Growing Pains Of A Free Republic: Machiavelli And Conflict

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The Growing Pains of a Free Republic

conflict's endemic in the mind: your job's to hear it in the wind and compass it in opposites, and bring the antagonists by your wits to being one, and that the law thenceforth, until you change your minds against and with the shifting winds that this and that way blow the straw.α

The public attitude toward personal liberty shifted dramatically after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington D.C. Before the Twin Towers were wantonly destroyed, civic liberty, in a universal sense, was virtually sacrosanct. With the passing of statutes like the Patriot Act in the United States and Bill C-36 in Canada, public and personal liberty has been wilfully compromised for the sake of public security, and has brought to bear upon the entire concept of political liberty a burden that has violated the

Howard Nemerov, Poem: "To the Congress of the United States, Entering Its Third Century", from The Selected Poems of Howard Nemerov. © Swallow Press and Ohio University Press. α

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sanctity of such a public disposition. Without liberty there can be no democracy. But how is it to be restored? Is it a simple question of reversing policy with an opposing act of instauration, or does it require civil conflict and disobedience in a struggle to win back, or, perhaps, to win outright those liberties necessary for a viable democratic union? The actions and record of the current administration in the United States is sufficient for a beginning of an answer to these questions. In a recent interview, a former strategist for the American Republican Party cited the significant reliance the architects of post 9/11 America had on the political advice of Niccolò Machiavelli, particularly in the pages of The Prince.1 But where they took violence, deceit and fraud as the means to achieve the honourable end of maintaining political power, they used the ideas of the Florentine with a typical understanding of how he understood politics. As a result, an increasingly wider chasm separates the haves from the growing number of have-nots. It is no mere irony that the author who proffered the advice to the ruling Medici family to wrest control of political power, had, in fact, offered the clearest insight to winning liberty, and this leads to the point of this essay. For civil liberty to be extended, class conflict must be maximised. It is the job of the government to enacts laws to manage the social dynamic to maximise, as opposed to suppress, this conflict; to sublimate the inherent violence in parliament. Since Karl Marx, it has been widely believed that a harmonious social order can only be derived from a world without classes and class conflict. Logically, this appears to be correct, and countless laws have been ratified to even out the playing field, as it were, in order for citizens to enjoy their pursuit of happiness. But beneath the surface of the evils of class conflict, and beyond the very human reaction to reconcile the conflict D Camellato 872900228

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and mitigate the struggle, is this actually so? Contrary to this prevailing opinion, Machiavelli accepted the class basis of political life and understood it to be the very dynamic that could be beneficial to a republic. “His own study of history,” writes Kent Brudney of Machiavelli, “and his own experience of Italian and Florentine politics led him to conclude that class politics were an immutable characteristic of republican political life, whose effects would often vitalise (or revitalise) a well-ordered republic.”2 The nature of this dynamic, however, is difficult to pinpoint in Machiavelli’s literature leaving no sign posts to identify which of the many paths to take to arrive at the comprehension of this “immutable characteristic of republican life”. The danger is in taking a wrong turn. Granted, in the body of Machiavelli’s literature, there are overtones and generalities from which one can infer this conclusion, still there are problems for one to encounter in the search for the locus of such conflict. What, for example, was the source of such conflict? Was it economical, psychological, or religious? Other writers have thought that Machiavelli admired the republic of ancient Rome, and disdained the sectarianism of the Florentine republic because the latter was rooted in Christianity, whereas the former was not.3 This view attributes the political success of the Romans to a quality of human spirit that the Florentines lacked. This is true so far as it goes, and is on the verge of cogency. Conceivably, one cannot imagine a warrior spirit to reside in the heart of somebody who turns the other cheek out of love for his enemies. Furthermore, in Machiavelli’s The Discourses, he states unequivocally his contempt for Christianity, and how it weakened the strength and virtù necessary to “make men very bold”.4 But this leads to a digression. It is not evident in Machiavelli’s published works D Camellato 872900228

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if he criticised religion as playing a determinant role in class struggle as much as he criticised its affect as an institutionalised state religion on a citizen’s virtù. Harvey C. Mansfield, for instance, mistakenly believed that Machiavelli admired the Roman Republic because the pagan spirit of the Romans allowed their passion and ardour to be channelled into military endeavours far more easily than that of a Christian people.5 While such conclusions are arguable, it would be more fruitful to follow the line of thought as that which Machiavelli drew in such statements as “I must not fail to discuss the tumults that broke out between the death of the Tarquins and the creation of the tribunes”6 to get to the heart of the matter. It would, moreover, be more rewarding to separate religion from politics. Machiavelli was clear in pointing out how the lesson the Roman Republic taught on public liberty can be obscured by the “quarrels between the nobles and the plebs,” and how those who attributed the downfall of the Roman Republic to this civil strife had attributed the wrong effect to the cause. More significantly: Nor do they realize that in every republic there are two different dispositions, that of the populace and that of the upper class and that all legislation favourable to liberty is brought about by the clash between them.7 One of the motivations for Machiavelli to pursue this line of thought was the endless factionalism of Florentine society that resulted in violence to the popoloα and the eclipse of public authority. Here, the difference between Florence and Rome owed more to the different attitudes of class interest than anything else. Factionalism is no more chaotic, undemocratic and prone to corruption than party politics is in America.8 A conspicuous feature in the history of Florence was the absence of a coherent class division that had α

Italian for ‘people’; the Florentine equivalent to the plebeians in the Roman Republic. D Camellato 872900228

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characterized ancient Rome beginning with the first secessio plebis circa 494 BC. How Machiavelli viewed class division is a key component to his conception of liberty, and it is the nature of this division, more than religion, that he was alluding to in Book I of The Discourses. The problem, however, as previously mentioned, is his lack of precision when he defines social classes. His proclivity to use terms loosely notwithstanding, some writers have established meaning in his use of the term “class” and have concluded that what he meant by such a term was rooted in economic life. Neal Wood observed that Machiavelli’s discussion of class behaviour often appears more psychological than economic, that his treatment of class behaviour was based on an empirical and historical method.9 But recalling what Brudney hypothesised, that Machiavelli wanted to suggest the immutability of class conflict and the enduring benefits such conflicts engender, one can safely assume that his class psychology was rooted in a consistent notion of economic station and ownership, and that “his argument did not depend on the continuity of a particular class but on the continuity of class oppositions and their importance to republics.”10 Embedded in this idea is the belief Machiavelli had in the ultimate safeguard for a republic’s liberty, that it was held in the hands of the people. To demonstrate this, it is first necessary to evaluate the dynamic arising from the relations between the wealthy and the rest of the people. Admittedly, Machiavelli suggested that class conflict derived from economic inequality, but there are instances when his is explicit about it. A feudal system, he maintains in a discussion of those conditions that favoured the establishment of republics, is incompatible with a free government. Arguing that the gentry “who live in idleness on the abundant revenue derived from their estates, without having anything to do either with their cultivation or D Camellato 872900228

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with other forms of labour essential to life,” are “pest[s] in any republic and in any province; but still more pernicious are those who…have castles under their command and subjects who are under their obedience.”11 In his time, there were regions in Italy that were poorly suited for a free republic, like Naples and Lombardy where the reign of the nobility was left intact. But unlike these fiefdoms, the conditions in Florence were amenable for the introduction of a free government since neither the ottimati, the landed wealthy, nor the popolo, were independent from the communal economy or the communal authority. The demise of the nobility, marked by the Ordinance of Justice in 1293, set their social standing as equals to the rest of the Florentine people, all accountable and equally dependent on the political institutions of the city state for both private protection and advancement in their lives. In The History of Florence, he analyzed a civic conflict that took place in 1353 between two rival families, the Albizzi, and the Ricci, and argued that due to the gradual dissolution of the landed gentry into the communal affairs of the city, there was an orderly resolution of class differences that rendered the urban wealthy a social position that no longer posed the problems that the landed gentry did. And as the citizens, since the ruin of the nobility, were on such an equality that the magistrates were more respected now than they had previously been, they designed to proceed toward the suppression of this disorder with civil authority alone.12 Another indication of Machiavelli’s understanding of how the struggle between social classes is rooted in the civil economy is found in Book I of The Discourses, where he discussed the effects of the Agrarian Law in Rome. It is clear he understood how the clash of social classes arises from private property, and that any legislation to establish D Camellato 872900228

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economic equality where none previously existed can bring damaging results. The law had two chief provisions: first, it limited the acres of land any citizen could own; and second it regulated the distribution of land and booty won in battle with neighbouring states. He cited the cause of the discord as being due to the acquisitive nature in which “some desire to have more and others are afraid to lose what they have already acquired.”13 Therefore, it is “clear from this that men set much greater store on property than on honours.”14 Keeping in mind that he characterised men essentially as ambitious, restless and selfinterested, at the core of this issue is the defence of property or the craving of property, and that any law favouring one interest over the other is likely to turn the city topsyturvy. A more accurate appraisal of the human character is achieved when considering the separate attributes of each class. It bears to be repeated here that the observations presented thus far were made empirically in the middle of the last millennium, in the case of Renaissance Florence, and historically two and a half millennia ago in ancient Rome, and yet they are no less pertinent to the state of modern political liberty than those of The Prince are to Lee Atwater’s understanding of how to seize and maintain political power.α The wealthy, either Roman patriciate or Florentine ottimati), according to Machiavelli were forever ambitious and always jealous of their social station, yet they did offer their cities the same qualities that were indispensable to the success of the republic, namely, their skills in politics and the military. One of the primary failures the Florentine

Lee Atwater, the adviser to President George H. W. Bush, reputedly reread The Prince once a year to ‘keep in touch with the Master’ (see Endnote 1). α

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republic endured, out of an irreconcilable animosity to the ottimati on the part of the people, was the continual exclusion of the wealthy class in all civic and political matters whenever the people gained control of government. In contrast to the Romans, who, despite their differences, operated on the principle of inclusion, the republic did not take advantage of these skills and “invited the political and military amateurism that characterised the Florentine Republic that Machiavelli served from 1498-1512.”15 For Machiavelli, the people, who generally were not as ambitious as the wealthy, desired only not to be oppressed, and as long as they and their families were reasonably secure, they were content. But where he observed the enduring enmity of one class to the other to the extent where they considered each other more to be enemies to be defeated rather than adversaries with whom they had to work out their difficulties, he insisted there be constitutional checks on aristocratic ambition, and when the common interest is neglected, the people are required to act politically to restore their freedom. In the breadth of his political literature, Machiavelli was consistent in thinking that the characteristics of the social dynamic were timeless, and as such accorded a reasonable degree of predictability in political life. On the whole, this meant that the behaviour of the citizenry, and conversely that of the governors of republics, could be anticipated. When the social role of each class was respected and accepted as a fact of life, then constitution-making and political leadership became less problematic. What upsets the balance is the development of factions within societies, as was the case in Florence.16 Whether it occurred due to family ties, or by guild loyalties, or by the development of parties, it muted the class interests necessary to the maintenance of D Camellato 872900228

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liberty. On this note, Machiavelli breaks with traditional political philosophy and affirms the rightful place of the people in any republic. This is the issue that has either escaped the attention of, or had been blatantly ignored by the political wisdom of his day. It was left to Machiavelli even to challenge the wisdom of Livy as well. Nothing is more futile and more inconstant than are the masses. So says our author, Titus Livy, and so say all other historians….But, however that may be, I think, and always shall think there can be no harm in defending an opinion by arguments so long as one has no intention of appealing either to authority or force. I claim, then, that for the failing for which writers blame the masses, any body of men one cares to select may be blamed, and especially princes; for anyone who does not regulate his conduct by laws will make the same mistakes as the masses are guilty of.17 Having said this, Machiavelli unveils his argument in favour of the people in a republic concluding with the remark that “for four hundred years they were enemies to the very name of king and lovers of glory and of the common good of their country.”18 In leading to this conclusion, he mentions a specific defence of the formal constitutional role the people played. Where Livy had attributed the virtue of the Roman constitution to the authority of the Consuls for its ability to contain the “tribunician storms”, Machiavelli argued that the creation of the Consuls and the Senate were but the beginning of the development of Roman greatness.19 If the political system of the Roman Republic did not accommodate the representation of the people, it would be inadequate. “In a republic, then,” writes Machiavelli, “at this stage there were the consuls and the senate, so that as yet it comprised…a Principality and Aristocracy. It remained to find a place D Camellato 872900228

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for Democracy.”20 If tumults occurred in the city of Rome, it was not due to unruly behaviour on the part of the plebeians, they happened out of necessity because of the populace being oppressed, or out of a suspicion that it was about to be oppressed. At any rate, it provided a public platform for those who discerned wrongful treatment to appeal to the public to plead their case. The subsequent creation of the Tribunes after the secessio plebis finally established the sort of mixed constitution that led the way for Roman liberty. “Hence,” Machiavelli concludes, “if these tumults led to the creation of the tribunes, tumults deserve the highest praise, since, besides giving the populace a share in the administration, they served as the guardian of Roman liberties….”21 Clearly, then, out of social and class conflict were the liberties of not only those who experienced or suspected to experience oppression, but those of the entire citizenry, were extended. It is precisely the reason that, owing to their political autonomy were they able to express any dissatisfaction to be adjudged and redressed by the public body thereby institutionalising a new way or means to formally give vent to civic discontent. This strikes at the core of modern political understanding. In the case of Rome, to propose that its republic owed its health to Roman dissension is a radical proposition. This was the theme in all of Machiavelli’s published literature. It was his desire to convince his readers to accept this proposition, for accepting it meant depriving the governing class in his day one of its most potent arguments, one that has resurfaced over the centuries to Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, to Mill, Madison, and Walter Lippmann, that is, popular attempts to share in government are inherently destructive to republics.

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One of the symptoms of this prevailing misunderstanding in politics is the notorious stigma popularly given to modern politicians. The fault lies with the perceived role that a politician has in a democracy. In an age where party politics justifies the means in governance, too much attention is paid to a candidate’s moral vision, or his steadfast belief in the incorruptibility of his ideals, or, once being elected, her ability to deflect blame and publicly vilify her opponent as an enemy, as being evil, and must be beaten and vanquished. In such a world, when one is implicated in scandal, all his associates are deemed guilty. This is conflict that has no lightning rod, so to speak, to shunt the high amperage electricity of social disagreement away safely. Where it leads is to factional division along abstract lines. What is needed is effective politicians who ply their trade artfully, who seek to negotiate and know when and how to compromise, who view their adversaries today as colleagues tomorrow, who, in short, can effectively apprehend maximised social conflict and direct it through existing, or if need be, new legislation to augment the liberty of the entire political body, and finally, who realise that conflict is not dire crisis but merely growing pains in the further development of a healthy republic.

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NOTES 1

Interview with Kevin Phillips, democracynow.org [cited 29 March 2008]. Kent Brudney, “Machiavelli on Social Class and Class Conflict,” Political Theory, Vol. 12, No. 4, (November 1984), p. 509. 3 Harvey Mansfield, Jr., “Party and Sect in Machiavelli’s Florentine Histories,” in Martin Fleisher, ed., Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought, New York, Atheneum, 1972, pp. 209-266. 4 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Discourses, Bernard Crick, ed(s)., Leslie J. Walker, trans., Penguin Books, New York, 1987, p. 278. 5 Mansfield, “Party and Sect”, p. 238. 6 Machiavelli, The Discourses, p. 113. 7 Machiavelli, The Discourses, p. 113. 8 Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, The Broken Branch : How Congress Is Failing America And How To Get It Back On Track, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 9 Neal Wood, “The Value of Asocial Sociability: Contributions of Machiavelli, Sidney, and Montesquieu,” in Fleisher, pp. 288-289. 10 Brudney, “Machiavelli on Social Class”, p. 511. 11 Machiavelli, The Discourses, pp. 245-246. 12 Niccolò Machiavelli, History of Florence and of the Affairs of Italy, Felix Gilbert, trans., Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1960, p. 111. 13 Machiavelli, The Discourses, p. 200. 14 Machiavelli, The Discourses, p. 204. 15 Brudney, “Machiavelli on Social Class”, p. 513. 16 Machiavelli, History of Florence, pp. 108-109. 17 Machiavelli, The Discourses, p. 252. 18 Machiavelli, The Discourses, p. 254. 19 Titus Livius, The History of Rome, Vol. 1, Rev. Canon Roberts, trans., Ernest Rhys ed., J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London, 1905, II.i, p. 79. 20 Machiavelli, The Discourses, p. 111. 21 Machiavelli, The Discourses, p. 115. 2

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