From Viable Systems To Surfing The Organisation

From Viable Systems to Surfing the Organisation M.Yolles Liverpool Business School, John Moores University [email protected] Journal of Applied Systems, 1(1)127-142. 2000

Abstract Viable systems theory is a cybernetic approach to systems. Its nature is discussed, exploring cognitive, organising, and behavioural domains of organisations, and their how these link with organisational survival. Exploring the generic properties of these domains leads us to certain questions about how we should look at organisations, and how information about them should be interpreted. Indeed, this leads us to a new conceptualisation about how we should look at organisations, distinguishing between their potential and kinematic attributes. These notions are built into the metaphor of surfing the organisation. Keywords Viable systems, surfing metaphor, potential, kinematic.

1.

Viable Systems Theory

Viable systems theory is implicitly concerned with complexity. It derives from a base of work by Beer (1959, 1975, 1979, 1981) and Schwarz (1995). It is part of management systems - explaining how human organisations - seen as (social) purposeful adaptive activity systems, are able to survive. Such organisations, when described in terms of their externally related activities, are called actors (or even collective actors). Stafford Beer has been a pioneer in part of this filed, with interests in dealing with organisations that are involved in uncertain complex problem situations. For this, he has developed the field of managerial cybernetics. Part of Beer’s theory of managerial cybernetics involves conceptualisations about viable organisations that are purposeful, adaptive, and are able to maintain their long term stability, and he referred to this as the viable systems model (VSM). More recently, Eric Schwarz has published in the associated area of general systems. He developed his own theory of (Schwarzian) viable systems that applies the dynamic concepts of chaos and complexity generically to self-organising systems capable of evolving. Yolles (1999) links Beer’s and Schwarz’ approaches to develop a new theory of viable systems that belongs to management systems, and which will define the approach taken here. A viable organisation is able to support adaptability and change while maintaining stability in its behaviour. In particular an organisation is viable if it can maintain stable states of behaviour as it adapts to perturbations from its environment. It is possible to model any coherent social organisation as a viable system. This is able to survive in a complex changing environment and in doing so can respond to changes, whether or not they have been foreseen. Such a system can generate sufficient variety of action through self-organisation to deal with that variety that impacts on it from its environment (called requisite variety). Viable systems exist by virtue of the worldviews that create them. Worldviews are generators of knowledge. They can be defined in terms of their “culture” that has the attributes of cognitive organisation (the set of beliefs, values and attitudes), and language. Normative standards also exist, that guide our behaviours and ways of thinking. Worldviews also have a cognitive space, populated by concepts and meaning, from which knowledge comes. Exemplars, where they exist, also form part of worldviews, and represent the illustrative examples through which knowledge is validated. Worldviews are action related, and through communications define a prerequisite for organised behaviour. Two types of worldview can be identified: weltanschauung and paradigm. Within the systems context the term weltanschauung was originally used by Churchman (1979) and by Checkland (1981), and

discussed by Checkland and Davis (1986). Yolles (1999) uses it as part of a basis for his viable systems theory. Weltanschauung may be seen as a worldview of an individual or a shared worldview of a group that is more or less visible to its viewholders, but not to others who are not viewholders. It is seen by some to be something that is personal (to the individual or group) indescribable, and informal. With peer group support weltanschauung can become formalised through language, enabling a set of explicit statements (propositions and their corollaries) to be made about their beliefs and knowledge. In this form, it can become a paradigm when supported by a peer group. Paradigms enable a set of explicit statements about their beliefs and other attributes that enable everything that might be expressed about the worldview, to be expressed. They are thus more or less transparent to others who are not viewholders. The formalisation process uses language that (more or less) enables everything that must be expressed, to be expressed, in a self-consistent way. A paradigm is more than shared weltanschauung. It is shared weltanschauung together with the explicitly defined propositions that contribute to understanding. When weltanschauungen are formalised they become paradigms, and are more or less transparent to others who are not viewholders. A formalisation is a language that enables a set of explicit statements (propositions and their corollaries) to be made about the beliefs and other attributes that enable (more or less) everything that must be expressed to be expressed in a self-consistent way. This does not of course mean that the paradigm is able to express ideas for which it has no concepts. Formal propositions define a logic that establishes a framework of thought and conceptualisation that enables organised action to occur, and problem situations to be addressed. Formal logic provides a standard of validity and a means of assessing validity [Kyberg Jr., 1968]. While groups may offer behaviour in ways that are consistent with their shared weltanschauung, paradigms emerge when the groups become coherent through formalisation.

2.

Behavioural and Cognitive Domains of Viable Systems

The relationship between weltanschauungen paradigms and the perceived real (or behavioural) world has been proposed by Yolles (1999) to have a form like that of figure 1. Let us explain this diagram. Organising/Transformational domain Paradigm (formal world view)

Behavioural domain representation

Behavioural world

organisation of intervention

develpoment/ learning

formation/ consolidation

Cognitive domain

interpretation Weltanschauung (informal world view) reflection/creation

Figure 1 The Paradigm Cycle Shared weltanschauung acts as a cognitive basis for the paradigm. Within it we develop cognitive models, that involve beliefs, values, attitudes, norms, ideology, meanings, and concepts. We perceive “reality” through our cognitive models as we interact with it through them. It is through the process of cognitive formalisation that weltanschauung becomes manifested as a paradigm that itself changes through a process of cognitive challenge. This may involve:  a process of conflict that should be resolved;  reflection to enhance our understanding of what we perceive;



conciliation enabling word view boundaries to change.

The relationship between the perceived real world and weltanschauung is partly through interpretation. By this, we mean that the “real” or behavioural world is an interpretation that involves our perceptions, and these are generally influenced by our beliefs. It also involves empirical challenge, which is connected to seeing (as opposed to the positivist word observation). The behavioural world is represented in the paradigm in a way that conforms to its belief system. Action is manifested in the behavioural world through an organising process that is in effect a transformation that is subject to surprises. This means that the cognitive basis of the paradigm is applied to the behavioural world. This occurs according to some formalised regime within the transforming organising process, which effectively defines logical relationships. These relationships become manifested as structures with associated behaviour in the behavioural world. The very idea of there being an organising process is a consequence of the notion of purposefulness, and results in purposeful behaviour. Purposeful behaviour is said to occur because of cognitive purposes that direct the actions of individuals and groups in a given situation. It is worldview determined, and can be expressed in terms of a behavioural mission. Cognitive purposes are interpreted within a domain of action through a knowledge of data processes and structural models, modelling processes that contain data, and procedures or rules of operation and other models relating to the current situation, and a mechanism for structured inquiry. For the moment, let us consider the interactivity of worldviews in what we have referred to as the cognitive domain, and the process of knowledge creation that we have referred to. Interaction within the cognitive domain between worldviews can occur between paradigms and weltanschauungen, or between paradigms and paradigms, or between weltanschauunen and weltanschauungen. Within the context of knowledge creation, this typological distinction is not really significant however, and it is enough simply to refer to worldview interactions. Knowledge generation within a social interaction is a local affair, and can be thought of as the result of what we call knowledge migration from one worldview to another. This occurs through the development of interconnections between the worldviews of the actors that are interacting that results from semantic communication. The transfer of semantic elements occurs between interacting actors as they attempt to establish common models so that they can create a mutual pattern of meaning across the interaction. Habermas (1987) expresses this in terms of a framework of interactive meaning that he calls lifeworld. During this interactive process two possibilities occur: (1) assumptions by one actor from its frame of reference are made about the others’ knowledge, (2) actors temporarily shift their frame of reference in an attempt to represent that of the other actors’, in order to try to appreciate received knowledge from that perspective. Often, option (1) fails in the longer term when a fictitious group consensus arises due to unexposed local unrepresentative assumptions. Option (2) is often more successful in terms of generating stable mutual patterns of meaning. This is because it can act as a basis for dialogue between the actors that enriches the semantic communication process, enabling the others’ knowledge to be more representatively perceived. Thus, the process of knowledge migration occurs when knowledge that flows from one actor to another results in locally new (relative) knowledge in that actor. Let us returning now to the more general model, and propose that it is possible to collapse figure 1. The cognitive domain of worldviews is differentiated from the behavioural domain within which is defined by the “real” or perceived behavioural world. In order to distinguish between these two domains and the transformations that occur between them, we have also introduced the organising domain. As explained by Yolles (1999), this conceptualisation can be reformulated into a new tri-domain model. The three domains are placed together to form a deep, surface, and transforming relationship. Let us propose that it is through an organising process that the cognitive world is converted from to that of the physical behavioural manifest world. If this manifest world is seen to be composed of individuals

that create organisations that each have a form, then that manifest behavioural form is sensitive to the composition of individuals that defines a possibly innumerable number (n, which may be large) of situations over time. The composition of individuals who make up a situation will potentially influence the nature of that organising process. Therefore, a manifested physical form is the result of homeomorphic mapping (or 1 to many) from the cognitive domain. Each mapping will result in a different form, and have associated with it different behaviours. In contrast to this, an isomorphic mapping will define a unique manifestation if it has not been subjected to surprises that interfere with meaning. This conceptualisation is illustrated in Figure 2, where we use a closed curve to show the homeomorphic potential of the tri-domain model. Manifest behavioural domain Organising Domain

World view populated Cognitive Domain

Figure 2 Tri-domain Model identifying a relationship between Worldviews and Behaviour

The cognitive domain is populated by worldviews that can be seen as a system of “truths” that rest upon worldview conceptualisations, and are able to generate knowledge as a result of manifest behaviour. This defines a potential for behaviour, but it is constrained within the organising domain. Transforming knowledge to behaviour occurs through organising. It produces sometimes surprising knowledge morphology. It is the surprises, often ruled by chaos, which contribute to the creation of organisational variation and variety. The organising domain is strategic in nature. It is also a logical domain so that all transformational relationships exist there. Consequently, it is also a cybernetic domain so that it is where control processes are defined. This domain is, however, a construct that derives from the worldview itself. This means that the nature of the organising that occurs within this context is determined ultimately by worldview concepts and propositions. The same basic tri-domain model can be used to represent the relationship between worldviews and shared worldviews as illustrated in the paradigm cycle. Let us take the shared worldview under consideration to be informal: that is a weltanschauung rather than a paradigm. A shared worldview derives from the association of a group of people who through their association together have developed a common cognitive model. Relative to the individual’s worldview, the shared worldview can be seen as a system of semi-formalised “truths” that involves a production of knowledge that is common and visible to those viewholders involved. These “truths” will be local to the group that defines the shared worldview, and will change as the composition of the group changes in social space. It will also vary with time, since individual perspectives are dynamic experiential phenomena.

3.

Paradigm Incommensurability

We are familiar with the weltanschauung principle that tells us that no view of reality can be complete, that each view will contain some information about reality, but that the views will never be completely reconcilable. The principle of finding a more representative picture of reality by involving as many weltanschauungen as possible generates variety through opening up more possibilities in the way situations can be seen. Those who adhere to this principle during an inquiry consequently regard weltanschauung pluralism as desirable.

We know that a plurality of weltanschauungen can form a shared weltanschauung, and that when this becomes formalised a paradigm appears. It is reasonable to consider then, that there should also be a paradigm principle that might be expressed as follows. A paradigm defines a truth system that results in a logical process that determines behaviour. The truth system is also responsible for recognising and producing what its viewholders consider to be knowledge about reality. Since different paradigms have different truth systems, knowledge across paradigms will never be completely reconcilable. Formal models of reality are built from paradigms, and each model will contain some knowledge that guides behaviour. Paradigms are created by groups of people, and a paradigm principle should be analogous to the weltanschauung principle. Thus, no formal model of reality can be complete, and finding a more representative picture of a given reality by involving a plurality of formal models generates variety through opening up more possibilities in the way situations can be addressed through action. To have paradigm pluralism, paradigm incommensurability must be addressed. There is a problem with paradigm pluralism that was argued initially by Kuhn (1970). If two paradigms are distinct, then they have conceptualisations that are dissimilar in nature, or qualitatively different. In order for viewholders of a given paradigm to communicate, they form a language that enables constructs involving meaning of their concepts to be transferred. This clearly affects the communications process between the viewholders of two paradigms. Whether one considers this as a problem about knowledge or rather about language, it still remains the basis of what is today referred to as paradigm incommensurability. Various approaches that attempt to validate methodological pluralism in the face of paradigm incommensurability exist. According to Jackson (1993), approaches of dealing with paradigm incommensurability can occur through the selection of paradigms that are based on ideas within Habermas’ theory of human interests [Habermas, 1970]. It tells us that human beings possess two basic cognitive interests in acquiring knowledge: a technical interest relates to the human endeavour referred to as work, and a practical interest for interaction. Another cognitive interest is critical deconstraining that results in the human endeavour emancipation, seen to be subordinate to work and interaction because it results from exploitation and distorted communication. Corresponding to these three classifications of human endeavour, are three types of knowledge that can facilitate “ideal” qualities of human situations, referred to as empirical analytical sciences, historical hermeneutic sciences, and critical sciences. Paradigms and their (systemic) behavioural manifestations may be validly used in a complementary way when viewed in terms of Habermas’ classifications [Jackson, 1993, p290-291]. To do this, we should see Habermas’ horizontal distinctions as a way of differentiating between paradigms and their methodologies to form analytically independent domains. While paradigms guide knowledge production and therefore determine knowledge type, systems methodologies should be seen to serve cognitive interests. Most approaches would seem to follow this distinction. Habermasian cognitive interests as represented by Jackson (1992), has three classifications, indicated as follows: 



Practical cognitive interests concern interaction. This requires that people as individuals and groups in a social system gain and develop the possibilities of an understanding of each others’ subjective views. It is consistent with a practical interest in mutual understanding that can address disagreements, which can be a threat to the social form of life. Their basis lies in knowledge that is part of the historical hermeneutic sciences, relating to practical interest. They can provide understanding of intersubjective life, and aim at maintaining and improving mutual understanding between people. Technical cognitive interests centre on work. This enables people to achieve goals and generate material well being. It involves technical ability to undertake action in the environment, and the ability to make prediction and establish control. Knowledge comes from empirical analytical sciences, concerned the with technical control of objectified processes.



Cognitive interest in critical deconstraining is concerned with emancipation. This enables people to (i) liberate themselves from the constraints imposed by power structures (ii) learn through precipitation in social and political processes to control their own destinies. Knowledge derives from the critical sciences, which recognise the limitations and dangers of inappropriately applied empirical analytical and historical hermeneutic sciences. The attempt to synthesise and systemise them to enable people to reflect on situations and liberate themselves from domination by existing power structures and processes.

An example of this is the approach adopted by Flood and Jackson (1991) and Jackson (1992) where they attempt to show how different methodologies can be used together even though they have different paradigms. It was referred to as a System of Systems Methodologies. Here methodologies are assigned to the domain of cognitive interest, and are seen in terms of a set of characteristics that correspond to Habermas’ technical, practical, and human deconstraining classifications. This results in a typology of methodologies. Methodologies that come from different cognitive interests can now legitimately be used together. This is because satisfying the needs of cognitive interests does not compromise any given paradigm from which a knowledge type comes. Yolles (1999) has shown that it is possible to extend Habermas’ argument through Figure 2. He introduced the idea of cognitive purposes that are associated with the organising domain, while cognitive interests should rather be seen as assigned to the systemic domain. Cognitive purposes are related to Habermasian teleology [Habermas, 1987]. They can be defined as follows: 





Cybernetic cognitive purposes involve intention. It occurs through the creation and strategic pursuit of goals and aims that may change over time, and enables people through control and communications processes to redirect their futures. Cybernetic cognitive purpose has knowledge that is connected to the science of control and communications. It has associated with it goals that derive from a belief system and knowledge; knowledge of group norms and standards enable the organising nature of cybernetic processes to be defined or redefined. Rational cognitive purposes are logico-relational and enable missions, goals and aims to be defined, and approached through planning. It involves logical, relational, and rational abilities to organise thought and action and thus to define sets of possible systemic and behaviour possibilities. Rational cognitive purposes are associated with a type of knowledge that is represented within the science of reasoning. Logical processes derive from a belief and conceptual system that give rise to a propositional basis. It involves specialist type of knowledge that comes from a penchant that ultimately determines cognitive purposes. Ideological cognitive purposes exist through the manner of thinking. The represent an intellectual framework through which policy makers observe and interpret reality that has a politically correct ethical and moral orientation, provides an image of the future that enables action through politically correct strategic policy, and gives a politically correct view of stages of historical development in respect of interaction with the external environment. Ideological knowledge is embedded in the science of ideas. It is an organisation of beliefs and attitudes (religious, political or philosophical in nature) that is more or less institutionalised or shared with others. It provides a total system of thought, emotion and attitude to the world and is reflected in any organising process. It refers to any conception of the world that goes beyond the ability of formal validation.

We can also define a third cognitive property that is associated with the cognitive domain. It is knowledge related, and called cognitive influence. The nature of cognitive influences derives from the notion that every social organisation can be defined in terms of it cultural, political and social domains. These have knowledges that can influence the worldviews of others than those who maintain those knowledges. They are fundamental to all organisations. The cultural domain has a cognitive organisation that is part of worldview, and when people perform social roles, they do so through the veil of their beliefs, values and attitudes. The political domain is concerned with polity (condition of order),

and as such has an interest in attributes that condition the social domain and its situations. It involves the creation of power placed at the disposal of some social roles, the use of which is also worldview determined. When conditions (of order) affect the social domain and become issues, political processes are used to address them (e.g., conflict resolution). The social domain itself is composed of both substructure and superstructure. The former is concerned with the nature of an organisation that relates to such things as purposes, modes (like service or production) and means (like technology) of activity and the social contexts that are responsible for it. It is thus concerned with the technical aspects of the organisation, including methods, operations, practices and technologies, and the way these are used. Superstructure is concerned with the form of the organisation. It can include formal and informal structures (e.g., role relationships) and their associated processes, and the behaviours of individuals (e.g., management style), groups, and the organisation as a whole within its environment. The attributes of cognitive influence are as follows: 





Cultural cognitive influences involve beliefs. Influences occur from knowledges that derive from the cognitive organisation (beliefs, attitudes and values) that come from other worldviews. We may note here that attitudes and values are also types of belief. Attitudes are beliefs in relation to an “object of attention”. Values are abstract ideas representing individual beliefs about ideal modes of conduct and ideal terminal goals, and beliefs about what is humanly “good” or “bad” performance by actors in a behavioural setting. Cognitive organisation influences our thinking processes, ultimately determines how we interact, and predefines our logico-relational understandings. Knowledge associated with cultural cognitive influences relate to the creation of a new definition of relationships between identifiable actors. It gives meaning to work related activities, and particularly with respect to those that involve interaction. Social cognitive influences relate to formation. They enable individuals and groups to be influenced by knowledges that relate to our social environment. This has a consequence for our social structures and control processes that define and maintain our social forms that relate to our intentions and behaviours. Social cognitive influence knowledge is knowledge about social superstructure and a substructure. Superstructure entails the institutionalised political and cultural aspects of a situation, and is issue related, while substructure is task orientated. Political cognitive influences are related to freedom. Influences occur from knowledges that affect our polity, determined in part by how we think about the constraints on group and individual freedoms, and are connected to organising and behaviour. It ultimately has impact on our ideology and our degree of emancipation. Knowledge relating to this concerns polity, a core aspect of politics. It is concerned with an organised condition of social (or civil) order. Polity is connected to politics through the latter’s orientation to the causal relationships relating to behaviour, that enables what may be referred to as social engineering. Within the context of knowledge about the creation of order, we can talk of polity knowledge. It would seem to be connected to what Marshall (1995) refers to as elaboration knowledge (relating to the relationships between the individual knowledge components and the way they are organised within a schema). Polity knowledge can be seen to relate to the relationships between individual knowledge components as perceived by an actor to be possessed by the other actors, and the relative way that they are organised. It would thus seem to be an active recogniser of identification knowledge (Ibid.), that is the concepts and patterns of meaning that make up knowledge. When polity knowledge is applied to other actors, it enables us to decide about them. Sometimes, such decisions involve “false” assumptions that are not representative of the identification knowledge of other actors.

Now, cognitive influences, purposes and interests are all analytically and empirically independent. They have been set up together in the rows of Table 1, there being horizontal interactivity between the row attributes. The columns of this table are also analytically and empirically independent, and have vertical interactivity. What is now interesting is that we may wish to see table 1 as a typology. This has not been considered before, and it will mean that we need to represent each column by a concept that we shall have to invent.

To do so, we must propose that there are mutual commonalties in each column. Consider the initial column first. The element in the first cell is practical cognitive interest that is a function of interaction. More simply we can discuss this element in terms of its functional attributes alone, as we can for whole table. Taken together with logico-relational processes and belief, all contribute to a formative orientation of the organisation that determines its present and future trajectories. In the second column, we have work, intention, and formation, and this gives the idea of something kinematic (“of motion considered abstractly”). Finally, in the third column, we have emancipation, manner of thinking, and freedom, suggesting that by releasing greater potential to individuals or groups the possibility of greater organisational viability is ultimately enabled. Cognitive Interest Purposes Influence

Orientation Practical (interaction) Rational (logico-relational) Cultural (belief)

Organisational Kinematics Technical (work) Cybernetical (intention) Social (formation)

Possibilities Critical Deconstraining (emancipation) Ideological (manner of thinking) Political (freedom)

Table 1 Conceptual Dimensions of the Organisation 4.

Surfing the Organisation as Part of a Viable Systems Conceptualisation

In discussing table 1 with a colleague, John Naylor, an exploratory proposal arose that connected the properties of viable systems to the metaphor of "surfing the net". Let us explore this a little further. The notion of “surfing the net” has been with us for quite some years now, ever since Internet developments have made it accessible and popular. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (1957 edition), surf is “the foam and commotion of sea breaking on shore or reefs”, and a surf-rider is someone who is “skilled in managing the surf”. The terminology has currency as a metaphor today in the context of Internet information and knowledge seeking. Thus, analogously, the surf of the Internet is the “foam and commotion” of information breaking on the shores or reefs of a semantic communications network. A good Internet surf-rider then, is skilled in managing to ride the “information highways”. It is possible to laterally transfer the term surfing to organisations, but the purpose for such an activity within a framework of meaning then raises questions about validity. For instance, is it of any use to refer to an organisation in terms of its “foam and commotion” of information that bubbles up as one explores it? The answer must be no, and the invention of surfing applied to organisations must come from a deeper meaning associated with organisations and their processes. The unconstrained lateral transfer of terms from one domain of study to another is too reminiscent of the last century, when concepts from physics were transferred to social science without there being a proper basis for this too occur. It did little for the social sciences in those days. Having said this, we can show that we can adopt the concepts associated with surfing as expressions that actually hold unambiguous meaning. To do this there are three dimensions of table 1 that must be considered. The first column of possibilities that relates to the properties of viable organisations concerns orientation. One metaphor for organisational orientation derives form the idea that surf provides surfers with direction and orientation despite the informational “foam and commotion” that it finds itself embedded in. This leads us to the notion of the study of an organisation’s formative orientation within the complex that it creates for itself and that determines its present and future trajectory. We are at a loss to find a name for this, and rather tongue in cheek suggest surfology as a study of the organisational "surf". For the second column, we must consider the kinematic (or motional) properties of an organisation. We note that a kinematic thing has a movement that can be considered abstractly without reference to the source of that motion. In this context the term surfing might be seen to attract an appropriate image. The term kinematic comes from arguments in which attempts are made to assign meaning to aspects of a new model that resulted from the exploration of properties associated with viable systems. Consequently, the image we might adopt for it comes from assigning surfing as directed movement within the chaos of the behavioural world that is undertaken by a surf-rider. Viable systems theory, then, become central to the concept of surfing the organisation. Finally, to consider the

last column of table 1, the generation of a surfeit of opportunity can liberate more possibilities for the organisation. Therefore, these release the following “3 surfs” images: 1. organisational surfology – the study of an organisation’s formative orientation within the complex that it creates for itself and that determines its present and future trajectory. 2. surfing the organisation - examining its kinematic attributes to see what it is doing and its likely potential activities. 3. surfeiting an organisation’s possibilities - generating a surfeit of organisational opportunity capable of encouraging variety. The need then, is to explore organisations in terms of these three dimensions, in order to determine whether they can be used to develop more insights into organisational processes. One way of doing this is to propose some measures that can be used in exploring each of the columns in table 1. In proposing measures below, we will hopefully start a debate about the utility of this approach. 1. Orientation: This classification is concerned with interaction, logico-relational, and beliefs. These are all connected with what we may call relevant others, that is those other actors that are relevant to a situation from the perspective of an inquirer. Interaction knowledge conditions knowledgeable action (action that results from knowledge), and may possibly be explored by examining how interaction processes change with the introduction of new knowledge. Cultural cognitive influences can be evaluated by examining beliefs, values and attitudes (cognitive organisation). One way of doing this may be to examine individual and group resistance to new classifiable patterns of cognitive organisation within a compound actor. The classifications should be indicative of beliefs that limit the possibility of variation and variety in the organisation. 2. Kinematics: Since this classification relates to work, intention, and formation, it may be seen as being representative of “viability in action”. Work knowledge conditions knowledgeable action, and may be explorable by examining how work processes change with the introduction of new knowledge. Measurements for this control process are qualitative, requiring an inquirer to search the local environment for ways in which knowledge has been applied (directly or indirectly) to varieties of situation. Social influences represent knowledges about the way in which social processes operate. This dimension can perhaps be measured not in terms of social meaning, but in terms of the reticence that actors have to the introduction of new social meaning. 3. Possibilities: Since this classification relates to emancipation, manner of thinking and freedom, it is concerned with the liberty that is essential for the creation of variety. As such, variety generation may be one way of evaluating the possibilities dimension of an organisation. We can now attempt to propose specific approaches to measurements about an organisation’s possibilities, which function as attributes of variety generation. Knowledge about emancipation may be determinable through in depth questioning of relevant others. It may relate to the structural violence that may be believed to exist within an organisation. This is reflected, for example, through the rules that staff have to follow. It may be possible to measure this qualitatively by obtaining perceptions of the equity among different sets of rules that relate to distinguished groups. Manner of thinking relates to the ideological and ethical attributes of actors, and can be explored through in depth questioning. It filters and restricts the way that information is considered [Midgley et al, 1998]. Thus, it seems that there is some hope to do more than propose that the notion surfing the organisation (and related terms) can be useful. The idea has meaning that is able to describe aspects of the viability of organisations that is very holistic. Further, it seems that there are measurable qualities and quantities that can produce a complete profile of an organisation and its capabilities within a given environment. This can tell us more about an organisation than can individual or plural methodological explorations, intended to address a particular problem through the application of a particular methodology.

5.

Conclusion

The theory of viable systems as it develops through linking the work of Schwarz and Beer provides a powerful way of exploring the properties and survivability of organisations. The three domains associated with viable systems theory are cognitive, organising, and behavioural (incorporating structure). By linking in and extending the work of Habermas, we can establish a set of properties that are assigned to each of the domains. It is through the setting these domain properties up as a typology, that we are led to seeking new terms that explain the new aspects of organisations. The difficulty in generating three terms that offer an appropriate image that directly relates to the intention should not be underestimated, and the introduction of small amount of humour in undertaking this process has not been resisted. Just as the notion of surfing is applied to Internet exploration for the seeking of information and knowledge, so we can apply it to organisations. However, the two meaning are different. Surfing the net relates to seeking information and knowledge that has been set up in an unstructured chaotic way. Surfing the organisation, however, derives from concepts of viable systems theory. The organisation is seen as a viable system, and by surfing the organisation we are looking at its possibilities, kinematics and orientation. In developing the background theory that gives meaning to the idea of surfing, we find that we have developed a potentially rich concept that will possibly enable us to consider organisations in more holistically. We say potentially, because it will only be of use if it can identify instruments of quantitative or qualitative measurement that are able to tell us something about the holistic condition of an organisation under examination.

6.

References

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