Indo Pak

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Air Superiority in the East The IAF's strength in the east was made up of 4 squadrons of Hunters, one of Su-7s, 3 of Gnats and 3 of the newer MiG-21s. The IAF also was prepared to hit any Chinese incursions into Indian territory in the eastern Himalayas. As it turned out, the Chinese did not stir and the IAF managed to knock out the PAF squadron within 2 days of the outbreak of war. The IAF had gone into action within hours of Pakistan's pre-emptive strikes of 3/4 December 1971. Counter air sorties in the east were so successful that the PAF was neutralized within hours of the outbreak of war. In their first raid on the 4th of December a four ship formation of MiG-21FLs from the No.28 Squadron took out the runways at Tezgaon air base near Dhaka. Three Sabers attempting to intercept the MiGs were taken out by a combination of cannon fire and K-13 missiles. For the remainder of the war, round the clock attacks on the Kurmitola and Tezgaon air bases kept them, and the PAF nonoperational. Meanwhile, later that day Hunters from No.14 Squadron struck Chittagong Harbour as a prelude to strikes from the carrier INS Vikrant. The Hunters were to continue flying interdiction missions for the remainder of the war in, shooting up ammunition dumps and other fixed installations. Gnats and Sukhoi Su-7s flew many missions in support of army units as they moved swiftly towards Dhaka, delivering ordnance such as iron bombs to take out enemy bunkers which occasionally posed an obstacle to advancing infantry. Canberras repeatedly struck Jessore forcing the enemy to abandon this strategic city. On the 11th of December three converted An-12s from the No.44 Squadron struck the Jaydebpur Ordnance factory in East Pakistan. Once Kurmitola and Tezgaon were put out of action the IAF had gained complete air superiority over East Pakistan. The story of the old Caribou transporters speaks a lot about the mood of the times. Two of these old Canadian transporters were posted at Hashimara during the war and were used during the Tangail air drop and for minor missions. The Caribou air crew were getting restless. They wanted a piece of the action. Finally, Eastern Air Command agreed by allowing them to bomb Dhaka by night. The PAF had been knocked out by then but the Pakistanis still had plenty of Chinese made multi-barrel anti-aircraft guns, which could be pretty devastating. The Caribous were fitted with old World War II bombs and told to circle Dhaka for as long as they could during the night. While the pilots droned over Dhaka along with the occasional AN-12 keeping the Pakistanis awake, an airman aboard the Caribou once in a while pushed out a bomb from the open back. None of the bombs caused significant damage but they kept the Pakistani generals getting much sleep. After the surrender, one Pakistani general was to angrily remark about the damned aircraft which did not allow any of them to sleep for a week or more.

The Western Air Situation Pakistani military analysts writing after the War tried to make out that the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) was heavily outnumbered even in the West. One writer claims that Pakistan had just 10 squadrons against 44 fielded by India. Such absurd assertions notwithstanding, fact is in 1971 the Indian Air Force (IAF) had a total of about 34 effective combat squadrons plus three under strength Canberra bomber squadrons and one AN-12 transporter squadron, which as it turned out played a remarkable role as modified bombers during the War. Of these Indian squadrons, ten were in the East (plus one Canberra squadron) and four were kept as reserves for protecting the inner cities. This meant the IAf had about 20 front-line combat squadrons in the West. Some of the front-line Indian squadrons were broken up and posted at different stations. This could be one reason for confusion on the Pakistani air intelligence side - and considerable exaggeration. The Pakistanis, according to the IISS (International Institute of Strategic Studies) Military Balance 1971, had 19 squadrons including two B-57B light bomber and one recce squadron. According to our studies, the Pakistanis had about 14 effective combat squadrons in the West excluding the B-57B bombers and recce aircraft. However, PAF squadrons tended to have more aircraft per squadron than the IAF. This was further bolstered by the acquisition of an unspecified number of F-86 Sabres, Mirage IIIs, Starfighters (from Jordan) and about 15 Chinese F-6s in the months prior to the war. These aircraft were not accounted for the IISS in its 1971 Military balance or in any other report. Also, the serviceability of PAF Sabres was much higher - meaning more aircraft could be fielded. The Indians had 16 aircraft per combat squadron but the effective availability during the war was 12 per squadron. Bomber and transporter squadron had 10 aircraft each of which about 6 to 8 were serviceable at any given time. Many PAF squadrons, in contrast, had as many as 25 aircraft. Thus, while the PAf was outnumbered in the West, at no point was it ever fighting against overwhelming odds.

2 More important, the PAF on the whole was far better equipped to fight a modern air war than the IAF. The Pakistanis, for instance, had very effective air-to-air missiles which the Indians lacked. American made Sidewinder missiles were fitted on Chinese-made F-6 aircraft, on Sabres and on Starfighters. These were accurate missiles and accounted for at least three kills by PAF fighters in air-to-air combat. The Indians had only their guns and cannons to rely on. The Soviet-made MiG-21 was the only aircraft in the IAF's inventory fitted with missiles. But the missiles - the infamous K-13 - were a poor copy of the American Sidewinders and were so useless that they were scrapped after the war. The other major advantage, and a critical one, the Pakistanis had was their radar and communication system built by the Americans. In most parts, particularly Punjab, the PAF had a real time radar surveillance system, the ability to track low flying aircraft coming over Pakistan and the means to guide their aircraft right to intruding enemy aircraft. India had nothing in comparison. Instead of low level radar, the IAF had to rely on men posted near the borders. Every time a suspected enemy aircraft flew over, the observation post had to call in on their high frequency radio sets to warn the sector controllers. Even the medium and high level radar cover available to the IAF was poor with the result that each forward base had to earmark between one to two combat squadrons just for air defence. It was a primitive and wasteful system - and the Pakistanis knew it. The technologically inferior but numerically superior Indian Air Force could be tackled quite easily by a smaller but more modern force. This is what prompted the PAF to launch pre-emptive strikes against forward Indian air bases on 3 December 1971. The IAF's counter strike in the west was mounted on much greater scale than in the east. Within hours of the first PAF strike, converted An-12s from No.44 Squadron (led by Wg Cmdr Vashist) struck ammunition dumps in the Changa Manga forests. In one of the first counter air sorties of the war, Sukhois from No.222 Squadron struck Risalwala air field, while aircraft from the No.101 attacked Pasrur. The No.101 was to later become involved in providing support to the 10 Infantry Division in the Sialkot Sector, eventually destroying over 60 enemy tanks. Keamri oil installations near Karachi harbour were struck twice on the 4th by a three ship Hunter formations. And No.27 Squadron's Hunters continuously strafed enemy positions around Poonch and Chhamb. The four antiquated Harvard/Texans of the IAF also joined in ground support missions, their slow speed being particularly useful in hitting enemy gun emplacements in the valleys and gorges of Kashmir. Three counter air strikes were mounted on the 4th by Hunters of No.20 Squadron against PAF airfields at Peshawar, Chaklala and Kohat. The raids left 8 aircraft destroyed on the ground, including at least 1 Mirage III. Maruts from No.10 Squadron were heavily involved in counter air operations, hitting targets upto 200 miles inside Pakistani territory. The second day of the war began with a Canberra strike against Masroor air base and other strategic installations around Karachi. A force of eight Canberras flying lo-lo over the Arabian sea set strategic and military installations around Karachi alight. A similar raid was mounted on the 6th. The success of these missions being confirmed by Photo Recon. Canberras reporting "the biggest blaze ever seen over South Asia". On the 5th , one four-ship formation from No.20 struck Chaklala for a second time in as many days destroying a C-130 and an Twin Otter on the ground. A second four-ship formation went for radar installation around Lahore and Walton. And a third raid by No.20 was mounted against the radar site at Sakesar, unfortunately two Hunters were lost during this mission. Later that day Maruts from the Nos. 10 and 220 Squadrons, and their MiG escorts moved against rail heads at Sundra, Rohri and Mirpur Khas. Between the 5th and the 12th , two Sukhoi squadrons flying form Halwara and Adampur repeatedly struck railway marshalling yards around Lahore. One of the most celebrated actions of the 5th and 6th December is contribution of four Hunters from the ATW in the defeat of a Pakistani armoured force at Longewala. A previous section covers this in great detail. The AN-12s were also quite busy on the 6th. A bombing raid by the AN-12s early in the day destroyed a Pakistani brigade in the Haji Pir salient. Later that day HQ 18 (Pakistan) Division at Fort Abbas was bombed, as were areas around Bhawalpur. The 7th of December got off to a rather bizarre start; a Marut from the No.220 Squadron, on its way back from a bombing raid against Rohri, actually engaged and brought down with cannon fire an F-86 sent up to intercept it. Surprisingly no Maruts were ever lost to enemy aircraft, although four were downed by ground fire. Two days later an enemy Shenyang F-6 was to be brought down by a ground attack aircraft - this time a Su-7 from No.32 Squadron. Between the 7th and the 12th, Sukhoi and Mystere Squadrons were engaged in support of I and XI Corps in the Fazilka-Ferozepur sector. The Indian Army's efforts in the Fazilka area were also assisted by bombing raids by No.44 Squadron's AN-12s. A four-ship formation flying at 180 ft above sea level struck Pakistani installations across from Fazilka on the 9th. As fighting in the west intensified, the Pakistanis launched an offensive against Poonch on the 10th. To break up this offensive Canberras dropped 28,000 lbs. of ordnance on the enemy. On the 11th, in even larger interdiction sorties the Canberras delivered 36,000 lbs. of ordnance against enemy emplacements and tank farms. Despite the damage, the Canberras inflicted on the enemy, four of the force were lost to ground fire. The war in 1971 revealed the true air-air combat capabilities of the MiG-21, altering perceptions held about it as an outcome of its disappointing performance in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. The MiGs on both fronts had ample opportunity to engage the enemy in aerial combat. The five squadrons that served on the western front conducted frequent armed reconnaissance

3 missions deep into enemy territory to lure out PAF fighters. All Su-7 and Marut raids were given MiG-21 cover. Unfortunately for the Indian pilots who flew in the northern sector (Western Air Command) there was little by way of aerial engagements. On the 11th a Gnat of the No.23 Squadron engaged and severely damaged a Mirage over Pathankot. Those who flew with the South Western Air Command were luckier. On the 12th a Jordanian F-104A Starfighter, on loan to the PAF was shot down by cannon fire by a MiG-21FL of No.47 Squadron flying from Jamnagar. A Marut strike against Naya Chor on the 16th was intercepted by three PAF Shenyang F-6s. In the ensuing dogfight one of the F-6's was brought down by cannon fire from one of the two MiG escorts from the No.29 Squadron. No Indian aircraft were lost in the engagement and the Maruts were able to hit their targets. The following morning a low flying Starfighter was destroyed by a MiG-21 scrambled from Utterlai. A few hours later MiG-21 escorts of a Marut mission near Umarkot destroyed a pair of Starfighters. While the hi performance MiGs were shooting down enemy fighters, the lumbering Antonovs were contributing more than their share to victory in the West. The Rohri railway yards which had remained under attack from day one of the war were hit by a pair of An-12s at dusk on the 13th. The following day the Antonovs delivered their coup-de-main against the enemy's fighting capabilities. On the evening of the 14th a three-ship formation of the Antonovs flying from Jodhpur struck the Sui Gas Plant. The damage caused by these aircraft was so extensive that it took six months to restore gas production at Sui to even 50% of capacity. Happily all three aircraft taking part in the mission were recovered safely, landing at Utterlai. Sadly however, that very night, Fg Offr N.S.Sekhon of the No.18 Squadron lost his life as he gallantly engaged 6 enemy Sabres over Srinagar by himself. Before being shot down Sekhon's Gnat managed to score hits on two of the enemy for which he was awarded the Param Vir Chakra posthumously. The An-12s flew in the bombing role for the last time on the 17th. A mixed formation of Canberras and Antonovs commanded by Vashist sortied against Skardu air field in Pakistani occupied Kashmir. Of the thirty six bombs dropped on the runway by the Antonovs, twenty eight hit the target while two fell within yards of it (this was confirmed by a PR sortie later the same day). On the way back, Vashist's aircraft was chased by two Mirages. In order to evade them he climbed down into a valley and kept circling for twenty minutes until the Mirages gave up and left. The most astonishing thing about the An-12 bombing raids is that none of the eleven (ten bombers and one flying command post) converted aircraft were lost, although many were peppered by ack ack. The ease with which these rather slow aircraft could strike deep into enemy territory is testimony to the ineffectiveness of the Pakistani Air Force during the winter of 1971. Only the absence of modern weapons delivery systems for its air-to-surface weapons prevented the Indian Air Force from causing more damage than it did. One of the last enduring debates on the 1971 War is the outcome of the air war. Both sides continue to claim that it won the air war. This debate continues because victory in the air is more difficult to quantify than victory on land or sea. In the land and sea wars, India emerged as the clear victor both in terms of objectives attained and losses/gains versus the enemy. In the air war, even estimates of losses on both sides are widely divergent. Immediately after the war, the official Indian Government figures given out were 86 Pakistan Air Force (PAF) aircraft destroyed as against 42 Indian Air Force (IAF) lost. The Pakistanis later claimed that they had actually won the air war by destroying over a 100 Indian aircraft while losing only 36 of their own. The truth, as usual, is somewhere in between. Unlike in 1965, the Indian Air Force in 1971 handled claims of aerial victories by its pilots with great maturity. No "kills" were awarded until all claims could be verified, preferably by photo reconnaissance missions. Almost immediately after the War was over, the Air Chief asked the Halwara station commander, Air Marshal C.V.Gole, to visit every IAF station in the West to ascertain the performance of various squadrons. "Later, we had access to other information as well and we worked out a pretty accurate picture of losses on both sides", he explains. But discrepancies could well remain. For instance, Gole recalls that one SAM battery had fired missiles at a couple of attacking Pakistani B-57 bombers. One was hit and streaming smoke. A few hours later, some villagers called to say that they had found the debris of the Pakistani aircraft. On investigation it was found that what remained was not the debris of an aircraft but that of a missile. The hit was not taken into account. It was only much after the war that some Pakistani report spoke about a B-57 pilot who had become "Shaheed" after he tried to bail out his burning aircraft but could not make it. Pakistani claims of their own losses are less than reliable. The main cause of this confusion has to do with various "Official" histories of the PAF quoting different figures. It has been estimated by some observers, based on signal intercepts from the PAF, that the PAF lost at least seventy-two aircraft (including at least fifty-five combat types). Pakistan itself admits to the loss of twenty-nine combat aircraft on the ground. Only 16 were claimed to have been shot down over India. Add to this the 13 Sabres destroyed by the PAF itself at Dhaka. Even then the figure comes to 58. However, a lot of this is inaccurate. After almost a year's of research, we at SAPRA INDIA believe that the losses of combat aircraft on both sides were as follows:

4 The PAF lost many more aircraft on the ground not only because the Indians launched many more counter air operations than the Pakistanis but also because the PAF itself destroyed 13 of its Sabres in Dhaka within a few days of the war. PAF's No. 14 squadron with about 18 aircraft felt it had been abandoned by its higher command and left to face the onslaught of ten full Indian squadrons. After a couple of gallant actions by Pakistani pilots, the PAF commanders in East Pakistan appear to have decided that the game was not worth the effort. The last aerial engagement in East Pakistan took place on 4 December. Even if the Pakistani claim that the Indians lost more aircraft is accepted, does it suggest that the Pakistanis won the air war? The answer is a clear no. Because war, in the ultimate analysis, is not a numbers game. Winning a war has to do with achieving clear objectives. For the IAF, the aim was twofold: first, to prevent the PAF from messing with the Indian Army's advances, logistics and launching points; and second, to seriously impair Pakistan's capacity to wage war. The PAF's job was to do the opposite. The pre-emptive air strikes on 3rd December were aimed at knocking out a good part of the IAF while it was on the ground. This failed for the simple reason that the Indians had learnt their lessons of the 1965 war and had constructed fortified pens and bunkers to store their aircraft. More important, young IAF fliers proved they had the grit to go out and fight, even if it meant losing one's life. By the end of the first week of the war, PAF fighters in the West appeared to have lost their will to fight. By this time, the IAF was repeatedly hitting secondary targets including railway yards, cantonments, bridges and other installations as well as providing close air support to the Army wherever it was required. The most dangerous were the close air support missions which involved flying low and exposing aircraft to intense ground fire. The IAF lost the most aircraft on these missions as is proved by the high losses suffered by IAF Sukhoi-7 and Hunter squadrons. But their pilots flew sortie after sortie keeping up with the Army and disrupting enemy troop and tank concentrations. Once it was known that the Indian Army was knocking at the gates of Dhaka, the PAF in the West virtually gave up flying. During the last few days of the war, the IAF brass ordered attacks on PAF airfields with the sole purpose of drawing out their aircraft. But that rarely succeeded as the PAF aircraft for the most part remained secured inside their pens, refusing to come out and fight. The strongest indictment of the Pakistani Air Force was made not by an Indian but by the Pakistani leader, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who took over from General Yahya Yahya Khan after the 1971 defeat. On taking over, he made a speech in which he castigated the PAF chief Air Marshal Rahim Khan and several other officers by name. A better analysis of effectiveness of the two air forces is provided by the losses per sortie figure. The IAF flew at least double the number of combat sorties per day than the PAF, thereby exposing itself to ground fire and enemy interdiction. Despite this, the IAF's attrition rate of 0.86 per 100 sorties during the 1971 War compares favourably with the Israeli rate of 1.1 in the Yom Kippur War. The PAF's overall attrition rate works out to 2.47 (including transporters and recce aircraft lost on the ground). If aircraft destroyed on the ground are not taken into account, the rate works out to 1.12, which is still very high given that PAF aircraft never really stood back to fight. The question of loss is important but, in the ultimate analysis, secondary. Achieving air superiority cost the IAF dearly in 1971 but in the end it managed to achieve complete dominance over the skies in both East and West Pakistan.

GULF WAR-II : PGMs Though the March-April 2003 war in Iraq was one-sided, it provided several glimpses of the coming of age of the ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA). The coalition forces, particularly the United States military units participating in the war, were almost fully networked and relied on state-of-the-art reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) technologies for what is increasingly being called “effects-based targeting”. The coalition aim was not to cause maximum attrition to Iraqi forces, with its attendant collateral damage, but to generate specific effects to further the military aim. Weapons of choice In the evolving tactics, techniques and procedures of the RMA now well under way, the mass of enemy forces, that is tanks and mechanised infantry combat vehicles, is no longer considered the most vulnerable and operationally important asset of the enemy. Due to greater reliance on automation,

5 attention is increasingly shifting towards neutralising enemy RSTA, command and control, communications and intelligence (C3I) systems, long-range fire delivery means, particularly rocket launchers and surface-to-surface missiles and logistics bases and choke points on lines of communications. The US-led coalition forces correctly assessed that the successful destruction of Iraq’s air defences, command centres, RSTA and firepower assets and the disruption of its intelligence and communications systems would render it incapable of fighting effectively. The aim was to paralyse Iraq’s war machine by carefully planned targeting. Hence, these elements were the primary targets in the early stages of the campaign. As has become the norm since the Gulf War of 1991, precision-guided weapons (PGMs) delivered from the air were the weapons of choice. The silver bullets of Gulf War II were undoubtedly the plethora of PGMs and improved conventional munitions (ICMs) that are increasingly replacing “dumb’’ bombs in western military inventories. During the 1991 Gulf War, despite all the CNN-generated hype of smart bombs flying unerringly through ventilators, PGMs formed less than 10 per cent of the total high explosive dropped over Iraq and were rather inaccurate. The collateral destruction of an air raid shelter harbouring women and children was the low point of how technology can be wrongly employed. The coalition forces did not destroy a single Iraqi Scud missile launcher. In Kosovo, PGMs accounted for about 30 per cent of the ordnance dropped and accuracies improved considerably. In the post-11 September retribution inflicted on the Taliban militia and its Al Qaeda supporters, the share of PGMs rose to nearly 60 per cent. During Gulf War II in March-April last year, over 70 per cent of all warheads were PGMs. As weapons systems researchers continue to gain mastery over the technology curve, the single shot kill probability of PGMs is growing steadily even as costs are coming down and future wars are likely to witness an even greater proliferation of PGMs on the battlefield. In conventional warfare, the first decade of the 21st century is likely to go down in military history as the age of air-to-ground weapons. Among these, the battle-tested but still evolving joint direct attack munition (JDAM) is likely to be the front-runner. It is guided to its target by signals from the global positioning system satellites continuously orbiting the earth. Programmed with the satellite coordinates of a target, the JDAM has been observed to land within 10 metres of its aiming point more than 50 per cent of the time. This is very high accuracy for a dumb, free-fall 1,000 or 2,000-pound bomb that has been retrofitted with guidance kits. JDAMs can be dropped from heights of almost 10,000 metres and standoff distances of more than 20 km, giving pilots added safety from ground fire. Cost effective Compared with the $1 million price tag of land-attack, Tomahawk cruise missiles, the JDAM modification kit costs less than $30,000 and makes it extremely cost effective. During the recent Afghanistan conflict, on average the US dropped 3,000 GPS-guided JDAMs every month. However, less than 20,000 JDAM kits were available with the US Air Force in October 2002 and the Boeing Company was asked to step up production to 2,000 kits every month in order to stock up for the planned invasion of Iraq. The bunker-busting GBU-24/28 laser-guided air dropped bomb was used extensively against underground command posts, communications nodes and living shelters. Going through the concrete slab that provides overhead protection to a bunker, this bomb is known to penetrate about 30 metres of soil and rock before exploding. For what the US army calls hard and deeply buried targets such as storage sites for weapons of mass destruction and command and control centres, the US had refused to rule out the use of nuclear weapons. A special penetrating warhead was under development for this purpose.

6 However, Saddam’s forces capitulated too soon for it to be required. Microwave bombs, part of the growing family of directed energy weapons, that emit powerful pulses of energy to destroy electronics systems were also fielded, besides existing radar-homing bombs that latch on to the radiation emitted by active radars. However, information about these is still sketchy. A single microwave device on board an attack aircraft is capable of neutralising 100 targets with 1,000 pulses of high-intensity energy on a single sortie. US military scientists had used a related technique to fairly successfully disable Yugoslavian power grids during the Kosovo campaign. To destroy chemical and biological weapons stockpiles without the deadly agents being released into the atmosphere, scientists have developed a new, radical bomb called a “thermobaric” bomb that was tested in the caves of Afghanistan. Also known as a “vacuum bomb”, it is a two-stage explosive device that combines a high-temperature incendiary fireball with overwhelming blast pressure. The super-heated gases generated by the thermo-corrosive reactive filling are designed to destroy the chem-bio agents without the confined space of the target. Though efforts are under way to develop air-delivered thermobaric bombs, at present these can be fired mainly from shoulder-fired rocket launchers carried by special forces teams specially inserted behind enemy lines and from tank guns. Like in Gulf War I, Kosovo and in Afghanistan, the first deadly payloads in Gulf War II were delivered from the air — by coalition air forces, including the air corps of the US marines, land-attack cruise missiles, attack helicopters and smart artillery shells. However, predictions of a mix of 3,000 missiles and PGMs in the first 48 hours did not come true as the war on the ground began soon after the failed decapitation attempt on Saddam Hussein by B-1B Lancer bombers. Radar-eluding B-2 stealth bombers, B-1B Lancers and B-52s attacked Iraq from bases in the continental US, the United Kingdom and Diego Garcia. Carrier battle groups positioned in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean launched Tomahawk cruise missiles to neutralise Iraq’s air defences. Potent combination Close air support to the ground forces was provided by A-10A Warthog of the US air force and the AV-8B Harier II of the Marine Corps. GPS navigation devices enabled pilots to fly accurately and distinguish between friendly forces and the Iraqi dispositions. AN/AAQ-28 Litening Laser designation pods were used to guide bombs at night and during bad weather. The E-3C Sentry airborne warning and control system aircraft provided command and control guidance. Apache helicopters firing Hellfire missiles and rockets supported every assault and successfully pursued the fleeing Iraqis. For better coordination, Iraqi territory was divided into “kill boxes” measuring 50 km by 50 km. These were declared “open” or “closed” based on the proximity of coalition forces to them, so as to minimise casualties from friendly fire. The ground war was fought mainly by M1-A Abrams main battle tanks and Bradley infantry combat vehicles moving in concert. Firepower was provided by 155 mm and multiple launch rocket system artillery regiments. “Humvee” vehicles provided logistics support. The potent combination of “fire and manoeuvre” won the race for Baghdad in what was by all yardsticks a lightning campaign. The “shock and awe’’ battle plan focused on the psychological destruction of the Iraqis’ will to fight rather than the physical destruction of their military forces. However, there was fairly large-scale military devastation as well as civilian casualties. Despite PGMs and smart shells, “collateral damage’’ continued to haunt innocent civilians. In the ultimate analysis, the Powell doctrine of overwhelming force, including the use of large land armies to win wars lost out in Iraq to the new Rumsfeld doctrine emphasising lean and mean armies, advanced weapons technology, special forces units and sheer brainpower to defeat future foes. The Indian armed forces have many lessons to learn from Gulf War II. To dismiss the war out of hand as one that is not

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applicable to the Indian scenario would be most imprudent.

Precision-guided weapons Precision-guided munitions played a starring role in Gulf War II, accounting for some 70 percent of all bombs and missiles that coalition forces used. Going into the war, military planners were concerned about Iraq's ability to jam the global positioning system (GPS) signals that these weapons use for guidance. As it happened, Iraqi jamming was ineffectual; jammers were destroyed quickly after they went into operation and had little influence on the overall accuracy of coalition weapons. Even so, U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) planners are putting additional research into better anti-jamming technology for future conflicts. As troops return from deployment to Iraq, individual soldiers are providing more input than ever into DOD's "lessons learned" analysis of what worked and what did not. In some instances, the services used Iraq to test new equipment, issuing it to only a few units to compare with what was being used more broadly. For example, some units were issued new Northrop Grumman AN/PVS-14 night-vision goggles and recommended them as a replacement for the standard PVS7 for comfort and performance. Not every such change came from the military, however. The commercial world and soldier ingenuity also showed where DOD might look for future combat technologies. For example, some soldiers were reported to have purchased civilian hand-held laser pointers to use in orienting fire from more than one platform weapon. The same held true for individual GPS, with many soldiers buying commercial systems rather than using the militaryissued Rockwell Collins PLGR (Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver). The most popular was the Rino from Garmin Ltd. in Olathe, Kan., which the Army did issue to the 82nd Airborne as part of its Rapid Fielding Initiative (a $400 million effort to improve those things on which soldiers have been spending their own money). The Rino also has a two-way radio capability, but it was rarely used because of security concerns.

AIR TO AIR REFUELLING Falklands War/South Atlantic War During the Falklands War, aerial refueling played a vital role in all of the Argentine successful attacks against the Royal Navy. The Argentine Air Force had only 2 KC-130H Hercules available and they were used to refuel both Air Force and Navy A-4 Skyhawks and Navy Super Etendards in their Exocet strikes. The Hercules on several occasions approached the islands (where the Sea Harriers were in patrol) to search and guide the A-4s in their returning flights. On one of those flights (callsign Jaguar) one of the KC-130s went to rescue a damaged A-4 and delivered 39,000 lb (18,000 kg) of fuel while carrying it to its airfield at San Julian. On the other hand, the Mirage IIIs and Daggers lack of air refueling capability prevented them from achieving better results. The Mirages were unable to reach the islands with a strike payload, and the Daggers could do so only for a 5 minute strike flight. On the British side, air refueling was carried out by the Handley Page Victor K.2 and after the Argentine surrender by modified C-130 Hercules tankers. These aircraft aided deployments from the UK to the Ascension Island

8 staging post in the Atlantic and further deployments south of bomber, transport and maritime patrol aircraft. The most famous refueling missions were the "Operation Black Buck" sorties which involved 14 Victor tankers refueling single Avro Vulcan bombers to attack the Argentine-captured airfield at Port Stanley on the Falkland Islands. They attempted to knock out the Port Stanley runway, blocking the Argentine C-130 Hercules reenforcement operations. The raids were the longest-range bombing raids in history until surpassed by the B-52 in the 1991 Gulf War and later B-2 flights. The Victor tankers, retired in 1993, were replaced in RAF service by Lockheed L-1011 and Vickers VC10 transports which were bought second-hand and fitted as tankers. The L-1011s, converted by Marshall Aerospace, and VC10s, converted by British Aerospace, can refuel any aircraft fitted with the NATO standard probe system

2 Aerial refueling, also called air refueling, in-flight refueling (IFR), air-to-air refueling (AAR) or tanking, is the process of transferring fuel from one aircraft (the tanker) to another (the receiver) during flight. Applied to helicopters, it is known as HIFR for Helicopter IFR, pronounced "hi fur".[1] The procedure allows the receiving aircraft to remain airborne longer and, more important, to extend its range and therefore those of its weapons or its deployment radius. A series of air refuelings can give range limited only by crew fatigue and engineering factors such as engine oil consumption. Because the receiver aircraft can be topped up with extra fuel in the air, air refueling can allow a take-off with a greater payload which could be weapons, cargo or personnel: the maximum take-off weight is maintained by balancing the larger payload with carriage of less fuel. Alternatively, a shorter take-off roll can be achieved because take-off can be at a lighter weight before refueling once airborne (as with the US SR-71 Blackbird reconnaissance aircraft). Usually, the aircraft providing the fuel is specially designed for the task, although refueling pods can be fitted to existing aircraft designs if the "probe and drogue" system is to be used (see later). The cost of the refueling equipment on both tanker and receiver aircraft and the specialized aircraft handling of the aircraft to be refueled (very close "line astern" formation flying) has resulted in the activity only being used in military operations. There is no known regular civilian in-flight refueling activity. In large-scale military operations, air refueling is extensively used. For instance, in the 1991 conflict with Iraq over its invasion of Kuwait and the 2003 war against Iraq, all coalition air sorties were air-refueled except for a few short-range ground attack sorties in the Kuwait area.

Aerial refueling systems The two most common approaches for making the union between the two aircraft are the boom and receptacle system (sometimes called flying boom) and the probe and drogue system. There is also a combination “boom drogue adaptor” that combines the first two methods. Much less popular was the wing-to-wing system, which is no longer used.

Boom and receptacle (The Boeing "Flying Boom") The “flying boom” is a rigid, telescoping tube that an operator on the tanker aircraft extends and inserts into a receptacle on the receiving aircraft. All boom-equipped tankers (i.e. KC-135, KC-10), have a single boom, and can refuel one aircraft at a time with this mechanism.

9 History of Flying Boom In the late 1940s, General Curtis LeMay, commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), asked Boeing to develop a refueling system that could transfer fuel at a higher rate than had been possible with earlier systems using flexible hoses. Boeing engineers came up with the concept of the “Flying Boom” system. The B-29 was the first to employ the flying boom system, and between 1950 and 1951, 116 original B-29s, designated KB-29Ps, were converted at the Boeing plant at Renton, Washington State. Boeing went on to develop the world’s first production aerial tanker, the KC-97 Stratotanker, a piston-engined Boeing Stratocruiser (USAF designation C-97 StratoFreighter) with a Boeing-developed flying boom and extra kerosene (jet fuel) tanks feeding the boom. The Stratocruiser airliner itself was developed from the B-29 bomber after World War II. In the KC-97, the mixed gasoline/kerosene fuel system was clearly not desirable and it was obvious that a jet-powered tanker aircraft would be the next development, having a single type of fuel for both its own engines and for passing to receiver aircraft. It was no surprise that, after the KC-97, Boeing began receiving contracts from the USAF to build jet tankers based on the Boeing 367-80 (Dash-80) airframe. The result was the Boeing Model 707, Military designation KC-135, of which 732 were built. Flying Boom Operation The flying boom is attached to the rear of the tanker aircraft. The attachment is flexible allowing boom movement up to 25 degrees left or right, and from flush with the bottom of the aircraft up to 50 degrees down. Mounted within the outer structural portion of the boom is a rigid tube through which the fuel passes. The tip end of the fuel tube has a nozzle attached on a flexible ball joint. The nozzle mates to the "receptacle" in the receiver aircraft during fuel transfer. A poppet valve in the end of the nozzle prevents fuel from exiting the tube until "contact" is properly made between the nozzle and receptacle. Toggles in the receptacle engage the nozzle, holding it locked during contact. Mounted on the hollow shaft surrounding the fuel tube are a pair of control surfaces which equal the functionality of a conventional aircraft V-tail stabilizing surface setup, or alternatively, a four-surface arrangement closely resembling the tail surfaces of the late World War II Heinkel He 162 jet fighter, allowing aerodynamic control of the boom. The fuel tube extends and retracts hydraulically; it also "freewheels" in and out in response to the receiver's fore and aft movement during contact. The receiver's receptacle is typically fitted on the aircraft's centerline, but design considerations may require other locations. To complete an aerial refueling, the receiver aircraft's pilot begins by flying formation directly below and approximately 50 feet (15 m) behind the boom. When cleared, the receiver aircraft moves forward to the contact position aided with either voice commands (using radio) or visual commands (using lights on the bottom of the tanker) from the crew member operating the boom, called a "boom operator" or "boomer" -- an enlisted crew member in the USAF. On KC-135 tanker aircraft the boomer lies prone on a couch or pallet; on the KC-10 the boomer sits. On either tanker, the boomer's position is in the back of the aircraft facing aft. Once the receiver aircraft reaches the contact position its pilot attempts to hold in place with as little relative motion between the two aircraft as possible. Using the ruddevator control stick and the extension/retraction lever, the boomer precisely positions the boom's nozzle into the receiver's receptacle. Following toggle engagement (locking the boom in place) pumps operated by the tanker's pilot force fuel through the boom into the receiver. While in contact, pilot director indicators (two rows of lights on the bottom of the tanker's fuselage change in relation to the nozzle's up/down and fore/aft movement) aid the receiver pilot in remaining within the air refueling envelope. The air refueling envelope -- a roughly cube-shaped area within which the nozzle and receptacle must remain during contact -- is slightly different for each receiver. Its boundaries are based either on boom movement limitations, or to prevent the receiver from moving into a position where any portion of the boom might touch the receiver outside the receptacle while in contact. The boom's mechanical limits stem from the both the structural limitations of yoke and trunnion system mounting the boom to the tanker, and the maximum deflection of the flexible nozzle. Should receiver movement left, right, up or down exceed the nozzle's deflection limits the nozzle could become mechanically bound in the receptacle (like trying to remove a key from a lock while pulling sideways instead of pulling straight back) preventing nozzle/receptacle disengagement. The boomer follows the

10 receiver aircraft's movement with the ruddevator control stick to maintain alignment between the inner fuel tube and the outer structural portion of the boom. He or she also monitors the receiver's position, via three boom position indicators, and commands the toggles in the receptacle to disengage the nozzle -- a disconnect -- before the receiver aircraft exceeds any published air refueling envelope limit. When fueling is complete, the boomer or receiver pilot (typically the boomer) commands a disconnect. Nozzle/receptacle disengagement might also occur following an automatic pressure disconnect when the receiver's fuel system has been filled to capacity. Following disconnect, the boomer retracts the fuel tube from the receptacle and flies the boom clear of the receiver. While not in use, the boom is flown or hoisted (via a cable and hydraulic pump) up to the bottom of the tanker and latched in position to minimize drag. The receiver backs away and clears the tanker, then continues on its mission. Flying Boom Systems in Service USAF fixed wing aircraft use the flying boom system exclusively. In addition to the US Air Force, the boom system is in use by the Netherlands (KDC-10), Israel (modified Boeing 707) and Turkey (ex-USAF KC-135R). Possibly the largest tanker aircraft, Iran took delivery of Boeing 747 tankers equipped with a single boom and three drogues in early 1976, but the current status of these aircraft is unknown. Both Japan and Italy have contracted with Boeing for tankers based on the B767. The European EADS group has developed a boom refueling system using "fly-by-wire" controls that is compatible with other boom systems. This is offered on modified European Airbus type aircraft that are configured as tankers. Advantages of Boom and Receptacle •

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Higher fuel flow rates (up to 1000 US gallons / 6,000lbs per minute for the KC-135 tanker) can be achieved with the large diameter of the pipe in the flying boom, resulting in much less time required to refuel compared to the smaller diameter required of a flexible hose system. Unlike bombers and other large aircraft, however, fighter aircraft cannot ‘’accept’’ fuel at the boom’s maximum rate. Thus, the flying boom’s primary advantage over the hose-and-drogue system is lost when refueling fighter aircraft.[4], requiring a reduction in refueling pressure when servicing these aircraft.[5] The boom method eliminates the requirement for the (often very large and less maneuverable) receiver aircraft pilot to precisely fly a probe into a drogue, something that is easily performed by fighter sized aircraft, but would be extremely challenging even for the best pilot in a larger aircraft. A tanker with a flying boom can be converted in the field to accommodate probe-equipped aircraft, if necessary.

[Disadvantages of Boom and Receptacle • • • • •

The cost to train and employ the "boomer" -- 1990s estimates place the cost to train a boom operator at nearly $1,000,000.[citation needed] Incompatibility with probe and drogue systems, which are prevalent on most non-US aircraft. Complexity of tanker design. Only one receiver aircraft can refuel at a time. Cannot be used to refuel most helicopters.

Probe and Drogue As its name implies, this refueling method employs a flexible hose that trails from the tanker aircraft. The drogue (or para-drogue), sometimes called a basket, is a fitting resembling a windsock or shuttlecock, attached at its narrow end with a valve to a flexible hose. The drogue stabilizes the hose in flight and provides a funnel to aid insertion of the receiver aircraft probe into the hose. The hose connects to a Hose Drum Unit (HDU). When not in

11 use, the hose/drogue is reeled completely into the HDU. The receiver has a probe, which is a rigid arm placed on the aircraft's nose or fuselage. This probe is often retracted when not in use, particularly on high speed aircraft. At the end of the probe is a valve that is closed until it mates with the drogue, after which it opens and allows fuel to pass from tanker to receiver. The valves in the probe and drogue that are most commonly used are to a NATO standard and were originally developed by the company Flight Refueling Limited. This standardization allows drogue-equipped tanker aircraft from many nations the ability to refuel probe-equipped aircraft from other nations. The NATO standard probe system incorporates shear rivets that attach the refueling valve to the end of the probe. This is so that if a large side-load or up-and-down load develops while in contact with the drogue, the rivets shear and the fuel valve breaks off rather than the probe or receiver aircraft suffering structural damage. A so-called "broken probe" (actually a broken fuel valve, as described above) may happen if poor flying technique is used by the receiver pilot, or in turbulence. Sometimes the valve is retained in the tanker drogue and prevents further refueling from that drogue until removed during ground maintenance. Where similar types of fighter aircraft are pod-equipped (compared to large transport aircraft) this is known as "buddy tanking" or "buddy-buddy" refueling, and the HDU is known as a “buddy pod” or “buddy store”.[6] Probe and Drogue Operation The tanker aircraft flies straight and level and extends the hose/drogue which is allowed to trail out behind and below the tanker under normal aerodynamic forces. The pilot of the receiver aircraft extends his probe (if required) and uses normal flight controls to "fly" the refueling probe directly into the basket. This requires a closure rate of approximately two knots (walking speed) in order to establish solid probe/drogue couple and pushing the hose several feet into the HDU. Too little closure will cause an incomplete connection and no fuel flow (or occasionally leaking fuel). Too much closure is dangerous because it can lead the hose developing a sine wave that can cause a side-load on the probe, severing the probe tip. The optimal approach is from behind and below (not level with) the drogue. Because the drogue is relatively light (typically soft canvas webbing) and subject to aerodynamic forces, it can be pushed around by the bow wave of approaching aircraft, exacerbating engagement even in smooth air. After initial contact, the hose and drogue is pushed forward by the receiver a certain distance (typically, a few feet), and the hose is reeled slowly back onto its drum in the HDU. This opens the tanker's main refueling valve allowing fuel to flow to the drogue under the appropriate pressure (assuming the tanker crew has energized the pump). Tension on the hose is aerodynamically "balanced" by a motor in the HDU so that as the receiver aircraft moves fore and aft, the hose retracts and extends, thus preventing bends in the hose that would cause undue side loads on the probe. Fuel flow is typically indicated by illumination of a green light near the HDU. If the hose is pushed in too far or not far enough, a cutoff switch will inhibit fuel flow, which is typically accompanied by an amber light. Disengagement is commanded by the tanker pilot with a red light.[7] Probe-and-Drogue Systems in Service USAF helicopters, and all US Navy and Marine Corps aircraft refuel using the “hose-and-drogue.” NATO countries and other western allies also refuel with the hose-and drogue. The probe-and-drogue system was first used in service on late models of the KB-29M Superfortress. Its first use in combat occurred on May 29, 1952 when twelve F-84s were refueled during a mission from Itazuke, Japan to Sariwon, North Korea. Also in the 1950s, the Royal Air Force converted two squadrons of Valiant bombers to the tanker role by mounting a Hose Drum Unit (HDU) in the bomb bay. These were No. 214 Squadron RAF at Marham, operational in 1957, and No. 90 Squadron RAF at Honingon, operational in 1958. In the 1960s the Valiant was replaced by Victor tankers that had up to three refueling points, one under the fuselage and a pod under each wing. Advantages of Probe and Drogue • •

Simpler/cheaper tanker design. The probe-and-drogue method allows aircraft not originally designed as tankers to be converted by attaching a refueling pod.

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Tankers can be equipped with multipoint hose- and-drogue systems allowing two (or more) aircraft to refuel simultaneously from the same tanker, reducing time spent by as much as 75% for a four aircraft strike package [8]. Multiple refueling points also offers redundancy over the single boom system. Can be used to refuel properly-equipped helicopters, such as the MH-53E Sea Dragon.

Disadvantages of Probe and Drogue •

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The lower flow rates (1,500-2,000lbs/min)[9] available from the lower pressure and limited diameter of the hose used in the probe-and-drogue system result in longer refueling times compared to the Flying Boom for larger aircraft. Drogue subject to turbulence and aerodynamic forces (bow wave) of approaching aircraft. Drogue subject to damage by poor receiver technique, making further refueling difficult or impossible. Precise placement of the probe into the drogue by the receiver aircraft pilot precludes large receiver aircraft installation. Drogue only equipped tankers cannot be easily fitted with boom systems

Multiple Refueling Systems Some tankers have both a boom and one or more complete hose-and-drogue systems. Where these are attached to the wings, the system is known as the Multi-Point Refueling System or MPRS. The USAF KC-10 has both a flying boom and also a separate hose and drogue system manufactured by the Sargent Fletcher company. Both are on the aircraft centerline at the tail of the aircraft, so only one system can be used at once. However, such a system allows all types of probe- and receptacle-equipped aircraft to be refueled, including large aircraft that are probe-equipped and do not have the maneuverability to take fuel from an off-centerline wing pod. Many KC-135 and some KC-10s are also equipped with dual under-wing hose-and-drogue attachments known as Wing Air Refueling Pods (WARPs).

Wing-to-wing Refueling In this method, similar to the probe and drogue method but more complicated, the tanker aircraft released a flexible hose from its wingtip. An aircraft, flying beside it, had to catch the hose with a special lock under its wingtip. After the hose was locked, and the connection was established, the fuel was pumped. It was used on a small number of Soviet Tu-4 and Tu-16 only (the tanker variant was Tu-16Z).

Grappling Systems Some historic systems used for pioneering aerial refueling used the grappling method, where the tanker aircraft unreeled the fuel hose and the receiver aircraft would grapple the hose midair, reel it in and connect it so that fuel can be transferred either with the assistance of pumps or simply by gravity feed. This was the method used on the Question Mark endurance flight in 1929, and also the first ever non-stop around-the-world flight by Strategic Air Command's B-50 nuclear-capable bomber nicknamed the Lucky Lady II in 1949.

Strategic and tactical implications Strategic uses and considerations The development of the KC-97 and KC-135 Stratotankers was pushed by the Cold War requirement of the United States to be able to keep fleets of nuclear-armed B-47 Stratojet and B-52 Stratofortress strategic bombers airborne around-the-clock either to threaten retaliation against a Soviet strike for mutual assured destruction, or to bomb the U.S.S.R. first had it been ordered to do so by the American President. The bombers would fly orbits around their assigned positions from which they were to enter Soviet airspace if they received the order, and the tankers would refill the bombers' fuel tanks so that they could keep a force in the air 24 hours a day, and still have enough fuel to

13 reach their targets in the Soviet Union. This also ensured that a first strike against the bombers' airfields could not obliterate the U.S.'s ability to retaliate by bomber. A noted example of refueling used in this manner in the movies can be seen in the opening credits of Dr. Strangelove. In the UK, in 1958 Valiant tankers were developed with one HDU mounted in the bomb-bay. Valiant tankers were used to demonstrate radius of action by refueling a Valiant bomber non-stop from UK to Singapore in 1960 and a Vulcan bomber to Australia in 1961. Other UK exercises involving refueling from Valiant tankers included Javelin and Lightning fighters, also Vulcan and Victor bombers. For instance, in 1962 a squadron of Javelin air defense aircraft was refueled in stages from the UK to India and back (exercise "Shiksha"). After the retirement of the Valiant in 1965, the Handley Page Victor took over the UK refueling role and had three hoses (HDUs). These were a fuselage-mounted HDU and a refueling pod on each wing. The center hose could refuel any probe-equipped aircraft, the wing pods could refuel the more maneuverable fighter/ground attack types. A byproduct of this development effort and the building of large numbers of tankers was that these tankers were also available to refuel cargo aircraft, fighter aircraft, and ground attack aircraft, in addition to bombers, for ferrying to distant theaters of operations. This was much used during the Vietnam War, when many aircraft could not have covered the transoceanic distances without aerial refueling, even with intermediate bases in Hawaii and Okinawa. In addition to allowing the transport of the aircraft themselves, the cargo aircraft could also carry matériel, supplies, and personnel to Vietnam without landing to refuel. KC-135s were also frequently used for refueling of air combat missions from air bases in Thailand. The USAF SR-71 Blackbird strategic reconnaissance aircraft made frequent use of air-to-air refueling. Its home base was at Beale AFB in central California, but to make actual reconnaissance missions over enemy territory, it was necessary to deploy the craft to forward bases in Okinawa or in Europe. Hence, there were lots of trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic flights. Also, for safe takeoff performance, it was necessary for the SR-71 to take off with lessthan-full fuel tanks. The SR-71 would then rendezvous with a specially modified KC-135 to top up its tanks. Then the SR-71 was capable of flying for many hours on its own. This tanker variant was necessary because the SR-71 used a special fuel, JP-7, with a very high flash point (needed to withstand the high skin temperatures of Mach 3+ cruising flight) which could not be used in other aircraft engines and the KC-135Q was equipped with a separate internal bladder system to carry and deliver this non-standard fuel.

Tactical uses and considerations The capability of refueling after takeoff conveys two considerable tactical advantages to those forces with access to tankers. It allows attack aircraft, fighters, and bombers to reach distances they could not without refueling, and patrol aircraft to remain airborne longer. Additionally, since an aircraft's maximum takeoff weight is generally less than the maximum weight with which it can stay airborne, this allows an aircraft to take off with only a partial fuel load, and carry additional payload weight instead. Then, after reaching altitude, the aircraft's tanks can be topped up by a tanker, bringing it up to its maximum flight weight. Vietnam War During the Vietnam War, it was common for USAF fighter-bombers flying from Thailand to North Vietnam to refuel from KC-135s en-route to their target. Besides extending their range, this enabled the F-105s and F-4 Phantoms to carry more bombs and rockets. Tankers were also available for refueling on the way back if necessary. In addition to ferrying aircraft across the Pacific Ocean, aerial refueling made it possible for battle damaged fighters, with heavily leaking fuel tanks, to hook up to the tankers and let the tanker feed its engine(s) until the point where they could glide to the base and land. This saved numerous aircraft. The US Navy frequently used carrier-based aerial tankers like the KA-3 Skywarrior to refuel Navy and Marine aircraft such as the F-4, A-4 Skyhawk, A-6 Intruder, and A-7 Corsair II. This was particularly useful when a pilot returning from an airstrike was having difficulty landing and was running low on jet fuel. This gave him fuel for

14 more attempts at landing for a successful "trap" on an aircraft carrier. The KA-3 could also refuel fighters on extended Combat Air Patrol. USMC jets based in South Vietnam and Thailand also used USMC KC-130 Hercules transports for air-to-air refueling on missions.

The Bekaa Valley War In June 1982, Israeli ground forces pushed into Lebanon in an effort to put an end to cross-border terror attacks. Operation Peace for Galilee, as Israel dubbed it, led to a prolonged conflict with Lebanon and produced mixed overall results. However, the initial phase of that operation included a spectacular moment when the Israeli Air Force destroyed 19 surface-to-air missile batteries, with no losses, and downed a huge number of enemy aircraft. With real-time intelligence and careful exploitation of adversary weaknesses, the IAF dealt modern air defenses their first major defeat. So startling was the IAF success in that Bekaa Valley air war 20 years ago this month that it ever since has stood out as a critical turning point in the deadly duel of fighters and SAMs. The Bekaa Valley success was long in the making. Israel's small but elite air force dominated the Six Day War of June 1967, pulling off one of the most successful surprise attacks of all time. Flying about 3,300 sorties, the IAF smashed the air forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The three Arab nations, taken together, lost around 400 aircraft on the ground and in the air. Thereafter, the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian armies were routed in the Sinai, Golan Heights, and West Bank. However, the IAF's dominance in the air was successfully challenged in the War of Attrition which officially started in March 1969 and ended in mid-1970. Egypt's campaign to harass Israeli forces in the Sinai was backed by a massive infusion of Soviet weapons, including modern aircraft and missiles. As a result, the IAF was the first air force that had to contend with advanced Soviet-made SAMs. During these years, IAF raids destroyed some Egyptian SAM batteries, but sporadic action was not enough. Worse, the SAMs were taking a toll on the small Israeli Air Force. One historian of these events, retired RAF Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason, observed, "Squadron attrition exchange ratios had changed from 1-to-40 in the air to 2-to-4 against missiles" during the peak of the War of Attrition. It was only too apparent that the Arab states were shifting from fighters to SAMS for air defense. The October War Major changes were on display during the October 1973 war. When Egypt and Syria mounted their coordinated surprise attack on Oct. 6, 1973, the IAF faced a formidable air defense environment--"denser than anything in North Vietnam," according to a 1978 Air University report. Egypt had only 20 mobile SA-6 SAM systems, but these were backed up by 70 SA-2s, 65 SA-3s, and upward of 2,500 anti-aircraft batteries and perhaps as many as 3,000 shoulder-fired SA-7s. Syria deployed another 34 SAM batteries. IAF pilots had to fight for air superiority while making frantic efforts to deliver close support to Israel's embattled ground forces east of the Suez Canal. "Israeli fighters and Arab missile sites engaged in mutual bloodletting," said one official Israeli report. When SAM batteries in the Bekaa Valley threatened Israel's air superiority over its border with Lebanon, IAF F-4 Phantoms such as these used high-speed anti-radiation missiles to destroy the sites. (Photo courtesy IAF Magazine) During this dangerous time, the IAF's second in command was David Ivry. Ivry, a 1967 war (and who recently served as Israel's ambassador to the United States), nature of the attack meant "we didn't have any time to eliminate the air defense, very dense air defenses, to participate in the land forces campaign, and we lost a

fighter pilot who flew in the recalls that the surprise and we had to fight within lot of airplanes."

In the first three days, the IAF lost 50 aircraft in about 1,220 sorties. This was an unsustainable loss rate of

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four percent, rivaling the loss rate of the early US bomber offensives over Germany in World War II. The losses tapered off, but the SA-6s, SA-7s, and ZSU-24 guns scored hits on 53 of Israel's prewar total of 170 A-4 Skyhawks and 33 of its 177 F-4 Phantoms. Some of the battle damage was light and some serious, but the air defenses were finding their mark and making it difficult for the IAF to provide emergency close air support to Israeli ground forces. Egypt's air defenses stymied the IAF's attempt to support Israel's early counterattacks. The IAF was undertaking very high-risk missions and, ultimately, Israel reaped the reward. The air support helped turn the tide in huge battles east of the canal. On Oct. 14, Egypt moved up reserves to the Sinai and pushed ahead of its own air defenses. Egypt paid the price with the loss of 28 aircraft that day. The attack unraveled as Israeli air and ground troops quickly stopped the advance. One Egyptian division commander, in an interview with British historian Trevor N. Dupuy, said, "When we tried to move out beyond the SAM umbrella, we took unacceptable losses from the Israeli Air Force." Fighting continued for several days more, ending in a cease-fire with Israeli ground troops ensconced west of the canal and all sides bloodied and battered. Israel had prevailed, but the cost of the October War made clear the fact that the IAF's tactics would have to change. Even at the end of the war, Israel was still groping for solutions to the SAM problem, losing five Phantoms in a single raid. Devastating Losses To Ivry, the IAF's loss of effectiveness was devastating. "At the end of the war," he said, "we managed to come up with quite an impressive victory," but Israel's military leaders had "a very bad feeling" about the fact that the F-4 was "not successful against SAM batteries." SAM belts restricted the ability of the IAF to interdict an invading army. Surface-to-air missiles could also shelter batteries of short-range surface-tosurface missiles like the SS-21, which would be capable of holding Israeli territory at risk of attack. As Ivry saw it, airpower's role in future wars had been placed in doubt. The 1973 war left Israel--not to mention other Western air forces--with the fear that fighters might no longer be able to gain air superiority against an integrated air defense. One such skeptic was Ezer Weizman, a former commander of the IAF. Ivry recalled Weizman's stated view as "the wing of the fighter plane was broken by the SAM." Clearly, the IAF's freedom to operate in future battles depended on its finding a way to rapidly and systematically take out stationary or mobile SAMs. In Ivry's view, the main lesson of 1973 was simple: "We have to find an answer to the SAM batteries." Years passed, and Egypt and Israel made peace, but the overall SAM problem did not go away. If anything, it intensified. In April 1981, Syria began to deploy its first SAM brigades to the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon. The move came in response to the IAF's shootdown of two Syrian helicopters which had been participating in attacks on Christian militia--Israel's allies--in southern Lebanon. One who was studying Syria's move with great interest was Ivry, who had become head of the IAF. "From our point of view," he said, the movement of SAM brigades into the Bekaa Valley was "crossing the red line" because it threatened Israel's air superiority over its border with Lebanon. SAMs in the Bekaa Valley restricted the IAF's ability to conduct reconnaissance or to provide air cover for ground operations. However, the clock was ticking on implementing the final phases of the 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty, which called for withdrawal of forces from the Sinai in 1982. The political situation was "very delicate," in Ivry's words. Israel was tempted to carry out an attack on the Bekaa Valley SAM brigades, but the IAF had a bigger challenge in mind: destruction of the Osirak nuclear reactor then under construction in Iraq. On June 7, 1981, in a stunning attack, a strike package of 14 Israeli fighters destroyed the reactor outside Baghdad.

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A year later, however, the elimination of the Bekaa Valley SAM sites became an urgent priority. Palestine Liberation Organization forces in southern Lebanon had become part of an escalating cross-border conflict aimed at Israeli settlements. The PLO fired artillery and rockets against Israeli civilian areas in Galilee. Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon got Prime Minister Menachem Begin's support for an operation in Lebanon to attack the PLO forces there. Operation Peace for Galilee aimed to drive Israeli ground forces into Lebanon to keep Syria at bay, while Lebanese Christian militiamen drove out the PLO. The first week of the operation culminated with the most significant air battle of the 1980s and one of the most important in the history of military airpower. The Hunt Begins On June 6, Israeli ground forces began an advance into the PLO settlements in Lebanon with the IAF fighters and attack helicopters providing support. Israeli forces moved fast, pushing north to Jazzin, where action stalled. Israeli ground forces needed continued air support, but the pace threatened to put IAF fighters, attack aircraft, and helicopters in range of the Bekaa Valley SAM sites. Ivry and his headquarters staff at the Tel Aviv command post were watching Syria closely. One major concern was trying to "avoid any war with Syria," said Ivry. The SAM sites were in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon with others in Syria itself, protecting the Bekaa Valley batteries. Syrian troops and Palestinian guerrillas were crowded into the small operational area along with Israeli helicopters and rescue operations. Remotely Piloted Vehicles (a Scout is shown here) detected additional SAMs deployed to the valley. This allowed IAF leaders to adjust their strategy. Later, the RPVs smoked out SAM sites for the F-4s to destroy. (Photo courtesy IAF Magazine) "Sometimes we had more than 100 planes flying in this kind of environment," said Ivry. It was "a real saturation area," about 1,500 square miles of airspace, where command and control was paramount. Ivry ran the central control of the operation himself. Initial plans called for attacks on 14 SAM sites. Then on Tuesday, June 8, Ivry learned that Israeli Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) had spotted an additional five SA-6s moving from the Golan Heights into the Bekaa Valley. "They had a very dense belt along the Golan Heights to prevent Israeli penetration" toward Damascus, Ivry explained. "We found this out in the morning," Ivry said, and "it meant quite a lot for us." The move signaled that Syria had no intention of becoming involved in a major war--or the SAMs would have been positioned to defend the approach to Damascus, instead of going north and reinforcing the Bekaa Valley. The redeployment suggested to Ivry that they could strike the SAM sites without drawing Syria into a wider war and achieve the goal of eliminating the SAM defenses from Lebanon. Conditions were perfect. Ivry changed plans on the morning of Wednesday, June 9, taking into account the five newly spotted SAM batteries. He planned to launch the attack at noon but had to wait for Israel's Cabinet to approve the raid. The Cabinet's deliberations finished shortly after 10 a.m. and "we got the green light." Ivry by that time had postponed the attack until 2 p.m. "Before the attack, there were a lot of Syrian patrols on the border," recounted Ivry, but no air combat engagements that morning. The Syrians avoided battle. "We'd shot down quite a lot of Syrian MiGs before," commented Ivry. "Free-Fire Zone" When Israel launched its strike force at 2 p.m., the Syrians ordered their combat air patrols to return to base and land. With their fighters down and safely out of the way, Ivry said, Syrian commanders thought they "were going to have a free-fire zone to shoot anybody who flies." He added, "They've been so confident that their air defense is so strong that why should they risk any Syrian fighter planes?"

17 Now, Ivry directed his strike aircraft toward the nest of SAMs. The SAM sites were a combination of SA-2s, SA-3s, and SA-6s. "It was a challenge to attack," said Ivry. Key to the plan was gathering data to exploit weaknesses in the technology of the SAMs and the way they were operated by the Syrians. Ivry recalled that "the intelligence-gathering effort which we did was an enormous one." Other sources describe how, prior to the war, Israeli drones tested out the radar and communications frequencies of the SAM batteries. In his 1991 book The Samson Option, Seymour M. Hersh writes that clandestine operations in May 1982 produced a wealth of data on SAM frequencies and radar coverage that later proved useful to IAF electronic warfare in the Bekaa Valley. Attacking the SAMs in daylight relied on command, control, and intelligence to make the strike fast and effective--and standoff missiles to give the Israeli aircrews the first shots. The plan had been well-rehearsed. Aircrews practiced attack runs against dummy SAM sites in Israel's Negev desert for months before the operation. The IAF conducted mock jamming of fighter and ground communications in order to undercut centralized control of the air defense. "You have to find a way when to jam and when not to jam," explained Ivry. "You can jam it when you need it to assist your fighter planes. And you cannot jam it when you want to get information, when you want to listen." IAF aircraft also carried electronic countermeasures pods to foil radar tracking. Ivry needed direct control over the attack to make it a success. The IAF command post in Tel Aviv gave Ivry a real-time command picture of the air battle through various data links. E-2Cs with their airborne surveillance radar downlinked their pictures to the command post. Remotely Piloted Vehicles provided video. Israel had one squadron of RPVs; this was not enough, in Ivry's view, and it had limited nighttime capability, but the squadron was enough for Ivry to keep at least two RPVs in the air all the time. Israeli RPVs helped provide constant locations of the Syrian SAM batteries. "We tried to follow them, because some of them had been mobile," said Ivry. He added, that morning "we'd been following them, all of them, [and] this was one of the conditions for that morning, to get all the information. Yes, we knew, no doubt, we knew all of them, where they were located." One at a time, four-ship formations of Israeli fighters flew into the engagement zone. The IAF pilots were able to shoot down as many as two or three out of four Syrian fighters. Here, three IAF F-15s carry out a patrol. (Photo courtesy IAF Magazine) The IAF also set up two-way voice communications between Ivry and his pilots. This real-time command, control, and intelligence capability, largely new to modern air warfare, delivered what Ivry termed the "realtime intelligence" to the local operators and the strike force. When the attack was launched, F-15s and F-16s provided interception and air defense capability while F-4 Phantoms took the main role in attacking the SAM batteries. RPVs went in first to get the Syrian SAMs to turn on their radars. Then the F-4s destroyed them with high-speed anti-radiation missiles. Because the fighters were striking known locations, the attack moved fast, minimizing the exposure of aircraft to the SAMs. The rapid flight time of the missiles also furnished just enough standoff to maximize the F-4s' chances of getting away. Immediately, the SAM batteries were "disrupted one after another," recounted Ivry. When the shooting was over, the IAF had destroyed all 19 SAM batteries within two hours without losing an airplane. The IAF had Laser-Guided Bomb capability, but Ivry said, "In this case we didn't use it. It's too slow. But then, after the attacks, after eliminating the SAM battery, you can come over to destroy part of the site" with no risk.

Score: 87-to-Zip

18

Meanwhile, Syria's fighters found themselves badly out of position when the Israeli attacks on the SAM sites began. "After about 20 minutes, they launched fighter planes to intercept, to try to disturb our attacks on the SAM batteries," Ivry noted. Helicopters, drones, electronic warfare, strike fighters, and now air combat made up a massive aerial melee. "You have a kind of concert which you are conducting," recalled Ivry. "It's not only just the fighter planes that are killing MiGs and other ones on SAM batteries. Once you have them in the same area, you have to conduct a concert. You cannot play the drums in the same time as the piano is playing a different concert. And air combat is a different concert than [the attack on] the SAM batteries." From the command center, Ivry had the E-2C air picture plus F-15s capable of sorting out engagements at shorter range. IAF pilots relied frequently on VHF radio, hoping to preserve their tactical communications and links to the command post. Ivry's tactic was to vector four-ship formations of Israeli fighters into the engagement zone, one at a time. Each air battle lasted one to two minutes. Ivry did not want to let any more than one four-ship into the battle area. "Never mind if I'm not going to catch all the MiGs" he said; he wanted "to be on the safe side that I'm not going to intercept one of ours." For the Syrians, the battle was hopeless, tactically and psychologically. Selective airborne communications jamming frazzled the airwaves for the Syrian MiG-21s and MiG-23s and cut them off from ground control. Ivry described their lack of confidence as the Syrian fighter pilots launched and came up into the fight without any idea of the interception route they would run. When they did try something, the interceptions attempted by the MiG pilots were "not very efficient," in Ivry's opinion. "So, we catch them slowly, one by one," he remembered. Listening in the command post, Ivry heard the Israeli fighters shooting down "sometimes two or three out of four" of the Syrians. "And the more they came, the lack of confidence on their side was increased." Psychologically, as Ivry said of the Syrian pilots' state of mind, "you're losing and losing." He went on, "Once you start to lose, you think, 'Well, I'm going to be a target, and I'm going to go over there because I've been summoned?'" The Israeli pilots kept the advantage. "I can only tell you that, within half an hour, we shot down about 26 MiGs," Ivry said. After two hours Ivry called off the SAM attacks. The tally grew so that by noon on Friday, when a cease-fire took effect, IAF pilots had shot down 82 airplanes without losing any in air combat. Wiping out the Bekaa Valley SAMs cleared the way for the IAF to give full support to the Israeli ground forces. Subsequently, the IAF also scored hits on Syrian tanks using attack helicopters with TOW missiles and fighters with LGBs. "We were attacking a lot of tanks," Ivry said. "We had an operation to prevent an armored division coming from the north, by night." After Israeli and Syrian tank clashes, the IAF used F-4s and A-4s, with Mk 82 and Mk 83 laser guidance kits attached, to designate and attack tanks by night. Real-Time Targeting Two weeks later, Ivry got a chance to test out real-time command and control against another small set of SAM batteries. The Syrians moved a new SAM battery into Lebanon. One F-4 Phantom loitering in the area was shot down by the ambush and "attacked by a missile coming from Syria, not from inside Lebanon." Ivry ordered an immediate strike and now believes they caught three out of the four batteries. The success came because the IAF constantly tracked the SAMs. "In some ways it was much more a kind of hunting," as Ivry described it. "We had RPVs running after them

19

[the SAM batteries] all the time." The SAM batteries ducked into villages, causing frustration. This left the IAF following them, "waiting to see that we are not going to miss them [the SAM batteries] getting out of the city and to attack them on a place which [was not] very populated." The RPVs gave a video picture that matched up with a map grid system familiar to the Israeli pilots, who knew the terrain well. With a lot of practice, the system gave Ivry the ability to call each fighter and pass the information within "seconds." "This was real-time communications," Ivry said. "By voice, I could speak with anyone from my command post. Sometimes I even knew the names" of the pilots in the formation, he added, especially when his son was flying. A Change in Warfare In contrast with the desperate air battles of October 1973, Israel's 46-hour Bekaa Valley air war set a new standard for orchestrated air operations and proved that even sophisticated mobile SAMs could be dismembered by well-coordinated air attacks.

The Bekaa Valley War forced Israel's enemies to consider alternative weapons and helped the IAF--whose F15s still bear the kill markings from this battle--regain its stature within Israel's armed forces. (Photo courtesy IAF Magazine) "The ability to disrupt the SAM batteries, this kind of achievement, it made a major impact strategically," Ivry noted. The lopsided scores against both Syrian SAMs and fighters put orchestrated airpower back in the center of modern warfare. Not losing airplanes was "mainly luck, I can tell you," Ivry said later, pointing to the closepacked nature of the air battles. Bekaa Valley underscored the value of electronic warfare and the benefits of coordination and careful planning. Ivry's role in coping with unexpected SAM batteries and altering attack plans in real time showed that success in air warfare rested on skillful execution in the heat of battle as well as prior planning. For Israel, the Bekaa Valley air war established a strong deterrent against Syria, according to Ivry. It also helped the IAF regain balance within Israel's armed forces. Yet the Bekaa Valley air war also helped drive Middle East strategy in a new direction. Potential opponents started to look for new weapons, since challenging the IAF in the skies was deemed pointless. Ivry cited conclusions drawn by the Syrian minister of defense, who felt that Israeli airpower and electronic warfare won the day in the Bekaa Valley and the next war would be a "surface-to-surface war and not the surface-toair war anymore." As Ivry said, "That's when they started to buy the Scuds." He was referring to Syria and Iraq. In Moscow, the Bekaa Valley operation threw military men into a kind of shock. Top Soviet systems had been trounced. On a visit to Czechoslovakia in 1991, Ivry met a Czech general who had been serving in Moscow in 1982. He told Ivry that the Bekaa Valley air war made the Soviets understand that Western technology was superior to theirs, and in this Czech general's view, the blow to the Bekaa Valley SAMs was part of the cascade of events leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Bekaa Valley also provided a preview of the technological marvels of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, with the US Air Force's destruction of integrated air defenses, to increasing real-time control by those in charge of fighter operations, to Laser-Guided Bombs hitting tanks in the desert. Used aggressively and skillfully by the IAF, airpower once again had come out on top.

Operation Mole Cricket 19 (Hebrew: 19-‫מבצע ערצב‬, Mivtza Artzav Tsha-Esreh) was a surface-to-air missile (SAM) suppression campaign launched by the Israeli Air Force (IAF) against Syrian targets on June 9, 1982, at the

20 outset of the 1982 Lebanon War. By the end of the day, the IAF had destroyed seventeen of the nineteen SAM batteries deployed in the Beqaa Valley and shot down 29 fighter planes, without losses. It was the first time in history that a Western air force successfully destroyed a Soviet-built SAM network.[1] The battle led the United States to impose a ceasefire on Israel and Syria.

Background In the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Egypt had 20 mobile SA-6 SAM systems, backed up by 70 SA-2s, 65 SA-3s, and upward of 2,500 anti-aircraft batteries and about 3,000 SA-7s. Syria deployed another 34 SAM batteries. In the first three days, the IAF lost 50 aircraft in about 1,220 sorties, a loss rate of four percent. The SA-6s, SA-7s, and ZSU-24 guns hit 53 of Israel's prewar total of 170 A-4 Skyhawks and 33 of its 177 F-4 Phantoms. The IAF found it difficult to provide air support to the ground troops. When Egypt tried to push beyond the range of its SAM batteries on October 14, it lost 28 planes. Ezer Weizman, a former IAF commander, said that "the wing of the fighter plane was broken by the SAM".[2] Between 1973 and 1978, the IAF undertook a major project to try to find an answer to the SAM threat.[3] On April 28, 1981 the IAF shot down two Syrian helicopters over Lebanon. Syria responded by deploying its first SAM brigades to the Beqaa Valley. The IAF decided to attack and the Cabinet approved, but the operation was called off due to weather conditions. By the time the weather cleared, the IAF was preoccupied with preparations to Operation Opera. The SAM suppression operation was originally called "Mole 3", but the figure increased in respect to the number of SAM batteries detected, eventually reaching 19. At this point the name was changed to "Mole Cricket", after the name of the plan for a general war since 1973, in order to prepare the force psychologically. The name was first revealed in 2002.[3]

Prelude On the night of Tuesday June 8, 1982, while the Battle of Jezzin was raging in central Lebanon, Israeli Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon, said at a meeting in the Northern Command headquarters "We know today that there will be a direct confrontation with the Syrians" and argued that it would be best to move deeper into Lebanon.[4] At 11:00 PM the IDF entered Ein Zahalta and were caught in a battle against a Syrian division, which halted its advance. Sharon used this as his principal argument for launching Mole Cricket 19.[5] Yekutiel Adam voiced his concern that the Cabinet was not fully aware of the war's state and objective. Sharon gave North Comand chief, Amir Drori, a go-ahead to drive on the Beqaa valley, and Deputy Chief of Staff (Ramatkal) Moshe Levi flew to Ein Zahalta to tell the commander, Menachem Einan, that the IAF would attack the Syrian missiles that day.[6] meanwhile, IAF commander David Ivry learned that Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV) had spotted an additional five SA-6s moving from the Golan Heights into the Beqaa Valley. The IAF interpreted that move as a signal that Syria had no intention of becoming involved in a major war — otherwise the SAMs would have been positioned to defend the approach to Damascus, instead. The redeployment suggested to Ivry that they could strike the SAM sites without risking an all-out war with Syria.[2] Sharon flew back to Jerusalem to attend a Cabinet meeting on Wednesday, June 9. He said Syria had already begun moving its second armored division (the Third Division) south from Ein Zahalta, which meant that this was the time to act. Drori, who came with Sharon to the meeting, was against the attack, saying it was superfluous. Eitan was ambivalent, preferring to limit the attack to a signal to the Syrians. Communications Minister, Mordechai Zipori, argued that Sharon's plan had exceeded the original forty-kilometer line. Sharon replied that the line had to be measured from Israel's northernmost point, Metula. He added that destroying the missile batteries in the Beqaa was necessary to save the force at Ein Zahalta.[7] Interior Minister, Yosef Burg, pointed out that a fight against the Syrians seemed imminent, in contrast to what the Cabinet wanted, and that attacking the missiles would only aggravate things and lead to an all-out war. Sharon stressed the vulnerability of the soldiers in the field. Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, turned to Ivry's deputy, Amos Amir, and asked for his projection of the IAF's losses in such an attack. Amir replied "I cannot promise no losses whatsoever, but they will be minimal". Begin then threw

21 his support of the attack and Burg was also convinced eventually, conceding that "if there's no choice, we must act". Sharon left the conference and issued an order for an air strike as well as a ground operation.[8]

The attack Ivry got the green light at 10:00 AM, but by then he had postponed the attack until 2:00 PM. When the attack was launched, the Syrians ordered their combat air patrols to return to base and land. IAF aircraft also carried electronic countermeasures pods to foil radar tracking. The IAF command post in Tel Aviv provided Ivry a real-time command picture of the air battle through various data links. E-2Cs with airborne surveillance radar down-linked their pictures to the command post. A squadron of RPVs kept at least two vehicles in the air all the time, providing constant location of the SAM batteries. A two-way voice communications between Ivry and his pilots was set up, allowing for real-time command.[2] The primary Syrian fighter was MiG-21, with considerable numbers of MiG-23s and Su-20s also deployed. Those aircraft depended on ground-controlled interception (GCI) sites.[9] The SAM sites were a combination of SA-2s, SA-3s, and SA-6s.[2] The IAF was flying F-15s and F-16s, as well as F-4s and Kfirs. It used AIM-7F Sparrow radar-guided missiles, AIM-9L Sidewinder infrared-guided missiles, and computer-aimed 20-mm cannons.[10] The F-15s and F-16s were equipped with a Head-up display (HUD) system.[11] The RPVs went in first to get the Syrian SAMs to turn on their radars, convincing the Syrians that many attack aircraft were overhead. The SAM crews then fired missiles at the drones, at which point the F-15s and F-16s provided interception and air defense capability while F-4 Phantoms attacked the SAM batteries, destroying them with high-speed anti-radiation missiles.[12] The rapid flight time of the missiles minimized the F-4s' exposure to the SAMs.[2] According to Ivry's later testimony, many of the SAM batteries were on the Syrian side of the border.[1] The Syrians soon launched about 100 fighter planes to stop the attacks.[1] IAF pilots relied frequently on VHF radio, in hopes of preserving their tactical communications and links to the command post. Selective airborne communications jamming frazzled the airwaves for the MiG-21s and MiG-23s and cut them off from ground control.[2] The Syrian pilots had difficulty fighting without GCI guidance. Twenty-nine MiGs were shot down. By night, seventeen of the nineteen SAM batteries were destroyed. The IAF suffered no losses.[9] Near 4:00 PM, with fourteen batteries destroyed and an hour left until dark, Ivry decided to call off the operation, assuming the optimal result had been achieved, and that the next day more SAM batteries would be brought anyway. Colonel Aviam Sela, a member of the operation staff, later said that Sharon severely criticized that decision