India-nepal: Regional Resonance

ISSN 1563-9304 | Ashara 4 1416 BS, Thursday | June 18, 2009

Click here to print this article A Nation’s Pain That Resonates In The Region Book Review :The Raj Lives- India In Nepal Thursday April 10 2008 15:08:21 PM BDT Reviewed By Mohammed Ashraf, USA As Nepal embarks on its first real quest for renewal since emerging as a nation-state two and half centuries ago, it continues to draw massive international attention. The global media’s propensity for running with neat story lines, however, stands in the way of a substantive analysis of the Himalayan nation’s entrenched complexities. More relevant for South Asia, perhaps, is a lessknown narrative: the overwhelming role and influence of India in almost all domains of Nepalese life. A new book, “The Raj Lives”, illuminates this aspect of the Nepalese experience in ways that carry resonance in the wider neighborhood. The author, Sanjay Upadhya, is a prominent Nepalese journalist who has closely observed and analyzed India-Nepal relations for more than two decades. Upadhya starts with a basic paradox. Historically, Nepal has remained an independent and sovereign country since Prithvi Narayan Shah conquered dozens of principalities into a unitary state under the Shah dynasty. Yet Nepal remains locked in what Upadhya calls an “embrace of estrangement” with India. Half a century after coming into existence, Nepal was forced to cede a third of its territory to the British Indian rulers after a two-year war. The 1816 Sugauli Treaty, by, among other things, stationing a British resident in Kathmandu against the wishes of the rulers, turned Nepal into a virtual protectorate of British India. Upadhya does not dwell in too much detail on why the British did not bring Nepal formally under the Raj. Still, he shows how Nepal stifled under it. By patronizing the Rana oligarchy and pitting it against the monarchy – represented by a succession of minors – the British succeeded in creating a buffer against Tibet and China. In doing so, they avoided the political, administrative and military costs of subduing the harsh mountainous terrain. By recruiting young Gurkhas into the British Indian army, London succeeded in emaciating Nepal’s earlier military prowess and cushioning the Ranas, to a great extent, against internal opposition. Time continued its forward march. The independence of India in 1947 had a major bearing on Nepal’s domestic politics. The Ranas faced growing opposition from younger Nepalese educated

in India. The new leaders in New Delhi shared close ties with prominent Nepalese democracy activists, many of whom took part in India’s independence struggle. In 1950, New Delhi enticed the Ranas into signing a Peace and Friendship Treaty in perpetuity in exchange for continued support. Six months later, having flawlessly extricated the king from his palace and brought him to Delhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and his associates forced the Ranas to share power with the monarchy – from whom they had usurped power a century earlier – as well as the democrats. In one of the poignant ironies that Upadhya evokes, the “dawn of democracy” in Nepal essentially saw the same Rana prime minister keep his job, this time as a commoner. After the so-called “Delhi Compromise” – which Nepalese communists, in particular, branded a sell-out – New Delhi systematically strengthened the king against the political parties. Upadhya explains, with compelling confirmation, the principal premise of the book: How India virtually adopted British colonial policies on Nepal. After King Mahendra ended Nepal’s brief interlude with multiparty politics in 1960 by dismissing Prime Minister B.P. Koirala’s elected government, Nehru offered token criticism of what he called a “setback to democracy”. The Indian government provided refuge to Nepalese exiles and supported their armed insurgency. But New Delhi never really extended enough political support to the Nepali Congress to enable it to mount a serious challenge to monarchical rule. India’s defeat in the 1962 war with China prompted Nehru to engage with the palace, which had steadily sought – and received – assurances of Chinese support. Upadhya narrates how India used the exiles to wrest concessions from the palace-led Panchayat regime. The situation discouraged B.P. Koirala – who had gone into exile in India after being released from prison in 1968 – to the point where he returned to Nepal to mount a peaceful campaign for change from within. A major instance of Indian maneuvering came in the form of the 1989 trade and transit dispute. Rajiv Gandhi’s government was infuriated by Nepal’s decision to purchase a small consignment of weapons from China. The 1950 treaty also contained an exchange of letters that was kept secret for nine years. India was using those to pressure successive Nepalese governments – democratic and autocratic alike – to bring the country in its sphere of influence. At the height of the trade and transit dispute, the Indian media revealed the existence of a secret agreement under which it claimed Kathmandu had explicitly pledged to buy arms from India alone. Disputing that interpretation, Kathmandu insisted that the Chinese had offered the weapons at bargain prices. Citing disagreements over the extension of the trade and transit treaties, India imposed a virtual embargo on Nepal. Meanwhile, it encouraged the banned political parties to rise up against the king. It soon emerged that India was pressuring King Birendra to sign a comprehensive treaty that would have brought Nepal into a Bhutan-like arrangement in exchange for continued support for palace rule. Perhaps mindful of the Ranas’ fate, the king refused. Growing popular protests ultimately forced him to restore multiparty democracy. India proudly claimed it had been behind the parties all along. Privately, Upadhya explains, New Delhi presented the democratic

government with the same restrictive treaty. The Nepali Congress government refused to sign that treaty, but India nevertheless won favorable terms on the sharing water resources, something the palace-led government had consistently refused. This time, it used the communists to ensure the ratification of the Mahakali Treaty in 1996. New Delhi secured prior rights on water, while Kathmandu is still waiting for the detailed project report, which was to have been ready in six months. The 1950 treaty also provided for an open international border and the freedom of movement, residence, property, business and other benefits for each other’s citizens on a reciprocal basis. But India, given the asymmetries, has been the beneficiary. Upadhya describes how India has been using its “special relations” with Nepal to prevent it from developing ties with Pakistan and Bangladesh. With the latter, Nepal is separated by 18 kilometers of Indian territory. New Delhi has rejected Kathmandu’s pleas for transit access primarily on security grounds. Upadhya explains that for most Nepalis, the 1950 Treaty lives as the preeminent symbol of the perpetuation of the Raj. The book suggests that India had encouraged King Gyanendra to take a more assertive role to combat the Maoist insurgency, while New Delhi provided refuge to key Maoist leaders. Although he makes no definitive assertion, Upadhya suggests that India might have tacitly supported King Gyanendra’s seizure of absolute powers, only to oppose him when he named himself head of government instead of an India-friendly politician. In any case, Upadhya shows how New Delhi continued to engage with the palace over the succeeding months. It was only when King Gyanendra led a successful effort to tie Afghanistan’s membership of SAARC with the induction of China as an observer that New Delhi took a hard line. Days after the summit in Dhaka, New Delhi forged an alliance between the Nepalese opposition parties and the Maoist rebels against the palace. “The Raj Lives” vividly portrays Nepal’s geopolitical compulsions. Since the collapse of the royal regime in 2006, China has emerged as an even more assertive external player in Nepal, precisely what New Delhi had sought to prevent. Beijing expects Kathmandu to respect its security sensitivities, especially concerning Tibet, and has made its wishes known explicitly in public. The recent Tibetan protests underscored Nepal’s vulnerability vis-à-vis its two giant neighbors. More and more Nepalese feel that India’s response to China’s influence would determine their country’s future irrespective of whether it remains a monarchy or becomes a republic after this month’s election. If Nepal were the only country in the region struggling to ward off Big Brother, it could have been brushed aside as an aberration. “The Raj Lives” comes as a powerful reminder of how easily other South Asian nations can share Nepal’s sentiments. ------------------------------------The Raj Lives: India In Nepal Author: Sanjay Upadhya New Delhi: Vitasta, 2008

Pages: 350; Hardbound Edition Price: Indian Rs.645 --------------------------------------Mohammed Ashraf is a freelance writer . Mr Asraf is of Pakistani heritage currently living in the United States and who has also lived in Nepal, E Mail : [email protected] http://www.bangladesh-web.com/view.php?hidDate=2009-0618&hidType=&hidRecord=194664