Group-2-torts (2).docx

CORDILLERA CAREER DEVELOPMENT COLLEGE COLLEGE OF LAW

TORTS AND DAMAGES Atty. Susana Gaplaew-Umayat

GROUP 2

MENDEZ, VANESSA PANEDA, AUBY TARONA, JESSICA VICENTE, GRAIL-ANN

CULPA AQUILIANA AND CULPA CONTRACTUAL

1. Distinguishing Culpa Aquiliana and Culpa Contractual

BASIS

CULPA AQUILIANA

CULPA CONTRACTUAL

1

Nature of negligence

Negligence is direct, substantive and independent

Negligence is merely incidental to the performance of the contractual obligation. There is a pre-existing contract or obligation

2

Defense of a “good father of a family”

This is a complete and proper defense insofar as parents, guardians, employers are concerned.

This is not a complete and proper defense in the selection and supervision of employees

3

Presumption of negligence

There is no presumption of negligence. The injured party must prove the negligence of the defendant. Otherwise, the complaint of injured party will be dismissed.

There is presumption of negligence as long as it can be proved that there was breach of the contract. The defendant must prove that there was no negligence in the carrying out of the terms of the contract.

a. Source Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation. [Cangco v. Manila Railroad, 1918] b. Burden of proof Culpa Aquiliana - when the source of the obligation upon which plaintiff’s cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence – if he does not, his action fails. Culpa Contractual – Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery. It is not necessary to prove the negligence. FGU INSURANCE V. SARMIENTO FACTS: G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS), driven by Eroles, carrying 30 units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes. FGU, an insurer of the shipment, paid the value of the covered cargoes, being a subrogee, and in turn, sought reimbursement from GPS but the later failed to heed the claim.FGU filed a complaint for damages & breach of contract of carriage against GPS and Eroles with the RTC. In its answer, respondents asserted that GPS was not engaged in business as a common carrier and that the cause of damage was purely accidental. The RTC subsequently dismissed the complaint holding that GPS was not a common carrier defined under the law & existing jurisprudence. ISSUE: Who has the burden of proof? RULING: GPS has the burden of proof. A default on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation gives rise to a presumption of lack of care & corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden being on him to establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so. GPS cannot escape from liability. In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract & the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may have been lost/suffered. c. Applicability of doctrine of proximate cause Proximate Cause- An act from which an injury results as a natural, direct, uninterrupted consequence and without which the injury would not have occurred. CALALA V. CA FACTS: Eliza Sunga rode a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Calalas. As jeepneystopped for a passenger to alight, a truck driven by Verena and owned by Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney which resulted Sunga’s was injury.Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging a violation of the contract of carriage. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Salva. The lower court rendered judgment against Salva and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the truck who was responsible for the

accident. It took cognizance of another case, filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena for quasi-delict, in which the same court held that Salva and his driver, Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney. ISSUE: Would the negligence of Verena, as the proximate cause of the accident, negates petitioner’s liability under contract of carriage? RULING: NO. The Court distinguished quasi-delict from breach of contract: The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. The Doctrine of Proximate Cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created d. Defense of employer for negligence of employee "From this article [Article 1903] two things are apparent:That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability." [Cangco v. Manila Railroad, 1918].

2. Is there an Intersection? Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict xxx. CANGCO V. MANILA RAILROAD, Supra 

Breach of contract of common carrier and negligence of Manila Railroad

FORES V. MIRANDA1 FACTS: Respondent was one of the Jeepney passengers who got injured when its driver, Eugenio Luga, lost control thereof, causing the jeep to swerve and to hit the bridge wall. He was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment, and later was subjected to a series of operations.The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly. A point to be further remarked is petitioner's contention that or one day before the accident happened, she allegedly sold the passenger jeep that was involved therein to a certain Carmen Sackerman. ISSUE: Is the petitioner liable for moral damages? RULING: NO. Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the same must be discarded. The SC repeatedly ruled that moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicted on a breach of the contract of transportation. The definition of quasi-delict in Article 2176 expressly excludes cases where there is a "preexisting contractual relation between the parties. CONSOLIDATED BANK V. COURT OF APPEALS 2 FACTS: L.C. Diaz and Company (LC Diaz), an accounting firm, has a savings account with Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (now called Solidbank Corporation). The firm’s messenger, a certain Ismael Calapre, deposited an amount with the bank but due to a long line and the fact that he still needs to deposit a certain amount in another bank, the messenger left the firm’s passbook with a teller of Solidbank. But when the messenger returned, the passbook is already missing. Apparently, the teller returned the passbook to someone else. Apparently, an amount of P300,000.00 was already withdrawn from the firm’s account. LC Diaz demanded Solidbank to refund the said amount which the bank refused. LC Diaz then sued Solidbank. In its defense, Solidbank contends that under their banking rules, they are authorized to honor withdrawals if presented with the passbook; that when the P300k was withdrawn, the passbook was presented. Further, the withdrawer presented a withdrawal slip which bore the signatures of the representatives of LC Diaz.

1 2

G.R. No. L-12163, March 4, 1959 G.R. No. 138569, September 2003

The RTC ruled in favor of Solidbank. It found LC Diaz to be negligent in handling its passbook. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC using the rules on quasi-delict (Article 2176 of the Civil Code). ISSUE: Whether or not the relations between Solidbank and LC Diaz, the depositor, is governed by quasi-delict in determining the liability of Solidbank. RULING: NO. Solidbank is liable for the loss of the P300k but it’s liability is grounded on culpa contractual. The act of the teller returning the passbook to someone else other than Calapre, the firm’s authorized messenger, is a clear breach of contract. Such negligence binds the bank under the principle of Respondeat Superior or command responsibility. AIR FRANCE V. CARRASCOSO3 FACTS: In March 1958, plaintiff Rafael Carrascosowas issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France through its authorized agent, the Philippine Airlines. However, upon reaching Bangkok for their stop over, he was asked by Air France’s plane manager to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a “better right” than him. Plaintiff protested and after a heated argument, Carrascoso eventually, though reluctantly, gave up his seat for the “white Man” and transferred to the tourist section of the aircraft for the rest of the flight. When Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air France for damages for the inconvenience and embarrassment he suffered during his trip. The CFI of Manila awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Air France however contends that the issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be seated in first class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent between the parties. ISSUE: Whether Air France is liable for damages. RULING: YES. Air France’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper. The Supreme Court also ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. FAR EAST V. COURT OF APPEALS 4 FACTS: Far East Bank and Trust Co. (FEBTC) issued a credit card to Luis Luna at its Pasig branch. Upon his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to Clarita S. Luna. When Clarita’s card was lost, he informed FEBTC. Later, Luis tendered a despedida lunch at the Hotel Intercontinental Manila. To pay for the lunch, Luis presented his credit card. Unfortunately, it was dishonored and he was forced to pay the bill in cash and felt embarrassed by this incident. Luis demanded the payment of damages from FEBTC. Festejo, vice-president of FEBTC, expressed the bank’s apologies to Luis and explained that in cases when a card is reported as lost, FEBTC undertakes necessary action to avert its unauthorized use such as tagging the card as hotlisted. Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the restaurant to assure that the Lunas were “very valued clients”of FEBTC. Nevertheless, the Lunas filed a complaint for damages.The trial court ordered FEBTC to pay the Lunas moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The appellate court affirmed the ruling. Hence, this petition for review. ISSUE: Whether FEBTC is liable for the said damages. RULING: Spouses Luna are entitled only to nominal damages and not to moral and exemplary damages. The court explained that in culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract and that bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Article 2219 states that, “Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; The Court found that the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation, but there was nothing to sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort even where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant . xxx The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort.

3 4

G.R. No. L-21438, Sept. 28,1966 G. R. No. 108164, February 23, 1995

PSBA V. COURT OF APPEALS5 FACTS: A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista, a 3 rd year student of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA), was stabbed in the premises of PSBA by elements from outside the school. Consequently, he died. This prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. PSBA sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article. ISSUE: Whether PSBA can be validly sued by the respondent. HELD: YES. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code. SYQUIA V. COURT OF APPEALS 6 FACTS: Petitioners were the parents and siblings, respectively, of the deceased Vicente Juan Syquia. They filed a complaint before the CFI against herein private respondent, Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. for recovery of damages arising from breach of contract and/or quasi-delict. According to the complaint, the petitioners and respondent agreed to inter the remains of deceased in the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery. They also alleged that the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased had a hole approximately three (3) inches in diameter. Upon opening the vault, it became apparent that there was evidence of total flooding, the coffin was entirely damaged and the exposed parts of the deceased’s remains were damaged. ISSUE: Whether the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., breached its contract with petitioners. alternatively, whether private respondent was guilty of a tort. RULING: NO. There was no negligent act on the part of the cemetery. Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the respondent's Court finding that there was no negligence. Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi- delict Had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit: “Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.” LRT V. NAVIDAD7 FACTS: Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token. While he was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, JunelitoEscartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached him. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously. Later, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against JunelitoEscartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Prudent Security and JunelitoEscartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally (about 500 k plus damages) On CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is Correct?

5

G. R. No. 84698, February 4, 1992 G.R. No. 98695, Jan. 27,1993 7 G. R. No. 145804, Feb. 6, 2003 6

RULING: YES. The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides: "Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. "Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755." "Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. "This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees."

exercised all the diligence of a

"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission."

NEGLIGENCE

A. CONCEPT OF NEGLIGENCE 1. Determining the Diligence Required Article 1173.The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the expected of a good father of a family shall be required.

performance, that which is

RTO C. SICAM and AGENCIA de R.C. SICAM, INC. v. SPOUSES JORGE8 FACTS: On different dates, Lulu Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry with Agencia de R. C. Sicam located in Parañaque to secure a loan. On October 19, 1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop and took away whatever cash and jewelry were found inside the pawnshop vault. On the same date, Sicam sent Lulu a letter informing her of the loss of her jewelry due to the robbery incident in the pawnshop. Respondent Lulu then wroteback expressing disbelief, and then requested Sicam to prepare the pawned jewelry for withdrawal on November 6, but Sicam failed to return the jewelry. Lulu, joined by her husband Cesar, filed a complaint against Sicam with the RTC of Makati seeking indemnification for the loss of pawned jewelry and payment of AD, MD and ED as well as AF. The RTC rendered its Decision dismissing respondents’ complaint as well as petitioners’ counterclaim. Respondents appealed the RTC Decision to the CA which reversed the RTC, ordering the appellees to pay appellants the actual value of the lost jewelry and AF. Petitioners MR denied, hence the instant petition for review on Certiorari. ISSUE: Are the petitioners liable for the loss of the pawned articles in their possession? (Petitioners insist that they are not liable since robbery is a fortuitous event and they are not negligent at all.) HELD: YES. Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.

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G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007

Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur:(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of human will;(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal manner; and,(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss. The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests on him who invokes it. And, in order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. Sicam had testified that there was a security guard in their pawnshop at the time of the robbery. He likewise testified that when he started the pawnshop business in 1983, he thought of opening a vault with the nearby bank for the purpose of safekeeping the valuables but was discouraged by the Central Bank since pawned articles should only be stored in a vault inside the pawnshop. The very measures which petitioners had allegedly adopted show that to them the possibility of robbery was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen and anticipated. Sicam’s testimony, in effect, contradicts petitioners’ defense of fortuitous event. Moreover, petitioners failed to show that they were free from any negligence by which the loss of the pawned jewelry may have been occasioned. Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. It does not foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part of herein petitioners. Petitioners merely presented the police report of the Parañaque Police Station on the robbery committed based on the report of petitioners’ employees which is not sufficient to establish robbery. Such report also does not prove that petitioners were not at fault. On the contrary, by the very evidence of petitioners, the CA did not err in finding that petitioners are guilty of concurrent or contributory negligence as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit: Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.

negligence, or delay, and those

Article 2123 of the Civil Code provides that with regard to pawnshops and other establishments which are engaged in making loans secured by pledges, the special laws and regulations concerning them shall be observed, and subsidiary, the provisions on pledge, mortgage and antichresis. The provision on pledge, particularly Article 2099 of the Civil Code, provides that the creditor shall take care of the thing pledged with the diligence of a good father of a family. This means that petitioners must take care of the pawns the way a prudent person would as to his own property. In this connection, Article 1173 of the Civil Code further provides: Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. We expounded in Cruz v. Gangan that negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do; or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is want of care required by the circumstances. A review of the records clearly shows that petitioners failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation. Petitioners were guilty of negligence in the operation of their pawnshop business. Sicam’s testimony revealed that there were no security measures adopted by petitioners in the operation of the pawnshop. Evidently, no sufficient precaution and vigilance were adopted by petitioners to protect the pawnshop from unlawful intrusion. There was no clear showing that there was any security guard at all. Or if there was one, that he had sufficient training in securing a pawnshop. Further, there is no showing that the alleged security guard exercised all that was necessary to prevent any untoward incident or to ensure that no suspicious individuals were allowed to enter the premises. In fact, it is even doubtful that there was a security guard; since it is quite impossible that he would not have noticed that the robbers were armed with caliber .45 pistols each, which were allegedly poked at the employees. Significantly, the alleged security guard was not presented at all to corroborate petitioner Sicam’s claim; not one of petitioners’ employees who were present during the robbery incident testified in court. Furthermore, petitioner Sicam’s admission that the vault was open at the time of robbery is clearly a proof of petitioners’ failure to observe the care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demanded. The robbery in this case happened in petitioners’ pawnshop and they were negligent in not exercising the precautions justly demanded of a pawnshop. FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY VS. COURTOF APPEALS9

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G.R. No. 130068 October 1, 1998

FACTS: M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila and was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Gavino, who was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association to conduct the docking maneuvers for the safe berthing, boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. When the vessel reached the landmark, one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, was dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier as well as the vessel. ISSUES: (1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the damage caused by the vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence?; (2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by the concurrent negligence of the master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage? HELD: (1) Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the command and navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation. He becomes the master pro hac vice and should give all directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing anchoring, towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty to insist on having effective control of the vessel, or to decline to act as pilot. Under certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel, but is deemed merely the adviser of the master, who retains command and control of the navigation even in localities where pilotage is compulsory. It is quite common for states and localities to provide for compulsory pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certain exceptions, to take on board pilots duly licensed under local law. The purpose of these laws is to create a body of seamen thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or depart, and thus protect life and property from the dangers of navigation. Upon assuming such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards of care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over which his license extends superior to and more to be trusted than that of the master. He is not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care, but must have and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an expert in his profession. Under extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary care. In this case, Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such strict standard of care and diligence required of pilots in the performance of their duties. As pilot, he should have made sure that his directions were promptly and strictly followed. (2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less responsible for the collision. The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. A perusal of Capt. Kabankov's testimony makes it apparent that he was remiss in the discharge of his duties as master of the ship, leaving the entire docking procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance over this risky maneuver. The owners of a vessel are not personally liable for the negligent acts of a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a compulsory pilot is imputable to the vessel and it may be held liable therefor in rem. Where, however, by the provisions of the statute the pilot is compulsory only in the sense that his fee must be paid, and is not in compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no exemption from liability. Even though the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause of the injury, but the negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the owners are liable. But the liability of the ship in rem does not release the pilot from the consequences of his own negligence. The master is not entirely absolved of responsibility with respect to navigation when a compulsory pilot is in charge. Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of her negligent management or navigation. PNR v. BRUNTY10 FACTS: Rhonda Brunty, who came to the Philippines for a visit is the daughter of complainant Ethel Brunty and an American citizen, died due to an accident when the car she was in collided with a Philippine National Railways (PNR) train. Previously, Rhonda, along with her Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia and their driver, was on their way to Baguio on a Mercedes Benz sedan. Around 2:00 am, approaching a railroad crossing, the driver speeding at 70km/hr overtook a vehicle. Unaware, they collided with the train. Rhonda and the driver died, with Juan suffering severe injuries.

10

G.R. No. 169891, November 2, 2006

Brunty’s heirs filed a Complaint for damages claiming that PNR was negligent for not having placed no flag bar, red light signal, and other mechanisms in the railroad classing where the accident happen. PNR claimed that the law did not require it to put such alarms. ISSUE: Whether or not PNR is liable. HELD: PNR was liable. PNR’s business is impressed with public interest; hence, it is expected from them to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of their work. Thus, even if the law did not require it to put such alarms, it was still required to do so as a matter of public duty or public safety. In determining whether or not there is negligence on the part of the parties in a given situation, jurisprudence has laid down the following test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, the person is guilty of negligence. Petitioner was found negligent because of its failure to provide the necessary safety device to ensure the safety of motorists in crossing the railroad track. As such, it is liable for damages for violating the provisions of Article 2176 of the New Civil Code “It may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both in the operation of trains and in the maintenance of the crossings. Moreover, every corporation constructing or operating a railway shall make and construct at all points where such railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings and erect at such points, at a sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the necessity of looking out for trains. “This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its failure to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it because public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed.” PNR v. COURT OF APPEALS11 FACTS: In the early afternoon of April 27, 1992, Jose Amores (Amores) was traversing the railroad tracks in Kahilum II Street, Pandacan, Manila. Before crossing the railroad track, he stopped for a while then proceeded accordingly. Unfortunately, just as Amores was at the intersection, a Philippine National Railways (PNR) train with locomotive number T-517 turned up and collided with the car. At the time of the mishap, there was neither a signal nor a crossing bar at the intersection to warn motorists of an approaching train. Aside from the railroad track, the only visible warning sign at that time was the defective standard signboard STOP, LOOK and LISTEN wherein the sign Listen was lacking while that of Look was bent. No whistle blow from the train was likewise heard before it finally bumped the car of Amores. After impact, the car was dragged about ten (10) meters beyond the center of the crossing. Amores died as a consequence thereof. On July 22, 1992, the heirs of Amores, consisting of his surviving wife and six children, herein respondents, filed a Complaint for Damages against petitioners PNR and Virgilio J. Borja (Borja), PNRs locomotive driver at the time of the incident, before the RTC of Manila. The case was raffled to Branch 28 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 92-61987. In their complaint, respondents averred that the train’s speedometer was defective, and that the petitioner’s negligence was the proximate cause of the mishap for their failure to take precautions to prevent injury to persons and property despite the dense population in the vicinity. They then prayed for actual and moral damages, as well as attorneys fees. In their Answer, the petitioners denied the allegations, stating that the train was railroad-worthy and without any defect. According to them, the proximate cause of the death of Amores was his own carelessness and negligence, and Amores wantonly disregarded traffic rules and regulations in crossing the railroad tracks and trying to beat the approaching train. They admitted that there was no crossing bar at the site of the accident because it was merely a barangay road. PNR stressed that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the locomotive driver and train engineer, Borja, and that the latter likewise used extraordinary diligence and caution to avoid the accident. Petitioners further asserted that respondents had the last clear chance to avoid the accident but recklessly failed to do so. ISSUE: Is PNR liable for damages? HELD: YES. Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Using the aforementioned philosophy, it may be reliably concluded that there is no hard and fast rule whereby such degree of care and vigilance is calibrated; it is dependent upon the circumstances in which a person finds himself. All that the law requires is that it is perpetually compelling upon a person to use that care and diligence expected of sensible men under comparable circumstances. The transcript of stenographic notes reveals that the train was running at a fast speed because notwithstanding the application of the ordinary and emergency brakes, the train still dragged the car some distance away from the point of impact. Evidence likewise unveils the inadequate precautions taken by petitioner PNR to forewarn the public of the 11

G.R. No. 157658, October 15, 2007

impending danger. Aside from not having any crossing bar, no flagman or guard to man the intersection at all times was posted on the day of the incident. A reliable signalling device in good condition, not just a dilapidated Stop, Look and Listen signage because of many years of neglect, is needed to give notice to the public. It is the responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep the signal devices in working order. Failure to do so would be an indication of negligence. B. DEGREES OF DILIGENCE A different, and older, approach has recognized distinct "degrees" of negligence itself, which is to say degrees of legal fault, corresponding to required "degrees" of care. xxx It recognizes three "degrees" of negligence: slight negligence, which is failure to use great care; ordinary negligence, which is failure to use ordinary care; and gross negligence, which is failure to use even slight care. AMEDO V. RIO12 FACTS: This case was instituted on October 18, 1950. In her original complaint instituted on October 18, 1950, plaintiff Elena Amedo sought to collect from defendant Rio y Olabarrieta, Inc., the sum of P2, 038.40 as compensation for the death of her son, FilomenoManaguit, who worked for the defendant as a seaman of the M/S Pilar II. The main allegation of said original complaint was: That on May 27, 1949 at about 11:30 o'clock in the morning, while the deceased FilomenoManaguit was on board M/S "Pilar II" as such seaman, he jumped into the water to retrieve a 2-peso bill belonging to him, and as a consequence of which, he was drowned. This however was dismissed due to lack of a cause of action which defendant filed stating that the allegation does not show that the death of plaintiff's son was due to an "accident arising out of and in the course of employment". She was allowed to file an amended complaint which was remanded to the trial court. Her amended complaint stated: That on May 27, 1949, at or about 11:30 o'clock in the morning while the said FilomenoManaguit was in the course of his employment, performing his duties as such ordinary seaman on defendant's M/S "Pilar II", which was anchored then about 1 1/2 miles from the seashore of ArceliDumarang, Palawan, his two-peso bill was blown by the breeze into the sea and in his effort to retrieve the same from the waters he was drowned. ISSUE: Whether Amedo could claim compensation from employer Rio. HELD: NO. Plaintiff‘s basis for appeal is the Workmen‘s Compensation Act. Sections 2 and 4 of which: Sec. 2. Grounds for compensation. When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment, or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified. Sec. 4. Injuries not covered. Compensation shall not be allowed for injuries caused (1) by the voluntary intent of the employee to inflict such injury upon himself or another person; (2) by drunkenness on the part of the laborer who had the accident; (3) by notorious negligence of the same. From these provisions three conditions are essential to hold an employer liable. These are: (1) the accident must arise out of the employment; (2) it must happen in the course of the employment; and (3) it must not be caused by the "notorious negligence" of the employee. Point in question is whether the accident was committed under these 3 conditions - "The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are descriptive of its character, while the words `in the course of' refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place - it may be conceded that the death of Filomeno took place "in the course of" his employment, in that it happened at the "time" when, and at the "place" where-according to the amended complaint-he was working. However, the accident which produced this tragic result did not "arise out of" his employment. The blowing of his 2-peso bill may have grown out of, or arisen from, his employment. It was the result of a risk peculiar to his work as a seaman or incidental to such work. But, his death was the consequence of his decision to jump into the water to retrieve said bill. The hazardous nature of this act was not due specially to the nature of his employment. It was a risk to which any person on board the M/S Pilar II, such as a passenger thereof or an ordinary visitor, would have been exposed had he, likewise, jumped into the sea, as Filomeno had.Filomeno’s accident was caused by his notorious negligence. "Notorious negligence" has been held to be tantamount to "gross negligence", which, in turn, has been defined as follows: - By gross negligence is meant "such entire want of care as to raise a presumption that the person in fault is conscious of the probable consequences of carelessness, and is indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury to person or property of others." It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea, one mile and a half from the seashore of Arceli, Dumarang, Palawan, Filomeno failed to exercise "even slight care and diligence," that he displayed a "reckless disregard of the safety" of his person, that he could not have been but conscious of the probable consequences" of his carelessness and that he was "indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury. - this is distinguishable from cases wherein the act done is not dangerous per se such as when an employee drops a cigarette on the pavement and picks it up. So, also, if, while FilomenoManaguit was working, his 2-peso bill merely fell from his pocket, and as he picked up the bill from the floor something accidentally fell upon him and injured him, he would surely be entitled to compensation, his act being obviously innocent.

12

G.R. No. L-6870, May 24, 1954

MARINDUQUE V. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION ACT13 FACTS: On August 23, 1951, at 6:00 a.m. in Bo. Sumangga, Mogpog, Marinduque, the deceased Mamador together with other laborers of the Respondent-corporation, (Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc.) boarded a truck belonging to the latter, which was then driven by one ProcopioMacunat, also employed by the corporation, and on its way to their place of work at the mine camp at Talantunan, while trying to overtake another truck on the company road, it turned over and hit a coconut tree, resulting in the death of said Mamador and injury to the others.” ProcopioMacunat was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. (Criminal Case No. 1491). He has paid nothing however, to the latter. ISSUE: What is the effect of the deceased’s having violated the employer’s prohibition against laborers riding the haulage trucks HELD: NO. There is no doubt that mere riding on haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It couldn’t be, because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. It is argued that there was notorious negligence in this particular instance because there was the employer’s prohibition. However there is practical unanimity in the proposition that violation of a rule promulgated by a Commission or board is not negligence per se; but it may be evidence of negligence. Section 6 provides as follows: “Sec. 6.Liability of third parties. — In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in accordance with law; and in case compensation is claimed and allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer who paid such compensation or was found liable to pay the same, shall succeed the injured employee to the right of recovering from such person what he paid: Provided, That in case the employer recovers from such third person damages in excess of those paid or allowed under this Act, such excess shall be delivered to the injured employee or any other person entitled thereto, after deduction of the expenses of the employer and the costs of the proceedings. The sum paid by the employer for compensation or the amount of compensation to which the employee or his dependents are entitled, shall not be admissible as evidence in any damage suit or action.” ILAO- ORETA V. RONQUILLO14 FACTS: Respondent spouses Eva Marie Ronquillo and Noel BenedictoRonquillo had not been blessed with a child despite several years of marriage. They thus consulted petitioner Dr. Concepcion Ilao-Oreta, an obstetriciangynecologist-consultant and chief of the Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility Section at the St. Luke‘s Medical Center. Dr. Ilao-Oreta advised Eva Marie to undergo a laparoscopic procedure whereby a laparascope would be inserted through the patient‘s abdominal wall to get a direct view of her internal reproductive organ in order to determine the real cause of her infertility. The procedure was scheduled on April 5, 1999 at 2:00 p.m. to be performed by Dr. Ilao-Oreta. Eva Marie, accompanied by Noel, checked in at the St. Luke‘s Medical Center and underwent pre-operative procedures including the administration of intravenous fluid and enema. However, Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not arrive at the scheduled time for the procedure and no prior notice of its cancellation was received. It turned out that the doctor was on a return flight from Hawaii to, and arrived at 10:00 p.m. of April 5, 1999 in, Manila. The Ronquillo spouses filed a complaint against Dr. Ilao-Oreta and the St. Luke‘s Medical Center for breach of professional and service contract and for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City. They prayed for the award of actual damages including alleged loss of income of Noel while accompanying his wife to the hospital, moral damages, exemplary damages, costs of litigation, attorney‘s fees, and other available reliefs and remedies. The RTC decided in favor of Ronquillo spouses and awarded Eva Marie actual damages but ruled that the failure of the doctor to arrive on time was not intentional. It found no adequate proof that Noel had been deprived of any job contract while attending to his wife in the hospital. The spouses appealed to the Court of Appeals and found that Dr. Ilao-Oreta grossly negligent. ISSUE: Whether or not Dr. Ilao-Oreta is guilty of gross negligence for her failure to arrive at the scheduled time for the procedure. HELD: It bears noting that when she was scheduling the dateof her performance of the procedure, Dr. Ilao-Oreta had just gotten married and was preparing for her honeymoon, and it is of common human knowledge that excitement attends its preparations. Her negligence could then be partly attributed to human frailty which rules out its characterization as gross. Dr. Ilao-Oreta‘s negligence not being gross, Ronquillo spouses are not entitled to recover moral damages. Neither are the spouses entitled to recover exemplary damages in the absence of a showing that Dr. Ilao-Oreta acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner, nor to award of attorney‘s fees as, contrary to the finding of the CA that the spouses “were compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect their interest,” the records show that they did not exert enough efforts to settle the matter before going to court.

13 14

G.R. No. L-8110, June 30, 1956 G.R. No. 172406, October 11, 2007

C. STANDARD OF CONDUCT 1. Importance It is impossible to fix an advance definite rules for all conceivable human conduct because of the infinite variety of situations which may arise. Standard of conduct must be: a. External and objective b. The same for all persons c.

Must make allowance for the risk apparent to the act for his capacity to meet it and for the circumstances under which he must act.

2. The Fictitious Person PICART VS. SMITH FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. ISSUE: Whether or not Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done HELD: YES. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences. Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against the threatened harm. It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. SICAM V. JORGE Jorge pawned jewelry with Agencia de R. C. Sicam. Armed men entered the pawnshop and took away cash and jewelry from the pawnshop vault. Jorge demanded the return of the jewelry. The pawnshop failed. The SC held Sicam liable for failing to employ sufficient safeguards for the pawned goods. It held that robbery, if negligence concurred, is not a fortuitous event. Also, Article 2099 requires a creditor to take care of the thing pledged with the diligence of a good father of a family.

Doctrine: The diligence with which the law requires the individual at all times to govern his conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which he is placed and the importance of the act which he is to perform. Negligence, therefore, is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do; or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is want of care required by the circumstances. Notes: The fictitious person is not the standard. It is his conduct. CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. SPS.TANJANGCO 15 FACTS: Respondents-spouses Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco (the Tanjangcos) own Lots 68 and 69covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 2422454and 2829615respectively, located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, Quezon City, which is managed by petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. (Corinthian). On the other hand, respondents-spouses Frank and TeresitaCuaso (the Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos’ lots. Before the Cuasos constructed their house on Lot 65, a relocation survey was necessary. As Geodetic Engineer Democrito De Dios (Engr. De Dios), operating under the business name D.M. De Dios Realty and Surveying, conducted all the previous surveys for the subdivision's developer, Corinthian referred Engr. De Dios to the Cuasos. Before, during and after the construction of the said house, Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules and Regulations of Corinthian.6 Unfortunately, after the Cuasos constructed their house employing the services of C.B. Paraz&Construction Co., Inc. (C.B. Paraz) as builder, their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos’ Lot 69 by 87 square meters. No amicable settlement was reached between the parties. Thus, the Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the latter failed and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit against the Cuasos for Recovery of Possession with Damages.Eventually, the Cuasos filed a Third-Party Complaint against Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios. The Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to ascertain the proper specifications of their house, and to Engr. De Dios for his failure to undertake an accurate relocation survey, thereby, exposing them to litigation. The Cuasos also faulted Corinthian for approving their relocation survey and building plans without verifying their accuracy and in making representations as to Engr. De Dios' integrity and competence. The Cuasos alleged that had Corinthian exercised diligence in performing its duty, they would not have been involved in a boundary dispute with the Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined that Corinthian should also be held answerable for any damages that they might incur as a result of such construction. On March 30, 1993, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Tanjangcos. It ruled that the Cuasos’ perimeter wall encroached on the land of the Tanjangos by 87 square meters. The RTC likewise held that C.B. Paraz was grossly negligent in not taking into account the correct boundaries of Cuasos’ lot when it constructed the house. It, thus, ordered C.B. Paraz to pay moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees to the Tanjangcos and the Cuasos. The thirdparty complaint against Corinthian and Engr. De Dios, on the other hand, was dismissed for lack of cause of action. ISSUE: Whether Corinthian was negligent under the circumstances and, if so, whether such negligence contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos. HELD: Indeed, it is clear that Corinthian failed to exercise the requisite diligence in insuring that the Cuasos abide by its Manual of Rules and Regulations, thereby resulting in the encroachment on the Tanjangcos’ property. By its Manual of Rules and Regulations, it is reasonable to assume that Corinthian, through its representative, in the approval of building plans, and in the conduct of periodic inspections of on-going construction projects within the subdivision, is responsible in insuring compliance with the approved plans, inclusive of the construction of perimeter walls, which in this case is the subject of dispute between the Tanjangcos and the Cuasos.41 It is not just or equitable to relieve Corinthian of any liability when, by its very own rules, it imposes its authority over all its members to the end that "no new construction can be started unless the plans are approved by the Association and the appropriate cash bond and preconstruction fees are paid." Moreover, Corinthian can impose sanctions for violating these rules. Thus, the proposition that the inspection is merely a "table inspection" and, therefore, should exempt Corinthian from liability, is unacceptable. After all, if the supposed inspection is merely a "table inspection" and the approval granted to every member is a mere formality, then the purpose of the rules would be defeated. Compliance therewith would not be mandatory, and sanctions imposed for violations could be disregarded. Corinthian's imprimatur on the construction of the Cuasos' perimeter wall over the property of the Tanjangcos assured the Cuasos that everything was in order. In sum, Corinthian’s failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos’ perimeter wall into Tanjangcos’ property – despite the inspection conducted – constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos. In the instant case, the Tanjangcos were deprived of possession and use of their property for more than two decades through no fault of their own.

3. Special Circumstances

15

G.R. No. 160795, June 27, 2008

JONASAÑONUEVO, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND JEROMEVILLAGRACIA16 FACTS: Villagracia was travelling along Boni Ave. on his bicycle, while Añonuevo,traversing the opposite lane was driving a Lancer car owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s brother. Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries and had to undergo four operations. Villagracia instituted an action for damages against P&G Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo before the RTC. He had also filed a criminal complaint against Añonuevobefore the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter was subsequentlyacquitted of the criminal charge. Añonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets. He posits that Article 2185 of the Civil Code applies by analogy. Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a persondriving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not Art. 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply to non-motorized vehicles, making Villagracia presumptively negligent. 2) Whether or not Villagracia was negligent for failure to comply with traffic regulations. 3) Whether or not Villagracia is guilty of contributory negligence HELD: NO. 1) Application of Article 2185 Anonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon. He posits that Article 2185 of the New Civil Code applies by analogy. The provision reads: Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation. Anonuevo hypothesizes that Article 2185 should apply by analogy to all types of vehicles. He points out that modernday travel is more complex now than when the Code was enacted, the number and types of vehicles now in use far more numerous than as of then. He even suggests that at the time of the enactment of the Code, the legislators must have seen that only motor vehicles were of such public concern that they had to be specifically mentioned, yet today, the interaction of vehicles of all types and nature has inescapably become matter of public concern so as to expand the application of the law to be more responsive to the times. At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array of non-motorized vehicles ranging from humanpowered contraptions on wheels such as bicycles, scooters, and animal-drawn carts such as calesas and carromata. These modes of transport were even more prevalent on the roads of the 1940s and 1950s than they are today, yet the framers of the New Civil Code chose then to exclude these alternative modes from the scope of Article 2185 with the use of the term motorized vehicles. If Aonuevo seriously contends that the application of Article 2185 be expanded due to the greater interaction today of all types of vehicles, such argument contradicts historical experience. The ratio of motorized vehicles as to non-motorized vehicles, as it stood in 1950, was significantly lower than as it stands today. This will be certainly affirmed by statistical data, assuming such has been compiled, much less confirmed by persons over sixty. Aonuevos characterization of a vibrant intra-road dynamic between motorized and non-motorized vehicles is more apropos to the past than to the present. There is pertinent basis for segregating between motorized and non-motorized vehicles. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion.Is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the sametime, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an accident or collision. This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to themotor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass, and greater combustibility due to the use of fuel. 2) Negligence on the part of Villagracia. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by the personal judgment of the actor in a given situation, but rather, it is the law which determines what would be reckless or negligent. Añonuevo asserts that Villagracia was negligent as the latter had transgressed traffic regulations. However, Añonuevo was speeding as hemade the left turn, and by his own admission, he had seen Villagracia at a good distance of ten (10) meters. Had he been decelerating, as he should, as he made the turn, Aonuevo would have had ample opportunity to avoid hitting Villagracia, such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident. Even assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn.

16

G.R. No. 130003, October 20, 2004

3) Contributory Negligence To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body. To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence. As between Añonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged Añonuevo assolely responsible for the accident. The petition does not demonstrate why this finding should be reversed. It is hard to imagine that the same result would not have occurred even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with safety equipment.

HEIRS OF REDENTOR COMPLETO, AND ELPIDIO ABIAD v. SGT. AMANDO ALBAYDA, JR. 17 FACTS: Albayda is a Master Sergeant of the PH Air Force, and Completo was the taxi driver of a Toyota Corolla which was owned by Abiad. Albayda was riding a bike on his way to the office, when Completo's taxi bumped and side swept him, causing serious physical injuries. He [Albayda] was brought to the PH Air Force General Hospital, but he was transferred to the AFP Medical Center because he sustained a fracture and there was no orthopedic doctor available in the first hospital. He was confined from 27 Aug 1997 to 11 Feb 1998, and again in 23 Feb to 22 Mar 1998 [approx. 7 months]. Conciliation before the barangay failed, so Albayda filed a complaint for physical injuries through reckless imprudence against Completo before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay. Completo filed a counter-charge of damage to property through reckless imprudence against Albayda. The Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for Albayda's complaint, and Completo's complaint [against Albayda] was dismissed. Albayda manifested his reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against Completo and Abiad. Albayda alleged that Completo's negligence is the proximate cause of the incident. He demanded the following damages and their respective amounts: Actual damages - 276,550; Moral damages - 600,000; Exemplary damages 200,000; Attorney's fees - 25,000 + 1,000 per court appearance. On the other hand, Completo alleged that he was carefully driving the taxicab when he heard a strange sound from the taxicab's rear right side. He found Albayda lying on the road, holding his left leg, so he brought Albayda to PH Air Force General Hospital. Completo asserted that he was an experienced driver, and that he already reduced his speed to 20km even before reaching the intersection. In contrast, Albayda rode his bicycle at high speed, causing him to lose control of the bicycle. Completo said that Albayda had no cause of action. Several people testified for each side, but here are some notes on the testimony of the owner of the taxi driver, Abiad. Abiad said that aside from being a soldier, he also held franchises of taxicabs and passenger jeepneys, and being a taxicab operator, he would wake up early to personally check the taxicabs. When Completo applied as a taxicab driver, Abiad required him to show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and driver's license. Completo never figured in a vehicular accident since he was employed, and according to Abiad, he [Completo] was a good driver and good man. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Albayda, and the defendants are ordered to pay actual [46k] and moral [400k] damages, and attorney's fees [25k]. Upon appeal at the CA, the court affirmed RTC's decision with modifications [no more actual damages; awarded temperate damages [40k]; moral damages only 200k; Completo and Abiad are solidarily liable to pay Albayda; added legal interest. ISSUES: 1.

Whether or not CA erred in finding that Completo was the one who caused the collision.

2.

Whether or notAbiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of the family.

3.

Whether or notthe award of moral and temperate damages and attorney's fees for Albayda had no basis. NO / NO / YES

HELD: It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence the motorist's breach in his duty of care owed to the plaintiff, that the motorist was negligent in failing to exercise the diligence required to avoid injury to the plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury suffered. NCC 2176 quoted, and said that the question of the motorist's negligence is a question of fact. Usually, more will be required of a motorist [25mi/hr = 37ft/sec] than a bicyclist [10mi/hr = 15ft/sec] in discharging the duty of care because of the physical advantages the former has over the latter. It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to exercise reasonable diligence. He was overspeeding at the time he hit Albayda's bicycle; he did not slow down even when he approached the intersection such negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the injuries sustained by Albayda. It was proven that Albayda had the right of way since he reached the intersection ahead of Completo. Art. 2180 cited obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable also for those persons for whom one is responsible. Employers are liable for damage caused by employees, but the responsibility ceases upon proof that employers observed the diligence of the good father of the family in the selection and supervision of employees. The burden of proof is on the employer. The 17

G.R. No. 172200, July 6, 2010

responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for QD is solidary. The employer's civil liability for his employee's negligent acts is also primary and direct, owing to his own negligence in selecting and supervising them, and this liability attaches even if the employer is not in the vehicle at the time of collision. In the selection of employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. With respect to supervision, employers should formulate SOPs and monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches. To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious [secondary] liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence. SPOUSES PACIS v. MORALES18 FACTS: Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student who died in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Morales is the owner of the gun store. On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and Herbolario as sales agents and caretakers of the store while owner Morales was in Manila. The gun which killed Alfred is a gun owned by a store customer which was left with Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a drawer. Since Morales would be going to Manila, he left the keys to the store with the caretakers. It appears that the caretakers took the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual damages for the hospitalization and burial, expenses incurred by the plaintiffs, compensatory damages, MD and AF.Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial court’s Decision and absolved respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MR denied, hence this petition. ISSUE: Was Morales negligent? HELD: YES. This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners’ son. Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for damages against respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s employer. Petitioners based their claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a person’s own negligence. Article 2176 states: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the “Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled. Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care. As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms. Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case.

18

G.R. No. 169467, February 25, 2010

4. Children TAYLOR V. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT CO.19 FACTS: David Taylor, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. After leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnacesthey found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it 2 long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. The boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and they went to Manuel's home. David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad is liable for damages. HELD: NO. Cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted. Two (2) years before the accident, David spent 4 months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment for 6 months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and physically than most boys of 15. True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances. The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their consequences He was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury JARCO MARKETING V CA20 FACTS: Zhieneth, 6 years old, was pinned by the bulk of the department store‘s gift-wrapping counter/structure and died. The department store contended that it was the child‘s own act of climbing into the structure that was the proximate cause of the fall of the counter. ISSUE: Is Jarco Marketing liable?

19 20

G.R. No. L-4977 ,March 22, 1910 G.R. No. 129792, Dec. 21, 1991

HELD: (Citing Sangco) Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under 9 years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over 9 but under 15 years of age is rebuttable, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that the child under 9 years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. YLARDE V AQUINO FACTS: Edgardo Aquino ordered his students to dig beside a 1 ton concrete block in order to make a whole to bury huge stones. He left four of them to level the loose soil around the open hole but allegedly telling them ―not to touch the stone‖. They, however, playfully jumped into the pit and caused the top of the concrete block to fall towards the opening. Ylarde wasn‘t able to climb out and he died because of the injuries sustained. ISSUE: Was the death of Ylarde caused by his own negligence? HELD: NO. The child Ylarde cannot be charged with reckless imprudence. (citingSangco) The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person engendered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his own age and experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. 5. Experts A. GENERAL (Expert and Professional) 

They should exhibit the care and skill of one who is ordinarily skilled in the particular field that he is in.



When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.



An expert will not be judged based on what a non-expert can foresee.



The rule regarding experts is applicable not only to professionals who have undergone formal education.

FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY 21

FACTS: M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila and was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Gavino, who was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association to conduct the docking maneuvers for the safe berthing, boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. When the vessel reached the landmark, one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier as well as the vessel.

ISSUES: (1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the damage caused by the vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence; (2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by the concurrent negligence of the master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?

21

G.R. No. 130150; October, 1998

HELD: (1) Upon assuming such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards of care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over which his license extends superior to and more to be trusted than that of the master. He is not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care, but must have and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an expert in his profession. Under extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary care. In this case, Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such strict standard of care and diligence required of pilots in the performance of their duties. As pilot, he should have made sure that his directions were promptly and strictly followed.

(2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less responsible for the allision. The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. A perusal of Capt. Kabankov's testimony makes it apparent that he was remiss in the discharge of his duties as master of the ship, leaving the entire docking procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance over this risky maneuver. The owners of a vessel are not personally liable for the negligent acts of a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a compulsory pilot is imputable to the vessel and it may be held liable therefor in rem. Where, however, by the provisions of the statute the pilot is compulsory only in the sense that his fee must be paid, and is not in compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no exemption from liability. Even though the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause of the injury, but the negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the owners are liable. But the liability of the ship in rem does not release the pilot from the consequences of his own negligence. The master is not entirely absolved of responsibility with respect to navigation when a compulsory pilot is in charge. Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of her negligent management or navigation.

CULION vs PHILIPPINES MOTORS

FACTS: When Culion wanted to get his motor schooner repaired, he went PMC where Quest, PMC’s manager decided to oversee the repairs. Apparently, the tube connecting the carburettor and the fuel tank was not well-fitted, such that the fuel mixture leaked and dripped down to the engine compartment. Quest attention was called on this but he took it lightly. When the engine was started, there was a backfire and burned the boat.

ISSUE: Whether or not PMC is liable. HELD: YES. When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence of he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. Quest is experienced in fixing car and tractor engines, but not that of boats. A person skilled in dealing with boats would have been sufficiently warned by the circumstances to cause him to take precaution against the danger. Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engine on boats. B. PHARMACIST Standard of Conduct: The profession of pharmacy demands great care and skill. The Druggist must exercise the highest degree of care known to practical men.

US vs PINEDA

FACTS: Pineda, a pharmacist, sold barium chlorate (poisonous) instead of potassium chlorate which killed 2 horses.

: Whether or not Pineda is liable.

HELD: YES. The profession of pharmacy is one demanding care and skill. The responsibility to use care has been variously qualified as “ordinary care,” “care of a specially high degree”, which is “the highest practicable high degree of prudence, practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, vigilance and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of business, in order that human life may not constantly be exposed to danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poison for harmless medicine. The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands. The question of negligence or ignorance is irrelevant. The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he sells.

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and AURMELA GANZON vs. RAUL DE LEON

FACTS: Respondent Raul T. De Leon, a judge, noticed that his left eye was reddish. He also had difficulty reading. On the same evening, he met a friend who happened to be a doctor, Dr. Charles Milla. The latter prescribed the drugs “CortisporinOpthalmic” and “Ceftin” to relieve his eye problems. Before heading to work the following morning, De Leon went to the Betterliving, Parañaque, branch of Mercury Drug Store Corporation to buy the prescribed medicines. He showed his prescription to petitioner AurmelaGanzon, a pharmacist assistant. At his chambers, De Leon requested his sheriff to assist him in using the eye drops. As instructed, the sheriff applied 2-3 drops on respondent’s left eye. Instead of relieving his irritation, respondent felt searing pain. He immediately rinsed the affected eye with water, but the pain did not subside. Only then did he discover that he was given the wrong medicine, “CortisporinOtic Solution.” De Leon returned to the same Mercury Drug branch, with his left eye still red and teary. When he confronted Ganzon why he was given ear drops, instead of the prescribed eye drops, she did not apologize and instead brazenly replied that she was unable to fully read the prescription and it was her supervisor who apologized and informed De Leon that they do not have stock of the needed CortisporinOpthalmic. De Leon wrote Mercury Drug, through its president, Ms. Vivian K. Askuna, about the day’s incident. Instead, two sales persons went to his office and informed him that their supervisor was busy with other matters. Having been denied his simple desire for a written apology and explanation, De Leon filed a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Mercury Drug and Ganzon are liable.

HELD: YES. Mercury Drug and Ganzoncannot exculpate themselves from any liability. As active players in the field of dispensing medicines to the public, the highest degree of care and diligence is expected of them.

In cases where an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection or supervision of one’s employees. This presumption may be rebutted by a clear showing that the employer has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family. Mercury Drug failed to overcome such presumption.

Petitioners Mercury Drug and Ganzon have similarly failed to live up to high standard of diligence expected of them as pharmacy professionals. They were grossly negligent in dispensing ear drops instead of the prescribed eye drops to De Leon.

As a buyer, De Leon relied on the expertise and experience of Mercury Drug and its employees in dispensing to him the right medicine. This Court has ruled that in the purchase and sale of drugs, the buyer and seller do not stand at arms length. There exists an imperative duty on the seller or the druggist to take precaution to prevent death or injury to any person who relies on one’s absolute honesty and peculiar learning.

Druggist must exercise the highest practicable degree of prudence and vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, so that human life may not constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly weapons for harmless medicines.

C. MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS (Doctors) 

The proper standard is whether, the physician if a general practitioner has exercised the degree of care and skill of the average qualified practitioner, taking into account the advances in the profession.



A physician who holds himself out as a specialist should be held to the standard of care and skill of the average member of the profession practicing the specialty, taking into account the advances in the profession.



By the physician-patient relationship, a duty is imposed on the physician to use the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. Stated otherwise, in treating his patient, a physician is under a duty to the patient to exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases.

CRUZ VS COURT OF APPEALS22

FACTS: On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali de Ocampo, accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City, Laguna. They arrived at the said hospital at around 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day. Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a “Myoma” in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991. Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1pm. According to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the windows and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant fora rag to wipe the window and floor with. Prior to the operation, Rowena tried to convince her mother to not proceed with the operation and even asked petitioner for it to be postponed, however it still pushed through after the petitioner told Lydia that operation must be done as scheduled. During the operation, the assisting doctor of the petitioner, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating room and asked that tagmet ampules be bought which was followed by another instruction to buy a bag of blood. After the operation, when Lydia came out of the OR, another bag of blood was requested to be bought, however, the same was not bought due to unavailability of type A from the blood bank. Thereafter a person arrived to donate blood which was later transferred to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath apparently, the oxygen tank is empty, so her husband and petitioner’s driver bought an oxygen. Later, without the knowledge of Lydia’s relatives, she was decided by the doctors to be transferred to San Pablo District Hospital were she was supposed to be re-operated. After Lydia experienced shocks, she died.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has been criminally and civilly negligent which caused the death of Lydia Umali.

HELD: Not criminally but only civilly liable. whether or not a physician has committed an “inexcusable lack of precaution” in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. A doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the physician’s conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. Further, in as much as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to the conclusion as to causation. In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant’s negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient.

In order that there may be recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural reference of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For negligence, no matter what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of and the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which in natural and

22

GR NO. 122445 NOVEMBER 18, 1997

continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would have occurred.

DELA TORRE v. IMBUIDO23 FACTS: At around 3:00pm of February 3, 1992, Carmen was brought to Divine Spirit General Hospital’s operating room for her caesarian section operation, which was to be performed by Dr. Nestor. By 5:30pm, of the same day, Pedrito was informed by his wife’s delivery of a baby boy. In the early morning of February 4, 1992, Carmen experienced abdominal pains and difficulty in urinating. She was diagnosed to be suffering from urinary tract infection (UTI), and was prescribed medication by Dr. Norma. On February 10, 1992, Pedrito noticed that Carmen’s stomach was getting bigger, but Dr. Norma dismissed the patient’s condition as mere fratulence. When Carmen’s stomach still grow bigger despite medications, Dr. Norma advised Pedrito of the possibility of a second operation on Carmen. Dr. Norma, however, provided no details on its purpose and the doctor who would perform it. At around 3:00pm on February 12, 1992 Carmen had her second operation. Later in the evening, Dr. Norma informed Pedrito that “everything was going on fine with his wife.” The condition of Carmen, however, did not improve. It instead worsened that on February 13, 1992, she vomited dark red blood. At 9:30pm of the same day, Carmen died. Per her death certificate upon information provided by the hospital, the immediate cause of Carmen’s death was cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebro vascular accident, hypertension and chronic nephritis induced by pregnancy. An autopsy report prepared by Dr. Partilano, medico-legal officer designate of Olongapo City, however, provided that the cause of Carmen’s death was shock due to peritonitis severe with multiple intestinal adhesions; status post caesarian section and exploratory laparotomy. Pedrito claimed in his complaint that the respondents failed to exercise the degree of diligence required of them as members of the medical profession, and were negligent for practicing surgery on Carmen in the most unskilled, ignorant, and cruel manner. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents were liable for medical malpractice that resulted to Carmen’s death. HELD: NO. Medical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient, or his or her family as in this case, must prove that healthcare provider, in most cases, a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Four essential elements must be established namely: 1) Duty; 2) Breach; 3) Injury and 4) Proximate Causation. All four elements must be present in order to find the physician negligent and thus, liable for damages. CASUMPANG V. CORTEJO24 FACTS: Edmer Cortejo was brought to the Emergency Room of the SJDH because of difficulty in breathing, chest pain, stomach pain and fever. Based on the initial examinations and the chest x-ray, Edmer was diagnosed with “bronchopneumonia”. Edmer was referred to Dr. Casumpang and he confirimed the initial diagnosis of bronchopneumonia. While under observation, Edmer’s symptoms were persisting which included fever and traces of blood in his sputum, and upon alerting Dr. Casumpang, he reassured Mrs. Corteho that her son’s illness is bronchopneumonia. The following day, Edmer vomited “phlegmn” with blood streak, and upon examination ordered by Dr. Casumpang, due to the advice of Dr. Sanga, Edmer’s blood test showed that he is suffering from Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever, which prompted his parents to transfer him to the Makati Medical Center, instead of the transferring him to the ICU which Dr. Casumpang suggested. Upon examination in the Makati Medical Center, the attending physician diagnosed Edmer with Dengue Fever Stage IV that was already in its irreversible stage. Soon, after Edmer died. Believing that Edmer’s death was caused by the negligent and erroneous diagnosis of his doctors, the respondent instituted an action for damages against SJDH, and its physicians: Dr. Casumpang and Dr. Sanga before the RTC of Makati. ISSUE: Whether or not the SJDH is solidary liable with the physicians. HELD: YES. We affirm the hospital’s liability not on the basis of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but on the basis of the doctrine of apparent authority or agency by estoppel. Despite the absence of employer-employee relationship between SJDH and the petitioning doctors, SJDH is not free from liability.

23 24

GR No. 192973 September 29, 2014 GR No. 171127, 11 March 2015

As a rule, hospitals are not liable for the negligence of its independent contractors. However, it may be found liable if the physician or independent contractor acts as an ostensible agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the “doctrine of apparent authority.” Under the doctrine of apparent authority, a hospital can be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether the physician is an independent contractor, unless the patient knows, or should have known, that the physician is an independent contractor. SJDH cannot disclaim liability since there is no showing that Mrs. Cortejo or the respondent knew, or should have known, that Dr. Casumpang is only an independent contractor of the hospital. BORROMEO vs. FAMILY CARE HOSPITAL, Inc FACTS: The petitioner brought his wife to the Family Care Hospital because she had been complaining of acute pain at the lower stomach area and fever for two days. She was admitted at the hospital and placed under the care of Dr. Inso. Lilian underwent multiple tests such as complete blood count, urinalysis, stool exam, pelvic ultrasound, and a pregnancy test. However, the tests were not conclusive enough to confirm that she had appendicitis. Dr. Inso decided to conduct an exploratory laparotomy on Lilian because of the findings on her abdomen and his fear that she might have a ruptured appendix. Operation was conducted, Dr. Inso confirmed that Lilian was suffering from acute appendicitis. He proceeded to remove her appendix which was already infected and congested with pus. six hours after Lilian was brought back to her room, Dr. Inso was informed that her blood pressure was low. After assessing her condition, he ordered the infusion of more intravenous (IV) fluids. Lilian did not respond to the blood transfusion. Dr. Inso observed that Lilian was developing petechiae in various parts of her body. Petechiae are small bruises caused by bleeding under the skin whose presence indicates a blood-coagulation problem. Dr. Inso did not have the luxury to conduct further tests because the immediate need was to resuscitate Lilian. Dr. Inso and the nurses performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on Lilian. Dr. Inso also informed her family that there may be a need to re-operate on her, but she would have to be put in an Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Unfortunately, Family Care did not have an ICU. Dr. Inso informed the petitioner that Lilian would have to be transferred to another hospital. Lilian was taken to the MMC by ambulance accompanied by the resident doctor on duty and a nurse. Dr. Inso. Upon reaching the MMC, a medical team was on hand to resuscitate Lilian. Unfortunately, Lilian passed away despite efforts to resuscitate her. At the request of the petitioner, Lilian’s body was autopsied at thePhilippine National Police (PNP) Camp Crame Crime Laboratory. Dr.Emmanuel Reyes. Dr. Reyes concluded that the cause of Lilian’s death was hemorrhagedue to bleeding petechial blood vessels: internal bleeding. Based on the autopsy, the petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Family Care and against Dr. Inso for medical negligence. ISSUE: Whether or not Dr. Inso and Family Care were responsible in Lilians death. HELD: In a Medical Malpractice Case, the plaintiff has the duty of proving its Elements, namely: (1) a Duty of the defendant to his patient; (2) the defendant’s Breach of Duty; (3) Injury to the patient; and (4) Proximate Causation between the breach and the injury suffered. In civil cases, the plaintiff must prove these elements by a preponderance of evidence. A medical professional has the duty to observe the Standard of Care and exercise the degree of skill, knowledge, and training ordinarily expected of other similarly trained medical professionals acting under the same circumstances. A breach of the accepted standard of care constitutes negligence or malpractice and renders the defendant liable for the resulting injury to his patient. The standard is based on the norm observed by other reasonably competent members of the profession practicing the same field of medicine. Because medical malpractice cases are often highly technical, expert testimony is usually essential to establish: (1) the standard of care that the defendant was bound to observe under the circumstances; (2) that the defendant’s conduct fell below the acceptable standard; and (3) that the defendant’s failure to observe the industry standard caused injury to his patient. The expert witness must be a similarly trained and experienced physician. Thus, a pulmonologist is not qualified to testify as to the standard of care required of an anesthesiologist and an autopsy expert is not qualified to testify as a specialist in infectious diseases.