that directly receive USAID funding. Questions focused on knowledge of the F process, the extent of consultation, immediate and anticipated effects of the F process on programs and on partnerships between US-based and local NGOs. The result is a snapshot in time of how the F process is perceived by key actors in the best position to judge its effectiveness in improving aid delivery: the people working on the ground in its implementation in the target countries. Obviously this research was done early in F process implementation and so ongoing developments could affect the picture.

Findings

This early, field-based snapshot provides valuable insights into the program to date and helps better arm decision-makers with the range of information they need to make early course corrections to improve the results and avoid the need for more far-reaching changes later on. The interviews revealed three major areas that, from the field perspective, must be addressed to ensure that the F process and US foreign assistance can meet stated goals: 1. The F process decision-making method has almost entirely failed to involve consultation with in-country actors despite the valuable input those actors could provide.

2. Field-based planners and implementers fear that the F process is, in combination with other trends in US foreign assistance, causing a worrisome shift away from assistance principles and areas of programming long accepted as central to the long-term success of development assistance. 3. The F process, as currently conducted, is plagued by a series of mismatches between theory and reality. These include: • implementation problems caused by mismatches between the F process and programmatic realities on the ground; • the fact that the F process, despite its stated goal of improving the coordination of US Foreign Assistance, really cannot make any truly significant progress in reducing the fragmentation of US foreign assistance as long as the F process has no jurisdiction over other US programs such as PEPFAR, the MCC and programs run by other Executive branch departments other than USAID and State; and • the unmet need for a serious examination of longerterm trends in how the US. government administers foreign assistance – trends that are having a growing impact on the ground, but which have received relatively little analytical scrutiny throughout the F process.

Recommendations

InterAction fully agrees that there is a need for improved coherence, accountability and transparency in US foreign assistance. However, the trends revealed by the interviews conducted as part of this research suggest that the F process, as executed to date, has demonstrated notable limitations in its ability to achieve these goals. Therefore, InterAction strongly recommends the following steps to improve the process and the overall goal of strengthening the effectiveness of US foreign assistance: • Suspend any further implementation of the F process and initiate a more substantial review of the initiative’s implementation to date and the issues beyond its jurisdiction that affect the overall effectiveness of the F process effort. This will ensure that aspects with significant negative impacts are removed and replaced with alternatives better able to meet all stated goals. • Conduct a thorough assessment of the steps necessary to ensure the statement in the National Security Strategy that “development is one of the three legs of US national security” (along with diplomacy and defense) is reflected in policy and programmatic reality. Alternatively, consider initiating a National Development Strategy so that development will be on par with other “legs” of US National Security. In either case, this should begin with a

reconsideration of the relative weight given to these three areas of interest in making foreign assistance determinations. Consideration of organizational changes necessary to achieve this goal should also begin. • Develop a systematic plan for consultation with local communities and civil society that allows decisions at the program level to be made in-country by field missions and not in Washington. • Develop a continued and more expansive consultative process between the F Bureau and US-based NGOs, including an open dialogue about the fundamental assumptions made by the new foreign assistance framework. Steps have been taken toward such an effort and we recommend that they continue. This could become an effective forum for a discussion of the impact of the general trends in the way US assistance is administered, particularly regarding the rise of independent programming (PEPFAR and MCC) and USAID’s shrinking levels of staffing and program support. • Vigilant oversight as to whether the F process will have an adverse impact on effective programs in the field that reduce poverty and meet basic needs is critical. Oversight is also needed for the provision of additional resources for such programs as necessary. Effective programs are community-based, work person-to-person and have true local ownership. Our research has shown that these are exactly the programs most at risk of becoming marginalized by the F process as it has been implemented thus far.

FINDINGS

The following findings represent the dominant areas of concern expressed by field-based actors during the 270 interviews InterAction conducted by InterAction. InterAction believes an important part of assessing the F process is comparing its results to the goals set for it by the Administration, namely: strategic alignment with the Strategic Framework improved coordination, efficiency and transparency in the use of US foreign assistance funds; and improved performance and accountability through the clearer alignment of foreign assistance with “human progress” and a uniform scale for measuring progress. To that end, the discussion of each finding ends with a brief review of the goals affected by that finding.

1. Decision-making throughout the F process has almost entirely failed to involve consultation with in-country actors, despite the valuable input those actors could provide.

Lack of advance consultation appears to have been a consistent hallmark/problem/characteristic with all key groups of actors at the field level. The interviews suggest a strong effort by Washington to intentionally limit input from the field during the development

process – even though in other areas (such as the MCC), the importance of field based input and the voices of local actors from the start have formed the core of the philosophy. USAID missions consistently reported that they were not consulted in advance. In the few cases where there was “consultation,” it was actually in the form of briefings rather than sessions in which they could provide input. Of the 25 USAID staff interviewed, 80 percent said they had not had opportunities to have input into the F process, either before or after it was announced.2 Even those who indicated they had been “consulted,” said that the meetings were really briefings, without the opportunity to make recommendations. In fact it appears that the decision-makers in Washington were actively working to limit not only field mission input, but even knowledge of the process while it was underway. For example, in one country, USAID staff was told that “Washington would do the strategy and the missions would do the tactics.” In another country, a Foreign Service Officer from the USAID mission was in Washington during the meetings of the Core Team3. Initially, he was told he could not attend the meeting for his country. When he complained, he was notified that he could attend but not speak or report what he heard to the Mission team. Another Foreign Service Officer was on a core team but not allowed to talk with her mission team. An additional respondent said, “The F reform has affected the mission’s ability to be predictable to the [national] government. Prior to Transformational Diplomacy, the mission had just completed our country strategy and they really burned the [national] government when they had to start adhering to the F process.” Further, another respondent stated, “There’s no dialogue and we don’t have the opportunity to defend our programs as we did in annual program reviews of the past. The F process lacks analysis and needs assessments.” Similar sentiments were expressed in other countries. NGO partners also reported a lack of transparency and inclusion. In the first round of interviews, most NGOs said USAID missions had not consulted them about the F process (in the target countries: 83 percent of US-based NGOs, 90 percent of local NGO partners and 82 percent of all NGOs with direct funding; and in the four supplemental countries 88 percent of the US-based NGOs).4 In one country, the rep2 Interviews were conducted with a range of USAID staff including mission directors in some countries, senior and mid-level staff, US citizens and foreign service nationals (FSNs) of the particular countries. 3 The Office of Foreign Assistance (OFA) that was created to carry out the TD reforms organized core teams to develop the strategy for each country. These teams were comprised of State Department staff and sometimes USAID staff, all of whom were based in Washington, DC. 4 The term “consultation” means an effort by a donor to engage PVOs or NGOs in discussion about a proposed action or policy where recommendations by PVOs/NGOs are invited, seriously considered, and perhaps actually adopted in regard to the proposed action. “Participation” normally means a decision-making role in the particular activity.

resentative of a very large, influential US-based NGO said: “Even though we’re an important partner, we wonder why they didn’t tell us of the changes.” At the October 24th panel discussion during a meeting of the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid in Washington, DC, three USAID mission directors – each from a different region – said that they had deliberately not shared information about the F process with partners in their countries. By way of explanation, one said, “It was not ready for prime time.” This aligns with the way the situation was described by respondents in one of the countries. As one respondent explained, “The process was top down, closed, and driven by the F Bureau. Missions received directives, and they were not comfortable embracing them or explaining TD to stakeholders.” Other bilateral and multilateral donors also do not appear to have been consulted or even well briefed at the local level. Respondents from this group said that neither USAID missions nor US embassies had briefed them on the F process. Several noticed drastic changes but did not know why they were occurring. One respondent from a multilateral organization said, “No one has a clue.” In only one country, which has a MCC Compact, did a respondent indicate that there was now more cooperation with multilateral agencies on the part of the US Government. The lack of consultation calls into question the effectiveness of this part of the F process effort in meeting several of its stated goals – improving transparency and improving coordination. Not surprisingly, this lack of consultation has led to a wide range of perceptions of shifts in programmatic focus and motivation, as well as mismatches that have undermined both support for the F process on the ground and raised significant concerns about its long-term effectiveness. In fact, the lack of consultation appears to have actually worsened field level performance and attitudes on several stated goals of the F process, undermining transparency in decision-making and coordination with actors at the point of impact. [If the F process is to do a better job of achieving these goals, these shortcomings will need to be addressed through a significant reform of the consultation and decision-making process.]

2. Field-based planners and implementers fear that the F process is causing a worrisome shift away from assistance principles and areas of programming long accepted as central to the long-term success of development assistance.

The most recent US National Security Statement5 specifically acknowledged development as one of the three legs 5 National Security Statement of the United States of America, (Washington, DC: The White House, March 16, 2006). Avilable at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf.

on which our national security depends. Yet the interviews suggest that key actors on the ground perceive a worrisome shift away from development principles and practices that have been proven essential to effective programming. In five of the seven countries, USAID respondents expressed concern that the aid program would become more and more politicized and that the development emphasis would continue to diminish. Some commented on the reduction of funding for development sectors in favor of peace, security and democratization and the advent of the MCC. One respondent said, “We are in the dark regarding a strategy. We don’t have any strategic framework for the agency.” In two countries, staffers said that much will depend on future leadership in Washington in both Congress and the White House/Administration. Representatives of other bilateral, multilateral donors and national governments in two of the four countries where such individuals were interviewed said they believed that the US Government is primarily interested in its own strategic interests rather than the development interests of the countries. One respondent said, “US policy is more important…not the needs of the country.” In the other country, one respondent noted, “The US behaves as a superpower and tends to seek its own strategic interest in the country. It should try to coordinate with other donors. The USAID program is more politically-oriented. They must admit they are not the most important donor in the country.” In the other two countries, respondents said they feared reduced funding for development areas. Of particular concern seems to be the fate of several areas considered critical to long-term development success and the ability of countries, communities and individuals to build their capabilities to eventually sustain themselves without aid. All those interviewed in seven of the countries in the second round were asked what they thought the development priorities needed to be in the countries in which they were working. Education, human development and capacity strengthening, poverty reduction through economic development (such as microenterprise), and health (particularly maternal and child health, health systems, reproductive health and nutrition) came up consistently as critical priorities. Yet, of the 13 USAID mission respondents asked if the TD reforms have been flexible enough to allow USAID missions to focus on the development priorities noted, only 23 percent of USAID staff said they were flexible enough. In one country, USAID staff said that the F process was inflexible because the agenda was determined by Washington with an intention to make all missions uniform. Therefore, countries lost their specific priorities. In another country, respondents expressed similar concerns. As one explained, “The process was top down, closed, and driven by the F Bureau. Missions received directives, and they were not comfortable embracing them or explaining TD to stakeholders.” In another country, a respondent said that budget cuts have limited

USAID action because there’s not enough money put into the priorities such as democracy and economic growth. In yet another country, a respondent said that education, viewed as a high priority by all respondents, is not a priority of USAID. Project ramifications of this perceived trend appeared in several of the countries. The eight countries with programming in family planning and reproductive health saw funding for that work drop by an average of 24 percent. Respondents in one country noted a 100 percent cut in USAID’s preexisting small-farmer agricultural programs when the MCC Compact was signed, along with less attention to education and health. In another country, respondents reported funding cuts in water and sanitation, environmental programs, maternal and child health and reproductive health. In a third, a respondent explained that PEPFAR money dwarfs funding for humanitarian, social development and even economic development programs. For both El Salvador and Nicaragua, the US Government’s FY 2008 presidential budget request includes significant reductions in funds for both maternal and child health and reproductive programs compared to FY 2006 levels. In the same FY 2008 request, in Zambia, maternal and child health programs have been eliminated; in Tanzania, reproductive health funding has been reduced; and in Ghana and Kenya, funding for water and sanitation has been eliminated. One respondent said, “Our proposals for Development Assistance (DA) funds are like throwing in the wind. There’s no dialogue and we don’t have the opportunity to defend our programs as we did in annual program reviews of the past. The F process lacks analysis and needs assessments.” In one country, the Mission’s five-year strategic plan has been replaced by the Mission Strategic Plan that was a product of the F process. The respondent said, “[A] lot of useful stuff [has been] discarded. [It has created] confusion for the government. US interests now are playing a greater role than local interests in determining the mission’s direction.” Similar sentiments were expressed in other countries. The perceived shift in focus calls into question the effectiveness of the F process to date, specifically in meeting two of its stated goals – improving transparency and improving coordination. It is also unclear how a shift away from principles and programmatic areas long proven to be central to effective development helps the F process achieve the objective of improving performance and accountability by aligning foreign assistance more clearly with human progress. Nor is it clear how such a shift helps ensure that the National Security Strategy’s statement, which states that development is “one of the three legs of U.S. national security” (along with diplomacy and defense), is reflected in practice.

3. The F process is plagued by a series of mismatches between theory and reality.

These include: (a) implementation problems caused by mismatches between the F process and programmatic realities on the ground; (b) the fact that the F process, despite its stated goal of improving the coordination of US Foreign Assistance, really cannot make any truly significant progress in reducing the fragmentation of US foreign assistance as long as the F process has no jurisdiction over other US programs such as PEPFAR, the MCC and programs run by other Executive branch departments other than USAID and State; and (c) the unmet need for a serious examination of longer-term trends in how the US government views and administers foreign assistance – trends that are having a growing impact on the ground, but have received relatively little analytical scrutiny in the F process. a. Implementation Problems Caused by Mismatches between the F process and Programmatic Realities on the Ground

Projects are being shifted to one-year, performance-based funding cycles where an emphasis on numerical results is key – an approach originally introduced through the PEPFAR program. This is causing problems for NGO planning and creates considerable anxiety regarding funding for the longterm. It also has implications for program success over the long term. Uncertainties in funding make it difficult to retain the best possible program staff; this in turn undermines program success. Even when multi-year awards are made, each year’s funding must be negotiated and is not guaranteed. Respondents called the yearly funding requirement time consuming and disruptive to project implementation. The F process has also increased the emphasis on data collection, monitoring and reporting through use of the new indicators that are largely quantitative and are not impact related. USAID requests for quantitative data are increasingly frequent and, in most countries, training has not been provided as to how to utilize the new system. In most instances, respondents reported that the new indicators are neither appropriate nor focused on impact. Therefore, NGOs are continuing to use their own indicators in addition to the newly required ones from USAID. Furthermore, the fact that these new indicators are being applied to existing projects is causing confusion. As one respondent noted, “Application of a whole set of new indicators to a project not designed with those indicators in mind means analysis becomes one big hell, as one has to compare apples with oranges.” The new indicators, preparation of the yearly Operational Plan and the new reporting requirements have all caused difficulties. As one respondent explained, “The abruptness

of the reforms, the short time period for implementation, unclear and oftentimes conflicting guidance with respect to mainstreaming the reforms into our day-to-day operations, and numerous glitches with migrating the data to the Operational Plan [OP] template combined to render preparation of the FY 2007 OP excruciatingly painful, time consuming and very costly.” In another country, a respondent described how program elements have to be selected based on the new indicators that often don’t fit realities on the ground: “F had a concept and tried to fit reality into it, rather than the other way around.” Another respondent said, “A cookie cutter approach to development indicators is crazy. Even trying to create regional indicators would be a near impossibility, let alone the global indicators that F has created.” Another respondent complained of the frequency of reporting requirements: “We’ve gone from quarterly reports to a system in which our partners are writing reports and doing data collection all the time. Reporting requirements have increased 50-fold.” In another country, a respondent said that FACTS (the new data collection system) does not work: “ This new system has not led to better data collection. It is cumbersome and confusing, not user-friendly, and the Mission is often unable to even access it due to the country’s limited internet capacity. The F Bureau in Washington didn’t take into account the less developed technology the missions in developing countries have to work with.” These implementation mismatches call into question the effectiveness of the F process to date in meeting several of its stated goals – namely improving coordination and efficiency.

b. Failure to Address the “Elephants in the Room” Independent Programming (Including PEPFAR and the MCC) Although the F process was intended to improve coordination and efficiency of US foreign assistance, respondents reported that proliferation of programs and variations in their operation is greater than ever. While the F process is intended to improve coordination of US foreign assistance, it is severely hampered in its ability to do so because of the many US assistance programs that are not within its purview. This results in a “balkanization” of foreign assistance rather than the coordination hoped for through the F process. In fact, the F process controls only a minority of the total US foreign assistance funding and, in some countries, its programs are dwarfed by PEPFAR and potential MCC funding. Respondents in this assessment consistently noted the continued (and often increasing) fragmentation of US assistance in their countries – despite the efforts of the F process. One respondent said, “…the ‘reality’ of various foreign assistance initiatives from a wide range of different US government agencies has become even more

proliferated, rather than more strategically integrated, orchestrated and managed through USAID…this is counter to the intent of [the foreign assistance component of] Transformational Diplomacy … as conveyed.” In another country, a respondent said, “It’s absolutely false to say that the US Government is better coordinated as a result of the F reform. The F process has nothing to do with PEPFAR or MCC.” In yet another country, a USAID staffer asks the PVO grantees and contractors to let him know if they sign contracts with other departments of the US Government, e.g. the Department of Labor, because otherwise he has no way of knowing this information. Since a number of the countries covered in this assessment are significantly involved in the PEPFAR and MCC processes, respondents were asked about the effects of those programs on areas and staff assigned to programs covered by the F process. • The President’s Emergency Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) The F process adopted many of the operational aspects of PEPFAR to such a great extent that some refer to F process as the “PEPFARization of the foreign assistance system.” Four of the countries in this assessment project have large PEPFAR programs. Respondents in these countries commented on ways in which PEPFAR is affecting other in-country aid efforts covered by the F process. The following were of particular concern. Respondents believe PEPFAR funds are overwhelming and distorting the health sector, while other important health needs are neglected. The annual US budget to fight HIV/AIDS abroad has increased from $1.5 billion in FY 2003 to $6.0 billion in 2008. Six of the countries in which interviews were conducted have FY 2008 HIV/AIDS funding requests that represent increases of between 51.52 percent (Nicaragua) and 201.06 percent (Tanzania) over FY 2006 levels. These large increases are, in a number of instances, accompanied by the reduction or elimination of programming in other health areas such as maternal and child health and reproductive health, and the related areas of water and sanitation. The amounts available for PEPFAR also dwarf those available for other important areas of development assistance. Because PEPFAR money can only be used in clearly prescribed ways to fight HIV/AIDS, other important health needs are neglected. Even though health care systems are the backbone of effective health care delivery, funding is severely lacking to strengthen these systems through efforts such as hiring and training personnel, and providing health infrastructure, equipment and supplies. Respondents in two countries reported that restrictions of PEPFAR money are so tight that money targeted for orphans and vulnerable children through PEPFAR cannot even be used to provide services to caretakers of such children. Other interview respondents noted that

t Changes in funding for health programs in FARM Countries, FY 06 vs. FY 08* Family Planning/ Reproductive Health

Water Supply & Sanitation

-30.07%

-5.47%

-100%

-20.12%

111.79%

-63.24%

-

-13.59%

32.79%

-9.53%

-100%

151.15%

-

51.48%

-2.38%

-

-3.37%

-

-

-

-

178.91%

-

-

-39.39%

-39.39%

-

-26.33%

-

-

-22.73%

-42.84%

-

-22.49%

201.06%

259.71%

0.00%

35.87%

-22.48%

-

165.08%

Zambia

150.00%

51.67%

-18.14%

-100%

-5.18%

-

127.85%

TOTAL

165.32%

47.21%

-5.31%

-0.52%

-24.35%

-100%

126.43%

HIV/AIDS

Tuberculosis

Malaria

Ghana

-28.80%

21.21%

69.15%

Honduras

-3.03%

-100%

-

173.37%

34.86%

-18.65%

Nepal

-45.40%

-

Vietnam

180.96%

-

El Salvador

450.96%

Nicaragua

51.52%

Tanzania

Country

Kenya

Maternal & Child Health

Total

*Comparison is between FY 06 Actual figures and the FY 08 Request

the PEPFAR budget is so high in some countries that the money cannot be programmed effectively, given the very restrictive requirements. PEPFAR fails to capitalize on in-country expertise in developing projects and partners, but then relies on (and often over-taxes) the same USAID in-country staff to monitor the programs. The Office of Global AIDS Coordination in Washington designs the PEPFAR projects and chooses the recipients of the funding without using the field expertise of USAID missions and other in-country actors. One respondent said, “PEPFAR is more about delivering things and measuring, not cooperative implementation. The terms are much prescribed.” At the same time, PEPFAR relies on USAID mission staff to monitor its programs – this at a time when USAID mission staffs are already overstretched covering other programming. Where PEPFAR budgets have grown dramatically, staff is overworked and unable to visit field projects due to the administrative workload in the mission. In one country, a respondent said, “Our own capacity is diminishing and NGO partners on the ground are beginning to feel the effects of a weak agency. If this continues to happen, we will all go down together.” • The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) The MCC was established in January 2004, two years before the F process was introduced. Seven countries in this assessment have signed either an MCC Compact or a Threshold Agreement. In each of those seven countries, respondents were asked how they thought the MCC Compact or Threshold Agreement was affecting the US foreign assistance

program in that country. Most respondents who knew about the MCC felt that its programs have had a negative impact on their missions’ programs. In at least four of the countries, the USAID budget has been reduced. In one country, a respondent said, “[The Office of Management and Budget (OMB)] representatives said on more than one occasion that OMB is urging to cut aid in MCC compact countries.” The focus of the MCC program in the various countries is on infrastructure, commercial agriculture, energy, promotion of trade and a favorable investment climate for the private sector. Many of the respondents said they thought the MCC would affect USAID negatively by either competing with, or substituting for its programs. They also feared that the MCC would have negative effects on rural development and poverty alleviation efforts in which USAID had been involved. One respondent said, “It will generate more wealth for the wealthy.” In one country, respondents feared negative environmental impacts and displacement of inhabitants in a region where a road is to be built. They also said that MCC’s promotion of an extractive industry in the region would run counter to USAID’s effort to protect biodiversity and natural resources. In another country, respondents felt that there was insufficient recognition of the role long-term USAID programs and efforts had played in helping the country meet the preconditions necessary for MCC participation. The F process’s failure to reach programs representing such a large portion of US foreign assistance calls into question the initiative’s effectiveness to date in meeting several of its stated goals – namely improving coordination and efficiency.

General Trends in the Way US Assistance is Administered Discussion of the problems with current efforts to improve the coordination and effectiveness of US foreign assistance frequently focuses directly on internal shortcomings of the F process itself (e.g. the decision-making process and the types of indicators used) or big programs that remain outside of its purview. Both are important. However, another very important factor generally remains off the radar screen: an ongoing general shift that has been underway for some time concerning how the US Government administers US foreign assistance. While the trend is clear, it has been more the result of incremental changes rather than a clear, carefully considered policy shift. For the F process to be truly successful, these changes must be reviewed and determinations made as to whether the changes should be continued or revised. These trends were clearly on the minds of a number of the participants in this assessment who saw them as relevant to any understanding of the current state of US foreign assistance in their countries and the F process. USAID has long experienced shrinking levels of field staffing to manage programs in traditional areas of development assistance that fall outside of the big new projects such as PEPFAR. During the interviews for this assessment, it also became clear that in some countries the USAID missions are losing additional staff because of the F process. Respondents in several countries reported that long-term AID employees have retired or have left due to frustration with the F process. Moreover, in two countries Foreign Service Nationals have lost their jobs in significant numbers or have been told that they will. Where personnel has remained stable, in countries where the PEPFAR budgets have grown dramatically, staff is overworked and unable to visit field projects due to the administrative workload in the mission. In one country, a respondent said, “Our own capacity is diminishing and NGO partners on the ground are beginning to feel the effects of a weak agency. If this continues to happen, we will all go down together.” These diminishing staffing levels have played into a longerterm trend that is significantly limiting both USAID’s options for ways to disburse foreign assistance funds and the number and types of implementers who can compete for direct funding. Specifically, there is a much greater emphasis on large contracts or grants run by consortia, with an emphasis on technical aspects of projects, and much less attention to the long-term, capacity-strengthening efforts carried out by NGOs. In several countries, a few very large US consulting firms are winning more and more USAID contracts, and only large US-based NGOs with substantial independent funding can compete. Comments from respondents in this assessment reaffirmed what InterAction had heard before – that this shift and the accordant financial and administrative requirements reduce the ability of local NGOs to compete. In at least two countries, USAID missions are also providing substantially more funding to national governments than to

NGOs. This is in spite of the fact that in certain sectors, previous government programs have failed miserably while NGO programs have been evaluated by external sources as excellent. In these countries, national government officials are now participating in reviews of NGO proposals although interview respondents maintain that the officials do not have the necessary qualifications to do so. In at least one country, local NGOs that received direct USAID funds in the past must now subcontract work through US-based NGOs or contractors. This includes two large local NGO initiatives that were originally created and nurtured with USAID funds and that have been functioning effectively for over 15 years. In one country, 100 percent of US-based NGO respondents noted that USAID is calling for increased use of US professionals rather than local personnel. There are signs that the F process is making it more difficult for some local NGOs to participate in projects in which they receive only indirect USAID funding. In November, US-based NGOs were asked if the F process was making it easier or more difficult to work in partnership with local NGOs. Twenty-one percent of respondents spread across five countries said it was more difficult. Reasons included sudden funding cuts from USAID, changes in report formats and/or proposals that were hard for local NGO partners, a number of abrupt shifts from USAID in areas of emphasis that local NGOs could not implement and, in one country, the fact that most local NGOs do not share the priority objectives of the new USAID focus. Two local NGOs in different countries noted that there had been reductions in sub-grants. In one of the countries, these were in health, education and the environment. Another said that the USAID emphasis on different sectors – democratization, conflict management and strengthening of political parties – was making work for local NGOs more challenging. Lastly, local NGOs that had previously received direct USAID funding were extremely unhappy about now having to receive funds through US-based NGOs and felt this made work more administratively and bureaucratically burdensome.

RECOMMENDATIONS

InterAction fully agrees that there is a need for improved coherence, accountability and transparency in US foreign assistance. However, the findings revealed by the interviews conducted as part of this research suggest that the F process, as executed to date, has demonstrated notable limitations in its ability to achieve these goals, has raised significant concerns about a fundamental shift away from critical programmatic areas and has not addressed a series of aspects of US foreign assistance that must be part of the process if the F process is to achieve its goals. Therefore, InterAction strongly recommends the following steps to improve the process and the overall goal of strengthening the effectiveness of US foreign assistance:

• Suspend any further implementation of the F process and initiate a more substantial review of the initiative’s implementation to date and the issues beyond its jurisdiction that affect the overall effectiveness of the F process effort. This will ensure that aspects with significant negative impacts are removed and replaced with alternatives better able to meet all stated goals. • Conduct a thorough assessment of the steps necessary to ensure the statement in the National Security Strategy that “development is one of the three legs of U.S. national security” (along with diplomacy and defense) is reflected in policy and programmatic reality. Alternatively, consider initiating a National Development Strategy so that development will be on par with other legs of US National Security. In either case, this should begin with a reconsideration of the relative weight given to these three areas of interest in making foreign assistance determinations. Consideration of organizational changes necessary to achieve this goal should also begin. • Develop a systematic plan for consultation with local communities and civil society that allows decisions at the program level to be made in country by field missions and not in Washington. • Develop a continued and more expansive consultative process between the F Bureau and US-based NGOs, including an open dialogue about the fundamental assumptions made by the new foreign assistance framework. Steps have been taken toward such an effort and we recommend that they continue. This could become an effective forum for a discussion of the impact of the general trends in the way US assistance is administered, particularly regarding the rise of independent programming (PEPFAR and MCC) as well as USAID’s shrinking levels of staffing and program support. • Vigilant oversight as to whether the F process will have an adverse impact on effective programs in the field that reduce poverty and meet basic needs and the provision of additional resources for such programs as necessary. Effective programs are community-based, work personto-person and have true local ownership. Our research has shown that these are exactly the programs most at risk of becoming marginalized by the F process as it has been implemented thus far.

Appendix One: Research Methodology

Most of the data for this report was gathered through two sets of in-depth interviews with a variety of respondents in five countries (Ghana, Honduras, Kenya, Nepal and Vietnam) in June and November of 2007. InterAction staff conducted supplementary interviews in four additional countries (El Salvador, Nicaragua, Tanzania and Zambia) in August and November of 2007. In total, researchers conducted 270 interviews in the nine countries.

Timing

This assessment was intentionally conducted early on in the implementation of the foreign assistance reform effort (F process). The intention was to create a snapshot of the effort on the ground while the process was still early enough in its execution to allow for any necessary adjustments to improve its effectiveness. Obviously this limited the amount of time the F process had to produce significant effects on the development work of PVOs and NGOs. As a way to maximize the value of data collected, the research was divided into two parts, with a first set of interviews carried out in late June and a second set of interviews with the same set of respondents carried out in November. This schedule was based on the hypothesis that little would be known about the reforms – and few effects felt – by June, whereas respondents would likely be more knowledgeable about the reforms and would have experienced more effects by November after the end-of-the fiscal-year proposal writing season had been completed.6 In addition, InterAction staff visited four other countries (El Salvador, Nicaragua, Tanzania and Zambia) to carry out supplementary research.

Choice of countries

The study focuses on five countries representing a geographic and situational cross section of the 35 “fast track” nations.7 Nepal was chosen as a rebuilding country, Kenya and Vietnam as developing countries, and Ghana and Honduras as transforming countries. InterAction engaged an experienced development professional in each of these countries to carry out the research. Of the four countries in which additional interviews were conducted, Zambia is categorized as a developing country and the remaining as transforming nations.

Categories of respondents

In the five primary countries, researchers interviewed five categories of respondents: • In-country staff of US-based NGOs that receive USAID funds; 6 July–early September is always a busy proposal-writing season for PVOs and NGOs requesting USAID funding since the US Government’s fiscal year ends in September and significant money is awarded just prior to the end of the fiscal year. 7 “Fast-Track” countries are those selected to complete an integrated, interagency Operational Plan in the US government’s 2007 fiscal year as part of the foreign assistance reform process.

• Staff of local NGO8 partners of US-based NGOs on USAIDfunded projects; • Staff of local NGOs receiving direct funding from USAID; • Staff of USAID missions in the particular country; • Staff of the US Embassy, other bilateral donors, multilateral donors, national government ministries or researchers knowledgeable about US foreign assistance.

t Sectors in which PVOs and NGOs Work Sector Health Agriculture Education Micro/Small Enterprises Women’s Empowerment Civil Society Strengthening Democracy/Governance

USBased NGOs 87% 52% 42% 40% 33% 33%

Local NGO Partners 70%

Local NGOs with Direct Funds 35%

50% 40% 43% 47% 35%

Interviews in the supplemental countries were limited to exchanges with USAID mission staff and with in-country staff of US-based NGOs that receive USAID funds.

similar. Information for NGOs in the five primary countries is provided below.

Focus of the research

In-country experience

In the second round of interviews conducted in November, researchers asked follow-up questions regarding awareness of the reforms and consultation, additional effects and anticipated effects. Researchers also asked respondents for their views regarding the country’s priority development issues, emerging trends in US foreign assistance in the country, and possible steps to improve US foreign assistance in that country. In the supplemental countries, the August interviews used an adapted version of the questionnaires used in the five countries in June. Similarly, the November interviews used a slightly adapted version of the questionnaires for the five countries’ second round of interviews. To develop a better picture of the NGO respondents themselves, they were also asked a series of questions to develop an understanding of the nature of their in-country operations. The results are covered in detail in Annex 2 of this report.

Length of time as USAID partner

In the first round of interviews in the five primary countries, researchers asked questions in four major areas: • Background on the NGOs’ programs in the country; • Awareness of the foreign assistance reforms and extent of related consultation; • Immediate effects of the reforms on the NGOs’ programs (both USAID-funded and those funded by other donors) and on their partnerships; and • Anticipated effects of the reforms in the future.

Appendix Two: Background on NGO In-Country Operations

The NGOs interviewed for this study were asked a series of questions to develop an understanding of the nature of their in-country operations. Topics included years of in-country experience, topical programming issues, strategic planning and partnerships. Data collected from NGOs in the five primary countries and the supplemental countries was very 8 “Local NGO” means an NGO created and staffed by citizens of the particular country with its headquarters located in that country.

Of the 100 NGOs interviewed, the vast majority have worked in their respective countries for at least five years, and a majority have had country programs for over 10 years. Of the USbased organizations, 90 percent had worked in the five countries for at least five to 10 years, while 77 percent had worked in them for 11 years or more. Of local NGO partners, 87 percent had at least five to 10 years of experience in the countries and 53 percent had 11 years or more. And 71 percent of the local NGOs with direct funding from USAID had 11 years or more. Sixty percent of the US-based NGOs and 53 percent of the local NGOs with direct funding have received USAID money for over five years. Thirty-seven percent of US-based NGOs and 29 percent of the local NGOs with direct funding have received USAID money for over 10 years.

Areas of work

NGO respondents work in a variety of development sectors, with health being the most common programming issue by far. Data on the top seven sectors are included below.

How they operate internally: strategic planning, and monitori ng and evaluation (M&E)

Significant majorities of the NGOs indicated that they have both a country and sector strategy for their work. Eighty-two percent of the US-based NGOs and 70 percent of the local NGOs (both categories) had country strategies. Similarly, 75 percent of the US-based NGOs and 71 percent of the local NGOs with direct USAID funding have sector strategies. Almost 100% reported having a M&E system in use (92% of US-based NGOs, 100% of local NGO partners, and 94% of local NGOs with direct USAID funds). The percentage of organizations that have both country and sector strategies and functioning M&E systems indicates strong capacity and accountability on the part of these PVOs and NGOs.

Partnerships

Almost three-quarters of US-based NGOs (72%) have partnerships with local NGOs.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

InterAction Foreign Assistance Reform Advisory Group Organization

URL

Academy for Educational Development Adventist Development and Relief Agency International CARE Catholic Relief Services Church World Services Heifer International Pact Plan USA Save the Children Winrock International World Education World Vision

www.aed.org www.adra.org www.care.org www.crs.org www.churchworldservice.org www.heifer.org www.pactworld.org www.planusa.org www.savechildren.org www.winrock.org www.worlded.org www.worldvision.org

InterAction Public Policy Working Group

1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

Organization

URL

Academy for Educational Development Action Against Hunger Action Aid Adventist Development and Relief Agency International Africare Aga Khan Foundation U.S.A. Air Serv International American Friends Service Committee American Jewish World Service American Red Cross American Refugee Committee AmeriCares Bread for the World CARE Catholic Medical Mission Board Catholic Relief Services Center for Health and Gender Equity, Inc Centre for Development & Population Activities (CEDPA) CHF International Child Health Foundation (CHF) Christian Children’s Fund Church World Service

www.aed.org www.actionagainsthunger.org www.actionaid.org www.adra.org www.africare.org www.akdn.org www.airserv.org www.afsc.org www.ajws.org www.redcross.org www.archq.org www.americares.org www.bread.org www.care.org www.cmmb.org www.crs.org www.genderhealth.org www.cedpa.org www.chfinternational.org www.childhealthfoundation.org www.christianchildrensfund.org www.churchworldservice.org

InterAction Public Policy Working Group (cont) Organization

URL

Concern Worldwide Congressional Hunger Center Counterpart International Ethiopian Community Development Council, Inc Florida Association for Volunteer Action in the Caribbean and the Americas (FAVACA) Food for the Hungry Friends of the World Food Program Global Health Council Habitat for Humanity International Heartland Alliance Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society Heifer International InsideNGO Institute for Sustainable Communities Interplast Int’l Catholic Migration Commission Int’l Center for Research on Women Int’l Crisis Group International Medical Corps Int’l Orthodox Christian Charities Int’l Reading Association International Relief & Development International Rescue Committee Jesuit Refugee Services USA Joint Aid Management Life for Relief and Development Lutheran World Relief Management Sciences for Health MAP International Medical Teams International Mental Disability Rights International Mercy Corps Minnesota International Health Volunteers National Peace Corps Association ONE Campaign Opportunity International Oxfam America Pact Pan American Development Foundation PATH Pathfinder International Physicians for Human Rights Plan USA Population Action International Project HOPE ProLiteracy Worldwide Refugees International

www.concernusa.org www.hungercenter.org www.counterpart.org www.ecdcinternational.org www.favaca.org/ www.fh.org www.friendsofwfp.org www.globalhealth.org www.habitat.org www.heartlandalliance.org www.hias.org www.heifer.org www.InsideNGO.org www.iscvt.org www.interplast.org www.icmc.net www.icrw.org www.crisisweb.org www.imcworldwide.org www.iocc.org www.reading.org www.ird.org www.theirc.org www.jrsusa.org www.jamusa.org www.lifeusa.org www.lwr.org www.msh.org www.map.org www.medicalteams.org www.mdri.org www.mercycorps.org www.mihv.org www.rpcv.org www.one.org/ www.opportunity.org www.oxfamamerica.org www.pactworld.org www.padf.org www.path.org www.pathfind.org www.phrusa.org www.planusa.org www.populationaction.org www.projecthope.org www.proliteracy.org www.refugeesinternational.org

InterAction Public Policy Working Group (cont) Organization

URL

Relief International RESULTS, Inc. Save the Children The Hunger Project U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) U.S. Committee for UNDP U.S. Fund for UNICEF Winrock International Women for Women International Women Thrive Worldwide World Vision World Wildlife Fund

www.ri.org www.results.org www.savethechildren.org www.thp.org www.refugees.org www.undp-usa.org www.unicefusa.org www.winrock.org www.womenforwomen.org www.womenthrive.org www.worldvision.org www.worldwildlife.org

Millennium Challenge Corporation Millennium Challenge Corporation

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Millennium Challenge Corporation Problem The Millennium Challenge Corporation’s (MCC) multi-year funding makes it vulnerable to Congressional cuts. For FY09 the President requested $2.225 billion, but the Senate Appropriations Committee allocated $254 million. Without continuity of funding the United States will loose credibility with potential Compact countries, which are improving policies and establishing programs in anticipation of signing a Compact.

Recommendations Congress should approve the House Appropriations Committee FY09 funding level for the MCC of $1.54 billion. The new Administration should set the FY10 level at $2 billion in its budget request. If Congress does not appropriate for FY09 a level of funding similar to last year ($1.55 billion), the MCC will not be able to sign any new Compacts until FY 2010.

Actions • After a development agency director is named, in consultation with that person, appoint a dynamic individual to lead the MCC who meets the following criteria: strong background in poverty-focused development; experience managing field programs; track record on gender integration and participatory approaches; strong management and communications abilities; and experience working with Congress; • Work with Congress to maintain support for the MCC through the budget and appropriations processes; • Support the program and maintain its integrity in terms of key principles: country ownership, civil society participation, non-political decisions, poverty reduction through economic growth, rewarding best performers, gender integration, multiyear funding, no tied or earmarked funds, transparency and accountability; • Ensure the MCC’s principles are maintained and that it has the structures and capacity to implement programs according to those principles in any major reform or restructuring of foreign aid; and • Fully fund the MCC budget request level.

Results

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The MCC model has been a catalyst of policy reforms around the world that improve transparency, fight corruption and promote women’s rights. Maintaining one of the more innovative U.S. foreign aid programs will encourage a continuation of policy changes in governments interested in a relationship with MCC and the United States government.

Background Established by Congress in 2004, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has developed into a highly innovative foreign aid program with a focus on reducing poverty through economic growth. The MCC has institutionalized a number of operating principles the development community has long advocated: country ownership, consultation with all elements of civil society, sustainability, multi-year funding, and transparent selection based on performance. To be eligible to participate in the program, low and moderate income countries are required to meet and pass a majority of 17 independent and publically available performance criteria in the MCC-defined areas of ruling justly, investing in people, and economic freedom. This requirement has created an “MCC effect” through which countries change polices in the three areas in order to be eligible to apply to the MCC. The MCC has signed 18 five-year Compacts for a total of $6.3 billion. To ensure the funding is available for each Compact the MCC sets aside the total Compact funding at the time of signing. However, Congress has not accepted the principle of legally committing, and therefore setting aside, funding for each signed compact.

POLICY PAPER

November 2008

The Millennium Challenge Corporation

T

1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

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he Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), initiated by President George W. Bush in 2002, is an innovative way of delivering aid. However, it is endangered by Congressional impatience with its model. The MCC’s long-term time horizon and multi-year funding mechanism have made the MCC vulnerable to cuts. For example, the Senate Appropriations Committee has proposed allocating only $254 million for FY 2009, a reduction of $1.3 billion from FY08. Without more funding, the United States will not be able to engage with the potential Compact countries. These countries are improving policies and establishing programs in anticipation of signing a Compact. On March 22, 2002, at the UN’s Financing for Development Conference in Monterrey, Mexico, President Bush announced plans to create the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). The President initiated the new program to “fight global poverty.” The Compact commitments by fiscal year Millennium Challenge Corporation (figures in millions of U.S. dollars) (MCC) was established by Congress Funds are committed at time of signing in January 2004 to administer the Country FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 MCA. The MCC is governed by a Madagascar $110 Board comprised of nine members: Honduras $215 the Secretary of State (Chair), the Cape Verde $110 MCC CEO, the USAID Administrator, $175 the Secretary of Treasury, the Unit- Nicaragua Georgia $295 ed States Trade Representative and four civil society members appoint- Vanuatu $66 ed by the President, pursuant to a Benin $307 recommendation by the majority Armenia $236 and minority leaders of the House $547 and Senate. The U.S. NGO commu- Ghana Mali $461 nity was integrally involved in supporting the original authorization El Salvador $461 for the program. NGOs understood Mozambique $507 that funding for the MCC would not Lesotho $362 be at the expense of other core deMorocco $697 velopment accounts. Development professionals have Mongolia $285 long advocated for bilateral foreign Tanzania $698 assistance to governments that in$305 cludes a number of elements that Namibia the MCC addressees: country own- Burkina Faso $481 ership, extensive consultation with Number of Compacts 5 6 4 3 all elements of civil society, sus- Total Value $905 $2,078 $1,851 $1,484 tainability, multi-year funding, and Average Compact Size $181 $346 $463 $495 transparent selection of recipients

based on performance. The MCC was the first U.S. initiative to propose substantial funding reflecting these ideals and focused on broad, long-term development. The MCC has signed 18 five-year Compacts. Interested countries are assessed against a set of concrete standards relating to their performance on a number of points related to good governance and commitment to improving the lives of their people. Successful countries then sign a Compact (a multi- year agreement) with the MCC. To ensure the funding is available for each Compact, the MCC sets aside the total Compact funding at the time of signing. The MCC has also awarded 19 Threshold grants, which are primarily managed by USAID. These grants are designed to improve a country’s indicator scores and thereby move them closer to eligibility to apply for a compact. The Threshold countries include: Albania, Burkina Faso, Guyana, Indonesia, Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, Malawi, Moldova, Niger, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Tanzania, Uganda and Ukraine. The Millennium Challenge Corporation functions within three principles: good governance, economic freedom and investment in people with a stated goal “to reduce global poverty through the promotion of sustainable economic growth.” Indicators and Program Eligibility: Candidate countries must be either low-income or lower middle-income. The MCC uses 17 indicators from independent, publically available sources to determine eligibility. The indicators are divided into three categories or “baskets”: Ruling Justly, Investing in People, and Economic Freedom. In order for a country to be eligible for assistance, called Compacts, it must reach or exceed the median level for half of the indicators in each category. Countries must also be at

or above the median on the corruption index. Those close to achieving Compact eligibility may qualify for the Threshold program to focus on areas of weakness and improve eligibility status. Funding: The Millennium Challenge Corporation’s funding mechanism is rather unique for the United States. Once a Compact or Threshold Agreement is signed, the MCC guarantees the allotted funding for the five-year duration of the program. These funds are obligated and set aside; therefore they are not available for other purposes. This allows for programs to be implemented and completed as planned. Though typical of some other countries’ aid programs, it is unique for U.S. foreign aid which usually provides funding on a year-to-year basis. Slow startup: Unfortunately the Millennium Challenge Corporation was slow getting started. This was due in part to the MCA model, which required countries to consult with their citizens to develop proposals and for the governments to develop implementation plans – a groundbreaking model crafted to increase sustainability. Other reasons included: (1) the lengthy period between the President’s announcement in Monterrey (March 2002) and the passage of the necessary legislation by the Congress (January 2004); (2) lack of development expertise among the MCC’s initial staff; (3) lack of specificity in directions to applicant countries; (4) reluctance of staff to conduct broad outreach to Congress or the development community; and (5) limited country capacity to carry out this process. Progress: The MCC routinely assesses its work and has significantly improved its operations and outlook over the past three years: 1. Ambassador John Danilovich began the duties of CEO in November 2005, bringing new staff, new energy, and or-

MCC Indicators Indicator Civil Liberties Political Rights Voice and Accountability Government Effectiveness Rule of Law Control of Corruption Immunization Rates Public Expenditure on Health Girls’ Primary Education Completion Rate Public Expenditure on Primary Education Business Start Up Inflation Trade Policy Regulatory Quality Fiscal Policy Natural Resource Management Land Rights and Access Human Rights Index Corruption Perceptions Index Global Integrity Index

Category Ruling Justly Ruling Justly Ruling Justly Ruling Justly Ruling Justly Ruling Justly Investing in People Investing in People Investing in People Investing in People Economic Freedom Economic Freedom Economic Freedom Economic Freedom Economic Freedom Investing in People Economic Freedom Transparency International (TI) Global Integrity

Source Freedom House Freedom House World Bank Institute World Bank Institute World Bank Institute World Bank Institute World Health Organization World Health Organization UNESCO UNESCO and national sources IFC IMF WEO Heritage Foundation World Bank Institute National sources, cross-checked with IMF WEO CIESIN/Yale IFAD / IFC (U.S. State Department) (TI site | link to data) (Global Integrity)

ganizational effectiveness into the MCC. 2. The MCC has improved the development expertise of its staff. Experienced staff now work at every level of the organization. Consequently, guidance to eligible countries has improved significantly, especially in the area of consultation on the MCC Compact and Threshold programs giving greater clarity to the expectations of recipients and setting them up for success. 3. The transparency of the MCC has significantly increased. All agreements, countries’ performance on selection indicators, and congressional notifications are posted to their website. General outreach meetings are organized after each Board meeting at which staff is available to answer questions. The MCC has made a habit of consistently consulting with various coalitions for guidance and input on planned decisions and draft policies 4. There is a renewed emphasis on implementation. 5. Better and clearer guidance is now provided to countries on roles and responsibilities. 6. The procurement and reporting requirements have been streamlined. 7. The addition of a MCC Gender Policy in January 2007 and the addition of a girls’ primary school completion rate indicator are two ways that the special concerns of women and girls living in poverty are being addressed. 8. The concrete commitment to the inclusion of environmental concerns resulted in the addition of a natural resource management indicator and a land tenure indicator to the selection criteria. Accomplishments: The MCC has committed $6.5 billion in five-year Compacts with nearly $300-$400 million in Threshold Program assistance committed to 19 countries. Through the Compacts and Threshold Programs, the MCC agreemtns are estimated to have an impact on over 22 million individuals living in poverty around the world. The MCC’s public and stringent eligibility requirements have launched policy reforms around the world, such as those that improve transparency, fight corruption and promote women’s rights. Specific examples of success include: • MCC Compact: Georgia repaired a gas pipeline, preventing serious environmental and safety hazards and the disruption of gas delivery. Georgia has also begun to rehabilitate municipal water supplies in two cities that serve 230,000 Georgians. • MCC Compact: Cape Verde’s programs have enhanced the transparency of its government operations and budgeting. • MCC Compact: Nicaragua’s Compact helped women increase their incomes by creating tree nurseries. The first 26 clean land titles have been awarded to beneficiaries, many of which went to female landowners. • MCC Compact: In Madagascar, almost 2,000 local farmers

and enterprises have received technical assistance from 6 new agricultural business centers and another 225 farmers have been trained to tap into microfinance credit. The first MCC-funded “guichet foncier” (local land office) was officially inaugurated on May 20, 2006; 353 land certificates have been issued to date (30% to women). • “MCC Effect”: When El Salvador reduced the number of days it takes to get the approvals and permits needed to start a business from 115 to 26 in order to improve their eligibility for an MCC Compact, business registrations jumped by 500 percent. • “MCC Effect”: MCC is working with the Government of Lesotho to ensure that gender equality in the area of economic rights is legally guaranteed before signing a Compact. In Lesotho, married women have been considered legal minors. However, the Parliament of Lesotho recently enacted a law ending the minority status of married women, a key milestone in Lesotho’s Compact development process.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Contributors to Millennium Challenge Corporation Paper Organization

URL

Bread for the World Catholic Relief Services Women Thrive Worldwide International Rescue Committee

www.bread.org www.crs.org www.womenthrive.org www. theirc.org

InterAction Millennium Challenge Corporation Working Group

1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

Organization

URL

Academy for Educational Development Adventist Development and Relief Agency International Africare American Refugee Committee Asia Foundation Basic Education Coalition Bread for the World Catholic Relief Services Center for Global Development Christian Children’s Fund Congressional Hunger Center Evangelical Lutheran Church in America Episcopal Church Habitat for Humanity International Institute for Sustainable Communities International. Housing Coalition International Relief & Development Management Sciences for Health National Wildlife Federation ONE Open Society Institute Oxfam America Pact Physicians for Human Rights Population Action International Save the Children

www.aed.org www.adra.org www.africare.org www.archq.org www.asiafoundation.org www.basiced.org www.bread.org www.crs.org www.cgdev.org www.christianchildrensfund.org www.hungercenter.org www.elca.org www.episcopalchurch.org www.habitat.org www.iscvt.org www.intlhc.org www.ird.org www.msh.org www.nwf.org www.one.org www.soros.org www.oxfamamerica.org www.pactworld.org www.phrusa.org www.populationaction.org www.savethechildren.org

InterAction Millennium Challenge Corporation Working Group (cont) Organization

URL

Share Foundation Transparency International U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) U.S. Committee for UNDP Winrock International Women Thrive Worldwide World Learning World Vision World Wildlife Fund

www.sharefoundation.org www.transparency.org www.refugees.org www.undp-usa.org www.winrock.org www.womenthrive.org www.worldlearning.org www.worldvision.org www.worldwildlife.org

Millennium Development Goals

Millennium Development Goals

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

The Millennium Development Goals and a U.S. National Development Strategy Problem The United States is not in harmony with other bilateral and multilateral donors and governments of developing countries that have adopted the Millennium Development Goals (a widely accepted global initiative to significantly reduce poverty) as their framework for foreign relief and development assistance and country-level competition.

Recommendations The U.S. should adopt the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and incorporate its framework into a U.S. national development strategy.

Actions • Make addressing the causes and consequences of poverty the primary objective of U.S. official development assistance – a step that would allow such assistance to complement and support U.S. foreign policy and security goals; • Appoint a key development leader head of USAID; • Draft a National Development Strategy (see separate briefing paper) that uses the MDGs as the framework for the U.S. development efforts. Use the MDGs as a framework for U.S. official development assistance and measure performance agains the MDG benchmarks; and • Commit to an increase in official U.S. spending on relief and development aid spending to the internationally agreed upon benchmark (accepted by all donors except the U.S.) of 0.7 percent of GDP.

Results Fully embracing the Millennium Development Goals offers an excellent opportunity for the U.S. to reestablish its leadership in global development and maximize the impact of its program dollars. In addition, by incorporating the MDGs into its overall national development strategy, would provide the U.S. with a real framework to combat global poverty.

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Background The September 2000 Millennium Declaration adopted by 189 nations including the United States represents a comprehensive, coordinated approach to halve world poverty and hunger, eliminate gender inequalities, prevent and treat HIV/AIDS and other deadly diseases, protect the world’s environment, and increase access to education, healthcare and to halve the proportion of people who are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water by 2015. There are eight goals Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) each of which is related to a specific topic such as poverty, education or health. Each goal has eighteen quantifiable targets measured against forty eight indicators. The Millennium Development Goals represents a common vision for the future. They serve as a powerful basis for mobilizing resources for development and coordination international development efforts, The quantitative nature of the goals allows for a degree of accountability, making it possible for countries to track progress and citizens to hold governments and donors responsible for improving people’s lives. Increasing aid volume is one component of the Goal 8—which calls for creating a global partnership for development—with the others being promoting fairer trade practices and debt relief for the poorest countries. While aid alone will not end extreme poverty, it is a vital component of achieving success with the MDGs. Although it has become fashionable in the current Administration to wring one’s hands about progress on the MDGs and warn of impending failure, it is important to recognize the real achievements. Several countries—notably India and China—have seen large drops in the number of people living in absolute poverty. While in 1990, 29 percent of the world’s population lived on less than $1 a day, by 2003 that share had fallen to just over 19 percent. In the past eight years 40 million more children are in school; AIDS deaths have been reduced by a million; and some 1.6 billion people have gained access to safe drinking water. All of this has been achieved through good political leadership and adequate resources. Success on a global scale will only occur if developing and developed countries fulfill their commitments under the global partnership for development. With active U.S. leadership, it is possible to garner domestic public support for tackling the challenges of ending poverty and encourage the international community to keep its promises as well. The United States still remains the largest aid donor in the world in absolute terms, but ranks next to last among all other donors in the percentage of its national wealth devoted to development assistance. The U.S. has limited its interventions to a vertical ap-

proach in areas such as malaria and HIV/AIDS and has created its own parallel system, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which most often does not address aid for poor countries.

POLICY PAPER

November 2008

The United States and the MDGs Previously published by InterAction, Bread for the World, Oxfam America, and World Wildlife Fund, November 2007. This is an abridged version of the full report.

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I

n 2007, the mid-point to the MDG deadline, many donor nations have prepared national progress reports. A conspicuous exception is the United States. To date, the U.S. government has not fully embraced the MDGs, which officials often portray as flawed and overly ambitious. The U.S. does not use the MDGs as a framework for its official development assistance (ODA), nor does it track spending according to the goals. The MDGs are, however, the first and only framework that the entire world, encompassing donor and recipient countries, has adopted to improve the human condition of the world’s poor. The purpose of this report is to provide the missing stocktaking of the U.S. contributions to the MDGs from a U.S. international non-profit (U.S. NGO) perspective. In undertaking this study, a major challenge has been the limitation of data, since the federal budget does not reflect the areas of the MDGs. Data was drawn from a range of sources, including the U.S. budget, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC), the World Bank, and various UN agencies. Overall, the report shows that U.S. development assistance does not have poverty reduction as its central purpose and continues to operate outside the global community’s poverty reduction agenda. Only by aligning its contributions with the MDGs can the U.S. coordinate effectively with other donor countries, best leverage the impact of its funds by building on the efforts of nations with MDG plans, truly partner with the efforts of developing countries, and play a leading role in the first truly global effort to improve the well-being of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable people. Our assessment of the U.S. and the MDGs finds the following: MDG 1 – Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger: The U.S. funds many programs worldwide to promote economic growth and feed the hungry, but still lacks clear strategies for promoting sustainable, poverty-reducing growth or addressing the root causes of hunger. MDG 2 – Achieve universal primary education: The U.S. government has made an important contribution to achieving Goal 2, more than doubling bilateral funding for basic education from 2000 to 2005. In order to meet the global commitment to get all children in school, the U.S. must make sure that resources are concentrated in countries with the greatest need. MDG 3 – Promote gender equality and empower women: The U.S. is contributing to the attainment of Goal 3 but does not track its contributions. Data from the OECD/DAC – as well as actual U.S. programming – show that gender equality and women’s empowerment is not a U.S. policy and spending priority. Global poverty cannot be reduced without women and girls at the center of any and all strategies. MDG 4 – Reduce child mortality: The U.S. needs to build on and expand its positive, longterm track record in supporting and providing technical leadership in promoting child survival. MDG 5 – Improve maternal health: The U.S. has made significant contributions to improving maternal health, but U.S. assistance for this sector has remained stagnant over the last decade – especially when compared to investments in other areas such as HIV/AIDS. Investment

in improving maternal health should be comprehensive and not overlooked in the fight against any particular disease. MDG 6 – Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases: The U.S. has been the global leader in the fight against HIV/ AIDS and continues to make significant investments. Changes in U.S. policy are needed to make U.S.-funded programs more effective. Especially important is building the capacity of health systems and making women and girls a priority in program planning and implementation. MDG 7 – Ensure environmental sustainability: The U.S., while making notable progress toward the achievement of MDG 7 in some indicators, is falling short in its contributions overall. Specifically, the U.S. has made strong progress in reducing consumption of chlorofluorocarbons, but carbon emissions and energy use remain high. In order to reduce poverty, the U.S. must commit to global efforts to respond to climate change. The U.S. should also require that climate adaptation be integrated into its development programs in order to reduce the risk that climate change will undermine the effectiveness of its current investments in poverty alleviation, health and the environment. MDG 8 – ODA: In absolute terms, the U.S. has been the leading donor of official development assistance for most of the past sixty years. The global development community, however, regards ODA as a percent of gross national income, not volume, as the best measure of a donor’s relative contribution. Here, the U.S. continues to fall short of expectations for a country of such tremendous wealth and generosity. MDG 8 – Trade: U.S. trade preferences are promising, but the U.S. has yet to live up to its commitment to building a trading system that is open, rule-based, predictable and nondiscriminatory, and that accounts for the special needs of least developed countries. By committing to a global trade round, reforming the farm bill, and improving trade preferences, the U.S. can take important strides in helping poor farmers. MDG 8 – Debt relief: The U.S. is on track to meet its MDG commitment for debt relief and has been a leader in removing debt as an obstacle for development. Offering terms more generous than other Paris Club members, the U.S. has cancelled 100 percent of bilateral debts with HIPC countries. Additionally, the U.S. pledged 100 percent of its target contribution to IDA, effectively freeing up much needed resources for development. The U.S. can also exercise its leadership to extend debt relief to include more debt-burdened countries and to ensure money saved in debt service actually goes into needed public investment. In conclusion, we call on the U.S. to focus its official development assistance on poverty reduction and to align with the global development community around the Millennium Development Goals. At the September 2000 United Nations Millennium Summit, the largest-ever gathering of world leaders adopted the Millennium Declaration, an agreement to take a com-

prehensive, coordinated approach to rid the world of poverty. In adopting the declaration, 189 nations – including the U.S. – pledged to work together to: halve world poverty and hunger; eliminate gender inequalities; prevent and treat HIV/ AIDS and other deadly diseases; protect the world’s environment; and provide education, healthcare, and clean water for all. From the actions and targets set forth in the declaration, the UN Secretariat developed eight goals, now known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with eighteen quantifiable targets measured against forty-eight indicators. The Millennium Development Goals represent a common vision for the future: “A world with less poverty, hunger and disease, greater survival prospects for mothers and their infants, better educated children, equal opportunities for women and a healthier environment.”1 As such, they serve as a powerful basis for mobilizing resources for development and coordinating international development efforts. The quantitative nature of the goals also allows for a degree of accountability, making it possible for countries to track progress and citizens to hold governments responsible for improving people’s lives. The MDGs are also the first international goals to recognize that eradicating poverty worldwide will only be possible through cooperation between rich and poor countries. This fact is explicitly acknowledged in Goal 8, which calls for a “global partnership for development.” Though individual countries are responsible for achieving Goals 1-7, Goal 8 calls on developed countries to support the development efforts of poor countries committed to poverty reduction by: increasing and improving aid, providing more debt relief and establishing a more fair trading system. In turn, developing countries have pledged to practice good governance and strengthen the rule of law. July 2007 marked the midway point between the adoption of the MDGs and the 2015 target date for achieving most of the goals. UN reports show that the world overall is close to meeting the goal of halving the proportion of people living in extreme poverty, though this is in large part due to the remarkable reduction in poverty rates in China and India. Countries are also making progress in achieving universal primary education.2 According to World Bank data, East Asia is closest to achieving all the MDGs.3 For example, it has already surpassed two targets: halving the percentage of people living in extreme poverty and reducing the proportion of children under five who are underweight. In contrast, sub-Saharan Africa is far 1 UN Statistics Division. “About the Millennium Development Goals Indicators.” United Nations. http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host. aspx?Content=Indicators/About.htm. 2 United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2007, (New York: United Nations, 2007), 4. 3 World Bank. Global Monitoring Report 2007: Confronting the Challenges of Gender Equality and Fragile States, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007).

behind on many of the goals. Despite some progress in reducing the percentage of people living in extreme poverty, the absolute number of poor remains roughly the same due to population growth.4 Likewise, though the region is making progress towards achieving universal primary education, in 2005, 30 percent of primary school-aged still children remained out of school.5 In sub-Saharan Africa, child and maternal mortality remain high, and it is one of the regions with the greatest proportion of children going hungry. In addition, the number of deaths from AIDS in the region has increased.6 The success of individual countries demonstrates that under certain conditions achieving the MDGs is possible, but success on a global scale will only occur if developing and developed countries fulfill their commitments under the global partnership for development. If the world is to meet the MDGs by 2015, as countries pledged to do, developing countries must implement policies and interventions that benefit the poorest and most disadvantaged segments of their populations. For their part, developed countries must keep their promises – namely, more and better aid, less debt and more fair trade.

U.S. Official Development Assistance

The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines foreign assistance as:7 “Financial flows, technical assistance and commodities provided by donor governments: (1) to promote economic development and welfare as their main objectives (thus excluding aid for military or other non-development purposes); and (2) as grants or concessional loans.”8 The largest category of foreign assistance is ODA: aid provided to low- and middle-income countries.9 After a very brief overview of the history of U.S. foreign 4 Ibid, 41. 5 United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2007, (New York: United Nations, 2007), 11. 6 Ibid, 18. 7 Established in 1961, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a grouping of thirty countries “committed to democracy and the market economy. Its mission is to help its member countries achieve sustainable economic growth and employment and to raise the standard of living in member countries while maintaining financial stability. The United States was a founding member. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is a twenty-two-member committee of the OECD which deals with development co-operation matters. To enable comparisons of the ODA of member countries, the DAC has established common definitions and methodologies for ODA reporting. The DAC is regarded as the authoritative source of information on ODA. 8 Steve Radalet. “A Primer on Foreign Aid.” In Working Paper Number 92. (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2006), 4. 9 The DAC classifies aid into three categories: (1) official development assistance, the largest; (2) official assistance, and (3) private voluntary assistance. Official assistance (OA) is provided to higher income countries with per capita incomes of more than $9000. Private voluntary assistance includes grants from NGOs, religious groups, charities, foundations, and private companies. See Steve Radalet. “A Primer on Foreign Aid.” In Working Paper Number 92. (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2006), 4.

assistance, this section discusses aid’s changing purposes, recipients and funding. The remainder of the report focuses on whether or to what extent: • U.S. ODA is contributing to the attainment of MDGs 1 to 6. • The U.S. is on-track to meet MDG commitments in four areas: 1. Environment: curbing the loss of environmental resources in both the U.S. and developing countries (Goal 7). 2. Aid: providing ODA to low- and middle-income countries (Goal 8). 3. Trade: opening the U.S. market to goods from those countries (Goal 8). 4. Debt: lifting the crushing debt burden of developing countries (Goal 8). In 1947, to provide aid to rebuild European countries left in ruins in the aftermath of World War II, Secretary of State George Marshall announced the creation of the Marshall Plan (1947-1951), the first U.S. bilateral assistance program. Heartened by the Marshall Plan’s tremendous success, President Truman, in his 1949 inauguration speech, announced a “bold new plan” to provide assistance to developing countries as a key component of U.S. foreign policy.10 U.S. foreign aid did not, however, have a department to administer it until President Kennedy established the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1961. Although USAID had primary responsibility for managing U.S. foreign assistance programs directly or jointly with the Department of State, over the next forty-plus years, a growing number of domestic agencies and the Department of Defense (DOD) began managing foreign aid programs.11 From 2002 to 2005, President Bush created three new foreign assistance agencies and initiatives: • The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR): a bilateral commitment to support HIV/AIDS prevention, care and treatment programs primarily in a limited number of “focus countries.” A presidential appointee who reports directly to the Secretary of State heads the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) and is responsible for managing PEPFAR. • The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC): a U.S. government corporation, created in 2004 to combat poverty through “sustainable, transformative economic growth.” • The President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI): a five-year program to reduce deaths due to malaria by 50 percent in fifteen African countries. According to the administration, USAID “in conjunction with the Department of Health and Human Services’ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Department of State, the White House, and 10 Baltimore County Public Schools. A Brief History of U.S. Foreign Aid. 2007, http://www.bcps.org/offices/lis/models/foreignaid/history.html. 11 Development Assistance Committee. DAC Peer Review of the United States, (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2006), 45.

Figure 1. The Changing Management of U.S. ODA Source: OECD (2006), DAC Peer Review of the United States

others” leads the initiative. As a consequence, by 2005, more than twenty-six government units were managing and implementing U.S. foreign assistance programs.12 At the heart of any discussion of U.S. foreign aid is a debate about the motivations and objectives for giving aid. Why do we give aid? Why should we give aid? There have always been multiple, and competing, stated purposes for U.S. foreign assistance. Fundamentally pragmatic considerations have been the principal drivers of U.S. aid policy. From the 1950s onward, administrations have described ODA as a “foreign policy tool,” intended primarily to serve U.S. security, political and economic interests: • From the 1950s to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, aid’s primary purpose was “containing communism.” • After signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979, “peace and security” in the Middle East became a primary focus of aid. As a result, Israel and Egypt have been the largest aid recipients from 1979 to the present – with one exception: in FY 2004, aid to Iraq was seven times aid to Israel. • For a brief moment from the mid- to late-1990s, foreign aid’s two stated objectives were “sustainable development” and “opening markets.” Development in its own right has been only one of several foreign aid objectives. What has changed over the past sixty years is the level of importance policy-makers have attached to development, the approaches taken to promote development, funding and primary recipients. Figure 1 presents 12 Ibid.

changes in U.S. ODA since the 1960s. All of this has changed dramatically since September 11, 2001. In September 2002, the Bush administration published the National Security Strategy of the United States. In it, the administration articulated a national security policy that, for the first time, established global development as one of three pillars (the 3 Ds) of U.S. national security – the others being defense and diplomacy.13 Some in the development community applauded the administration’s decision to raise development to a new place of prominence in U.S. foreign policy. Others have voiced concerns, to paraphrase Orwell, that “all ‘Ds’ might be equal, but some ‘Ds’ would be more equal than others.” In effect, their concern was that U.S. development policy would be subordinated to defense and diplomacy. As evidence, they cited the fact that U.S. foreign aid programs had already been recast to focus on their contribution to winning the war on terrorism. Indeed, the 2002 foreign assistance budget justification explicitly named the war on terrorism as the top foreign aid priority.14 On January 19, 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced her intent to reform and restructure U.S. foreign assistance, aimed, she argued, at “transformational development.” The stated goals of the process were to ensure that foreign assistance is used effectively to meet the Administration’s broad foreign policy objectives and to better align 13 White House. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, DC: White House, 2002). 14 Curt Tarnoff and Larry Nowels. Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004).

USAID and State Department aid activities.15 That day, Secretary Rice also announced creation of a new position, the Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA), who would serve concurrently at a level equivalent to Deputy Secretary in the State Department and as USAID Administrator. As the first DFA, Ambassador Randall Tobias led the reform process; the acting DFA, Henrietta H. Fore, will now lead its refinement and implementation.16 By early 2006, the DFA had developed a new comprehensive framework for U.S. foreign assistance. The framework created five country categories. • Rebuilding: countries in, or emerging from, internal or external conflicts. • Transforming: low and lower-middle income countries that meet certain performance. criteria based on good governance and sound economic policies. • Developing: low and lower-middle income countries that are not yet meeting performance criteria. • Sustaining Partnership: upper-middle income countries with which the United States maintains economic, trade, and security relationships beyond foreign aid. • Restrictive: authoritarian regimes – most ineligible for U.S. aid – with significant freedom and human rights issues. The DFA also added a sixth “global” category to encompass global or regional programs that transcend any one country’s borders. 15 Condoleezza Rice. Remarks on Foreign Assistance, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2007), http://www.state.gov/secretary/ rm/2006/59408.htm. 16 At the time this report was completed, Mrs. Fore had not been confirmed by the Senate. We assume that her confirmation is imminent.

In addition, the framework linked the country categories to five strategic objectives: 1. Peace and security. 2. Governing justly and democratically. 3. Investing in people. 4. Economic growth. 5. Humanitarian assistance. The foreign assistance framework shows the relationship between these objectives, the country categories, program areas and funding accounts. In comparing past aid allocations with the current administration’s request for FY 2008, we found: • By 2005, U.S. foreign aid funding had reached a record high. It is likely to grow more in the FY 2008 appropriations. U.S. total gross ODA (in constant 2004 dollars) more than doubled – from $13.114 billion in 2001 to $27.682 billion in 2005.17 The administration’s total request for FY 2008 is a 12 percent increase over FY 2006.18 • Foreign aid has become more “militarized” as the proportion of aid managed by USAID has declined sharply. In 1998 USAID managed 64.3 percent of U.S. ODA. It has since fallen to 50.2 percent in 2002 and 38.8 percent in 2005. ODA managed by the Department of Defense, on the other hand, rose from 3.5 percent in 1998 to 5.6 per17 Development Assistance Committee. DAC Peer Review of the United States, (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2006), 25. 18 Congressional Research Service. State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2008 Appropriations (RL34023), by Connie Veillette and Susan B. Epstein, (Washington, DC: June 13, 2007), 12.

Table 1. Selected Sector Funding, FY 2006 and FY 2008 (in millions of current US$) Sector

FY06

Good Governance

$354.22

$507.39

43.2%

$90.32

$81.98

-9.2%

Maternal and Child Health

$738.85

$608.53

-17.6%

Family Planning/ Reproductive Health

$429.82

$332.29

-22.7%

Basic Education

$520.80

$535.30

2.8%

Trade and Investment

$408.74

$238.58

-41.6%

Agriculture

$561.99

$498.72

-11.3%

Environment

$292.11

$248.73

-14.9%

Counter-terrorism

$157.05

$185.27

18.0%

Rule of Law

$210.73

$317.28

50.6%

Human Rights

Source: U.S. Department of State Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Justification, FY 2008, and CRS calculations.

FY08 Request

% Change

Objectives Accounts within State/USAID

Peace and Security FMF, TI, IMET, ESF, INCLE, NADR, PKO, ACI, FSA, SEED

Governing Justly and Democratically DA, TI, SEED, FSA, DF, ESF, INCLE, IO&P, ACI

Investing in People DA, CSH, ESF, IDFA, IO&P, FSA, SEED, GHAI, ACI, Title II

Other USG Agency Contributions Foreign Assistance Program Areas

Counter Terrorism Combating WMD Stabilization Operations and Defense Reform Counternarcotics Transnational Crime Conflict Mitigation and Response

Rule of Law and Human Rights Good Governance Political Competition and Consensus-Building Civil Society

Assist in creating and/or stabilizing a legitimate and democratic government and a supportive environment for civil society and media.

Health Education Social Services and Protection for Vulnerable Populations

Category Definition Rebuilding Countries

States in or emerging from and rebuilding after internal or external conflict.

Prevent or mitigate state failure and/ or violent conflict.

Developing Countries

States with low or lowermiddle income, not yet meeting MCC performance criteria, and the criterion related to political rights.

Address key remaining challenges to Support policies and programs that accelerate security and law enforcement. and strengthen public institutions and the creation of a more vibrant local government, civil society and media.

Encourage social policies that deepen the ability of institutions to establish appropriate roles for the public and private sector in service delivery.

Transforming Countries

States with low or lowermiddle income, meeting MCC performance criteria, and the criterion related to political rights.

Nurture progress toward partnerships on security and law enforcement.

Provide limited resources and technical assistance to reinforce democratic institutions.

Provide financial resources and limited technical assistance to sustain improved livelihoods.

Sustaining Partnership Countries

States with upper-middle Support strategic partnerships income or greater for which addressing security, CT, WMD, and U.S. support is provided to counter-narcotics. sustain partnerships, progress, and peace.

Address issues of mutual interest.

Address issues of mutual interest.

Restrictive Countries

States of concern where there are significant governance issues.

Foster effective democracy and responsible sovereignty. Create local capacity for fortification of civil society and path to democratic governance.

Address humanitarian needs.

Global or Regional

Activities that advance the five objectives, transcend a single country’s borders, and are addressed outside a country strategy.

Prevent the acquisition/proliferation of WMD, support CT and counternarcotics.

Start or restart the delivery of critical social services, including health and educational facilities, and begin building or rebuilding institutional capacity.

Economic Growth DA, ESF, SEED, FSA, IO&P, ACI, Title II



Macroeconomic Foundation for Growth Trade and Investment Financial Sector Infrastructure Agriculture Private Sector Competitiveness Economic Opportunity Environment

Humanitarian Assistance IDFA, MRA, ERMA, ACI, Title II

Protection, Assistance and Solutions Disaster Readiness Migration Management

End Goal of U.S. Foreign Assistance

Graduation Trajectory

Assist in the construction or reconstruction Address immediate needs of refugee, of key internal infrastructure and market displaced, and other affected groups. mechanisms to stabilize the economy.

Stable environment for good governance, increased availability of essential social services, and initial progress to create policies and institutions upon which future progress will rest.

Advance to the Developing or Transforming Category.

Encourage economic policies and strengthen institutional capacity to promote broad-based growth.

Encourage reduced need for future HA by introducing prevention and mitigation strategies, while continuing to address emergency needs.

Continued progress in expanding and deepening democracy, strengthening public and private institutions, and supporting policies that promote economic growth and poverty reduction.

Advance to the Transforming Category.

Provide financial resources and technical assistance to promote broad-based growth.

Address emergency needs on a shortterm basis, as necessary.

Government, civil society and private sector institutions capable of sustaining development progress.

Advance to the Sustaining Partnership Category or graduate from foreign assistance.

Create and promote sustained partnerships on trade and investment.

Address emergency needs on a shortterm basis, as necessary.

Continued partnership as strategically appropriate where U.S. support is necessary to maintain progress and peace.

Continue partnership or graduate from foreign assistance.

Promote a market-based economy.

Address emergency needs on a shortterm basis, as necessary.

Civil society empowered to demand more effective democracies and states respectful of human dignity, accountable to their citizens, and responsible towards their neighbors.

Advance to other relevant foreign assistance category.

Achievement of foreign assistance goal and objectives.

Determined based on criteria specific to the global or regional objective.

cent in 2002 to 21.7 percent in 2005 (See Figure 1). • Aid would become more concentrated by region. Aid to Africa nearly doubled: from 13.1 percent FY 2001 to 22.3 percent in FY 2006. The president’s FY 2008 request for more HIV/AIDS funding would give the Africa region the largest overall increase in aid (53.8 percent). This increase, however, masks decreases in basic education, agricultural sector productivity, water supply and sanitation, and family planning and reproductive health funding for Africa.19 In FY 2008, the Near East Region and South and Central Asia would receive increases of 3.6 and 5.5 percent respectively – due to increased funding for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Aid to these regions had already more than doubled from FY 2004 to FY 2006.20 The president’s request would cut funding for Latin America by 9.1 percent, largely due to cuts in basic education, environment, and humanitarian assistance. • Funding for security would go up, but development down. Table 1 compares funding levels for specific sectors between FY 2006 and FY 2008. Counter-terrorism and rule of law would receive increases of 18.0 and 50.6 percent respectively. Good governance would receive an increase in funding; and yet human rights funding would decrease. Also cut are maternal and child health, family planning and reproductive health, trade and investment, agriculture, and the environment.

19 Congressional Research Service. U.S. Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected Recipients (RL31362), by Thomas Lum (Washington, DC: Updated August 22, 2007), 5. 20 Congressional Research Service. State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2008 Appropriations (RL34023), by Connie Veillette and Susan B. Epstein, (Washington, DC: June 13, 2007), 15.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Contributors to Millennium Development Goals Policy Brief

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www.interaction.org

Organization

URL

Bread for the World CARE International Youth Foundation Oxfam America Women Thrive Worldwide World Wildlife Fund

www.bread.org www.care.org www.iyfnet.org www.oxfamamerica.org www.womenthrive.org www.worldwildlife.org/

National Development Strategy

National Development Strategy

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

A Call for a Comprehensive National Development Strategy Problem The U.S. Government’s system for allocating, managing, delivering and monitoring foreign assistance is fragmented and lacks strategic direction. There is no centralized management or oversight of United States government programs. The proliferation of Presidential Directives, Congressional earmarks, new assistance structures and funding streams, stymies the achievements of America’s foreign assistance goals of peace and stability.

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Recommendations Under the direction of a deputy national security advisor for stabilization and development, develop and approve a national development strategy with the goal of unifying the administration and operation of all U.S. Government foreign assistance. The Administration’s effort should be coordinated with the Senate and House Authorizing Committees’ efforts to draft and pass a new Foreign Assistance Act. This recommendation is made in close coordination with the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network and ConnectUS.

Actions • Nominate early a USAID Administrator to be sworn in as part of the national security team (Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Advisor) on January 20, 2009 to ensure a smooth transition and provide direction and vision for U.S. assistance programs throughout the world including Afghanistan, Iraq, and other potentially crisis prone areas; • Create a deputy security advisor position at the National Security Council (NSC) and staff it comparably to other directorates at the NSC. Charge the new deputy to coordinate the effort to lead and write a government-wide national development strategy; • Write and promulgate a national development strategy which would be updated every two years which would, in clear concise terms, define the overarching goals in major areas of the U.S. foreign assistance program; • Rewrite and authorize a Foreign Assistance Act which would harmonize priorities among U.S. Government agencies, multilateral institutions, and recipient governments to assure the best use of limited U.S. Government development resources; and • Submit a budget in March 2009 which would decrease the military development budget and re-allocate development funding to a central empowered US Department for Global and Human Development.

Results The national development strategy will bring cohesion and coherence to the multifaceted foreign assistance programs sponsored by the U.S. government. It will identify overlapping agendas, programs working at cross purposes and gaps in U.S. government development assistance programming.

Background As identified in the 2002 National Security Strategy and, reaffirmed in the 2006 version, the U.S. national security relies on three pillars: diplomacy, defense and development. But U.S. foreign assistance (the development pillar) is broken and needs to be fixed. This will require a serious administration-lead and congressional bipartisan effort, addressing a number of major initiatives including agreement on our goals in foreign assistance and the principles that should guide those efforts, rebuilding and rationalizing budgets and organizational structures, and new legislation to reflect these priorities. All are major tasks and must be undertaken together. Each is critical for the success of the others. To that end, an effort undertaken at the direction of the President by the newly created position, deputy national security advisor for stabilization and development, would look at and bring together the fragmented foreign assistance programs under one all encompassing national development strategy. The development of the strategy would include the incorporation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) as a framework for the delivery, monitoring and evaluation of U.S. foreign assistance. It is our belief that when this stock-taking is completed, it will become clear that a major a re-organization and consolidation of foreign assistance programs should be undertaken. In cooperation with Congress, the national development strategy process would support and align itself with the reauthorization of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, a broken, unwieldy instrument of the Cold War era. With the consolidation of various foreign assistance structures including the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the President’s Malaria Initiative, and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), InterAction believes, at the heart of the organizational restructuring, there will be recognition of the need to create a new Cabinet-level Department for Global and Human Development (DGHD). Its mandate would be to promote people-centered, sustainable development and provide humanitarian assistance. It would effectively coordinate the use of U.S. foreign assistance funds and give development the seat at the table it needs to be an strong and effective counterpart to the Departments of State and Defense. The Secretary of the DGHD would be the lead voice within the U.S. Government, below the President, on development assistance and humanitarian issues and a member of the National Security Council. After a government-wide assessment and evaluation of the myriad of U.S. foreign assistance programs has been undertaken, numerous development assistance and humanitarian programs presently scattered across various departments and agencies, would naturally be placed in the DGHD. The DGHD would manage programs in key development sec-

tors including: agriculture, civil society, economic growth, education, environment, good governance, health, and rule of law. Gender equality is essential for meaningful progress and would be a guiding principle for DGHD activities in all sectors. InterAction proposes all functions relating to development and humanitarian assistance presently under the Department of State’s Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration housed in the DGHD. Department of Agriculture programs relating to food aid would move to the DGHD, as would smaller programs currently located in the Departments of Commerce and Labor and elsewhere. Recently created programs that give the Department of Defense (DoD) a large role in development promotion would move to the DGHD. However, under the overall coordination of the DGHD, DoD would continue to play a key role in many complex international humanitarian relief operations. The Department for Global and Human Development would receive its budget from Congress and make decisions on the proper allocation of funds across countries and sectors. It would have a direct relationship with the Office of Management and Budget on budget issues; its budget would not be vetted by the Department of State. The Department of State would play an important role in providing advice to the DGHD on important diplomatic considerations to take into account when considering allocations, but ultimate decisions on budget levels would be based fundamentally on development and humanitarian criteria. Economic Support Fund (ESF) levels would be set by the Department of State after examining DGHD allocation levels.

POLICY PAPER

November 2008

Proposed Major Components and Organization of a Cabinet-level Department for Global and Human Development Previously published by InterAction, July 2008.

I

nterAction, the largest alliance of U.S.-based development and humanitarian relief non-governmental organizations, has called for the creation of a Department for Global and Human Development (DGHD). This paper provides detail on the proposed components of such a department. It builds on InterAction’s paper that explores the reasons a new department is needed.

Why a new department?

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The Department for Global and Human Development’s fundamental mandate will be to promote people-centered, sustainable development, broadly defined and inclusive of the Millennium Development Goals,1 and provide humanitarian assistance. The long-term goal of its activities is a stable, sustainable world of free, democratic, economically prosperous states in which the worst aspects of poverty have been eliminated. We believe this name emphasizes the major attributes that the new department must have: • Global because the department will focus on global issues. The DGHD will lead U.S. Government international programs on HIV/AIDS, avian flu and other health threats, as well as climate change and biodiversity conservation. It will play a role within the U.S. Government on trade issues with the developing world. The department also will be global in its focus on participation and collaboration with recipient country governments, other donors, multilateral organizations, and, crucially, with civil society. • Human because the department will focus on people-centered development. Its core purpose will be to improve human well-being and alleviate the worst aspects of human suffering. • Development because the department will focus on sustainable development. It will develop and manage coordinated approaches to alleviate poverty, promote sustainable, equitable economic growth, and respond to global challenges.

1 The eight Millennium Development Goals are to: (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3) promote gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce child mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability; (8) develop a global partnership for development. The Bush Administration has endorsed these goals.

In 1961, when President John F. Kennedy called for greater coherence and cohesion in U.S. civilian foreign assistance programs, he said this: If our foreign aid funds are to be prudently and effectively used, we need a whole new set of basic concepts and principles: • Unified administration and operation – a single agency in Washington and the field, equipped with a flexible set of tools, in place of several competing and confusing aid units. • Country plans – a carefully thought through program tailored to meet the needs and the resource potential of each individual country, instead of a series of individual, unrelated projects. Frequently, in the past, our development goals and projects have not been undertaken as integral steps in a long-range economic development program. • Long-term planning and financing – the only way to make meaningful and economical commitments. … Special attention to those nations most willing and able to mobilize their own resources, make necessary social and economic reforms, engage in long-range planning, and make the other efforts necessary if these are to reach the stage of self-sustaining growth. • Multilateral approach – a program and level of commitments designed to encourage and complement an increased effort by other industrialized nations. • A new agency with new personnel – drawing upon the most competent and dedicated career servants now in the field, and attracting the highest quality from every part of the nation. • Separation from military assistance – our program of aid to social and economic development must be seen on its own merits, and judged in the light of its vital and distinctive contribution to our basic security needs. … President Kennedy’s concepts and principles stand the test of time to guide a new reform of U.S. foreign assistance programs. It is astonishing how far the U.S. Government has drifted from these clear, compelling ideas over the last fifty years: • Instead of a unified administration and operation, today we have multiple “competing and confusing aid units” scattered throughout the U.S. Government. • Instead of “carefully thought through” country plans, today we too often have “a series of individual, unrelated projects.” • Instead of long-term planning and financing, we too often have short-term plans and funding. • The Millennium Challenge Account and Corporation were created in 2003 to bring “(s)pecial attention to those nations most willing and able ... to reach the stage of selfsustaining growth,” but this promising move also “added

to the fragmentation of foreign assistance programs across the Executive Branch and weakened the authority of USAID.”2 • Instead of a multilateral approach, the U.S. too often has taken a unilateral approach, not coordinating with other interested governments, organizations, businesses, and civil society structures. • Instead of attracting personnel of “the highest quality from every part of the nation,” today’s USAID is a shell, unable to implement President Kennedy’s vision. USAID, created by President Kennedy, and still the primary actor responsible for U.S. foreign assistance programs, today is weak, poorly organized, and has been demoralized and eviscerated by severe staff shortages. • Instead of a clear separation between military and civilian assistance programs, we see today greater and greater encroachment of military personnel and programs into what should be civilian foreign assistance programs. InterAction has drawn on the insights of President Kennedy (see Appendix I), on recent reports from various organizations and commissions (see Appendix II), and on broad experience from six decades of nongovernmental organizations’ (NGOs) work on development and humanitarian issues in developing its recommendations on the structure of a Cabinet-level department for Global and Human Development. Aspects of this proposal are closely modeled on the recommendations of the 2004 report of the Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security sponsored by the Center for Global Development. The Commission’s report, On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security, recommended “that the administration establish an integrated development strategy and implement it within a single, Cabinet-level development agency.” InterAction endorses the central recommendation of the Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security (see Appendix III): The new Cabinet department would … incorporate USAID, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and some foreign assistance programs run by the Departments of State, Defense, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture. Of course, the United States will always deploy some economic assistance purely in support of diplomatic goals; resources for that purpose should remain in the State Department. In addition, although Treasury has been consistently effective in working with Congress to ensure appropriate U.S. leadership in the multilateral development banks, those activi2 Radelet, Steve, Center for Global Development Essay, “Modernizing Foreign Assistance for the 21st Century: An Agenda for the Next U.S. President,” March 2008, p. 7.

ties ultimately should move from Treasury to the new development agency as well, if it is to meet the challenges we have outlined. A new Department for Global and Human Development would replace the weakened U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The current national security strategy has recognized that diplomacy, defense and development are the three pillars of our national security. Yet the current administrative structure of the executive branch leaves the development component without the high-level, centralized organization it needs to fulfill its role as an equal pillar. The DGHD’s Cabinet-level designation would give it the clout to insist on the importance of effective development strategies without being drowned out by louder voices in the government arguing for an emphasis on other goals, often to the detriment of development. An independent department-level voice dedicated to advocating for development should facilitate striking the appropriate balance between various assistance tools and the valid imperatives of the Departments of State and Defense. Even a strengthened USAID would lack the ability to get a seat at the table when these major decisions are discussed, could not coordinate other Cabinet-level departments effectively, and would not have the same ability to attract high quality staff “from every part of the nation.”3

Major Components and Organization4

The Secretary of the DGHD would be the lead voice within the U.S. Government below the President on development assistance and humanitarian issues and a leading advisor to the President on international issues. To ensure that this voice is always heard when it must be, the DGHD Secretary would be a member of both the National Security Council and the National Economic Council. The DGHD would have a seat on all major interagency groups where development and/or humanitarian issues are discussed. Most development assistance and humanitarian programs, presently scattered across various U.S. Government departments and agencies, would be placed in the DGHD. 3 In her book Security by Other Means, Lael Brainard of the Brookings Institution, describes the current fragmentation of foreign assistance within the U.S. Government, and after analyzing various models for structure concludes that a more centralized and elevated organization (i.e., a Cabinet-level department) is required to effectively utilize development assistance. 4 This section is not intended as an exhaustive presentation of the various structural components of the DGHD. It does not discuss the need for certain functions, such as legislative and public affairs, program and policy coordination, and management and accounting, which any government department must have. Instead, this section focuses on those structural components which would shift from various departments and agencies to the DGHD, and particularly on structures where the focus and activities are not obvious and require some explanation.

USAID would become part of the DGHD. All international health programs with in-country projects would become part of the DGHD, including PEPFAR and the President’s Malaria Initiative. The DGHD would manage programs in key development sectors, including agriculture, civil society, economic growth, education, environment, good governance, health and rule of law. InterAction strongly believes that gender equality is essential for global progress and security. Gender equality and women’s empowerment should be guiding principles for DGHD activities in all sectors. All functions relating to development and humanitarian assistance presently under the Department of State’s Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), including all non-domestic funding for migration and refugee affairs would be housed within the DGHD. Programs in the Department of Agriculture (USDA) relating to food aid would also move to the DGHD as would smaller programs in the Departments of Commerce and Labor and elsewhere. The U.S. Government presently runs six poorly coordinated food aid programs, some of which have conflicting objectives. While USDA would retain a role regarding food aid, these programs would be coordinated and rationalized under the DGHD, and would be run by the new department. Recently created programs that give the Department of Defense (DoD) a large role in development promotion also would be moved to the DGHD. However, under the overall coordination of the DGHD, DoD would continue to play a key role in many complex international humanitarian relief operations. All development programs in the Baltic States, Eastern Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union presently coordinated by the Department of State would move to the DGHD. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) would become part of the DGHD. The many positive aspects of the MCC should be retained, including its emphasis on the provision of substantial, multi-year funds to well-governed democratic states, country ownership, transparent eligibility criteria, the elimination of tied aid, and careful consultation with local and international NGOs. Roles regarding environmental issues would be divided among the DGHD, the Department of State, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of the Interior, and other relevant parts of the U.S. Government, with the DGHD responsible for funding activities across the developing world to respond both to global environmental challenges and local environmental issues in particular countries and regions, and the State Department in the lead in negotiations on climate change and other critical environmental issues. EPA would provide technical experts and assistance. The DGHD would coordinate closely with the State Department’s Bureau for International Organizations regarding U.S. support for international organizations, such as UNICEF,

the UN Development Program, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, whose primary missions relate to development promotion and/or humanitarian response. A new, joint office for the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and debt should be created with personnel from both the DGHD and Treasury. The DGHD would lead on issues concerning the World Bank and other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs); the Treasury would lead on issues concerning the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The two departments, along with other relevant U.S. Government (USG) entities, would jointly manage debt relief and debt financing issues. The DGHD would have a voice on U.S. Government trade policy towards developing countries. More than one dozen U.S. Government departments, agencies and other entities currently have a role in trade issues. This list includes: the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR); the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Justice, Labor, State, Transportation, and Treasury; USAID; and EPA. The DGHD would have a seat on all major interagency groups working on trade issues. The Secretary of the new department would have a central role regarding certain U.S. Government agencies and entities: • The Director of the Trade and Development Agency (TDA) would report to the Secretary of the DGHD. • The DGHD Secretary would maintain the seat that the Administrator of USAID presently has on the Board of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC); • DGHD Secretary also would become an ex officio member of the Board of the Export-Import Bank; and • The appropriate regional DGHD Assistant Secretary would become an ex officio member of the Board of, respectively, the Inter-American and African Development Foundations. The Peace Corps would retain its independence outside the DGHD. State Department accounts that have a large security/military component would remain there, such as the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Account and the Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs Account. The State Department would retain control over political and security-related programs, including Economic Support Funds (ESF) and military assistance. However, the DGHD would work closely with the State Department to ensure that ESF monies allocated for projects are used to promote development. ESF is rarely a cash transfer to another government. Much more frequently, ESF is provided as project assistance, and much of it is implemented by USAID.5 5 Problems occur when State insists that USAID implement patently inappropriate projects. This happens when State officials confuse their role in

Appendix IV provides a notional allocation of roles between the DGHD and various departments and agencies presently funded through the 150 Account. The DGHD must be structured to work effectively with the variety of private actors also working to promote global and human development. The HELP Commission’s recent report on foreign assistance reform, “Beyond Assistance,”6 notes: “Private philanthropists and foundations, multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, co-operatives, faith-based organizations and universities are increasingly engaged in the developing world through charitable giving and through development activities which were formerly the exclusive purview of governments. … Our elected leaders should capitalize on the unique skills and assets that other segments of our society can bring to bear.” Expanded partnerships with private organizations should enhance the effectiveness of the DGHD. The DGHD should look to expand recent initiatives in this area, and seek out creative new actors and approaches to work with and support. This should include looking for ways to expand work with voluntary organizations, foundations and individual volunteers. The DGHD must possess a strong capacity to evaluate projects, generate lessons learned, and not only communicate this information within the DGHD, but also to share it with other bilateral and multilateral donors, recipient countries, civil society and other actors. Foreign assistance programs need to operate under one coherent system not merely to account for where monies are being invested and for what purpose, but, equally, to measure and understand whether and how programs have helped improve peoples’ lives, e.g., by increasing literacy rates, decreasing infant deaths, sustaining communities’ natural resources, strengthening democratic institutions, and other similar measures. The DGHD should integrate women’s empowerment and gender equality into all its activities and mechanisms for measuring success.

Resource Allocation, Coordination, and Staffing

Under the DGHD, overall resource allocation would proceed in a radically different manner from what occurs today providing overall policy direction with USAID’s role to provide professional design and management of development programs. The State Department’s ability to require USAID to implement ESF programs that USAID finds inappropriate has varied from administration to administration. The Clinton Administration had a Memorandum of Understanding governing State-USAID collaboration on ESF that reportedly led to a greater voice for USAID and more appropriate development projects through ESF. The Bush Administration has lowered USAID’s voice, reverting to older U.S. Government habits of using ESF as “walking around money” intended to serve short-term U.S. interests with much less regard for effective development promotion. 6 For more discussion of the HELP Commission’s report and other recent studies of foreign assistance, see Appendix III.

under the “F” process of foreign assistance reform. The DGHD would receive its budget from the Congress, and, based on the relevant laws, would make decisions on the proper allocation of funds across countries and sectors. It would have a direct relationship with the Office of Management and Budget on budget issues; its budget would not be vetted by the State Department. The Department of State would play an important role in providing advice to the DGHD on important diplomatic considerations to take into account when considering allocations, but ultimate decisions on budget levels would be based fundamentally on development and humanitarian criteria. Economic Support Fund (ESF) levels would be decided upon by the Department of State after examining DGHD allocation levels. For example, the State Department would examine country allocations by the DGHD, and, where it concluded that a particular country required additional assistance, would decide to allocate ESF. Then, in consultation with the DGHD, the most appropriate mix of programs would be decided upon. In ESF decisions, the State Department would have the lead in suggesting sectors, while the DGHD would retain the authority to design and manage the most effective programs within the sector. ESF allocations could be made on rare occasions as direct cash transfers to a country’s government, but most ESF funds would go to projects designed and managed by the DGHD. The U.S. Government has a variety of interests in many countries of the world. These interests can include preventing conflict, fighting terrorism, strengthening civil society, promoting democracy, strengthening the private sector, reducing child and maternal mortality, and many more. There is not one “right” mix of programs in such complex situations, particularly given the constantly changing environment and the involvement of multiple local and international actors. Particularly in fragile states, careful coordination among the Department of State, DGHD, DoD, and other U.S. actors will be required. InterAction supports close coordination among U.S. Government departments and agencies working internationally. The Department of State would retain the lead role in the U.S. Government mandated to coordinate overall U.S. engagement in particular countries. The DGHD would ensure that the development voice is not muffled as these complex issues are discussed. Further, with most programs placed within the DGHD, the confusion of multiple Cabinetlevel departments operating programs in countries around the world would be addressed, with coordination processes streamlined and rationalized. The U.S. ambassador in any country would remain the head of the country team, including DGHD representatives. Just as the Department of Defense regularly has defense attachés in U.S. embassies who works closely with the U.S. ambassador and serves as the voice of DoD within the Embassy,

so the DGHD Country Director would work closely with the ambassador and serve as the leader and voice of the DGHD within the Embassy. The DGHD Country Director would coordinate all DGHD activities in country, including all operations of the present USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), and Office of Food for Peace, as well as all of the international refugee functions presently under the State Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration, the Department of Agriculture’s food aid programs and other smaller programs currently housed in the Departments of Commerce and Labor and other parts of the executive branch. InterAction strongly believes in local ownership of programs and partnerships with stakeholders. This can only be done well when administered by staff based in the country; it cannot be done effectively from Washington. According to former USAID Administrator J. Brian Atwood: If a foreign agency is to be effective in assisting a nation pursuing a development strategy, it must have adequate numbers of professionals on the ground (including a large number of host-country citizens), and programmatic flexibility to direct resources where needed. Its professional representatives must have the standing and knowledge to coordinate with the government and with other donors. The skills needed are managerial, diplomatic, and technical, combined with cultural sensitivity and language capacity. The Department for Global and Human Development must place most of its staff in the countries where it works (including outside of capital cities where appropriate), attract high-quality personnel, and provide regular opportunities for in-service training. Placing sufficient numbers of talented, trained, motivated personnel in cities like Jakarta and Monrovia is the best way to establish the types of programs and maintain the kinds of partnerships that will promote development in countries like Indonesia and Liberia. The DGHD will need to recruit a substantial number of professionals who are highly skilled in particular technical areas. Some of these people will staff technical offices in Washington; others will serve in DGHD field missions. The U.S. Government suffers from a drastically low number of technical experts in such key areas as agriculture, democracy promotion, development economics, education, the environment, gender, and population. The new Development Leadership Initiative (DLI) of USAID Administrator Henrietta Fore, included in the administration’s FY 2009 Budget Request, is an important step in the right direction. Under the DLI, “USAID will recruit, hire, and train 300 new Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) in critical stewardship and technical backstops. The DLI will strengthen USAID’s capacity to provide leadership overseas to develop, implement, and integrate programs

that bring peace, prosperity, and security to the world.” This important initiative should be dramatically expanded under the DGHD.

Legislation

Creating such a Cabinet-level department requires passage of new authorizing legislation to rewrite the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as well as revision of other legislation relating to specialized programs, such as the Millennium Challenge Act and the sections in the Farm Bill relating to food aid.

APPENDIX I. President John F. Kennedy and Foreign Assistance Structure

In 1961, barely two months in office, President John F. Kennedy sent a “Special Message to Congress on Foreign Aid.” Most of it could be applied nearly verbatim as a diagnosis of today’s problems as well as a cogent reform program. His message included the following: … (N)o objective supporter of foreign aid can be satisfied with the existing program – actually a multiplicity of programs. Bureaucratically fragmented, awkward and slow, its administration is diffused over a haphazard and irrational structure covering at least four department and several other agencies. The program is based on a series of legislative measures and administrative procedures conceived at different times and for different purposes, many of them now obsolete, inconsistent and unduly rigid and thus unsuited for our present needs and purposes. Its weaknesses have begun to undermine confidence in our effort both here and abroad. The program requires a highly professional skilled service, attracting substantial numbers of high caliber men and women capable of sensitive dealing with other governments, and with a deep understanding of the process of economic development. However, uncertainty and declining public prestige have all contributed to a fall in the morale and efficiency of those employees in the field who are repeatedly frustrated by the delays and confusions caused by overlapping agency jurisdictions and unclear objectives. Only the persistent efforts of those dedicated and hard-working public servants who have kept the program going, managed to bring some success to our efforts overseas. In addition, uneven and undependable shortterm financing has weakened the incentive for the long-term planning and self-help by the recipient nations which are essential to serious economic development. The lack of stability and continuity in the program – the necessity to accommodate all planning to a yearly deadline – when combined with a confusing multiplicity of American aid agencies within a single nation abroad – have reduced the effectiveness of our own assistance and made more difficult the task of setting realistic targets and sound standards. Piecemeal projects, hastily designed to match the rhythm of the fiscal year are no substitute for orderly long-term planning. … Although our aid programs have helped to avoid economic chaos and collapse, and assisted many nations to maintain their independence and freedom – nevertheless it is a fact that many of the na-

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tions we are helping are not much nearer sustained economic growth than they were when our aid operation began. Money spent to meet crisis situations or short-term political objectives while helping to maintain national integrity and independence has rarely moved the recipient nation toward greater economic stability. … If our foreign aid funds are to be prudently and effectively used, we need a whole new set of basic concepts and principles: Unified administration and operation – a single agency in Washington and the field, equipped with a flexible set of tools, in place of several competing and confusing aid units. Country plans – a carefully thought through program tailored to meet the needs and the resource potential of each individual country, instead of a series of individual, unrelated projects. Frequently, in the past, our development goals and projects have not been undertaken as integral steps in a longrange economic development program. Long-term planning and financing – the only way to make meaningful and economical commitments. … Special attention to those nations most willing and able to mobilize their own resources, make necessary social and economic reforms, engage in longrange planning, and make the other efforts necessary if these are to reach the stage of self-sustaining growth. Multilateral approach – a program and level of commitments designed to encourage and complement an increased effort by other industrialized nations. A new agency with new personnel – drawing upon the most competent and dedicated career servants now in the field, and attracting the highest quality from every part of the nation. Separation from military assistance – our program of aid to social and economic development must be seen on its own merits, and judged in the light of its vital and distinctive contribution to our basic security needs. … I propose that our separate and often confusing aid programs be integrated into a single Administration … The field work in all these operations will be under the direction of a single mission chief in each country reporting to the American Ambassador. This is intended to remove the difficulty which the aided countries and our own field personnel sometimes encounter in finding the proper channel of decision-making. …

But I am not proposing merely a reshuffling and re-labeling of old agencies and their personnel, without regard to their competence. I am recommending the replacement of these agencies with a new one – a fresh start under new leadership. But new organization is not enough. We need a new working concept. At the center of the new effort must be national development programs. It is essential that the developing nations set for themselves sensible targets; that these targets be based on balanced programs for their own economic, educational and social growth-programs which use their own resources to the maximum. If planning assistance is required, our own aid organization will be prepared to respond to requests for such assistance, along with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and other international and private institutions. Thus, the first requirement is that each recipient government seriously undertake to the best of its ability on its own those efforts of resource mobilization, self-help and internal reform – including land reform, tax reform and improved education and social justice – which its own development requires and which would increase its capacity to absorb external capital productivity. And in May 1961, President Kennedy stated: My decisions on foreign affairs organization are predicted on the following principles: First, authority for the conduct of activities which advance our foreign policy objectives should be vested in the President or other officials primarily concerned with foreign affairs. Second, international activities of domestic agencies should be clearly either (i) necessary extensions of their normal domestic missions or (ii) undertaken on behalf of and in support of programs and objectives of the appropriate foreign affairs agencies.

APPENDIX II. Recent Studies on Restructuring Foreign Assistance

Three studies released in the second half of 2007, while differing on the specifics, all agreed on the importance of foreign assistance and the need to significantly alter present structures and approaches. One report, “Embassies Grapple to Guide Foreign Aid”, was prepared by the Minority Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. They endorsed the importance of foreign assistance and bemoaned the decline of USAID, but did not agree on the creation of a Cabinet-level agency.

The next, the U.S. Commission on Helping to Enhance the Livelihoods of People (HELP Commission), proposed a new structure for the State Department, and, in two annexes, four of the Commissioners endorsed the creation of a new Cabinet-level Department of International Sustainable Development. InterAction has commented on the HELP Commission’s recommendations: http://www.interaction.org/ media/20071207-HELPReport.htm. Also in its report, the Commission on Smart Power, organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), underscored the importance of development: “The most sustainable rationale for global development over time is this: American leaders ought to commit to global development because it reinforces basic American values, contributes to peace, justice, and prosperity, and improves the way we are viewed around the world. Investing in development contributes to American security at home by promoting stability abroad. A U.S. government effort that promotes a positive relationship with the world’s poor, their civil society institutions, and governments is in the interest of the American people.” The Commission called for the creation of a “cabinet-level voice for global development.” Its rationale for this position is strong: “Internally, a cabinet-level voice could bring greater coherence across the aid community and the entire U.S. foreign policy establishment and provide a sense of common purpose for development personnel in the U.S. government. Retention, recruitment, and training of experienced development staff are currently major challenges. Externally, a cabinet-level voice for global development would show a different American face to the world. Development as a theme concerned with the world’s less fortunate and a process grounded in partnership helps to connect the United States to foreign populations.” However, as with the HELP Commission, the Smart Power Commissioners did not agree on a specific model. Finally, InterAction CEO Sam Worthington is part of a new Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network, a coalition of NGOs, think tanks, and foreign policy experts, which relased a proposal entitled, “New Day, New Way: U.S. Foreign Assistance for the 21st Century.” That proposal recommends four specific actions: Develop a national strategy for global development; Reach a “grand bargain” between the Executive Branch and Congress on management authorities and plan, design and enact a new Foreign Assistance Act; Increase funding for and accountability of foreign assistance, and; Streamline the organizational structure and improve organizational capacity by creating a Cabinetlevel Department for Global Development. The “New Day, New Way” proposal is available here: http://interaction. org/library/detail.php?id=6288

APPENDIX III. Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security, “On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security,” Center for Global Development, 2004

In 2004, the Center for Global Development formed a bipartisan panel of 30 former U.S. Government officials and members of Congress, representatives of academia, civil society, the private sector, think tanks and research centers as the Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security. Their report recommended a Cabinet-level development agency: A new architecture must give development issues a single, strong voice at the Cabinet level; better coordinate the multiple agencies and entities that deliver foreign assistance; play a role in development and trade policy; establish a single, unified budget for development; and integrate strategies for countries and regions. Development policy is an increasingly important tool – it is more than just writing a check – and the United States needs to invest in developing the expertise and capacity to wield it effectively. For all these reasons, the Commission proposes that the administration establish an integrated development strategy and implement it within a single, Cabinet-level development agency. The new Cabinet department would not entail an expansion in bureaucracy but incorporate USAID, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and some foreign assistance programs run by the Departments of State, Defense, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture. Of course, the United States will always deploy some economic assistance purely in support of diplomatic goals; resources for that purpose should remain in the State Department. In addition, although Treasury has been consistently effective in working with Congress to ensure appropriate U.S. leadership in the multilateral development banks, those activities ultimately should move from Treasury to the new development agency as well, if it is to meet the challenges we have outlined. Treasury should retain its strength on core economic issues and continue to be responsible for the IMF, giving it a leading role in guiding U.S. policy toward the international financial institutions. These significant changes would need to be codified in a new Foreign Assistance Act written to replace the outdated authorizing legislation that currently governs U.S. development activities.

APPENDIX IV. DGHD Role in Present U.S. Government Programs Funded by the 150 Account

The following table lists in the first column the accounts found in the administration’s FY 2009 request for international affairs (150 Account). The second column lists which U.S. Government entity presently controls funding. The third column indicates what role the DGHD would have if such accounts continued to exist upon its creation. Two caveats are in order. First, this table is not intended to suggest that this account structure would be optimal, or even appropriate, after the creation of the DGHD; to the contrary, any reform creating the DGHD also should rationalize and reduce the overall number of accounts. Second, it does not capture every activity discussed in this paper, since other international development activities receive funding from different departments, such as Defense, Labor, and Commerce, which are funded via other accounts in the Federal Budget.

Account

Present Control

Peacekeeping Operations International Military Education and Training

State State

International Financial Institutions International Organizations and Programs

Treasury State

P.L. 480 Title II (Food for Peace) McGovern-Dole International Food for Education

USAID Agriculture

Export-Import Bank of the United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation U.S. Trade and Development Agency Child Survival and Health Programs Fund Development Assistance International Disaster Assistance Transition Initiatives Development Credit Authority USAID Operating Expenses USAID Capital Investment Fund USAID Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund USAID Inspector General Operating Expenses Economic Support Fund Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union Peace Corps Inter-American Foundation African Development Foundation Millennium Challenge Corporation Global HIV/AIDS Initiative1* International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Andean Counterdrug Program Migration and Refugee Assistance U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs Treasury Technical Assistance and Debt Restructuring Foreign Military Financing

Ex-Im Board OPIC Board Independent agency USAID USAID USAID USAID USAID USAID USAID USAID USAID Department of State Department of State Department of State Independent agency Foundation Board Foundation Board MCC Board State State State State State State Treasury State

1 *Provides much of the funding for the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)

Role of DGHD

Seat on Board Seat on Board TDA Director reports to DGHD Secretary Lead Lead Lead Lead Lead Abolish account Lead Lead Lead Coordinate with State Lead Lead Coordinate with Peace Corps Seat on Board Seat on Board Replace State as lead Lead Coordinate with State Coordinate with State Lead Lead Coordinate, as necessary, with State Coordinate with Treasury Input to State on dev’t implications on appropriate countries Input to State on dev’t implications Input to State on dev’t implications on appropriate countries Shared coordination with Treasury Coordinate with State on appropriate organizations and programs Lead Lead

POLICY PAPER

November 2008

Why the U.S. Needs a Cabinet-level Department for Global and Human Development Previously published by InterAction, July 2008.

T

he United States Government’s system for allocating and delivering foreign assistance is badly broken and must be repaired. InterAction, the largest alliance of U.S.-based development and humanitarian assistance nongovernmental organizations, released a paper discussing seven principles that should guide foreign assistance reform (http://www. interaction.org/files.cgi/4715_IA_development_principles.pdf). As part of the reform effort, InterAction has also called for the creation of a Cabinet-level Department for Global and Human Development (DGHD). This paper discusses those principles as they relate to the need for this new department. The Department for Global and Human Development’s fundamental mandate will be to promote people-centered, sustainable development (broadly defined and inclusive of the Millennium Development Goals1) and to provide humanitarian assistance. The long-term goal of its activities is a stable, sustainable world of free, democratic, economically prosperous states in which the worst aspects of poverty have been eliminated. Effective work in this area is in the U.S. national interest. As the Commission on Smart Power, organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), explained in its 2007 report: American leaders ought to commit to global development because it reinforces basic American values, contributes to peace, justice, and prosperity, and improves the way we are viewed around the world. Investing in development contributes to American security at home by promoting stability abroad. A U.S. government effort that promotes a positive relationship with the world’s poor, their civil society institutions, and governments is in the interest of the American people.

Background

1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

Major U.S. Government foreign assistance programs began after World War II. Only two decades later, responding to what he called the “haphazard and irrational structure” that characterized the U.S. Government’s approach to foreign assistance, President John F. Kennedy proposed and the Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. In 1961, President Kennedy also created USAID as a “(u)nified administration and operation – a single agency in Washington and the field, equipped with a flexible set of tools, in place of several 1 The eight Millennium Development Goals are to: (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3) promote gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce child mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) develop a global partnership for development. The Bush Administration has endorsed these goals.

competing and confusing aid units.” Nearly five decades later, the U.S. Government’s system for allocating and delivering foreign assistance is badly broken and must be repaired yet again. Drawing on the insights of President Kennedy, recent studies and extensive experience from six decades of nongovernmental organizations’ (NGOs) work on development and humanitarian issues, InterAction recommends the creation of a Cabinet-level Department for Global and Human Development as a critical component of the broader effort to rebuild U.S. foreign assistance. We believe this name emphasizes the major attributes that the new department must have: • Global because the department will focus on global issues. The DGHD will lead U.S. Government international programs on HIV/AIDS, avian flu and other health threats, as well as climate change and biodiversity conservation. It will play a role within the U.S. Government on trade issues with the developing world. The department also will be global in its focus on participation and collaboration with recipient country governments, other donors, multilateral organizations, and, crucially, with civil society. • Human because the department will focus on peoplecentered development. Its core purpose will be to improve human well-being and alleviate the worst aspects of human suffering. • Development because the department will focus on sustainable development. It will develop and manage coordinated approaches to alleviate poverty, promote sustainable, equitable economic growth, and respond to global challenges.

Principles for effective foreign assistance and the need for a new department

The experience of the InterAction community teaches that an effective reform of U.S. foreign assistance must incorporate the following seven principles: 1. Poverty reduction must be a primary objective of U.S. foreign assistance because it promotes stability. 2. Achieving the long-term objectives of global prosperity and freedom depends upon sustainable development as a long-term process, which should not be sidetracked for any short-term political agenda. The achievement of long-term development goals requires a patient and steady approach. 3. Cohesion and coherence, in place of current fragmentation, are necessary to achieve the effective use of foreign assistance resources. 4. Building local capacity promotes country ownership and leads to self-sufficiency. 5. Harmonize priorities among U.S. government agencies, multilateral institutions and recipient governments to assure the best use of resources.

6. Humanitarian assistance programs should continue to be a core part of foreign aid and be guided by the principle of impartiality to conform with international humanitarian law. 7. U.S. foreign assistance programs should be under civilian control and run by development professionals in order to be appropriate for the public abroad. The U.S. military should be engaged in foreign assistance delivery only in exceptional circumstances when they have unique capabilities or responsibilities, e.g. during natural disasters when the logistical capabilities of the military may be crucial in providing life-saving assistance, or during conflict that precludes the presence of civilian aid workers. The balance of this paper examines each of these principles in the context of the call for a new department: 1. Poverty reduction must be a primary objective of U.S. foreign assistance because it promotes stability. Today’s U.S. Government programs are not as effective as they should be in reducing poverty for two main reasons: • tensions between short-term political and security goals and long-term development goals too often lead to decisions to fund poorly-designed programs that fail to promote either those short-term goals or development goals; and • the proliferation of uncoordinated programs throughout the Executive Branch results in less effective achievement of development goals than will occur under the unifying structure of a department. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Act that presently governs most U.S. foreign assistance programs, has required a particular focus on poverty reduction since it was revised in the early 1970s. However, the Act itself was enacted nearly fifty years ago, is more than nine hundred pages long, and has been amended numerous times. The present Act no longer provides coherent guidance to the Executive Branch on foreign assistance; rather, it is a smorgasbord from which any policy can be chosen and justified. The Foreign Assistance Act must be rewritten to re-emphasize the focus on poverty reduction. The creation of a department like the one proposed in this paper will be critical to ensuring that Executive Branch execution of the revised law reflects that focus while also providing necessary coordination within the U.S. Government and between the U.S. and other actors. A focus on poverty reduction requires balancing shortterm efforts to directly attack poverty and longer-term efforts to promote broad-based economic growth, thereby reducing poverty. InterAction believes that the new department must implement programs and policies that lead to measurable improvements over the short to medium-term in human well-being, particularly among the poorest.

2. Achieving the long-term objectives of global prosperity and freedom depends upon sustainable development as a long-term process, which should not be sidetracked for any short-term political agenda. The achievement of long-term development goals requires a patient and steady approach. This principle should guide efforts to alleviate the tensions between short-term political and security goals and long-term development goals. Today, these tensions too often lead to decisions to fund poorly-designed programs that fail to promote either those short-term goals or development goals. This problem was exacerbated by the Bush Administration’s reorganization of foreign assistance in early 2006, when the Secretary of State created a new senior position in the Department of State, the Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA), and a new office at State of people working for the DFA. This official and accompanying office were dubbed “F.” This decision has led to a near merger of USAID within the Department of State, with accompanying confusion of development and diplomatic goals. Carol Lancaster and Ann Van Dusen anticipated many of the problems of placing the central coordinating official for foreign assistance within the State Department in a prescient study published in 2005, Organizing Foreign Aid: Confronting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century. They discussed the critical distinction between aid “allocated to countries (usually by the Department of State) primarily for diplomatic reasons – to fortify or reward a friendly state” and aid allocated “to achieve developmental goals (for example, to expand education or promote agriculture).” These two goals are emphatically not the same, even though aid allocated for diplomatic and/or security reasons is often implemented by USAID. They stress this crucial point: “development work is quite distinct from the core activity of the [D]epartment [of State],” since “[d]evelopment implies a long-term engagement in bringing about social change in other countries, requiring a set of skills and a consistency over time that can prove a poor fit with the skills and more short-term time horizon and modus operandi associated with traditional diplomacy.” Writing before the “F” process began, Lancaster and Van Dusen noted that “USAID’s current strategic planning process is … too control oriented and Washington driven …” Since then, the “F” process has resulted in changes to foreign assistance that have significantly exacerbated these problems. InterAction has concluded that neither the “F” process nor a “super State Department,” as proposed by some, is the way to reach the goal of a coherent, effective, well-coordinated, well-managed, powerful set of programs within the U.S. Government that promote global and human development. InterAction further believes that the importance of development, while recognized by the Bush Administration,

was undercut by giving the State Department primacy over both diplomacy and development. The creation of a new Department for Global and Human Development will take the core insight of the Bush Administration regarding the importance of development and create an organizational structure that finally will provide global and human development with the voice (and the seat at the table) it needs to be a truly effective counterpart for the Departments of Defense and State, and to provide the strong organization it needs to be effective internationally. 3. Cohesion and coherence, in place of current fragmentation, are necessary to achieve the effective use of foreign assistance resources. This principle should guide efforts to address the proliferation of uncoordinated programs throughout the Executive Branch that results in less effective achievement of development goals than would occur under the unifying structure of a department The U.S. Agency for International Development, the primary agency currently responsible for U.S. foreign assistance programs, is weak, poorly organized, and has been demoralized and eviscerated by severe staff shortages. Further, U.S. foreign assistance programs are chaotically spread across dozens of government departments and agencies in fifty different, largely uncoordinated programs. The creation of “F” has not had a large effect in reducing the overall incoherence of U.S. Government efforts internationally. The present effort under “F” cannot even assert effective control over other aid activities within the Department of State, such as the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator, much less over other Cabinet-level assistance programs run by the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, Labor, and many others, without any effective overall coordination. There is broad agreement, including among actors as diverse as Secretary of Defense Gates, the bipartisan members of the HELP Commission, and Oxfam on the need to elevate the importance of development and to improve the coherence of U.S. Government foreign assistance programs. This was the intent of the Bush Administration’s creation of “F.” However, as Gerald Hyman, a former senior official at USAID, noted in his recent report, Assessing Secretary of State Rice’s Reform of U.S. Foreign Assistance, the “F” experience has not been a happy one: (H)ow did the reform turn out? The answer, in short, is that the reform, whose goals of transformation, transparency, and accountability are unassailable, has, in practice, dramatically centralized not only the large strategic issues but also the tactical ones. It has created an unwieldy system directed by a small core staff, which cannot possibly keep pace with the details necessary to make its own reform system work, let alone be wise or knowledgeable

enough to make the good decisions the reform system requires. The reform has marginalized embassies in the design and delivery of assistance, although that defect was mitigated somewhat after the first year. And finally, the process by which the reform was created also marginalized those who might have made it better, especially the congressional oversight panels that would be asked to authorize and appropriate resources in its wake. The old system needed reform, and unquestionably the Rice initiative has brought improvements – but not nearly enough and at too high a price. For example, festering problems of fragmentation and incoherence have been addressed, but in a way that creates very substantial problems. Overall, the benefits of the reform have not been worth the costs. The DGHD will incorporate the vast majority of U.S. Government development programs, simplifying the task of coordination and providing both cohesion and coherence to U.S. Government development and humanitarian efforts. However, cohesion and coherence are required not only within U.S. Government development and humanitarian programs, but between such programs and others, particularly those managed by the Departments of State and Defense. The new Department for Global and Human Development will work in a variety of environments, ranging from states, such as Pakistan (see Appendix I), Colombia, and Afghanistan, where the U.S. is pursuing multiple objectives through multiple departments, to states in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, where it will often be the largest U.S. Government department providing assistance. Its Cabinetlevel designation will give it the clout to insist on the importance of effective development strategies in countries such as Pakistan, without being drowned out by louder voices in the government arguing for an emphasis on other goals, often to the detriment of effective development promotion. A department-level voice advocating for development should make it easier to reach the appropriate balance between various assistance tools and the valid imperatives of the Departments of State and Defense. Fragile states in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere pose different challenges for the U.S. Government. Many of these countries are not high on the list of U.S. short-term foreign policy priorities and do not receive substantial amounts of foreign assistance or U.S. attention. The greatest risk now, particularly in the states of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, is that the present confusion between diplomacy and development is being compounded by the elevation of the role of the U.S. military in development. As in Pakistan, if the militarization of U.S. assistance continues, U.S. credibility and effectiveness in promoting development in Africa and elsewhere will continue to be undermined. A new department

will be better able to insist that the U.S. Government develop a coherent, well-balanced strategy for fragile states such as Haiti, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and others that do not receive adequate attention from policymakers focused on shorter-term challenges. 4. Building local capacity promotes country ownership and leads to self-sufficiency. Self-sufficiency, so that foreign assistance is no longer required, is the ultimate goal for countries that receive U.S. development assistance. Capacity building programs for governmental and nongovernmental organizations are essential to reaching this goal. Effective design and implementation of these programs is a great challenge, particularly in the fragile states, and building local capacity can be a complex, long-term process. At present, USAID cannot effectively support this essential goal. The most effective way to build local capacity is through locally-designed and managed projects. This, however, is a labor intensive undertaking, requiring well-trained U.S. Government personnel based in-country to ensure that such projects are well-designed and targeted, and that they are appropriately monitored and evaluated to ensure that they produce the intended, measurable results. A new department will have local capacity building as one of its goals and would employ sufficient numbers of trained staff to design effective programs in this area. The DGHD needs sufficient personnel, a cadre of Foreign Service Officers that is double or more the size of today’s USAID direct-hire personnel, to support these local development activities. USAID’s present weakness has multiple negative consequences. The U.S. Government’s current capacity to support country ownership is crippled by a drastically low number of technical experts in such key areas as agriculture, democracy promotion, development economics, education, the environment, and population. This shortage of professionals combines disastrously with the requirement that USAID programs large amounts of money according to the labyrinthine directives of the Foreign Assistance Act and the cumbersome regulations designed to implement the law. As a result, USAID is unable to take the risks required to build local capacity by working directly with local organizations. Instead of managing programs to improve governance, promote private sector-led growth, and strengthen civil society’s role in ensuring transparency and participation, USAID increasingly funds massive, multi-billion dollar, worldwide contracts with dozens of U.S.-based implementers. These Indefinite Quantity Contracts (IQCs) can lead to inappropriate organizations undertaking large-scale activities in countries where they have little or no prior experience. The current USAID Administrator, Henrietta Fore, has recognized that personnel shortages undermine development effectiveness. Her Development Leadership Initiative (DLI),

included in the administration’s FY 2009 Budget Request, is an important step in the right direction. Under the DLI, “USAID will recruit, hire, and train 300 new Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) in critical stewardship and technical backstops. The DLI will strengthen USAID’s capacity to provide leadership overseas to develop, implement, and integrate programs that bring peace, prosperity, and security to the world.” This important initiative should be dramatically expanded under the DGHD. Gender equity is a key component of building local capacity and ownership. It should be an integral part of development practice and a key goal of development programs. Effective programming in this area requires a keen understanding of local realities. Currently, programs to promote gender equity are under-resourced and not sufficiently priorititized. The DGHD, with more appropriately staffed Missions, will be able to design and manage the range of programs necessary to promote local ownership with gender equity. 5. Harmonize priorities among U.S. government agencies, multilateral institutions, and recipient governments to assure the best use of resources. As discussed above, the creation of a Cabinet-level department will harmonize priorities within the U.S. Government and facilitate efforts to coordinate effectively with other actors. To harmonize priorities among the new department, multilateral institutions, and recipient governments, it is essential that a new administration refocus U.S. international engagement on much greater collaboration and harmonization with these and other actors. The present administration has emphasized unilateral approaches, with inadequate attention to coordination with other donors, recipient governments, and others. Various reports released over the last year, including the report of the Commission on Smart Power and the Georgetown University report America’s Role in the World: Foreign Policy Choices for the Next President stress the need for the U.S. to emphasize collaboration with and participation in international organizations as an essential restructuring of U.S. engagement policies. The DGHD will further this goal by creating a central location for coordinated engagement by the U.S. with others on sustainable development and humanitarian assistance programs. 6. Humanitarian assistance programs should continue to be a core part of foreign aid and be guided by the principle of impartiality to conform with international humanitarian law. The U.S. has long been a world leader in providing highly effective, rapid assistance during humanitarian emergencies. Nevertheless, division of responsibilities across various departments and agencies, including the Departments of State, Defense and Agriculture, and USAID, undercuts the

effectiveness of U.S. activities. The DGHD will strengthen the ability of the U.S. to respond in a coordinated fashion to these emergencies, making efficient and effective use of the many tools of the U.S. Government. In particular, the DGHD will lead in coordinating the U.S. response to emergencies, using, when needed, the tremendous logistical resources of the Department of Defense, but always in a coordinated approach. Various proposals circulating in Washington suggest the creation of a new cadre of experts to enhance the U.S. ability to respond to such emergencies. Too often, such proposals do nothing to address the weakness of USAID today and the strengths of the many private voluntary organizations that focus on response to humanitarian emergencies. Strengthening U.S. capabilities in this area should concentrate on the actual strengths and weaknesses of engaged private actors and the U.S. Government. 7. U.S. foreign assistance programs should be under civilian control and run by development professionals in order to be appropriate for the public abroad. The Bush Administration is the first to clarify the importance of three areas of international engagement: development, diplomacy, and defense. As the 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States explains, “Development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies.” However, the U.S. Government today possesses a weak development arm. This means that, although the U.S. Government has conceptually endorsed the importance of these three areas, it has not yet taken adequate actions to match its rhetoric. Development is a profession, as different from diplomacy as diplomacy is from work on defense issues. Although it has understood the importance of these three areas, the Bush Administration has not acted on the need for professionalism to achieve development goals. Indeed, it has sometimes acted as if the disparate skills of development professional, diplomat, and soldier were interchangeable. In particular, the administration sometimes has assigned development tasks to diplomatic and military professionals. They have not performed well. At the same time, the administration too often undervalued the importance of civilian development professionals working both within the administration and in nongovernmental organizations. Diplomacy, defense, and development all are important components of U.S. international action. All three need to be strong. The U.S. Government at present is only organized for effective action in two of these three areas. The Departments of State and Defense are powerful actors within the U.S. Government. The Department for Global and Human Development must have its own seat at the table alongside State and Defense, and must be staffed and managed by development

professionals, not controlled by others with different training and expertise. InterAction’s principles clearly state the need for coordination and coherence in U.S. Government programs. Particularly in fragile states, alleviating poverty and promoting economic growth, human rights, democracy and good governance require effective action to promote peace and security. This often implies actions involving the U.S. military, such as military education and training programs. Defense professionals, led by Secretary Gates, already have recognized that when peace and security exist in a region, it is essential that civilian professionals be in place to design, manage and implement sustainable programs to fight poverty and promote economic growth, human rights, democracy and good governance. Furthermore, interrelated, coordinated diplomatic and development initiatives are necessary to promote sustainable development. Therefore, InterAction supports close coordination among U.S. Government actors working in these areas. The Secretary of State would retain the statutory authority as the person under the President ultimately responsible for U.S. activities internationally. The U.S. Ambassador in any country would remain the head of the country team, which would include Department of Defense professionals as well as those working for the DGHD. This coordination role for the Secretary and Department of State should not be confused with the deep understanding, experience and ability required to manage programs in development and humanitarian response. Just as the U.S. military is the repository of U.S. Government expertise on defense issues, the new department will serve as the repository of U.S. Government expertise in development and humanitarian response. In this context, InterAction believes that the U.S. military should be engaged in non-military foreign assistance delivery only in exceptional circumstances when they have unique capabilities or responsibilities, e.g. during natural disasters when the logistical capabilities of the military may be crucial in providing life-saving assistance, or during conflict which precludes the presence of civilian aid workers.

Conclusion

The United States Government’s system for allocating and delivering foreign assistance is badly broken and must be repaired. As this paper has highlighted, principles that should guide foreign assistance reform in general also demonstrate the need for a Cabinet-level Department for Global and Human Development as part of that reform process. Recognizing that creating such a department is a significant organizational undertaking, InterAction has also produced a separate paper with recommendations on how to structure the department and details of its operational role in relation to other departments and agencies in the U.S. Government

APPENDIX I. Pakistan, Soft Power, and the Misuse of Foreign Assistance

A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan, a study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released last year prior to the tragedy of Benazir Bhutto’s assassination analyzed what happens when development is undervalued in U.S. Government efforts: For American assistance to be effective in a largeaid-recipient state such as Pakistan, it must go beyond transactional, quid pro quo deals and address the country’s main drivers of conflict, instability and extremism. Despite more than $10 billion in U.S. assistance since September 11, 2001, distrust, dissatisfaction and unrealistic expectations continue to undermine the official goal of developing a strong, strategic and enduring partnership. Pakistan’s main drivers of conflict, instability and extremism include: a culture of impunity and injustice, discontent in the provinces, ethnic and sectarian tensions, a rapidly growing and urbanizing youth population, and extremist views among traditional allies. Militant groups exploit these underlying conditions to recruit followers on the basis of a narrative of shared suffering and injustice and the failure of the state to provide stability or prosperity. The vast majority of U.S. assistance to Pakistan since September 11, 2001, however, has not been directed to Pakistan’s underlying fault-lines, but to specific, short-term counterterrorism objectives … The authors of the CSIS study made five recommendations to reformulate U.S. assistance to Pakistan: For U.S. assistance to be effective in a large-aid-recipient nation like Pakistan, it must move toward the following five goals: 1. Broaden the partnership. Aid works best when donor objectives are aligned with the aims of local partners, grounded in local realities and open to regular evaluation by local residents. … 2. Increase transparency. This study has demonstrated that there is little transparency in how much money the United States spends in Pakistan and where it goes. After months of research, there is still a feeling that billions of dollars could be unaccounted for even though simple reporting mechanisms are available. The lack of transparency hurts policymakers’ ability to make strategic decisions on the basis of all available information. It also makes publics both in the United States and in Pakistan less trusting and more cynical about the na-

ture of the partnership. 3. Become more catalytic and more flexible. When a crisis arises, the cry to do something is great, and the first response is often to do what is already being done at greater scale with the same partners. This is compounded by structural inflexibility in the way aid is allocated and disbursed. Once money has been appropriated and programmed, shifting money to needed problems is infrequently attempted. The United States should do more to encourage innovation and entrepreneurism among aid delivery in Pakistan. America should recognize its own limitations and seek to play more of a catalytic role in building local capacity. 4. Develop an integrated strategy aligned with resources. This research has suggested that the United States does not have a wellintegrated Pakistan strategy that cuts across all relevant departments and agencies. Points of collaboration may occur, but it is ad hoc rather than the norm. … 5. Integrate hard and soft power. There is no magic formula for striking the right balance between coercion and getting Islamabad to share the same goals as America. There is a clear imbalance of resources, however, going to short-term security cooperation over longer-term relationship building. With only about 25 percent of embassy employees in Islamabad coming from the State Department, the civilian side of the U.S. government does not have the right people, training or funds to be a capable partner for the Department of Defense or the intelligence community. A strategy driven by security personnel often is skewed to short-term, concrete targets, even though this may account for only 10 percent of what building long-term security actually requires. The development community would not have to fear that poverty alleviation would be subjugated to national security priorities in a post-9/11 world if there could be a consensus established between civilians and the military on both sides of the aisle that poverty may not produce terrorists in any direct sort of way, but that it is an underlying condition easily exploited all over the world. These recommendations highlight the role that a Department for Global and Human Development can play in ensuring that development promotion in countries such as Pakistan becomes an integral part of U.S. policy.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

InterAction Public Policy Working Group

1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

Organization

URL

Academy for Educational Development Action Against Hunger Action Aid Adventist Development and Relief Agency International Africare Aga Khan Foundation U.S.A. Air Serv International American Friends Service Committee American Jewish World Service American Red Cross American Refugee Committee AmeriCares Bread for the World CARE Catholic Medical Mission Board Catholic Relief Services Center for Health and Gender Equity, Inc Centre for Development & Population Activities (CEDPA) CHF International Child Health Foundation (CHF) Christian Children’s Fund Church World Service Concern Worldwide Congressional Hunger Center Counterpart International Ethiopian Community Development Council, Inc Florida Association for Volunteer Action in the Caribbean and the Americas (FAVACA) Food for the Hungry Friends of the World Food Program Global Health Council Habitat for Humanity International Heartland Alliance Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society Heifer International InsideNGO Institute for Sustainable Communities Interplast Int’l Catholic Migration Commission Int’l Center for Research on Women Int’l Crisis Group International Medical Corps

www.aed.org www.actionagainsthunger.org www.actionaid.org www.adra.org www.africare.org www.akdn.org www.airserv.org www.afsc.org www.ajws.org www.redcross.org www.archq.org www.americares.org www.bread.org www.care.org www.cmmb.org www.crs.org www.genderhealth.org www.cedpa.org www.chfinternational.org www.childhealthfoundation.org www.christianchildrensfund.org www.churchworldservice.org www.concernusa.org www.hungercenter.org www.counterpart.org www.ecdcinternational.org www.favaca.org/ www.fh.org www.friendsofwfp.org www.globalhealth.org www.habitat.org www.heartlandalliance.org www.hias.org www.heifer.org www.InsideNGO.org www.iscvt.org www.interplast.org www.icmc.net www.icrw.org www.crisisweb.org www.imcworldwide.org

InterAction Public Policy Working Group (cont) Organization

URL

Int’l Orthodox Christian Charities Int’l Reading Association International Relief & Development International Rescue Committee Jesuit Refugee Services USA Joint Aid Management Life for Relief and Development Lutheran World Relief Management Sciences for Health MAP International Medical Teams International Mental Disability Rights International Mercy Corps Minnesota International Health Volunteers National Peace Corps Association ONE Campaign Opportunity International Oxfam America Pact Pan American Development Foundation PATH Pathfinder International Physicians for Human Rights Plan USA Population Action International Project HOPE ProLiteracy Worldwide Refugees International Relief International RESULTS, Inc. Save the Children The Hunger Project U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) U.S. Committee for UNDP U.S. Fund for UNICEF Winrock International Women for Women International Women Thrive Worldwide World Vision World Wildlife Fund

www.iocc.org www.reading.org www.ird.org www.theirc.org www.jrsusa.org www.jamusa.org www.lifeusa.org www.lwr.org www.msh.org www.map.org www.medicalteams.org www.mdri.org www.mercycorps.org www.mihv.org www.rpcv.org www.one.org/ www.opportunity.org www.oxfamamerica.org www.pactworld.org www.padf.org www.path.org www.pathfind.org www.phrusa.org www.planusa.org www.populationaction.org www.projecthope.org www.proliteracy.org www.refugeesinternational.org www.ri.org www.results.org www.savethechildren.org www.thp.org www.refugees.org www.undp-usa.org www.unicefusa.org www.winrock.org www.womenforwomen.org www.womenthrive.org www.worldvision.org www.worldwildlife.org

U.S. Government Regulatory Constraints on NGO Space

U.S. Government Regulatory Constraints on NGO Space

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Regulatory Constraints on NGO Space Problem Three Executive branch initiatives undermine the ability of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to effectively implement U.S. foreign assistance  programs. Two intended to help fight terrorism put the lives of NGO staff at risk by requiring the organizations to perform tasks associated with intelligence services. The third needlessly puts countless others at risk by denying them access to programs that can help them avoid contracting HIV/ AIDS.

1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

Recommendations It is imperative that the following three policies be eliminated: (1) USAID’s Partner Vetting System (PVS) to vet NGO personnel and leaders; (2) the Department of Treasury’s Voluntary Guidelines intended to prevent charities funneling money to terrorists; and (3) the anti-prostitution policy requirement for organizations receiving money from the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) through USAID and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).

Actions Partner Vetting System: • Suspend implementation of the rule that created the PVS while using consultative process between USAID and the NGO community to design a workable alternative system that protects NGOs, the government and the public against the unintended diversion of U.S. funds to terrorist organizations without putting U.S. NGO personnel at undue risk; Department of Treasury Voluntary Guidelines: • The Department of Treasury should drop its Anti-Terrorism Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S. Based Charities and endorse in their stead the Principles of International Charity developed by over 39 American NGOs, foundations, grant makers, legal firms, and public interest advocates. This will remove NGOs from roles usually performed by security and intelligence personnel; and Anti-Prostitution Pledge Requirement: • USAID and HHS should revise their guidelines as applied to domestic and foreign NGOs to comply with the August 2008 federal court ruling (which found it unconstitutional to compel U.S.-based groups to adopt the U.S. Government’s requirement), and allow the most effective groups to partner with the U.S. in the fight against HIV/AIDS. 

Results American NGOs would be able to more effectively implement U.S. foreign assistance programs without having to sacrifice constitutional rights or put their staff in physical jeopardy.

Background These three executive branch initiatives undermine the ability of relief and development organizations to effectively implement U.S. foreign assistance programs by restricting access to important groups and discouraging the cooperation of key local partners. Some put U.S. civilians in harm’s way  by requiring them to undertake tasks normally the responsibility of security and intelligence service operatives. Partner Vetting System On July 17, 2007, USAID published a notice in the Federal Register describing the agency’s intent to create a new Partner Vetting System (PVS). The notice proposed vetting individuals and officers from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that apply for USAID contracts, grants and cooperative agreements to ensure that neither USAID nor USAIDfunded activities were inadvertently benefitting terrorists. The PVS will affect every nonprofit organization that applies for USAID funding, and thousands of NGO employees and board members – a list of people that includes religious leaders and members of Congress – will be forced to turn over private personal information. Furthermore, in proposing the new PVS, the agency has ignored the fact that U.S. NGOs already have procedures in place to certify that funds are not diverted to terrorists or terrorist organizations. The proposed system, which was effectively put forth with no consultation with the NGO community, dangerously blurs the lines between USAID and the various security agencies of the U.S. government. If the employees of U.S. NGOs working abroad are suspected of working in concert with U.S. intelligence agencies, the threat of terrorist acts against them can only increase. Nonprofit relief and development organizations are often the only non-security, non-military face of the American people in some of the most dangerous places in the world. If NGOs are forced to restrict their operations in these places – which they will if the PVS is implemented – we will be ceding the streets of the world to the kinds of violent extremists that this policy aims to target. Treasury Department Voluntary Guidelines In November 2002, without any prior consultation with the affected organizations, the Department of Treasury issued Anti-Terrorism Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S. Based Charities. A broad coalition of grantmakers, NGOs, foundations, law firms, and public interest groups formed the Treasury Guidelines Working Group of Charitable Sector Organizations and Advisors and submitted common and individual comments criticizing the Guidelines as unnecessary, impractical, and likely to pose dangers to American citizens working for these organizations abroad.

In March 2005 the group also produced Principles of International Charity which it proposed that the Department of Treasury issue in lieu of its Guidelines. The Department of Treasury declined to do so, but has twice revised the initial Guidelines in response to criticism, most recently in September 2006. The Working Group and its members remain concerned that the Guidelines are discouraging charitable giving and are being used inappropriately by federal officials. In December 2006 the Working Group wrote to Secretary Paulson re-iterating its request that the Guidelines be withdrawn in favor of its Principles of International Charity. Anti-Prostitution Pledge Requirement The Global AIDS Act of 2003 required that organizations receiving funds under the Act have or adopt a policy explicitly opposing prostitution. Until May 2005 USAID and HHS did not enforce the policy requirement against U.S.-based NGOs. But in May and June 2005 the two agencies issued directives imposing the policy requirement on their U.S. NGO implementing partners without providing any guidance on what activities would no longer be permissible. Because prostitutes can spread HIV/AIDS, many NGOs have programs to encourage their cooperation in measures to control the disease. In January 2006 InterAction entered the federal courts with an amicus brief supporting the position that the directives were an unconstitutional abridgement of the free speech rights of American citizens. The Federal District Court in New York agreed but the administration appealed its decision to the Second Circuit Court. Before that Court could issue a ruling the administration adopted a tactic that sent the case back to the District Court. There the directives were again ruled unconstitutional, resulting in another administration appeal to the Second Circuit Court, where the matter now rests (November 2008).

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

InterAction USAID Management Reform Working Group Organization

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www.interaction.org

Academy for Educational Development Adventist Development and Relief Agency International Africare Air Serv International America’s Development Foundation HQ American Friends Service Committee American Red Cross American Refugee Committee Bread for the World CARE Catholic Relief Services Centre for Development & Population Activities (CEDPA) CHF International Christian Children’s Fund Concern Worldwide Congressional Hunger Center Counterpart International Enterprise Development International Florida Association for Volunteer Action in the Caribbean and the Americas (FAVACA) Food for the Hungry Global Health Council Habitat for Humanity International Heifer International Helen Keller International INMED Partnerships for Children InsideNGO Institute for Sustainable Communities Int’l Crisis Group International Medical Corps International Relief & Development International Rescue Committee Int’l Youth Foundation Jesuit Refugee Services USA Lutheran World Relief Management Sciences for Health MAP International Mercy Corps National Association of Social Workers Opportunity International Oxfam America

URL www.aed.org www.adra.org www.africare.org www.airserv.org www.adfusa.org www.afsc.org www.redcross.org www.archq.org www.bread.org www.care.org www.crs.org www.cedpa.org www.chfinternational.org www.christianchildrensfund.org www.concernusa.org www.hungercenter.org www.counterpart.org www.endpoverty.org www.favaca.org/ www.fh.org www.globalhealth.org www.habitat.org www.heifer.org www.hki.org www.inmed.org www.InsideNGO.org www.iscvt.org www.crisisweb.org www.imcworldwide.org www.ird.org www.theirc.org www.iyfnet.org www.jrsusa.org www.lwr.org www.msh.org www.map.org www.mercycorps.org www.naswdc.org www.opportunity.org www.oxfamamerica.org

InterAction USAID Management Reform Working Group Organization

URL

Pact PATH Pathfinder International Physicians for Human Rights Plan USA Refugees International Relief International Save the Children United Methodist Committee on Relief Winrock International World Vision World Wildlife Fund

www.pactworld.org www.path.org www.pathfind.org www.phrusa.org www.planusa.org www.refugeesinternational.org www.ri.org www.savethechildren.org www.umcor.org www.winrock.org www.worldvision.org www.worldwildlife.org

InterAction Humanitarian Policy and Practice Counterterrorism Working Group Organization

URL

AmeriCares Adventist Development and Relief Agency International America’s Development Foundation American Friends Service Committee American Near East Refugee Aid American Red Cross CARE Catholic Relief Services CHF International Christian Children’s’ Fund CIVIC Concern Worldwide Ethiopian Community Development Council Food for the Hungry Habitat for Humanity International Heart to Heart Heifer International InsideNGO International Crisis Group International Medical Corps International Relief & Development International Rescue Committee International Youth Foundation Lutheran World Relief

www.americares.org www.adra.org www.adfusa.org www.afsc.org www.anera.org www.redcross.org www.care.org www.crs.org www.chfinternational.org www.christianchildrensfund.org www.civicworldwide.org www.concernusa.org www.ecdcinternational.org www.fh.org www.habitat.org www.hearttoheart.org www.heifer.org www.InsideNGO.org www.crisisweb.org www.imcworldwide.org www.ird.org www.theirc.org www.iyfnet.org www.lwr.org

InterAction Humanitarian Policy and Practice Counterterrorism Working Group (cont) Organization

URL

Management Sciences for Health Mercy Corps Plan USA Save the Children Winrock International World Vision

www.msh.org www.mercycorps.org www.planusa.org www.savethechildren.org www.winrock.org www.worldvision.org

NGO and Military Relations NGO and Military Relations

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

The U.S. Military’s Expanding Role in Foreign Assistance Problem The military’s growing involvement in humanitarian and development assistance is a serious concern to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Its operations often blur the line between NGOs acting in accord with humanitarian principles, and the military’s pursuit of political and security objectives. In the development arena differences in mandate and training make the military a poor substitute for civilian experts.

Recommendations The Congress and new Administration should ensure civilian agencies have the necessary mandates, funding and personnel to lead U.S. diplomatic, humanitarian and development efforts. The military should not take on development work to compensate for resource gaps in USAID and the Department of State. The currently expanding assistance programs of the Department of Defense should be thoroughly evaluated to ensure effectiveness in meeting its security objectives. U.S. military should, as a rule, be used in disaster relief as a last resort, in situations requiring an extraordinarily quick response or large lift capacity. The military response should be limited in geographic and programmatic scope, and should always be in support of civilian agencies.

Actions • Rebuild civilian personnel and resource capacities at the Department of State and a newly constituted, elevated independent development agency (see separate briefing paper) by providing robust support in the international affairs budget; • Rewrite and reauthorize the Foreign Assistance Act to promote and protect humanitarian and development priorities, including reinvigorating related expertise and resources; and • Conduct a full review of Department of Defense programs and regional combatant command activities relating to foreign assistance. Determine the appropriateness and effectiveness of the Department’s security, humanitarian and development aid programs and the extent to which they are redundant.

Results

1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

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These steps will help address the imbalance among the three pillars of national security: defense, diplomacy and development. In combination, they will improve U.S. Government capacity to address poverty through effective development assistance and eliminate duplicative Department of Defense programs, thus freeing up scarce military resources for tasks critical to its core mission.

Background Since 1998, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) share of U.S. Official Development Assistance (ODA) increased from 3.5% to 22%. The DoD has dramatically expanded its relief, development and reconstruction assistance through programs such as Section 1207, the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) and the Combatant Commanders’ Initiative Fund, and through the activities of the regional combatant commands, particularly AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM, and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Like the military, humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) adhere to a strict set of principles and standards of behavior. For NGOs these are based on the  Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief. This code of conduct binds signatories to the following key principles: • The Humanitarian Imperative: Every human being has the right to humanitarian assistance when affected by a natural or man-made disaster; • Independence: NGO staff must not knowingly allow themselves to be used by governments or other groups for non-humanitarian purposes; and • Impartiality: Assistance is provided according to need, without regard to race, religion, nationality or political affiliation. Militaries have frequently been involved in natural disaster response where their logistical resources, air and marine transport capabilities, and engineering services can be of significant help in specific contexts. Such efforts are most effective when coordinated with civilian expertise, which can be found in USAID, the United Nations and NGOs. In other disaster contexts, however, the military’s involvement can be deeply problematic. The U.S. military’s chief focus is security. Its relief and development activities emphasize winning the “hearts and minds” of a population. Moreover, the military generally lacks specialized humanitarian and development expertise. Quick-impact projects and other force protection activities motivated by security objectives may undermine sustainable development projects and relationships built by NGO workers. Well-intended projects may have negative consequences and are often unsustainable due to the military’s short-term goals and high turnover. Relief activities by the military can also compromise the security of NGO staff in or near conflict areas by blurring the lines between humanitarian and military personnel. NGOs take a different approach: they generally make a long-term commitment to a situation, acquire a deep un-

derstanding of local societies, employ largely local staff, and design projects with community participation and cultural sensitivity to ensure sustainability. NGOs operate in a multilateral context with the host government taking the lead, and, when local institutions are  not functioning, with the UN. As a result, instead of using weapons or armed guards for their security, NGOs rely on an “acceptance” model that rests upon perceived impartiality and the trust of the communities in which they work. In conflict situations, NGO staff generally keep their distance from the military unless deemed necessary to address civilian needs. This is not an expression of hostility to the military, but instead a necessary and vital measure for their security – security that depends on community belief in their neutrality and independence from political and military actors. The military, therefore, should not consider NGOs as “force extenders” or assume their cooperation, and should leave development and humanitarian response to civilian agencies and NGOs as much as possible. NGOs recognize that communication with military actors is mutually beneficial when conducted in a neutral space, and guidelines exist to help improve NGO-military relations when they operate in a common space. Although the InterAction- Department of Defense Guidelines apply in hostile and potentially hostile environments, they are useful in any environment where the military is present. The military should focus on its mandate and its strengths including security sector reform, maritime security, and military-to-military trainings in civilian protection and HIV/AIDS. However, when the military does engage in humanitarian and development activities, its involvement should be approved, led and coordinated by civilian agencies. It is important that the “do no harm” principle is respected. The military should develop clearly specified security and developmental objectives before implementing any assistance project and should regularly monitor progress towards achieving these goals. Relations between the military and NGOs should adhere to the Guidelines (attached) and military uniforms should be worn at all times, without exception.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Peacekeeping Problem In recent years United Nations members (including the U.S.) have charged UN peacekeeping operations have been charged with increasingly complex and dangerous tasks. However, heightened expectations and responsibilities have not been matched with the increases in financial, material, and political support necessary to fulfill these mandates and meet related expectations.

Recommendations Recognizing the contribution of UN peacekeeping to the achievement of our strategic objectives, the U.S. should seek to strengthen the UN’s ability to deploy the large, multidimensional peacekeeping operations needed to resolve the world’s complex conflicts situations. The U.S. should show positive leadership through consistent financial and material support, the promulgation of necessary UN institutional reforms, and the development of stronger institutional linkages between the U.S. Department of State and the UN peacekeeping system. Furthermore, the U.S. should actively use its leadership position on the UN Security Council to ensure that peacekeeping is not weakened and discredited through irresponsible deployments.

Actions • Demonstrate the renewed U.S. commitment to UN peacekeeping through the prompt and complete payment of the U.S. share of current UN peacekeeping costs, and the payment of U.S. peacekeeping arrears; • Remove the legislative cap on U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, allowing us to fully meet our obligations to the UN and to pay off all arrears incurred under the cap; • Use U.S. leadership to ensure that UN peacekeeping missions are provided with the resources necessary to fulfill their mandates, including equipment, troops, and political backing to resolve the crises in areas in which peacekeepers deploy; • Use U.S. leadership on the UN Security Council to ensure that UN peacekeeping is used responsibly and judiciously; and • Take a leading role in the reform of UN institutions needed to reinforce the UN’s ability to mount credible, sustained peacekeeping operations, during which peacekeepers guilty of human rights violations are held to account.

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Re-investment in UN peacekeeping will strengthen and expand the capacity of the UN to effectively and consistently protect civilians, and stabilize weak and failing states. It will also send a strong signal of the Administration’s intention to reclaim the U.S. role as a respected leader in the international community.

Background There are over 100,000 UN peacekeepers deployed in 20 missions on four continents around the world. These operations all originate with the UN Security Council, which authorizes the missions through Security Council Resolutions and regularly reviews their mandates. Since the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping no longer resembles the “classical” observation missions of lightly armed troops monitoring ceasefire agreements. Today’s peacekeeping missions are complex operations deployed into active conflict zones. Modern peacekeepers are asked to create stability, protect civilians, demobilize ex-combatants, and guide the development of democratic institutions that respect human rights and uphold the rule of law. Peacekeeping today often represents a comprehensive effort to stabilize and reconstruct failed and failing states. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations manages UN civilian and military peacekeepers working to promote values and institutions that coincide directly with U.S. political and strategic interests. Throughout the world, UN peacekeeping efforts strive to prevent conflict, protect civilians affected by armed conflict, to uphold the human rights, and to promote stability and good governance. For example, in southern Sudan UN peacekeepers have been deployed to support and promote the U.S.-backed Comprehensive Peace Agreement that brought over two decades of brutal civil war to an end. Reports of sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers threaten to overshadow their positive contributions to prevent and secure peace. While the UN has implemented significant reforms to prevent and address sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, including mandatory pre-deployment trainings and the establishment of a conduct and discipline unit at headquarters and in the field, more needs to be done. The U.S. should press troop contributing countries to hold accused nationals legally accountable and to incorporate the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse into standard military training. In spite of the complexity, sensitivity and danger involved in conducting modern UN peacekeeping, UN missions are routinely deployed with mandates that far exceed the equipment, staff, troop numbers and political support they receive to get the job done. Also problematic is the increasing inclination of UN member states to deploy UN peacekeepers into situations where there is no peace to keep, creating unreasonable expectations and damaging the credibility of the UN peacekeeping system as a whole. For example, current US pressure to deploy a large-scale peacekeeping operation in Somalia ignores the reality that military intervention in an environment where there is no peace to keep will actually result in a further escalation of violence, and will not im-

prove the security situation for Somali people or the delivery of humanitarian assistance. And yet, regardless of the enormous challenges faced by modern peacekeeping, the multilateral UN approach has proved to be a successful and cost efficient way to promote international peace and security. A 2005 RAND study found that multinational UN forces are far better suited than unilateral U.S. forces to perform peacekeeping responsibilities. Furthermore, the Office of Management and Budget gave the U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping (CIPA account) its highest rating under the OMB Program Assessment Rating Tool. As part of this assessment, UN peacekeeping efforts were judged to be consistent with State Department objectives, consistently achieving stated the goals. As a permanent member of the Security Council with the power to veto any Security Council Resolution, the U.S. effectively has the right to withhold approval for any mission or mandate it considers ill conceived. Yet the U.S. routinely continues to underfund the U.S. share of the costs of these operations – this despite the fact that we have approved the missions. This, in turn, encourages other UN member states to do the same, with the result that UN peacekeeping operations routinely fall behind in payments for troops and equipment, jeopardizing the ability of peacekeepers to do their jobs, and thereby putting vulnerable people even further at risk. The U.S. has a projected debt of over $1.3 billion based on the administration’s FY09 CIPA request due to a legislative cap on U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. Congress retroactively lifted the 25% cap on payments to UN peacekeeping for 2005 – 2008 and provided $190 million to pay off some of its debts through the FY08 supplemental. The FY09 appropriations bill contains language to prevent further arrears and Congress and the Administration should continue to work together to permanently remove the legislative cap to demonstrate our commitment and support to these critical peacekeeping missions. In short, despite the amazing strides and accomplishments of UN peacekeeping over the last two decades, the system under tremendous financial and political strain – this at a time when the need for and demands on it are greater than ever. The new Administration has the opportunity to use leadership on this matter to re-assert the U.S. as a global leader in the defense of human rights, the prevention of mass atrocities, and a leader of states by making a renewed commitment to the development and responsible use of UN peacekeeping.

POLICY PAPER

November 2008

Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments Previously published by United States Institute of Peace, InterAction, and the Department of Defense, July 2007.

O

n March 8, 2005, the heads of major U.S. humanitarian organizations and U.S. civilian and military leaders met at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) to launch a discussion on the challenges posed by operations in combat and other nonpermissive environments. The Working Group on Civil-Military Relations in Nonpermissive Environments, facilitated by USIP, was created as a result of this meeting. InterAction, the umbrella organization for many U.S. NGOs, has coordinated the non-governmental delegation.1 Repre­sentatives from the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and the U.S. Agency for Inter­national Development have participated on behalf of the U.S. Government.

1. Recommended Guidelines

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Guidelines for Relations between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Agencies in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments The following guidelines should facilitate interaction between U.S. Armed Forces and NonGovernmental Organizations (see Key Terms) belonging to InterAc­tion that are engaged in humanitarian relief efforts in hos­tile or potentially hostile environments. (For the purpos­es of these guidelines, such organizations will henceforth be referred to as Non-Governmental Humanitarian Or­ganizations, or NGHOs.) While the guidelines were devel­oped between the Department of Defense (DOD) and Inter-Action, DOD intends to observe these guidelines in its deal­ings with the broader humanitarian assistance com­munity. These guidelines are not intended to consti­ tute advance endorsement or approval by either par­ty of particular missions of the other but are premised on a defacto recognition that U.S. Armed Forces and NGHOs have often occupied the same operational space in the past and will undoubtedly do so in the future. When this does oc­ cur, both sides will make best efforts to observe these guidelines, recognizing that operational necessity may require deviation from them. When breaks with the guidelines occur, every effort should be made to explain what prompted the deviation in order to promote transparency and avoid dis­traction from the critical task of providing essential relief to a population in need.

www.interaction.org

1 The InterAction delegation includes CARE, Catholic Relief Services, the International Medical Corps, the International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps, Refugees International, Save the Children, and World Vision.

A. For the U.S. Armed Forces, the following guidelines should be observed consistent with military force protection, mission ac­complishment, and operational requirements: 1. When conducting relief activities, military personnel should wear uniforms or other distinctive clothing to avoid being mistaken for NGHO representatives. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should not display NGHO logos on any military clothing, vehicles, or equipment. This does not preclude the appropriate use of symbols recognized under the law of war, such as a red cross, when appropriate. U.S. Armed Forces may use such symbols on military clothing, vehicles, and equipment in appropriate situations. 2. Visits by U.S. Armed Forces personnel to NGHO sites should be by prior arrangement. 3. U.S. Armed Forces should respect NGHO views on the bearing of arms within NGHO sites. 4. U.S. Armed Forces should give NGHOs the option of meeting with U.S. Armed Forces personnel outside military installations for information exchanges. 5. U.S. Armed Forces should not describe NGHOs as “force multipliers” or “partners” of the military, or in any other fashion that could compromise their independence and their goal to be perceived by the population as independent. 6. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should avoid interfering with NGHO relief efforts directed toward segments of the civilian population that the military may regard as unfriendly. 7. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should respect the desire of NGHOs not to serve as implementing partners for the military in conducting relief activities. However, individual NGOs may seek to cooperate with the military, in which case such cooperation will be carried out with due regard to avoiding compromise of the security, safety, and independence of the NGHO community at large, NGHO representatives, or public perceptions of their independence. B. For NGHOs, the following guidelines should be observed: 1. NGHO personnel should not wear military-style clothing. This is not meant to preclude NGHO per­sonnel from wearing protective gear, such as hel­mets and protective vests, provided that such items are distinguishable in color/ appearance from U.S. Armed Forces issue items. 2. NGHO travel in U.S. Armed Forces vehicles should be lim­ited to liaison personnel to the extent practical. 3. NGHOs should not have facilities co-located with facilities inhabited by U.S. Armed Forces personnel. 4. NGHOs should use their own logos on clothing, vehicles, and buildings when security conditions permit. 5. NGHO personnel’s visits to military facilities/sites should be by prior arrangement. 6. Except for liaison arrangements detailed in the sec­tions

that follow, NGHOs should minimize their activities at military bases and with U.S. Armed Forces personnel of a nature that might compromise their inde­pendence. 7. NGHOs may, as a last resort, request military pro­tection for convoys delivering humanitarian assis­tance, take advantage of essential logistics support available only from the military, or accept evacuation assistance for medical treatment or to evacuate from a hostile environment. Provision of such military support to NGHOs rests solely within the discretion of the military forces and will not be undertaken if it interferes with higher priority military activities. Sup­port generally will be provided on a reimbursable basis in accordance with applicable U.S. law. C. Recommendations on forms of coordination, to the extent fea­sible, that will minimize the risk of confusion between military and NGHO roles in hostile or potentially hostile environments, subject to military force protection, mission accomplishment, and operational requirements are: 1. NGHO liaison officer participation in unclassified security briefings conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces. 2. Unclassified information sharing with the NGHO liaison officer on security conditions, operational sites, location of mines and unexploded ordnance, hu­manitarian activities, and population movements, insofar as such unclassified information sharing is forthe purpose of facilitating humanitarian operations and the security of staff and local personnel engaged in these operations. 3. Liaison arrangements with military commands prior to and during military operations to deconflict military and relief activities, including for the purpose of protection of humanitarian installations and personnel and to inform military personnel of humanitarian relief objectives, mo­dalities of operation, and the extent of prospective or on­going civilian humanitarian relief efforts. 4. Military provision of assistance to NGHOs for hu­ manitarian relief activities in extremis when civil­ian providers are unavailable or unable to do so. Such assistance will not be provided if it interferes with higher priority military activities.

2. Recommended Processes

A. Procedures for NGHO/military dialogue during contingency planning for DOD relief operations in a hostile or potentially hostile environment: 1. NGHOs engaged in humanitarian relief send a small num­ber of liaison officers to the relevant combatant command for discussions with the contingency planners responsible for designing relief operations. 2. NGHOs engaged in humanitarian relief assign a small number of liaison officers to the relevant combat­ant command (e.g., one liaison was stationed at U.S. CENTCOM for 6 of the first 12 months of the war in Afghanistan, and one was

in Kuwait City before U.S. forces entered Iraq in 2003). 3. The relevant military planners, including but not lim­ited to the Civil Affairs representatives of the rele­vant commander, meet with humanitarian relief NGHO liaison officers at a mutually agreed location. B. Procedures for NGHOs and the military to access assessments of humanitarian needs. U.S. military and NGHO representatives should explore the following: 1. Access to NGHO and military assessments directly from a DOD or other U.S. Government Web site. 2. Access to NGHO and military assessments through an NGO serving in a coordination role and identifying a common Web site. 3. Access to NGHO and military assessments through a U.S. Government or United Nations (UN) Web site. C. Procedures for NGHO liaison relationships with combatant commands that are engaged in planning for military operations in hostile or potentially hostile environments. (NGHO liaison personnel are provided by the NGHO community): 1. The NGHO liaison officer should not be physically located within the military headquarters, but if feasible, should be close to it in order to allow for daily contact. 2. The NGHO liaison officer should have appropriate access to senior-level officers within the combatant com­ mands and be permitted to meet with them as necessary and feasible. 3. There should be a two-way information flow. The NGHO liaison officer should provide details on NGHO capabilities, infrastructure if any, plans, concerns, etc. The military should provide appropriate details regarding minefields, unexploded ordnance, other haz­ards to NGHOs, access to medical facilities, evacuation plans, etc. 4. The NGHO liaison officer should have the opportunity to brief military commanders on NGHO objectives, the Code of Conductof the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and NGOs Engaged in Disas­ter Relief, the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Com­mittee (IASC) Guidelines, country-specific guidelines based on the IASC Guidelines, and, if desired, The Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. U.S. Armed Forces personnel should have the opportunity to brief NGHOs, to the extent appropriate, on U.S. Government and coalition goals and policies, mon­itoring principles, applicable laws and rules of engage­ment, etc. 5. The NGHO liaison officer could continue as a liaison at higher headquarters even after a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) or similar mechanism is established in-country. Once this occurs, liaison officers of individual NGHOs could begin coordination in-country through the CMOC for civil–military liaison.

D. Possible organizations that could serve as a bridge between NGHOs and U.S. Armed Forces in the field2, e.g., U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Office of Military Affairs, State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and the UN’s Humanitarian Coordinator: If the U.S. Agency for International Development or the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization agree to serve a liaison function, they should be prepared to work with the broader NGHO community in addition to U.S. Government implementing partners. The UN’s Humanitarian Coordinator or his/her rep­ resentative could be a strong candidate to serve as liaison because he/she normally would be responsible for working with all NGHOs and maintaining contact with the host government or a successor regime.

Key Terms

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs): In wider usage, the term NGO can be applied to any nonprofit organization that is independent from government. However, for the pur­poses of these guidelines, the term NGO refers to a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alle­viating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, hu­man rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 3-08/JP 1-02) Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations (NG­ HOs): For the purposes of these guidelines, NGHOs are or­ ganizations belonging to InterAction that are engaged in humanitarian relief efforts in hostile or potentially hos­tile environments. NGHOs are a subset of the broader NGO community. Independence for NGHOs: Independence is defined in the same way as it is in the Code of Conduct of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and NGOs Engaged in Disaster Relief: Independence is defined as not acting as an instrument of government foreign policy. NGHOs are agencies that act independently from governments. NGHOs therefore, formulate their own policies and implementation strategies and do not seek to implement the policy of any government, except insofar as it coincides with their own independent policies. To maintain independence, NGHOs will never knowingly—or through negligence— allow themselves, or their employees, to be used to gath­er information of a political, military, or economically sensitive nature for governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those that are strictly humani­ 2 In situations in which there is no actor to serve as a bridge, a US military Civil Affairs cell could serve as a temporary point-of-contact between NGHOs and other elements of the US Armed Forces.

tarian, nor will they act as instruments of foreign policy of donor governments. InterAction: InterAction is the largest coalition of U.S.based international development and humanitarian non­ governmental organizations. With over 165 members operating in every developing country, InterAction works to overcome poverty, exclusion, and suffering by advancing ba­sic dignity for all.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Contributors to NGO and Military Relations Policy Brief Organization

URL

American Jewish World Service American Red Cross American Refugee Committee CARE Catholic Relief Services CHF International Christian Children’s Fund Church World Service Habitat for Humanity International International Medical Corps International Rescue Committee Jesuit Refugee Service Mercy Corps Oxfam America Refugee Council USA Refugees International Relief International Save the Children US Fund for UNICEF Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children World Vision

www.ajws.org www.redcross.org www.arcrelief.org www.care.org www.crs.org www.chfinternational.org www.ccfusa.org www.churchworldservice.org www.habitat.org www.imcworldwide.org www.theirc.org www.jrsusa.org www.mercycorps.org www.oxfamamerica.org www.rcusa.org www.refintl.org www.ri.org www.savethechildren.org www.unicefusa.org www.womenscommission.org www.worldvision.org

InterAction Humanitarian Policy and Practice Working Group

1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202-667-8227 [email protected]

www.interaction.org

Organization

URL

Action Against Hunger (USA) Adventist Development and Relief Agency International African Medical & Research Foundation, Inc. Africare Air Serv International Alliance to End Hunger American Friends Service Committee American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee American Jewish World Service American Near East Refugee Aid American Red Cross International Services American Refugee Committee Americares America's Development Foundation Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team

www.actionagainsthunger.org www.adra.org www.amref.org www.africare.org www.airserv.org www.alliancetoendhunger.org www.afsc.org www.jdc.org www.ajws.org www.anera.org www.redcross.org www.archq.org www.americares.org www.adfusa.org www.amurt.net

InterAction Humanitarian Policy and Practice Working Group (cont) Organization

URL

Baptist World Alliance/Baptist World Aid Brother's Brother Foundation, The Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC) CARE Catholic Medical Mission Board Catholic Relief Services CHF International Christian Children's Fund Christian Reformed World Relief Committee Church World Service CONCERN Worldwide US Inc. Congressional Hunger Center Counterpart International, Inc. Direct Relief International Doctors of the World, Inc. Episcopal Relief and Development Ethiopian Community Development Council Food for the Hungry Friends of Liberia GOAL USA Fund Handicap International Heart to Heart International Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society Help the Afghan Children Immigration and Refugee Services of America International Aid International Catholic Migration Commission International Medical Corps International Orthodox Christian Charities International Relief and Development International Relief Teams International Rescue Committee Islamic Relief Jesuit Refugee Service/USA Korean American Sharing Movement Latter-day Saint Charities Lutheran World Relief MAP International Mercy Corps Mercy-USA for Aid and Development, Inc. National Peace Corps Association Northwest Medical Teams Operation USA Oxfam America Partners for Development Physicians for Human Rights Presbyterian Disaster Assistance and Hunger Program

www.bwanet.org www.brothersbrother.org www.civicworldwide.org www.care.org www.cmmb.org www.crs.org www.chfinternational.org www.christianchildrensfund.org www.crwrc.org www.churchworldservice.org www.concernusa.org www.hungercenter.org www.counterpart.org www.directrelief.org www.dowusa.org www.er-d.org www.ecdcinternational.org www.fh.org www.fol.org www.goalusa.org www.handicap-international.us www.hearttoheart.org www.hias.org www.helptheafghanchildren.org www.refugees.org www.internationalaid.org www.icmc.net www.imcworldwide.org www.iocc.org www.ird-dc.org www.irteams.org www.theIRC.org www.irw.org www.jrsusa.org www.kasm.org www.providentliving.org www.lwr.org www.map.org www.mercycorps.org www.mercyusa.org www.rpcv.org www.nwmti.org www.opusa.org www.oxfamamerica.org www.pfd.org www.phrusa.org www.pcusa.org

InterAction Humanitarian Policy and Practice Working Group (cont) Organization Project HOPE, The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc. Refugees International RELIEF International Salvation Army World Service Office, The Save the Children Trickle Up Program, The U.S. Association for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees U.S. Fund for UNICEF United Jewish Communities United Methodist Committee on Relief World Concern World Education World Emergency Relief World Relief Corporation World Vision

URL www.projecthope.org www.refugeesinternational.org www.ri.org www.sawso.org www.savethechildren.org www.trickleup.org www.unrefugees.org www.unicefusa.org www.ujc.org www.umcor.org www.worldconcern.org www.worlded.org www.worldemergencyrelief.org www.worldrelief.org www.worldvision.org

Humanitarian Priorities

Humanitarian Priorities

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Humanitarian Funding Priorities Problem The United States does not have the funding mechanisms necessary to respond to the quick onset of humanitarian emergencies. Additionally, the United States consistently underfunds the two primary responders to international humanitarian crisis’s, the Department of State’s BPRM and USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), reducing the USG’s ability to respond rapidly and with the flexibility necessary to adequately address emergencies.

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Recommendations A revitalized USAID and Department of State, through their respective policy and planning units, must be given the mandate to adopt significant reforms to systematize and streamline humanitarian assistance in order to effectively and efficiently respond to growing global needs. Unclear and often artificial divisions of responsibility between agencies, between humanitarian and development assistance, and between natural disaster and conflict-induced displacement response, have led to inefficiencies in the planning, management and funding processes. The practice of under-funding humanitarian accounts in the regular budget and addressing the remaining gaps through supplemental bills (see separate briefing paper) has also been deeply problematic and prevents help from reaching people in need.

Actions • Fully fund humanitarian accounts in the regular budget and use supplemental funding only for truly unanticipated emergencies; • Increase the Department of State’s Bureau for Refugees, Population and Migration (BPRM) Emergency Refugee Migration Assistance (ERMA) funding ceiling to $200 million and speed up the approval process by allowing draw-downs to be certified by the Secretary of State, rather than the President; • Provide USAID’s OFDA with a minimum budget of $550 million at the beginning of each fiscal year to prevent regular supplemental budget requests and ruptures in provision of life-saving assistance; and • Create a Transition Fund of $300 million for USAID to bridge the “relief to development” gap in countries transitioning out of conflict.

Results By providing USG humanitarian and development assistance experts with quickly accessible and flexible funding, the US will be able to respond rapidly and nimbly to emergencies as they occur. This will underscore the position of the United States as a leader in effective assistance and as a compassionate defender of vulnerable populations around the world. The creation of a Transition Fund will allow USAID to build upon the successes of humanitarian programs during the transition to development assistance and its flexibility will allow for shifts in programming mechanisms during the transition from conflict to stability.

Background The United States is known as a generous and compassionate donor nation, but the mechanisms by which the U.S. Government is able to respond to quick onset emergencies and to transition from emergencies into recovery and development assistance do not allow for the rapid and flexible response that is necessary for these situations. Humanitarian accounts should be fully funded during the regular appropriations process. The trend of underfunding humanitarian accounts such as IDA, MRA, ERMA, and emergency food aid in the regular budget means that OFDA and BPRM must seek to fill in the missing funds through emergency supplemental budgets. The irregular process causes scale-backs and shutdowns of life-saving programs, reduces crisis readiness, and creates costly inefficiencies when staff is let go and then re-hired. Even if the humanitarian accounts are replenished, the irreversible human consequences result in lost lives, malnourished children, and the spread of disease. The Department of State’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (BPRM) can use the Emergency Refugee Migration Assistance (ERMA) draw-down mechanism to access an additional $100 million in the case of an emergency that creates or impacts a refugee population. However, this draw-down requires Presidential approval, which can slow the process down considerably. The Secretary of State has the contextual knowledge and the judgment to determine whether and when these funds should be used and would be able to respond more quickly than the President. It would make sense to shift draw-down approval to the Secretary of State in order to allow BPRM to react more swiftly. Also, the $100 million ceiling has not been reviewed for over a decade, and as costs for these responses have increased in line with increases in related food and transportation costs, this ceiling should be increased to $200 million. USAID’s Office for Disaster Assistance (OFDA) responds to more than one hundred emergencies worldwide each year. OFDA consistently spends more than $550 million per year on these responses, yet is just as consistently underfunded at the beginning of the fiscal year at less than $350 million. This underfunding at the outset then means that OFDA must seek to fill in the missing funds through emergency supplemental budgets. As these supplemental budgets take months for Congressional approval and for the money to hit the books, often the supplemental tranche is not available for use by OFDA and its implementing partners until close to the end of the fiscal year. In the meantime, OFDA is unable to respond to ongoing crises at the level at which its emergency response experts deem necessary. As some of the key crises that the humanitarian community has been dealing with are starting to transition from

emergency response to the recovery and development stage, it has become clear that USAID does not have an effective mechanism to facilitate the shift from one type of assistance to another. There is no consistent approach to transferring support to basic social services such as health and education, often provided through NGOs, to the control of national ministries in countries emerging from conflict. Within USAID, it is unclear where the responsibility lies to ensure a coherent transition, and there is rarely a “handshake” between USAID’s Bureau for Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) and the regional bureaus responsible for more traditional development assistance when programs are being transitioned from one type of assistance to another. Because of this, there are many examples of humanitarian assistance programs ending without development assistance picking up support for basic social services, causing already vulnerable populations to lose access to key basic services such as health and education, which then contributes to continuing instability. Of particular concern in communities coming out of conflict is the impact that sexual violence has had on women and their families. Addressing the physical and psychological needs of women who have survived sexual violence is extremely important to the recovery process for communities coming out of conflict and this particular issue, along with the reintegration of child soldiers, is often lost in this “relief to development” gap. To address this gap and allow for a more flexible response to transition situations (which can fluctuate between emergency and recovery as peace processes are being worked out), USAID should be provided with a Transition Fund of $300 million, which the Administrator can access specifically to support the transition process. The funds accessed should be programmed by the regional bureaus, with a clear plan developed in coordination with DCHA that would prevent gaps in basic social services.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Afghanistan Problem Despite significant investments in Afghanistan’s reconstruction since 2001, the country remains highly unstable as the lives and livelihoods Afghans are constantly threatened due to deteriorating security, military operations, the global food crisis, corruption, persistent poverty, uncoordinated international actors and weak governance.

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Recommendations To further the conditions needed for sustainable peace, instead of focusing on simply backstopping short-term military objectives, U.S. humanitarian and development assistance should be coordinated with the efforts of the Government of Afghanistan and other donors, and it should focus on alleviating poverty, building local capacity, and reintegrating the 5 million returning refugees. Rather than relying on military and quasi-military actors to conduct relief and development efforts, the U.S. should use civilian experts to carry out such assistance and strictly separate this work from military-related efforts and actors such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).

Actions • Develop a coordinated assistance strategy with the Afghan government and donors to ensure that assistance is poverty-focused, better balanced among stable and conflict-affected and poppy-growing areas, and builds the capacity of Afghan civil society; • Re-establish a clear and consistent separation between military and civilian-led assistance efforts. The PRTs should return their to their original focus on sectors where they hold a comparative advantage, such as security sector reform and support for extending the Afghan government’s presence; • Request the Government Accountability Office to conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan to evaluate the effectiveness of funding mechanisms and performance of all implementing actors in addressing development objectives; • Provide the leadership and resources to address the looming humanitarian crisis through long-term measures coordinated with the relevant Afghan ministries; and • Take all measures to prevent civilian harm and displacement during military operations. Immediately report any incidents to the Afghan government and humanitarian actors to provide assistance.

Results The recommended actions will shift the focus of U.S. assistance to efforts that ensure aid efficiently and effectively addresses the root causes of the poverty which dominates so much of Afghanistan and serves as a catalyst for sustainable development.

Background Afghanistan is one of the least developed countries in the world, with deep-seated poverty characterized by limited economic infrastructure and high rates of illiteracy and maternal and child mortality. Decades of war and ineffective governance have destroyed most of Afghanistan’s political and economic infrastructure. U.S.-based NGOs have been working in Afghanistan and with Afghan refugees for decades, building relationships with communities, building a deep understanding of their needs and preferences, and creating opportunities for development. While international attention has settled on military conflict, poppy production and roadside explosions, the efforts of international NGOs and their Afghan colleagues, who have undertaken longstanding, peaceful initiatives to rebuild Afghanistan, merit greater consideration and support. The growing food crisis in Afghanistan, evidenced by rising food prices and extreme food shortages, will exacerbate the situation. The urban poor, widows, orphans, the elderly, the disabled and recently returned refugees are the most vulnerable populations. Long-term measures to strengthen food security, reduce the vulnerability to disasters and external shocks, and enhance the effectiveness of agricultural assistance and land and water management should be developed immediately with the relevant Afghan ministries. International assistance remains heavily imbalanced in a number of ways. Geographically, assistance is concentrated disproportionately on the capital, the most insecure and poppy-growing areas of the country. As a result, more peaceful regions are neglected even though they often present the greatest opportunity for successful development. Donors’ choice of aid implementers is also imbalanced with much of the assistance going to the wrong actors, such as the military and contractors which often have limited development experience and knowledge of the local environment. The multitude of pooled funds has also contributed to the inefficient disbursement of funds. A careful balance must be struck in a multi-year assistance strategy which uses a diversity of implementers and funding mechanisms to support sustainable development throughout the country. Quasi-development efforts and “hearts-and-minds” activities focused on security objectives have minimal, and often negative, development impacts for most people. Assistance activities carried out by international military actors, particularly the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) often end up fueling corruption and providing strength for local power holders who too often do not have the long-term development needs of the local people in mind. In fact, PRTs sometimes actually contribute to insecurity, resentment and hostility by failing to consult with the community and blurring the lines between military and civilian activities. This ap-

proach could contribute to further deterioration of security and undermining of government legitimacy in previously stable parts of the country. NGOs are under attack. Over the last six months, killings, kidnappings and other violence against NGOs have increased drastically, threatening their ability to work in Afghanistan. The provision of humanitarian and development assistance by U.S. military actors sometimes heighten insecurity for NGOs, which rely on perceived impartiality, the clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants, and the acceptance by local communities to maintain security in conflicted and insecure environments. All efforts, including adherence to the InterAction-DoD Guidelines and Afghanistan-specific civil-military guidelines, must be made to distinguish between the activities of military actors and those of NGOs. Military operations have led to displacement and a 20% increase in civilian deaths over last year. The high civilian death toll threatens to undermine Afghans’ support for international military forces, as well as the Afghan government and security forces. The U.S. and other military actors must take all measures to enhance the protection of civilians, ensure accountability through immediate and independent assessments and consistently report incidents to the UN and humanitarian agencies to ensure that those affected receive the appropriate assistance.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Burma (Myanmar) Problem Burma is one of the poorest countries worldwide but it receives 20 times less international aid than comparable developing countries. Other donors now separate politics from humanitarian aid, and have significantly increased resources to Burma. The U.S. should follow suit and increase humanitarian aid inside the country.

Recommendations U.S. policy towards Burma traditionally focused first and foremost on achieving political goals and has seen limited success over the past 20 years. In this same period, living conditions for millions of Burmese have undergone a devastating slide downwards. They live constantly on the brink of humanitarian crises, and Cyclone Nargis has shown that any shock can have disastrous consequences. The U.S. must give greater priority to humanitarian issues, and recognize not only the immediate benefits of aid, but also the importance that strengthening civil society through aid work will have for long-term democratization in the country.

Actions • Ensure humanitarian needs are met regardless of political concerns. Separate political objectives from humanitarian needs; • Join the U.K. and European Union in increasing support for independent humanitarian work inside Burma. Additional funding to programs inside Burma should not decrease commitments to organizations in Thailand; • Increase assistance to independent humanitarian programs in Burma gradually, with $20 million for FY2009, $25 million in 2010, and $35 million in 2011; • Travel to Burma to directly assess the situation, including the ability of the United Nations (UN) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to provide humanitarian assistance inside the country and to assess the impact of the U.S. mission; and • Work with operating agencies, the UN, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to ensure independent aid operations, full accountability, and transparency, protection of local staff and partners, and involvement of beneficiaries at all stages of the aid process.

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Greater humanitarian engagement will respond to urgent needs, thereby reducing mortality and vulnerability while also increasing people-to-people contact. A focus on training and capacity building for community-based organizations will foster civil-society development and promote a break from traditional patronage systems that foster political support for the Burmese regime.

Background Months after Cyclone Nargis, which devastated large swaths of the coastal region and killed an estimated 140,000 people, the world has an outdated image of the situation inside Burma based on the traditional image of the nation as largely closed to outside assistance efforts. Aid agencies today report an unprecedented level of access and mobility in the Ayeyarwady Delta, which is a tribute to the successful fight by the international community for humanitarian access. To maintain these gains and provide the possibility that these new, relaxed operating rules will spread out of the delta throughout the country, the U.S. must maintain its commitment to providing humanitarian aid to Burma. Before Cyclone Nargis struck, Burma was already widely believed to be one of the poorest countries in the world. The UN Development Program estimates GDP per capita in Burma as the 13th lowest in the world. The average Burmese family spends 75% of its income on securing food supplies. Less than 50% of children complete primary school and according to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 104 of every 1,000 children in Burma die before the age of 5 – the second-highest rate outside Africa, after Afghanistan. Burma also has the highest HIV rate in Southeast Asia; and malaria, a treatable and preventable disease, is still the leading cause of mortality and morbidity. While international aid for cyclone relief has been impressive, including a $50 million contribution from the U.S., noncyclone related programs provide Burma with less overseas development assistance: a mere $2.88 per person. This is less than the per capita amount for any of the other poorest 50 countries – a group in which the average is more than $58 per person. Western donor governments traditionally have imposed broad-based sanctions on Burma, including limiting humanitarian and development assistance to minimal levels in order to pressure the military government into reforms. Recently, however, recognizing the lack of significant success of their traditional approach and the high level of need, European donors have changed course and begun increasing humanitarian assistance to Burma. The European Commission plans to raise its funding inside Burma to $63 million by 2010. The United Kingdom (UK) plans to provide $36 million by 2011. This increased humanitarian aid is matched by a tightening of sanctions targeted specifically at government officials and their cronies by both the UK and European Union. Outside of cyclone relief, U.S. policy-makers continue to deny funding for humanitarian assistance to Burma, with minor exceptions for HIV and avian flu programs. U.S. officials most familiar with the country – those in Rangoon and in regional offices in Thailand – support greater levels of humani-

tarian aid. Despite this view, other administration and congressional staff continue to resist expanding U.S. assistance. As a result of these policies, the U.S. is in danger of ending its cyclone relief program at the end of 2008. Currently, there is no Administration request nor any congressional appropriations for new humanitarian assistance and recovery programs in 2009. UN aid agencies and international NGOs go to pains to ensure that their work does not benefit the regime. To this end, these groups can document their use of independent firms in purchasing, transport and the delivery of goods and services, and are transparent with donors about all contracts they hold to allay any concerns. Local staff and cooperation with local NGOs and community-based organizations underpin the operations of international agencies. At the village level, rice banks, health promoters, religious associations and other informal entities have emerged as effective, independent partners for international organizations. Support for international aid efforts often also directly strengthens independent Burmese civil society. A lack of political progress cannot justify the prolonged suffering of ordinary Burmese, who are in large part innocent victims of the prolonged political stalemate. The U.S. must re-think its Burma strategy and look at increasing humanitarian assistance if it is to meet its goal of supporting the people of Burma.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Chad Problem Eastern Chad is host to roughly 250,000 Sudanese refugees from neighboring Darfur. Furthermore, some 185,000 Chadians have been internally displaced and approximately 700,000 civilians in eastern Chad are threatened by ongoing violence between the Chadian government and rebel groups based in Sudan.

Recommendations The U.S., in close partnership with France, the European Union and other critical African actors such as Libya, must press the warring parties in Chad to fulfill their commitments, including their commitment to release all children from their forces, and fully implement the terms of all peace agreements that have been signed. In order to stabilize the security and political situation, the Government of Chad should enter into an inclusive political dialogue with all opposition groups including the rebel factions and normalize its relationship with the Government of Sudan.

Actions • Put pressure on the Government of Chad and the country’s political and armed opposition groups to engage in an inclusive dialogue aimed at resolving the root causes of Chad’s internal crisis; • Develop and support a comprehensive approach to bring an end to child recruitment by both the Chadian military and the numerous rebel groups operating in eastern Chad; • Provide adequate, predictable funding for early-recovery projects – in the context of an overarching Chadian development strategy – in order to fill immediate service and infrastructure gaps while also contributing to long-term development; and • Support the United Nations Secretary-General’s request for a stronger, broader mandate for the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) which would support civilian police, and Chadian justice sector and governance reform.

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Immediate investment in the protection of civilians will signal to the Chadian people that the U.S. has not forgotten them in the shadow of Darfur. By applying pressure to the Government of Chad to engage in an inclusive dialogue with armed and political opposition, the U.S. will help to ensure the stabilization of both Chad, and the central African region.

Background Internal and Regional Insecurity: Insecurity in Chad is the product of a variety of domestic and regional crises. It has been the site of a protracted civil war in which a number of often fragmented rebel movements continue to launch attacks on towns throughout the east. The rebels receive support and protection from the Government of Sudan, just as Sudanese rebels receive support from the Government of Chad, with the spillover exacerbating the conflict and humanitarian conditions in the Central African Republic. Chadian rebels have established bases inside Darfur and launch attacks from inside Sudanese territory, including the February 2008 attack on the Chadian capital of N’Djamena that nearly overthrew the government. Likewise, the Darfur rebel group JEM (the Justice and Equality Movement) uses the Zaghawa-dominated Bahai region of Chad as a safe area in which to regroup and launch attacks into Sudan, such as the unprecedented May 2008 attack on Khartoum. Chad’s rebels, however, do not represent the most immediate threat to civilians. These groups, which include well trained, disciplined officers who defected from the Chadian military, do not systematically attack civilians. Rather, the greatest threat to civilians and humanitarian operations is banditry. Bandit groups, which sometimes involve local authorities, the Chadian military, and moonlighting police or gendarmerie, act with almost complete impunity. They have been responsible for chronic car-jackings and the violent looting throughout the east. Child Recruitment: The conflict and displacement situation in eastern Chad has made refugee and internally displaced (IDP) children particularly vulnerable. Many children have been separated from their families, physically attacked, or recruited by fighting forces from all sides of the conflict. As members of militias and armed groups move into refugee camps and IDP sites, refugee and displaced children are especially vulnerable to recruitment and forced labor. Children as young as nine years old are being forcibly and/or voluntarily recruited into armed forces. In 2007, the Chadian government signed the Paris Principles, which aim to protect children from recruitment and assist those who have been involved with armed groups, and agreed to stop recruitment and start the release of all children. The Chadian national army, militias supported by the Chadian government, and Chadian rebel groups, however, all continued recruiting children within IDP sites and host communities. Thousands of children are also recruited from refugee camps located close to the Sudan border by Sudanese armed groups, including the Janjaweed, the JEM and the Sudan Liberation Army. The International Response: In September 2007 the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad

(MINURCAT) to eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic to ensure security within the refugee camps. The resolution also authorized the European Union to deploy a military force (EUFOR) to provide area security and force protection for the lightly armed UN police. Unfortunately neither the mandate nor the configuration of the peacekeeping forces adequately addresses the generalized threat of banditry and impunity, both of which expire in March 2009. The resolution of the conflict in Chad will require both an inclusive, internal political dialogue, and sustained pressure on both the Governments of Chad and Sudan to normalize relations and stabilize the border areas of these two volatile countries. In the interim, the U.S. should support efforts to ensure that civilians in Chad – both Sudanese refugees and Chadians themselves – are protected by offering strong political and material support to an expanded and well-resourced UN mission, which includes a military component, civilian police, and Chadian justice sector and governance reform, as well as supporting efforts to stem the recruitment of children into armed forces and factions.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Problem Ongoing conflict between the Congolese government led by President Joseph Kabila and multiple rebel and militia groups has created widespread regional instability and a devastating humanitarian crisis in which over 1 million have been internally displaced, 45,000 die monthly from conflict and disease, and sexual violence is at unprecedented levels.

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Recommendations A comprehensive U.S. policy in the DRC must address both the pervasive poverty and immediate needs of all Congolese, while focusing substantial diplomatic energy on resolving the conflict in the eastern part of the country, ensuring the stability that will allow political and economic development to take root. Increased humanitarian and development funding, support for good governance, and reforms in the security and justice sector are critical to ensuring that the Congolese are able to move this vast, complex and key regional power forward in a positive direction for the benefit of its 60 million inhabitants and the region. A resolution to the conflict in the east is also critical to Congo’s future and the U.S. has a huge role to play.

Actions • Assert U.S. leadership, with the United Nations and regional and donor governments, to ensure an end to fighting and implementation of the 2007 Nairobi and Goma Peace Agreements; • Support a comprehensive plan to address and prevent sexual violence with: support to survivors, their families and communities; accountability for perpetrators; and protection by peacekeepers and national security forces; • Assist the Congolese government in professionalizing its armed forces and police to protect the civilian population; • Fully pay the U.S. share of the budget for the UN peacekeeping mission (MONUC), and work to improve the effectiveness of MONUC in protecting civilians from abuse; • Significantly ramp up U.S. Government spending on humanitarian and development efforts, as well as on transition programs that bridge the gap between relief and development; and • Press for better control of natural resource extraction as it fuels conflict and human rights abuses such as child labor.

Results While the challenges in the DRC are complex and not easily solved, an engaged U.S. leadership taking effective action as outlined above can have an enormous positive impact on the lives of millions of Congolese, and indeed on the entire region.

Background The protracted war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC or Congo) amounts to one of the deadliest conflicts since World War II. Over the past decade, fighting between government forces and rebel groups in the eastern region of the country has resulted in the loss of more than five million lives. The war which began in 1998, and which stems in part from the 1994 Rwanda genocide, at one point involved armies from eight neighboring nations and was labeled “Africa’s First World War”. It came to an official end with a comprehensive peace agreement signed in 2002, which the U.S. helped to broker. While Rwandan and Ugandan troops who had been fighting directly and through proxy groups in the east withdrew, former Rwandan soldiers, many of whom participated in the genocide, remained in hiding in eastern Congo and are implicated in much of the violence that occurs today. But they are not alone. All sides in this conflict are implicated in war crimes of unfathomable proportions. UNICEF estimates that hundreds of thousands of women have been raped, constituting the worst pandemic of sexual violence in the world. In some displacement camps, more than 70% of women have been raped. Gang rape, rape of girls as young as eight, and genital mutilation of rape victims are pervasive. All parties to the conflict have forcibly recruited as many as 40,000 children to fight and carry out atrocities. In 2006, the country held its first presidential and parliamentary elections in 40 years. Despite hopes that the post election period would usher in peace and stability, it has proven difficult to break free from decades of exploitation by foreign nations, individuals and armed groups, and persistent conflict, economic stagnation and corruption. These factors have left Congo extremely poor despite its unrivaled regional natural resource wealth, with virtually no modern infrastructure and minimal basic services for the majority of the population, who live on less than $1 per day. Instability continues to plague the region and deprive it of almost all modern infrastructure. Opportunities for education and jobs are limited, making recruitment of young people easy for armed militias; and the challenges of integrating formerly violent opponents into a new political system, have created enormous obstacles to securing peace. The Congolese government’s authority remains weak, and multiple armed groups take advantage of this power vacuum. With porous borders, weapons and military equipment still flow into the eastern DRC with ease, fueled in part by the illegal exploitation of mineral wealth. Robust assistance for security sector reform in the military, police and justice systems, are required to build the Congolese government’s capacity to protect civilians and its vast territory. Today, over 1 million people are internally displaced and

over 300,000 live as refugees in other countries. Recent attempts to end the longstanding conflict include the Nairobi Communique signed by Rwanda and DRC in November 2007, aimed at disarming and repatriating former Rwandan soldiers who fled to Congo after the genocide. The Goma Agreement signed by the government and 22 armed groups in January 2008 called for a cease-fire and laid out a plan to end hostilities. Despite the slow progress in implementing the agreements and the serious challenges to their viability, both agreements are considered the last best hope for sustainable peace in the region. Over the years, the U.S. has played an important role in responding to the Congo crisis, using its diplomatic muscle to facilitate recent peace agreements and supporting the UN peacekeeping mission (MONUC), the transitional elections process, and the provision of emergency relief, health, education and other basic services. Consolidating real gains in the region, however, will require an even greater investment of funding, expertise and use of U.S. influence. If the U.S. does not act, the consequences will be grave not only for Congolese but also for the region as a whole.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Ethiopia Problem Up to 16 million Ethiopians, roughly 20% of the population, are at extreme risk due to increasingly intense and frequent droughts and rising food costs exacerbated by inappropriate policies, overpopulation, lack of investment in agriculture and pastoral livelihoods, and insecure land tenure. The Ethiopian government’s unwillingness to accept the magnitude of the food crisis undermines the international community’s ability to respond effectively.

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Recommendations Despite some progress in the Ethiopian government’s approach to chronic food insecurity, the development and emergency needs throughout the country are extremely high and the mobilized response is grossly inadequate. Without additional funding, full humanitarian access throughout the country, and transparency, people including many children may needlessly die. Greater implementation of relevant lessons learned elsewhere about addressing chronic vulnerability would produce more effective and sustainable results. The United States, with other donors and the United Nations, should lead efforts to ensure the protection of civilians and the preservation of humanitarian access to the conflict-affected Ogaden region.

Actions • Spearhead a campaign to mobilize new resources from the international community to respond to the current food crisis with a comprehensive approach that addresses agriculture, livelihoods and livestock protection, health, education, civilian protection, water and sanitation, and land tenure; • Press Prime Minister Meles to increase transparency and acknowledge the scope of the humanitarian crisis in order to ensure timely, needs-based assistance; • Encourage the Ethiopian government at the highest levels to work with civil-society organizations (CSOs) to revise the draconian law restricting such groups; and • Call on all parties to the conflict in the Ogaden to respect international humanitarian law, protect civilians and permit the provision of impartial humanitarian assistance to those in need.

Results Immediate and effective assistance efforts, including a broad range of interventions, will avoid famine and save lives. Medium and long-term efforts to support recovery and rebuild the agricultural sector will increase food security and resilience to external shocks.

Background Ethiopia is one of the most food insecure countries in the world and the recent food crisis threatens to affect up to 20% of the population and plunge millions deeper into poverty. An estimated 6.4 million additional people require food assistance while more than 7 million people are considered to be chronically food insecure and depend on assistance each year. While some of these shortages have been triggered by a lack of rain, the increasing intensity of seasonal droughts, inappropriate policies, overpopulation, a lack of investment in agriculture and pastoral livelihoods, and insecure land tenure have made people vulnerable to the point where even the slightest external shock sets off a humanitarian crisis. Ethiopia has made significant progress in analyzing and responding to chronic vulnerability and predictable seasonal hunger, but many challenges remain, particularly in terms of integrating relief and development frameworks before, during and after an emergency. In 2005, the Government of Ethiopia, together with a group of donors, launched a Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) to provide predictable food and/or cash transfers to chronically food insecure people across the country. Today, the PSNP provides 7.2 million people with monthly support to meet their food needs during the traditionally lean period from January until June. In order to respond to additional, and less predictable needs, the federal government regularly leads major multiagency and multi-sectoral needs assessments. These form the basis for an annual “humanitarian requirements” document that contains estimates of the official numbers of affected people and of the funds needed to assist them. In October 2008, the government updated its 2008 humanitarian requirements document to acknowledge that 6.4 million people would require food and non-food assistance in 2008. Many agencies on the ground believe this number is purposely underestimated by over 20%. Currently, the emergency assistance being delivered is not enough to meet the enormous, existing needs. In addition, the assistance delivered fails to reflect lessons learned that could improve its lasting impact in the face of chronic vulnerability. While food aid is an important part of the current emergency response, efforts should be broadened to include a much greater range of non-food interventions to improve food security. For example, there is an urgent need to increase resources for immediate livestock and livelihoods protection – if livestock (which are an important source of income) die, communities will remain dependent on aid for months or even years to come. The long-simmering conflict in the Ogaden, in eastern Ethiopia, between the Ethiopian government and Ogaden

National Liberation Front (ONLF), escalated in 2007. Civilians bear the brunt of indiscriminate attacks, killings and destruction of livelihoods by both parties. The Ogaden has been severely affected by the drought and food price crisis, yet the Ethiopian government  has restricted access to the region, preventing NGOs from providing assistance to populations in need and exacerbating the humanitarian situation. Independent humanitarian action and humanitarian coordination throughout the country have been threatened by the Ethiopian government’s politicization of needs assessment/analysis and responses. For example, the government maintains a high level of control over information, actors and activities and has been unwilling to publicly acknowledge the scale of the need. The U.S. must use its leverage to press the Ethiopian government to take immediate actions needed to avoid a large-scale famine.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Iraq Problem Millions of Iraqis have been violently displaced and made vulnerable. Inside Iraq, insecurity is compounded by a lack of economic opportunities, basic services and safe shelter. Those who fled to neighboring countries have depleted their savings, cannot legally work, and fear being forced to return.

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Recommendations U.S. leadership in responding to this humanitarian crisis has not been strong enough. The U.S. must work with the Government of Iraq, the United Nations and other international stakeholders to develop a comprehensive strategy to meet the needs of displaced and vulnerable Iraqis, both inside and outside of the country. It must include plans for creating the conditions for voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable returns to Iraq; rigorous diplomacy with host countries to ensure refugees have access to legal protection, basic services and legal income and increased resettlement of vulnerable refugees to the U.S.

Actions • Develop a multi-year strategy for humanitarian and development assistance for Iraq. Lead this assistance with a White House-level coordinator working with appropriate US government humanitarian agencies; • Commit to fulfilling at least 50% of future appeals for Iraq’s humanitarian crisis from the UN, International Organization for Migration and International Committee of the Red Cross appeals and strong funding for NGOs; • Press the Iraqi government to allocate adequate funding and work with it to build capacity to address the humanitarian needs of displaced and other vulnerable Iraqis, inside and outside the country; • Promote refugee returns to Iraq only when they can be voluntary, safe and sustainable, in consultation with UN High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), displaced Iraqis and the governments of Iraq and host countries; • Increase Iraqi resettlement target to at least 45,000 for FY09, although not at the expense of other refugee populations. Find durable solutions for refuges in camps in Syria and Jordan; • Ensure adequate funding for domestic refugee assistance to meet the needs of increased arrivals and special needs of this population; and • Fully implement the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act (P.L. 110-181).

Results These steps will increase the capacity of the Government of Iraq and regional host countries to address the humanitarian and protection needs of displaced and otherwise vulnerable Iraqis, leading to greater stability in Iraq and the region.

Background Extreme violence, human rights violations and targeted persecution have touched almost all corners of the Iraqi population. More than 2.7 million Iraqis are internally displaced, and millions more have sought refuge in neighboring countries. Over the past year, Iraq has seen dramatic reductions in violence. But as security gains are consolidated, Iraqi citizens will begin to expect more from their national and local government, including increased access to basic services such as electricity, clean water, basic healthcare and education. Increasing the ability of the Government of Iraq to provide these services will ease the suffering of the Iraqi population. It will also contribute to stability in Iraq and lay the groundwork for conditions that can lead to voluntary, safe, sustainable returns of displaced Iraqis. While the U.S. has increased humanitarian assistance and resettlement for Iraqis since 2006, the U.S. response is incommensurate with the scope of the need. Equally troubling is the fact that there seems to be no clear long-term strategy to address the crisis that is likely to become a protracted one. Significantly more resources and coordination, both within the US government and with international stakeholders, are needed to address the crisis in a comprehensive manner. Until this foundation is set, the U.S. should strengthen its assistance to the millions of Iraqis who have fled their homes and are living in difficult conditions in other parts of Iraq or in urban centers in Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Iran, and other countries in the region, with the largest numbers in Syria and Jordan. In addition, there are close to 3,000 Palestinian refugees in Iraq who have tried to flee and have long been refused entry by Jordan and Syria; they currently live in life-threatening, inhospitable camps along the Iraqi-Syrian border. Urgent Humanitarian Needs of Displaced and Other Vulnerable Iraqis Insecurity, war, neglect and the targeting of many professionals have left Iraq’s education and health sectors in a state of crisis. Some internally displaced Iraqis, who are squatting in residential or public buildings, are at risk of eviction and further displacement. Many other vulnerable Iraqis lack access to clean drinking water, food rations, adequate health care, education, income and livelihoods, and other services. Some too impoverished to flee even within Iraq are struggling to protect themselves and meet their most basic needs. And the conditions of the basic services that do exist remain highly problematic. For example, Iraq’s dilapidated sanitation and water system contributed to a serious cholera outbreak as recently as September 2008. Many Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries came from middle class backgrounds and were initially able to sur-

vive on savings. But their savings are rapidly running out, and food and fuel prices in the region have dramatically increased. Jordan and Syria do not provide work authorization for Iraqi refugees and most host countries do not recognize their refugee status and refugee rights. As a result, refugees are vulnerable to exploitation and pushed to engage in risky survival strategies, including child labor and prostitution, and for some, return to displacement or persecution in Iraq. Vulnerable Groups Particularly vulnerable groups include but are not limited to: religious and ethnic minorities, including the Chaldo-Assyrian Christians, Sabaeans, Yzedis, and Turkmen; refugees in Iraq, including Palestinians, Sudanese, and Iranian Kurds; women, including widows; children, including orphans or unaccompanied minors; elderly Iraqis with serious medical needs; and victims of torture and violence. Iraqis with real and perceived ties to the United States or international organizations are also extremely threatened.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Somalia Problem Somalia is experiencing a massive humanitarian crisis: 1 million people internally displaced and more than 3 million needing assistance as fighting rages involving U.S.-supported Ethiopian forces, the internationallybacked Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and armed opposition groups. Severe drought, record-high food prices and insecurity that hampers the humanitarian response are exacerbating the crisis.

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Recommendations Somalia must be a higher priority for the new administration. It will require a comprehensive, inter-agency strategy for peace and stability, integrating political, security and humanitarian efforts. It should engage the United Nations Security Council to strengthen human rights components in the UN Political Office in Somalia and ensure that possible deployment of a UN peacekeeping force is only pursued when there is a peace to keep. The U.S. Government should work to ensure that Somali refugees are afforded international protection in the countries to which they have fled and provide financial support for programs targeted at refugees in host countries.

Actions • Condemn violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in Somalia; • Support an independent, international initiative to investigate human rights violations and hold perpetrators accountable; • Call on the Government of Kenya to ensure that its border with Somalia remains open for refugees and access by humanitarian aid efforts; • Provide robust support to humanitarian efforts to promote the protection of aid workers and unhindered access for the provision of assistance; • Provide adequate funding to address potential shortfalls in emergency humanitarian assistance (including continued common humanitarian air services and security coordination) and development aid to provide vulnerable groups, including women, with education, employment and training opportunities, in coordination with local civil society projects; • Hold the TFG accountable for the bilateral assistance it receives, particularly compliance with its commitment to facilitate access for humanitarian aid; and • Work with allies to draft a timeline to ensure predictable navy escorts for World Food Program (WFP) ships carrying critical food assistance through pirate-infested waters.

Results A U.S. policy that prioritizes humanitarian assistance and supports a negotiated political settlement in Somalia, which would further long-term U.S. interests in regional stability.

Background Somalia has some of the lowest development and humanitarian indicators in the world following seventeen years of conflict and insecurity. However, the crisis has never been as acute as it is today; a direct consequence of the conflict that ensued following the arrival of Ethiopian troops in January 2007. The conflict has spread from Mogadishu to most parts of South and Central Somalia, involving the TFG, backed by the Ethiopia military, and a myriad of armed opposition groups including splinters including the Eritreanbacked Union of Islamic Courts, Islamist groups such as al-Shabab, as well as clan-based and business interests. The U.S. is perceived as playing an important role in the conflict by financially supporting the Ethiopian army and the TFG and by conducting periodic counter-terrorism operations in Somalia targeting alleged Al-Qaeda operatives. As the conflict rages on with no clear end in sight, the Somali people bear the brunt of the violence. According to the United Nations, the number of people needing humanitarian assistance has increased to nearly 3.2 million people or 43% of the Somali population. The shortfall in supplies of food needed for supplementary feeding for children suffering from acute malnutrition is extremely serious. Lawlessness extends along Somalia’s extensive coastline, making these critical shipping lanes the most dangerous in the world. Somali pirates have held hundred of seafarers and dozens of ships hostage, collecting millions in ransom to fuel their attacks. WFP ships carrying the vast majority of Somalia’s food aid have also been targeted and in October 2008, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1838 urging member states to protect WFP’s shipments. While some countries provide intermittent naval escorts for shipments carrying mostly U.S.-donated food, the U.S. Navy has failed to provide this critical service despite its presence in the region. Throughout the recent conflict, Somalia’s civilians have been the victims of human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law committed by all parties to the conflict, including rape, extra-judicial executions, arbitrary detention, and indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians and their property. Civilians have been killed, internally displaced and have fled the country due to fighting in the capital Mogadishu and across southern and central Somalia. Civil society humanitarian workers, journalists and human rights defenders have been harassed, arrested, robbed, kidnapped, carjacked, executed and killed by roadside bombs. Bilateral assistance into Somalia flows through the TFG, which lacks the capacity to facilitate and coordinate humanitarian assistance. There is no designated ministry for humanitarian assistance and the TFG does not have a hu-

manitarian focal point with which the aid community can engage on access issues, such as checkpoints and arbitrary taxation. Abusive behavior by TFG security forces and their Ethiopian allies, as well as the lack of government capacity and services throughout the country has resulted in scant popular support and its perception as an illegitimate and externally-imposed body by Somalis. The Government of Kenya sporadically closes its border with Somalia, in violation of Kenya’s obligations under international and its own refugee laws. As well as stopping many Somalis from seeking refuge in Kenya, the closures also prevent humanitarian assistance and personnel from crossing into Somalia. In the wake of the fighting, an African Union peacekeeping force (AMISOM) was authorized in January 2007. The mandate of AMISOM is primarily to protect the TFG institutions in Mogadishu. Currently its mandate does not include protection of civilians. Previous experience in Somalia with both UN and U.S. forces testifies to the difficulties of deploying an external peacekeeping force when there is no political process or peace to keep. The current U.S. pressure to deploy a largescale peacekeeping operation – whatever form it might take – ignores the reality that military intervention in this polarized environment will actually result in a further escalation of violence, and will not improve the security situation for Somali people or the delivery of humanitarian assistance. There can be no military solution to the crisis in Somalia.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Sri Lanka Problem The 25-year civil war between the Government of Sri Lanka and rebels has been characterized by a disregard for the protection of civilians and the internal displacement of over half a million people. The crisis continues to be largely ignored by the international community despite escalating violence resulting in continued displacement and civilian deaths.

Recommendations The U.S. Government should take all possible steps to ensure the conflict receives priority attention from the international community. The Sri Lankan government and Tamil rebels must be held accountable for protecting civilians in the areas they control, including allowing freedom of movement to safety and providing humanitarian organizations (NGOs) with unfettered access to those in need. Use international pressure to press both sides to end the fighting and embrace a sustainable solution to the underlying political and social causes of the conflict.

Actions • Prioritize protection of civilians, a return to the ceasefire and reaching a negotiated solution to the conflict, at both the United Nations and in its relations with the Sri Lankan government and influential nations like India and Japan; • Provide full diplomatic and financial support to UN and NGOs efforts to reach, protect and assist civilians in need; • Ensure that U.S. security assistance does not further contribute to violations against civilians; • Maintain the position that Sri Lanka will not be considered for a Millennium Challenge Compact until the government shows a substantial improvement in its human rights record; • Push for a full and impartial investigation of crimes against innocent civilians, including the murders of the 17 Action Contre Le Faim aid workers, and insist that those responsible for such abuses be held accountable; and • Provide the necessary resources to mitigate conflict, ensure a sustainable peace, rebuild conflict-affected areas and allow for the safe return and reintegration of those displaced.

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By putting the Sri Lankan conflict high on its diplomatic agenda for the Asia region, the U.S. will help bring desperately needed attention to a hidden humanitarian disaster, increase the chances assistance will reach those in need, and help lay the groundwork to resolve a conflict that is a potentially destabilizing factor in an important region.

Background The conflict between the Government of Sri Lanka and the rebel Tamil Tigers (LTTE) has raged for twenty-five years since the outbreak of communal violence between the island’s Sinhala majority and the Tamil minority. The conflict is exacerbated by ethnic tensions and significant economic disparities along ethnic and geographic fault lines. The war has killed an estimated 70,000 people and displaced over 1,000,000 from their homes. A significant number of displaced people were displaced yet again by the 2004 Asian tsunami, which ravaged conflict-affected and conflict-sensitive areas of Sri Lanka. Several attempts at a negotiated settlement have been made over the years, the most promising being the Norwegian-led efforts that resulted in 2002 ceasefire, which largely held until the election in November 2005 of President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who ran on a platform of defeating the Tigers militarily. Tensions escalated in 2006 due at least in part to perceptions of unequal distribution of Tsunami funds. After a period of rising tensions, with both parties committing provocations, the ceasefire was formally abandoned in 2006 with open warfare and acts of terrorism. After a hardfought campaign that displaced close to 200,000 civilians, the government re-established control over Tamil areas in the eastern part of the country and is now waging a pitched battle to regain ascendency in the north. The LTTE rebels have responded to the government’s campaign with strong resistance. In September 2008, all communications were cut to the affected area, and both UN humanitarian assistance NGOs were ordered to leave. New population displacements have resulted as civilian institutions, including schools and churches, continue to be subject to bombardment. Access by road to the region has been cut, resulting in serious shortages of food, medicine and essential supplies. The LTTE are preventing civilians from fleeing to safe zones not currently affected by the conflict. All of this adds up to a desperate humanitarian crisis that requires the priority attention of the U.S. and the international community. Certain countries, particularly India and Japan, have special influence in Sri Lanka, and U.S. diplomatic efforts should include continued targeted outreach to those governments. In 2006, 17 aid workers from Action Contre la Faim were murdered in the eastern region. A national investigating commission was established, but the commission of observers authorized by the Sri Lankan President decided to terminate its work in March 2008 citing a lack of government cooperation in carrying out a transparent and comprehensive investigation. The LTTE has been designated a terrorist organization by the State Department since 1997. Bilateral security assis-

tance to the Sri Lankan government, such as military training and equipment, has raised concerns that such assistance could contribute to violence against civilians. The deterioration in security and in the government’s human rights record led the Millennium Challenge Corporation to suspend more than $11 million intended for Sri Lanka in FY08. Over time, the U.S. must help provide the resources required to rebuild conflict-affected areas, ensure a sustainable peace and allow for the safe return and reintegration of the displaced. With hundreds of thousands of Sri Lankan lives hanging in the balance, the U.S. and other governments must move this crisis to the top of the humanitarian agenda and give this issue the focused attention and action it requires.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Sudan Problem The crisis in Sudan is a web of conflicts. The 2005 peace agreement to end decades of war in southern Sudan is at risk of collapsing. In Darfur, conflict, widespread human rights abuses and mass displacement continue after 5 years, humanitarian access is severely reduced, and the peace process has made no progress. A peace agreement for the East is also languishing unimplemented.

Recommendations Previous U.S. efforts to address Sudan failed in part because we addressed each crisis in isolation and disregarding regional influences, overlapping actors, parallel tactics, and the underlying causes of many of the problems. Focusing on Darfur while the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the East Sudan Peace Agreements (ESPA) falter and violence explodes in neighboring Chad, will not bring peace to Darfur or the rest of Sudan. As Sudan moves closer to the elections scheduled in 2009, the U.S. must reinvigorate diplomatic efforts in support of the CPA, assist return and recovery efforts in the South, and address the immediate humanitarian needs in Darfur.

Actions • Appoint a full-time U.S. Presidential envoy to ensure implementation of the CPA and the work of the United Nations (UN) Joint Chief Mediator to promote successful Darfur peace talks that include civil-society; • Mobilize diplomatic and financial resources to address the transition from humanitarian to development programs in the South to ensure a tangible peace dividend, while pressing the Southern Sudanese government to make recovery and assistance for returnees a much higher priority; • Engage European, Chinese and regional African and Arab partners to increase and coordinate pressure on the many parties to the Darfur conflict to respect international humanitarian law, and agree and adhere to existing ceasefire agreements; • Work with the UN to ensure that the peacekeeping forces for Darfur (UNAMID) and in the South (UNMIS), particularly in the flashpoint of Abyei, are first and foremost effective at protecting civilians; and • Work to ensure that humanitarian agencies can access all those who require assistance.

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The steps outlined above will ensure that existing efforts address the root causes and provide civilians with the necessary protection and humanitarian assistance. They will also provide support to prevent the collapse of the CPA and re-start the Darfur peace process.

Background Sudan, Africa’s largest country, has been wracked by violent conflict for much of its independent history, resulting in weak governance, chronic poverty and little infrastructure. The unequal distribution of its oil wealth and violent competition over increasingly scarce land and water resources fuel much of Sudan’s conflicts. The 22-year civil war in the south killed 2 million people and left over 4 million displaced. Despite the signing of the CPA in 2005 between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army, many of the milestones set out in the CPA have not been met, and there is serious danger that key CPA requirements for elections in 2009, a referendum on self-determination for the south in 2011, resolution of disputed border areas of the oil-rich Abyei region, and sharing of oil revenue will also not be honored. While the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) deployed a peacekeeping force to support the implementation of the CPA, the May 2008 flare-up in Abyei demonstrated their weak capacity to protect civilians. Collapse of the CPA would mean return to war between north and south Sudan and extinguish any prospect of peace in Darfur. An estimated 2 million southern Sudanese have returned home since 2004, but only a fraction have access to basic services, such as clean water, primary health care, education and the creation of livelihoods. Failure to address reintegration and recovery needs throughout Sudan generates frustration and exacerbates communal tensions, which could ultimately jeopardize the success of the peace processes. The Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) ended fighting between the government and the Eastern Front in 2006 but remains fragile. While the eastern region is among the most marginalized regions in Sudan with morbidity rates as high as those found in Darfur, few international NGOs work there and little information on humanitarian conditions exists. Increased humanitarian and development funding is needed for this neglected region’s recovery. Five years into the crisis in Darfur, protection, assistance and sustainable peace remain out of reach for the people in Darfur. More than 4.5 million people are affected by the conflict and in need of humanitarian assistance. Aid workers in the region are finding it increasingly difficult and dangerous to reach the people in need. Humanitarian access has dramatically decreased due to violence by various parties to the conflict and bureaucratic impediments placed by the Government of Sudan. The U.S. should support safe access by continuing to adequately fund the UN’s Humanitarian Air Service, which provide essential transport for aid workers and supplies; ensuring that UNAMID prioritizes the protection of humanitarian actors; and by pressing the Government of Sudan to remove bureaucratic obstacles on the

entry and movement of humanitarian personnel throughout the country. The dire situation continues despite the world’s largest humanitarian operation on the ground and unparalleled grassroots mobilization, particularly in the United States. International leaders have found themselves compelled to act by the public but unable to dramatically change the situation on the ground. As of the fall of 2008, parties to the conflict have more to gain by fighting than talking. The incentives for peaceful coexistence are not yet there. The best model for reconciliation in Darfur is the best model for the country as a whole: the CPA. It is crucial that this landmark agreement be vigorously supported for the credibility and legitimacy of any political negotiation going forward with the Government of Sudan. After the failure of numerous ceasefire agreements, the world responded to the crisis in Darfur by sending peacekeeping forces to protect civilians and facilitate humanitarian assistance; first the African Union in 2004, and now the United Nations-African Union ‘hybrid’ mission (UNAMID). Yet almost one year into its deployment and with less than half of its members in country, UNAMID has failed to provide adequate protection to the people of Darfur. The force lacks critical equipment, personnel and training resources leaving the people of Darfur, humanitarian agencies and even its own peacekeepers vulnerable to ongoing attacks and extreme violence. While not the only cause, the continuation of the Darfur crisis is due, in part, to the failure of the U.S. and others to see the challenges in Sudan as connected and overlapping. Sustainable peace in Darfur hinges on the implementation of the CPA and ESPA. The CPA and ESPA include power sharing, wealth sharing and security provisions, that if implemented, could contribute to the decentralization and democratization of Sudan and therefore address some of the root causes of Darfur’s crisis. Conversely, failure to implement these agreements could result in a return to numerous localized conflicts or even large-scale conflict across Sudan. Recovery and reconstruction assistance for the transitional areas along Sudan’s contentious north-south border and for Eastern Sudan has not met community needs or expectations. As a result, peace in the south and east remains fragile.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Uganda Problem In northern Uganda, despite peace talks that produced a landmark ceasefire agreement and a measure of security allowing many people to return home after two decades of war, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) leadership remains at large, destabilizing the broader region and obstructing lasting peace, while separate tensions are on the rise in the Karamoja region.

Recommendations This long-standing regional crisis is now at a crossroads, where sustainable peace is possible but not guaranteed. The Juba Peace Process created tangible gains, including improvements in security and humanitarian access, but strong and decisive U.S. diplomatic leadership and reconstruction assistance will be vital to a sustainable peace: continued high-level political focus on peace and reconciliation, augmented by a robust effort to restore viable communities, will provide a peace dividend that removes the incentives for returning to fighting while it also contributes to broader regional stability.

Actions • Appoint a high-level diplomat to monitor and advance regional security and ensure the full implementation of the Final Peace Agreement; • Hold the Government of Uganda accountable for its Peace and Reconstruction Development Plan (PRDP). Sustainable peace will require that the U.S. and its partners work with the Government of Uganda to ensure follow-through on commitments to rebuild the North; • Develop a clear USAID transition strategy with robust, flexible funding. A comprehensive, USAID transition plan that addresses the transition from relief to development is urgently needed to ensure basic services needed to encourage voluntary return of refugees and others displaced by the fighting; and • Support human rights in the troubled Karamoja region. The Government of Uganda must respect human and civil rights while conducting its forced disarmament activities, and the Karamojong must likewise respect the rule of law. Reports that U.S. military will begin activities in the area are disconcerting, as they could exacerbate tensions in this flashpoint.

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These steps would support sustainable peace in northern Uganda and contribute to stability in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and the Central African Republic.

Background For over two decades, the war in northern Uganda has caused a humanitarian crisis for millions of civilians and exacerbated other conflicts in the region. Since 1986, northern Uganda has been embroiled in a conflict involving the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Government of Uganda, causing a widespread regional security and humanitarian crisis. Considered one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, more than 1.8 million people – eighty percent of the population in northern Uganda – were forced to flee their homes, living in squalid camps in which 1,000 individuals died each week. Lacking popular support, the LRA resorted to abducting children to serve as soldiers, bonded labor and sex slaves. Between 30,000 and 66,000 children were kidnapped over the course of conflict, with abductees forming as much as 90 percent of the LRA’s ranks. Over the course of 20 years, the Government of Uganda’s inability to protect civilians or defeat the LRA – largely due to tribal and regional indifference, and war profiteering – gave way to the current regional crisis that merited international action and greater policy focus, both within the Bush Administration and the international community. After significant public and congressional pressure, the U.S. eventually supported the Juba Peace Process, which was initiated in August 2006 by the Government of South Sudan, supported by regional governments and the United Nations. The process secured a landmark cease-fire agreement and made significant strides towards addressing the broader political and economic grievances of the population in northern Uganda; but it stalled in May 2008 when LRA rebel leader, Joseph Kony, refused to sign the Final Peace Agreement. Despite this serious setback, regional leaders have called for continued engagement between the parties, while retaining a forum to address regional security and development issues. This unresolved crisis has now become a broader regional security problem, as the LRA has expanded their attacks and abductions of civilians in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic (CAR). LRA attacks in South Sudan threaten implementation of that region’s hard-won Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the Sudanese government in Khartoum. LRA activity in eastern Congo has heightened tensions between the Ugandan and Congolese governments, while roaming attacks have destabilized the border areas inside CAR. Within this context of regional instability, a number of actors continue to provide covert support to the LRA. Despite improved stability in northern Uganda, almost half of the nearly two million people forced from their homes remain in displacement camps. They now face the difficult decision of whether to leave these crowded and diseaseridden camps for the uncertainty of life back home, where

basic services such as schools, clean water, and health clinics have yet to be restored. Many families have responded by keeping a foot in both worlds, with parents returning home to work in the fields and children left, unprotected, in the camps to attend school, where they are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. Police and judicial infrastructures, crippled during the war, are unable to address high rates of sexual violence or emerging disputes over land. Combined with the massive levels of trauma caused by the war, these challenges are preventing the people of northern Uganda from emerging from the shadow of this 22 year-old conflict. As the situation in northern Uganda transitions from the emergency phase, a funding gap has occurred. Humanitarian assistance is decreasing before development programs are implemented. U.S. funding for recovery activities in northern Uganda is hampered by its inflexibility – only $2 million of the $125 million for FY08 is un-earmarked, restraining the ability to meet the fluid transition needs from war to peace. More attention needs to be paid to the deteriorating situation in the Karamoja region in the north, where the Ugandan military’s excessively violent response could unravel any stability gained. The US Government must raise these concerns with the Government of Uganda and encourage greater economic and development investments that will help to address the underlying causes of tensions. True peace, reconciliation, and development in Northern Uganda are dependent on a good-faith effort by the Government of Uganda to address the underlying causes of the conflict. However, the United States has traditionally been unwilling to publicly push the GoU to meet its obligations towards its population in the North. We must hold all sides accountable, and this includes ensuring that the GoU’s budgetary and policy decisions, particularly in the Peace and Reconstruction Development Plan, reflect a real commitment to rebuilding the North.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

West Bank/Gaza Problem Humanitarian conditions in the West Bank and Gaza have sharply deteriorated since 2006 and NGOs cannot fulfill their mission due to violence, restrictions on their movement and access to humanitarian goods, and the lack of visible progress in settling the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. The continued and deteriorating plight of the Palestinians increases hostility toward the U.S. across the region and hinders prospects for peace.

Recommendations The U.S. government, along with the parties to the conflict and the Quartet (the diplomatic mediating group in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, made up of the U.S., Russia, the European Union and the United Nations) should encourage Israeli and Palestinian officials to reach agreement on actions to improve humanitarian workers’ movement and access for basic goods and services. The Administration must immediately reinvigorate the peace process through support for broader efforts towards reconciliation between the Palestinian factions, and to bring all parties back to the negotiating table.

Actions • Work with the Israeli and Palestinian authorities to ensure full implementation of the 2005 Access and Movement Agreement, establish procedures to open the crossings and restore full humanitarian and commercial access to and from the West Bank and Gaza; • Work with Israeli and Palestinian authorities to set a broadened definition of humanitarian goods needed to maintain and rehabilitate basic public services, allowing for reactivation of all stalled humanitarian and development projects, with a view toward increasing assistance to reflect the severity of the need; • Demonstrate firm political support for the agreement on the cessation of violence and press concerned parties to adhere to its terms; and • Promote broader efforts at reconciliation, including those by neighboring countries, within the Occupied Palestinian Territory and between Israel and the Palestinians.

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The recommended actions will alleviate suffering amongst Palestinians and Israelis alike as well as promote confidence in the feasibility of a negotiated settlement of the conflict. Building confidence in the peace process and its prospects will encourage parties to return to the negotiating table and move the region closer to a lasting peace.

Background The humanitarian situation for the 3.8 million Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza has steadily deteriorated since the January 2006 elections. In the West Bank, approximately 50% of the population lives below the poverty line, with unemployment rates soaring to nearly 30%. Despite the 2005 Access and Movement Agreement, increases in West Bank checkpoints, along with a myriad of trade restrictions have severely impacted the movement of people, aid workers and goods, and have created major obstacles to people’s efforts to support themselves and their families. Supplies such as medicine, fuel, cement, spare parts and seeds for humanitarian and development programs are difficult or impossible to access. Moreover, West Bank closures, property confiscations and the widespread destruction of land, wells and water harvesting cisterns have prevented access to much-needed water. Palestinians living in Gaza face particularly difficult circumstances as evidenced by the high rate of unemployment, the large number of people requiring food assistance, and the declining quality and quantity of water. With a 79% unemployment rate and spiraling food prices, approximately 75% of the 1.5 million people in Gaza must rely on food assistance from World Food Program and UNRWA (the UN mission for the area). The quality and quantity of water are also declining, with 40 percent of the population having water only for a few hours a day or even a week. The limited availability of spare parts and fuel stocks needed to operate the sewage pumps means that Gazans have no means of safely disposing of the sewage. The waste is being pumped into the Mediterranean every day creating a serious risk of a communicable disease outbreak and posing long term environmental risks not only in Gaza but also along the Egyptian and Israeli coastlines. Studies further report that there has been an increase in chronic disease and malnutrition among children under five in the Gaza Strip, with an increase in children suffering from diarrhea, insomnia and anxiety. There also has been an increase in spousal and child abuse and a 50% rise in the demand for anti-depressants, reflecting the sense of malaise and hopelessness amongst the population in Gaza. The Palestinian economy has severely deterioriated and has virtually collapsed in Gaza, stymieing development efforts and contributing to increasing and entrenched poverty. The closures have led to the suspension of 95% of Gaza’s industrial operations, as businesses can neither access the inputs they need for production, nor the crossings to export what they produce. Medical care is also insufficient due to the lack of supplies in Gaza; and there is only limited access to Israeli hospitals, as evidenced by parked ambulances around Gaza, unable to operate due to lack of fuel and parts.

Valid, approved medical cases from both the West Bank and Gaza are sometimes kept waiting at the crossings for up to five hours. Humanitarian organizations are also having trouble fulfilling their missions in Gaza. USAID-funded construction projects have stopped due to the lack of building materials and cement. Pre-school feeding programs have been cut back and the provision of psychosocial counseling stopped because NGOs’ most senior experts do not have the visas required to enter Gaza from the West Bank and their trucks in Gaza do not have gasoline to reach outlying areas. The fragile agreement on the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hamas is holding and has brought some improvements in security conditions for both sides. Its collapse would turn an already dire situation into a disaster. Maintaining and strengthening the agreement to ease the humanitarian situation requires the U.S. to exercise its unique influence, and international and regional support.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Disaster Risk Reduction Problem Natural disasters have increased fourfold over the last 20 years, affecting the poorest and most vulnerable communities most severely. The increase in frequency and magnitude of disasters reduces recovery time and increases vulnerability, undermining investments in humanitarian relief and development and progress toward the Millennium Development Goals.

Recommendations Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) is the systematic development and application of policies, strategies and practices that minimize vulnerabilities and disaster risks throughout a society. DRR activities help mitigate the adverse impacts of natural hazards and prepare communities for such events, many of which will be exacerbated by climate change. As a signatory to the Hyogo Framework for Action, (the international community’s commitment to better address and coordinate DRR), the U.S. must vigorously support international DRR initiatives and investments aimed at safeguarding vulnerable communities to save lives and minimize the loss of assets among the poor.

Actions • Increase participation by the Government of the U.S. in global efforts to reduce the vulnerability of impoverished communities at risk for disaster; • Establish an on-going multi-stakeholder national task force that brings together government, academia, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society actors, to promote, support and strengthen the U.S. commitment to the Hyogo Framework for Action as other leading nations have done; • Increase support for DRR activities such as flood control and coastal management that diminish the negative impact of human activity and climate change; • Establish a point person at USAID to liaise with U.S. NGOs on DRR activities; and • Promote mainstreaming of DRR activities into USAID-funded development activities by following USAID/OFDA’s example of committing at least 10% of program resources to disaster preparedness and mitigation programs.

Results

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Taking these steps to invest in Disaster Risk Reduction will: • Save lives and reduce human suffering in the face of disasters, demonstrating U.S. commitment to the world’s most vulnerable communities; • Gradually reduce the costs of responding to disasters and protect development program investments; • Increase countries’ capacity to respond to hazards; and • Result in more effective foreign assistance by reducing the impact of hazards and supporting faster recovery.

Background According to the 2007 World Disasters Report released by the International Federation of the Red Cross, the number of natural disasters1 worldwide has increased by 40% from the previous decade. The number of disaster victims also increased by at least 30% from 2004-2007, as reported in data from the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. Climate change exacerbated the record number of natural disasters across the world in 2007, up nearly 20% from 2006. Vulnerability to disasters is increasing due to rapid and unplanned urbanization, diminished coping mechanisms, and shorter recovery periods between disasters. The achievement of every Millennium Development Goal (MDG) is endangered if DRR measures are not put in place. The eradication of extreme poverty and hunger (MDG 1) will not be achieved where disasters result in the loss of human life and livelihoods. Progress toward reducing child mortality by two thirds (MDG4) is undermined when proper disaster preparedness and mitigation strategies are not in place, as disasters reduce access to clean water and, increase vulnerability to water-borne disease, a top-five factor in child mortality. The world cannot effectively combat HIV and AIDS, malaria, and other diseases (MDG 6) while poor health and nutrition weaken immunity following disasters. In addition to saving lives and reducing vulnerability, DRR measures are cost effective. The U.S. Geological Survey and the World Bank calculated that $40 billion invested in physical or engineering DRR measures (e.g., adequate infrastructure design) would have saved $280 billion in losses from natural disasters in the 1990s. In China, $3.15 billion spent on flood control over the last 40 years has averted $12 billion in losses. Case studies demonstrate the benefits of relatively low cost DRR programs in terms of saving lives and reducing the vulnerability of people living at risk. For example, in the last 38 years Bangladesh has experienced three cyclones with similar high intensity levels. Due to effective partnership on DRR between the Government of Bangladesh and international donors (including USAID and its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)), mortality resulting from 2007’s Cyclone Sidr was reduced to 3,363 deaths as compared to nearly 500,000 and 138,000 deaths due to cyclones in 1970 and 1991 respectively. These DRR measures included cyclone shelters, early warning systems, and communitybased preparedness measures. The annual cost of these measures totaled $460,000. While it is impossible to mea1 Disaster is defined here as “a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or society causing widespread human, material, economic, or environmental losses which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources.”

sure the impact Sidr may have had without the disaster risk reduction measures put in place, the statistics clearly suggest the measures have saved hundreds of thousands of lives for only a few dollars per life per year. There is robust international commitment to DRR. The 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction was held in Kobe Japan, just days after the Indian Ocean tsunami, a disaster underscoring the importance of effective detection and early warning systems. One hundred sixty-eight countries (including the U.S.) adopted the conference’s Hyogo Framework for Action2 (HFA) to strengthen international commitment to DRR with the goal of a substantial reduction of disaster losses (in lives and in social, economic and environmental assets) of communities and countries by the year 2015.

2 The Hyogo Framework for Action has five priorities: 1. Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation; 2. Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning; 3. Use knowledge, innovation, and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels; 4. Reduce the underlying risk factors; and 5. Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.

POLICY BRIEF

November 2008

Contributors to Humanitarian Priorities Policy Briefs Organization

URL

American Jewish World Service American Red Cross American Refugee Committee CARE Catholic Relief Services CHF International Christian Children’s Fund Church World Service Habitat for Humanity International International Medical Corps International Rescue Committee Jesuit Refugee Service Mercy Corps Oxfam America Refugee Council USA Refugees International Relief International Save the Children US Fund for UNICEF Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children World Vision

www.ajws.org www.redcross.org www.arcrelief.org www.care.org www.crs.org www.chfinternational.org www.ccfusa.org www.churchworldservice.org www.habitat.org www.imcworldwide.org www.theirc.org www.jrsusa.org www.mercycorps.org www.oxfamamerica.org www.rcusa.org www.refintl.org www.ri.org www.savethechildren.org www.unicefusa.org www.womenscommission.org www.worldvision.org

InterAction Humanitarian Policy and Practice Working Group

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Organization

URL

Action Against Hunger (USA) Adventist Development and Relief Agency International African Medical & Research Foundation, Inc. Africare Air Serv International Alliance to End Hunger American Friends Service Committee American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee American Jewish World Service American Near East Refugee Aid American Red Cross International Services American Refugee Committee Americares America's Development Foundation Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team

www.actionagainsthunger.org www.adra.org www.amref.org www.africare.org www.airserv.org www.alliancetoendhunger.org www.afsc.org www.jdc.org www.ajws.org www.anera.org www.redcross.org www.archq.org www.americares.org www.adfusa.org www.amurt.net

InterAction Humanitarian Policy and Practice Working Group (cont) Organization

URL

Baptist World Alliance/Baptist World Aid Brother's Brother Foundation, The Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC) CARE Catholic Medical Mission Board Catholic Relief Services CHF International Christian Children's Fund Christian Reformed World Relief Committee Church World Service CONCERN Worldwide US Inc. Congressional Hunger Center Counterpart International, Inc. Direct Relief International Doctors of the World, Inc. Episcopal Relief and Development Ethiopian Community Development Council Food for the Hungry Friends of Liberia GOAL USA Fund Handicap International Heart to Heart International Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society Help the Afghan Children Immigration and Refugee Services of America International Aid International Catholic Migration Commission International Medical Corps International Orthodox Christian Charities International Relief and Development International Relief Teams International Rescue Committee Islamic Relief Jesuit Refugee Service/USA Korean American Sharing Movement Latter-day Saint Charities Lutheran World Relief MAP International Mercy Corps Mercy-USA for Aid and Development, Inc. National Peace Corps Association Northwest Medical Teams Operation USA Oxfam America Partners for Development Physicians for Human Rights Presbyterian Disaster Assistance and Hunger Program

www.bwanet.org www.brothersbrother.org www.civicworldwide.org www.care.org www.cmmb.org www.crs.org www.chfinternational.org www.christianchildrensfund.org www.crwrc.org www.churchworldservice.org www.concernusa.org www.hungercenter.org www.counterpart.org www.directrelief.org www.dowusa.org www.er-d.org www.ecdcinternational.org www.fh.org www.fol.org www.goalusa.org www.handicap-international.us www.hearttoheart.org www.hias.org www.helptheafghanchildren.org www.refugees.org www.internationalaid.org www.icmc.net www.imcworldwide.org www.iocc.org www.ird-dc.org www.irteams.org www.theIRC.org www.irw.org www.jrsusa.org www.kasm.org www.providentliving.org www.lwr.org www.map.org www.mercycorps.org www.mercyusa.org www.rpcv.org www.nwmti.org www.opusa.org www.oxfamamerica.org www.pfd.org www.phrusa.org www.pcusa.org

InterAction Humanitarian Policy and Practice Working Group (cont) Organization Project HOPE, The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc. Refugees International RELIEF International Salvation Army World Service Office, The Save the Children Trickle Up Program, The U.S. Association for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees U.S. Fund for UNICEF United Jewish Communities United Methodist Committee on Relief World Concern World Education World Emergency Relief World Relief Corporation World Vision

URL www.projecthope.org www.refugeesinternational.org www.ri.org www.sawso.org www.savethechildren.org www.trickleup.org www.unrefugees.org www.unicefusa.org www.ujc.org www.umcor.org www.worldconcern.org www.worlded.org www.worldemergencyrelief.org www.worldrelief.org www.worldvision.org