From Environmental To Ecological Sociology

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From Environmental to Ecological Sociology By Dr. Gary Bowden Sociology, University of New Brunswick-Fredericton

Paper presented at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the Australian Sociology Association, LaTrobe University, December 8-11, 2004 Published in: In K. Richmond (Ed.) TASA 2004: Proceedings of the Australian Sociology Association, December 2004.

Contact information: Email: [email protected] Mailing address: Department of Sociology, University of New Brunswick, PO Box 4400, Fredericton, NB, Canada, E3B 5A3

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From Environmental to Ecological Sociology Abstract The rise and institutionalization of environmental sociology represents one of the most significant changes to the discipline of the past quarter century. Underlying this success, however, is a deeper question: Do these developments represent the first step down a longer path toward more fundamental theoretical change or have the changes to date delivered us to the promised land? Riley Dunlap (2002), one of the sub-discipline‟s founders and most tireless advocates, recently argued the latter position. The three sections of this paper combine to argue the former, that fundamental theoretical change is still required. The first section distinguishes between environmental and ecological sociology and advocates the latter. The second section examines current sociological theorizing about the environment and concludes that the label “environmental sociology” accurately describes the current state of affairs. The third section identifies three theoretical disputes that have, in the past, prevented the development of ecological sociology. Recent scholarship has resolved these debates, thus paving the way for the development of ecological sociology, the characteristics of which are briefly described. Distinguishing Environmental and Ecological Sociology A quarter century ago, William Catton and Riley Dunlap wrote a series of articles defining environmental sociology (Catton and Dunlap 1978a; 1978b; 1980; Dunlap and Catton 1979; 1983; 1994). Frustrated with perceived deficiencies in then contemporary sociological practice, they argued that sociology should examine the relationship between society and the biophysical environment. This link was overlooked, they argued, because the taken-for-granted assumptions of mainstream sociology led the discipline to ignore

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the biophysical environment. To rectify the situation, they advocated a new paradigm based on an alternative set of background assumptions. A close reading of Catton and Dunlap‟s publications shows two distinct definitions of environmental sociology: one methodological and the other paradigmatic. In contrast to Dunlap and Catton, I do not see the two definitions as alternative ways of rendering the same thing. Instead, I wish 1) to draw a distinction between environmental sociology (defined methodologically) and ecological sociology (defined paradigmatically) and 2) to argue that present thinking conflates the two. Methodologically, Catton and Dunlap (1978a: 44) defined environmental sociology as the “study of interaction between the environment and society.” Studies using social variables as both cause and effect, for example the examination of social class distinctions in public opinion toward the environment, merely transferred the gaze of traditional sociological theory to a new substantive area – attitudes about the natural environment. In contrast, Dunlap and Catton argued for the inclusion of both environmental and social variables as cause and/or effect. Such studies, for example of the impact of social class on environmental degradation or of energy shortages on society, they viewed as „real‟ environmental sociology. Such studies were exceptionally rare in the 1970‟s, they argued (Catton and Dunlap 1978a; 1978b; 1980), because Western society was premised upon a particular set of background assumptions – the Dominant Western Worldview (see column 1 of Table 1). Traditional sociology emerged out of this tradition and, hence, shared a set of related background assumptions, the Human Exceptionalism Paradigm (see Column 2 of Table 1). In other words, they described a sociological paradigm based upon a shared

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anthropocentrism that – irrespective of particular theoretical orientation (Marxist, functionalist, symbolic interactionist, or whatever) – led sociologists to treat modern societies as „exempt‟ from ecological constraints. In contrast to these existing paradigms, they advocated an environmental sociology that embodied a new set of assumptions (Column 3 of Table 1). Thus, the second definition defines a set of background assumptions comprising the paradigmatic structure of environmental sociology. Table 1 highlights three significant differences between the two conceptualizations of “environmental sociology.” First, the paradigmatic definition is more elaborate and precise. In addition to the methodological element of the first definition (the assumption about social causation), the paradigmatic definition includes several other assumptions. Second, the nature of those additional assumptions – particularly those about society – significantly shift the focus from environment to ecology (i.e., from the biophysical realm to a particular systemic conceptualization of the biophysical realm). Recognizing this, Catton and Dunlap, who had originally labeled the NEP the “New Environmental Paradigm” (Catton and Dunlap 1978a), renamed it the “New Ecological Paradigm” (Dunlap and Catton 1979:250) to emphasize the ecological foundation of society. Third, language of paradigms and paradigm change, invokes Kuhn‟s famous work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962).

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Table 1: Major Assumptions of the Dominant Western Worldview, Sociology’s Human Exemptionalism Paradigm, and the New Ecological Paradigm. Dominant Western Worldview (DWW)

Human Exemptionalism Paradigm (HEP)

New Ecological Paradigm (NEP)

Assumptions about the nature of human beings

People are fundamentally different from all other creatures on Earth, over which they have dominion.

Humans have a cultural heritage in addition to (and distinct from) their genetic inheritance, and thus are quite unlike all other animal species.

Despite exceptional characteristics, humans remain one among many species that are interdependently involved in the global ecosystem.

Assumptions about social causation

People are masters of their destiny; they can choose their goals and learn to do whatever is necessary to achieve them.

Social and cultural factors (including technology) are the major determinants of human affairs.

Human affairs are influenced not only by social and cultural factors, but also by intricate linkages of cause, effect, and feedback in the web of nature

Assumptions about the context of human society

The world is vast, and thus provides unlimited opportunities for humans.

Social and cultural environments are the crucial context for human affairs, and the biophysical environment is largely irrelevant.

Humans live in and dependent on a finite biophysical environment that imposes potent physical and biological restraints on human affairs.

Assumptions about constraints on human society

The history of humanity is one of progress; for every problem there is a solution, and thus progress need never cease.

Culture is cumulative; thus technological and social progress can continue indefinitely, making all problems ultimately soluble.

Although human inventiveness may appear to temporarily extend carrying capacity limits, ecological laws cannot be repealed.

(adapted from Dunlap 2002:333)

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Thus, Catton and Dunlap‟s work suggests three distinct visions of sociological practice: traditional sociology, environmental sociology (the methodological definition) and ecological sociology (the paradigmatic definition). The conceptual differences among them can be clarified by a simple visual representation. Think of two colored circles, one yellow and one blue, separated by an empty space. The yellow circle represents the social sphere; the blue circle represents the natural sphere. Traditional sociology (the HEP) operates like a set of colored glasses that obscures the blue circle and, hence, sociological theorizing ignores the biophysical environment. Environmental sociology, the methodological definition imploring sociology to take the biophysical environment (and its interactions with society) into account, removes those glasses. We now see both circles and, in addition, the arrows of causation (representing interactions between the two spheres) flowing between them. Note, however, that expanding the perspective to include the natural sphere does not necessitate a fundamental overhaul of the way the social is theorized (it continues to exist as an autonomous, identifiable yellow circle). In contrast, the paradigmatic definition (ecological sociology) argues that each sphere is, in part, embedded within the other. This can be visualized as two overlapping circles, one yellow and one blue. Embedding the spheres within each other has two significant implications. First, the shapes of the yellow and blue circles are altered (they each have a bite taken out of them by the overlap). Second, a new region (the green area created by the blending of the yellow and blue in the overlapped area) is created. Stated in theoretical terms, paradigm change involves a significant modification of a disciplines conceptual apparatus (the change in shape of the yellow area). In addition, seeing the two spheres as embedded (rather than interacting) focuses attention on the possibility of a

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new type of emergent phenomenon (e.g., phenomenon such as global warming that emerge from the blending of the two spheres) represented by the green area. The Current State of Environmental Sociology Which of the three representations best describes current practice? Looking over the developments of the past 25 years, several things are evident. First, sociological studies of the nature-society connection have been institutionalized as part of a recognized sub-discipline, complete with journals and scholarly associations. Second, as a series of recent theoretical reviews have noted (Dunlap et al 2002: 3-32; Redclift and Woodgate 1997; Buttel 1996; Dunlap 1997), theoretical diversity among self-identified environmental sociologists has increased over time. Indeed, the variety of theories in environmental sociology closely approximates the various theoretical traditions present in the discipline as a whole: Marxist, Durkheimian, Weberian, world-systems, social constructionist (for examples of each of these, and others, see Dunlap et al 2002). Third, there exists a general consensus that theory development in the field has occurred; through a process of “greening” previously existing theories (Dunlap et al 2002: 3-32; Redclift and Woodgate 1997; Buttel 1996; Dunlap 1997). In other words, the core of each of the previously existing theories has remained fundamentally intact. The modifications have occurred through a process of extension – i.e., integrating previously ignored concerns into the fabric of the existing theories. This is the equivalent of the second alternative (environmental sociology) described above. The basic outline of sociology‟s theories – be it social constructivist approaches, Marxist perspectives, cultural studies, or whatever – as represented by the yellow circle remain unchanged.

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Without denying the significance of these developments, it is erroneous to claim, as Dunlap (2002) does, that the greening of sociological theory constitutes a Kuhnian paradigm shift (see Bowden 2004 for an elaboration of this point). On the other hand, self-identified environmental sociologists tend to embrace the assumptions of the NEP and, as a result, see themselves as working within a paradigm that differs from that of traditional sociology. How can we explain this apparent contradiction: the objective fact that the emergence of environmental sociology has not caused a paradigm revolution within sociological theory juxtaposed against the belief of environmental sociologists that they employ a different paradigm? A close examination of Column 3 of Table 1 provides the answer. The defining characteristic of the NEP is a concept borrowed from biology – the notion of carrying capacity – or the existence of biophysical limits on human society. By removing sociology‟s colored glasses, environmental sociologists have become aware of, and adopted, ideas from outside the traditional discipline, specifically the biologist‟s concept of carrying capacity. Thus, environmental sociologists have embraced biology‟s orientation toward scarcity (in contrast to the economic conception traditionally held by the discipline) while “greening” sociological theory rather than radically revising it. The fact that environmental sociology did not bring about a paradigm change does not mitigate the need for change. Several recent empirical studies concluded that systems combining people and nature are not the same thing as the interaction of autonomous social and natural systems (Gunderson and Holling 2002: 121-146, 195-240). More specifically, they argue that social and natural systems are involved in a process of coevolution (Holling 1994). This concept implies the need for an integrative framework that

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encompasses both the natural and the social, i.e., for ecological sociology. But such theoretical development has yet to occur. Why? Three Theoretical Disputes and The Developments That Resolved Them Three theoretical disputes have acted as barriers to the paradigm change necessary for the emergence of ecological sociology: the division between economic optimists and neo-Malthusians, the division between realists and social constructivists, and the inadequate and discredited conception of system characterizing most sociology. In each case, recent developments have removed resolved these debates and paved the way for paradigm change. As noted above, the distinction between the HEP and the NEP reflects a division between economic and biological conceptions of scarcity. The economic optimists argue that social arrangements – typically free markets, science and liberal democracy – provide the institutional arrangements that allow humans to solve any problem they confront. Economic markets raise capital and provide incentives for entrepreneurs to solve problems; science provides knowledge about the functioning of the natural world, knowledge that can be applied to the problem; and democracy allows participation by wider segments of the public, thus enhancing the probability that a solution will be found. In contrast, the neo-Malthusian tainted NEP holds that the demand for resources, stemming from population growth and the increasing standard of living, grows exponentially while the ability to provide them grows arithmetically. As a result, there exist strict biophysical limits on resource supply – the carrying capacity of an ecosystem or the biosphere.

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This argument was recently resolved by Homer-Dixon (1999). Where the economic optimists and neo-Malthusians argued past one another, holding that the key claims of the other side were false, Homer-Dixon recognized that both groups offered partial truths and developed a theory integrating the insights from both. He accomplished this by shifting the discussion from a focus on scarcity to an analysis of whether or not we can supply the requisite ingenuity and identifying the factors relevant to determining society‟s supply of and requirement for ingenuity. A second conundrum involved sociology‟s debate between realist and constructionist ontology. Chronologically paralleling the rise of environmental sociology was another development – the sociology of scientific knowledge – which treated scientific conclusions as just another socially constructed knowledge claim (Latour and Woolgar 1979). Many environmental sociologists, however, took a strong realist view; science legitimized the existence of environmental problems and the need for remedial action. These debates culminated in the science wars (Parsons and Long 2003). Since that time, researchers on both sides have moved toward a common middle ground. See, for example, the „critical realism‟ of Collier (1994) or the „realist constructivism‟ of Murphy (2002). Even Bruno Latour now claims that “things strike back” and, in recognition of this, has added “a realist social philosophy of science” to the “old tired theme of social construction” (Latour 2000: 115, 114). The third limiting factor involves sociology‟s traditional attitude toward system thinking. In the late 1970‟s, when Dunlap and Catton were advancing their ideas, sociological theorists were engaged in an Oedipal rejection of functionalism, the dominant tradition of an earlier generation of theorists. In the process of throwing out the

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functionalist bath water, the discipline also threw out the baby – any discussion of system. Functionalism treated social systems as a self-regulating equilibrium in which, when confronted with pressure to change, a mechanism acts to restore the system to a state of balance. This approach, exemplified in the highly influential work of Parsons (1951), was beset with a number of problems; an excessively rigid relationship between parts and the whole and an inability to deal with either a) sudden change or b) diversity. Unable to overcome the objections, sociology largely abandon systems theorizing (Walby 2004: 1-9). That was not the case in other disciplines. Updated versions of systems theory, notably the idea of complex adaptive systems (Byrne 1998; Holland 2000; Kauffman 1995), overcome the objections leveled against traditional systems thought in sociology and are now being applied to social systems (Walby 2004). The most promising such theory, Holling‟s (2001) notion of a panarchy, outlines a common framework for the explanation of social, economic and ecological systems while recognizing the distinctive nature of social systems (Gunderson and Holling 2002: 103-120). With the disputes resolved, the guiding principals of an ecological sociology become apparent: 1) a model of human nature – human‟s as problem-solvers – predicated upon what is ecologically unique about our species (we are adaptive generalists rather than adapted to the specifics of a particular ecological niche) (see Homer-Dixon 2001: 191-220) and 2) a model of co-evolving natural and social systems premised upon that model of human nature. Such a conceptualization would integrate the social and ecological demands for energy flows (social organization requires energy inputs to overcome the tendency toward disorganization implicit in the second law of

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thermodynamics) with the differential cycling present in natural systems (water, carbon, etc.) and social systems (the information necessary for problem-solving). While not totally foreign to current theory (Meyerowitz 1985), an information processing model of society differs substantially from more traditional models (e.g., Marxist class conflict) and, hence, will involve a true paradigm shift within sociology.

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