Hitler's Counterinsurgency

Hitler’s Counterinsurgency General Fabio Mini, ITA-ret Thoughts from the readings of Helmut Heiber’s “Hitlers lagebesprechungen-1962” (English edition “Hitler and his generals”- Enigma Books, 2004; First Italian Edition “I verbali di Hitler” – Libreria Editrice Goriziana, 2009). The stenographic transcripts of Hitler’s conferences with his generals between 1942 and 1945 are exceptional historical documents and sources of modern teaching. One of the topics Hitler discussed in length that maintains a dramatic validity is related to the control of the territory which in wartime, in peacekeeping operations and in the struggle against transnational crime deals with the civilian population and hostile irregular forces. The summer seminars organized by DIILS (US Defense Institute of International Legal Studies- Newport RI) in Latin America have shown that the legality of the control of the territory within national boundaries poses the same challenges our armed forces face abroad. Many senior and junior Army/Police commanders think that irregular fighters, rebels, insurgents, bandits that often act and shield or blow themselves up among the civilians have no rights. They see no alternatives to shelling and shooting at entire villages, public gatherings, churches, mosques and crowds in order to kill some of these fighters always identified as evil or worse. The inevitable casualties among civilians, women and children are often condoned as “collateral damages” inflicted to people that had the fault to be in wrong place at the wrong time. Hitler used to call the irregular fighters “pigs” and had very clear ideas on how to deal with them as well as with Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, communists and political opponents. However, he did not like to issue specific “rules of engagement” believing that soldiers and policemen needed free hands and had to be protected by the hierarchy for their misbehavior as long as they achieved success. His military staff did not agree with him, but eventually the army did exactly what the SS and Himmler’s police had always done. During the conference held on December 1st, 1942 Hitler was briefed on the situation along the Eastern Front where the asymmetrical fighting of the partisans was more intense. Partisan fighting was an intentional and well-prepared element of the Soviet national defense plan, although German commanders were unaware of it before the outbreak of war. Shortly after the hostilities began in June 1941, Stalin himself called for men to join this guerilla war. He found willing followers in most parts of the country, especially since the German occupying regime proved eager to plunder the country and enslave the population. After the heavy reversals suffered by the Wehrmacht in the winter of 1941-42, the partisans— or, as they were called by the Germans, the "bands" [banden]—gained particular strength in the rear area of Army Group Center. Because they were able to control large, connected areas and organize mass attacks against the few railways in the region, they became a dangerous threat to those fighting at the front. German countermeasures, which were initially limited to passive protection, began to develop into real attack and encirclement operations, in which SS, police and army units participated. The fight was conducted with extreme cruelty on both sides. Colonel General Jodl, chief of Operations of the General staff, had issued a regulation on November 27, 1942, but Hitler was not aware of it and Jodl was pretending the regulation was still a draft. JODL: my Fuhrer, I’d like to remind once again the draft of the regulation on the fightings against the bands. THE FUHRER: Yes, I saw it, but I think a certain preamble is necessary. Basically, in guerilla fighting, everything that leads to success is right—this has to be drummed into everybody. This is the first priority. If somebody does something which is not in accord with an order, but which can lead to a clear success, or if someone finds himself in an emergency situation that he can only confront with brute force, then every method that leads to success is correct. The goal must be to destroy the guerillas and restore peace and order. Otherwise, we will end up in the same situation 1

that we had once in our domestic affairs, with the so-called self-defense clause. Hitler is referring to the self-defense clause of paragraph 53 of the German Criminal Code, which says: "It is not a criminal action if the action was taken in self-defense. Self-defense means defensive measures that are necessary to stop an unlawful attack that is being attempted against oneself or another. Overstepping the bounds of self-defense is not a criminal act if the offender has done so out of dismay, fear or shock." Although the German law of self-defense in Section 53 is relatively broad, and—in contrast to Swiss law—does not require a fundamental proportionality of the two opposing legal rights, Hitler's observations concerning the practical consequences (for police officers, for example) are not entirely incorrect. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to express the legal version—in which complex and diverse real-life situations have to be reduced to a concise statement—differently}. Thus, the text of Paragraph 53 was not changed during the Third Reich. THE FURHER: This clause led to the situation that no policeman or soldier actually dared to use his gun in Germany. This was such an elastic clause that the individual had to say to himself: If I unfortunately kill the other person, then I’m done for, if he kills me, then I’m also done for — but how do I make him unable to fight without injuring him, and without becoming unable to fight myself ? That was the famous elastic clause in the self-defense law, which always trapped the person carrying the gun — regardless of whether they were in the polke or army. This was exhibited at the incidents at Zabern the most crassly.68 But it has been constantly repeated with the police. On the one hand, there was the order: You have to do this. But on the other hand, there was the danger of exceeding of the law of self-defense. In November 1913, in Zabern (Saverne) in Alsace there were riots against the German army. The troops reacted with loaded weapons and arrested 27 people. The colonel, who was accused of unlawful detention, was exonerated by the court-martial in Strasbourg on a flimsy pretext. The "Zabern affair" led to intense debates in the Reichstag and a vote of censure against the government. THE FURHER: So I think we have to include a preface: "Disregarding everything ... it is of the highest duty to destroy the gangs. Thus, everything will be regarded as right which helps destroy them, and, inversely, everything that doesn't help destroy the gangs will be regarded as wrong." That will give everyone freedom of action. What can they actually do in many cases? What should they do, if the pigs push women and children out in front? I went through that in Chemnitz, where the red pigs spit on us while holding their children in front of them. We were completely defenseless. God forbid, if we had touched those children! Fighting against the gangs is the same situation. If they push women and children out in front of them, then the officer or noncommissioned officer has to have the option of shooting them, regardless. The important thing is that he will fight his way through and destroy the gangs. The person carrying the gun has to be guaranteed complete cover from the rear. We can give him general orders, but we have to cover his back as well, so the poor devil doesn't have to say to himself, "Afterwards I will be held responsible." What should they do? The pigs barricade themselves into a house, and women and children are in there as well. Is the man allowed to set fire to the house or not? If he sets it on fire, the innocent will bum as well. [ — ] There should be no question about it! He has to set it on fire. One can't say, "The man wasn't allowed to do it; only an officer could do it." No! If the poor devil is standing there with six or seven men — what should he do then? That was the tragedy of the police — that it was only officers who could do this. When was an officer ever next to a policeman? The poor man was always completely on his own. That's why French policemen join the German police, because with us they get back-up for the first time. The French police have never experienced anything like that! When there were riots in Paris back then and shooting broke out, it cost the French 2

policemen their necks. They were held accountable for it. On the one hand, they had the order to protect the chamber and to take action against the demonstrators. How should they protect the chamber if the demonstrators were advancing? If they had marched forward and the officials hadn't protected the chamber, then they would have been punished for not doing anything about it. So they fired, and were punished for firing. One really has to be incredibly cautious with these things, for the sake of the little man. Also, one must always imagine the mentality of the fighter. We can say here at this green table, that common sense should be decisive: How could you be so foolish? [—] Haven't you thought about it? [—] The poor devil isn't able to think—he is fighting for his life, for his existence! And that little man precisely, the little non-commissioned officer, fights his way through the action, and shoots and kills so many women because he saw no other way to get through the village. Hitler is clearly overexcited. He refers to the bloody riots in Paris on February 6, 1934, which resulted in sixteen dead and several hundred wounded—mostly in front of the Chamber of Deputies. The riots were started by front-line veterans but soon included all political persuasions, including the Communists, and the man in the street. General Jodl answers with a sentence that he will be asked to explain at Nuremberg trial. JODL: That is not an issue here. While fighting, they can do what they want. They can hang them, hang them upside down, or quarter them— nothing is mentioned about that in here. The only restriction concerns reprisals after the fighting in areas where gangs had lived. That is an action that is cautiously (analyzed) by the Reichsfùhrer himself, as he says: I have to be sure that by doing so I don't extend the areas of the gangs and don't (drive out) the entire male population. The word would spread from village to village, and then 2,000 men will leave to go to the gang areas again. Otherwise, nothing is said about being allowed or not being allowed to do something. It is only the experience gained from reconnaissance and deployment. The apparent cynical statement after the longwinded comments by Hitler is typical of the annoyed Jodl. It was ironic, and, according to the participants, caused smiles all around. On June 7, 1946, Jodl was interrogated by Colonel Pokrowsky at the Nuremberg Trial, and said the following regarding this statement: "The draft of this memorandum had been lying for weeks with the Fuehrer. He constantly complained that by issuing regulations, the troops would be limited in their ruthless fighting against the gangs. And since I had already issued these regulations without his permission —and he still wasn't giving his permission—I became slightly irritated. When he again started in on longwinded discussions about his fighting experiences, about experiences in Chemnitz while fighting against the Communists, I said in order to finally break through: 'My Fuehrer, what people do while fighting is not written about in these regulations. I don't care if they cut them in four pieces or if they hang them upside down.' Had I known that the Russians are so poor at understanding sarcasm, I would have added: 'and roast them on a spit.' That is what I said, and then I added: 'But these regulations deal with retaliation after the fighting, and that has to be forbidden.' At that, all of the officers laughed, including the Fuehrer, and he gave me permission to issue the regulations."— Jodl’s self-confidence allows him to be sarcastic even with his judges. From the transcripts it is not possible to establish if Hitler gave his final authorization as stated by Jodl, but t is plausible because the conversation goes on in a more relaxed and even ironic atmosphere. THE FUHRER: But, fundamentally, it must be written down in there that he is absolutely right if he thinks that he has to use the strongest means possible in order to carry out his duty, and that he will be covered for it afterward, whatever may happen. JODL: This concerns the (Army) leadership above all, since the SS has more experience with it anyway. THE FUHRER: It has more experience. Listen to what is being said about the SS, because it has this experience! They are always saying that the SS acts brutally. 3

JODL: That is not true at all. They do everything quite cleverly—with a carrot and a stick, as it is done around the world! THE FUHRER: One excuses the carrot, but not the stick. Two weeks later Hitler found the way to pass on the troops the "preamble" he wanted. An order dated December 16, 1942, signed by the Feldmarshall Keitel, stated: "The Fuehrer has received reports indicating that several members of the Wehrmacht who were involved in the guerilla fighting were afterward called to account for their behavior during the fight. In response, the Fuehrer has ordered: "The enemy is using fanatical, Communist-trained fighters who don't hesitate to commit any act of violence. More than ever this is a question of survival. This fight has nothing to do with military chivalry or with the agreements of the Geneva Convention. If we don't engage in this fight against the bands with the most brutal means possible—in the East as well as in the Balkans—the available forces will soon be unable to control this plague. Therefore, the troops are authorized and required to use all means possible in this fight, without any restrictions—including against women and children—as long as it leads to success. Considerations of any kind are a crime against the German nation and against the soldiers at the front. Our soldiers have to bear the consequences of the attacks and cannot accept considerate treatment of the gangs and their members. These principles must also be applied in the combat instructions for the guerilla war in the East." The principles were followed and thoroughly applied indeed, on all fronts, most of the times in a barbarian way. Today, the international and humanitarian laws should prevent similar behavior. However, many commanders and soldiers look for shortcuts to legality in the fight against rebels, insurgents, gangsters, terrorists or Taliban’s, keeping the military courts busy. They think that the good cause they fight for will justify the means and the “collateral damages” suffered by innocents and civilians. This is not true. They think that the rule of law obtained through laws and orders authorizing indiscriminate means can legalize brutality. This is not true. The rule of law is our strength if it mirrors our civilization, but it becomes our weakness when it mirrors our fear, arrogance and revenge. They think that success will forgive the excess. This was also Hitler’s logic, but did not work for him and will never work for anybody. Hitler’s ruthlessness was based on the premise that massacre and repression would be justified as long as they could lead to success. In all theatres of the Second World War and in all counterinsurgency wars, where brutality overcame the rule of law, the “bandits” reorganized, the population protected them and hate against the occupants increased. Whenever the legal forces resorted to criminal behavior, they lost. Whenever they refrained from brutality they suffered heavy losses but finally won over terrorism, insurgency and crime. The “bandits” that fought against the Nazi fascists won everywhere. They were liberated and freed themselves. The Nazi fascists lost everything: power, territory, sovereignty, allies, dignity and honor. The leaders that took part in the discussion on bandits recorded in 1942 ended up in the following ways: Adolf Hitler, Commander in chief: committed suicide. Wilhelm Keitel, General Feldmarshal: sentenced to death at Nuremberg. Hanged in 1946. Alfred Jodl, Colonnel General, Head Command and Operations Office: sentenced to death at Nuremberg. Hanged in 1946.

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