Ingos And Technology Transfer

Analysis of International Non-Governmental Organizations as Facilitators of Technology Transfers in Resource Constrained Settings

Arunan Sivalingam

The proliferation of International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO’s) has become an extensively researched area within the social sciences and in the context of international political economy. It has been through the bi-lateral mechanisms of such organizations that institutional barriers have been overcome and development goals achieved. INGO’s have been praised for their perceived comparative advantage in reaching inaccessible communities and their ability to function with modest resources (Committee on Science and Technology in Foreign Assistance, 2006). This has become particularly relevant after the observed failures of technology transfers by large multi-nationals and large scale institutional entities. Due to such inefficiencies, many INGO‘s have acted as facilitators in the transfer and implementation of technologies at the community level. Technological transfers have not come without the subsequent potential for high economic, institutional and cultural risks. It is for this reason that economic cost-benefit analyses have been undertaken over cultural and institutional needs assessments (Kedia and Bhagat 1988). The benefit accrued by INGO’s has also been overshadowed by their intrinsic capacity-related drawbacks. In particular, the inability of NGO’s to create economies of scale, lack of technical expertise when acting as mere facilitators and misunderstanding of cultural and institutional contexts have highlighted such constraints. Successes have been achieved when community centered cost-benefit analysis have been complemented with studies of holistic absorptive capacities (Kedia and Bhagat, 1988). International voluntary organizations have demonstrated institutional advantages in process-embodied technology transfers, which allow for external actors to work with recipients in structuring technology on context specific recipient needs. Product-embodied transfers have proven to be more difficult, because they entail the direct transfer of a pre-created technology1

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Process-embodied transfers focus on the knowledge transfer of a specific methodology (e.g. farming methods), whereas product-embodied transfers entail a transfer of a specific product (e.g. LED lighting systems)

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(Bhagat and Kedia, 1988). It has been observed that it is only through careful situational analysis, the engagement of various stakeholders and understanding of local values, which has allowed external organizations to successfully implement novel technological capabilities. At the beginning of the modern economic development era, technocrats and institutional agencies looked at the growth potential of low income countries (LIC’s) through mechanisms which would enable a ‘catching up’ through technological transfers. Technology has been understood to be one of the key inputs in achieving economic growth, as argued by economists such as Frederich List and others. The work of German economist Schumpeter was the first to put forward the hypothesis of the Technology-Push model, stating that only through introducing radically new ideas into economic life could development be generated. Thus in Schumpeter’s view technology was seen to carry paramount importance. Starting with the Green Revolution, such views were put into practice, with private Trans-national corporations (TNC’s) working to capture emerging markets, and transplant novel technological capabilities (Enos, Lall, and Yun, 1995). Although as observable evidence reveals, direct investment failed for various reasons; the primary being the failure of many TNC’s to accurately assess the technological absorptive capacity of recipient countries. The capital intensity of such external technologies and the grounding of research and development (R&D) in donor countries, helped exacerbate this fact (Enos, Lall, and Yun, 1995, 56). Such failures demonstrate the implications of technology transfers in the context of environmental, social and cultural norms, whose perceptions must be examined. Bhagat and Khadia’s (1988) study on the complexity of social and cultural environments, based on the work of Hofstede reveals a critical research deficit; highlighting the many failures in trying to accomplish successful transfers of product-oriented technologies. These types of technologies were largely manufactured externally, and transplanted into

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communities without sufficient understanding and guidance in sustainable local R& D capabilities.

This was due to the fact that TNC’s looked for domestic capital to supply external

capital needs, overlooking capital for local infrastructure. This consequently limited transfer of investment capital only to developing countries with proven resources (Galbriath, 1965). The countless examples of the failure of technology transfers have been heavily analyzed from a technical perspective. Yet what has been overlooked is the important linkage of societal culture and strategic management processes. Bhagat and Khadia’s research into the differences in technology transfers between countries within the organization for economic cooperation and development (OECD) and that between OECD states and non-OECD countries reveals an important variation (1988). Industrialized states who engaged in strategic technology transfers viewed the overall strategic management process between exchanging firms to be the most critical step in carrying out a viable transaction. Conversely, research into transfers between an industrial state and newly industrializing countries (NIC’s) showed high importance in societal and culturally based differences, revealing the relational gap in transfers undertaken at the institutional level by private companies and state sponsored development programs (Bhagat and Kedia, 1988). The type of macro-development undertaken by firms was based on the assumption that absorptive capacity and institutional capacity existed at the outset of the transfer process. In addition, the assumptions held and selection criteria established by multilateral donors such as the World Bank were similar, with the only difference being the goal of building technological capacity, rather then utilizing what was already assumed to exist. In this regard, technological activities were considerably influenced by the nature of the domestic market and industrial base of the developing country, not social factors (Enos, Lall, & Yun, 1995, 58). These underlying issues therefore have contributed to the broad consensus that the majority of technological

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transfers were and have been failures. Evidence reveals that the benefits of increased technology have not trickled down to the most marginalized and impoverished communities in recipient countries. Consequently, many INGOs have come to bridge these gaps by fostering links between experts, the private sector and local communities through long-terms relationships with such stakeholders (Parry, 2005). The effectiveness of INGOs in demonstrating a comparative advantage in processoriented transfers over product-oriented transfers can be clearly observed when examining the differences in the modes of technology transfer. Interestingly enough in the literature, processoriented technology have been characterized as being more difficult to implement. The primary reason for this difficulty in implementation is that such technology transfer involves more engagement with various transferral processes than product-oriented transfers, due to the fact that the process of utilizing a specific technology must be understood by recipients when introduced (Bhagat and Kedia, 1988). Based on the work of various scholars and accumulated field experience observations; basic requisites have been defined and deemed fundamental when carrying out any form of technology transfer between two distinct groups. The role of cultural orientations of the donor agent and that of the recipient organization or community, for example, has emerged as a critical aspect in the success of transfers or lack thereof (Saad, 2000). Technology transfer, like innovation is not a single action, but rather a total process involving various stages of bringing a new idea to the market and is characterised by various interfaces. It is a highly complex phenomenon where changes are of a techno-economic and social type (Saad, 2000, 126). It is for the reasons outlined above that many transfers failed in the early development period. Technical considerations were promoted at the expense of engagement with stakeholders and assessing local capacities. Mass macro transferrals have thus

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been seen to be failures due to their conceptual oversight, but it is this gap that INGOs have come to bridge. The operating framework of INGOs has allowed for a comparative advantage in process-oriented technology transfers. Due to the very organizational mandates of various INGOs to work with local communities. When examining the literature on the linkages between NGOs and process-embodied technology transfers, it is apparent that consensus is ambiguous on the success of NGOs in this regard. In particular, agricultural process -embodied technology transfers have been extensively undertaken by INGOs, resulting in either major failures or successes.

Although the complexity

and relative failure rate of many extensive agricultural schemes cannot be neglected, such as the Green Revolution, INGOs have seemed to demonstrate relatively more success in this area then their predecessors of the agricultural revolution of the 1960’s. Much of the success of INGO’s can be accounted for by the reluctance of agricultural ministries of LDC governments to not demonstrate capacity to reach rural farmers, or the lack of political will to do so (Biggs and Farrington, 1990). Latin America reveals itself to be a case in point, with its large density of INGO’s; many exposed their ability to provide agricultural extension programs, reach small communities with farm inputs and provide technical assistance (Biggs and Farrington, 1990). Surveys of INGO activity in African and South Asia contexts reveals a similar dynamic with the number of INGO sponsored agricultural extension and research activities well surpassing public sector initiatives (Biggs and Farrington, 1990). The organizational structure of INGOs, which allows INGOs more flexibility to work in local environments, has also been a major factor in their success over their counterparts in the public sector. INGOs have also not worked independently of the public sector. For example, when the political environment has been permitting, groups such as the Taskforce on Appropriate Technology worked with the Ministry

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of Agriculture to conduct research and influence policy in Bangladesh (Biggs and Farrington, 1990, 485). Therefore, the action- orientated nature of many NGO’s has allowed them to work with local communities to garner local insights, gauge local problems and effectively respond to concerns and capacities of local communities. In many cases, NGO’s themselves have conducted their own monitoring and evaluation activities and feasibility studies in order to ensure effective technology transfers. In eastern Africa, CARE International’s Agroforestry Monitoring and Evaluation Methodology Project was set up in collaboration with six different NGOs, and demonstrated extensive technical and scientific analysis in its monitoring and evaluation of specific projects (Biggs and Farrington, 1990, 484). Furthermore, many INGOs also have gone well beyond action-oriented feasibility studies and collaboration projects, to undertake their own studies. The Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) for example, has worked for an extensive period of time in Bangladesh, and has utilized sound scientific methodology to conduct on-farm trials and collect data. Such examples demonstrate the flexibility in focus of INGOs as compared to government research objectives, for example, which seek to find immediate results and increase productivity (Wilson, 1995). External organizations have shown their ability to address constraints with their program centered approach. Focusing on multiple sectors has better enabled premature problem identification (Kaimowitz, 1993). The above examples demonstrate that with regard to agriculturally based processembodied technology transfers, several NGO’s have demonstrated a proven comparative advantage over private and state-led organizations. This comparative advantage can be attributed to the broad community level approach that many organizations take in addressing issues of human development, and the close collaboration with local actors. Such relationships

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established by INGOs helps build connections with community needs, visions and constraints. Therefore, the comparative advantage shown in process-oriented transfers can be explained by the inevitable methodological context in which such processes must occur: close community collaboration, process design and implementation (Kaimowitz, 1993). Although at a relational level, NGO’s have demonstrated an advantage over other institutional actors in technology transfers, there are many drawbacks to highlight. Firstly, the lack of technical expertise in agriculture amongst INGO staff members creates a problem in not understanding the more long-term impacts of transplanting certain technologies. Furthermore, it has been documented that many INGOs have based their agricultural project methodologies on subjective trial and error experiments, and thus have no long-term follow-up due to their limited link to local institutional capacity, i.e. laboratories, qualified researchers etc (Kaimowitz 1993, 1145). Quantifying the strengths and weaknesses of non-state actors; their advantage in accessing and working with local communities has proven to be a major strength. Yet the tendency of some INGOs to lack the technical know-how to understand long-term impacts of technological transfers and unwillingness to be open to community input, has demonstrated their drawbacks and thus has caused project failures (Wilson 1995). This is important when analyzing the role of such actors in relation to process oriented and product-embodied transfers; as such transfers have not shown the same positive results as the former. This can simply be accounted for by the mere fact that product-oriented transfers utilize a direct and external transferring of a specific technological product. This direct and external transfer occurs in the absence of economic, political and social or cultural local absorptive capacity considerations at the local

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level. Process-oriented transfers on the other hand, rely on close collaboration and creating relationships with local actors, to ensure a mutual transferral of knowledge and understanding. Much of the technology transferred to developing countries has been based on a simple supply side approach of utilizing product-oriented technology transfers; marshalling resources as solutions in response to perceived problems. However, in practice it has been observed that it is the demand-side approach that has proven more effective, where problems in need of solutions seem to overwhelmingly present themselves (National Research Council Staff, 1995). The global energy crisis has presented itself as a case in point, as current and perceived supply cannot meet demand. In addition, sustainable development has become incorporated more and more into policy and development objectives. Many companies have started to enter the market and capitalize on the tremendous need for clean fuel and energy in the developing world. A particular area has been in response to the fact that the vast majority of the world is not connected to electrical grids, lacking access to basic electricity. Yet this has been seen as both a blessing and a curse; as it is obvious in practical terms, having the whole world connected to the grid is impractical and environmentally disastrous. Therefore a captive market exists to adopt sustainable technology such as Solid State Lighting, utilizing LED technology2 (Mills 2002, 4). Although from a laboratory perspective a large open market exists in which to implement such a technology, many constraints have been highlighted alongside the numerous successes. The following section will illustrate an example in which both successes and constraints are apparent in undertaking a product-oriented transfer. Light up the World is a not-for-profit organization that works to implement Solid State Lighting in communities in the developing world and has demonstrated various successful projects, but has also encountered various constraints that go beyond the organizational realm. Much of this is reflected in the difficulties inherent in product-embodied transfers, which rely on competent 2

LED (light emitting diodes) are a much more efficient way in utilizing light over conventional fluorescent lighting

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understanding and community buy-in of the imported technology (Bhagat & Kedia 1988, 563). Various INGO’s have made the mistake of a universalization approach, in which a product is deemed to fit local environments, based on the assumption that similar social environments and geographical proximity require the same products. A needs assessment undertaken in Ghana and South Africa respectfully, by graduate students doing a needs assessment to gauge the feasibility of Solid State Lighting produced varying data. Although the countries are both located in Africa and are assumed to have similar social and environmental contexts, research revealed differently. The fear caused by higher crime rates in South Africa, for instance, generated a different conclusion on the utility of Solid State Lighting than in Ghana (Barnowsky & Skovmose 2007, 20). In addition, respondents raised concerns that research did not consider. For example, it was found that many respondents talked about the convenience and mobility of the lights, as well as aesthetic issues. Although various cost-benefit analyses were undertaken, showing the tremendous cost-savings of LED systems over traditional fuel, many respondents stated they would only be willing to spend a certain amount per week (Barnowsky & Skovmose 2007, 27). Again, although analyses were undertaken, forecasting that $100 loans for the lighting system would be feasible, community response differed, as many people viewed this cost as something they would only put into essential needs (Barnowsky & Skovmose 2007, 27). Although $100 is a fraction of the cost spent on Kerosene, respondents did not perceive and internalize the cost in this manner. In addition, financial cycles differed in the two case countries; however, it was assumed that annual financial capital was constant and not residual. Another very important overlooked aspect was training. Most cost-accounting overlooks the cost in preliminary information, technology adaptation, troubleshooting and unexpected problems (Fiset, Hanel & Niosi 1995, 1821). In the cases above, it was found that sunk costs were not accounted for when LED systems broke down by manufacturing fault, or simply by lack of user understanding. In the case of the former, many individuals became upset as they were guaranteed warranty periods, but had no way of following Arunan Sivalingam

up when the systems broke down (Barnowsky & Skovmose 2007, 38). Such examples provide the context for some of the resentment demonstrated by local individuals within the community, who became antagonistic toward the project. Consequently, research demonstrated the importance of analysing social outcomes with the introduction of the new LED technology. Many of the issues brought forth with the Solid State Lighting case study above, have been observed in the implementation of other productembodied transfers. The primary inhibitors have been the lack of pre and post project follow-up, to ensure the transition in the community can function as smooth as possible. In a survey conducted by various Canadian engineering firms who initiated projects, it was found that a vast majority of recipients could not demonstrate capabilities in executing activities they were supposedly enabled to conduct through transfers. Furthermore, many recipients lacked the requisite understanding in the use and maintenance of the implemented technology (Fiset, Hanel & Niosi 1995, 1827). Most importantly, the lack of understanding of holistic social and environmental factors, demonstrated a primary cause of failure in project implementation, and was demonstrated in the needs assessment above. Another factor overlooked by many INGOs, and highlighted in the research In Ghana and South Africa above, is the opposition by members in the community to the technology altogether. Many individuals often do not want a new technology implemented, even with demonstrated ability to improve economic conditions. The above analysis reveals that INGO’s have found it much more difficult in facilitating product-embodied transfers due to the inevitable one-shot and externally designed nature of such a transfer, and the inability it gives such organizations to utilize comparative advantages. INGOs have shown they have strength in building and working with local communities, by means of a participatory approach. Conversely, product-embodied transfers, due to their emphasis on

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technical dissemination objectives, and the fact that technologies are already pre-created make such an approach difficult. Successes have been demonstrated when INGOs have used their organizational strengths in building community relationships, and working to mutually address community concerns. This is paramount in the context of technology transfers as one of the primary inhibitors of success has been a lack of community knowledge, trust and understanding of new products. Thus in some cases when INGO’s have not focused on utilizing community capacities, they have fallen into the same trap embodied by their predecessors (Fiset, Hanel & Niosi 1995, 1827). By utilizing demonstrated strengths in process embodied transfers, INGO’s have shown an advantage in dealing with product and process embodied transfers. INGOs have thus, in demonstrated instances, shown their overall capacity to act as effective facilitators to address human development in the contentious area of technology transfer.

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REFERENCES Barnowsky, C., Skovmose, M. (2007). “Solid State Lighting in Developing Nations: Is There a Market for Solar Lighting in Africa. ” Graduate Research University of Calgary, 3-43. Bhagat, R., Kedia, B. (1988). “Cultural Constraints on Transfer of Technology across Nations: Implications for Research in International and Comparative Management.” The Academy of Management Review, 13, 559-571. Biggs, S., Farrington, J (1990). NGOs, Agricultural Technology and the Rural Poor. Food Policy, 15, 479-491 Committee on Science and Technology in Foreign Assistance. (2006). Fundamental Role of Science and Technology in International Development: An Imperative for the U.S. Agency for International Development. Washington: National Academies Press Enos, J., Lall, S., Yun, M. (1997). “Transfer of Technology: An Update.” Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, 11, 56–66. Retrieved March 29, 2008, from http://www.blackwellsynergy.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8411.00004 Fiset, L., Hanel, P,. Niosi, J. (1995). “Technology Transfer to Developing Countries through Engineering Firms: The Canadian Experience.” World Development, 23, 1815-1824. Galbraith, J. (1965). “The Underdeveloped Country.” In Lucht, B. The Lost Massey Lectures (pp.2-42). Scarborough: House of Anansi Press Kaimowitz, D. (1993). “The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in Agricultural Research and Technology Transfer in Latin America. ” World Development, 21, 1139-1150. Mills, E. (2002). “Global Lighting Potential.” Light & Engineering, 10, 5-10. National Research Council Staff. (1995). “Marshalling Technology for Development: Proceedings of a Symposium.” Washington: National Academies Press. Parry, J. (2005). “Technology Transfer Brings Immediate Benefits.” Appropriate Technology, 32, 12-13. Saad, M. (2000). “Development through Technology Transfer: Creating New Cultural Understanding.” Bristol: Intellect Books. Wilson, G. (1995). “Technological Capability, NGOs, and Small-scale Development Projects.” Development in Practice, 5, 128-142.

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