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Chimerica is a chimera By Fabio Mini (Translated from Limes magazine by Jo Di Martino, posted on Scribd by the author) A global duopoly is implausible. The rapprochement between China and America takes place in unwanted and unhappy circumstances: Beijing remains inferior and Washington is on the decline. World order and the order of things 1. The last two decades have been an extraordinary period for the United States and China as the evolutionary parabolas of both countries have intertwined. Once free of the duopoly of global management with the Soviets, America began a downward spiral that has brought her to its current economic and credibility crisis while China, after its negative climax of the Tiananmen crisis and although remaining on a level far removed from the American parabola, has begun an ascending phase that has brought it to its current status as the most likely partner in a new global duopoly. The list of new acronyms that attempt to identify the future lords of the world always includes China: the “Bric” (Brazil, Russia, India and China), “Cindia” (China and India) and the most credited, but also most problematic from a geopolitical perspective, “Chimerica” (China and America). The nickname simultaneously indicates a need, a hope and a nightmare. It can be a fundamental objective for international security and stability or a monster that, like the mythological one that it evokes and that unites the most diverse bestialities, is suggesting either the fruit of an incestuous relationship or an illusion. In actual fact the differences in the two beasts that would allegedly be uniting to lead the world are such that we cannot really be certain they can succeed. And if they should, they would give birth to an unstable monster. The road to rapprochement between the two powers has been obstructed and greatly influenced by accidental or unexpected events. In 1979 China was in full ascendance but the reforms of Deng Xiaoping achieved no practical results. Militarily China managed to lose a war against an exhausted Vietnam. Twenty thousand dead in just 17 days of fighting and only a vague 1

objective: a contradiction for Chinese policy unless that adventure is viewed from the perspective of punishing the ally of an enemy (USSR) at a time in which the United states were ready to make any concession to China in exchange for a mere “sign of friendship”. During that same year the United States had moved its official mission in China from Taipei to Beijing and had solemnly recognized Taiwan’s membership in the People’s Republic. Such gifts needed to be graciously exchanged. The American rapprochement with China that characterizes the entire decade is a series of important geopolitical concessions in exchange for a financial participation in the only recently initiated but highly promising development. The tragedy of Tiananmen and Beijing’s reaction to the rebellion may also be seen as an exaggerated trust that the United States (and thus the world) would not risk alienating China because of a “domestic” issue. This calculation, if it did exist, will turn out to be erroneous, but only by a small margin. American reaction was not as harsh as could have been expected and the sanctions imposed on China were more detrimental to the Americans than to the Chinese. In effect the Chinese took advantage of this new international isolation to settle domestic accounts and to expand the field of their relations and their national interests to areas that were not subject to American influence and to escape those of the rapidly dissolving Soviet influence. And it was this unexpected Soviet disintegration that determined the new season of friendly relations between the United States and China, in spite of U.S. support to Taiwan. The 1996 show of force by China, with their missile exercises near Taiwan and the consequent deployment of two American aircraft carriers to the Straits of Formosa, something else that was not wanted, will further improve relations between the two nations. In 1998 we have the historical official visit of President Clinton to China: a performance-visit that the Chinese government will carefully organize so that it appears as a personal success of the president. Relations worsen with the (accidental) NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo War of 1999, but in this case also the showdown is resolved with congruous compensation to the victims.

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The Chinese do not much like the new Bush administration. And only three months from the inauguration another ‘incident’ occurs. In April 2001, in the skies over the island of Hainan an American Ep-3 spy plane that had been performing its mission for years, collides with a Chinese fighter plane and is forced to land. The pilot of the Chinese fighter dies, the American crew is arrested and accused of espionage. The American government expresses its regrets for the incident and the Chinese release the crew. The Ep-3 and all its electronic equipment however is kept, dismantled, studied, copied and returned in pieces. The incident is closed. Another unexpected event brings the two countries closer together. After September 11 China seizes the opportunity of putting an end to criticism of its policies of repression of internal dissent and against the independent movements of minorities by approving and strongly supporting the war against global and Islamic terrorism. Beijing votes in favor of the American proposals before the United Nations and supports the war in Afghanistan, provides information on real and presumed Chinese, Pakistani and Uiguri terrorists and allows them to be arrested and incarcerated in Guantanamo.

China no longer appears as a strategic-military enemy of the United States but it is still not an ally. The struggle moves to the economic arena. During that same year the Chinese People ’s Republic, thanks to the United States, is admitted into the World Trade Organization. By Western intentions this should have limited Chinese commercial capabilities: in fact, it doubles them within one year.

2. The economic and strategic dialogue between the United States and China, begun in 2006, is the new forum for tangible rapprochement and the new Obama administration is expanding and reinforcing it. Recent talks (July 2009) between the two administrations concerning the measures to be implemented to deal with the global crisis are not limited to financial cooperation and to maintaining Chinese financial support to the U.S. public debt. The negotiations also cover environmental and military strategic issues, such as measures 3

to contain global warming and control the proliferation of nuclear weapons, with clear reference to Iran and to humanitarian crises. In respect of the global crisis everyone appears to be more virtuous and cooperative and President Obama can finally pronounce the words that the Chinese have been pursuing for thirty years: “strategic partnership”. We do not know if in uttering these words he was fully conscious of the value that the Chinese attribute to such terms, but what’s said is said. And for the Chinese the words of an American president are worth more than a treaty. For the Chinese “partnership” is not an alliance or a friendship, it is a sharing among equals. “Strategic” means that we’re talking of serious issues and especially of concrete plans, projects and designs. If President Obama intends “partnership” to mean a relationship between majority and minority partners, he should explain this to the Chinese before it becomes necessary for another incident to make things clear. ‘Strategy’ as understood by the Chinese is not that intuitive or foreseeable. The one adopted by China in the past thirty years was on two levels: internal and external, the two not always connected as they referred to different geopolitical needs. Within the country, China requires many filters to prevent the flight of persons, news and resources. That’s why it needs continuity of central power, the support of intellectuals, businessmen and investors and the silence of the masses. So far it has obtained everything. The silent majority is not a problem and activists of dissent find very few followers. Even when faced with serious problems (Falungong, Sars and the protests of minorities and workers) there is no danger of overturning the central power. Unions do not exist, although in the past ten years about 60 million workers have lost their job and the crisis continues to produce unemployment.

The attacks of September 11 have renewed and reinforced the repression of ethnic minorities. China immediately embraced the crusade against international Islamic terrorism and today it can maintain that it is a member in good standing of the “global war against terrorism” being led by the United States because it is combating the Uiguri. Before they were 4

simply considered as separatists, independentists and criminals; today they are “international terrorists”. In-country China also needs to monitor investments and corruption, crime and development. The bindings of domestic containment are tight and it is only planned and explicitly approved arguments can filter outward. Outside the country, China requires freedom of movement and commerce, clear rules and stability. And it is here that the strategic elements that make up the “pearls” on the string of a Chinese “necklace” must not limit or obstruct this freedom, nor can they impair external stability or permit the spread of anarchy. Thus the strings of Chinese foreign policy are numerous, placed at different distances and destined for different purposes. In its thirty years of pursuing such power factors as raw material, energy, technology, road infrastructures, lines of communication, political relations, commercial routes, financial speculation and political affiliations, China has staked a great deal on military credibility, industrial and military modernization and international cooperation. It has built its geopolitical power network by achieving the control of or its simple presence in numerous strategic areas. The continental string of pearls that crosses Myanmar (Birmania), Thailand, Pakistan and India, is the closest to the immediate interests of the country, but it is connected to the string of energy and finance that passes through Iran, the Near East, Cyprus, North Africa and Portugal. The string of pearls, essentially military, that connects the East Chinese Sea, the Straits of Taiwan and the South China Sea is a bit more external and is both defensive and “offensive” in the sense that it attempts to attain an area of alleged Chinese sovereignty that is useful both to freedom of movement and to underwater exploitation. But this string is connected to a series of commercial and infrastructural pearls that include the Pakistani port of Gwadar, a port that plays a much more important role in the Chinese scheme: it is the westernmost pearl along the maritime route between the Near East and southern China and is fundamental to the energy (and military) interests of China. The other “pearls” are the naval infrastructures in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and the South China Sea.

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China is also building a port in Sri Lanka, in the city of Hambantota, which appears to be a naval supply base for Chinese traffic. Sri Lanka recently defeated the Tamil separatists with the decisive help of Pakistan, China and Russia, The latter two are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Pakistan, with the full support of China, has asked to become a full member. The SCO is an offshoot of the Shanghai Five group founded in 1996 to improve military security and mutual trust in the frontier regions between Central Asia and Northern China. In 2001 it became the SCO and in 2004, in Tashkent, it instituted the Rats, a counter terrorism unit tasked with combating the three demons: terrorism, separatism and extremism. The SCO has six regular members, including Russia and China, located in Central Asia. But in spite of public reassurance, it does not appear to be destined to remain a regional organization. There are four “observer” nations (India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia) that already enlarge its sphere of interest. The United States asked for the status of observer in 2005 but was refused. Belarus and Sri Lanka, countries that have nothing to do with central Asia, are considered dialogue partners. In fact, Belarus has already asked to become a regular member and in spite of Russia’s doubts it may succeed. Other invited participants are Afghanistan, Asean and CIS. The SCO has already been defined as the “NATO of the east” but for the moment the similarity to NATO is evidenced not by the level of power but by the tendency of its members to shrink from common commitments. Recently Uzbekistan limited the participation of its forces in the Rats to the role of observers. But everything that could appear to represent vulnerability when China is involved tends to become a point of strength. Beijing has already exercised its regional role becoming the needle on the scale of numerous crises. It was a point of reference in the Korean crisis, the Asian financial crisis and the complex and varied central Asian situation. It has shown fear of the crises and instability as long as it could manage them to its own advantage. From the Chinese perspective the SCO, even if disorganized, can serve to reinforce this role. 3. The global scope of the Chinese strategy can be seen in many ways: by

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tracking investments, financial speculations, commercial transactions, the migration of technicians and students, programs of military cooperation, the flow of strategic resources, the trips abroad by bureaucrats and speculators and so forth. But to get a general idea it’s sufficient to check the destination of diplomatic missions and the changes in airline destinations. The combination of the two demonstrates that China is present throughout the globe, even where no one would expect it to be. The three major Chinese international air companies have regular flights toward almost anywhere in the world. They even go to such unusual areas as the Northern Mariana Islands. China is the only example of a nation that has permanent diplomatic missions in every nation of the world, whether it’s a developed nation or one that is broken and lacerated by war. Where other nations may send mercenaries or so called humanitarian aid; where the United Nations believe it’s not even worth being present, China opens an Embassy and often even Consulates. Africa and South America are the principal examples of this sort of geopolitics that extends Chinese presence well beyond the traditional and expected areas of interest. In fact, the strings of pearls that reach up to the Near East, Africa, South America, Panama and the Caribbean are certainly not for defensive purposes, but are directed at conquering and preserve the power to control and penetrate that strategic system of supply that was once the kingdom of the two blocs and of the colonial powers. Africa is often described as a continent in the throes of decline, but it is in Africa that China is staking its future. It’s a question of economy, resources and industrial interests as well as political influence. China has official diplomatic missions in 46 nations of the continent. Many throughout the world view the Chinese network as a threat that is at least potential, especially considering the geopolitical and economic ties that China has with Iran, Sudan, Syria, Palestine, Yemen, Pakistan, Cuba and Venezuela. And yet, for many observers, it’s a mystery how China manages to maintain these relations while simultaneously consolidating a solid industrial and military relationship with Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The string of political and financial influence that appears to be spreading outward from China, and thus from 7

the margin of the world, even reaches some islands in the Pacific, thus penetrating directly into the heart of the American and Australian area of interest. China is still far from launching a high seas fleet able to compete with the United States, but the influence in those islands can generate political - and potentially military – returns in an area that is strategically important both for Australia and the United States and especially for the U.S. Navy which holds uncontested dominion. In particular, Beijing has exploited the region’s need for development aid, offering loans and subsidies free of any political and economic obligations as are usually applied by the United States, Australia and international financial institutes. China is already developing (or expanding) contacts with Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Kiribati, Tonga and the Solomon Islands. In light of the political and ethnic instability that’s already spreading in many of these nations, it’s easy for Beijing to be take root in each of these locations by presenting itself not as an external force of morality – nor as a Maoist or Communist ideological force - but simply as an interested Asian country that happens to be well supplied with plenty of cash. There’s little chance that Beijing will deploy forces to the South Pacific in the short term, but relations with island nations provide it with a strategic instrument to use with or against American naval power in Asia. The Chinese military have paid a great deal of attention to developing coastal batteries of anti ship missile systems that, if needed, could be deployed along the entire South Pacific and South East Asia. A chain of islands armed with anti ship missiles could cause a great deal of delay to the deployment of armed forces in the region. In the event of a confrontation between Washington and Beijing, such a chain of islands, placed along the fundamental routes between the United States and Australia – and that could potentially extend along the Indonesian archipelago up to the Indian Ocean – could really interrupt the exchange and supply routes. Furthermore, by initiating a psychological war and a war of nerves it can already influence the economic and military conduct of the US and their customer States. Many alarmist descriptions of Chinese expansion in the Pacific have been reformulated according to the new 8

map of terrorism and the Chinese contribution to counter terrorism. In this field the United States and China plan to open a new phase of cooperation. China no longer supports local movements that could be easily accused of “international terrorism”. Nevertheless, a good part of the financial ties instituted prior to 2001 are still in force. In Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Micronesia, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu there are embassies and consulates. The classification of the largest foreign investors in China, along with the Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands, also includes the Western Samoas. In spite of the fact that China has amply demonstrated that it is already a power thanks to its geopolitical, strategic and economic capabilities, the United States and Australia tend to emphasize its military power. Australia is actually terrorized by the Chinese military threat and perceives its geographic position as being “under” China, as if it feared being physically crushed by the Asian continental mass and the yellow mass that inhabits it. This is a very old psychosis that also has to do with the throng of Japanese military moving through the Pacific during the Second World War and with the mass migration of the Chinese that had Australia as one of its favorite goals. In any case, it is unquestionable that this is a psychosis crated by an excess of geography in making a geopolitical assessment. The military factor of Chinese power is in reality much weaker in material and immaterial factors. It is not obviously inconsistent, but its overestimation ends up altering the overall judgment capability.

4. The Chinese armed forces have been reorganizing and modernizing for more than twenty years. They have undergone three large reductions passing from a force of 4 million men and a people’ militia of 20 million in 1984 to the current 2.3 million soldiers, 660 thousand military police, 800 thousand reservists and 10 million militia. In spite of the fact that the numbers alone make the Chinese military structure one of the largest in the world, the regular forces do not exceed one and a half million active duty military and the militia, where it still exists, is a sort of after work activity with an annual opportunity to 9

participate in parades or exercises. The official Defense budget is ridiculous (59 billion dollars for 2008, little more than the Italian budget and less than a tenth of the American one). Even if we surmised that it might in actual fact be double or triple the amount, the levels of investment are still inadequate as a force to be feared on a regional or global level.

For this reason the real task of deterrence is entrusted to several elite and technologically advanced air, naval and ground units and especially to the strategic and tactical missile component that has highly respectable operational capabilities, even though they are still not up to ensuring global security nor of sustaining a confrontation with the United States or Russia. The Chinese conventional force focuses on domestic emergencies or ground based border activities, using asymmetrical proceedings able to offset technological deficiencies. The development of a high seas fleet, nuclear submarines and new missile forces tends instead to safeguard status and national sovereignty. The issue of Taiwan or that of the Spratly islands is part of the latter function while the Uigure and Tibetan problems overlap the two: if there is no external interference they remain domestic issues, if there is external interference they become question of sovereignty requiring the use of strategic instruments.

On an international level, the climate of suspicion decreases with the intense cooperation with Russia on the one hand and the new path taken by Obama on the other. Australia, New Zealand, India and even the United States today are very attentive to Chinese proposals of cooperation and mutual trust. This of course does not mean that a bordering country such as Japan, India or the United States will not periodically issue an alarm about the Chinese threat. India is particularly sensitive both to Chinese naval maneuvers as well as their land movement along its borders. While naval movements may cause some alarm, that of soldiers on foot on the peaks of the Himalaya certainly cannot represent a crucial threat requiring the attention of press agencies around the world for every high 10

altitude Chinese exercise. But the Indians and the Americans appear to enjoy this continual “the wolf is at the door” call for exercises that normally conclude without ever having fired a shot and with hundreds of frozen and exhausted soldiers.

5. China is taking advantage of the crisis to restructure its productive industrial and commercial sector, to put weak companies out commission and to make provincial and local governments that often do not follow the instructions of the central government and evade paying the taxes owed to Beijing more dependent and thus more maneuverable. With the loss of 41 million jobs, the crisis is also making them lose hope of returning to the “iron bowl” concept, with guaranteed work for all, including the lazy and incapable (in addition to dissidents). The qualitative advantages among the work force will be considerable and will favor improved production for the next thirty years since it will be the oldest and the less qualified who will be sent home. The danger of rebellion by those who are fired is a real one and they expect to obviate it by a policy of police and military control and by increasing social protection measures, making use of voluntary insurance systems and the ability of local communities to support themselves. The crisis is also an opportunity to cool the economy and bring the annual growth to a les chaotic level. The 9% objective pursued for twenty years and never reached might be reached this year. There are also significant repercussions in the sector of national and international security. Tibetan and Uigure rebellions have demonstrated that the police, intelligence and military systems are essential in intercepting and repressing rebellions. China had planned a “normalization” of Tibet and Xingjian, envisaging some concessions in exchange for promises of “harmony”. The two communities flatly refused and organized their most decisive demonstrations during the Olympic Games. An affront that Beijing viewed as a form of looting. It therefore took care not to appear weak and vulnerable and thus encourage external rebellions and even attacks. The Chinese police 11

regime was strengthened internally invoking the status of exceptions, but externally it “lost face”. This will never be forgiven and the increasingly harsher repressions are not so much a sign of harsher rebellion but of reactions without scruples. On an international level China needs to consolidate the results of a decade old policy of containing external interference and supporting new and old allies and friends in Asia, Africa and South America. It must also avoid attempts at “looting” made by Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines and all the countries with which it has unresolved issues. It must be and appear to be strong. China as a former enemy of Russia and of the United States cannot even afford the luxury of underestimating the risk that these powers, directly or through proxies, may strike at Chinese interests through acts of containment or embargoes. It must also assure its allies and friends, including States that are not very malleable, such as North Korea, Iran and Pakistan, that it will not allow any looting against them either. International security is pursued with one eye toward instruments of policy and cooperation and the other toward military deterrence. It is nevertheless undeniable that it is in respect of this particular task that China must deal with more commitments that it has agreed to and that it can reasonably honor. Rapprochement between the United States and China and the possibility of strategic partnership in leading the world are happening at a most unfortunate time. This is a historic opportunity that is occurring incidentally (the crisis) and under material and moral conditions unfavorable to both. China never dreamed of drawing close to America under the threat of American insolvency and the United States never wanted to get close to China hat in hand. China did not want to show the signs of domestic weakness so evident because of the Tibetan and Uigure issues and the United States certainly would never have wanted to be indifferent to questions of human rights. Obama’s America cannot dialogue with a China while suffering from credibility because of the tragic policy of Bush and the scandals of Bagram, Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. China knows that it can yield nothing in terms of national 12

democratization and individual liberties. And the United States know they cannot, must not and wish not to renounce the prerogatives and responsibilities of a superpower even though they have been under stress for years.

6. The likelihood of establishing a Chimerica according to such geopolitical factors is not a plausible one. The two partners, although close in some sectors, have very different indexes of power. To institute a cooperation of equals China would need to be a super power or one that would soon become a super power (in a decade or so). The most favorable estimates in this sense indicate that such an objective may be achieved by 2038 in the best of cases and at a constant pace of development, a pace that is already limited by the current crisis. The most pessimistic estimates envisage that China will never be a superpower and that in fact it is close to collapse. George Friedman of Stratfor, sticking with the geographic factors, believes that China cannot become a superpower because it lacks the capability for expansion since it is blocked in the continent by Siberia, the mountains and the sea. And since it does not even have a tradition of maritime power, China is ostensibly condemned to a regional role. Other scholars believe that the status of superpower is prevented by the difficulty in managing resources and by social and demographic dynamics such as inequality in domestic development, corruption and the fragility of the Chinese system, still vacillating between communism and the market, between directorship and liberalism. All these limitations would appear to prevent both parity and the objective capability of making an equal contribution toward forming and managing a new hypothetical world order capable of stabilizing the planet.

Furthermore, the experience of the United States from 1989 to date has demonstrated that a sole super power, and one that is in crisis, is not capable of assuming this global control. According to this logic, even the possibility that China and the United States might become equals as a 13

result of the economic collapse of the latter loses all meaning: there’s no guarantee that two great powers can become one super power. Europe for example, is made up of many medium size powers yet is not capable of carrying out the functions of a single great power. A Chimerica composed of a former super power and an almost super power is a monster even worse than the incestuous fruit of the superpowers. There remains the possibility that the two may talk to each other and then do exactly what they want or that they seek each others’ advice on a football game. Not so great, but we have to make do.

7. One possibility, though a chimerical one, would be to relinquish the idea of world order understood as order imposed and assured by the super powers by diktats and slaps in the face. We need to restore the Order of Things. This is not a pun. Nor is it an exhumation of Zen concepts or of the phenomelogical order that determines the cause and effect of all biological laws. The Order of Things is the system that lies beyond our rules and impositions and that often opposed them. It is the dynamic order modulated by factors that are just as dynamic and often ignored. It is the order that rushes to emerge and be reaffirmed every time it is violated. Violation of the Order of Things manifests itself as fear, sense of guilt, rancor, mistrust or as fortune, fortuitous event, accident or incident. Judging from the incidents, fortuitous events, fears and rancor that have characterized the past few decades, Sino American relations and the unipolar management of the world, it is obvious that world order has done no more than attack and violate the Order of Things.

The geopolitical world order rests on artificial rules that are fixed, unchangeable and repetitive, rules in contrast to the constant free flow of Things. The model of a world order that we have adopted is mechanical, it is not free and cyclical. It always issues from the results of wars, not from peace treaties, that usually alter the results of wars creating the basis for subsequent conflicts. World order is destined to perpetuate the order of the conquerors. When such an order is faced by a crisis caused by an unexpected 14

change in equilibriums we try to construct a new order, but one that never manages to fulfill all needs and more important never manages to interpret the sentiment of the world that it expects to govern. The reason for this inadequacy is always attributed to the infancy of the system of order and to its immaturity. Thus enormous efforts are expended to provide substance to the power factors that must prevail and to bring the system to a socalled maturity. A system is considered mature when it provides the most favorable equilibriums to the power or to the powers of hegemony. The efforts undertaken to make the system mature are not just the able political or geopolitical maneuvers to form alliances or obtain a wider consensus, to make economies interdependent and compatible and to raise the standards of living, they are the disruption of systems that contrast the order imposed, the subjugation of peoples that do not belong to the system, the reinforcement of economic and social disparity, the imposition or rules and bonds, political aggression, an economic crisis for which others have to pay, speculation, the weapons race and naturally the wars, small and large, declared and dissimulated.

When the system is considered mature we are always surprised that it does not last and that it becomes necessary to adopt a new one. And everything begins again in an inevitable samsara: it is the painful cycle of rebirth according to Buddhism, where the form of rebirth depends on the actions of a previous life, without having any memory of that life.

The persistence of that cyclical model and the always renewed enthusiasm in proposing it can be explained only by stupidity or by self- interest. There is no reason for the former, but there is for the latter: perhaps resources and energies must be dispersed rather than preserved and perhaps a system that is new, young and even immature does not disperse as much as one that needs to be sustained and held together while we daily try to destroy it.

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The past may teach but unfortunately that doesn’t mean we are ready to learn. History, even the most similar to itself, always occurs in different contexts and it is easy to manipulate it in order to adapt it to contexts that are inadequate or to reject it. Furthermore, the history of sociopolitical systems is always made to coincide with the history of regimes and empires. And what is affirmed is the history written by subsequent regimes and empires: those who won and who hurry to write or rewrite it according to their own interests. There have always been historians willing to write and validate the version of the conquerors. And the intellectuals who launch themselves in revisionist crusades never do it against the existing system of power but in its favor.

One might at this point believe that there is no way out of the system and that the world is condemned to suffer the imposition of the strong, of the subtle and the unbalanced. And yet, in the system of the Order of Things a Chimerica would be a harmonious and compatible entity exactly because of the different characteristics of each of the two major components and their need to interact with all the others: on the same level of respect, because all are capable of contributing to the general equilibrium, in one way or another. If Chimerica were understood as a responsibility of joint leadership and as a catalyst of energy, China and America would share equally important roles even though from unequal positions. One might consider preserving and safeguarding global resources intended for a more equal distribution. The power factors would be redefined according to the ability to influence geopolitics by balancing rather than exasperating. There would be fewer fears, feelings of guilt and accidents. A highly chimerical possibility, as I said.

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