Hr-cases-digest-part1.docx

I. II.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Cases:

1. Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994; FACTS: On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the petitioners" t o d e s i s t f r o m d e m o l i s h i n g t h e s t a l l s a n d s h a n t i e s a t N o r t h E D S A p e n d i n g t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in business". On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental motion to dismiss. And petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. ISSUE: Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the CHR? RULING: No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation, involving civil and political rights. The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that it does not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC. The Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business.

2. Carino vs. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991; FACTS: On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. The teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education (Hon. Isidro Cariño) to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer

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the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" (the Civil Service Decree) and temporarily replaced. The MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner Secretary Cariño, which was dismissed. Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the alleged violation of the striking teachers’ right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. After their petitions were denied, respondent teachers thereafter submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. The Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring his attendance therein. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence. The Commission on Human Rights had earlier made clear its position that it does not feel bound by the Supreme Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, making plain its intention to hear and resolve the case on the merits. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition. ISSUE: Where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudication, may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication? RULING: No. The CHR has no such power. It was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The CHR may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function the Commission does not have. It cannot try and decide cases as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. "Investigate," means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. "Adjudicate," means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle, to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" the matters involved. These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. Indeed, the Secretary of Education had already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, and it appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions involved.

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Reversal can only be done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by the Supreme Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. 3. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768 July 21, 2003;

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Bataan Shipyard Engineering Co. Inc., vs. PCGG, G.R. No. 75885 May 27, 1987;

FACTS: Challenged in this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition by a private corporation known as the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc. are: (1) Executive Orders Numbered 1 and 2, promulgated by President Corazon C. Aquino on February 28, 1986 and March 12, 1986, respectively, and (2) the sequestration, takeover, and other orders issued, and acts done, in accordance with said executive orders by the Presidential Commission on Good Government and/or its Commissioners and agents, affecting said corporation. The sequestration order issued on April 14, 1986 was addressed to three of the agents of the Commission, ordering them to sequester several companies among which is Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc. On the strength of the above sequestration order, several letters were sent to BASECO among which is that from Mr. Jose M. Balde, acting for the PCGG, addressed a letter dated April 18, 1986 to the President and other officers of petitioner firm, reiterating an earlier request for the production of certain documents. The letter closed with the warning that if the documents were not submitted within five days, the officers would be cited for "contempt in pursuance with Presidential Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2." BASECO contends that its right against self-incrimination and unreasonable searches and seizures had been transgressed by the Order of April 18, 1986 which required it "to produce corporate records from 1973 to 1986 under pain of contempt of the Commission if it fails to do so." BASECO prays that the Court 1) declare unconstitutional and void Executive Orders Numbered 1 and 2; 2) annul the sequestration order dated April- 14, 1986, and all other orders subsequently issued and acts done on the basis thereof, inclusive of the takeover order of July 14, 1986 and the termination of the services of the BASECO executives. ISSUE: Whether or not BASECO’s right against self-incrimination and unreasonable searches and seizures was violated. RULING: No. The order to produce documents was issued upon the authority of Section 3 (e) of Executive Order No. 1, treating of the PCGG's power to "issue subpoenas requiring * * the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, statements of accounts and other documents as may be material to the investigation conducted by the Commission. It is elementary that the right against self-incrimination has no application to juridical persons. While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges. Corporations are not entitled to all of the constitutional protections, which private individuals have. They are not at all within the privilege against selfincrimination; although this court more than once has said that the privilege runs very closely with the 4th Amendment's Search and Seizure provisions. It is also settled that an officer of the company cannot refuse to produce its records in its possession upon the plea that they will either incriminate him or may incriminate it." The corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It received certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. It’s powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserve right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could

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not, in the exercise of sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the production of the corporate books and papers for that purpose. The defense amounts to this, that an officer of the corporation which is charged with a criminal violation of the statute may plead the criminality of such corporation as a refusal to produce its books. To state this proposition is to answer it. While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges. (Wilson v. United States, 55 Law Ed., 771, 780 [emphasis, the Solicitor General's]) The constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures finds no application to the case at bar either. There has been no search undertaken by any agent or representative of the PCGG, and of course no seizure on the occasion thereof. 5.

EPZA vs. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992

FACTS: EPZA (petitioner) purchase a parcel of land from Filoil Refinery Corporation, and before petitioner could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. EPZA paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were private respondents (TERESITA VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA). Ten years later, respondent Teresita, Loreto and Pedro, filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies". Alleged in their complaint was the information that EPZA bulldozed the area with acts in violation of their human rights. CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA to desist from committing such acts . Two weeks later, EPZA again bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at the other respondents, and fired a shot in the air. CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating her first order and expanded it to include the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the contractors, and their subordinates. EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders, but same was denied by the Commission (CHR). Hence, EPZA, filed in SC this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued ordering the CHR to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned injunction orders. In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the immediate lifting of the restraining order. The CHR contends that it’s principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitution, "is not limited to mere investigation" because it is mandated, among others to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection. ISSUE: WON CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of. RULING: Petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction issued by the respondent Commission on Human Right are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the TRO which this Court issued is made PERMANENT. In Hon. Isidro Cariño, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., we held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. “The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be

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likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.” The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication. The "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose. 6. Gen. Razon vs. Tagitis, G.R. No.182498 December 3, 2009; FACTS: Engr. Morced N. Tagitis is a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme. He was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. More than a month later , the Mary B. Tagitis (Tagitis), Engr. Tagitis's wife, filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the Court of Appeals (CA). The petition was directed against certain members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP): The petition avers that: Soon after the Tagitis left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and reported the matter to the local police agency. Kunnong including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group; Information from persons in the military who do not want to be identified stated that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed men; and according to reliable information received by Tagitis, subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups. Tagitis filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, seeking their help to find her husband, but Tagitis's request and pleadings failed to produce any positive results. The unexplained uncooperative behavior of the petitioners to Tagitis's request for help and failure and refusal of the petitioners to extend the needed help, support and assistance in locating the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis who had been declared missing since October 30, 2007 which is almost two (2) months now, clearly indicates that the [petitioners] are actually in physical possession and custody of Engr. Tagitis. On the same day the petition was filed, the CA IMMEDIATELY ISSUED the Writ of Amparo. At the same time, the CA DISMISSED the petition against the Tagitis from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.

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Petitioners appealed the decision of the CA to the Supreme Court. Hence, this petition ISSUES: 1. WON the petition for writ of amparo filed is sufficent in form and substance; 2. WON there was an enforced disappearance in this case that can be a proper ground for issuance of writ of amparo; 3. RULING: 1. YES. In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the respondent’s Amparo petition, the petitioners contend that the petition violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule and hence did not comply with the formal requirements of the said Rule. SC held however, that in an Amparo petition, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; hence the one filing the petition may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the one filing the petition under the circumstances, WHILE presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, to determine if the required elements-–namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security-–- are present. Applying these rules in the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances under which Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere to be found despite efforts to locate him. It also clearly alleged how Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty and security were violated when he was "forcibly taken and boarded on a motor vehicle by a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives," and then taken "into custody by the respondents’ police intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007, specifically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect him with different terrorist groups." 2. YES. The Convention defines enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law." There is no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the hotel desk and was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned- the petitioner, Engr. Tagitis’ colleagues and even the police authorities, is that Engr Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen again. Likewise, there is no direct evidence showing that operatives of PNP CIDG Zamboanga abducted or arrested Tagitis. Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the Tatigits and her friends, and that he provided them information that Tagitis was being held by police officials. However, this is based on the input of an unnamed asset. He simply claimed in his testimony that the "informal letter" he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG. He also stressed that the information he provided the respondent was merely a "raw report" from "barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow up" as to its veracity. To be sure, Tagitis’s and Mrs. Talbin’s testimonies were far from perfect, as the petitioners pointed out. The inconsistencies the petitioners point out relate, more than anything else, to details that should not affect the credibility of the respondent and Mrs. Talbin; the inconsistencies are not on material points.

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To consider also that some pieces of evidence are incompetent and inadmissible evidence of is to state that in the absence of any direct evidence, a court should dismiss the petition. An immediate dismissal for this reason would make the Amparo Rule ineffective, since it cannot allow for the special evidentiary difficulties that are unavoidably present in Amparo situations, particularly in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, the Court declares that courts in amparo proceedings should at least take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence; and this should include those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence. But the Court must take into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason which shall be used as a basic minimum admissibility requirement. The Court gleans from all these admitted pieces of evidence and developments a consistency in the government’s denial of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, which is disrupted only by the report made by Col. Kasim to Tagitis about her husband. Even Col. Kasim, however, eventually denied that he ever made the disclosure that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasim’s disclosure, made in an unguarded moment, unequivocally point to some government complicity in the disappearance. 7. Guazon, et al. vs. Gen. Villa, et al., G.R. No. 80508 January 30, 1990; FACTS: The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target house to be search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. The residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained that they're homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their money and valuables had disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported incidents of maulings, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical informations. The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents contends that the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such event. ISSUE: Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human rights. RULING: It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by the parties, it appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights of the squatters and low income families are fully protected. However, the remedy should not be brought by a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and not one violator is properly charged. In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no permanent relief can be given. In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the court temporary restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila.

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Marcos vs. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989;

FACTS: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. RULING: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime. The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. 9. Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015; FACTS: Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the PDAF. Petitioner requested to post bail which was denied on the ground of prematurity considering that Enrile was not yet in the custody of law at that time. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered Enrile’s arrest and Enrile voluntarily surrendered. Thereafter, petitioner filed his Motion to Fix Bail, which was later

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denied. Likewise, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner insists that these denials were made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, in this petition for certiorari, petitioner argues that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not shown that his guilt is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account his age, his medical condition, and his social standing. In its Comment, the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to bail. RULING: The petition is meritorious. Petitioner is granted bail on the following grounds: 1. Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent. In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail. 2. Prior to conviction, bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion as enshrined in Section 13, of the Constitution and in Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court. 3. Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is subject to judicial discretion. But, such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty. 4. Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail. In granting the petition, the Court is guided by the principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As stated in the case of Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, this national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities indicate that the risk of his flight or escape is highly unlikely. With his solid reputation in his public and his private life, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail. Further, bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial. It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed. This will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial. On the other hand, to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People

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through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion. 10. People vs. Casio, G.R. No. 211465 December 3, 2014; 11. Garcia vs. Hon. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013; 12. Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills, Co., G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973; FACTS: The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Workers who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike. Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated. RULING: Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to

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individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the Issue raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution. 13. International School Alliance of Educators vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845 June 1, 2000; FACTS: Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. ISSUE: Whether or Not the grants provided by the school to foreign hires and not to local hires discriminative of their constitutional right to the equal protection clause. RULING: The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding. The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly. While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-

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hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," "to afford labor full protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations. In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. Wherefore, the petition is given due course. The petition is hereby granted in part. The orders of the secretary of labor and employment dated June 10, 1996 and march 19, 1997, are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent school of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires. 14. BAYAN MUNA vs. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618 February 1, 2011; FACTS: Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictionsTheserious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms,is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92. ISSUE: Whether or not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is void ab initio for contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of international law. RULING: No. Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the ICC.The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position, which, as already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in theprocess undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the countrys judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously. Petitioner, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or

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with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. Perspective wise, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With this view, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute International Agreements; treaties and executive agreements. Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. However, a treaty has greater dignity than an executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment. Petitioner, in this case, argues that the NonSurrender Agreement between the Philippines and the US is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must be duly concurred in by the Senate. Petitioner relies on the case, Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, in which the Court stated: international agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties; while those embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executive agreements. According to petitioner, the subject of the Agreement does not fall under any of the subject-categories that are enumerated in the Eastern Sea Trading case that may be covered by an executive agreement, such as commercial/consular relations, most-favored nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and settlement of claims. The Supreme Court held, however, that the categorization of subject matters that may be covered by international agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone. There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or an executive agreement as an instrument of international relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties intent and desire to craft an international agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests. The matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the parties in either international agreement each labor under the pacta sunt servanda principle.International Agreements; limitations on sovereignty. The RP, by entering into the Agreement, does thereby abdicate its sovereignty, abdication being done by its waiving or abandoning its right to seek recourse through the Rome Statute of the ICC for erring Americans committing international crimes in the country. As it were, the Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirmation of the Philippines national criminal jurisdiction. National criminal jurisdiction being primary, it is always the responsibility and within the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide to try persons of the US, as the term is understood in the Agreement, under our national criminal justice system; or it may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US persons committing high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them. In the same breath, the US must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with respect to persons of the RP committing high crimes within US territorial jurisdiction. By their nature, treaties and international agreements actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and absolute jurisdiction. The usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the other. 15. Ang LADLAD LGBT Party vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010; FACTS:

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Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT (lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgender) community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC. On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs, and advocates sexual immorality. Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it “ or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections.” Furthermore, states COMELEC, Ang Ladlad will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, COMELEC still, on December 16, 2010, upheld the First Assailed Resolution. On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad a Petition, praying that the Supreme Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the denial of accreditation by COMELEC, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma. 2. Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions contravened the constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, of Ang Ladlad, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation. RULING: 1. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our nonestablishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” The Supreme Court ruled that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. The government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. 2. The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the Office of the Solicitor General agrees that “there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the group’s members have committed or are committing immoral acts.” Respondent have failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Absent of any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or the Supreme Court, to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored

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one. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and underrepresented sectors. This is in accord with the country’s international obligations to protect and promote human rights. The principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR should be recognized. The Constitution and laws should be applied uninfluenced by public opinion. True democracy should be resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate due to conflicting opinions. The Petition was GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) was SET ASIDE and the COMELEC was directed to GRANT petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation. 16. Vivares, et al. vs. St. Thersa’s College, et al., G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014; 17. Government of Hong Kong Administrative Region vs. Hon. Olalia, G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007; 18. Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-4254 September 26, 1951; 19. Andreu vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-4253 October 31, 1951; 20. Lam Yin vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-22744 March 31, 1966;

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