Viable Learning Systems

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Viable Learning Systems Interactive Learning Environments, 2000, vol. 7, no. X, pp1-21. M.I.Yolles The Business School, Liverpool John Moores University [email protected] Abstract: Learning theory has not yet developed sufficiently to address such notions as the relationship between learning behaviour and strategy, and evolutionary learning. To do this within the modern context, it needs to call on the paradigm of complexity. One approach towards this has been developed that comes from Viable Systems Theory. Applying its conceptualisations to learning situations gives us what we call Viable Learning. Keywords: Learning theory, behaviour, strategy, evolutionary learning, viable learning. 1.

Viable Learning Theory

Viable learning theory derives from viable systems theory as developed by Yolles (1999), that itself comes from a base of work by Beer (1959, 1975, 1979, 1981) and Schwarz (1994, 1995). From management systems theory, we take the notion that organisations may be seen as viable systems. Stafford Beer was a pioneer in this field, and was interested in dealing with organisations that were involved in uncertain complex problem situations, for which he developed managerial cybernetics. Part of his theory involves conceptualisations about viable organisations that are purposeful, adaptive, and are able to maintain their long term stability, and he referred to this as the viable systems model. More recently, Eric Schwarz has published in the associated area of general systems. He developed his own theory of (Schwarzian) viable systems that applies the dynamic concepts of chaos and complexity generically to self-organising systems capable of evolving. Yolles has linked these two approaches, but also calls on ideas that come from cognitive and social psychology, connectionism, and artificial intelligence. He has developed a new theory of viable systems that belongs to management systems, but which has broader application. The notions of complexity are thus implicit to viable systems theory. This enables it to link with the notions associated with the complexity paradigm, that explain such ideas as evolutionary development. It includes for example, the notion that viable systems may be dissipative (Nicolis and Prigogine, 1989) and thus implicitly unstable. Variety is a concept that encapsulates this because it is a measure of complexity. Having said this, however, probably few (if any) attempts have been made to formulate quantitatively measures of complexity because fundamentally, viable systems theory is qualitative. It is possible to model any organisation as a viable system that is seen to be active, purposeful, and adaptive. A viable system is an organisation that survives. In doing so it can respond to changes (whether or not they have been foreseen) that can generate sufficient variety through self-organisation to deal with that variety impacting on it from its environment (called requisite variety). A viable organisation is able to support adaptability and change while maintaining stability in its behaviour. In particular an organisation is viable if it can maintain stable states of behaviour as it adapts to perturbations from its environment. Now, the environment can be differentiated into a suprasystem of interacting organisations that exists in its environment. Such organisations are normally considered to be autonomous, in that they are taken to be 1

analytically and empirically independent from one another. What constitutes independence is a matter of practical requirement that enables, for instance, measurements to be taken from a given organisation without conceptually complicating them with data from other organisations. The question of whether an organisation in a suprasystem of them is indeed autonomous is one of estimating its degree of interactivity with the other organisations. It is perspective driven, and is ultimately axiomatic. These ideas can be applied in learning contexts. This might relate to either individual learners, or to learning organisations (that are in any case the subject of management systems). At the individual level we can see a learner as a viable organisation. Thus, the individual learner will undertake viable learning if s/he can maintain stable learning behaviour, while being able to adapt to changes in a given learning environment that changes the learning situation. Whether a learner can adapt to the changes in the learning environment is a function of his/her plastic limit. In the systems literature, when perturbations push it beyond this limit, the system either changes its form (incrementally through morphogenesis, or dramatically through metamorphosis) or dies. As an example of this, an individual learner studying on a university course who is struggling “dies” in this context when s/he leaves the course prematurely, because new learning behaviours cannot be found. If a viable organisation survives, then it is able to change its form, to adapt. We refer to the model that describes such learning capabilities as the viable learning model (VLM) that was first introduced by Yolles (1997). While at this stage it is a purely qualitative model, it could benefit from experimental research for quantitative verification. If a learning situation is to be seen as a viable system, then the question must be raised: what is its systemic nature? A system can be seen as a non-separable entity that is composed of a set of objects of attention that are defined in mutual relation to each other, and which is not reducible into a sum of its objects. If each object is thought of as a component of the system, then commonly the system is a set of components that interrelate. A system is bounded through a frame of reference that is defined for and within the context of a situation. The boundary will change according to the learning purpose and worldview of a viewer. A system boundary may also be defined in terms of the degree of interaction between the parts that define it. Thus, a viewer may see the parts to be richly or poorly interactive. In modelling a situation systemically, a viewer will make a judgement about what constitutes a rich set of interactions, and distinguish this group by forming a boundary around it. This boundary distinguishes the set of parts within its perimeter from the poorly interactive ones that lie outside it in the environment. Viewers often have to justify this boundary to their peer group through language and logic that is common to the group. To see learning systemically, we can define a set of analytically and empirically independent objects of attention that together form a rich learning situation. Other objects of attention that are less rich in terms of their mutual learning interactions are not part of the system, even though they may influence it. We can define three objects of attention as: (a) (b) (c)

a learner, a learning source (such as predesigned courseware or a natural learning situation), a target situation (that may exist in either a “real” behavioural world or an artificial one).

Normally these three objects of attention are sufficient to define the system. It may be the case that we will wish to include a viewer also (e.g., an examiner who is to evaluate the learner). 2

However, to do this it is sufficient to define the system and the viewer together in a larger suprasystem. These objects of attention are analytically independent because they can each be examined as a separate whole, and they are empirically independent because measurements can be taken about one without necessarily having to take measurements about another. What constitutes such independence is, in the end, a matter of judgement and peer group agreed decision. Thus, a learning source (e.g., courseware) and a target situation (e.g., a case study) will define the context of a learning situation for a learner, noting that here all objects of attention are richly interactive. We as learners, or as viewers in the wider suprasystem, will decide upon the nature and extent of the boundary that defines the system. We can attempt to examine the learning capability of a learner, without immediate reference to the other two objects of attention. We can also take measurements about the learning capability of the learner (for instance through an examination) within that context without immediate reference to them (e.g., from a marking scheme). When we refer to a learner, we must also consider the context of the situation that itself implies the systemic accompaniment (b) and (c). This can be defined because a learner in a purposeful adaptive activity “system” will have a structured relationship with the learning source and the target situation. This relationship effectively drives the learning behaviour of a learner. This is a quite different from non-purposeful learning, which occurs when learners learn through the daily events that become “life” teachers (can we perhaps think of these as virtually purposeful?). Now, each of the objects of attention (a)-(c) can have associated with it a worldview, an idea that we shall explore in some detail now. 2.

Worldviews

Pedagogic perspectives involve different worldviews. According to Yolles (1999), the notion of worldview is a literal translation from the German weltanschauung that derives from Scheler (1947) and was developed by Mannheim (1967). Worldviews are relative to the institutions that one is attached to in a given society, and they change as the institutional realities change (Berger and Luckman, 1966). More recently (Yolles, 1999), weltanschauung has taken on the meaning of a view or perspective of the real world that is determined by cultural and other attributes of the viewers. Through a process of socialisation, a view is formed within the institutions one is attached to in a given society, and they change as the institutional realities change. Worldviews may be shared by a group of people, though when this occurs the individuals each retain their own realities while using common models to share meaning. Further, worldviews have boundaries that are generated within the belief system and cognitive space of their viewholders, and as a result we can explore worldviews in terms of their knowledge attributes. We can distinguish two forms of worldview for the system domain: weltanschauung and paradigm. The term weltanschauung was originally used by Churchman (1979) within the systems context. It has been given a distinct definition by Checkland (1981) and Checkland and Davis (1986) when used as one of the cornerstones of his own systems methodology directed at solving problem situations that involve purposeful human activity. The use of the word by Checkland has been variously defined as the worldview: (a) that determines model building of relevant systems and conceptual models; (b) for which in a particular situation 3

certain notional systems are seen as relevant; (c) behind the perceived social reality of the situation in which the study is made. An interpretation of this is: the perspective of a situation that has been assumed, and in particular how it is regarded from a particular (explicit) viewpoint (including the assumptions made about the system) (Patching, 1990). It has also been defined (Yolles, 1999) as the worldview of an individual or the shared worldview of a group that is more or less visible to the viewholders, but not more generally to others who are not viewholders. We can relate the notion of a shared weltanschauung to that of paradigm. A paradigm is more than shared weltanschauung. It is shared weltanschauung together with the explicitly defined propositions that contribute to understanding. When weltanschauungen are formalised they become paradigms, and more or less transparent to others who are not viewholders. A formalisation is a language that enables a set of explicit statements (propositions and their corollaries) to be made about the beliefs and other attributes that enable (more or less) everything that must be expressed to be expressed in a self-consistent way. This does not of course mean that the paradigm is able to express ideas for which it has no concepts. Formal propositions define a logic that establishes a framework of thought and conceptualisation that enables organised action to occur, and problem situations to be addressed. Formal logic provides a standard of validity and a means of assessing validity (Kyberg Jr., 1968). While groups may offer behaviour in ways that are consistent with their shared weltanschauung, paradigms emerge when the groups become coherent through formalisation. It may be said that informal worldviews are more or less composed of a set of undeclared assumptions and propositions, while formal ones are more or less declared. More, since paradigms are forms of worldviews they are by their very nature bounded, and thus constrain the way in which situations can be described. Now paradigms can change (Yolles, 1998; Kuhn, 1970) so that the nature of the constraint is subject to a degree of change - however bounded it might be. The idea of a paradigm (or more generally worldview) is illustrated in figure 1, and derives from Yolles (1996). An alternative way of representing a paradigm as shown in figure 2, proposed because some perceive that: (a) worldview is culture centred, (b) cognitive organisation (beliefs, values, and attitudes) are its attributes, (c) it may not be seen that normative and cognitive control of behaviour or action can be differentiated, (d) there may be debate about whether there is a distinction between formal and substantive rationalities. The cognitive space is seen as a space of concepts, knowledge and meaning, and its relationship to culture is underlined. Exemplars form part of the cognitive space. It also relates directly to action and communication that is a prerequisite for organised behaviour.

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Paradigm

Exemplars concrete problem solutions

stimulates supports

Language epistemology Propositional base creates knowledge & communicates concepts ideas and reinforces Culture attitudes affect Cognitive organisation

beliefs in views or models

normative standards

values of conduct affect influence

Figure 1 Context Diagram Showing Concept of a Paradigm

Culture

Attitudes

Normative standards

Beliefs

Values

Language

Cognitive space Concepts, knowledge & meaning to construct behaviour Propositional base. Exemplars. Action/behaviour & communication

World View

Figure 2 Idea of the Paradigm 3.

The Cybernetics of Learning

From the well accepted propositions of Beer, every purposeful adaptive activity system has a metasystem. The system has form, thus has structure, process and associated behavioure. It is assigned to an energetic behavioural domain. The knowledge related metasystem is the “cognitive consciousness” of the system that it drives, and is assigned to a cognitive domain. According to Yolles (1999), the two domains are connected across a gap that we refer to as the transformational or organising domain. It is strategic in nature, and operates through information (figure 3). This model can be applied to any purposeful adaptive activity system by distinguishing between cognitive, strategic, and behavioural aspects of a situation. This defines the basis of viable systems (as defined by Yolles) that, through transformational self-organising processes, are able to support adaptability and change while maintaining stability in their behaviour. In a plastic organisation the nature of that behaviour may change, and in so doing a viable system will maintain behavioural stability. Stability does not imply behavioural equilibrium, rather that behaviour is coherent and can occur in a consistent way that relates to purpose. In the learning context, an individual will undertake viable learning if 5

s/he can maintain stable learning behaviour while being able to adapt to changes in a given learning environment and different learning situations. We refer to the model that describes such learning capabilities as the viable learning model (VLM). Transformational/organising domain Behavioural domain representation

Behavioural world

organisation of intervention

Paradigm (formal worldview)

develpoment/ learning

formation/ consolidation

Cognitive domain

interpretation Weltanschauung (informal worldview) reflection/creation

Figure 3: The Relationship between the Behavioural and Cognitive Domains in a Viable System The organising process is a transformation that manifests worldview constructs (seated in the cognitive domain) into the behavioural world (seated in the behavioural domain). This conceptualisation enables us to collapse the worldview domain into a single cognitive domain that defines what may be called a learning metasystem. To explain this, let us collapse the types of worldview (paradigm and weltanschauung) of figure 3 into a deep or cognitive domain (figure 4). It is through organising (also called transmogrification - or transformation with surprises) that attributes of the cognitive world are mapped to the physical manifest behavioural world. Suppose that this manifest world is seen to be composed of individuals that create organisations that each have form. Then that manifest behavioural form is sensitive to the composition of individuals that defines a possibly innumerable number (n, which may be large) of situations over time. Variation in that composition will potentially influence the nature of organising, and thus the forms that are manifested. That is, organising is sensitive to group nature and its conceptualisations, and any concept can be manifested behaviourally in many different ways. This argument is implict when we say that the mapping between the congitive and behavioural domains is homeomorphic. We can also say that organising defines a homeomorphic potential, implying that there is a feasible set of manifest forms each of which depend in part upon group composition. These forms will each be different, and have associated with them different behaviours. To illustrate the idea of homeomorphic potential, from figure 3 we construct figure 4 as a set of embedded closed curves. We can use this figure recursively to show how we can attribute the properties of a system to a behavioural situation rather than declaring it to be one. In the same way that we can map from the cognitive to the behavioural domain, so too we can map from the domain of worldviews to the “explicitly imagined” behavioural domain. From this we can project a cognitive system model onto the dotted line in figure 4. This can now be designated as the boundary of a “new” 6

cognitive domain that can be mapped into the behavioural domain. Alternatively, some may wish to see the dotted line imposed on the behavioural domain, taking it to be a system. This representation we have adopted is reminiscent of the model developed by Chomsky (1975), in his structural model of the relationship between syntax and semantics in language theory. It is also structurally similar to that used in the field of artificial intelligence by Clancy and Letsinger (1981). This distinguishes between “deep” knowledge and “surface” knowledge, the former relating to principles, and the latter to skills. Manifest behavioural domain Organising Domain

World view populated Cognitive Domain

Figure 4: Relationship between the Cognitive and Behavioural Domains, through a homeomorphic potential 4.

Learning Behaviour, Strategy, and Metalearning

The construction of the above theory of viable systems can be applied to learning. In so doing we will draw on the ideas of learning behaviour, learning strategy, and metalearning. Kolb (1974) proposed that learning behaviour occurred as a continuous learning cycle (figure 5). It implicitly defines a behavioural schedule that is buried within the set of phases, and indicates a set of behavioural steps that a learner will pass through (e.g. read this, do that,…). It is not always the case that a set of steps will be predefined, but this is really a topic beyond the scope of this paper. E x pe rie n cial le arning qu adrant

C on cr ete experien ce

A ctive exper im en tation

R e fle c tiv e le arnin g quad rant Reflective obser va tion

A c tiv e le arning quad ra nt

A bstrac t le arn ing qu adran t A bstra ct con cep tua lisa tion

Figure 5: The Kolb Learning Cycle The behavioural schedule defines how a learner tackles and deals with learning material. For traditional open and distance learning materials that operate as a schedule of programmed learning, a number of steps may be defined and the learner will make an ordered selection of them. Thus, suppose that we have a traditional form of open and/or distance learning material that is composed of units. It is through learning behaviour that a learner will pass through each unit, from the introductory unit to the final one, in some order and according to some stepped 7

organisation of learning. At a more detailed level of behaviour, each unit may be composed of objectives, summaries, examples or case studies, a glossary, and a form of learning evaluation that may be either for the personal use of a learner of the formal use of an institution. Learning behaviour, if constrained to a set of predefined activity steps, occurs as a schedule of those activities. The schedule will be defined according to a strategy that a learner adopts. In many traditional paper based open learning texts, a programme of work would be structured into units, and from the earlier theory, each might begin with the objectives of the learning materials, have summaries, embed examples and a glossary. If a tutor adheres to a rigid learning strategy, then he or she will devise a set of very tight constraints on learning strategy that will define a unique behavioural schedule permitting only one possible way for a learner to pass through this material. Thus for example, a sequential ordering of objectives, summaries, and so on may occur that define only one learning path for a learner. This may not be consistent with the personal strategy of a given learner who may wish, for instance, to sample parts of the learning material or consult the glossary before embarking on the learning material. Perhaps a more flexible approach is for a tutor to offer a menu that enables the learner to define his or her own strategy of learning within less tightly tutor defined constraints, for example presenting materials on a website. So the degree of flexibility on learning strategy offered to a learner is tutor determined through the constraints imposed on the learning material. Learners have cognitive processes that within our model are be assigned to a cognitive domain. This is defined by the worldview(s) of a learner or group of learners, that defines not only the nature of the manifest strategy that a learner will adopt, but also changes in learning strategy. It also defines the behavioural schedule that a learner adopts, or enables an interpretation of some one else’s behavioural schedule to occur. This relates to the idea of metalearning. Learning about learning is referred to as metalearning, and enables learners to: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

have knowledge to reason about its own operation; have a structure which simplifies the reasoning process; infer conclusions from a chain of inference rules; determine accuracy, consistency, and plausibility of its conclusions; explain reasoning behaviour.

Metalearning induces learners to assess the patterns by which they learn (Cunningham, 1990). Patterns describe process, event schedules, or inter-relationships. In terms of metalearning, a behavioural schedule will establish personal criteria that enables a strategic trigger to be defined, and that will enable a behavioural schedule to be changed. It may redefine what constitutes the elements of a learning domain by creating new conceptualisations, thus explicitly influencing the nature of a learning strategy. This will then affect the behavioural schedule or sequencing of learning material in the learning domain. It can enable new maps of learning material to be created, based on the new conceptualisations. It can result in new logical strategic processes that sequence learning material, and can result in the definition of new rules to provide a way of overcoming highly constrained learning domains. Returning now to Kolb’s learning cycle, Kolb associated each phase with a learning “style” that brought out the idea that learners can be classified as having a particular style of learning. From this work, the notion of learning style has become an accepted typology of the learning penchant of individual learners. Learning cycle approaches may be a satisfactory simplification of the 8

learning behaviour/styles and process, but according to Cunningham (1987), Kolb’s work was deficient in a number of ways: (a) as a reaction against theory based learning, there can be an over-value of experience based learning; (b) learning can be perceived to be based entirely on what others hand down and by selfreasoning; (c) research evidence does not support learning cycle theory: e.g., the cycle does not indicate how learners gain ability in learning. Neither does Kolb’s work consider learning strategy. The concept of learning strategy centres on the notion that the acquisition of knowledge in learning environments is very much related to the strategy through which a learner learns. Learning strategy is to do with controls and constraints. Examples of control features are a content index and a content map. Laurillard (1987) argues that constraint minimisation provides better results in learning than its maximisation. Constraints are apparent when learning goals are predefined for a learner, rather than allowing them to be learner-defined. How a learner understands the steps in a cycle of behaviour is another issue that we shall not consider here. If learning behaviour is stable then its scheduling process of these steps is controlled. Contrary to this, under chaos the scheduling process will be arbitrary. Let us suppose that the learning system passes from a condition of stability to one of chaos, and then back to one of stability. As stability is regained, a new metasystem arises so that the system has passed through a metamorphosis. To understand the nature of the new metasystem, we must explore the learning process a little further. 5.

The Domains and their Cognitive Properties

It is possible to develop what we call “cognitive properties” associated with each of the domains in figure 4, which clearly relate to the ideas of learning behaviour, learning strategy, and metalearning. We can apply the work of Habermas as explored by Jackson (1992) to our basic model, and its extensions developed by Yolles (1999). The work actually lies within the context of the complemenetary use of systems methodologies within management systems, but we can easily extend this. Associated with the behavioural domain is what Habermas (1970) calls cognitive interests. The organising domain has what Yolles calls cognitive purposes. Finally, there is the cognitive domain cognitive influences, as illustrated in table 1 (Yolles, 1999). The Habermasian classification of cognitive interest has technical and practical attributes. The former of these relates to work. In our context this can also be directly connected to Kolb’s behavioural phases of the learning process in figure 1, so that, the notion of work refers to the work of learning. The practical attribute is concerned with learners interaction within a learning process. These can also be related to Kolb’s ideas, and from Habermas’ perspective this should ideally be accompanied by emancipation in the way learning occurs to enable learners the opportunity to maximise their learning potential. Learning also occurs according to cognitive purpose, and the cybernetic attributes of this relate to intention by the strategic pursuit of learning goals and control processes. Rational and ideological attributes also affect cognitive learning purposes. Finally, cognitive influences can occur with respect to social, cultural or political attributes that guide learners to learn according to their embedded knowledges about learning (and metalearning). The social 9

attribute is connected to structures, processes (including facilitating technologies), and roles, and learning will have attributes that relate to this. Similarly one is able to identify cultural and political attributes, the meaning of these being relative to the nature of the learning situation that one is concerned with. Thus for instance, in the political nature of learning, polity is seen as being concerned with engineering the enablement of group form, condition of order, and related processes. It relates to the learning situation that a learner wishes to be in. Its commodity is power that determines who directs the learning process, and how it is directed. COGNITIVE LEARNING INTERESTS OF THE BEHAVIOURAL DOMAIN Technical Practical Critical Deconstraining Work as learning. This enables Learning interaction. This requires Emancipation. This enables people to (i) people to achieve goals and that people as individuals and groups liberate themselves from the learning generate material well-being. It in a social system learn to gain and constraints imposed by power structures (ii) involves technical ability to develop the possibilities of an learn through precipitation in social and undertake learning action in the understanding of each others political processes to control their own environment, and the ability to subjective views. It is consistent with destinies. make prediction and establish a practical interest in mutual control. understanding that can address disagreements, which can be a threat to the social form of life COGNITIVE PURPOSES OF LEARNING WITHIN THE ORGANISING DOMAIN Cybernetical Rational Ideological Learning intention. This is through Logico-relational. Enables learning Manner of thinking about learning. An the creation and strategic pursuit of source missions, goals, and aims to intellectual framework through which policy learning goals and aims that may be defined, and approached through makers observe and interpret reality that has a change over time, enables people planning. It involves logical, politically correct ethical and moral through learning control and relational, and rational abilities to orientation, provides an image of the future communications processes to organise thought and learning action that enables action through politically correct redirect their futures. and thus to define sets of possible strategic policy, and gives a politically correct systemic and learning behaviour view of stages of historical development in possibilities. respect of interaction with the external environment and related learning processes. COGNITIVE INFLUENCES ON LEARNING WITHIN THE COGNITIVE DOMAIN Social Cultural Political Formation. Enables Thinking. Influences occur from Freedom. Influences occur from knowledges individuals/groups to be influenced knowledges about learning that about learning that affect our polity by knowledges about learning that derive from the cognitive determined in part by how we think about the relate to our social environment. organisation (beliefs, attitudes, constraints on group and individual freedoms This has a consequence for our values) other worldviews. It to learn and in connextion with this to learning about social structures and ultimately determines how we learn organise and behave. It ultimately has impact processes that define our social to interact and defines our logicoon our learning related ideology and our forms that are related to our relational understandings. degree of emancipation. intentions and behaviours.

Table 1: Relationship between human cognitive interests, purpose, and influences Learning processes can occur at three levels: cognitive, strategic, and behavioural. The cognitive domain is knowledge related, some of this being the acquisition of knowledge about the learning process itself (metalearning). Part of this process also concerns planning as considered by Lester and Kroll (1990). It is through metalearning that an ability to develop learning strategy is developed that itself determines the nature of learning behaviour and associated style. Metalearning operates from a learner paradigm which has within it a learning system as its metaphorical “cognitive consciousness” that provides the system with direction 10

and guidance. Learning behaviour can therefore be seen as a manifestation of this. Thus, for instance, a learner (who may be an individual, a group of individuals, or an organisation), enters a learning situation. Learning strategy is determined from the learner’s metasystem, but is an organising process that ultimately determines behaviour. It is a result of cognitive purpose that Kroll (1988) refers to as metacognitition. It involves cybernetic and rational process that operate as transformations that may be subject to surprises, and that will constrain learning behaviour. As an example of this, learning strategy may break down, when the learning process become destabilised, and learning becomes an ad hoc affair. This can occur in situations of learning “chaos”. We are aware that according to VLM metalearning, learning strategy, and learning behaviour are all directly linked, and any change in one domain can directly affect the others. Thus for instance, suppose that a perturbation caused by the environment occurs in the domain of a learner’s learning strategy, then under the appropriate conditions we should see an affect in either learning behaviour and/or metalearning. In the event that these perturbations are very severe, then chaos can be induced and the learning system becomes divorced from its metasystem. This may appear to occur as an arbitrary learning behaviour from the perspective of a viewer. However, according to propositions by Yolles (1997d) that conform to chaos theory, a new metasystem may spontaneously arise that provides a metalearning basis for the new learning behaviour. Now, cognitive influences, purposes and interests are all analytically independent. They have been assembled together in the rows of Table 1, there being horizontal interactivity between the row attributes. The columns of this table are also analytically independent, and have vertical interactivity. Now, it is tempting to see the table as a typology, which will mean that we need to represent each column by a concept that we shall have to invent. To do so, let us propose that there are mutual commonalties in each column. Take the initial column first. The element in the first cell is practical cognitive interest that is a function of interaction. More simply we can discuss this element in terms of its functional attributes alone, as we can for whole table. Taken together with logico-relational processes and thinking, all contribute to a formative orientation of the learner that determines its present and future learning trajectories. In the second column, we have work, intention, and formation, and this gives the idea of something kinematic (“of motion considered abstractly”) that relates to movement of the learning process. Finally, in the third column, we have emancipation, manner of thinking, and freedom, suggesting that by releasing greater potential to learners, the possibility of greater learning viability is ultimately enabled. 6.

The Viable Learning Metasystem

Earlier we considered three objects of attention (a)-(c). For the VLM this suggests that there are also a triad of worldviews that in some way complement one another. Worldview complementarism has been critisised by what we have referred to as the “fundamentalists” of paradigm incommensurability (Yolles, 1999a) that suggests that worldviews cannot be made complementary since they conceptually or qualitatively different. Approaches to counter this have occurred using table 1. The nature of complementarism is of interest in this section, arguing that from it a worldview results that provides a learning model that the learner pursues. We can consider that each of these objects of attention is itself a viable system in its own right. In the case of (a), this means that the learner is able to be purposeful and adaptable in his or her learning behaviour, and is able to survive as a learner. In the case of (b) and (c), a learning source and target situation seen to form the basis of a viable system will have 11

associated with them groups of people who themselves form a viable learning organisation. As a consequence, each of the three objects of attention can be thought of as having cognitive, organising, and behavioural domains. Concentrating on the former of these for a moment, we can represent the embedded worldviews associated with each as in figure 6. The intention of this diagram is to illustrate that the three objects of attention can be:  kept analytically apart the relationship between the target situation, the inquirer, and the targeting methodology  clearly indicated that the processes of learning and learning sources influences are distinct. In te r a c tiv e s p a c e o f w o r ld v i e w s d e fi n i n g t h e m eta system o f lea rn in g P a ra d ig m (s) o f le a r n in g so u r c e

P a r a d ig m (s )/w o r ld v ie w (s ) o f ta r g e t s itu a tio n

W o r ld v ie w (s ) o f lea rn er

Figure 6: Learning triad defining an interactive space of worldviews and their knowledges The diagram is also intended to highlight the idea that in learning situations:  the worldviews of the actors in a situation are seen as an abstract property  learning involves a learner with a worldview (or worldviews for a plural inquirer)  there is an interaction and influence between the formalised worldview(s) of a learning source, the worldviews of a learner, and the target situation through their cultures and “truths”. The context of the situation can be defined within a framework of thought that constructs these three objects of attention as its orthogonalities against which changes in one can be related to the other. This visulaisation is not unlike traditional approaches where independent but related variables (e.g. space and time) are graphed one against another within a frame of reference to enable changes (e.g., velocity) to be represented. Part of our interest here is to argue that learning can be represented as a viable system, and we do this through a direct translation from systems theory to the learning domain. Thus the explanations that we propose will be subject to experimental varification, yet to come. The precepts that define a viable learning system will involve the arguement that a metasystem can be formed that is manifested as a purposeful adaptive learning system that can evolve according to the principles of viable systems theory as proposed by Schwarz (1994). The formation of a cognitive domain as represented in figure 3 requires the creation of shared paradigms through the establishment of a common cognitive model. This enables at least some of the knowledge of a learner to be used to apply at least some of the knowledge of a learning source to at least some of the knowledge of the worldviews that make up a target situation. The selection of knowledge comes from the frame of reference that enables a learner to learn within a given context.

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We think in terms of systems having learning structure and related behaviour. Then the cognitive domain can be thought of as forming a metasystem that directs learning into complex target situations, and that we have earlier referred to as metalearning. When the learning metasystem couples with a system we refer to it as a purposive in its learning behaviour. If the three apexes of worldview do not relate to each other in a common model, then the triad of figure 6 is not seen to form the basis of a systemic learning process. As a result, the learning process will be seen to be composed of an arbitrary selection and application of learning to the target situation. Some might refer to it as illustrating a misunderstanding of a learning material, of a target situation that manifests as behaviour what has been learned, of source learning, or of the application of the latter to the former. Any learning behaviour that results from a strategic learning process will likely be meaningless and of little value. When a learning process falls into chaos, it loses its connection with the learning metasystem, and in response to stimulus from a target situation the learning process behaves spontaneously in a way that is structure determined. To understand this, we can say that if a learner’s structural approach is defined as an ordered set of procedural steps of learning, then only these steps are available for selection in that order by an inquirer making an inquiry. In the formation of a viable learning system, we have proposed three objects of attention to be required. Each has its worldview, but together they do not define a whole metasystem. What functions as a metasystem is a disconnected and disjointed set of worldviews that simply contributes to the confusion of chaos. It is only when the objects of attention come together by forming a whole metasystem that defines purpose, that the system will be able to achieve and maintain that purpose. The emerging metasystem occurs through the formation of a virtual paradigm that may endure for the duration of the inquiry into the situation. Three functions of the metasystem are that it will: 1. define a shared worldview that enables a structured learning approach to be applied to a situation by a learner meaningfully, 2. constrain the learner by use of a structured learning approach 3. control the selection or use of structured learning to make it appropriate for the target situation, having care in how the learning is applied to the situation. The first of these results come through the creation of a virtual paradigm that formalises a learner’s approach. Part of this process is to define the purposes of a learner. This comes from the learner’s understanding of the actors’ view(s) of the target situation, the mission and goals of the structured learning, and his own purposes in applying the learned knowledge and skills to the target situation. Within the learning process, a learner will adopt a set of propositions from the different worldviews that represents its “truths” and enables knowledges to be recognised. In structured learning situations this is guided by the selection of a learning approach such as illustrated in table 1, or a circumstantial one that comes through action learning. In the former case the learning content is directed by the institution, while in action learning it is directed by the circumstances of the target situation. Sometimes it can also be a result of both of these as in cooperative learning, where we see the target situation as being the cooperative group. The idea that there are three autonomous worldviews in interaction is complexified because the worldviews attached to each autonomous apex of figure 6 are themselves likely to be 13

plural. This means that there may be many worldviews in a target situation that must be addressed, that the learner may be a group that involves a number of worldviews, and that the paradigm that defines learning content may also be pluralistic. The nature of cooperative learning (Yazdani and English, 1997; Yolles, 1997a and 1997b) may be of particular interest since it consists of a plurality of learner worldviews. The group assembles, and the individuals more or less together form a set of common cognitive purposes within a single frame of reference defined within a virtual (or working) paradigm that enables them to work together (more or less) as a team. Group behaviour is possible because of the formation of a shared weltanschauungen. This occurs through a common cognitive model that enables meaning to be shared. Its boundaries are defined as a frame of reference for group behaviour. The individual weltanschauungen are maintained, though through association there may well be a learning process in which weltanschauungen are changed in some way. If failure of a group process occurs, then one explanation is through weltanschauung incommensurability. In any situation, worldview plurality can occur with respect to both the informal and formal worldviews of an organisation. There is always an interaction between weltanschauungen and paradigms in the same way as there is between different weltanschauungen and different paradigms. The plurality of informal worldviews is often ignored by supposing that there is a consensus in a situation. Often, little is done to determine what the consensus actually means in a given context, and whether it has any value in respect of an intervention strategy. With respect to formal worldviews, it is normally the dominant paradigm that is referred to during an inquiry. This can also be seen as a supraparadigm of the organisation. 7.

Conclusion

In this paper we have attempted to show that learning situations can be seen as viable learning systems. Consequently, it is possible to see learners within a given definable context having properties of viable systems, including purposefulness, adaptability, and learning survivability. It also provides the opportunity of discussing such problems as complexity, chaos, and evolutionary learning within this context. More, it offers the possibility of encompassing and developing existing learning theory, subject to experimental evidence that the propositions of viable system do indeed operate. 8.

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Stellung

des

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Kosmos.:

Nymphenburger

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